Victory Is Not Enough by Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer; War and the Psychological Conditionsof Peace by William BrownReview by: Phillips BradleyThe American Political Science Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jun., 1943), pp. 543-545Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1948949 .

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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES 543

of the Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940. From Peking in the days immediately before and after Lukouchiao, he takes his readers to war- encircled Shanghai, to Hongkong with its profiteers and refugees, to bombed but undaunted Chungking, and to Yenan, where, at the head- quarters of the famous Eighth Route Army, he renewed his earlier ac- quaintance with Mao Tse-tung and other Communist leaders. Along with such military matters as bombings, guerrilla tactics, and the strategy of "scorched earth," the author also discusses China's industrial cooperatives, the character of Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese leaders, relations between the Communists and the Kuomintang, Japan's plans for a "New Order," the short-sighted folly of American and British policy in the Far East, and various other factors essential to an understanding of the gen- eral situation.

In the course of his discussion, Mr. Snow's own views and conclusions are supplemented by views expressed by various Chinese leaders, and of all these quoted comments the most striking is the following from an interview with Mao Tse-tung in September, 1939:

"At that time Mao also predicted that the Japanese would not enter the European war, but would attempt to compel the Western Powers to help force a decision on China. Only after Japan had wrung sufficient appeasement from Britain and America to weaken their own political and military position in the Far East, he believed, would she proceed to move on Indo-China, the Dutch Indies, and finally the Philippines. Mao said that the British would seek to 'stop the war in China,' and once he said that Chamberlain considered it necessary 'to sacrifice China in order to make an ally of Japan.' He also anticipated that, in the event of a Brit- ish or American attempt at a Far Eastern Munich, a Russo-Japanese non- agression pact might follow- 'on condition that it would not interfere with Soviet support for China.'

Even in February, 1941, when the first edition of this book appeared, Mao's comments still contained a large measure of unfulfilled, but accu- rate, prophesy. G. NYE STEIGER.

Simmons College.

Victory Is Not Enough. BY EGON RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 1943. Pp. 322. $3.00.)

War and the Psychological Conditions of Peace. BY WILLIAM BROWN. (Lon- don: A. and C. Black, Ltd. 1942. Pp. viii, 144. 7s. 6d.) The first of these books provides a blueprint for peace-making-against

the background of a brief but penetrating psychological analysis of the breakdown of the peace constructed at Versailles. The author, an Austrian by birth and a participant in the last war as an Austrian airman, has had

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544 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

an interesting career as journalist, diplomat, and League of Nations offi- cial. He now teaches in this country. He is, therefore, well equipped to discuss from first-hand experience the disintegration of the democratic superstructure after the peace resulting from the impact of deep-rooted forces in the life of central Europe.

Dr. Ranshofen-Wertheimer's approach is primarily social and psycho- logical; there is relatively little analysis from the economic and political viewpoints, although he does not ignore the factors more commonly con- sidered in appraising the postwar events of the past quarter-century. About one-third of the book is devoted to a study of the psychological causes of the defeat of the Versailles peace-within Germany and among the vic- torious Powers. He believes that the defeat began at Versailles itself, in the contradiction between the Anglo-American and the Continental con- ceptions of the conditions and purposes of world organization. He goes on to portray the failure of the Weimar government as the tension between the idealism of the Social Democratic leaders and their practical inca- pacity to assess and guide the emotional reaction of the German masses to defeat. The fall of France is similarly interpreted as fundamentally the result of the spiritual revolution toward religion and against the failures of the democratic regimes to cope with internal economic and social questions. In all of these cases, the author stresses the feeling of the peoples rather than any single event or succession of incidents as the inner core of the breakdown of peace in our time.

As to future peace-making, the author applies the same index of psycho- logical criteria to his specific prescriptions. His major thesis is that a European federation must be established, with a monopoly of force and of economic power to insure the status quo in any future outbreak. If peace is to last, a more accurate appraisal of the dominant forces in Europe must be made than was made in 1918. He believes that two tendencies, apparently contradictory but capable of being harnessed, will reassert themselves after this war-socialist radicalism and traditional conserva- tism. Both trends are already discernible; unless account is taken of each, stabilization will be impossible. He makes a strong case for recognizing- and channelling-conservative forces in order to rebuild the foundations of a spiritual order and a civic consciousness in the conquered countries as well as in the fascist states.

His formula for the treatment of Germany after the war is not new, but is buttressed by the cogency of native judgment. He advocates a com- plete military occupation and the immediate installation of foreign ad- ministrative control, manned chiefly by Americans. Local administration should be firm rather than always right; it should enforce its decisions without consulting the desires of the people. Control should be maintained long enough to insure an effective mass-reeducation of the entire people. Advisers, drafted from those expelled by Hitler (not by any means pre-

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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES 545

dominantly a Jewish group), would provide the necessary link between knowledge of domestic conditions and effective control. Only so, he be- lieves, will the German people be able to reorient their own life toward integration into a peaceful Europe.

Dr. Ranshofen-Wertheimer's study is highly suggestive to political scientists. His emphasis of the psychological factors. in and conditions of postwar peacemaking, although not entirely new, is of special importance in a period when many either ignore their significance or deal with them without an adequate background in European thought. That background is here portrayed with insight and objectivity, from experience in gov- ernment and in its observation from the press gallery. It is one of the most revealing interpretations of postwar problems that has as yet ap- peared for Americans from a European pen.

Dr. Brown's slim volume attacks the same problem in more general terms and from a more specifically psychoanalytical viewpoint. Many readers will be put off from further perusal by his reiterated defense of Chamberlain at Munich. The real merit of his comments on the causes of war and the conditions of peace is also obscured by the form in which the essays appear, as lectures and letters to The Times. Behind the screen, however, there is much to ponder. Not since Edward Glover's War, Sad- ism, and Pacifism has so searching a study of the roots of conflict, personal and national, appeared.

Much of the book revolves around the psychology-or psychosis-of Nazi nationalism, domestic and international. Dr. Brown's comments are both informed and acute; he speaks from experience in the last war as well as in this. He links the innate ambivalence in the individual with that displayed in the international policies of states. He believes that, until statesmen and citizens understand the relations between their con- scious motivations and their unconscious drives, there is little hope for peace. We must substitute positive values and objectives for our present negative defenses against the sense of fear or of inferiority before we can develop the psychological foundations for peace. Only on such a basis can we understand the mentality of the Germans-or of ourselves. It is greatly to be hoped that the author will elaborate his penetrating study into a more rounded manual for the peacemakers of tomorrow; no area of action deserves greater attention than the one outlined in this brief essay.

PHILLIPS BRADLEY.

Queens College.

Vichy; Two Years of Deception. BY LAON MARCHAL. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1943. Pp. vi, 251. $2.50.)

The regime of Marshal P6tain has been enveloped in obscurity. Not- withstanding all the books and articles, personalities have remained enig-

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