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The experience of law enforcement and the Muslim,Arab, and Sikh communities in Greater Boston is sig-nificantly different from their experience in eitherSoutheastern Michigan or Southern California. For thepurposes of this study, the Greater Boston Area encom-passes Suffolk, Middlesex, and Norfolk counties.According to the 2000 US Census, these three countiescover an area of 1,282 square miles and have on average16,000 people per square mile.

DESCRIPTION OF COMMUNITYWhile defining the exact size and composition of

American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh populations is com-plicated and at times controversial,176 it is important forthe purposes of this study to define the relative size ofthese populations in each of the study sites in order tocontextualize their experiences. In terms of the Sikh andMuslim communities, there is no government censusdata collected. Community estimates indicate that theSikh community is relatively small, (approximately2,000-4,000 persons in Eastern Massachusetts), dis-persed, and disproportionately made up of profession-als. There are two gurdwaras in Greater Boston and onein Milford, Worcester County, which also draws partici-pants from Greater Boston. In terms of the Muslim com-munity, while there are not exact numbers for GreaterBoston, there are approximately 40 mosques or IslamicCenters in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and anestimated 25,000-35,000 Muslims.177 While estimateson the Arab community vary widely, ranging from53,000 to 175,000 people, it is clear that this communi-ty comprises less than 1% of the population of the entireCommonwealth of Massachusetts. According to theArab American Institute, there is an estimated Arab-American population of 175,000 with MiddlesexCounty housing 21% of the state’s Arab-American pop-ulation.178

Because these communities are relatively small,national community organizations have not prioritizedthis region in terms of distributing national resources.Therefore, unlike Southeastern Michigan and SouthernCalifornia, in Massachusetts there is no chapter of CAIRand the ADC chapter is still in its nascent stages ofdevelopment. In addition to the lack of robust commu-nity organizations, there is not a clear consensus withinthe diverse and dispersed Massachusetts Muslim, Araband Sikh communities that investing the time and

resources necessary to establish an ongoing dialoguewith law enforcement is necessarily a high priority.Further, there is no coordinating group that effectivelyoversees or organizes the local community groups thatdo exist.

Because of these factors, much of the law enforce-ment and government outreach in Massachusetts hasbeen initiated and maintained through the work of spe-cific individuals rather than community-based organiza-tions. As previously discussed, Boston has a long histo-ry of community organizing and policing and there arestrong chapters of other national civil rights organiza-tions such as the ACLU. However, prior to September11th these organizations had not worked closely with theMuslim, Arab, or Sikh communities.

Several additional unique factors are present in theGreater Boston communities. Because of the large uni-versity base in this area, a large proportion of these com-munities are comprised of a transient academic popula-tion. Further, these communities are ethnically diverse,including a significant African American Muslim popu-lation and a Caucasian Sikh community.

While these communities are small in GreaterBoston and historically have not been part of a compre-hensive community-policing strategy, followingSeptember 11th these communities and law enforcementwere compelled to increase their interactions. The cata-lyst for this interaction were two precipitating factors: 1)two of the planes hijacked on September 11th originatedfrom Boston’s Logan Airport, thus Boston became theepicenter of the initial stages of the response efforts andinvestigations (PENTTBOMB); 2) national directiveshave focused law enforcement efforts on Muslim, Arab,Sikh communities nationwide. Although these commu-nities in Greater Boston are relatively small and notpolitically organized, they are large enough to draw theattention of law enforcement in its efforts to implementnational directives. Further, it is worth examining theGreater Boston area because it is representative of thevast majorities of communities in the United Stateswhich have a relatively small and dispersed communitybases.

DESCRIPTION OF LAW ENFORCEMENTAs discussed at length in the “Why Partner?” chap-

ter of this guide, Boston has a significant place in thehistory of community policing. While this history is

VII. The Greater Boston Experience

176Defining the size of these communities can be controversial because there is disagreement about the accuracy of U.S. Census data as itrelates to the American Arab community (many feel the Census numbers underestimate the size of the population). Defining the size of theMuslim and Sikh communities is complicated because religious affiliation is not accounted for in the U.S. Census and therefore in order toassess the overall size of these communities it is necessary to rely on a compilation of information acquired form community organizations andacademics.177Hassan Abbas, Visiting Research Fellow, Harvard Law School, received via e-mail on 4/12/04. 178Arab American Demographics, Arab American Institute, at: http://www.aaiusa.org/demographics.htm, accessed on 4/15/04.

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nimportant, it is equally important to note that theseefforts in the past were focused primarily on state andlocal law enforcement and, by and large, the AfricanAmerican, Latino and Asian communities.179

Additionally, while Boston’s reputation for local com-munity policing is well-established and renownednationwide, local and national media as well as parts ofthe public-at-large take a skeptical view of federal lawenforcement in Boston due primarily to the WhiteyBulger case that stems from the 1980s.180 While thisskeptical view may be inappropriate under current cir-cumstances, it remains an operational reality for lawenforcement in Massachusetts. Current federal lawenforcement executives report, however, that “the resultof the Bulger case has in no way deterred the FBI orUSAO efforts in terrorism.”181

Like the community in Greater Boston, which is dis-persed, federal law enforcement has responsibility for awide geographic region including Maine, NewHampshire, and Massachusetts. After September 11th

this already thinly stretched federal law enforcementteam was further challenged by its central role in theSeptember 11th response and investigation. Nationwide,the FBI “covered over 500,000 investigative leads andconducted over 167,000 interviews.”182 Because theBoston field office played a large role in this investiga-tion, one can extrapolate the huge demands placed onthis office after September 11th. Specifically, not onlydid two of the hijacked flights depart from Boston’sLogan Airport but also one group of hijackers, includingMuhammad Atta, took a connecting flight out ofPortland, Maine and his suitcase which contained a sui-cide note, did not make the transition and was recoveredat Boston’s Logan Airport.

POST SEPTEMBER 11TH INITIATIVESBecause the Greater Boston area lacks active com-

munity-based organizations or a formal means of com-munity–law enforcement communication, much of theproductive interaction between law enforcement and thecommunity has been initiated and maintained at theindividual level. After the September 11th attacks, therewere a number of proactive efforts on the part of suchindividuals. Since they were initiated by individuals,

however, these efforts were sporadic and neither sys-temic nor institutionalized.

The Sikh CommunityMuch of the Greater Boston Sikh community’s

response to September 11th backlash was led by volun-teer members of the Sikh community, including NavjeetSingh of the Sikh Mediawatch and Resource Task Force(SMART). Singh explains that the catalyst for his com-munity’s action was the arrest of a young Sikh-American named Sher J.B. Singh by police inProvidence, Rhode Island. On September 12th, 2001,law enforcement officials boarded an Amtrak trainsearching for four “suspicious” men who reportedly hadknowledge of the September 11th attacks.183 Aftersearching Sher J.B. Singh, who was traveling fromBoston to Virginia to return home after a business trip,police arrested him on the criminal charge of carrying aconcealed weapon. The alleged “weapon” was a kirpan,which is a small religious sword carried by initiatedSikhs. While the FBI quickly realized that this case wasnot terrorism-related, the Providence Police Departmentcontinued to pursue it.184 The charges against Sher J.B.Singh were dropped more than a month later after muchoutcry from the Sikh community as well as the broadercivil rights communities, particularly religious andinterfaith organizations in Rhode Island.

According to Navjeet Singh, this incident demon-strated to the Sikh communities in New England exact-ly how vulnerable they were after September 11th andemphasized the need for action. The community’s firstresponse to the arrest was to organize through the localgurdwaras and through an informal network of friendsand acquaintances of Sher J.B. Singh to secure his bail.Members of the community spent the next two dayscalling and writing letters to the media, political con-tacts, and the ACLU with the dual objective of persuad-ing the government to drop the charges and stopping thenegative media attention focused on Sher J.B. Singh.

Immediately after the September 11th attacks, Singhwas in contact with the national office of SMART tocollaborate on a proactive programming strategy both inregards to the Sher J.B. Singh incident and the generalbacklash experienced by the community. On the Sunday

179While the United States Attorney’s Office in Massachusetts along with local District Attorney’s Offices and the Office of the AttorneyGeneral have historically been involved in the development and implementation of several community-policing related initiatives (the Weed andSeed site in Grove Hall for example), in terms of enforcement, the initiatives focused on the Boston Police Department not the FBI or otherfederal enforcement agencies.180In the 1970’s renowned mobster Whitey Bulger became an informant for the FBI in Boston. It has since come to light that some within theFBI-Boston secretly protected Bulger and his organization while working with him to dismantle his rival organization, La Cosa Nostra. Currentand former employees of federal law enforcement in Massachusetts report that the Bulger case and the ongoing attention it receives from thelocal and national media color the way they, and many of their colleagues, are viewed by the public.181Memo from Assistant United States Attorney Michael Ricciuti to Sasha O’Connell regarding: Partnering for Prevention and CommunitySafety: Draft of Boston Chapter; 4/23/04.182Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee: “The Inspector General’s Report and the September 11th Response”, Michael E. Rolince,Acting Assistant Director in Charge, FBI 6/24/03 at: http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress03/rolince062403.htm accessed on 4/15/04. 183Tom Mooney, “Sikh Won’t be Prosecuted”, The Providence Journal, 10/26/01, at:http://www.sikhcoalition.org/news.asp?mainaction=viewnews&newsid=126 accessed on 4/12/04.184Interview with Navjeet Singh, Representative, Sikh Mediawatch and Resource Taskforce (SMART), 4/1/04.

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nfollowing the attacks and the Amtrak incident, at reli-gious services at the gurdwara, Singh and other commu-nity members developed a plan of action for local com-munities. This plan included proactively reaching out totown governments, local and state police departments,and schools to introduce themselves and their commu-nities at large. Groups of community members living inneighboring towns and cities were asked to contact localgovernment, law enforcement and/or school officials,and the community was advised to actively and publiclyparticipate in town halls and September 11th vigils.Singh, his family, and other Sikhs, for example, intro-duced themselves to their local police department, theBoard of Selectman in Shrewsbury, and the State Policein Framingham. According to Singh, Sikh students atBoston University led this effort in Boston the gurdwarain Millis took the lead there, and other Sikh familiestook the lead in their own and neighboring communities.This effort resulted in very positive interactions, andevents such as an awareness panel organized at theWestboro schools.185

The Muslim CommunityOne segment of the Muslim community that has

been particularly active in Greater Boston in relation tolaw enforcement outreach is the Pakistani-Americancommunity. Pakistani-Americans number approximate-ly 5,000 in the Greater Boston area, thereby represent-ing about 15-25% of the entire Muslim population in thearea.186 This community worked proactively to mitigatethe potential negative effects of the nationally mandatedNSEERS, or special registration program (see AppendixD), which affected a large number of immigrant popula-tions.

The local community’s response to NSEERS waslargely coordinated by Barry Hoffman, who has longserved as the Honorary Consul General of Pakistan forNew England. Hoffman, an American, is commissionedby the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, DC and isrecognized by the US Department of State as a diplo-matic employee of the Pakistani mission. Soon after theinception of the NSEERS directive, the Embassywarned Hoffman of the many problems facing somePakistani citizens who were forced to register andencouraged him to work with the local immigrationauthorities on their plan for implementing the NSEERSprogram. Hoffman worked with local individuals andorganizations including Shahid Ahmed Khan, RegionalVice President of Pakistani American Congress, thePakistani Association of Greater Boston (PAGB), andInternational Institute of Boston to develop a plan to

mitigate the negative effects of NSEERS on Pakistanisin the area.187

To start, they approached then-Deputy Director ofthe regional INS office Dennis Reardon, who was veryreceptive to them. According to Hoffman, INSDirectors/SACs around the country were aware of thesituation in Southern California in which hundreds ofpeople were detained and were looking for a means tobetter implement NSEERS in their own districts.Hoffman also notes that these directors had a great dealof discretion in implementing the program. Together,Hoffman and Reardon agreed that the objective ofNSEERS was to register people and not to arrest them.After they agreed on the program’s main operationalobjective, Reardon guaranteed that no one in his districtwho came to register would be arrested unless they werewanted for criminal activity or had already been adjudi-cated for deportation. Those who were in violation ofimmigration laws such as having overstayed their visaswere to be given a notice to appear before a judge.188

This allowed those people time to seek legal representa-tion in order to prepare their case or to leave the coun-try voluntarily.

This initiative proved to be very successful both inaddressing the fears of the community and in helpingregister a large number of people. Barry Hoffman andhis associates hosted seminars on NSEERS and publi-cized the guarantee they had received from Reardon atlocal mosques. The Pakistani Embassy in Washington,DC strongly supported Hoffman in this effort. Further,the Embassy spoke directly with Attorney General JohnAshcroft and the US Department of State to make themaware of their concerns about the NSEERS program’seffect on the American Pakistani community. TheEmbassy also publicized Hoffman’s efforts on its web-site and listed him as a 24-hour point of contact for thisissue.

The Arab CommunityAccording to the local Massachusetts chapter and the

national office of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimina-tion Committee (ADC), there is nothing to report interms of proactive initiatives in building relationshipswith law enforcement taken on the part of the Arab com-munity in Greater Boston.

Boston Police Department (BPD)While BPD had very limited interactions with the localMuslim, Arab, and Sikh communities in Boston prior toSeptember 11, 2001 that changed quickly after theattacks.189 Immediately following the attacks on

185Ibid.186Hassan Abbas, Visiting Research Fellow, Harvard Law School, received via e-mail on 4/9/04.187Interview with Barry Hoffman, Honorary Consul General of Pakistan, 4/13/04. 188Ibid.189Interview with Lieutenant David Aldridge, Boston Police Department, 3/23/04.

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nSeptember 11th, the BPD began outreach efforts to thelocal Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities in an effortto stave off any potential backlash. Specifically, BPDreached out to Muhammed Ali-Salaam Deputy Directorof Community Planning for the Boston RedevelopmentAuthority, who referred BPD to a number of communi-ty organizations. Additionally, BPD instituted a programof visiting “every mosque in Boston,” giving publictalks, and visiting community centers and community-owned restaurants, all in an effort to publicize accurateinformation about what to do if a community memberexperienced a hate crime or hate incident.190 Further,BPD relied one of their officers who is of Lebanesedescent to do additional outreach to the community.

BPD emphasized that all of these initial meetingswere “non-invasive.”191 That is to say that while officersproactively sought out this community, they were therefor the sole purpose of making themselves available forthe reporting of hate crimes and hate incidents. Theirinteractions with the community during this time wereprimarily focused on information-sharing and leavingcommunity members with contact information. BPDfound this outreach to be particularly challengingbecause unlike other communities in Boston, with a fewexceptions the Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities inBoston are geographically dispersed, making the plan-ning of community visits more challenging.

From the beginning, BPD sensed skepticism on thepart of the community in terms of the reasons the policewere making contact in the days following September11th. In its efforts to make itself available to these com-munities, they felt they were up against what theydescribe as a “cultural fear of law enforcement” as wellas the perception that BPD was the “right arm of immi-gration.”192

Efforts to bridge this sense of distrust were focusedon two fronts: 1) an effort to accurately explain BPD’srelationship with immigration authorities; and 2) aneffort to make information available about BPD’s workand to follow up on reported hate crimes and hate inci-dents. Through these initiatives, BPD was able todemonstrate its serious commitment to communitysafety.

In regards to BPD’s relationship with immigrationauthorities, BPD made efforts to explain to the commu-nity that while BCIS has the authority to audit their

records, in practice, BPD is not required to ask individ-uals about their immigration status during routine inter-actions. In fact, BPD is fighting the national move torequire local departments to enforce immigration regu-lations because it would “ruin our relationship with thedecent people in our city.”193 Explaining this operationalpractice to the community made them more comfortablewith increased police presence.194 Additionally, in termsof building trust and breaking down barriers of skepti-cism, BPD reports that when word got back to the com-munity that BPD had in good faith acted upon hatecrimes and incidents reporting, the community respond-ed with increased trust.195

In addition to efforts immediately following theSeptember 11th attacks, BPD has sustained its efforts towork with these communities. BPD has been active inthe two local Hate Crimes Taskforces (one operated outof the Governor’s office and one out of the AttorneyGeneral’s office).196 Additionally, while BPD’s effortshave moved into more of a “response” mode now thatthe community is familiar with the department and itsrole vis-a-vis hate crimes investigations and response,the department does still occasionally proactively visitthe community in order to “check in.”197

FBI-Boston DivisionImmediately following the events of September 11th,

the Civil Rights Squad from the Boston FBI officebegan an initiative designed to make contact with everymosque in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for thepurpose of providing information about the resourcesthat were available to the community to respond to inci-dents of hate crimes or other forms of retribution. Inorder to do this, the FBI agents from the BostonDivision worked closely with the Bureau of Alcohol,Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and utilized a database ofplaces of worship compiled by the ATF. ATF had builtthis database as part of their church arson initiative andthe FBI found it very useful for the quick identificationof mosques in the days and weeks after September11th.198 In addition to the mosque site visits, the CivilRights Squad at the Boston office sent letters to all ofthe area mosques offering to come for meetings to dis-cuss the FBI’s role in hate crimes investigations. Out ofthis initiative, the FBI heard back from five mosqueswith which they followed-up.

190Ibid.191Ibid.192Ibid.193Ibid.194Ibid.195Ibid.196According to a member of the community who was invited to attend one meeting of the Attorney General’s Hate Crimes Taskforce but neverasked to return, these meetings were ineffective at including a consistent community voice. Further, ADC-MA reports that their representativesdropped out of the AG’s Office Hate Crimes Taskforce because the Anti-Defamation League was asked to participate as well which the ADCfeels precludes them from effectively participating.197Ibid.198PfP Boston Law Enforcement Focus Group, Jay White, Acting Supervisor, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston Division, 4/5/04.199Ibid.

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nWhile forging relationships during a crisis was diffi-

cult,200 the FBI reports that long-lasting relationshipshave developed out of these mosque visits which haveproven mutually beneficial to the FBI and the commu-nity.201 Specifically, the FBI reached out to some ofthese same contacts as part of their effort to recruittranslators for languages with which the FBI had seriousdeficiencies.202

In addition to the mosque visit project, FBI Bostonhas participated in numerous community meetings andbriefings and have included leaders from the Muslimcommunity in their Citizen’s Academy program whichoffers citizens the opportunity to learn first-hand aboutthe operations of the local FBI Field Office.203

Additionally, the FBI Boston Field Office has recentlybegun a series of media brown bag lunches where theyinvite local media representatives to an off-the-recordmeeting about Bureau operating procedures and pub-licly available case information. This initiative is aimedat making accurate information available to the publicabout FBI policies and procedures by proactively work-ing with the media to better inform its coverage.204

United States Attorney’s OfficeIn the months that followed September 11, 2001 pur-

suant to an Executive Order from President Bush, theDepartment of Justice organized Anti-Terrorism TaskForces (ATTF) out of every United States Attorneys’Office. These groups were made up of executives fromfederal, state, and local law enforcement who werecharged with coordinating all anti-terrorism efforts.Boston like all districts immediately developed theirstanding ATTF which was designed to complement theJoint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) already in place. TheATTF (which today has become the Massachusetts Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council or ATAC), took a numberof steps to facilitate its mission of “developing effectivefederal, state, and local partnership[s] to comprehen-sively address the threat of terrorism”205 including thecreation of a Civil Rights Sub-Working Group for theATTF/ATAC. In addition, United States AttorneyMichael Sullivan created an Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU)in September of 2002 where four Assistant UnitedStates Attorneys (AUSAs), an Intelligence Research

Specialist (IRS), a Security Specialist and three supportstaff work exclusively on anti-terrorism initiatives.

According to the OUSA, Paul Saba of the Arab-American Lawyers Association and Juliette Kayyem ofthe JFK School of Government were substantiallyinvolved in the early stages of the Civil Rights Sub-Working Group of the ATTF/ATAC.206 This group wasreportedly helpful on a number of mandated initiativesincluding the implementation of the student registrationpiece of the NSEERS program.207 Over time the inter-personal relationships built through this working groupbecame quite strong and the United States Attorney’sOffice began to rely on one-on-one contact with indi-viduals for input rather than convening the entiregroup.208

As this report goes to print, the United StatesAttorney’s Office in Massachusetts is pursuing addi-tional outreach with the Muslim community. On April22, 2004, the USAO held a meeting with “several rep-resentatives” of the Muslim community to discussdeveloping a plan for institutionalizing outreach efforts.Community representatives have agreed to propose anagenda and a list of invitees for an initial planning meet-ing. Work on this initiative is in its nascent phase, but isongoing.209

Cambridge Police DepartmentWhile the Cambridge Police Department did not

have a particularly robust relationship with its localMuslim, Arab, or Sikh communities prior to September11, 2001 it does have a long-established history offocusing on a strategy of community policing. Thiswell-established framework and the Chief’s ongoingparticipation in efforts focused on ending racial profil-ing, enabled it to react quickly to the situation and pro-vide the community with protective services in a waythat was warmly received.210

In the afternoon of September 11th the CambridgePolice Department visited the Cambridge mosque inorder to offer assistance and protection. According toMuhammed Ali-Salaam a member of the mosque, “Iwas literally taken aback with their sensitivity and theirprofessionalism.” As the officers explained their inten-tions and arrived at the door to the mosque, they respect-

200PfP Boston Law Enforcement Focus Group, Kenneth Kaiser, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston Division,4/5/04.201PfP Boston Law Enforcement Focus Group, Jay White, Acting Supervisor, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston Division, 4/5/04.202Ibid.203Ibid.204PfP Boston Law Enforcement Focus Group, Kenneth Kaiser, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston Division,4/5/04.205Memo from Assistant United States Attorney Michael Ricciuti to Sasha O’Connell regarding: Partnering for Prevention and CommunitySafety: Draft of Boston Chapter; 4/23/04. 206Ibid.207PfP Boston Law Enforcement Focus Group, Gerard Leone, First Assistant United States Attorney,United States Attorney’s Office, 4/5/04.208Ibid.209Memo from Assistant United States Attorney Michael Ricciuti to Sasha O’Connell regarding: Partnering for Prevention and CommunitySafety: Draft of Boston Chapter; 4/23/04.210Interview, Ronnie Watson, Commissioner, Cambridge Police Department, 6/13/03.

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nfully carried their shoes in their hands.211 This interac-tion was the beginning of a relationship between theCambridge Police Department and Ali-Salaam thatincluded the provision of cultural training to the policedepartment and the inclusion of Muslim communitymembers in a series of interfaith community events tocommemorate September 11th.212

CHALLENGESWhile the Muslim, Arab and Sikh communities and

law enforcement of Greater Boston face a number ofchallenges to their efforts to develop partnerships, theyare not alone. Unlike Southeastern Michigan andSouthern California, most cities in the country are likeBoston in that they do not have well established historicrelationships between law enforcement and the Muslim,Arab, and Sikh communities nor do they have wellfunded and organized community organizations, factorswhich significantly facilitate the development of strongpartnerships.

MediaMisinformation about ongoing cases spread to the

community by the media can be toxic to law enforce-ment-community partnerships. Boston faced a clearexample of this challenge in the case of the Ptech inves-tigation.

PTech Inc. is a Quincy, Massachusetts-based soft-ware firm that was started in 1994 by co-foundersOussama Ziade, who had originally come to the U.S.from Lebanon to study at Harvard, and James Cerrato.213

Between the time the company was founded andSeptember 11, 2001, the firm developed an extensivelist of clients for their software which was designed tographically represent large amounts of information.Among these clients were the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, the Air Force, the Navy, and NATO.214

In October of 2001 the name Yasin al-Qadi, a busi-ness man from Saudi Arabia, began appearing on a gov-ernment list of individuals and organizations suspected

of funding terrorist organizations. This turn of eventsimpacted Ptech because, according to CNN, in 1994 al-Qadi had invested $5 million of the $20 million dollarsPtech raised from approximately fifty investors.215

According to Ptech management, they became awarethat al-Qadi’s name had surfaced on the government’slist but, because al-Qadi was never a shareholder ofrecord and because he turned down additional requestsfor funding they report that “[our] lawyers suggestedthere is nothing that needs to be done.”216

Law enforcement became aware of the connectionbetween al-Qadi and Ptech and on the evening ofDecember 5, 2002 federal agents arrived at the Ptechoffice where they executed a search warrant. Accordingto press reporting, Ptech CEO Oussama Ziade said hewas happy to assist the FBI and granted authority for thesearch and the federal agents agreed to be discreet abouttheir search (parking their cars away from the Ptechoffices) and to not leak word of their search to themedia.217 During the course of the search, Ziade metwith federal agents, described Ptech’s relationship withal-Qadi, and was assured that “neither Ptech nor itsemployees or officers [were] the target of the investiga-tion.”218

As the search was wrapping up in the early morninghours of December 6, 2001, the parking lot of the Ptechoffice building began to fill with reporters and photog-raphers from the media who had been leaked informa-tion from an unknown source about the ongoing inves-tigation. The media coverage that followed the search ofPtech was far from accurate. The media described thesearch as a “raid” of the Ptech office, and insinuated thatin regards to Ptech’s investors there was “at least one ofwhom is now suspected of having ties to Osama binLaden’s al-Qaida terrorist network”219 and in some casessuggested that Ptech employees had been arrested.220

The inaccurate reporting prompted the OUSA to releasea statement explicitly stating that a search was executedand that “The search was conducted in connection withan on-going financial investigation. Media characteriza-tions of this as a terrorist investigation are premature.”221

211Ben Arnoldy, “September 11 One Year Later: On Profiling,” The Christian Science Monitor, at: www.csmonitor.com/specials/oneyearlater/onProfiling_ali-salaam.html, accessed on 4/12/04.212Ibid.213“Possible Terror Ties Devastate Tech Firm,” CNN.COM, available at: www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/biztech/01/01/problems.ptech.ap,accessed on 5/03.214Pam Belluck and Eric Lichtblau, “Threats and Responses: The Money Trail; Federal Agents Raid a Software Company Ouside Boston,Seeking Links to Al Qaeda,” New York Times, 12/7/02, at: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html, accessed on 5/03. 215“Possible Terror Ties Devastate Tech Firm,” CNN.COM, available at: www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/biztech/01/01/problems.ptech.ap; accessedon 5/03,Al-Qadi’s exact relationship to Ptech and its investors has not been publicly corroborated by law enforcement.216Ibid.217Ibid.218Ibid.219See “Software Firm Attracted Attention with Government Clients,” 7 News Boston, available at:http://web1.whdh.com/news/articles/local/h6320/, accessed on 5/03. 220Dan Verton, “Ptech Workers Tell the Story Behind the Search,” Computer World, available at: from www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,77682,00.html, accessed on 5/03.221Press Release, United States Attorney District of Massachusetts, “Statement of U.S. Attorney Michael J. Sullivan,” 12/6/02.

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nThe December 2002 statement from the OUSA about

the Ptech investigation (which is still ongoing today)also made explicit that there was no reason to believethat the software products sold by Ptech to the U.S. gov-ernment were compromised in any way.222 Despite theseclarifications, inaccurate reporting created a significantchallenge for Ptech whose business has suffered drasti-cally.223 In addition to the impact on Ptech and itsemployees, the media coverage of the Ptech search hashad a significant impact on the ability of the communi-ty and law enforcement to establish relationships anddevelop working partnerships.

One reason that the media coverage of the Ptechsearch has been challenging for law enforcement-com-munity partnerships is that Ptech’s CEO Oussama Ziadeis a prominent member of the Muslim community inBoston. Thus, the community watched the media cover-age with great interest and had many concerns about lawenforcement’s intent in “targeting” an apparently inno-cent member of the Muslim community.224 These con-cerns fed the growing distrust of law enforcement feltby a large segment of not only the Muslim but Arab andSikh communities as well.

In addition, law enforcement was put in the chal-lenging position of needing and wanting to correct inac-curate media reporting through conversations and edu-cation opportunities with the community but being lim-ited in their ability to do so by Department of Justiceregulations and court rulings which prohibit them fromdiscussing any active investigation (like Ptech) with thepublic. This created a sizeable challenge for buildingcommunity relationships because, as MassachusettsAnti-Terrorism Coordinator Michael Ricciuti reported,it was difficult to have productive meetings and infor-mation sessions with the community during this timebecause the community was predominantly interested insorting out the facts of law enforcement’s role in thePtech investigation but law enforcement was prohibitedfrom discussing it at all because it was an active inves-tigation.225 In May of 2003, Ricciuti and FBISupervisory Special Agent David Nodolski spoke at themosque in Quincy, MA in an effort to address commu-nity concerns about the Ptech case. Again, their abilityto discuss the specifics of the case was limited by regu-lations governing ongoing investigations. The inabilityof law enforcement to discuss details of the Ptech casewas perceived by the community as an attempt tostonewall and it further deepened their distrust and

heightened the challenges inherent in establishing work-ing relationships. While the Ptech search occurred inDecember of 2001, it has had devastating effects on thecompany. As of January 2003 Ptech had reduced its 65employee company to 10 employees. Thus, Ptechremains a source of concern for the community not onlyin Massachusetts but nationwide.

Another example of the media impeding communi-ty-law enforcement partnerships is The Boston Herald’srecent series of articles about the Islamic Society ofBoston (ISB) and its supporters. The ISB, which is asocial as well as religious organization, was formed in1981 by a group of area students and academics. Today,ISB is pursuing a number of social and educationalprojects and is working to build a large mosque and cul-tural center in Roxbury, MA.226 In October 2003 andagain in March 2004, The Boston Herald printed a seriesof articles, which drew a link between the ISB and anumber of controversial individuals and organizations.The Herald also criticized ISB’s support for Ptech andclaimed that ISB’s mosque-building project was fundedprimarily by donors in the Middle East.227 There is nopublic information available to indicate that the ISB isthe subject of any on-going law enforcement investiga-tion or that the Herald obtained its information from lawenforcement sources.

Community members viewed these articles to beinaccurate, misleading and in some cases Islamophobic.Some feared that the articles would increase backlashand hate crimes against Muslims in Greater Boston.Community members also felt that although these arti-cles were printed by an independent media outlet, lawenforcement should have made an effort to publicly cor-rect misinformation and show their support for theMuslim community.228 Law enforcement inMassachusetts continues to “take no position on theaccuracy or lack of accuracy as to what the BostonHerald reported.”229 The FBI field office reports thatthey did respond to the negative Boston Herald articlesby meeting with Dr. Yousef Abou-Aballah, Director,ISB; and the OUSA arranged a meeting with their infor-mal community liaison, Muhammed Ali-Salaam to dis-cuss community concerns and gain an understanding ofthe community’s perspective.230 This meeting, however,was not highly publicized in the community and manycommunity members continue to believe that lawenforcement responded with inaction, thereby, posinganother challenge to partnership efforts.

222Ibid.223“Possible Terror Ties Devastate Tech Firm,” CNN.COM, available at: www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/biztech/01/01/problems.ptech.ap,accesed on 5/03.224PfP Greater Boston Community Focus Group, Anwar Kazmi, Islamic Council of New England, 1/24/04.225Interview with Michael Ricciuti, Anti-Terrorism Coordinator, United States Attorney’s Office, 4/4/03.226For more information about the ISB, its projects, and its response to allegations by The Boston Herald, see www.isboston.org.227Jonathan Wells, “Islamic Radical Tied to New Hub Mosque”, The Boston Herald, 3/7/04. 228PfP Greater Boston Community Focus Group, Salma Kazmi, ISB, 1/24/04. 229Memo from Assistant United States Attorney Michael Ricciuti to Sasha O’Connell regarding: Partnering for Prevention and CommunitySafety: Draft of Boston Chapter; 4/23/04.230PfP Greater Boston Law Enforcement Focus Group, Teresa Lange, Supervisory Special Agent, FBI-Boston, 4/5/04.

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nThe Fleet Bank Cases

A very public challenge to law enforcement – com-munity partnerships in the Greater Boston area has beenthe Fleet Bank cases, which interestingly are driven nei-ther by law enforcement nor the community. InNovember 2002, Fleet Bank closed the accounts of fiveMuslim and/or Arab-American individuals in theBoston area and in February 2003, it closed the accountsof three Islamic schools, a mosque, a Muslim-ownedbusiness, and at least 10 other Muslim individuals.231

The Bank reportedly gave no explanation for the clo-sures other than it did not feel that the banking relation-ship was in its best interest and that it had a right to ter-minate a banking relationship at any point and withoutprior notice.232 These types of abrupt account closures ordenial of services by banks and other financial institu-tions have increased since September 11th, primarilyaffecting Muslims and Arab-Americans.233 While TitleII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits business fromdiscriminating based on race, ethnicity, religion, ornational origin, after September 11th, private financialcompanies have been able to deny services to anyonethey think is on a watch list or believed to be connectedwith terrorism.234 However, there is no publicly avail-able information that would indicate that any of theindividuals or institutions that were subjects of the FleetBank account closures were the subjects of on-goinglaw enforcement investigations.

In response to the Fleet Bank cases, some communi-ty organization such as the ADC-MA and the ACLUorganized a campaign known as Fleet Flight to protestthe Bank’s actions. Fleet Flight is a sustained, long-termcampaign in which each week a number of communitymembers voluntarily close their Fleet checking, savings,or credit card accounts. This campaign has focusedcommunity attention to the Fleet cases, which hasincreased awareness and in some cases fueled angerwithin the community.

While there is no indication that law enforcementrequests or directives drove the Fleet cases, many com-munity members are suspicious that these cases weresolely the result of an overzealous private company, act-ing alone. Thus, these cases present an unusual chal-lenge for law enforcement in its relationship with thecommunity. Law enforcement representatives in theBoston area often find themselves defending theirorganizations and their lack of involvement in the FleetBank cases. From the community’s perspective, it is

important for law enforcement to acknowledge thewide-ranging effects of the Fleet cases on the communi-ty. Additionally, in terms of approaching the communi-ty about partnerships, it is important for law enforce-ment to understand the commonly held suspicion ofgovernment involvement in these cases. Further, thesecases are relevant for law enforcement nationwide asthey received national attention from the media andcommunity. Thus, the Fleet Bank cases exemplify howthird-parties, whether the media or private industry, caninfluence partnerships between law enforcement andcommunities.

Community Perceptions of Government According to both community members and law

enforcement representatives in Greater Boston, a signif-icant challenge to partnerships is the general lack ofcommunity understanding or familiarity with the detailsof American government operations. This unfamiliaritywith government policies, procedures, and services is aproblem with many segments of the American publicbut seems particularly acute in groups with large immi-grant populations such as the Muslim, Arab, and Sikhcommunities in Massachusetts. At times such groupsview the government not as different agencies anddepartments with different roles and objectives, butrather as one big, monolith or “officialdom.”235 This per-ception of the American government extends beyonddomestic agencies to US embassies and consulates over-seas. A negative experience with American agenciesoverseas or at airports, at times shapes one’s perceptionof the government even before entering the US.236

Further, a positive interaction with a governmentagency or representative can be easily counteracted by anegative, more publicized experience. For example, onecommunity member noted that in the past, the Muslimcommunity in Irvine, California had a very positive rela-tionship with the military, which began when the USMarine Base there allowed the Muslim community touse its facilities for Eid prayers.237 The communitymember, however, felt that this positive interaction wasovershadowed by the much more publicized arrest of aMuslim chaplain, Army Capt. James Yee, who served inGuantanamo Bay, Cuba. Capt. Yee was first held on sus-picions of espionage but after the Army dismissed thosecharges he was found guilty on the non-criminal viola-tions of adultery and improperly downloading pornog-raphy onto an Army computer. Most recently Capt. Yee

231Fleet Flight Campaign, available at: www.fleetflight.org, accessed on 4/13/04.232Ibid.233Leela Jacinto, “Muslim Blacklisting? American Muslims Accuse Banks and Other Financial Institutions of Discrimination”, ABC News,6/11/03 available at: http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/Business/muslim030611.html, accessed on 4/13/04.234Ibid.235Interview with Husain Kazmi, Vice President, Hopkinton Muslim Community Center, 4/1/04. 236Interview with Hassan Abbas, Visiting Research Fellow, Harvard Law School, 4/1/04.237Interview with Husain Kazmi, Vice President, Hopkinton Muslim Community Center, 4/1/04.

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nwas cleared of all charges on appeal.238 This incidentheightened fears that Muslims, whether immigrants orAmericans, serving in the US military were under sus-picion by the U.S. government.

As many of the post-September 11th issues faced byMuslim, Arab, and Sikh communities are complicatedand handled by multiple agencies, community membersare additionally frustrated when law enforcement repre-sentatives do not address their grievances and they feelcaught in a ‘pass the buck’ scenario. For example, oneoften-told story is of community members bringing upnegative incidents at the airport with FBI agents. Whilethe community has been frustrated with these encoun-ters because Federal agents outside the airport are oftenunable to provide adequate information about specificand personal situations, one can also understand theFBI’s inability to respond because airport security is notwithin their jurisdiction. From its perspective, lawenforcement representatives feel that they cannot andshould not be forced to answer for the actions of othergovernment agencies or departments. This is at timesperceived as an unwillingness of agencies to takeresponsibility for each other and is particularly trouble-some in cases that require an urgent law enforcementresponse, such as hate crimes or hate incidents.

At times however the challenge lies not in a lack ofunderstanding of operational realities but rather in dif-fering perceptions of complicated realities. For exam-ple, different perceptions of post-September 11th deten-tions of Muslim and Arab men as part of the PENT-TBOMB investigations have been a point of contentionin Greater Boston. Law enforcement in Massachusettsreport that the widely held belief of community mem-bers that nationally, mass detentions took place in theweeks and months after the attacks is not based on factbut based on rumor and misunderstandings.239 However,from the community perspective, PENTTBOMB relateddetentions are an ongoing source of concern, fear, anddistrust of law enforcement.

The detention of 762 men as part of the post-September 11th investigations has been well document-ed in reports by civil rights organizations such asACLU’s January 2004 report America’s Disappeared:Seeking International Justice for Immigrants DetainedAfter September 11240 and the US Department of Justicein the April 2003 Office of the Inspector General’s(OIG) report.241 In terms of perspectives, while lawenforcement representatives in Massachusetts note that

the OIG’s report “discussed issues concerning the treat-ment of those arrested after September 11,” they arequick to emphasize that this report “did not find thatthose people were improperly arrested or detained, orthat some process of detaining people, independent ofthe normal criminal or immigration process, was fol-lowed.”242 From the community’s perspective, howeverwhile these detentions may have been legal, the focus ofconcern is on the treatment of detainees and the appear-ance of racial profiling in the enforcement of immigra-tion laws.

It is also important to note that most of thesedetainees were not charged with terrorism. Howeverthat does not indicate, as many community membersbelieve, that they had no knowledge or connection withterrorist activities. For example, one immigrationdetainee who pled guilty to conspiracy to commit iden-tification fraud and aiding and abetting the unlawfulproduction of identification documents traveled over-night with two of the September 11th hijackers.243 Whilein the case of detentions there is publicly availableinformation to help clarify perceptions, many situationsare not as easy to sort out. In cases where there is notpublic information available, it is particularly importantfor law enforcement and the community to recognizeand respect each other’s perspective even if they do notagree.

Need for Accountability Another challenge perceived by the Greater Boston

Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities is the lack ofaccountability to the community among individual fed-eral law enforcement representatives. Many communitymembers have cited the airport as a place where lawenforcement representatives, namely TransportationSecurity Administration (TSA), Bureau of Citizenshipand Immigration (BCIS), and Customs officials mustacknowledge that they are representatives of the gov-ernment and act accordingly. They must serve not onlyas law enforcement officials but also as ambassadors ofthe U.S., who every day influence how hundreds of for-eign nationals perceive this country.

Community members do however report that theirinteractions with local law enforcement such as the BPDhave by and large been positive. According to HussainKazmi of the Hopkinton Muslim Community Center,this contrast is perhaps related to the fact that local lawenforcement is directly accountable to the community.

238“Army Clears Guantanamo Chaplin”, BBC News, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3627657.stm, accessed on4/15/04. It is important to note here that while Chaplin Yee’s arrest was highly publicized in the national media, there has been little nationalmedia attention of him being cleared of all charges.239PfP Law Enforcement Focus Group, Mike Ricciuti, Anti-Terrorism Coordinator, US Attorney’s Office, 4/5/04.240This report available at: http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=14800&c=207, accessed on 4/13/04. 241“The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation ofthe September 11 Attacks”, p.2, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Justice, 4/03.242Memo from Assistant United States Attorney Michael Ricciuti to Sasha O’Connell regarding: Partnering for Prevention and CommunitySafety: Draft of Boston Chapter; 4/23/04.243Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee: “The Inspector General’s Report and the September 11th Response”, Michael E. Rolince,Acting Assistant Director in Charge, FBI 6/24/03, available at: http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress03/rolince062403.htm accessed on

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nLocal law enforcement representatives often live in andare an active part of the communities where they serve.As Kazmi notes, “I see the Chief at Boy Scout meet-ings.”244 By contrast, federal law enforcement isaccountable primarily to national politically appointedexecutives in Washington, DC.

No Formal Structure for CommunicationA significant challenge to community – law enforce-

ment partnering efforts in the Greater Boston area is thelack of a formal, on-going structure for communication.This challenge, which was also noted in SouthernCalifornia, greatly inhibits their ability to develop,maintain, and advance partnering efforts. UnlikeSouthern California, however, until very recently therehave been no notable efforts in building such a structurein Greater Boston. This may be due to the relativelysmall size and lack of organization within the communi-ty and the inability of both the community and lawenforcement to prioritize the partnering model.

National DirectivesPost September 11th, the Boston Office of the FBI’s

counterterrorism squad,245 in addition to their centralrole in the PENTTBOMB investigation, was working tomeet the requirements laid out by USDOJ that they con-duct 117 voluntary interviews of nonimmigrant alienswho met a series of USDOJ requirements.246 Accordingto Supervisory Special Agent Teresa Lange, this projectproved particularly challenging because: 1) USDOJrequired these interviews to be completed over a veryshort amount of time; 2) there were very few agents inthe office on September 11th who had experience work-ing with this community; and 3) the timeframe for con-ducting these interviews extended over the Muslim holymonth of Ramadan.247

SSA Lange sees the local FBI office’s hamperedability to effectively implement the post September 11th

interview project as sharply contrasting with the BostonFBI’s ability to carry out USDOJ mandated voluntaryinterviews of Iraqi’s in this country in the spring of2003. In the case of the Iraqi interviews, she noted thatunlike the first round of interviews following September11th, the office was given enough time to plan and exe-cute the interview project effectively. Specifically, in the

case of the Iraqi interviews, the Boston FBI office hadtime to establish a uniform protocol for conductingthese interviews, which was disseminated to all agentsinvolved in the project during pre-interview briefings.248

The protocol for the interviews reminded agents toemphasize to community members that they were notrequired to talk with the FBI and it encouraged agents toutilize these interviews as an opportunity to ask com-munity members if they (or anyone they knew) had beenthe subject of a hate crime or hate incident.249 While lawenforcement clearly learned from the process, by allaccounts the interview project that immediately fol-lowed September 11th “raised concerns within the com-munity” and there is general acknowledgement that itcould have been done more effectively.250

Community OrganizationIn Boston, from law enforcement’s perspective, there

are “fissures in the [Muslim, Arab, and Sikh] communi-ty that are difficult to navigate.”251 This has been foundto be true in two distinct senses. First, the Muslim, Arab,and Sikh communities in Massachusetts are largeenough to have significant contact with law enforce-ment and to have other significant issues such as workplace discrimination and immigration challenges.However, currently the community is not large enoughto be a focus of national community resources.Therefore, local community organizations tend to beunder-funded and somewhat disjointed. Specifically,whereas community organizations such as CAIR andADC have large well staffed offices in places likeDetroit/Dearborn and Los Angeles, in Boston, as previ-ously mentioned, CAIR does not maintain an office andADC just hired their first full time staff person locally in2004. Further, organizations like the SMART relyexclusively on volunteer assistance in Massachusetts.While individuals involved in these organizations do atremendous amount of work solely relying on volun-teers and limited staff assistance, their resources areextremely limited. This lack of resources limits theirability to coordinate the time-consuming process ofengaging in ongoing communication with law enforce-ment.

In addition to the lack of robust community organi-zations to support and staff partnership efforts with lawenforcement, unlike the local Sikh community there is

244Interview with Husain Kazmi, Vice President, Hopkinton Muslim Community Center, 4/1/04.245There was only one counterterrorism squad in the Boston FBI office on September 11, 2001. Today, the office has three squads each entirelydedicated to counterterrorism work.246“Homeland Security: Justice Department Project to Interview Aliens after September 11, 2001,” p. 29, General Accounting Office, 4/03.247PfP Boston Law Enforcement Focus Group, Teresa Lange, Supervisory Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston Division,4/5/04.248For further discussion of implementation of pre-Iraq war interviews in contrast to post-September 11th interviews see: “Protecting YourCommunity From Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement, Vol 2: Working With Diverse Communities,” Police Executive ResearchForum, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services,” p. 40, 3/04, available at www.policeforum.org, accessedon 5/3/04.249Ibid.250PfP Boston Law Enforcement Focus Group, Michael Sullivan, United States Attorney, United States Department of Justice, 4/5/04.251PfP Boston Law Enforcement Focus Group, Michael Ricciuti, Anti-Terrorism Coordinator, United States Attorney’s Office, 4/5/04.

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nnot a clear consensus within the diverse and dispersedMassachusetts Muslim and Arab communities thatinvesting the time and resources necessary to establishan ongoing dialogue with law enforcement is necessari-ly a high priority. This lack of consensus is undoubted-ly a result of a number of factors including the absenceof an effective coordinating umbrella organization tohelp make priorities and create a strategy across thesediverse communities, and the fragility of this small anddiverse community. This makes them further apprehen-sive about initiating a relationship with the well-organ-ized and relatively well-funded law enforcement agen-cies. In contrast, the Sikh community has been betterable to utilize their tight-knit and relatively small reli-gious community to set priorities and implement out-reach efforts.

Further in Massachusetts, like many communitiesnationwide, there is a history of distrusting law enforce-ment. According to the community, this distrust and fearhas been fueled by, among other things,252 the previous-ly discussed situations with Ptech, Fleet Bank, and theISB.253 This profound distrust and fear may be a signif-icant factor contributing to the lack of focus on estab-lishing law enforcement outreach programs.254

Whatever the reasons, having local communities that arenot particularly well resourced or organized and thathave not overtly prioritized coordination efforts withlaw enforcement, presents a significant challenge toestablishing local partnerships.

LESSONS LEARNED

Need for a Formal Mechanism forCommunication

The experience of law enforcement and the commu-nity in Boston exemplifies the need for the creation of aformal, ongoing mechanism of communication betweenthese two groups. Without standing lines of communi-cation, law enforcement and the community becomedependent on individuals for communication and inter-action. This arrangement has a number of drawbacksincluding: limiting the perspectives included in theexchange; minimizing the distribution of informationgained through these interactions; and leaving commu-nication lines susceptible to changes in personal priori-ties and personnel assignments.

No Quick FixIn order to create a formal mechanism for communi-

cation between law enforcement and the community, itis clear in Boston that simply importing a model that hasworked in other parts of the country would be counterproductive. Specifically, taking immediate steps toorganize an formal advisory board for the communityalong the lines of the BRIDGES group in SoutheasternMichigan or the one currently being planned in LosAngeles, would not be beneficial to the community or tolaw enforcement at this point in time.

This would be an inappropriate course of actionbecause 1) there is no active standing community-lawenforcement advisory board from which a groupdesigned to specifically address the needs of theMuslim, Arab, and Sikh communities could be spun;255

2) law enforcement in Greater Boston is still too tenta-tive about what community partners they should andcould effectively work with on such an advisory boardto move directly to this type of organization; and 3)from the communities’ perspective, they are not cur-rently organized and resourced to a level where they feelthey could adequately and consistently represent theirissues and concerns through such a formal (and laborintensive) communications mechanism.

“Begin at the Beginning”256

While jumping directly into the establishment of aformal advisory board is not the appropriate next step inBoston, a plan for moving in the direction of establish-ing partnerships and ultimately a formal advisory boardof some kind has emerged and has received at least pre-liminary support from both the community and lawenforcement representatives locally.

Since both the community and law enforcement aresomewhat wary of jumping into a formal committedstructure, beginning with a series of separate, facilitatedbriefing sessions for law enforcement and the commu-nity has been proposed. At this stage, community repre-sentatives would meet with a facilitator and a trainer todiscuss: their concerns about meeting with law enforce-ment; who would best represent their communities incollaborative dialogues; the development of a vision andstrategy for their work with law enforcement; and waysto deepen the learning about each of the law enforce-ment agencies and what their roles and responsibilitiesinclude in order to prepare for dialogue sessions. On the

252See the “Perpectives” section of the Challenges Chapter for a discussion of other possible sources of community mistrust of law enforcementand the U.S. government more generally.253PfP Greater Boston Community Focus Group, 1/24/04. 254The United States Attorney’s Office in Massachusetts reports that they have been at times surprised and disappointed by the level of fear anddistrust. One of the many challenges this fear creates is a tendency for community members to unnecessarily lie to law enforcement officialsout of fear and misunderstanding of jurisdiction. This creates an additional layer of complications for law enforcement officials who don’t wantto have to take action against otherwise innocent community members for lying to federal officials.255In Southeastern Michigan prior to September 11th they had an active multi-community advisory board, ALPACT, which was a place fromwhich to start growing the group that would become BRIDGES.256A terms used by Jim Jordan, former head of strategic planning, Boston Police Department to describe the BPD’s approach to initiating com-munity outreach on work.

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nlaw enforcement side, they too should begin by meetingwith a facilitator and a trainer in order to have the oppor-tunity to learn about: what they can expect to hear fromthe community; information about the cultural and reli-gious make-up of their local communities; and well asmore information about the relevant national and localcommunity organizations.

Following these briefings, the community and lawenforcement would be asked to select a diverse group ofrepresentatives who would be available to participate inonce monthly meetings over the course of the next cal-endar year. Once these commitments were made, thesegroups would begin meeting with the help of a facilita-tor. The focal point of this series of roundtables wouldbe the community and law enforcement representativesworking together to clearly define a mission for thegroup (such as increasing public safety) and a strategyfor achieving that mission (this would be focused onincreasing community-law enforcement communicationand coordination). Once the mission and strategy wereclearly defined, a facilitator would begin working withthe group to begin the process of developing a collabo-rative plan for implementation.

In addition to working together to develop a plan forincreased communication and coordination, theseround-table meetings would provide an opportunity forlaw enforcement and the community to begin to get toknow each other and exchange information—the foun-dations of trust. After the completion of these meetings,which could last up to a year but could reach resolutionsooner, this group would begin to transform itself intothe kind of formal working group required to beginimplementing a jointly developed action plan. By“beginning at the beginning” and offering training andcollaborative work opportunities to develop mutuallybeneficial goals, law enforcement and the community inBoston could begin the process required for partnership.