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Vivarium

Volume 27

1989

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CONTENTS

OF VOLUME

XXVII

1989)

L.M.

De

Rijk

Semantics nd

Metaphysics

n

Gilbert

of

Poitiers 1

JolBiard Les

sophismes

u savoir:Albert e

Saxe entre

ean

Buridan t Guillaume

Heytesbury

36

Miriam liav-Feldon

Grand

Designs

ThePeace Plans

of

he

Late

Renaissance 51

Reviews 77

Joseph

.

Buijs

Attributes

f

Action n Maimonides 85

C.H.

Kneepkens

The

Quaestiones rammaticalesf

he

MS

Oxford, orpus

Christi

ollege

250

AnEdition

f

heThird

Collection

103

L.A.

Kennedy

The

Fifteenth

entury

nd Divine

Absolute ower 125

Reviews

153

BooksReceived

162

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Vivarium

XVII,

1

(1989)

Semantics

nd

Metaphysics

n Gilbert

f

Poitiers

A Chapter of Twelfth-Century Platonism (2)*

L. M. DE

RIJ

2 Gilbert's

View of Transcendent

Reality

Gilbert's world consists

of

quite

a lot of

singular

subsistent

bjectswhich owe their

being

and

'being-a-something'

to a collection of

forms,

both subsistential

nd

accidental.

Well,

God has

created this

world afterwhat

in

the

Platonic traditionwas called the

'exemplary

Forms'. For

Gilbert,

creation and concretion

re

two

complementary

notions

which

play

an

important

role in his

ontology.

Creation

is the

reception

of a total form r

collection

of

subsisten

iae;

it is

also

called

generation.

As a natural

process

it

amounts to

'beginning

to be-of-a-

certain-kind'.1

2.1

Creation and

Concretion

Creation

and

generation

primarily

oncern

the

substantial

or

total)

form

collection

of subsistentiaewhereas the

accidental forms

'acciden-

tia'

in

Porretan

usage)

come

into

being qua

as

many adaptations

to

the

subsistentiae.

Nielsen seems

to be

wrong

to

oppose

concretion

gainst

creation

and generation)

in such a

way

that

concretion would

only

relate

to the

coming

into

existence

(generation)

of accidental

forms.

To

my

mind, creation and concretion are

materially

he same

(as

far

as

the created world is concerned. There* is

a

formal

difference

between

the

two,

however:

creatio'

refers o

the

production

resulting

fromGod's

activity

'causation

out of

nothing'),

whereas

'concretio'

refers o the

process

by

which

participated

formsbecome embodied in

matter.

Here

are

some of the basic texts:

*

Part

1)

is found

n this

ournal,

6

1988),

73-112.

1 I preferhis o Nielsen's enderingp. 69): "begins obelongo a genus",where

alicuiuss

ignored

nd,

more

mportantly,genus'

s taken n ts

xtensional

ather

than ts ntensionalense.

1

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Heb.

199,19-20:

mnia

naturalia onmodo

reata

edetiam oncretaunt.

All naturai

hings

re

not

nly

reated ut lso

solidified

'enmattered'].

Trin.7,56-9:multa untuevocanturforme',t orporumiguret liaque n ub-

sistentibusreationeeu

oncretione

iunt;

uibus

d

cui

nsunt,

ut

liquid

st ut li-

quid

sse

octrine

rdine emonstratur.

There re

many

hings

hich

re called

forms',

uch

s

bodily

igures

nd other

things

hich

riginate

n

subsistente

y

creationr

concretion;

things

due to

which hat

n which

hey

nhere

ither

is-a-something'

r s

demonstrated

o be-a-

something'

hrough

n

orderly

earned

rgument.

Ibid.

8,87-8:

... ERIS

FIGURAM

que,

cum

apis

olvitur

alore,

n

pso

reatur.

....

the

hape

f

bronze,

hich

riginates

n a stone

when

he atters

dissolved

y

heat.

Eut.

255,74-256,78:

enerado

amque

st

ngressus

n substantiam.

deoque

uic-

quid

per

reationem

ncipit

licuius

eneris

sse,

d

recte icitur

generari'.

uod

uti-

que

omnibus

emporalibus

tqueperpetuis

onvenit.

ec enim mnia

on

emper

fuerunt.

deoquequicquid

ecundum

uodlibet enus

unt,

sc.

hec

omnia]

er

generationem

ocesse

ceperunt.

Generation

s ndeed

he irst

tep

n the oad o

ubstance. ence

whatever,

ue

to

creation,

egins

obe of

ome

eneric

ature,

s

truly

aid to

be

generated'.

his t

least

appens

o ll

temporal

nd

perpetualhings,

or llthese avenot

lways

een.

Therefore,

hatever

hey

re

ndof

whatever

enus, hey

ad

begun

obe this

enus

througheneration.

Trin.

4,54-6:

reatio

amque

ubsistentiamnesse acit

tcui

nest

b

ea

aliquid

it.

Concretio ero

idem ubsistentieaturas

osterions

ationis

ccommodai

t,

cui

cum ll

nsunt,

implex

on it.

For

creationauses subsistential

orm o

nhere

in

something

so that

hat n

whicht

nheres

is-a-something'

ue to t

viz.

hat

orm].

oncretion,

n

the

ther

hand,

ccommodateshe ame

ubsistentialorm ith

ome atures

f

econdary

ank

so that hat

n which

hey

nhere

ogether

ith hat form> is not

n

incomposite.

It

should be noted in

this

connection that the nature

osterions

ationis

mentioned above are not necessarily accidental forms,as Nielsen

seems to assume. This'

may

be

gathered

from Trin.

89,18-9

where

Gilbert

speaks

of

"

posterions

rationis naturas

aliquas

vel

e

componentes

vel

sibi

adiacentes":

it is

quite

clear in

this context

that

by

'nature

componentes'

Gilbert

means

subsistential forms. In

fact,

by

our

author

explicitly

peaks

of the concretionf

genus

and

difference,

s

well

as

of the creation f

accidents:

Trin.

44,79-81:

mne ubsistens

ultorum

uibus

st,

dest

eneris

t

diferentie

t

accidentis,

oncretione

ubsistit.

Each

subsistent

ubsists

ue to

the

oncretionf themultitudefconstituents

y

which

t

s,

viz.

genus,

ifferentiand accident.

2

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bid.

8,87-8:

... FIGURAM

que

... creaur

...

the

igure

hich... is created.

Ibid.

1,18,8-9;

ccidentia sive

n

eis creata

ive xtrinsecusffixaint.

the ccidents,hetherreatednthem rmerelyttachedto them>fromutside.

Similarly,

at

Trin.

84,73

where

he

says

that

th

immanent forms

never

go

without the matter

they

are embodied

in,

Gilbert uses the

term

concretione

or the

concretion of all

kinds of

forms

in

matter,

including

the

subsistential

forms. For the

text,

see

below,

p.

12.

Finally,

at Eut.

292,23-4

Gilbert

speaks

of

the

creation

f accidents:

"et

preter

has

[sc.

subsistentias]

lle etiam

que

in

eodem

creantur

x habitu

coniunctorum",

where

qualities

and

quantities

are meant

see

292,27-

8). For the text see our thirdsectionbelow (3.21).

The

terms

creation' and

'

concretion are

used

in

connection

both

with

subsistential

and accidental forms.

They

indicate the

embodi-

ment

of

forms

hroughparticipation

r the

diffusion

f

Perfect

Being,

so

to

speak.

This

brings

us to

a number

of

items

all in some

way

related to the

origin

and actuad

rise

of

natural bodies.

2.2

Esse

and

essentia

As we have alreadyseen in our first ection 1.1-1.4), a thing'ssub-

sistentia

r id

quo

s

also called

its esse.

As far as

natural bodies are

con-

cerned,

that nature

s their sse

Eut.

242,3-5;

quoted

above,

part

one,

p.

107).

This esse s not the

substance

or

the id

quod)

tself

ut that

by

whichthe atter s

{Heb.

196,242),

although

t is true

that the esse ome-

times s

called 'substentia'

(i.e.

in

a

broader

sense,

standing

for sub-

sistential

form;

see

above,

part

one,

p.

80).

The esse f

natural bodies

arises from heir

form(s):

"... naturalibus

quorum

omnium

esse ex forma

est"

{Trin.

89,6);

cfr.

ibid.

82,1-4,

quoted below, p. 8. In naturalbodies we findmore thanone subsisten-

tia.

Accordingly,

here s

a

multiplicity

f

esse.

This

multitude allows

Gilbert to

speak

of

whatever

mode of

being'

{quodlibet

sse)

of

subsis-

tent

things Trin.

82,1-2).

At

Trin.

I,

cap.

40 he

exemplifies

this for

man

(as opposed

to

God).

If

someone

when

speaking

about

somebody

says

he is a

man',

he chooses

only

one

mode of

being

(the

subsisten-

tial

one,

to

be

sure)

from

the whole

collection of

the

modes of

being

of that man:

2 Cf. Trin.5,80-2:Est gituromo orpus on b eo exquo ipse onstatorpore,

sed

ab illius

orporis

sse. stet

demhomo

piritus

on b

eo ex

quo ipse

onstat

spiritu,

ed

ab

illius

piritus

sse11

3

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Trin.

123,30-7:

.. cum

de

aliquo

dicitur:est

homo'

..

is

qui predicatur

sse

HOMO,

quamvis

it

homo,

NON tarnen ST

INTEGRE

hoc

IPSUM

quod

predicatur

OMO.

Idest:

nontotum3

uo

est

redicatur

sse

quod

est n

eo

quod

diciturssehomo. edquihocdealiquodicit, lurimauibusdempse st eipso

adhuc

icenda

idest ualitates

uibus

st

qualis,

t

quantitates

uibus

st

uantus)

reliquit.

...

When ne

says

f

omebody:

be

is a

man'

..,

although

e who

s

predicated

o

be a man < indeed is

a

man,

he is

not

imply

nd

entirelyust

that

which

s

predicated'called'),

man'.

mean o

say:

n

that e

s said

to

be

a

manhe s

not

said o

be

all

that

which

e s

through

he

omplete

sse

y

which e

s.

Whoever

ays

this bout

omebody,

till

eaves

uite

lot f

modes

f

being y

which he

ameman

is unsaid

f

him,

iz. the

ualities

y

which

e

s

such-and-such,

nd the

uantities

by

which

e

s of

certain

ize.

Similarly, f a man is ust, he is a man byone ofhis subsistential orms

and

just

by

another:

4

'aliud est

id

quo

est

homo,

aliud

id

quo

est

iustus"

(Trin. 124,69);

cf.

ibid.

81,80-1.

Of

course,

something's

esse

id quo

est)

and the

thing

tself

id quod

est)

are

mutually

related:

Eut.

278,8-279,12:

..

etesse

t d

quod

st

uiusdam

orsortiiatione

ine e

esse

non

possunt,

t

corporalitas

t

corpus;

ctu

namque orporalitas

ichil stnisi it n

cor-

pore,

t

corpus

on

st

quod

vocatur

isi

n

pso

it

orporalitasue

est

eius

sse.

and

being'

nd thatwhich

s',

e.g.

'being orporeal'

nd

body',

annot

o

withoutachother,wingo certainartnership;being orporeal'ndeedsactuallynothingnlesst nheresn a body,nd bodys notwhat t s called

viz. body]

unless

being

orporeal',

hich

s its

sse,

s

present

n

t.

However,

there s

yet

a

distinction

o

be

made

between

the two.

This

distinction s

very mportant

nd

elucidated

by

Gilbert

n

many

ways.

First

of all he

mentions

it

in

his

exposition

of the

famous

second

Theorem

of

De

hebdomadibus

Heb.

193,51-195,6;

see

above,

part

one

p.

76

and 81

ff.).

Moreover,

the

distinction

omes

up

in

his

extensive

discussion of

natura'

(see

ibid.,

p.

106

ff.).

At

Trin.

92,90

ff.

Gilbert

argues that esse nd idquodest re genericallydifferent,s well as con-

ceptually:

"

esse vero et id

quod

est

nec

eiusdem

generis

nec

eiusdem

sunt

rationis"

(Eut.

293,57-8).

To be

sure,

the ontic

value of the

different

orms

subsistential

or

accidental)

is

not identical either.

Unlike the

subsistentiae

he accidental

forms re

not the esseof the

subsistent

hings

s

is

patently

lear

from

Eut.

260,94-5,

quoted

ibid.,

p.

110 and Heb.

209,91

ff.

quoted

ibid.

p.

103:

esse of

accidents is

merely

desse

sc.

subsistentiis),

ather

han

inesse

sc.

subsistentibus).

3

Unlike

ring prefer

he

eading

totum)

f

MS Zwettl

53 o hat

toto)

f

he

ther

MSS.

4

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Of

course,

the

widest

divergence

on

this score

is that

between

the

subsistentiae

nd

their

companions,

i.e.

the accidents

(quantity

and

quality)

on

the

one

hand,

and

the

'accessories'

subsumed

under the

heading

'status' on the other. n Trin.

123,55

125,17,

thevera ssendi

ratio

or

vere

ssendi ensus of the former s

set

alongside

the

quedam

extrinsecusollatio

f

the latter

123,55;

124,60;

125,1;

126,45; 135,2;

136,22).

As

may

be

expected,

what

is

elsewhere

called

status

see

ibid.

p.

104

ff.)

s

associated

with

the sensus ollationis

136,29-30).

When

discussing participatio

nd

habitus

we

will

come across these notions

again.

'Essentia'

is seldom used

by

Gilbert

to indicate

created essences

see

e.g. at Eut. 278,84). Essences occurring n natural bodies {nativa) re

usually

designated

by

the term substantia'

(in

its

secondary

sense,

of

course;

see

part

one,

p. 80).

So

'substantiae' stands

for

subsistentiae

particulariter

ubstantes',

as

is

explicitly

aid

at

Eut.

279,31-2:

Eut.

78,7-279,14:

ttende

uod,

um

uperius

ixeritssentiasunc icit ubstantias

in

particularibus

sse.

Quia

namque

t esse t

d

quod

st

uiusdamonsortii

atione

sine e

essenon

possunt

...

[see

above,

p.

4]....,

recte,

upposito

uolibet

orum

duorum

ominum

hocest

essentia' el

substantia'),

ensus

llius

ue

sequitur

ic-

tionis d eorum

viz. nominum]

uodlibet

ut

consequenter

ut

accidentaliter

redditur4.

Note hat e Boethius]irstaid essences' nd now ayssubstances'o bepresent

in

the

articulars.

or ince

uetoa certain

artnership,being'

nd that

which

s'

cannot o without

achother

...

see

bove,

.

4],

< therefore

whichever

f he wo

terms

viz.

essence'

r

substance')

s

put

s the

ubject

f

he

roposition,

he ense

of

he

redicate

erm5s construedith

ither

ne

of hem

n

terms

f

ither

atural

or

ncidental

elatedness.

Ibid.

279,29-33:

ttende

uod,

cum

prius

ixerit essentien

particularibus

ub-

stant",

einde

x

eodem

ensu

substantien

particularibusapiunt

ubstantiam",

nunc

dem

olens

ntelligi

it "subsistentias

articulariter

ubstantes",

um

amen

aliud

it

ssentia,

liud

ubsistentia,

liud

ubstantia.

Note hat,whereas e saidbefore:essences ubsistnparticulars",nd nextwhen

meaning

he

ame

had"substancesbtain heir

tate f ubstance

n

particulars",

e

now

wanting

s

tounderstandhe

ame)

peaks

f subsistentiae

ubsistingarticu-

larly",

and

that>

even

hough

essence',

subsistentia'nd

substance're not

quite

he ame

hing.

4

For

the connexio

onsequentialis

s.

accidentalis'

istinction,

ee Eut.

346,61

f.

and

L.

M. de

Rijk,

Gilbert

e

Poitiers:es

vues

mantiques

t

mtaphysiques

in: Gilberte

Poitierst es

ontemporains.

ux

rigines

e

a

ogica

odernorum.ctes u

septimeym-

posium

uropen

'histoiree

la

logique

t de la

smantique

divales. entre

d'Etudesuprieurese civilisationdivaleePoitiers,oitiers7-22 uin 985,

dits

ar

JeanJolivet

t Alain

de

Libera,

Napoli

1987,

147-171

sp.

p.

164-8.

5

litt,of

the erm

hat

ollows',

.e. 'is

in

second

osition'.

5

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 27, NOS. 1-2, 1989

9/169

In

point

of

fact

Essentia'

is

commonly

used to

stand for

God's

Being(ness)6.

Well,

whenever the term

is used to

designate

God's

Nature itrunsparallelto subsistentia' as used inthe case of creatures.

This

may

be

gathered

from

passages

such as the

following

ne:

Trin.

66,1-167,17:

anifestumst GITUR

quod

horum RIUM est

UNA

tantum

SUBSTANTIA,

ue

grece uidem sya

icitur,

atine

ero,

icut

ictum

st,

ubstantia

vel ubsistentia

el,

ut

expressius

icatur,

ssentia.

It

is

obvious, herefore,

hat

fthe hree ivine ersons

heres

ust

one

substance

which

s called

usya'

n

Greek,

nd

n

Latin,

s

hasbeen

aid,

substantia'

r

sub-

sistentia'

r,

to

put

t

more

xpressly

viz.

when

peaking

bout

God]

essentia'.

2.3 Formaand Idea

Small

wonder that

in the Platonic

ontology

ike Gilbert's doctrine

of

being

undoubtedly

s,

the

notion

of forma' is of

paramount impor-

tance.

The term

s used

to refer o

both God's

Being

as well

as all

kinds

of

being

occurring

n our world:

Trin.

9,5-6:

Quod

formam

ivinam ocaverat

sc.

Boethius]

sse

mnium,

stendit

non bhorrere

naturalibus

uorum

mnium

sse x forma

st;

cf. bid.

8,76-8.

BycallingheDivine orm he sse f llthingsoethiushowed hat he ormers

not

t

complete

ariance

ith

atural

hings

hich ll

owetheir

sse o their orm.

In

his

commentary

on

De hebdomadibus ilbert follows

Boethius

in

using

the

term

orma

ssendi o

mean esse.

Heb.

196,34;

cf.

193,49).

The

foregoing

discussion

has made

it

quite

clear

that

the

subsistentiae

id

quo

or

ea

quibus

in fact re forms

see

above,

part

one,

p.

76).

'Forma'

is

a term

which has

many

different enses

and

so

is

'materia',

as

Gilbert

argues

at the

beginning

of the

long

exposition

on

matter nd

form

n his

commentary

on

Boethius'

De Trinitate

80,62-3).

God

is

called the Prima Forma:

Trin.

1,90-3:

Forma'

uoque

multipliciter

icitur.

amessentia

ei,

quo opifice

est

uicquid

st

liquid

t

quicquid

st sse

nde

llud

st

liquid

tomne

uod

sic nest

ei

quod

est

liquid

t

ei

quod

est

sse

adsit,

rima ormaicitur.

'Form',

oo,

s

said n

manyways.

or

he ssence

f

God,

n virtue f

whom

s the

Creator

1)

whatever

is-a-something',

nd

2)

whatevers

that

ind

f

being

hrough

6 Seee.g. Trin.1,17-20; 9,15; 1,90; 2,16; 6,10; 7,49; 7,63; 0,26-9; 9,4-5;

109,18; 12,32-3;

13,41-5; 20,59;

166,1-167,2;

69,70-4.

s

God

is una

olitaria

essentia

Trin.

20,72),

n his ases

essens

=

'

subsistens'see

Trin.

13,50-6;

66,88.

6

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 27, NOS. 1-2, 1989

10/169

which he

former

is-a-something',

nd

3)

whatevernheres

n

that

which

is-a-

something'

uch

hat t

ccompanics

hat sse1

s,

s called

Primary

orm';

f.

7,63

88,75

nd

89,5-6.

It is clear fromGilbert'swords that God's Essence, called

'Primary

Form' is the

cause of

all

natural

bodies,

including

their

ontic consti-

tuents.

Indeed,

God

is

said to be the Creator

(Cause)

of

(a)

the id

quod

having

some

determinate,

mperfect

eing:

'quicquid

est

aliqui

(b)

the

'being'

out

of

which

that

id

quod

is some

determinate

thing;

hereby

ts

subsistentiae

re

meant

(c)

all

kinds of

being

that nhere

n

the id

quod

n

such

a

way

that

they

accompany (one of) the subsistentiaehereby, of course, the

'accidents'

quantity

and

quality

are

meant whose mode

of

being

is

often

described as

an

adesse

Next

the

four

elementary

bodies,

fire, air,

water

and

earth,

are

dis-

cussed.

(For

the

next

passages,

cf.

Calcidius,

In

Timaeum latonis

nrs

302-3

=

pp.

276,12-277,8

and

345,21

ff.

d.

Waszink).

They,

too

are

entitled o the name

'forma',

as

they

re

no

longer

formlessmatterbut

consist of

primary

matter

as

informed

by

an

intelligible

pecies:

Ibid.

1,94-82,100:

uatuor

uoque

incere

ubstantie,

dest

gnis,

er,

qua,

terra,

non uidemue n ilvamutuamoncretionemabere redictaunt,ed ueex silva

et

ntelligibili

pecie

unt,

quibus

emum

ematerie

ensiles

gnee,

eree,

quatiles,

terree

educte

unt,

orporum

cilicet

ue

nutriculemnia

ontinentis

uscipit

inus

exemplaria

eorundem

orporum

dee

rece,

atine

ero

orme

ognominate

unt.

Also

he

our

enuine

ubstances,

iz.

fire,ir,water,

arth I

mean,

ot

hose hich

were aidbeforeo

havemutual

oncretion

n

primordial

atter,

utrather

hose

which onsist

f

primordial

atter

nd an

intelligible

pecies,

ut

of

which

inally

those

ieces

f

fiery,

ery,watery

r

eartly

matter

re

deduced,

hat s

to

say,

he

exemplary

lements

f bodieswhich he

ap

of

the

all-containing

ostermother

bears

,

in

Greek

hey

re

called he

ideai' and

n

Latin

he formae'

f

those

odies.

In a third ense 'forma' is used to

signify

ll thosemodes of

being

which are

elsewhere

called subsistentiae

see

above,

part

one,

p.

82):

7

ei

quod

estesse' is

merely

paraphrasis

or

he

dative ase of

the

gerund

sse

(equivalent

oGreek

i

inai).

t cannot

e stressed

oo

ftenhat he

ormula

d

quod

est

receding

specialtechnical)

erm erves

o set ff he atter.

.g.

"id

quod

est

'ambulare'

on

st

dem

uod

currere'

means

'to

walk' s

not he ame s

'to

run'

or id

quod

est mbulare'

may

tand

or

heword

concept,

otion)

fwalk-

ing.

n

such

ases,

Latin

grammar

equires

uch

paraphrases

n

genitive

r

dative

case.

So the amous

ormula

in

eo

quod

st sse'

certainly

oes

not

mean

omething

mysteriousikeinthatwhichsbeing'let loneinthatwhicheing s')butust in

(its)

being' 'in

essendo',

s is the

sage

f

he

aterMiddle

Ages).

The

correct

iew

is

foundn

Nielsen,

.

50. See alsoL. M.

de

Rijk,

rticle

uoted

elow,

.

16,

n.

16.

7

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Ibid.

2,1-4:

llud tiam

uorumlibet

ubsistentium

uodlibet

sse x

quo

unumquod-

que

eorum

st

liquid

et

quod

eorum

ue

sibi

dsunt

rcdictum

st sse

materia,

eorundem

ubsistentium

icitur

forma';

t

corporalitas

mnium

orporum

sc.

diciturorma.

Also

very

mode

f

being

f

very

ubsistent

hatsoever,

uetowhich ach

of hem

'is-a-something'

nd

which,

s we have

said,

s the

matterf those

hings

hich

accompany

t,

s

called 'form'

f

hose

ubsistentsn

the ame

way

s

being

or-

poreal'

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 27, NOS. 1-2, 1989

12/169

[i.e.

this

mode f

being]

n

them,

y

no means

llows hem

obe

simple.

nd

hese

two re

only

amed

matter',

ut he lements

hich

re the

sse f he ubsistents

arecalled

othmatter'

nd

form',

et istinctively:they

recalled the

matter

of hatwhichccompanieshem nd theform' f hose hings hich ueto them'

are-a-something'

Next

Gilbert

comes to

distinguish

two

kinds

of

'forma

simplex',

a

Form

without

matter,

that

is,

(

=

God)

and the

exemplary

Forms. In

God,

of

course,

no

composition

or adesse an

be found

since

He is his

Being):

Trin.

2,15-9:

imiliterormarum

lia

nullius

materiet deo

simplex,

t

Opificis

essentia

ua Ipse

vere st.

Neque

nim

psa

ex multisssentiis

onstat

eque

lli n

Opifice

dsunt

liqua quorum pifex

el

psa

esse vel dici

possint

liqua

ratione

materia.

Likewise

f he ormsheres one

ompletely

mmaterial

nd, herefore,

imple,

uch

as the ssencef he

Maker

y

which e

truly

s. For his essence doesnot

onsist

of a multitudef essences or do certain

hings ccompany

t in the

Maker,

speculation,

hich,

ranscending

ll

natural

odies,

ixests

gaze

upon

heir

rinciple

tself

either

heir

Maker

hankso whom

hey

re,

r the

exemplary

orm

rom hich

hey

re

deduced,

rthe

hyl

matter)

n

which

hey

re

located),

s

called

intellectual'

ar

xcellence.

Earlier on these forms were called

corporumxemplaria81,97-82,100

quoted

above,

p.

7)

and

sensiliumdee

83,34,

quoted

above,

p.

10).

They

are also

considered to inhere in the

four

elements,

though

definitely

ot as their

matter';

rather

hey

re

present

n

the

elements

as exemplaria.ndeed, theyare of a pure nature:

Trin.

9,2-10:

Nam tsi

ontingat

t inesse' icatur

ut

epe

n

theologicis

cripturis

dicitur ivinitasnesse

atri ut dee

lementis),

non amen

t

materie.

ivinitas

enim nPatre icitur

sseut

ssentia

nEo

qui

vere

st

et dee nelementis

t

xemplaria

inhis

ue

sunt

arundem

magines.

am

neque

dee nelementis

eque

sia

nPatre

create

ubsistentieunt

uibus

n

ipsis

ccidentiaoncretaint

uorum

x

earum

causis

psa

int,

t

x effectulle

icantur,

aterie.

taque

nec

Pater

liquorum

ror-

sus

nec lementa

x

deis

materieunt

ccidentium.

deoque

neque

sia

nequeydee

cognominantur

materie'.

For

lthough

t

may

happen

hat

t

viz.

he

mmaterial,

ranscendent

orm]

s said

to inheren' e.g. ntheologicalreatisesivinitysoftenaid o nheren he ather,

orthe

xemplary

ormsnthe

lements),they

re>

not,

owever

said to

nhere

in

them>

as their

matter.

or

Divinity

s

said to be

present

n

theFather

s

the

Essence

n

Him

who

ruly

j;

and theforms

n

the lements

uaexemplars

n that

which

s likenesses

fthese

orms.

orneither

he

xemplary

orms

resent

n

the

elementsor he sia nthe

ather

re

reated

ubsistentiaeith

hichhe ccidents

in

them

ould

oalesce

uch

hat

hey

hemselves,

wing

o

he auses

f he

ccidents,

[viz.

the

ubsistentiae],

ould

e thematerial

ubstratesf hose

ccidents,

ndthe

subsistentiae,

y

denomination

b

effectu,

ould e called

o. Hence

eitherhe ather

is the

ccidentf

nything

hatsoever

or re

he lements

ade ut f

he

xemplary

Forms

he

matterf

ccidents.

herefore

eithersianor he

xemplary

orms

re

named

matter'.

In

his

commentary

n De Trinitate ilbert

oins

Boethius

in

preserving

the

name 'forma' for the transcendent

Forms,

and

referring

o the

14

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18/169

immanentforms

y

'

icones or

'imagines1

See

99,12 ff.,

where the

pro-

duction of the

bodily

world

is

pictured:

Ibid.99,12-100,23. EQUE ENIM ESSET vero nomine ORMA SED potius

IMAGO.

Recte

utique.

EX HIS ENIM

FORMIS

QUE

SUNT

PRETER

M

ATERIAM,

dest x incerisubstantiis

igne

cilicettaere t

qua

et

terra)

non

utique

is

ue

n

yle

mutuam

abent

oncretionemed

ue

sunt x ilva

t

ntelligibili

specie,

ue

suntdee

ensilium

ISTE FORME

QUE

SUNT

IN

MATERIA ET

ei

quod

est esse

materie

dvenientes,

ORPUS

EFFICIUNT,

quadam

exempli

b

exempli

uo onformativaeductioneENERUNT. Ac

per

hoc lle incereidee'

(idest

xemplares)

t veronomineforme' ocantur.

AM

CETERAS

QUE

IN

CORPORIBUS

SUNT VOCANTES

FORMAS'

hoc

nomine

BUTIMUR

DUM

non

ydee

ed

ydearum

INT

icones,

dest MAGINES.

Quod

utique

nomen is

melius

onvenit.

For t the ranscendentorm]would ot rulye a form utratheromeikeness.

This s

correctly

aid

by

Boethius.

or theforms hich re

enmatterednd which

joining

material

eing, roduce

he

ody,

ave,

y

deduction hich

makes he am-

ple

esemblets

xemplar,

riginated

rom

hose orms hichre

without

atter,

iz.

the

enuine

ubstances

fire,

amely,

ir,

water nd

arth)

nd

ertainly

ot romhe

oneswhich

ome

ogether

oalescing

n

matter,

utratherhe nes

which onsistf

primordial

atter

nd n

ntelligiblepecieswhich

re

he

xemplars

f he

ensible

bodies).

ence hese

enuine

deae

viz.

exemplars)

re lso

ruly

amed

forms'.

or

when

alling

he

ther

orms hichre

present

n

bodies,

forms' e buse

hat ame

as

they

re not deae utratherheircones

i.e.

likenesses,

name

which,

or

ure,

better

uits

hem.

In the commentaryon De hebdomadibushe process is described in

similar terms:

Heb

195,0-7:

T

VERO

id

QUOD

EST,

ACCEPTA in

se

FORMA

ESSENDI,

idest

a

quam

abstractimntellectus

oncipit

ubsistentia

que

acceptio

icitur

'generano'),

ST

ATQUE

materie

que grece yle' dicitur)

ormeque

uius

que

grece ysiosis' ocatur)

oncursu,

pifice

lia

forma

ue

nominatur

ysia',

uxta

exemplar

llius

uod15

icitur

ydea', ycon

hocest

llius

xemplarisxemplum

t

imago)

ONSISTIT

ut

orpusoquod

t sse

orporalitatem

abet

st

orpus

t

homo

eoquod

humanitatem.

Howeverhat

whichs

as soon s ithas

receivedhe

orm

hich

ives

t

being

i.e.

the ubsistentiahich he ntellectbstractivelyonceivesf), receptionhichs

called

generation'

is

and,

after he oncourse

f

matter

which

s

called

yle'

n

Greek),

nd ts

orm,

which

scalled

ysiosis'

n

Greek),

ue o he

ction f he orm

named

ysia',

afterhe

xemplar

f hat

form>

[viz.

he

ysia],

which

exemplar

s called

idea',

comes nto xistences

ycon'

.e. a

sample

nd

ikenessf

that

xemplary

orm.

.g.

because

body

as

corporality

s

its

being

t

is-a-body',

and because

t

has manhoodt is-a-man'.

15

quod

s the

eading

ound

n

two atherad

manuscripts.

owever,

would

refer

it

tothe sual

eadingue

I

understandhe ext s

follows:

uxta

xemplar

llius

sc.

forme

ue

nominatur

sia]

uod

sc.

exemplar]

icitur

dea'.

The

usual

eadingue

musteadtothencorrectiew hat he ormas called oth sia ndydeaunlessne

takes

ue

o tand or

uod y

o

called

attractio',ut,

o

my

nowledge,

ilbert ever

uses uch

highly

classical'

onstruction).

15

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19/169

3 The

Ontological

Structure

of

Natural

Bodies

In the

previous

two sections

the

constituents f

the natural

bodies were

discussed as well as theirprinciples,God, theexemplaryForms(idee)

and

primordial

matter.

Now,

we have to consider the basic

process

through

which all

sublunary

being (all

'creatural

being'

if

you like)

comes into existence.

Here

the

pivotal

notions

are

'participado'

and

'habitus'.

3.1

Participatio

nd

habitus

Gilbert

distinguishes

between

two kinds of

participatio

viz.

partak-

ing

of esse nd

partaking

of esse

liquid.

He deals with them whencom-

mentingupon

the sixthTheorem

of

De

hebdomadibus"Omne

quod

est,

participt

eo

quod

est esse

6

ut

sit,

lio vero

participai

ut

aliquid

sit":

Heb.

198,96-199,6:

upra

n

regula

ertia,

qua

dictumst

'quod

st,

articipare

li-

quo potest")

articipationem

icebat

d

quod

st um uo sse liudhabere

uiddam.

Unde

n

quarta perte

icebat:'Id

quod

st,

habere

liquid

reterquam

uod

psum

est

potest".

n

quo

(etiam

t

n o

quod

n

tertielausula

onebat

icens:

'est utem

aliquid

cum sse

usceperit",

t nfine

ecunde

ubiungens

quod

est,

ccepta

ssendi

forma,

st")

patenter

stendit

uoniam

abere

psum

sse

articipatio

st.

In the hird ulewhichuns: thatwhichs canparticipatensomethinglse")he

called to have

omething

lse

together

ith ts

wn

being'

participation.

ence

n

the ourthulehe

clearly

tated:

thatwhichs

can

possess

omething

esides hat

it s itself'.

By

that

(and

also

by

thatwhich e stated t the nd

of

he hird ule

when

aying:

it

is-a-something

hen

thas

acquired eing"

nd

by dding,

t the

endofthe econd

ule;

that

whichs is as soon s it has

receivedhe orm hich

provides

eing")

he

patently

howed hat he

possession

f

being-itself

s

par-

ticipation.

Next Gilbert

explains

the sixth theorem:

Ibid.

199,7-16:

MNE

QUOD

EST,

scilicetmne

ubsistens,

ARTICIPAT

EO

QUOD EST eius17SSE,non uidem t o sit liquided d hoc antum T eo SIT.

16

'participt

o

quod

est sse

=

'partakes

n

esse'

ratherhan he

rather

lumsy)

'partakes

n that

whichs ts

sse1;

ee

above,

.

7,

n.

7.

However,

ilbert

eems o

take heformula

n

the atter

ay;

ee

199,7-8.

n

top

of

that,

s all Mediaeval

authors ilbert

eads:

Omne

uod

st tc." For

he

correct)

missionf st

y

ome

of

ur

MSS,

seeL. M. de

Rijk,

OnBoethius'

otion

f

eing:

Chapter

f

oethianeman-

ticsin: Norman retzmann

ed.),

Meaning

nd

Reference

n

Medieval

hilosophy.

tudies

in

Memory

f

JanPinborg.

ynthese

istorical

ibrary.

exts nd Studies

n

the

History

f

Logic

nd

Philosophy,

ds. N.

KretzmannndG. Nuchelmans.ol.

32.

Dordrechttc.

988,1-29.

17

n

Boethius'

tatement

participt

o

uod

st

sse

=

"participates

n

Being")

where

idquodst sse sundoubtedlyheLatin araphrasisfGreeko inaiseealso L. M.

de

Rijk,

rticle

uoted

bove,

.

15)

Gilbert

ost

emarkably

akes he nfinitivesse

tomean

thing's

roper

sse,

ather

han he

ource f

Being

which

hingsartake

16

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Cum odem

ERO idem

ubsistens

uodam

LIO

PARTICIPAT

UT

eo SIT

ALI-

QUID.

Sed illa

participatio

ua

eo

quod

est sse

articipai,

atura

rior

st,

ltera

vero

osterior.

nde

nfert:C

PER

HOC.

Quasi: quia

videliceton

potest

sse li-

quid.isi rius aturaliterit ID QUOD EST (sicut ictumst)PARTICIPAT EO

QUOD

EST ESSEUT SIT. ESTVEROnaturaliterrius T deinde ARTICIPET

ALIO

QUOLIBET

quo aliquid

it.

Everything

hat

s,

.e.

every

ubsistent,

ossesses

ts

eing

s a

share17,

ot n

order

to

therebybe-a-something'

ut

ust

to be.

Together

ith

his

being',

owever,

he

same ubsistent

articipates

n

something

lse

n

order o

therebye-a-something'.

But hat

articipationy

whicht

participates

n

being'

s

naturallyrior

o he ther

one. From his e

nfers:

hence

meaning:

ince

thing

pparently

annot

be-a-

something'

nless,

y

natural

riority,

t

s)

thatwhich

s

as

was

aid)

participates

in

being'

n order o

be, ut,

by

natural

riority,

t s in

order o

additionallyar-

ticipate

n

anything

lsewhatsoever

wing

o

which

t

is-a-something'.

Some pages later on this s furtherxplained. What is possesses some

nature

by

which t

is,

and

some nature

by

which t

is-a-something

Well

this

possessing

a

nature' is

participation.

As forthis

nature,

we

have

to

distinguish

between

'primary

nature'

and

'secondary

nature'.

A

thing's

'Primary

nature'

is

only

preceded by

the Primordial Cause

(God)

and

is called

generalissima

ubsistentia.

thing's

'secondary

nature' is the

companion

{comes)

f the

primary

one which

also con-

tains the cause

of

the

former

secondarily

to its

First

Cause,

of

course).

The

secondary

nature, then,

belongs

to the

potency

of

the

primarynature. As is

easily

seen, the subsistentiae are to be taken as the

primary

nature,

the so-called 'accidents'

as the

secondary

nature.

Accordingly,

twofold

participation

may

be

distinguished:

Heb.

08,64-209,81

Ad

quod

dicimus

uod participado'

sicut

t

n

his

ue premisse

sunt

egulisignificatumst), luribus

icitur odis.

um

enim

ubsistens

n se ali-

quid

utnaturam

ua

sit el

liquid

it

habet,

icitur

uod

psum

a natura

articipt.

Natura ero

ue, quoniam

nest

ubsistenti,

iciturb eo

participan,

lia

ta

prima

est tnullam

re

e

quam equatur

isi

rimordialem

abeat

ausam;

t a

que

omni

subsistenti

nest

eneralissima

ubsistentia.

lia

huius

rime

uodammodo

omes st

et,post ausam rimordialem,llam uoque tacausam abet t ad potentiamius

ipsapertineat

t

proprietate,ua

sine a non sse

possit,

dhereat...

[this

natura'

is a

collectiveame

f ll

differentiae

nd ubaltern

enera;

or he

ext,

ee

part

ne,

p.

106]

He

omnes

on

modo abitu

lio

uo

nherentubsistenti

erum

tiamlio

quo generibus

ius

predictaotestatetqueproprietate

dherent,

icuntur

haberi'.

Ac

per

hoc

duplici

atione

articipantur.

We

reply

hat

as

has lso

been ndicated

n

the

reviousules)

participation'

s used

in

many

enses.

orwhen

subsistentas

omething

n t s the

nature ue

towhich

it s or

s-a-something

it s

said

to

participate

n that ature. he

nature, owever,

which,

ince t nheresn the

ubsistents said to be

participated

n

by

t,

s

either

in.Hencemy ranslationpossessestsbeings a shareviz. nBeing tself).r are

we

to

ake ius sse orefer

othe

pecial

dealForm

n

which ach

hing articipates?

I

doubt t.

17

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 27, NOS. 1-2, 1989

21/169

primary

o such

n

extent

hat t

has no

other

ause

preceding

t

but

he

rimordial

cause

for

t

s themost

eneric

ubsistentia

nhering

n

each

ubsistent);

r t

s,

so

to

speak,

he

ompanion

fthis

rimary

ature

nd

has,

econd o the

primordial

cause lso his primaryature as its ause, o uch nextent,ndeed,hattper-tains

o he atter'

potency

nd

dhereso t n

being property

ithout hicht an-

not e

...

All

hese

atures

re aid obe

had' not

nly

y

hemode

f

having'

ue

towhich

hey

nhere

n the ubsistentut

lso

by

hemode f

having'

ue

to

which

they

dhere o the

generai.e.

genericubsistentiae]

hrough

he foresaid

otency

and

property.

ence t s in

a

twofoldense hat

hey

re

partaken

n.

The second kind of

participation

s

dealt

with at Heb.

198,97-8:

"par-

ticipationem

dicebat id

quod

est cum uo essealiud

habere

uiddavrC

However,

since

by partaking

n

any

of

these modes

of

being

(the

generalis

ubsistentia

nd all subaltern

modes,

including

the differential

subsistentiaethe generation or corruption, n case of the absence of

participation)

of

a

body

is

involved,

the inherence of such

subsistentiae

is to be viewed as

taking place

'by

substance' rather

than

by par-

ticipation':

Ibid.

209,82-5:

uoniam

amen arum ccessioneubsistens

n

quo

habent

ieri,

generatur

t decessione

orrumpitur,

on am

participatione

uam

ubstantia

sicut

genera psa quibus

dsunt

el

species

e

quibus

unt)

ubsistentinesse icuntur.

However,

ince t s a

result

f heirdditionhat he ubsistentn which

hey

ome

into xistences

generated

nd

by

their

ithdrawal

t

passes

way, hey

re said

to

bepresentnthe ubsistentssentiallyatherhan yparticipationjust s the enera

themselves

hich

hey

ccompany

r the

pecies oncerned).

For

that

reason,

this

improper

sort of

participation

is

opposed

against

the

true

participation

occurring

n the case of accidentia. he

accidents

are

properly

aid of their

subsistent)

ubstrates ecundum

ar-

ticipationem

they

are not said

secundum

e,

idest

amquam

sse.

{Trin.

209,86-210,95,

quoted

ibid.,

p.

103).

Gilbert often

distinguishes

between the

generic,

differential nd

specific

modes of

being

on

the

one

hand,

and that of

the

accidentia on

the other

by referring

o their

diverse

ways

of

participation.

See Trin.

117,78-83

and

118,95 ff.;

see

ibid.

p.

84.

Next,

the

distinction

etween esse x ubstantia

nd

esse x

participatione

is defined

in

terms

of

'be-ing'

and

'having something

n

addition

to

this

be-ing' respectively:

Ibid.

210,16-20:

uod

enim liud sitex

participatione

sse

aliudvero x ubstantia

manifeste

ocuit

n

tertia

egula

icens

fit

articipatio

um

liquid

am

s'

et n

quarta

biait: id

quod

st

abere

liquid reterquamuod

psum

st

potest",

t

n

fine

exte,

um e omni

uod

st

oquens,

ixit: est ero t

participet

lio

quolibet".

That

being y participation'

s

differentrom

being y

essence'

oethius

learly

taught

n the hird ule

y aying:

participation

s effectedhen

omething

lready

18

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 27, NOS. 1-2, 1989

22/169

is"

and

n

the

ourth

ule

y

aying:

that

whichscan

possessomething

lsebesides

what

t

s

tself',

nd at the ndof he ixth ulewhere

peaking

f

ll

that

which

s

he said:

"but t s n order

o

participate

n

anything

lsewhatsoever".

This view of

participation

is quite understandablyalso found in

Gilbert's

comment

on the fourth xiom:

Ibid.

96,39-43:

regula uodammodorccedentis

ensum

xplanat.

deo

namque

id

quod

st

articipareliquo

dictum

st

uoniam

D

ipsum

UOD

EST,

POTEST

HABERE

ALIQUID

PRETER

QUAM

illud it

QUOD

IPSUM

quod

est

EST,

idest

reteruam

it sse

quo ipsum

st.Ut

corpus

reter

orporalitatem

um

psa

qua

est

orporalitate

abet olorem.

This

rule

xplains

he

meaning

f he

revious

ne,

we

might

ay.

For hatwhich

s

is

said

o

participate

n

something

lsefor he

ery

eason

hat

what

s can

possess

somethinglsebesideshat hichhe hingtselfs, .e. besides hemode fbeing ueto whicht s.

E.g.

besidests

orporalitybody

also> has colour

ogether

ith

the

very

orporality

ue to

whicht

s.

So,

again,

participation

n

the

proper

sense of

the

word is associated

with the

so-called accidentia.

A

similar

ine

of

though

s found some

pages

further

n.

Unlike

the

mode of

being

described

earlier

as esse

x

ubstantia

participation

s now

identifiedwith accidentalis

articipatio

Trin.

215,27-8);

see also

210,6.

So

much for

participation

s far

as

subsistentiae

nd

formae

ccidentales

(in Porretansense) are concerned. What about the seven remaining

Aristotelian

categories?

In

dealing

with

these

categories

our

author

never

speaks

of

'participatio'18,

but

of some

sort

of

'having':

Ibid.

124,87-125,94:

ELIQUA

VERO

septem

generum

ccidentia

in

the

Aristotelian

ense,

o

be

sure]NEQUE

DE

DEO

NEQUE

DE

CETERIS

vera

essendi atione

REDICANTUR.

NAM

UBI,

idest

ocus,

POTEST

quidem

PREDICARI

VEL DE

HOMINE

VEL

DE

DEO;

DE

HOMINE

UT cumdieimus

"homo st N

FORO",

DE

DEO UT

cum

ieimus

Deus

est

UBIQUE".

SED

ITA

dicitur elhomo

sse n foro el Deus esse

ubique

UT,

quamvis

n

predicando

a

dicatur

est',

NON tamen

ta

dicatur

UASI

IPSA

RES

DE

QUA

DICITUR SIT

ID,

idest abeat

sse

o,

QUOD

PREDIOATUR.

The

remaining

even

ccidental

ategories

re

neither

redicated

fGod

nor

f

he

other

hings

n a

truly

ssential

ay.

For,

t s

true, Where',

.e.

place,

may

be

predicated

f man

r

of

God

of

man,

.g.

when

we

ay:

a man s on the

orum',

ofGod

when

aying

.g.

God

s

everywhere')

but man s

said

o

be on

the

orum

or

God tobe

everywhere

n

such

way

hat

lthough

n

using

hose

redicates

ne

18

There

may

e

doubts

onccrning

ilbert's

se

of

he erm

participatio

xtrinseca'.

At

Trin.

23,57-9

t

seems o be used

s an

equivalent

fwhat

lsewhere

s called

'accidental

articipation',

.e.

participation

f

ccidentalorms'.

owever,

t

88,68-

9

it

s

rather

sed s

a

general

erm

overing

ll

modes f

being

which

re

different

fromhe ubstantialode fbeing roperoGod,such hatxtrinsecaeems o bea

pejorative

pitheton

f ll

kinds f

participation

as opposed

o

PSUM

ESSE),

rather

than restrictive

ttribute.

19

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23/169

says

ii' it is not meant

s

if the

thing

tself

hich s

spoken

f

s that

which s

predicated,

.e. owes

ts

being

o thatwhichs

predicated.

This leads us to say a fewwords on the related notion of 'habitus'.

Properly

peaking,

habitus19 s

materially

dentical

with

participatio.

The formal

difference etween the two is

that

participation

refers o

the

transcendent orm

partaken

n

(which

is indicated

by

the ablative

case),

whereas

habere r habitus

re rather concerned

with

the share

something

has'

('possesses')

due to

some

act

of

partaking.

So

both the

participation

of esse

impliciter

nd

the

participation

of

some

esse

liquid

in

addition

to the esse

impliciter

s called 'habitus':

Heb.

199,4-6:

trumquegitur

abitm

videlicet

t

quo

habetur

psum

sse t

quo

aliud liquidumpso buno olo,destbeoquod st),nhac exta egulamanifeste

'participationem'ppellat.

In

this ixth ule

e

clearly

alls

bothmodes

f

having'viz.

both he ne

by

which

one

single

hing

i.e.

'that

which

s') possessesust be-ing'

s well

s

thatmode

y

which,

ogether

ith t

i.e.

be-ing']

t has

somethinglse) participation'.

Accordingly

habere' and

'habitus'

also

occur elsewhere

n

the

same

broad sense:

Ibid.

08,65-209,67:

umenim ubsistens

n

e

aliquid

t

naturam

ua

sit

el

liquid

sit

habet,

icitur

uod psum

a

natura

articipt.

For

when

subsistent

as

something

n

it

as thenature ue to whicht s

or

s-a-

something

it s

said

to

participate

n

that ature.

Ibid.

09,79-81:

e omnes onmodohabitu

lio ...

dicuntur

aberi.

ee

above,

.

17.

Eut.

93,67-8:

n hoc

gitur

no

d

uod

st abet

sse

uo

st t

a

que psum

sse

uoquo

modo

cquuntur.

In

this

ingle hing,

he d

quod ossesses

he sse

y

whicht s

as

well s

thatwhich

in

whatever

ay

s

subsequent

o

this sse.

This broad sense of 'habere' clearlyexpresses a mutual relationship

since that which

has,

'is had'

at

the same time.

So

the id

quod

estnot

only

has some

things

but is

also 'had'

by

them:

their

diversity

s

deduced from this feature:

Ibid.

93,68-294,72:

psum

uoque

sse t

ea

que

psum equuntur,

abent

d

quod

st

de

quo

vere

icantur.

ue

nisi iversa

ssent,

abere

aberique

on

possent.

ichil

enim mnino el esse n se velhabere

e

potest

aliquo

modo

ibi

oniungi.

19

Of

course,

we are

not

concerned ere

with

he

Aristotelian

ategory

f habere

(echein, (as at Irin.163,18) or hehabitushichsopposedodispositioneing oth

of

hem

ust

one ense f

uality

see

Arist.,

ateg.

,8b

26

ff;

his ense s found

.g.

at

Trin.

7,22).

20

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Also his

sse

nd

thatwhichs

subsequent

o t

possess

he

d

quod

fwhich

hey

re

truly

aid.

Well,

f

hey

ere otdiverse

hings,

hey

ould

not

possess

nd

be

pos-

sessed,

or

bsolutely

othing

an

be

present

n

tselfr

possess

tselfor e connected

with tselfn someway r another.

However,

unlike

participado',

the term

habitus'

('habere')

is also

used

to indicate

an

object's having

some feature

designated

by

one of

the

remaining

seven

Aristotelian

categories,

which

Gilbert

usually

refers

to

by

the collective

name 'extrinsecus affixa'

(see

part

one,

p. 101):

Trin.

29,13-5:

etera ero

ue

quolibet

modo

ibi nvicem

dunantur,

cilicet el

intrinseco

oncretionis

el xtrnsecouiuslibet

ppositionis

abitu...

The other

hings,owever,

hichn

anyway

reunited

ith ne

nother,

.e. either

bythe ntrinsic ode fhaving'whichs concretionrby hextrinsicodefhaving

whichonsists

n

ny

uxtaposition

hatsoever

Eut.

281,84-5:

..

QUIBUSDAM que

in se vel

extrinsecus

ffixa

abere

icuntur

A

CCIDENTIBUS.

Cf.

bid.

82,2-3.

....

certainccidents hich

hey

re

said

o have n themselvesr

diverse,

ince lato s

whateveris

mind,

in

he rder

f

nature,

s,

but

his

mind

s notwhateverlato s. And

onceptuallyhey

are

ompletely

ifferent,

ince

lato onsists

f

mind ndhisminds one

fhis

on-

stituents.

owever,

hey

renot n

every

espect

wo

because,

ue to

the

imilarity

of ertainlements

he

ne fwhichs

said f

Plato,

he ther

f

his

mind,

ou

annot

assignwhat hetwoparts roperlyre.Well, his s rightlyalled 'unity', ot

a

'union'.

herefore,

f

omebody

onceivesf

omething

mong

he atural

things

hichs distinct

rom hat

nity,

t

happens yanalogy

hat,

part

romll

consideration

f

imilarity

nd

dissimilarity,

e

opposes

o

t,

lso

by

he

ingularity

of ts

nature,

ome

ther

nity

hich

s

different

from

t>;

e.g.

to

this

man

here

hat

therman

r

that tone.

It>

also

many

subsistentsrecalled one

andthe

ame

hing',

ot ue

the

ingularity

f ne

nature ut ather

n

virtuef

he nion

f

many

natures

whichrises

because

f

their

imilarity.ccording

o this

union

, indeed,

plurality

f

men

is

called

one

r

the amemanand

a

plurality

fanimalsone

r

the

amenimal*

Ibid.

55,2-7;

uantitates

t

qualitates

ecundum

uas

equalia'

t

similia'

icuntur,

non deodiverseuntsicut otestastvilitasecundumuas lledominus',ste ero

'servus'

icuntur),

ed

quodammodo

num

unt;

on

uidem

a

que

ex

ingularitate

est

unitate,

ed ea

que

ex

proportione

omparatur

nione.

32

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The

quantities

nd

qualities

n virtue

f

which

hey

viz.

created

hings]

re called

'equal

or

similar',

re

not

ll that iverse

e.g.

the

position ower

nd

vileness

est d

quod

est

homo'

hoc uer-

bum

est

sustinetur

b

hoc nominatiuo

homo'

et remouetur ndefinite

esse id

quod

est

Socrate,

quod

uerum est

quia1

'homo'

non est Socrates'.

Cum

autem dicitur Socratesst d

quod

non

sthomo'

est

sustinetur b

hoc

nomine

quod

refert

d,

et remouetur

[/.

60vb

ab eo

quod

Socratem esse

hominem.

Quod

fal-

sum

est,

quia

Socrates

est id

quod

est

homo.

l)

quod

..

quia]

scripsiuia

...

quod

MS

QVAESTIO

IVa

Questio

est cum

participium

diciatur

nomini

substantiuo ntransitiue

et

cum

possit

poni

substantiue in

neutro

genere, quare

non

dicatur

adiectiuum.

soLVTio.

Sicut

species

primitiua

et

deriuatiua

dicuntur

in

respectu

ideo

quia

ubi non

est

primitiuum,

non

oportet

queri

deriuatiua

-

unde cum omne participium it in deriuatione,superfluum ssetque-

rere cuius

speciei

sit

-

,

sic cum

substantiuum t adiectiuum

dicantur

in

respectu nullumque

participium

sit

substantiuum,

non est

dicen-

dum

quod aliquod

sit

adiectiuum sicut

neque

pronomen.

Nullum

enim

pronomen

in

eo

quod pronomen

est,

est

adiectiuum.

QVAESTIO

Va

Qvis

VOCATVR

ste?

Hac questione queriturde re nominis uel uerbi.

Non

uerbi;

ergo

de re

nominis;

ergo

de

substantia uel

proprietate

111

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115/169

substantie.

Si

de

proprietate,

rgo

conuenienter

potest

ei

reddi nomen

adiectiuum.

Item.

Hic fit

questio

de

qualitate;

aliquod

nomen conuenienter

potest

ei

responden;

ergo

illud

potest

illam

qualitatem

determinare;

ergo

sumitur

ab

aliqua

proprietate.

Item.

In hac

interrogatione

onitur

hoc

interrogatiuum

ubstantie

quis

quod

est

tantum

interrogatiuum

ubstantie;

ergo

uel

inproprie

ponitur

uel

querit

de substantia.

Item. Hic

'quis

est steV

queritur

de substantia et hic

'quis

uocatur

isteV

queritur

de

qualitate.

Hoc nomen

quis

est tantum

nterrogatiuum

substantie. In prima ponitur proprie; ergo in secunda inproprie.

Item.

Hoc

nomen

potest

querere

de

substantiaet

qualitate

et

quan-

titate;

et

est

nomen substantie et nec

qualitatis

nec

quantitatis.

Quando

querit

de

substantia,

proprie ponitur

et

quando

de

quanti-

tate,

inproprie

ponitur; ergo

quando

de

qualitate, inproprie.

Item. In hac

interrogatione

ueritur

de

qualitate;

ergo

non

oportet

nomen substantiuum ei

responden.

Item.

Si

hac

interrogatione ueritur

de

substantia,

ergo

potest

ei

pronomen responden.

Item. Questio est de substantia; ergo illudquod respondetur,debet

cercius

significare

uam quod ponitur

in

interrogatione.

Propter

huiusmodi dicimus

quoniam neque

de substantia

neque

de

qualitate

queritur,

sed de

propria

qualitate. Propria

uero

qualitas

non

est

qualitas.

QVAESTIO

Via

Queri potest

utrum

in hac

constructione

vis

videt

socratem?

quis

supponat

locutioni. Dicimus

quoniam

sic

est,

sed

interrogatiue,

dest

hoc modo ut

querat

de

supposito.

Nec

quis

bi uere

supponit,

sed

quasi

ficte:

quendam

modum

loquendi, quando

est

interrogatiuum.

t hec

interrogatio

ult

sibi

talem

responsionem,

ut certificetur e

supposito

pertinente

d

illum,

ut

(quis

uidet ocratem?

irgilius

uel

aliquid

tale. Et

tale

suppositum significai uis quod

ad

substantiam

proprie pertinet,

ut

quale

ad

qualitatem.

Contra hoc obicitur.

In

hac constructione

ponitur

uerbum transi-

tiuum et in usu transeundi; et hic nominatiuus construitur um hoc

uerbo uidet

ntransitiue,

obliquus

transitiue;

ergo persona

significata

112

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 27, NOS. 1-2, 1989

116/169

nominatiuo ostenditur

agere

per

uerbum

in

personam

significatam

obliquo; ergo agituel transituel eius ostensio estfalsa. Instantian hoc'

Socrates on

egitVirgilium

et

in

omnibus

imperatiuis

et

interrogatiuis

et

optatiuis

orationibus.

In

omnibus enim

istis

non

fit

ransitio

e

per-

sona

ad

personam.

Concedi

tarnen

potest quod

hec constructio

quis

uidet ocratemV it

transitiua.

Nil

tamen

ostenditur

ransirnec

transit

tiam,

immo

que-

ritur

quis

agat.

Sicut dicitur

predicatiua

propositio

non

tantum ea in

qua

aliquid

predicatur

de

aliquo

sed

in

qua

etiam

aliquid

remouetur,

sic

non

dicitur lia

constructiotantum

transitiua

n

qua

fit

transitio,

sed etiam ilia in qua ostenditurnon transiruel in qua aliquis modus

loquendi

transitiue

ponitur,

ut

lfac

gnem'

'

utinam

egerem irgilium

QVAESTIO

Vila

De

pluralibus

quoque

distributiuorum

querendum

est

que

eorum

nominatiuis

pronominum

iungantur

et

que

non. Nam

bene

dicitur

1

omnia

sta

sunt

lba

sed non

'

omnia storum1isi

per

subauditionem.

Econuerso bene dicitur lquelibetstorumet non 4quelibetsta'

Quia

nominatiuus

ste,

scilicet

sta,

plura

simul

quasi

collectiue

sup-

ponit.

Sed tamen ad

notandum

quod

eorum

cuilibet conuenit

predica-

tum,

addimus omnia

quod

distributionis im habet.

Vnde non

dicam

omnia

sta

unt

uatuor

nisi

quodlibet

eorum

esset

quatuor,

quia

colli-

git

et

distribuii. Sed

quelibet

magis

distribuit

t

minus

colligit.

Et

ideo

magis exigit genitiuum,

qui

distributionis

roprius

est,

quam

plur-

lem

nominatiuum,

qui semper

colligit.

Queri

etiam solet

utrum

congrue

dicatur

alter stius

t

llius

et

lquili-bet stius t llorum'

Quod

ex eo

uidebitur,

quod

sicut

pro

'isticurrun

dicimus

"iste t

Ule

urrun

similiter

ro

istorumidetur

posse

dici

c

istius

et

illius alter

per

conceptionem.

Nec

inuenies in aliis

instantiam,

ut

'

miseret

storum

similiter

istius

t illius'

Licet autem

non

irrationabiliter

ici

posse

uideatur,

auferendum

tamen

est

quoniam

contra usum est.

Vel si ratio

reddenda:

quia

rpu-

gnt singularitas

distributioni.

Dicimus enim

'

omnis

homo

egi

non

tamen

omnis

steuel

alius

quia

rpugnt

iste um omnis.

Et

tamen

in

aliis bene

dicitur