VIRTUAL INFORMATION CENTER (VIC)CONCEPT REFINEMENT WORKSHOP

EXPLORING OTHER ENABLERSWORKING GROUP REPORT

1. BACKGROUND:

The purpose of the Virtual Information Center (VIC) series of experiments is toevaluate concepts for managing the acquisition, processing, analysis andpresentation of information to the CINC and CJTF during HumanitarianAssistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations. These experiments wereundertaken as an element of an ongoing USCINCPAC initiative in support ofJoint Vision 2010 (JV2010).

The first VIC experiment including a JTF was conducted 20-24 April 1998. Theexperiment took place at two primary sites: Joint C41SR Battle Center(JBC),Suffolk, VA, (the JTF) and USCINCPAC's Political Military Anchor Desk(PMAD) facility in Camp Smith, Honolulu, HI (the CINC). The results of thatexperiment are captured in its final report of 15 October 1998.

A VIC concept refinement workshop was held in Washington, DC, from 3 to 5November 1998. The workshop was sponsored by the OSD C41SR CooperativeResearch Program (CCRP), USCINCPAC and JBC. Attendees at the workshopwere divided into four working groups: External Organizational Relationships,Internal Organizational Relationships, Tools and Exploring Other Enablers.

The following attendees participated in the Exploring Other Enablers workinggroup:

* Mr. Russ Myers (Chair) - GTE Senior Technologist at JBC,757-686-7436, myers@jbc.js.mil

* Mr. Ken Greenwell - Navy Science Advisor Program (NSAP) ScienceAdvisor to CINCACOM, 757-836-5313, nsapusac(.nosc. mil

* Ms. Julia Loughran - Thoughtlink Inc., 703-281-5694,loughran()thoughtlink.com

* Dr. Stu Starr - MITRE, Director of Plans, 703-883-5494,starr(@mitre.org

* LTC Earl Madison - JCS/J8, Army Signal Corps, 703-695-1762,earl. madisoni@s.pentagon.mil

· MAJ Duane Riddle - Battle Command Battle Lab, Ft. Leavenworth,913-684-8042, riddledi)leav-emh 1 .army.mil

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* Ms. Linda Kusar-Fischer - CINCACOM Decision Processes Directorate (JX),757-836-6392, kusar@jtasc.acom.mil

* Dr. Mike Sovereign - Naval Postgraduate School, Institute for JointWarfare Analysis, 831-656-3008,

sovereign (nps.navy.mil· Mr. Ed Waller - Community Open Source Program Office (COSPO),

703-281-8917, rew@(cospo.osis.gov* Mr. Robert Steele - President, Open Source Solutions, Inc.,

703-242-1700, bear@oss.net

The working group was challenged to operate "out of the box", i.e., examineorganizational issues and tools not being addressed by the other workinggroups. The working group chose to explore "other enablers" to OOTWoperations in the context of six broad categories and assign principalresearchers/authors to each category as follows:

1. Doctrine and Policy (LTC Madison, MAJ Riddle, Dr. Sovereign)2. Organization (Ms. Kusar-Fischer)3. Information Management & Labeling (Mr. Waller, Mr. Steele)4. Technology (Mr. Myers, Ms. Loughran)5. Culture (Dr. Starr)6. Training & Exercises (Ms. Loughran, MAJ Riddle)

This is the report of the Exploring Other Enablers working group.

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2. DOCTRINE and POLICY:

Topics discussed included:· Commander Centric Decision Making Processes (Cognitive)· A view of a HQ/TOC/Opns Center as a System of Systems· Day to Day Versus Go to War Information Policy· Split Based w/Reach Back (i.e., Forward and Rear Info Centers)· Cross Agency (NGO, PVO, Multi-National, etc.) Information· Open Source as Intelligence Multiplier (Complements J2/lntel Product)· Market Place Information & Services (Information as a commodity)· Information Fusion w/ Human Interface· JV 2010 Linkages (Information Operations Vision, Concept, Capabilities)* Regional Evolving to Global Implementation of Info Mgmt· Inconsistent Joint Publications on Information Management· PDD 56 Impact· Information LNOs (10, NGO, Host Nation)· VIC as an element of the Joint Experiment Campaign Plan (J9 ACOM)· Refine ALSA Multi Service TTP for JTF IM to address VIC environment· Development of bilateral open source sharing policy

Future OOTWNIC experiments should examine DOD policy such as the draftCommanders' Common Tactical Picture (CTP) Guide for GCCS 3.02 of 10August 1998, draft Joint Pub 3-16, "Multinational Operations", draft CJCSI8910.01 "Blue Force Tracking Collection and Dissemination Policy", and thedraft Air Land Sea Agency (ALSA) Multi Service Tactics, Techniques andProcedures (MTTP) for JTF Information Management to ensure that theOOTWNIC unclassified inter-agency operational environment is adequatelyaddressed.

Note that all these policy documents are in draft. Also note that each addressesnew military concepts. Also note that each is written to address conventionaloperations. None address the unclassified unconventional inter-agencyenvironment required for OOTW. Policy questions that should be addressed bysuch documents include:

a. What is the CTP for unconventional operations such as OOTW?b. How is the CTP exchanged at the unclassified level with inter-agency

partners?c. What C41 systems are required/desired when the OOTW involves inter-

agency and multinational military forces?d. Are there any time-sensitive friendly inter-agency force tracking

requirements associated OOTW?e. What is the impact of inter-agency and/or multinational OOTW operations

on JTF Information Management policy and organization?

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BCBL Leavenworth (BCBL(L)) participation in future OOTWNIC experiments isimportant. BCBL(L) oversees the C2 Lab at Ft. Gordon and the Intel lab at Ft.Huachuca. BCBL(L) is also the lead agency for the DARPA Command Post ofthe Future ($67M) and BCBLCECOM CP21 ($37M) projects.

Written doctrine is useless unless it is understood and implemented. Writtendoctrine must reflect proven and accepted techniques, operations and systems.Once proven and accepted, these techniques, operations and systems mustbecome institutionalized and organizational members must be trained in theirimplementation. Such is the case with OOTWNIC.

Written doctrine must capture these proven and accepted techniques, operationsand systems in order to completely institutionalize them and documentrequirements for training and material. This is an iterative process. InitialOOTWNIC doctrine will serve as a benchmark and common reference pointwhich will enable organizations to develop and implement informationmanagement systems and procedures. Through implementation andexperimentation with new OOTWNIC concepts, organizations will optimizeinformation systems and procedures. This is an evolutionary process whichmust be steered towards the goal of providing commanders and staffs immediateaccess to the information needed for them to understand the operational contextand situation within which they execute their mission. As this goal is achieved,the procedures and systems which facilitate accomplishment of this goal willbecome institutionalized and must be captured in writing as the "true" doctrine.

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3. ORGANIZATION:

Topics discussed included:* Examination of the USACOM/JX as a non-Napoleonic organization approach

to Knowledge Enabling· Examine the SOCOM Center for Intelligence and Information

Operations as a non-Napoleonic organization approach to KnowledgeEnabling

* Examine ALSA MTTP recommendations for JTF Information managementorganization structures as they may pertain to OOTNIC

* The absence of DOD proponency for Information Management & a commoninformation look and feel.

· The Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) Master Plan states, "...existingcapabilities are not adequate to meet current changes in mission, policy, anddoctrine that are part of new warfighting and fiscal realities. For thewarfighter, these realities include: the need to support Combined and Jointpeacetime operations world-wide."

· The JTA only accommodates operational, technical and systemsarchitectures. There is a need for a DOD and JTF information architecture.

The consensus of the group was that the "cold war" Napoleonic organizationmodel employed at CINC and JTF echelons is a major impediment to the all-source all-discipline information management necessary to support theOOTWNIC concept. For example, during the April 1998 VIC experiment severalpertinent CINC and Joint Staff policy documents were identified but they were allcontained the narrow and incomplete view of a particular staff code. ThePACOM J2 Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTP) for Intelligence Support toJoint Operations covered intelligence RFIs but there is no equivalent documentpublished by the J3, J4, etc.

A few years ago General Sheehan, then CINCACOM, established a new staffDirectorate, JX, to facilitate cross-staff information sharing and ACOMknowledge development. General Sheehan wanted to transform USACOM intoa Knowledge Based Organization (KBO). All of his staff directors wereadmonished to make their best information available to the JX staff forconsolidation into a USACOM Knowledge Today WEB site on the SIPRNET inlieu of development of the legacy "stovepipe" approach to information sharingand management.

JX was created as a result of need to enable fast, informed decisions by theUSACOM staff to include increasing awareness, effectiveness and agility,focusing command attention and activity, and improving knowledge andinformation flow throughout USACOM.

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The goal of the JX organization is to provide more timely and accurateknowledge and information for better decision making and raise the level ofknowledge of USACOM staff members. The JX model for knowledge sharing isnot along standard hierarchical organizational lines. JX is a multifaceted networkof human beings buying, selling and bartering knowledge in what could beconsidered a USACOM knowledge marketplace. The knowledge sharing JXinitiative has led to a more open and trusting environment among USACOM stafforganizations. CINCACOM has provided the following challenges to his staffand JX:

* Develop USACOM into an organization that recognizes and utilizes"knowledge" as a key organizational asset.

* Incorporate knowledge management as a fundamental strategic process -acquiring, developing, utilizing, archiving and disseminating knowledge withinthe organization, to clients and to customers.

* Develop and support a knowledge sharing culture with strong and open teamcommunications.

Organizations working in the knowledge environment can no longer function in astove-piped fashion. This understanding alone provides an organization with thecatalysts or opportunity to examine its structure focusing on removing theorganizational barriers that inhibit knowledge flow and thereby enhancingorganizational effectiveness. Even looking at changing specific roles within anorganization is required to evolve into a KBO. For example, the role of the"gatekeeper" in the traditional organization must transition into a "mentoring" rolethat assists and promotes the knowledge process and environment.

The focus for change at USACOM is on Organizational Knowledge as expressedby the current CINCACOM, ADM Harold W. Gehman, Jr.:

"Knowledge, jealously guarded by an individual, is not power. Quite theopposite, it detracts from the power and effectiveness of the entireorganization."

"You will be judged here by how well 'your information' was utilized by theorganization; NOT by your cleverness in obtaining it."

"We must adapt to new information flow. Everyone must 'know' whateveryone else knows."

More recently, SOCOM has disbanded the Napoleonic staff organization in favorof "Centers" that combine functions (e.g. C41SR, Acquisition) thus leading tomore efficient information sharing and management.

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· J3 and J5 have merged to become the Operations, Plans, and Policy Center(SOOP)

* J7 and J8 have merged to become the Force Structure, Requirements,Resources and Strategic Assessments Center (SORR)

* J2 and J6 have merged to become the Intelligence and InformationOperations Center (SOIO)

* SOAC (acquisition) and J4 have merged to become the Acquisition andLogistics Center (SOAL)

* J1 and Special Staff have merged to become the Command Support Center(CSC)

;written ahat calls for anagement

)orted by all.t at the JTF

refers to the'ct, and3n, collection.struction ofmationand thee JTFion

1 I U UtVIVIl u I Iiv,,, T I LV, ,- -jr-v IVI I , II , IIvI m VVIvo, a ,i IC,. opportunity toexamine organizations and how they are structured in the context ofinformation/knowledge flow and management. In the context of the ALSAMTTP, information includes data, information, knowledge and understanding.The identification of the JTF Information Management Officer (IMO) is not unlikethe private industry function known as the Chief Knowledge Officer or theKnowledge Manager (see http://www.ewin.com/articles/cko.htm).

The group was concerned that there is no one DOD organization proponent forinformation management. The DISA has an Information DisseminationManagement (IDM) PMO and the Intelligence Community (IC) INTELINKManagement Office (IMO) has an Information Management Division (IMD), toname two, but there isn't much synergy among the various DOD activities.

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The DII/COE Master Plan and the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) need to beupdated to reflect new information management paradigms such as IDM andInformation Architectures.

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4. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT and LABELING:Topics discussed included:* Examination of the utility of the CAPCO SIPRNET Virtual Classification

Manual (VCM) in OOTWNIC operations.* Integration of INTERNET and COSPO's Open Source Information System

(OSIS) network into OOTWNIC experiments.* Integration of open source imagery (e.g. Topographic Engineering Center

(TEC) IMAGENET, Air Force EAGLE VISION) into OOTWNIC experiments.* Examination of the CAPCO information markings standard for utility in an

OOTWNIC environment.

The information management and labeling discussions focused on innovativemethods for making unclassified information available to military and inter-agency forces involved in OOTW operations.

"Open source" is a term frequently used for unclassified information but that termdoes not just mean INTERNET. One anecdote about the INTERNET is that itscontent is 1% substance, 4% opinion and 95% pornography. While that may bean exaggeration, it is clear that the INTERNET alone will not provide theOOTWNIC information requirements. Fortunately, the working group includedtwo of DOD's most knowledgeable people on the subject of Open Source - Mr.Robert Steele, President of Open Source Solutions, Inc., and Mr. Ed Waller ofthe Intelligence Community (IC) Community Open Source Program Office(COSPO).

Open Source Solutions defines "open source" as any and all information that canbe derived from overt collection: all types of media, government reports andother documents, scientific research and reports, commercial vendors ofinformation, the Internet, etc. The main qualifiers to open source information arethat it does not require any type of clandestine collection techniques to obtain itand that it must be obtained through means that entirely meet the copyright andcommercial requirements of vendors where applicable. Open sourceintelligence (OSINT), in sharp contrast to its raw foundation, applies the provenmethods of the Intelligence Community to open source information, andtransforms volumes of information into an unclassified intelligence product thatrepresents judicious source discovery and validation, multi-source integrationand subject-matter expertise.

The Community Open Source Program Office (COSPO) provides IntelligenceCommunity enterprise-wide information acquisition and delivery services via avirtual private network (VPN) known as the Open Source Information System(OSIS). OSIS was one of the tools employed by the JBC JTF during the April

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1998 VIC experiment. Expanded use of OSIS is recommended for future VICexperiments.

The Army Topographic Engineering Center (TEC) is the NIMA executive agentfor commercial imagery including an INTERNET password protected WEB sitefor SPOT and LANDSAT. The Air Force runs EAGLE VISION which is an opensource imagery downlink capability. Both should be exercised during future VICexperiments in coordination with NIMA.

Information Management, the process by which we, "obtain, manipulate, direct,and control information," is the key to the successful operation of a VirtualInformation Center (VIC). Clear, concise direction as to the classification andreleasability marking of information handled by the VIC is essential to efficient,secure operation and protection of information. Such protection is necessary topreserve sources of information and to protect intellectual property rights orcontractual obligations. Thus an efficient, uniform marking schema is necessaryin VIC operations.

The Controlled Access Program (CAP) Coordinating Office (CAPCO) wascreated in 1995 by DCI Directive to provide direction and oversight for allcompartmented programs. The CAPCO answers to a CAP oversight committeechaired by Deputy Director for Central Intelligence (D/DCI) and DEPSECDEF.CAPCO has defined a set of markings standards for the intelligence communitythat have now been adopted for the Defense Messaging System (DMS).CAPCO has established a Virtual Classification manual (VCM) WEB site onmade the markings register available on the US SECRET and US SpecialCompartmented Intelligence (SCI) components of the Defense InformationSystems Network (DISN). The SCI Joint Worldwide IntelligenceCommunications System (JWICS) URL is http://www.cms.ic.gov/capco andthe SECRET Internet Protocol (IP) Router Network (SIPRNET) URL ishttp://www.cms.cia.sgaoovov/capco/pagesNCM/001frame.htm.

The CAPCO markings standards should be applied as far as possible toinformation handled by the VIC. Considerations such as contractual agreementsfor commercial data and copyrights MUST be observed in the handling ofinformation in the VIC context. Where the standards put forth in the VCMcannot reasonably be applied to VIC-handled information, a Standard OperatingProcedure (SOP) must be developed to cover the rules for releasability of suchinformation.

Open source material clearly is the mainstay of VIC operation. Classifiedintelligence may be used to 'validate' open source material inside the DODcomponent of the VIC, but almost exclusively, open source material will be theproduct answering decision-maker's questions. Open source is the 'source of

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first resort' and will be the principal substance of the VIC's responses to thedecision-maker. Successful use of open source to answer at least somedecision-maker questions will allow the more efficient use of classified collectionresources against the 'harder' targets. But, how can open source material aremade more useful in the VIC context?

There is an unimaginable and uncatalogued volume of open source material thatcould be applied toward answering any question. The VIC context thoughdemands that "just the right information " at "just the right time" to be useful.Tools that provide the researcher with a single source of reliable information,covering known information needs can save hours of research time. Forexample, a set of tools that gives the researcher a:

- Registry of 'subject matter experts' on a given topic. (Government,NGO, business, 10, academia, etc) that could be consulted for accurateanswers.

- 'Web portal' established for each 'known' HADR (or other mission area)problem set, establishing in effect a 'profile' for each problem set and lettingsearch tools seek out and deliver information that matches the profiled needs.For instance, if we know that every few years there is a flooding problemrequiring humanitarian assistance in Bangladesh, we can build a template of'information needs' for that problem set. The information needs could besatisfied, and the information held in a database until the flooding problemrecurs, then updated on the spot as necessary and used in answering questionsand preparing plans/orders for deploying elements.

- Virtual electronic 'library' of validated information, correlated to aprescribed list of information needs that is readily accessible. An excellentexample of such a tool is the World Basic Information Library (WBIL). Theconcept was successfully piloted by the Community Open Source ProgramOffice (COSPO), in coordination with the Army's Foreign Military Studies Officeand the military reserves. The WBIL is available on the Open SourceInformation System (OSIS) and, with appropriate access policy changes, couldbe used as an important resource in the VIC context. While the existing WBILholdings cover only Africa, the concept is to eventually expand the project to true'global coverage.'

- Library of open source (commercial) imagery would help in providingvisual evidence of ground situations or supplementing mapping products. TheArmy's Topographic Engineering Center has a program called IMAGENET that isavailable on the Open Source Information System (OSIS) and on the Internet.

To facilitate integration of open source assets, future VIC experiments shouldconsider a campaign plan that includes:

a) Provisions for testing information-sharing with real-world NGOsb) Provisions for testing information-sharing with US civilian agencies and

country teams

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c) Provisions for procurement of and testing of real-world informationincluding commercial imagery and image map services from the private sector

The critical next step for VIC is not a concrete one of development, but ratherone of promulgating the vision to the other CINCS through a road show, with theroad show integrating a canned demo that Mr. Steele says that his companycould put together with one of his partners, Autometric, Inc.

A critical step for VIC is to secure cross-CINC demand for and JCS fundingsupport for an examination of the availability, cost and intake implications forvarious kinds of multi-lingual multi-media open sources.

Part of this review should use a single test case country team and determinewhat information, including mapping and imagery information, is available forlocal procurement, and how much it would cost in terms of both dollars and time.The idea would be to explore the role to be played by country teams in futureVIC implementations, both as collectors and consumers in the VIC architecture.

The findings of this review should establish a strawman budget for two kinds ofopen source procurement: ongoing and surge. As noted by the Externalorganization workshop, the VIC is not a creature to be stood up suddenly, butmust be up and running constantly. An important value of the VIC would be thecontinuing relationships - "knowing who knows". Building the trust andconfidence over time among the inter agency partners will be critical. Hence, theVIC will have routine monthly subscription and acquisition costs includingacquisition costs associated with buying local knowledge; and it will have surgecosts including the costs of commercial imagery support

The review should pay special attention to timelines of acquisition. We tend toassume that information will be available overnight. In fact there is a great dealof critical information (bridge loading on a particular line of march, for instance)that has to be collected by a real human. From all of this should come a credibleprogramming estimate for the cost to support a multi-CINC virtual informationcommunity.

Keep the focus on information, and especially keep the focus on cross-staffinformation, i.e. the VIC is NOT an intelligence support activity but rather acommand support activity. This in turn will lead to the possibility of separate lineitems for each CINC for information acquisition costs, to include commercialimagery and Russian maps.

Slow down the decision-support side of the VIC. Until VIC has a better handleon the kinds of information that are going to be coming in, and how thatinformation will be deduplicated, clustered, weighted, summarized, andvisualized, it is premature to accelerate that "output" side.

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Give some thought to a multi-lingual interface and a bake-off between whatSYSTRAN offers and what might be available from other companies, such asSRA International's cross-web multi-lingual miner. The value of a VIC will bebased on its ability to bring open sources into the CINC, its ability to be multi-lingual and support coalition and complex peacekeeping operations with civilianagency participants, and its integration of information processing technology.

There is a growing wealth of open source geospatial information.* 2 meter imagery is available today from the formerly classified Russian

satellite system.* 5 meter imagery is available from the Indians, but they only have one satellite

so it is limited in coverage and capability.* 10 meter French SPOT imagery is supported by a global network of ground

stations, years of global coverage in the archives and the ability to providetwo-day revisitation.

geospatial processing and visualization can play a more important role in theVIC. Both the USAF, Autometric Inc. and TEC should be brought into adiscussion of what DOD and private sector capabilities can be brought to bear.USAF Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) has asked for a 70 day deployment of EAGLEVISION, and is beating the drum for much more commercial imagery.Autometric, Inc. has a powerful multi-source geospatial correlation andvisualization product called EDGE.

See http://www.autometric.com/AUTO/PRODUCTS/EDGE for a description ofthe Autometric, Inc., EDGE product line.

Mr. Steele suggested some open source metrics for VIC consideration:* TIMING: Do open sources enable "good enough" information to be received

quickly?· CONTEXT: Do open sources give us a contextual understanding that would

not otherwise be available?* CONTENT: Are open sources "good enough" to improve the decision at

hand, whether by reducing uncertainty or bringing forward factors that wouldotherwise have been overlooked?

* EMPOWERMENT: Does the inherent sharability of open sources empowerthe decision-maker by contributing to the understanding of other keypersonnel, most of whom may not be cleared for classified information?

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5. TECHNOLOGY:

Topics discussed included:· Collaborative technology* Information cataloging technology* Metafile standards* Multi Level Security (MLS) technology

Multi-point collaborative technology is a key VIC enabler. There is a core set ofcapabilities common to most collaborative technology candidates - audioconferencing, shared white boarding (e.g., a common overlay viewed by allparticipants, each having the ability to annotate such that all the otherparticipants can see), shared processes (e.g., a common mission supportapplication processor driving the screen of all participants), and, wherebandwidth permits, videoconferencing.

At least eight of the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration 1997 (JWID97)projects involved collaborative technology. The JWID Joint Program Office(JJPO) sponsored a MITRE report on the use of collaborative technologiesduring JWID97 - "JWID97 Collaboration Across the Coalition". Seehttp://www.dra.hmg.gb/iwid/jwid97/reports/colab planning/mitre dcp_report.html for the full text of that report. The report concludes that,

"In the face of continuing budget and personnel reductions, and more andmore operations conducted as part of a multi-national coalition, collaborationhas become a key factor in the successful conduct of business in themilitary, whether in peacetime, crisis, or war. Successful collaboration can bea forcemultiplier, shortening timelines for planning and execution cycles, permittingfaster reactions to enemy actions. It enables more timely support to decisionmakers for more responsive actions with more complete analysis. Thecapability to collaborate seamlessly across geographic and organizationalboundaries also provides an unprecedented opportunity to re-evaluatecurrent doctrines and processes - a decisive edge to win the war. This factextends to all military operations, both national and coalition."

Technology demonstrated during JWID97 included:

- The Common Operational Modeling, Planning and Simulation Strategy(COMPASS) GOTS which achieved "golden nugget" status during JWID97.COMPASS was developed to enable collaborative planning supported bymodeling & simulation (M&S)

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- The Collaborative Virtual Workspace (CVW) GOTS developed by MITRECorporation and used by some members of the Intelligence Community (IC) tosupport collaborative intelligence production.

- Microsoft's point to point COTS collaborative tool called NETMEETING is abundled component of MS INTERNET EXPLORER and was used during theApril 1998 VIC experiment to support JTF Commander (JBC) to CINC (PACOMPolitical Military Anchor Desk - PMAD) collaboration.

- Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) Collaborative Tool-set (JCT) GOTS used to support collaborative intelligence dissemination.

- and SUN's SHOWME COTS product on the Army Maneuver ControlSystem (MCS).

Subsequent to JWID97, DIA ran a competitive procurement to select a standardCOTS collaborative technology for their Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture(JIVA) program. The GTE COTS product DIA JIVA selected is known as productINFOWORKSPACE (IWS). IWS is engineered such that an MS NET MEETINGcollaborative session can "join" an IWS session in progress.

GCCS 3.0 includes three collaborative technology segment groupings -JDISS/JCT, COMPASS and a deliberate planning collaboration GOTS toolknown as the Theater Analysis, Replanning and Graphical Execution Toolbox(TARGET). TARGET was originally demonstrated during JWID 94. TARGETprovides such capabilities as shared plans, video, voice, maps, briefings andpointers. JWID 94 was used to demonstrate collaborative disaster reliefplanning in Hawaii at USCINCPAC and combat operations at USACOM and theAir Combat Command. TARGET includes a shared set of planning toolswhich enable users to jointly assess transportation feasibility, cost, casualties,and time associated with alternate courses of action (COA). In the JWID94 reliefscenario, a Combined JTF was simulated from NRaD in San Diego whointeracted with surrogate members from Army Materiel Command and DefenseLogistics Agency. Logistics, weather, and disaster anchor desks were providedon Oahu. Functionally, the planning tools enable crisis action members to rapidlyproduce Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD), validate feasibility,visualize results on the Geographical Logistics Awareness Display (GLAD),obtain critical situation information from anchor desks, select a final course ofaction, and transmit this to the theater commander.

The use of collaborative technology is particularly important in an OOTWenvironment. Future VIC experiments should attempt to sort through the mazeof technology options to identify the most cost-effective tools for that uniqueunclassified inter agency network.

Information cataloging and dissemination management across US classified andunclassified security domains would be a boon to Inter Agency and OOTWoperations. DOD has made significant investments in information dissemination

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management (idm) but has yet to determine the ideal mix of idm technologyrequired to support JTF operations to include OOTW. The ideal mix is referredto by some as "big IDM".

The Joint Staff J6 is staffing a third draft Mission Needs Statement (MNS) forInformation Dissemination Management. The MNS states:

"Timely, relevant, accurate information is a fundamental requirement for thedecision making process of military operations. Robust commercialdevelopment, acceptance and expansion of Intemet Services are spawningrapid technology improvements in information management. Uncoordinatedapplication of these improvements threaten the smooth flow of informationbetween Warfighters and supporting activities; complicate our ability todefine and implement policies for information resource usage priorities; and,pose interoperability problems in choosing the right emerging technologies toaddress the information overload problem. The Department of Defense(DOD) needs the processes, functions, and services of InformationDissemination Management (IDM) to provide the Warfighters at all levels(Strategic, Operational, and Tactical) and other users of information withawareness of relevant, accurate information, automated access to newlydiscovered or reoccurring information, and timely, efficient delivery ofinformation in a useable format. Equally important is an InformationDissemination Management strategy that can guide ongoing IDM efforts andthat can address the amount of information available to the Warfighter, theimpact of information overload on the Warfighter, and how the informationdelivery may be prioritized to optimize the use of information resources...IDM will also be incorporated into the Common Operating Environment(COE) configuration management programs and will provide services thatare applicable to allied/coalition operations where feasible. It will extendfrom the location where the functional activity information resources areaccessed for dissemination and retrieval; through all DOD communicationpathways; to the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical levels. This will requirecommanders to establish local area guidelines for the dissemination ofinformation within their area of responsibility. IDM will encompass voice,data, image and video transmissions and will be applicable across allsecurity domains. The integrated capability provided by IDM is needed bythe CINCs, Services, and Agencies and is critical to achieving JV 2010goals."

The "big IDM" challenge is not technology. DOD has invested over $.5B in IDMrelated technology in very large programs such as the Battlefield AwarenessData Dissemination (BADD) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration(ACTD), the Global Broadcast System (GBS) Phase I testbed, the Bosnia C2Augmentation (BC2A) initiative also known as the Joint Broadcast System (JBS),the GBS Phase II, and the Intelligence Community (IC) Integrated Broadcast

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System (IBS). The challenge, depicted in the graphic below, is to sort throughthe technology maze to find that technology that best applies to the unclassified,inter agency VIC network.

FY99 & 00 IDM Focus

Top Di

Technolog:

T

IDM)ted forigementK WEB pages

ssified.al MLSoperability.URY, OIW,/ICentation inidex.html for

Bottom Up

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6. CULTURE:

Topics discussed included:· Some needed cultural changes* Opportunities for cultural change* The difficulties of cultural change

Fundamental changes to the DOD culture will be required in order for DOD toeffectively and efficiently handle the challenges of OOTW missions and to fullyunderstand the benefit of a concept such as the VIC.

Culture, according to Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition, is "The setof shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes anorganization."

One can deduce several key insights from the definition. First, culture gets at thefundamental aspects of an organization (e.g., values, goals). Thus, it is thebedrock upon which the key aspects of the problem rests (e.g., policy, personnelissues, technology). Second, because it is so fundamental, it is generally deep-rooted in a conservative organization, and hence difficult to change. Finally,because it constitutes the context for all other aspects to the problem, one mustundertake cultural change in concert with any other significant change to theenterprise.

There are five principal areas where DOD cultural changes are required.

First, the US military has historically focused almost exclusively on the militarydimension of a conflict. In light of the conflicts that are emerging in the "NewWorld Disorder", (e.g., Somalia, Bosnia) this will require an expansion of scopeto include first order consideration of political, social and economic factors by themilitary. This has profound implications on the education and trainingcommunities and a redefinition of the metrics that guide development andexecution of courses of action.

Second, from an information focus, the military has traditionally sought to clarify"known unknowns", (e.g., what are the capabilities and intentions of anadversary's battalion?). That has caused them to focus on the question of "howto get needed information", (e.g., what sensor to task to collect key data; how tofuse available data to generate needed information). Culturally, the military mustconfront the issue of "unknown unknowns", (e.g. in Somalia, who are the powercenters?). Once they have structured the problem, they can then begin toconsider what information to get, (e.g., monitor the food supply or the number ofsoccer fields that are being used). These changes will require significant cultural

18

reorientation by the individuals and organizations charged with the DODinformation enterprise.

Third, there is a need for a cultural change in our conceptualization of forces andoperational concepts. In the cold war, the focus was on a symmetrical opponentand measures that reflected traditional military effectiveness, (e.g., lossexchange ratios). The current spectrum of adversaries is far moreheterogeneous ranging from hackers to transnational terrorist and rogue states.All of these adversaries are likely to use asymmetrical techniques to avoid USstrengths, (e.g., conventional combined arms) and to exploit its weaknesses,(e.g., attacks against critical infrastructures; use of WMD to limit US access totheaters). These changes require basic changes in our understanding ofconcepts such as indications and warning (I&W) and tactical warning and attackassessments.

Fourth, we need to modify our organizational constructs to deal with the realitiesof the information age. Thus, Napoleonic stovepipes, (i.e., the classical "J" staffsections) must be reconfigured to allow the collaboration that the above citedchanges in the nature of the problem mandates.

Finally, cultural changes are needed to accommodate all of the organizationsthat are central to the enterprise. Thus, even though the military is currentlyundergoing a cultural change to think more "purple", (i.e., from a Service to aJoint perspective), that change does not go far enough.

Since the true dimension of the problem subsumes coalition partners,international organizations and NGOs, the military will have to expand itsspectrum of thinking to subsume the full "rainbow". This will require majorinitiatives to broaden knowledge of languages, ethnic heritages and socio-economic issues.

Some keys to cultural change in the military are the identification of "changechampions", broader participation in planning, different organization structures(like the VIC and PMAD), new processes, technology and resources.

Change starts at the top. Since the DOD "top" turns over more frequently, (e.g.,more often than it takes to have cultural changes take root), it is important tohave a succession of champions who are committed to the change.

As noted above, a broader set of players, (e.g., NGOs, lOs), are central to theenterprise, particularly in OOTW operations. This requires broadeningparticipation in planning and operations to ensure that these diverse participantsare "in synch".

1919

A WEB-like information structure like the VIC is inconsistent with rigid, stovepiped organizations.

Key to process change is to incentivize the search for new solutions. Thismeans rewarding those who "get it", (e.g., promoting them) and not rewardingthose who are not responsive to the leadership of "change champions".

The technology key to cultural change is to be open to commercial innovationsand to adapt them to the unique problems/environments of today's military.

Ultimately, the "change champions" must ensure that adequate resources (in allits dimensions) are available to nurture the cultural change.

Cultural change is hard. It is extremely difficult and it requires long termcommitments.

The figure below depicts a business process reengineering model that has beenwidely used to co-evolve the critical elements of an enterprise. The key point isthat all of the elements must be addressed, in concert, if a lasting change to anenterprise is to be enabled. Note that cultural issues must be considered, as acontext of the overall undertaking.

iduct, or morer new order of

Dr. Stu Starr, 3-5 VIC workshop

20

CULTURAL CONTEXT

~~~I ~ORGANIZATION

PEOPLETRAINING/EXERCISES

DOCTRINESPOLICY

PROCESSES RESOURCES TECHNOLO YINFO MGM T

I,5 I"5~~~~~_

PRDUT

--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I

7. TRAINING and EXERCISES:

Topics discussed included:* Examination of the sufficiency of UJTL/JMETL in terms of:

Requirement for training approach for using VICRequirement for training for OOTW (CCP)Requirement for training multi-agency, multi-national, coalition

coordination (e.g., PDD-56)* VIC concept applied to new training approaches:

Focused scenarios for JTF staff to augment CPX trainingUse of open source info, collaboration, role playing, OOTW simulation to

augment CPX training for JTF staff· VIC concept to support to CPX training:

VIC for exercise planning, developmentVIC for info gathering, collaboration in exercise execution

The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and the CINC's Joint Mission EssentialTask Lists (JMETLs) need to be evaluated to ensure that they address issuesthat are associated with the VIC concept. In addition to their being a trainingrequirement for how to utilize a VIC, tasks associated with OOTW missionsand/or coordinating with outside agencies must also be addressed in the UJTLand JMETLs.

In May of 1997, President Clinton signed the Presidential Decision Determination56 (PDD-56), the product of which is referred to as "the US InteragencyIntegration and Implementation Plan." This establishes a domestic plan forinteragency collaboration and coordination. The incorporation of PDD-56concepts into Joint training is an important enabler for the VIC concept. FutureVIC activities should address PDD56 issues with the assistance of the Nationaldefense University (NDU). NDU has training responsibility for PDD-56 and isimplementing that responsibility through NDU, Army War College and ForeignService Institute courses of instruction.

Another enabler for VIC is to provide an environment that has the potential toenhance current JTF training. There is currently a training void that existsbetween relatively low-cost, low fidelity academic and seminar games and thehigh-cost, high fidelity Command Post Exercises (CPXs). By using VIC as theinformation source for a distributed, interactive training environment, portions ofthe JTF staff could be training in information gathering and collaboration withoutside agencies. This would augment the current training - filling a currenttraining void.

21

The traditional JTF CPX training could also be enhanced via the VIC concept.By using VIC in a training experience, the CINCs and their staff could learn thevalue of the concept and learn to use it in an operational capability.

A potential target of opportunity for the VIC concept is to become involved withthe Brave Knight CPX. Brave Knight is being supported by ACOM/JWFC, but itis a EUCOM JTF training event. It features a Poland, ConsequenceManagement (CM) scenario. Key dates are March 99 Mid Planning Conference(MPC) scenario development August 99 and Phase 3 CPX 15-30 Aug 99. Keylocations for the exercise are the USACOM joint warfighting Center 9JWFC)Joint Training Analysis and Simulation Center (JTASC) and Kelley Barracks,Germany. The EUCOM desk officer for this exercise is LTC Lingenfelter, 726-6207. The training audience is the Second marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF)out of Camp Lejeune, NC, acting in a Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF)capacity. The scenario is that the JIATF and Interagency response team areformed in response to a nuclear weapon detonation in Eastern Europe. Ifoperated as a non-intrusive parallel activity, a coordinated VIC activity couldshow added value of the VIC concept. The JBC lab in JTASC test bay 19 couldplay the role of a II MEF JIATF VIC node via network connectivity to the trainingaudience in JTASC test bay 14. The test bay 14 Brave Knight JIATF CommandCenter is literally right around the corner from the JBC test bay 19.

Being that it focuses on CM, outside agencies are being involved in the scenariodevelopment for Brave Knight. This is being done in conjunction with NDU'sacademic course on PDD-56. In this instance, outside agencies will gather inMarch of 1999 to learn about PDD-56, while at the same time, generating thestrategic guidance and outside agency plans for the scenario. These documentswill be provided to the training audience as they develop their OPLAN for theexercise. In the exercise execution, these outside agencies will also participateby generating scenario products in support of the training.

Using the VIC concept in this exercise, VIC could act as a mirror site to thetraining audience. This could demonstrate the superiority in RFI products whenthe VIC is being employed.

22

Presentationby Xiao Xing, deputy director of Info., Red Cross Society and Yuan Jing, DeputySecretary General of Hubei Branch, RCSC

1. Summary· General information on Chinese Red Cross· '98 floods in China· Information sources used /obtained by Chinese Red Cross during emergency

situation* What are to be further improved· Conclusion

2. General information on Chinese Red Cross* Founded in 1904;* One of the members of International Red Cross since 1912;* 150,000 grass-root organizations and 20 million membership nationwide* To function as an auxiliary of authorities in humanitarian field in carrying out

such tasks as disaster relief/preparedness, first aid, social welfare, bloodtransfusion and dissemination of International Humanitarian Law, etc.

3. '98 Floods in China* General picture on floods situation* Losses and affected population;* Red Cross' relief operations and;* Situation in affected regions so far.

4. Information sources used /obtained by Chinese Red Cross during emergencysituation* Information released by authorities;* Field assessment by local Red Cross, HQ's team;* Media reports from both home and abroad and;* Telecommunication (no alternatives ways to obtain information so far).

5. What are to befurther improved* Personnel training for obtaining and using of information source;* Alternatives communication tools (computer network, mobile satellite phone);* Donation in cash and kind at emergency stage;* Transportation and;* Disaster preparedness

6. Conclusion* Relief operations depend on external limited donation;* Rapid response to disaster to be further strengthened;* Personnel training and;* Alternative communication ways besides existing telecommunication.

La

1

Our View--Information Issues in-Relation to '98 China Floods

Presentation at Paclnfo'99By Xiao Xing, Juan Jing,

Red Cross Society of China

I | . . . . . . . .

Summary

*General information on Chinese RedCross

*'98 floods in China*Information sources used /obtained by

Chinese Red Cross during emergencysituation

*What are to be further improvedOConclusion

I I - n o n n Em n

General information on_I -_ Chinese Red Cross

*Founded in 1904;*One of the members of International Red Cross

since 1912;*150,000 grass-root organizations and 20 million

membership nationwide and;*To function as an auxiliary of authorities in

humanitarian field in carrying out such tasks asdisaster relief/preparedness, first aid, socialwelfare, blood transfusion and dissemination ofInternational Humanitarian Law, etc.

'98 Floods in China

OGeneral picture on floods situation*Losses and affected population;ORed Cross' relief operations and;OSituation in affected regions so far.

Generalpicture onfloods situation

· The YangtzeRiver Valley was hit by eightsuccessive flood crests;

· Record -breaking floods also hit theNenjing River and Songhua River Valley,with successive flood crests and;

· 12 provinces and more than 180 millionpeople were affected.

Losses and affectedpopulationLosses and affectedpopulation;

* More than 180 million people were affected and4,150 dead;

* More than 18.3 million evacuated (homeless);* 6.85 million houses collapsed and more than 13

million damaged;* More than 22 million hectares of cultivated land

affected, in which 5.29 million no harvest and;* Direct economic losses: 255 billion yuan (US$30

billion).

n 18 n n n ni 'T [I IT U em

A

· ~ ~ ~ I~~~ I ' ' * f

Red Cross' relief operations and

22

· Operations in 10 flood-hit provinces;· Offering 670 million in cash and kind;* More than 9000 medical teams serving

victims and;· Beneficiary: 30 million people.

Io n n n

· The most of victims removed reconstructed housesor shelter houses;

* Food and cloths available;· No epidemic diseases found in affected regions;· Some victims will face lack of food in this spring

and;· Environment problem during coming spring.

-I _ r - n ~ I I.

information sources used/obtained by Chinese RedCross during emergency situation

*What kind of information is needed?OMajor channels to obtain information:

* Informaion rleased by authoriies;* Fld asssment by local Red Coss, HQ'I team* Meda repor from ba home and abroad and

*Telecommunication (no alternatives ways toobtain information so far).

What are to be further improved

*Personnel training for obtaining and using ofinformation source;

*Alternatives communication tools (computernetwork, mobile satellite phone);

*Seeking donation in cash and kind atemergency stage;

OTransportation and;*Disaster preparedness.

Conclusion

*Relief operations depend on externallimited donation;

*Personnel training;*Rapid response to disaster to be further

strengthened and;*Alternative communication ways

besides existing telecommunication.

-

Situation in affected regions so far

- l

I~~~~ I. 1 fl -i - - -lN m i i i i . . i T .

-- ~ I I1 n w ~ q f~ I1 f

Paclntel '99 PROCEEDINGS Pacific Intelligence Forum Creating a Virtual Intelligence

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