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Vivarium

Volume 14

1976

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VIVARIUM

AN

INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL

FOR

THE

PHILOSOPHY

AND

INTELLECTUAL

LIFE

OF THE

MIDDLE

AGES

AND

RENAISSANCE

VOLUME

XIV

1976

E.

J.

BRILL

-

LEIDEN

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VIVARIUM

AN

INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL

FOR THE PHILOS-

OPHY

AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE

OF

THE

MIDDLE

AGES

AND

RENAISSANCE

vivarium

s devoted

n

particular

o the

profane

side

of

mediaeval

hilosophy

nd the

ntellectualife

f

the

Middle

Ages

and

Renaissance.

editors

C.

J.

de

Vogel,

Utrecht)

L.

M. de

Rijk, Leyden)

H.

A.

G.

Braakhuis,

Nijmegen)

F. F.

Blok,

Amsterdam)

J.

IJsewijn,

Louvain).

SecretaryftheEditorial oard:Prof. . M.deRijk.

All

communications,

xcept

hose

f business

ature,

hould

be addressed

o C.

H.

Kneepkens,

atholieke

Universiteit,

Erasmuslaan

0,

8.26,

Nijmegen,

he

Netherlands.

advisory

Marie-Therse

'Alvemy,

Paris-Poitiers)

Tullio

Gregory,

committee

(Rome)

Paul Oskar

Kristeller,

New

York)

-

JanPinborg,

(Copenhagen)

Albert

immermann,

Cologne).

publishers

E.

J.

Brill,

Leiden,

The

Netherlands.

published

Twice

yearly,

ay

nd

November;

a 160

pages

yearly.

Contributions

ubmitted

o

vivarium should

preferably

be writtenn English, rench rGerman. he manuscripts

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paced,

xcept

for

ong

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nd footnotes.

dequate

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hould be

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ontinuously

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ach article.

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ofthe

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Contributors

eceive

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ree f

charge.

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM, VOL. 14, NOS. 1-2, 1976

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CONTENTS

OF

VOLUME XIV

(1976)

. . KNEEPKENS "Mulier Quae Damnavit Salvavit" A

Utrecht Note

on the

Early

Developmentof

the

Relatio

simplex

i

L. M.

de

RIJK

Some

Thirteenth

entury

Tracts

on

The

Leiden

Game

of

Obligation

II

26

rpd

p. orb an

Anonymi

Teutonici

commentum n

Utrecht

Theo oli

eclogam

e

codice

Utrecht,

U.B.

22

editum

4)

50

e.

j.

ash

worth

"/

Promise

You a

Horse': A

Second

Waterloo

Ontario

Problem

of

Meaning

and

Reference

n

Late

Fifteenth

and

Early

Sixteenth

Century

ogic

(j)

.

.

.

62

G.

R. Evans

St. Anselm'

Analogies

81

Reading

Berks.

Jerome

v.

brown

fohn

Duns

Scotus

on

Henry

of

Ghent's

Windsor Ontario Argumentsfor Divine Illumination

The

Statement

f

the

Case

94

paul

v.

spade

William

Heytesbury's

osition

on

"

In

-

loomington,

ndiana

solubles"

One

Possible

Source

114

L.

M.

de

RIJK

Richard

Billingham's

Works

on

Logic

121

Leiden

E.

j.

ASHWORTH

"/

Promise

You a

Horse - A

Second

Waterloo,

ntario

Problem

of Meaning

and

Reference

n

Late

Fifteenth

and

Early

Sixteenth

Century

ogic

(2)

139

.

H.

KNEEPKENS

Another

Manuscript of

the

REGULAE

Nijmegen

DE

MEDI I

S

SY

LLABI

S

maistri

W l-

leimt:

Cambridge

Corpus

Christi

Col-

lege

460

156

BOOKS

RECEIVED

59

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6/164

Vivarium

IV,

i

(1976)

i(

Mulier

Quae

Damnavit

,

Salvavit"

A

Note on the

Early

Development

f

theRelatio

simplex

C.

H.

KNEEPKENS

I.

Introduction

In

of

the

his

paragraph

Notices et

on

extraits

the

rapports

} Charles

of the

Thurot

relatives

observed

to

their

for

antecedents,

the period

f

his

Notices et

extraits

CharlesThurot observed forthe period

from the

late

Antiquity

until

the

middle of

the

twelfth

century

servile

following

f

the medieval

grammarians

of

Priscian's

doctrine

on the

relatives.

Only

in

Peter

Helias' Summa

he

noticed

a first

tep

on the

path

of

independence:

the

division,

not found

in

Priscian,

of

the

relatio

nto

the

relatio

directa

nd

the

relatio

ndirecta

2

A

further

tage

of

development

Thurot

found n

the

tracts

dating

from

the

middle of

the thirteenth

entury:

a

systematical

treatment f the

relatio

and the relatives in

one

section.

In

his Notices

he

printed

an

extensivefragment aken fromthe Summa de constructionefmaster

Poncius the

Provencal,3

ater,

in

1886,

completely

edited

by

Fierville.4

Poncius'

section on

the

relatives

[De

relativis)

5

can

be

divided into

two

main

parts:

on the relatio and

on

the

relatives.

The

paragraph

on

the relatio

tartswith a

definition

f the

relatio

ascribed

to Priscian

'

Relatio est

ut ait

Priscianus,

antelate rei

repetitio

vel

representatio'

Next

a

division

of the

relatio

into eleven

kinds

is

given,

among

which

there

are five

couples

*

This paper, n a first raft,was read at the Internationalymposionor

Medieval

ogic

and

Semantics

Leyden/Nijmegen,

974.

wish o

express

my

cordial

hanks

o

Prof.L. M.

de

Rijk

and

Drs

H. A.

G.

Braakhuis or

heir

many

nd useful

ommentsnd

criticisms. am

indebted lso to

Mrs

Deborah

Gil

who

was

so

kind o readthis

paper

nd to

correct

o

many

lumsy

ffences

I

made

against

he

English rammar.

1

Ch.

Thurot,

Notices

t

extraits

e divers

manuscrits

atins

our

ervir

l'histoire

des

doctrines

rammaticales

u

moyen-ge,

otices

t

Extraits .

.,

t.

XXXII, 2,

Paris

1869

anast. repr.

Frankfurtm Main

1964),pp. 355-72.

2

Thurot

869

p.

356.

3

Thurot

86,

pp.

356-7.

4

Ch.

Fierville,

ne

grammaire

atine

ndite u

XIIIe

sicle,

aris

1886.

The

Summade constructionef master Poncius is edited n theAppendixI,

pp.

177-92.

5

Fierville

886

pp.

186-90.

I

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1.

a.

ecleptica:

'qui

legitdisputai*

b.

non-ecleptica:

homo

qui legitdisputt';

2. a. directa:

'

hic legit ui disputt

b. indirecta:

'ille

legitquem

video'

3.

a. intrinseca:

idem

egit

t

disputt

b. extrnseca:

T.

legit

qui

disputt

;

4.

a.

intrasumpta:

Sortes

diligit

e'

b.

extrasumpta:

'homo

egit

qui

disputt']

5.

a.

mutua:

'Ule

qui

legit

disputt

6. a.

personalis:

'Prus

legit

qui disputt

b. simplex: 'mulierdampnavit ue salvavi.

The

relatio

simplex

on

its

turn,

s subdivided

into

seven

subkinds

1.

when the antecedent

supposits

for

an

appellat[iv]um( )t

and

the

relative for another

appellat[iv]um

'mulier

dampnavit

que

salvavi

2.

when

the antecedent

supposits

for the sort

(maneries),

and

the

relative for

the same:

'homo est

dignssima

creaturarum

cui

competit

uti r

lione'

3.

when the

antecedent

supposits

for

the

sort,

and the

relative for

an

appellat[iv]um serpens st aUidissimumnimal qui venit dmulierm'

4.

when

the

antecedent

supposits

for

an

appellat[iv]um,

and the

relative for

the sort:

'homo

currit,

qui

est

dignssima

creaturarum']

5.

when the antecedent

supposits

for

the noun

itself

(materialiter),

and

the

relative

for

the

res

(= appellatum)

'

homo

est

appellativum

nomen

quod

( )

currit'

6.

when the

antecedent

supposits

for

the res

and the

relative

for the

noun

itself

(materialiter)

'homo

currit

quod

est

appellativum

nomen'

7.

when

the

antecedent

and

the relative

supposit

for

the

sort

in

equivocation:

'canis est latrabile animal

quod

est celeste sidus or

'

manus

mee

que

vos

feceruntt

lavis

confixe

unt'.

The

paragraph

on

the

relatives

starts

with the

division of

the

relatives

into

the relativa

substantiae

and

the

relativa

proprietatum

and is

further

devoted

to

the rules

for

the

use

of

the

relatives

in the

proposition,

and

to some

exceptional

cases.

The

following

definitions

f

the

relatio

personalis

and

of

the

relatio

simplex

attracted

Thuros

special

attention

The

relatio

xtrnseca

as

lacking

n

Fierville's

manuscript.

supplied

t

from hurot

869 p.

357.

2

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'Personalis

elatio

st,

quando

ntecedens

upponit

ro

uno

appellativo )

et relativum

ro

eodem,

t

P.

legit, ui disputt.

Simplex

st,

quando

antecedens

upponit ro

uno

appellativo )

et rela-

tivum

pro alio,

ut in

theologia

mulier

ampnavit,ue

salvavit.'

He

supposed

their

origin

n the

logical

theories

of the

early

thirteenth

century,8

nd

brought

them

in relation

with

the

suppostilo

simplex

and

personalis,key-notions

n the medieval

Terminist

ogic.9

The

oldest mention of

the

relatio

implex

known

to

Thurot occurred

in

a

line of Alexander

de

Villadei's

Doctrinale

dated

by

Thurot

in

the

first

art

of

the

thirteenth

entury.10

ere

only

one kind of the

relatio

simplex

as such

was

given:

'Occurretque

ibi

quandoque

elatio

implex

Femina, uaeclausit itae ortamreseravi.11

Thurot

printed

immediately

after

these lines

the

comment from

the

o-called Glose

Admirantes'

dating

from he

middle of

the

thirteenth

century.

This

commentary

pointed

at the

parallel

between

the relatio

simplex/personalis

nd

the

suppositio

implexpersonalis,

2

The

glossator

first

gives

three

ways

of the

use of the notion

of

suppositio

simplex

[i.

'

homo

est

species'

2.

'

homo est

animal

3.

'

piper

venditurhic et

Rome'.].

Next

he states

that

the

relatio

simplex

has been

called so

a

privatione ersone and discusses the meaningofpersona here. In this

context

persona

cannot

signify

ither

the

accident

of the

verb nor

of

the

pronoun,

nor the

individua essentia

rationalis

nature

(i.e.

the

Boethian

definition),

but

persona

has to be

accepted

here

as the

7

Thurot

869,

pp.

357-9.

8

Thurot

869,

pp.

357-8:

'Les

dnominationst

les

dfinitions

es

relatio

simplex

t

personalis

nt

t

empruntes

la

logique

du

temps

and

he

adds

in

a

note

'La

terminologie

t la

thorie

ogique

e la

suppositio

'apparaissent

pas

avant e

XIIIe

sicle.

Le

plus

ancien

exte

u

je

aie

rencontre

st

dans

le

Doctrinal

'Alexandre

e

Villedieu).

uivant

es

logiciens

ne

terme

nral

dsigneubstantivement,u,comme n disaitdsle commencementu XIIIe

sicle,

uppose our

supponit

ro)

a

classe

ides

laquelle

sa

signification

est

rapporte,

omme

ans homo st

pecies,

nimal

st

genus,

u

pour

outce

qui

est

compris

ans

'tendue e

sa

signification,

omme

ans

omnis omo

st

animal.

La

premire

uppositio

tait

appelle implex

la

seconde

personalis.

On

disait

de

mme

e

la

relatio.

9

For

the

development

f

Terminist

ogic,

ee L. M. de

Rijk,

ogica

moderno-

rum.

A

Contributiono

the

History

f Early

Terminist

ogic, (Assen

1962),

II,

i,

2

(Assen 967).

10

Thurot

869,

p.

28:

'Alexandre

e

Villadieu donc

vcu et crit

dans

la

premire

oiti

u

XIIIe

sicle'.

11

Das

Doctrinale es

Alexander

e

Villa-Dei,

d. D.

Reichling,

erlin

1893,

w. 1449-50;Thurot 869,p. 360: 'Alexandrene connatqu'une espcede

relatio

implex'

12

Thurot

869,pp.

360-1.

3

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9/164

res individua

accidentibus

circumscripta,

t

sunt

tempus,

ocus,

figura

-

for

they

make a

thing

an individual

thing,

and

show

that it

is

a

res

singularis ,

or

as the

individuumof a

species.

And so the

adjective

personalis

in relatio

personalis

must be taken. Therefore n the term

relatio

simplex

the

adjective

simplex

indicates the removal

of the

collection of accidents

needed for

an

individuano,

and so the

word

used in the relatio

implex

does

not

stand for n

individuum,

ut for a

genus

or a

species.

However,

in the

proposition

mulier

que dampnavit,

salvavi,

the

question

rises

whether the relative

que

refers to idem

numero

Relatio

personalis)

or

to idem

specie Relatio simplex).

If

it

refers to

idem

numero,

the

proposition

is

false,

for then

the

real

identity f Eve and Maryhas to be accepted. If it refers o idemspecie,

the

proposition

is false

too,

since

a

species

cannot damn nor

save.

But

if

we

want

to maintain the

dicta

antiquorum,

he

glossator says,

we have to

mix

up

in

such

locutions

the intentio

peciei

and

the

intentio

ndividui,

and understand

them as follows:

mulier,

.e. a

thing

of this

species, dampnavit,

and

a

thing

of the same

species

salvavit.

Any

further ubdivision

of the

relatio

simplex,

as

given by

Poncius,

does not occur

in the Glose.

Whereas the textsprintedby Thurot on thissubject, can all be dated

in the thirteenth

century,

the notions

of the relatio

simplex

and

personalis

do

already

occur

in some

writingsdating

from he

twelfth

century.

In

this

paper

I will trace the

development

of the

relatio

simplex

ccording

to

some

of these

texts

dating

from

he

early

twelfth

century.

n a

followingpaper

I will sketch a second

stage

of

develop-

ment: the

incorporation

of the

relatio

simplex

into

the theories on

syntax by

the

grammarians

of the

late twelfth nd

early

thirteenth

century.

And in a further

tudy

I

intend

to examine the use

made

ofthe relatio implex n the tracts that belong to the traditionof the

early

Terminist

ogic

from the

later

quarter

of the

twelfth

until

the

middle of the

thirteenth

entury.

In the above

mentionedtracts

on the

relatio

he

example

mulier

que

damnavit,

alvavi

or

slight

variations

of

t,

have been

frequently

sed

for

llustrating

he

relatio

implex.

Since it

is

a common

procedure

for

medieval

grammarians

and

logicians

to take the

same

example

for

illustrating

a

certain

question,

even if

terminology

and doctrinal

point

of view

differ, propose

to

use,

in

a first

nstance,

his

example

typical

of the

relatio

implex,

as a

guide

forthe

investigations

on the

development

of the relatio

implex.

4

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II. The Early Twelfth

Century Texts

A.

Peter

Abailard

The example 'mulierque damnavit salvavi or a slightvariant of it

occurs

three

times

n

the Abailardian

writings

I.

The

Logica

'Ingredientibus (the

gloss

on

the

Perihermeneias).lz

In

the

discussion

on the

true affirmative

ategorical

propositions

(de

veris

affirmationibus)

bailard

claims

that

the formal

structure

of all

the

dicta

of

propositions

of

this kind

is

aliquid

esse

aliquid

quod

ipsum

est

The

propositions

homoest

animal

9

and

'

Socrates st animal9

Abailard

continues,

both

say

hominem

esse animal

but

the former

does so simpliciter nd the latter determinateAbailard now makes

two

remarks on

the

proposition

Socrates

est animal

*

with

regard

to

the

above

given

formal

structure.

We

must note that

since

'

Socrates

est

animal

9

says

Socratem sse

illud

quod

ipse

est

the

nominal

predicate

phrase

illud

quod

ipse

est

is

used here in the

proposition

neutr

liter,

just

as

if t

was said that

quae

res

ipse

est

refers o animal

simpliciter

so

that it

does not

obtain from

Socrates

the

subject,

any

determinate

meaning.

The

same

question

is dealt

with in

the Sententie

secundum M.

Petrm,XXVI ,14where is argued that the proposition Socrates est

homo

says

Socratem sse id

quod

ipse

est

Here we

must not take

'id'

discrete

ecundum

personam

but

indifferenter

am

secundumnaturam

quam

secundum

personam

In

the

Logica

'

Ingredientibus

Abailard

illustrates this

process

of

referring

with

two

examples

'

per

mulierem

intravit

mors

per

eandemvita

and

'

mulier

uae

damnavit,

psa

salvavi

According

to

Abailard

the

pronouns

eandem

and

quae/ipsa

are used

here

indifferenter

nd

not

personaliter

since the

meaning

of

e.g.

the

latter

example

is: mulier

a

thing

of

this

sex,

damnavit et

eadem

a

thing

of the same

sex,

salvavit so that eadem s used for: the same

secundum

indifferentiam

exus

and

not

for: the

same secundum

identitatem

ersonae.

This

kind

of

relatio

Abailard

calls the relatio

indi

er

ns,

and it

can

occur when

the

appellative

noun

to which

the

relative

refers,

s

a noun habens

nominationem

onfus

m.

13

Logica

'

Ingredientibus

in:

Peter

Abaelards

Philosophische

chriften

ed.

.

Geyer,

eitrge

.

., XXI,

1-3,

Mnster.

W.

1919-1927,

sp.

Vol.

3:

Die

Glossen u

Epjxeveta,

p.

307"53

(esp-

pp.

396-7).

For the

text,

see

Appendix

.

14L. Minio-Paluello,welfthenturyogic Texts ndStudiesI, Abaelardiana

indita

j.

Super

periermeneias

II-XIV,

2.

Sententie

ecundum .

Petrm,

Roma

1958,

.

118.For

the

ext,

ee

Appendix

.

5

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8/9/2019 VIVARIUM, VOL. 14, NOS. 1-2, 1976

12/164

idem

similitudine

and

idem

pro

incommutato

Dealing

with idem

definitione

e

adds

a

remark on

idem

as

a

relative

pronoun

in

subject

position

in

a

proposition.

And

according

to

Abailard the relative

pronoun

idem can

only

be used as

subject

term in

the

meaning

of

idem

numero

or of

idem

definitione

So

when

we

say

'

mulier damnavit

mundum t

eadem

salvavi the

proposition

has two

meanings:

a

true

one and

a

false one.

For

if the relatio

s

taken ad

identitatem umeri

i.e.

if

the

personaliter

numero

ame woman

is

understood

to have

damned

and to have

saved,

the

proposition

s false. But if idem

is

accepted

to be

ad

identitatem

efinitionis,

o

that

eadem

only

means

the same

quantum

nomen

mulieris

simpliciter

the

proposition

will be

true.

3.

The

Sententie ecundum

M

.

Petrm

II.

Sophisms

about

totum'.18

As

Minio-Paluello indicates

in

his

introduction to the

Sententie

the

same

discussion

as

in the

Ingredientibus

ccurs

in

this work.19

In

the

solution

of

the first

ophism

about

'totum'

the

author of

the

Sententie

points

at the twofold

use

of

the

relative

(dictio

relativa):

either

t

refers

ersonaliter

quasi

discrete

secundum cilicet

dentitatem

persone

or

indifferenter

simpliciter

ecundum

identitatem

ature

idest convenientie el similitudinis rerumiuxta causam inpositionis

premissi

nominis

This distinction

s

not

an

arbitrary

one,

for

since

the relatio

ccording

to

the

author

always

happens

to be in

accordance

with

the

things (res),

it

is

built

upon

the

identity

of the

things.

And

as the

distinction

n

the identitasrerum

an

be

made into an

identitas

secundum

personam (e.g.

'

idem

est

Marcus

quod

Tullius

)

and an

identitas

secundum naturam sive

speciem

(e.g.

'

idem est

Petrus

quod

Marcus'),

so

in the relatio the

distinction

an

be made

into a relatio

secundum

identitatem

ersone

and a

relatio

secundum

identitatem

nature Of both kinds an example taken fromSedulius is given: a)

secundum identitatem

ersone:

'

non

quia

qui

summus

pater

est

et

filius

hie

est'

(Carm.

Pasc .

I,

319),

explained

with the

words: non

est

eadem

utriusque

persona

and

b)

secundum

identitatem

nature:

'

sed

quia

quod

summus

pater

est

et

filius

hie

est'

(Carm.

Pasc

.

I,

320),

i.e.

eiusdem

nature

hec est

persona

In

the

same

way

the

relatio

n

the

proposition

homo

sculpit qui

pingi

or

'

homo

sculpit

et

idem

pingi

can

be

accepted

either

ad

personam

or ad

speciem

sive

naturam

18Minio-Paluello958,pp. 115-8. orthetext, eeAppendix .19

Cf.

Minio-Paluello

s

Introduction,

p.

XXXIX-

XLI,

and

M. T.

Beonio-

Brocchieri

umagalli,

The

Logic of

Abelard

Dordrecht

969,

esp.

pp.

92-3.

7

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13/164

humanitatis

ndifferenter.

nd as

a

specimen

of

the

latter kind of

relatio,

the

author adduces

the

proposition

'mulier

que dampnavit,

salvavi and he explains: noncirca eandempersonam, ed circa

noturam

sexus muliebris. .Eva

quippe

dampnavit,

Maria

salvavit.

Next he adds

a remark

that another

example

of

this

kind of

relatio

appears

in

Priscian

'ubi videlicet

de "sui"

loquitur'.

This does

not,

however,

as

Minio-Paluello adds

in a

note,

refer to Priscian

XII,

1-3,

the

introductoryparagraphs

to

the

pronouns,

but to Priscian

XVII,

115:

'.

. . ut

'ille sui

miseretur,

lle sibi

donat,

Virgilius

e

celebra.

et

pro

composito

raeco

,

t

diximus,

ccipitur,

uod pud

Graecos

uidem

intribusnveniturersonis,t vel n sereflectitctum uumvel nposses-

sionem

uam

. 20

Here

the relative

quod

litteraliter

refers

to

composito

Graeco

but

in

fact

to

IfxauTou,

nd

.

Some lines

further n

in the Sententie

he

question

of

the

demonstratio

ad

naturam

s

discussed

too,

with the

example

taken

from he

Benedictio

fontis.

So we find

n

the

Abailardian

writings

he

distinction

n the

relatio

and the act ofreferringnto

A. the relatio

secundum

identitatem

er onae

/numeri,

nd

referri

personaliter

r

determinate

B. the

relatio ecundum

ndifferentiamjidentitatem

aturae or

defini-

tions

,

and

referri

impliciterjindif

er

ntergener

liter et

confuse

This

kind of

relatioAbailard

calls also

the

relatio

ndifferens.

From

the above

quoted

passages

it

appears

that Abailard was

fully cquainted

with the distinction

n

the relatio and

that he

applied

it in his logical discussions. But he does not supply us with the very

reason

for

this

distinction;

he

merely

makes use

of it:

a relative

that

refers

to an

antecedent

term

nominationis or

significationis

confusae,

causes

a

relatio

ndifferens

r

confusa

and it

is

on

its

turn

a

relative

confusae

significationis

too,

we

must

not

wonder

about

this

distinction,

or

t

has

its

analogy

in the

identitas erum

When

we,

however,

examine

the

frequently

sed

example

'

mulier

tc' it

appears

that the use of

the

relatives

in this

proposition

s

in

disconformity

20Prisciani Grammatici aesariensis nstitutionumrammaticarumibri

XVIII,

ex. rc.

M.

Hertz,

Vol.

I-II

(=

Grammatici

atini,

I-III),

Leipzig

1855-9

anast. repr.

Hildesheim

961),

Vol.

II,

p.

16810-3.

Italics

are

mine).

8

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM, VOL. 14, NOS. 1-2, 1976

14/164

with the

requirements

made

by

Priscian

in

regard

with

the use of the

relative

(pro)

nouns

in a

proposition:

'Propriumstpronominisro aliquo nomineproprio oniet certas ig-nificare

ersonas'

21

'Hoc

idem,

dest

qui', quotiens ubiungitur

omini,

uomodo

apud

Graecos,

ecesse

st

non solum d nomen

raepositum,

ed

etiam

ad id

subiunctumlterum erbum

roferri,

t Virum

cano,

qui

veni. si no-

minativo

ominativus

diungitur,

d eandem

ersonam

erba eferuntur'.22

The

medieval

grammarian

now had to

choose

between

disavowing

Priscian or

the author

of

the

authorative

saying,

and

taking

his

refuge

to the

figura

i.e. to

solve

the

problem by

means

of a locutio non-

propia

or

figurativa,

.e. a relatio

non-propria

Apart

fromthe

grammarians,

the medieval

theologians,

who were

mostly grammarians

too,

must have

clearly

felt the need

for

this

distinction

n

the relatio

as

the

examples

used

for

illustrating

the

relatio

ndifferens

y

Abailard

show.

The

distinction etween

the both

kinds of relatio secundum dentita-

tem

ersonae

nd secundum

dentitatem aturae

is neither

grammatical

nor

a

theological

one.

It

was

derived from he

results

of the reflexions

made in

the

discussionson

the universalia

so

it

is a

philosophical

one

it

was constructedupon theAbailardian, i.e. anti-realistic, daptation

of

William of

Champeaux'

indifferemia-theovy

'In

nullis

rgo

oc

nuenis t

eadem

ubstantia

it,

um

persone

intdiuerse.

Nam

ubicumque

unt

ersone

lures, lures

unt t

substantie,

el ubicum-

que

una

est

ubstantia,

na

tantum

nueniturt

persona

nisi

n

lia summa

essentia

ue,

cum n

rerum

reatione

mirabilis

ppareat,

n sua

mirabilior

cogitatur

atura.

Et

ut

omne

mbiguitatis

enus

xeludamus,

ides has

duas

uoces

"unum"

scilicet

t

"idem"

duobus

accipi

modis,

ecundum

indifferentiam

t

secundum

dentitatem

iusdem

rorsus

ssentie. ecun-

dum

ndifferentiam,

t

Petrum t

Paulum

dem

dicimus

sse

n

hoc

quod

sunt

homines,

uantum

enim

ad

humanitatem

ertinet,

icut

iste est

rationalis t ille; et sicut ste est mortalis t ille. Sed si ueritatem on-

fiteli

olumus,

on est

eadem

utriusque

umanitas,

ed

similis,

um sint

duo

homines.

ed

hic

modusunius

d

nturm

iuinitatis onest

referen-

dus

ne,

quod

fidei

ontrarium

st,

hac

acceptione

res

Dos uel tres

ub-

stantias

ogamur

onfiteli.

Secundum

dentitatem

ero,

prorsus

num et

idem dicimus etrum

t

Simonem,

aulum et

Saulum,

acob et

Isral

qui,

cum

singuli ingulas

habeant

ubstantias,

inguli

non

plus

quam

singulas

habent

personas'.23

21

Priscian,

I,

18

=

ed.

Hertz, , p. ss13"4.

22

Priscian,

VII, 30

=

ed.

Hertz, I, p. 127

2~e.

23Editedby Dom . Lottin n hisPsychologietmorale ux XIIe et XIIIe

sicles,

ome

V,

Problmes

'histoire

ittraire:

'cole

d'Anselme e Laon

et de

Guillaume

e

Champeaux,

embloux

959,

pp.

192-3.

9

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15/164

So we

can

observe

that an

incongruity

with

respect

to the

gram-

matical rules

gradually developed

to an

institutionalized

ncongruity,

so

that we

may speak

of a

figura,

and

got

its

theoretical

frame

by

the

interaction of

logic

and

grammar, probably

stimulated

by questions

asked

from he

part

of the

theologians.

The interest Abailard

pays

to this

kind

of

rdatio,

arises from ts

usefulness

for his

logical

inquiries.

Abailard

makes the well-known

distinction between

the

significatio

rerum

nominaiio

or

appellatici)

the extensional

or denotative

meaning-function

f

a

word,

and

the

significatio

ntellectuum

the

later

significatio

n a

strict

sense),

the

intensional

or

connotative

meaning-function

f a

word.24 Another

distinction Abailard makes in the meaning-function f the noun,

is based

upon

the notions

discretio nd

confusio

i.e. discretejdistincte

opp.

non- istinct

onf

s

eindis

rete).

5

These

distinctions,

when in

combination

applied

to

the

nouns,

result

n: i. nomen

significationis

confusas

2. nomen

nominationis

confusae

3.

nomen

nominationis

discretae.

rom these

only

the former wo

are of

nterestfor

he rdatio

indifferens.

Ad.

I.

Every

noun used

intensionally

s

a nomen

significationis

confusae.

In the inherence

theory

of

predication

the

predicate

term

is always accepted intensionally: connoting the universal nature

that inheres n

the

subject

(a

concretum),.g.

the

proposition

Socrates

est

animal'

expresses

that the

universal

nature of animal

{=

status

animalis or

the esse animal

inheres

in the

subject

Socrates.As

24

For the

distinction

etween

the

significatio

erum nd the

significatio

intellectuum

y

Abailard,

ee L.

M.

de

Rijk,

Logica

Mod.

II,

i,

p.

194:

'The

term

significatio

is

reserved,hen,

or

he

significatio

ntellectuum

nly,

while

what

was called

significatio

ei

according

o

the

first

oint

of

view receives

the name

appellatio

r nominatio'

and

J.

Pinborg,

ogik

und

Semantik

m

Mittelalter.in berblickStuttgart 972,pp. 51-2: Er (sc. Abailard)nimmt

seinen

Ausgangspunkt

n

der xtensionellen

eutung

AlleWrter

wir

ehen

hier von

den

Syncategoremata

b,

die

nur

mit den

kategorematischen

us-

drcken

usammen

twas denotieren

sind

Namen

(durch ppellatio,

der

in

der

Terminologie

baelards

ignificatio

erum).

Wenn

wir

aber die

Be-

deutung

uf

die

significatio

erum

eduzieren,

ekommen

ir

Schwierigkeiten

mit den

Allgemeinbegriffen

nd

mit den

Verben,

eren

Bedeutung

uf

diese

Weise nicht

rschpfend

eschrieben

ird.

Sie konstituieren

a

einen

nhalt,

der kein

Ding

ist.

Diese

Art

der

Bedeutung

enntAbaelard

ignificatio

n-

tellectuum. ie

ist eine

Abstraktion

us den

denotierten

inzeldingen:

man

darf lso nicht

on

einem

Allgemeinbegriff

nd

seiner

ignificatio

ntellectuum

auf etwasExtensionelles

chliessen'.

25Cf.Beonio 969,p. 93 for heterms iscretusndconfusus,eealsoDe Rijk,

Logica

Mod.

II, 1,

pp.

590-1

nd

592.

2e

For the

nherence

heory

y

Abailard,

ee

L.

M.

de

Rijk

m his

ntroduction

10

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16/164

we

have

seen

27

this

proposition

determinate

ays

hominem sse

animal

i.e.

Socrates

st

sse

animal

quod

pse

est.

By

using

the

relatives

llud

quod

referring

o

animal Abailard

gets

in

conflict

with the

requirements

f

the

grammarians,

ince

they

have to

refer o a

certa

persona

so that

by application

of it

in

the

proposition

Socrates

est

esse

animal

quod

ipse

est the

indeterminate

meaning-function

f animal

here

would

be

restricted.

Therefore

Abailard

takes

up

the

relatio

indifferens

in

order to make a relatio to

a

nomen

ignificationis

onfusae

without

any restricting

orce.

Ad

2.

In the

'Introductions

parvulorum

Abailard

also

gets

in

conflictwith

the

restrictive orce

the

relative

pronouns

have

according

to thegrammarians.28n thediscussion nthemultiplicitasropositionis

ex

relatione

pronominis

Abailard

rejects

the

opinion

that

any

multi-

plicitas

in

propositions

of the

type

omnis

homo

diligit

e'

can be

based

upon

a

multiplicitas

pronominis

there

is

according

to

Abailard no

multiplicitas

t

all: Like omms homo

has

an

indeterminateor

non-

distinct

meaning

in

the

proposition,

he

relative,

since it

refers

o

a

vox

confusae

ignificationis

causes a

relatio

onfusa

It

must,

however,

be

emphasized

that homo in

the

quoted

proposition

'

omnis

homo

diligit

e

*

is not

used in the

same

meaning-function

s

animal

n

Socrates

est animal as clearly appears fromthe discussion Abailard devotes

to

the

suggested

multiple

sense of the

proposition

omnis

homo

curri

in

the

Logica

'

Ingredientibus

29

He

speaks

here of

ndiscrete

ominare

to

Petrus

Abaelardus,

ialctica,

nd

ed.,

Assen

1970,

p.

XLII:

'Inherence

theory.

According

o

this

theory

he

copula

of

an

affirmative

roposition

states

the

nherence f a

"universal

ature"

ignified

y

the

predicate

erm,

in

the

individuum

enoted

by

the

subject

term';

and

Pinborg

972,

p.

53:

'Die

inhaerentia-Theorie.

ach

dieser

wird

das

Prdikat

ntensionelluf-

gefasst,

.h.

es stehtfr

einen

allgemeinen)

nhalt

significatio

er se).

Die

copula

drckt

us,

dass

dieser nhalt

sich

m

Subjekt

als Form

findet.

as

Subjektwird xtensionellufgefasst,ndem as Prdikat ber lle odereinigeoderkeine

der

Denotata

des

Subjektes

ussagt'.

27

See

above,

p.

5.

Pietro

AbelardoScritti

ilosofici,

d. M.

Dal

Pra,

Roma/Milano954

19692],

pp. 235 sqq.

For

the

text,

ee

Appendix

.

29

Ed.

Geyer,

Peter

Abaelards,

.

463:

'Sed

dicitur,

uod

si

omnis

ingula

colligit

uae

continenturn

voce cui

apponitur

multiplicem

ropositionem

facit,

elut si

homini

ppositum

olligat

ocratem

t

ceteros

ui

continentur

in

homine,

tale>

est,

um

dicitur:

omnis

omo

urri,

si

dicatur: Socrates

currit,

lato

curriet

sic

de

ceteris.

ed ad

hoc

dico,

quod

non

est

verum,

i

colligit

singulos

homines,

uod

multiplicem

ropositionem

aciat,

quippe

indiscrete t

indifferenter

ic

singulos

olligit,

t non

distingut,

ui

sint,

quia sicuthomo' ndiscreteosnominat ondistinguendoui sint, ta omnis'

appositum

omini

ndiscrete

os

colligit

t

hoc

solum

dicitur,

uod quicquid

est

homo,

st

animai

currens ),

sed

qui

sint

homines,

on

distinguitur'.

II

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17/164

with

regard

to

the

subject

term

homo

and

of indiscrete

olligere

with

regard

to

the universal

sign

omnis.We have here a

noun used extension-

ally30.

And

what Abailard calls

a

noun

significationis onfusae

in

the Introductiones

iarvulorum,

e

calls more

precisely

a noun

Habens

nominationem

onfusam

n

the

Logica

'

Ingredientibus

mulier n

the

example

'

mulier

quae

damnavit,

psa

salvavit31

When

Abailard

makes

a relatio to

a noun nominationis

onfusae

he

has to take

his

refuge

o

the relatio

ndifferens

oo,

in

order

to avoid the

attributionof

a

sig-

nificano

determinata

y

the relative.

B. William

of

Conches

In hisGlosule uperPriscianumWilliamofConches32also comments

on

Priscian,

XVII,

30,

the

place

where Priscian

speaks

about

the

four

ways

the

relative

qui

and its

oblique

cases can

refer o the

ante-

cedent.33William

proves

to be

well aware

of

the conflict Priscians

requirement

as to

de

nominativo

ad

nominativm auses

in

respect

to

propositions

of

the

type

as

'

mulier

etc

He offers

wo

solutions:

either

we

appeal

to

the well-known

dictum

that the

Holy

Bible is

not

submitted to

the rules of

the

grammarians,

or

we

state

that

here

we

have

to

do

with

a locutio

igurativa

[f.98rb]Seddicerent oc essefalsumum nueniaturmulierue dapnauit

saluaui

tarnen adem

mulier

apnauit

t saluauit.

Quibus

responde-

mus uel

quod

diuina

pagina,

ut domina

rcium,

ulli

arti

subiacet,

el

quod

illa locutio

sit

figuratiua.

st

enim sensus llius:

idem sexus

et

dapnauit

t saluauit.

Et sic

hoc

nomen

mulier

bi est nomen

exus,

non

persone/.34

It

is

remarkable

that

William here

does

not

speak

about

the

relatio

indifferens

implex,

since

he

appears

to

be

acquainted

with this

kind

of relatio

as can be

proved

by

his

comment

on

Priscian,

XVII,

115,

wherehe uses the term relatiogeneralis

[f. 8]

et

acce.

p.

con. gre.

Et

subdit,

dest

aitoi,

ocest

ompositum

tercie

ersone.

ed ne

aliquisputet

uod

n sola

tercia

ersona

sset om-

positum

ronomen.

t sic est

generalis

elatio'.

30

See

above,

p.

10.

31

See

above,

p.

5.

32

For

the

grammarian

illiam f

Conches,

is

works,

he

MSS,

and his

posi-

tion n the

learned

world

of

the twelfth

entury,

ee E.

Jeauneau,

eux

r-

dactions

es

gloses

e Guillaume

e Conches

ur

Priscien,

n:

RTAM,

27

(i960),

pp.

212-47;

nd De

Rijk,Logica

Mod.

II,

i,

pp.

221-8.

33See above,p. 9,. 22.

34

quote

the

Ms

Paris,

BN

lat.

15130

,

this

part

s also

printed

y Jeauneau

i6o, p.

240.

12

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM, VOL. 14, NOS. 1-2, 1976

18/164

How we

have

to

accept generalis

n this

context,

can be

illustrated

by

the discussion

on the

meaning

of the

pronouns {ad

Priscian,

XII,

3),

where

generalis

s used

in

opposition

to

firaprius,

here the

equivalent

ofdiscretus

determinatus

[ff.

ovb-8ira]

is de

quo

i

mDixi.

Exemplum

st

ubirelatiuums

positum

in

responsione

acit

ecundam

ognitionem

e re de

qua precessit

ltera

cognicio

er

llam

dictionemd

quam

refertur.ed

queritur

um

dicamus

'

homo

mbulai,

dem

mouetur',

n idem aciat

fiat

MS]

ibi

[in MS]

secun-

dam

cognitionem

e

re

de

qua precessit

ognitio

er

hoc nomen

homo

Nam

non

possumus

icere

uod

dem

bi

facit

ognicionem

e re

significata

per

hoc

nomen,

um lludnichil isi

peciem

ignificete

de re

nominata

per

ipsum,

om illud

nichil

nomint isi

singulos

homines;

t de

nullo

hominum

bi fit

ecunda

ognitio.

d

quod

dicimus

uod

de

rebus

diuerse

fiunt

ognitiones,

cilicet lie

generales,

lie

proprie,

lie

substantiales,

alie accidentales. um gitur icimushomo mbula generlemacimus

de eo

cognitionem

t

id

quod

homo est res illa

de

qua

sermo st.

Cum

uero

dicimus

idemmouetur'

de eadem facimus

ropriam

ognitionem,

idest

quod

ille

idem homo

qui

ambulat,

mouetur. t sie

[f.

81ra]

fit

secunda

ognitio

t

propria

e eadem re de

qua precessit eneralis

og-

nicio.

Vel

dicamus

ieud se

prius,

ut

exposuimus,

uod

omnes

persone

uerborum

otabiles

unt et

certe,

quod

nemo

debet dicere

qui

proprie

uelit

oqui

'

homo mbula nisi

pro aliquo

hominum

iffiniteoc

dicat.

Et

tunc

acit

rimam

ognitionemer

hoc

nomen

omo e

aliquo

hominum

et

propriam.

t

cum

postea

subdit

idem

mouetur'

facit

per

hoc

nomen

idem

propriam

t

secundam

ognitionem

e eodem

homine.'.

As appears fromthis comment, William does not generally like

to

accept

a

sort of

relatio

simplex

as

belonging

to the

common and

grammatical

way

of

speech.

This fact can be

illustrated, too,

by

his

comment

on

Priscian, XII,

i :

[f.

76vb]

Dicimus

nim

uod

etiam

ubi:

ronomen

eferturd

appellatiuum

nomen,

bi

ponitur

ro proprio

nomine,

dest

in

significatione

roprii

nominis,

dest

d

significandum

liquam

ndiuiduam

ubstantiam. am

si

dicatur

homo

mbulat,

dem

mouetur'istud

pronomen

dem

ponitur

d

significandum

ropriam

ubstantiam.

ntelligimus

nim

er

hoc

pronomen

idem

uod

lle

demhomo

ui

ambulat,

mouetur. i

dicatur

uod

nescimus

per lludpronomene quo sitsermo, icimus uia uerum st; sed illequi

profert,

orsitan

eit

pro quo profrt

homo

mbulat t

de

eodem erum

est

quod

mouetur'Et

siue sciatur iue

nesciatur

e

quo

homine it

sermo,

tarnen

citur

er pronomen

dem

quod

ille

qui

ambulat,

mouetur;

uod

nesciretur,

i

nomen

repeteretur.

am

tunc

propositiones

ossunt

sse

uere

uel false

pro

diuersis,

t

si

diceretur

homo

mbulat,

omo

mouetur'

Sed

cum

pronomen

elatiuum

bi

ponitur,

ro

eodem

uere sunt

semper

ambe

propositiones

el

false,

t

cum dicitur

homo

mbulat,

demmouetur'

ad

eadem

ersonam

eferendusst actus

uterque'.

C.

The

Gloss

Licet Multi

In Arte

The

Ms

Oxford

Bodl.

Canon mise

281

contains on

ff.

r

-

83

v

a

glosson the Priscian minor 35

35

For

the

description

f this

Ms,

see

L. M.

de

Rijk,

SomeThirteenth

entury

13

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM, VOL. 14, NOS. 1-2, 1976

19/164

Inc.

prol.

Licet multi

n

arte

gramatica

recipui

onstructionum

xpositi-

onem

obis

reliquerint

n suis arnen

xpositionibus

inus

iligentes

.

.

Inc.

glos.

Priscianus

gitur

e arte

gramatica

e

tractaturum

roponens

cumtria int psiusmateria . .Des. .

.

.

non,

nquam,

ta

dicitur

ego ego

homo',

ed

quotquot

habeat

nominatiuos,

ebent

recedere

erbum.

In

the

same

hand

some

notes

on the

interpunction

nd on

metrical

questions

are added. A different and

wrote

on ff

84v

-

8yY

a tract

on

logic.36

As to

the datation

and

localisation

of

the

gloss

there

s

no

external criterium

xtant,37

but some

of the

views

expressed

in the

gloss

stand

in

close

affinity

with

those

of

William

of

Conches,

e.g,

the

explanation

on the terms

transitivas nd intransitivas

sc.

with

regard to the constructo transitiva nd intransitiva, y means of the

terms

corporeus

nd

incorporeus

38

the discussion

on

the

meaning

of

the

nouns39

and the view

that the

participle

of

the

present

tense

Tracts n theGame

of Obligation

in:

Vivarium,

III

(1975), pp.

22-54,

sp.

pp.

22-3.

36

Edited

by

De

Rijk

1975,

pp.

26-54.

37

There

re some

slight

ndications,

part

of the

doctnnary

ne:

the use

of

the e

-

caudata

n

stead of the usual

e in

some

places

(Ms

s.

XII)

;

dealing

with he

oloecism,

he

glossator ives

he

nstance:

utmodo

aciunt

ormanni

;

the use ofthe

nameof

Chartres

n

examples.38Ms f. 2r: 'Et nota quosdamterciummembrum onstructionumignare,

uidelicet

mixtam,

dest nec transitiuam ec

intransitiuam,

ed

partim

hoc

partim

llud,

ut

'

Socrates lbus uidet

Platonem

Dicunt enim

rationem

on

esse,

unde

potius

udicetur

ntransitiua

uam

transitiua el

econuerso,

um

habeat

partes

ntransitiue

unctas,

ut

Socrates

t

albus

et alias

transitiue

iunctas,

ut

uidet

t Platonem.

oc

autem

dicunt stius

nominis ntransitiua

uim

penitus

gnorantes,

um enim

ompositum

it

ex

hoc

nomine

ransitiuum,

quod

datum

est

per

positionem

ue

significationis,

t in

priuatoria artcula.

Sicut dicitur

corporeum

liquid

habens

corporei,

ncorporeum

ichil,

ta

transitiuum

liquid

habens

transitionis,

ntransitiuumichil'.For

the

view

held

by

William,

ee Ms

Paris,

BN

lat.

151

0,

f.

85rb_va:

Sed dicent

on-

structionemuehabetnominatiuumumuerbo tobliquo ndiuersis ersonis

nec tantum sse transsitiuam

ec

ntranssitiuam,

t Socrates

iligit

latonem'.

Quibus

dicimus

uod

omnis

que

habet

duas dictiones

f.

85 a]

transsitiue

coniunctas,

tsi

multas

ntranssitiuaoniunctas

abeat,

transsitiua

st.

Item

dicunt:

Quare

pocius

propter

artem

ranssitiuam

icitur ranssitiua

uam

propter

ntranssitiuam

ntranssitiua

Contra

uod

dicimus

uod

hoc

nomen

intranssitiua

riuatiuum

st,

hoc nomen

ranssitiua on.

Est autem

priua-

tiuorum

atura

totum

ontrarium

egare,

t

incorporeum

st de

quo

nichil

est

corpus.

ed

non-priuatiua

on

priuant

ontrarium,

t

quando

dico istud

est

corporeum',liquam

eius

partem

sse

incorporeum

on

nego.

Potest

enim

aliquid

esse

corporeum

t

partem

habere

ncorpoream,

t homo. Sic

igitur

intranssitiua

artem

ranssitiuam

abere

non

potest,

ed

transsitiuam

ichil

prohibetaberentranssitiuam'.

39

Ms

f

i9r"v:

Sed

nota: Cum

nomen

signifcet

ubstantiam,

on tamen

omne

nomen.

Quedam

enim

ignificantualitatem,

t

albedo,

uedam

aliud.

14

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM, VOL. 14, NOS. 1-2, 1976

20/164

cannot

be

construed

with a

verb of the future

tense,40

o

that I

surmise

that

the

gloss

belongs

to

the

intellectual

area

of

Chartres

and Paris of the middle

of

the twelfth

entury.

In

the same

way

as

William

of

Conches

the

glossator

comments

on

Priscian, XVII,

30,

too.

To

the

objection

made

against

Priscian's

requirement

llustrated

by

the

example

'

mulier etc.1 he

answers

that

the

relative

here

is used

non

proprie

(i.e.

figurate

,

or

that

the

Holy

Bible

is

not submitted to the rules

of

Priscian

[f.

4r]

'Sed

si

opponatur

de

ista

constructionemulier

ue

saluauit,

dampnaui,

dicendum

st

quia proprie

non

ponitur

ui

ibi uel

diuina

pagina

non

subiacet

egulis

risciani.'.

Priscian, XVII, 115 is also commented on by the glossator n nearly

the

same

way

as William

does,

but

he

speaks

of

relatio

simplex

in

stead

of

generalis

[f.

47r]

Et

nota illud

simplicem

elationem

acere

d

compositum

non

ad

eaitoy.

Aliter

nim esset falsum.

Compositum

nim

habent n

tribus

personis,

aitoy

n

sola tercia habent.Sed

quia

auctor

dicturus

st in

sequentibus

omposita rime

t secunde

ersone

arere

lurali

t

pluralia

eaitoy

oco eorum

uccedere,

deo

illud

quod

ad

eaitoy

hoc

modo

potest

referri.'.

D. Thierry fChartres

The

example

'

mulier

etc also

occurs

twice

n

the

writings

f

Thierry

of

Chartres:

.

.

.

Item. Nota

quedam

nomina

uisse

nuenta d

quedam

significanda

t

ad

alia

appellanda

uel

nominanda,

uedam

d

eadem

significanda

t

appellanda.

Omna

enim

ppellatiua

liud

significant

t

aliud

appellant,

ommant.

igni-

ficant nim

rem

llam

de

qua

per

se

prolata

ntellectum

onstituunt,

t

ideo

nullam

rem

discretam

ignificant.

psa

enim

per

se

prolata

nichil

discrete

faciunt

ntelligi.

Res

autem

dicunt

ppellare,

uia

eis

conueniunt

er

appellationem. erbigratia.Cum aliquisprofert anc uocemhomo, ullumhominemacit

ntelligi,

ed rem

uandam

ssecommunemmnibus

ominibus,

idest

hominem;

t

ideo

rem

llam

ignificat.

ingulos

utem

homines

ppellat.

Sed

hoc

nomen

ocrates

f. gv]

dem

ideo

Ms]

significat

t

appellat,

t

omnia

propria

ominanichil

nim

liud

significantuam

appellant'

For

William's

view,

ee De

Rijk,Logica

Mod.

II,

1,

pp. 223-4.

40

Ms f.

56v:

'sciendum

tamen. Licet

participia

t

infinitiua

redicta

int

presents

emporis

t

preteriti

nperfecti,

ossunt

amen

onstruium

preterito

perfecto

t

plusquamperfecto

n

significatione

reteriti

nperfecti,

dest

signi-

ficando

nceptionem

ei

et non

perfectionem.

um

enim

dicitur

scribens

profeci',

on fit

bi

hic

ntellectus,

t

quidamputant:

cripsi

t

profeci.

unc

enim

haberet

cribens

ensum

preteriti

erfecti

uem

nunquam

habet. Hune

autem ntellectumonstituit: cribebam, rofeci. t nota quod si iungatur

cum

preterito

lusquamperfecto,

undem

ensum.

imilitern

sensu tantum

preteriti

nperfecti

ungitur

nfinitiuus

infinitiuis

s]

eis.

Cum

futuro

utem

15

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8/9/2019 VIVARIUM, VOL. 14, NOS. 1-2, 1976

22/164

quod

est

qualitas

,

are

here

used

improprie

so

that

they

make

a

relatio

simplex.

For,

he

continues,

f

they

were

used

proprie

both

verbs had

to referto

the

same

suppositum,

which

would

make the

proposition

false.

Thierry

illustrates

this

problem

with

an

example

also

given

in the Lectiones

'

Socrates

est homo

qui

est

species

This

proposition

would

mean,

if

the relative

qui

were

used

here

proprie

that

Socrates

is

man

as well as

species:

Quod falsum

est

E.

John

of Salisbury

When

John

of

Salisbury

in the 20th

chapter

of

the

second

book

of

his

Metalogicon

6

states

that

an

universale

according

to his view

is

quod menscommuniterntelligit . . quod vox communiterignificai he

immediately

points

at

the

problem

this

definition

auses with

respect

to the

rules

of

the

ars

grammatica,

ince

according

to

this ars

the

meaning

of

the relatives

may

not

be

vague,

but

has

always

to

be

restricted from

an infinite

to a

definite

meaning by

a

determinatio

personae

aut actus aut alterius

actionis.

Whenever

there

is not

any

certain or

definite base for

the

relatio

there

cannot

be a

relatio,

at

least

not

without

a

vitium

r

a

figura.

So in

the case

of relative

clauses

of

the

type quod

promittitur, uod

significatur

quod

intelligitur

he

object of the act

expressed

by

the verb must be

something

discretum,

at

least

in

order to

constitute

a

propria

relatio.

In

opposition

to this

kind of

relatio,

John

sets

the

relatio

in

genere,

n which no

definite

thing

s

at

the

basis

of the relatio

nd in

which the

relatives

have not a

determinate

signification,

f

we

want to

save the

true

sense

of

the

proposition.

He

gives

three

examples

of

this kind of relatio

n

genere:

'

mulier

que

salvavit,

damnavi

'

lignum

quod

mortis,

t

vitecausam

dedi

'quas Boreas aufert, evehitmitis Z ephirus rondes*47

The

relatives n

these

propositions

do

not,

according

to

John,

refer o

aliquid

diffinitum

uod

discernant

but

they

remain n

genere.

And

at

the

same

way

the relatives in

the

above

mentioned

clauses about the

universalia

have to

be

accepted:

They

do

not

refer o

anything

definite,

but

remain

also

in

genere.

46

oannis

Saresberiensis

piscopi

Carnotensis

Metalogicon

ibri

UI,

rec.

. . I. Webb,Oxford 929,PP-97~n6, esp.pp. 101-5.For thetext, eeAp-

pendix

.

47

Bothius,

ons.

. M.

5.

20.

17

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM, VOL. 14, NOS. 1-2, 1976

23/164

Next

John explains

his

view on the universalia

with a discussion

centered

around

the

example 'quod significatur

hoc nomine

homo',

species est'. He underlines

t with the

statement that if one

attends

the

relatio

simplex

que fit

in

genere,

8

there

are no

troubles

with the

foregoing

ropositions;

but

if

one looks

for

User

dio,

it would

not be-

come clear what is meant

as

discrete,

.e. in the

case

of a

relatio

ropria.

Like

Abailard,

John

also deals

in this context with the

proposition

'omnis homo

diligit

se'. First

he

states

that

every

demonstrative

nd

relative word is used

either non

satis

proprie implex

relatio

que fit

in

genere)

or

refers

o a definite

object:

'aut certo t sua ratione

definito

innititur

ubiecto'

relatio

ropria)

otherwise

hey

are

deprived

of their

very function. There is, however, also an abuse of the relatio ex

causa

commoditatis n the

proposition

omnis homo

diligit

se'.

John

calls it a relatio

icentiosa 49

The two

grammatical

texts show

that the

grammarians

of the first

part

of the twelfth

century

were aware

of the

problems

that rose

around

propositions

of

the

type

'mulier etc.'.

They

solved them

with

the

help

of a

figura,

but

they

did not use

in this case the

relatio

implex

generalis.

In fact

they

refused

to

speak

about this distinction

n the

paragraphs devoted to the

relatio and the

relatives,

and even

more:

William of Conches

expressly

refused

to

accept

a

significatio onfusa

or

generalis

of the

(relative)

pronouns,

a

requirement

for

the relatio

simplex.

It

must

also be noted

that Peter Helias

in

no

part

of his

Summa mentioned

the relatio

implex.

On the other

hand,

they

knew

this notion well

and

used

it

in their comment on

Priscian,

XVII,

115,

to which the Master

of the

Sententie lso referred.

Quite

in

opposition

to the attitude

of the

grammarians

s that of the

logicians: Thierry

and

John

made in a

rather xtensive

way

use of t.

The

real

application

of it in the writingsof Thierryremains somewhat obscure,since we

have

only

two references

ut

of his

theological

works

at our

disposal,

48

McGarry's

ranslation

n The

Metalogiconf

John

of Salisbury Berkeley

and Los

Angeles

1955,

must be

corrected

n

this

point. McGarry

ailed

o

see

the

technical

meaning

f

relatio

implex

que

fit

n

genere

and translated

'Plane si

relationem

implicem,

ue

fit

n

genere,

uis

attendat

.

with

'Evidently,

f

one ooks

nly

or

simple

eneral elationship

tc It

is,

however,

definitely

ot

a

question

f a

general

elationship,

ut

of

the

relatio

implex

i.e.

the relatio

uefit

n

genere

the

same

as

John

ome

ines

before

alled

the

relatio

n

genere.

49So John peaks fthree inds frelatio1) therelatio ropria2) therelatio

simplex,

n

fact

a

relatio

mpropria

but

non-vitiosa

figura

3)

the relatio

licentiosa.

18

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM, VOL. 14, NOS. 1-2, 1976

24/164

but

according

to

his

own

words

he dealt with

propositions

of

the

type

in

which

the relatio

simplex

occurs,

in his

logical

writings.50

nd

in

John's

discussion

on the

universais

the relatio

implex appears

to be

a

useful tool in order to

explain

his view.

When we

summarize

the first

tage

of

development

of the

relatio

simplex

we first re

confronted

with

Priscian's two

requirements

with

respect

to the

meaning

of the

pronouns

and

the use of the

relative

noun

qui

in

proposition,

hat musthave

caused

problems

n

connection

with

ome authoritative

ayings.

n

developing

the

theory

of

meaning

of

the universal

nouns the

logicians

were

confrontedwith the

same

problems:

As trained

grammarians hey

solved

it with

the

application

of a logical distinction: the second component of the termrelatio

indiff

er

ens

/ ener

alis

/

implex

is

a

logical

notion.

Especially

the

logicians

developed

this distinction

further and

made

a

frequent

use

of it in their

discussions, without,

however,

to

forget

ts

gram-

matical

origin.

This

attention from the

part

of the

logicians

is

maybe

the

reason

why

the

grammarians

howed

less interest n

it:

They

explained

this

way

of

speech

by

means of a

figura]

this

figura

did not

belong

to the

traditional

corpus

of

the

figur

e:

It

was

part

of

the mos

docentis

of

the

logicians.

Utrecht

Instituut

voorLaat

Latijn

AppendixA

PeterAbaelards

hilosophische

chriften,

d. .

Geyer,Beitrge

ur

Ge-

schichte

er

Philosophie

nd

Theologie

es

Mittelalters,XI,

1-3,

Mnster.

W.,

1919-27.

Logica Ingredientibus'pp. 396-7:

Quaeritur

cum

dicitur

de omnibus

veris

affirmationibus,

uod

dicunt

aliquid

esse

aliquid quod

ipsum

est,

utrum,

liquid

esse

aliquid,

quod

ipsum

est',

sit in vi

nominis

el

orationis.

t f

rtasse

dicitur,

uod

in

vi nominis

omnium ictorum

ropositionum

i

firmati

arum

ategoricarum,

uod

non

est,

iam

non eri

impersonaliter

ositum quo

ut

nomen

ccipitur

ulla

signi-

ficatio

artium

ttendetur

illud

tempus

habebunt d

quod

referantur,

ullam

coniunctionem

ttendimus ffirmationisn

verbis

huiusmodi,

er

quae

doctrina

ensus

ffirmationis

at,

quia

non est

omnino

n

vi

orationis

accepta.

Unde

potius

concedendumst

,

liquid

esse

aliquid quod

ipsum

st'

in

vi

orationis

ccipi

et

,

liquid'

ubicumque onitur,

omen

st

omnium am

exsistentiumuam nonexsistentium,icutet quandodicitur liquidesse id

50

See

above,

p.

16.

19

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM, VOL. 14, NOS. 1-2, 1976

25/164

quod

non

est,

ut

,chimaera

st homo'

vel

,chimaera

st chimaera'

el cum

,aliqui

nomen

ommune it

mnium,

otest

haec

mpersonalis

ratio,

liquid

esse

aliquid

ipsum

est'

generaliter

e

habere d omnes ensus

cate-

goricarum erarum ffirmationum,uae personalibuserminisonstant, thuius

quoque

sensus

propositionis

ontineat

liquid

esse

aliquid,

sicut et

istarum:

homo

st

animal'vel

,

margarita

st

apis'.

Ex

quo apparet

uod

et

,homo

st

animal'

et

,

ocrates

st animal'

utraque

icit

hominem

sse

animal,

cum

tamen

altera

simpliciter

icat

hominem sse

animal,

lteradeterminate

proponat

ominem

une esse animal.

Propositiotaque

dicens

hominem

sse

animal lia

simpliciter

d

dicit

quod

homo

est

animai,

lia

quod

Socrates

st

animal

vel

Plato,

et sic

de aliis.

Attende

tiam,

quod

cum

,

ocrates st

animal' dicat Socratem

sse

illud

quod ipse

est,

llud

quod

est' neutraliter

onitur,

c si dicatur:

uae

res

pse

est,

ad animal

simpliciter

efertur

ta

quod

ex Socrate

quod

subiectum

st,

nullam

ignificationem

eterminatam

ccipit,

icut

et cum dicitur:

per

mu-

lierem ntravitmors, er eandemvita' vel ,mulier uae damnavit,psa sal-

vavit' indifferenter

ronomina

eferimus,

on

personaliter,

si dicatur:

mulier amnavit

t

eadem,

d

est,

res eius

sexus

salvavit,

cilicet

imiliter,

t

videlicet adem

secundum

ndifferentiam

exus,

non secundum

dentitatem

personae

dicatur.

Nec sola

pronomina

ndifferentem

elationem

abent icut

et nomen

appellativum

d

quod

refertur,

abet

confusam

ominationem,

verum

t demonstrativa

ronomina

uae

nullo

praemisso

ndigent,

onfusam,

non

personalem

ignificationem

abent,

veluticum sacerdos

quam positam

benedicens

it:

,qui pedibus

uper

e ambula

it,

qui

te

in

aquam

convertit',61

id

est

,tui

similem'

t non de

identitte

ersonae,

ed de

natura

elementi

dictum

ntelligatur.

on hanc

enim

personaliter

quam,

dicimus,

alcavit

vel

mutavit,

ed

elementm iusdem.

Sicut

ergo

demonstrativis

ronominibus

quandoque

non personalitert discrete timur, ed generalitert confuse,

sic etiam

relativis,

um ad nomen

onfusae

ignificationis

efertur,

eluti

um

dicimus:

uod

Socrates st

animai,

icit:

Socrates

st esse

aliquid

quod

ipse

est,

d est

esse

animal,

uod,

scilicet

nimal,

pse

est,

quod

tantum

alet

si dicatur:

icit

umesse

animal

t

pse

est

animal.

Et attende

uod

illud

uppositum

quod pse

est' ad sensum

uius ocrates

est animal'

non

pertinet,

ed

quaedam

est determinatio

raedicati,

eluti

i

dicatur:

quod

Socrates

st

animal,

dicit eum

hominem sse

animal

qui

est

philosophus,

eterminatio

st

subiecti

ec

in

sensum

ropositionis

enit,

um

in

propositione

il

de

philosophia

ignificetur.

Appendix

Petri

Abaelardi

Opera

Theologica,

d.

E.

M.

Buytaert,

urnholti,

969*

Corpus

Christianorum

Continuatio

ediaeualis,

XII.

Theologia

hristiana

III,

144 [pp.

249-50]

144.

Et secundum

as

quidem

tantum

duas

significationes

upra

positas

relatiue

upponi

olet

hoc

pronomen

uod

est

idem',

hoc est

aut

secundum

identitatem

umeri,

ut

secundum

dentitatem

efinitionis.

um

enim

icimus

'mulier amnauit

mundum

t eadem

aluauit',

duo

sunt

ensus,

nus

quidem

falsus,

i ad

identitatem

umeri

iat

relatio,

t uidelicet adem

personaliter

numeromulierntelligatur

t damnasse

t

saluasse;

alius

sensus

uerus,

i

ad identitatemefinitionisupponaturdem,ut uidelicet antummodoigni-

61

Benedict

o

fontis

n

S

abbaio

aneio.

20

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM, VOL. 14, NOS. 1-2, 1976

26/164

fiet

uantum

nomenmulieris

impliciter,

ta

repetitum:

mulier

amnaui

et mulier

aluaui,

quod quidem

uerum st

propter

uam et

Mariam.'.

Appendix

L.

Minio-

aluello,

Twelfth

enturyogic.

Texts

nd

Studies I.

Abaelardiana

inedita

Roma,

1958.

Sententie

ecundum .

Petrm,

VI-XXX

[pp.

11

-9]:

[XVI]

Cum dicitur

enarius

perfici

x

quaternario

t

dimidietate

ius,

istud

eius* d hoc

nomen

quaternarium'

uobusmodis

eferri

otest

ecundum

vim

verborum,

oc est

vel

secundum

ersonam

el

secundum

peciem

ive

naturam

quaternarii.

uobus