vivarium - vol xliii, no 2, 2005

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VIVARIUM

AN INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL

FOR

THE PHILOSOPHY

AND INTELLECTUAL

LIFE

OF THE

MIDDLE AGES

AND

RENAISSANCE

vivariums devoted

n

particular

o

he

rofane

ide

fmediaeval

hilosophy

and he

ntellectualife

f heMiddle

ges

ndRenaissance.

EDITORS

L.M. de

Rijk,

Leiden)

H.A.G.

Braakhuis,

Nijmegen)

C.H.

Kneepkens,

(Groningen)

W.J. ourtenay,

Madison)

E.P.

Bos,

Leiden)

D.

Perler,

(Basel)

M.G.M. an er

oel,

Nijmegen).

Secretary

f he ditorial

oard: rof. .H.

Kneepkens.

All

ommunications,

xcept

hose f

business

ature,

hould

e addressed

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Mediaevistiek,

.O. Box

716,

700AS

Groningen,

heNetherlands.

ADVISORY

Tullio

regory,

Rome)

Albert

immermann,

Cologne)

J.E.

Murdoch,

COMMITTEE

(Cambridge,

A).

PUBLISHERS

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VIVARIUM

AN INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL

FOR

THE

PHILOSOPHY

AND INTELLECTUAL

LIFE OF

THE

MIDDLE

AGES

AND

RENAISSANCE

vivariums

devoted

n

particular

o

the

rofane

ide f

mediaeval

hilosophy

and

he ntellectual

ife f

heMiddle

ges

nd

Renaissance

editors

L.M. de

Rijk,

Leiden)

H.A.G.

raakhuis,

Nijmegen)

C.H.

Kneepkens,

(Groningen)

W.J. ourtenay,

Madison)

E.P.

Bos,

Leiden).

.

Perler,

(Basel)

M.G.M.

an er

oel,

Nijmegen).

Secretaryf he ditorialoard: rof..H.Kneepkens.

All

ommunications,

xcept

hose

f

business

ature,

hould

e addressed

toC.H.

Kneepkens,

ijksuniversiteit

roningen,

aculteiter

etteren,

akgroep

Mediaevistiek,

.O.

Box

716,

700

AS

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heNetherlands.

advisory

Tullio

regory,

Rome)

Albert

immermann,

Cologne)

J.E.

Murdoch,

committee

(Cambridge,

A).

publishers

Brill,

eiden,

he

Netherlands.

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PRINTEDN

THENETHERLANDS



CONTENTS OF VOLUME

XLIII

(2005)

Alessandro D. Conti Introduction 1

Stephen

D. Dumont

Duns Scotus's

Parisian

Question

on the

Formal Distinction

7

Giorgio

Pini

Scotus's Realist

Conception

of the Cate-

gories:

His

Legacy

to Late Medieval

Debates 63

Paul Vincent

Spade

The

Problem

of Universais nd

Wyclif's

Alleged

Ultrarealism

Ill

Laurent Cesalli

Le

«pan-propositionnalisme»

e

Jean Wyclif

1

4

Alessandro D. Conti

Johannes harpe's

Ontology

nd Semantics:

Oxford

Realism Revisited

156

Fabrizio

Amerini

What

s

Real.

A

Reply

to Ockham's Onto-

logical Program

187

Mary

Sirridge

Dream Bodies and

Dream Pains

n

Augus-

tine's De Natura et

Origine

Animae ..

213

Dominik

Perler

Emotions and

Cognitions.

Fourteenth-

Century

iscussions n the Passions

of the

Soul

250

Florian

Hamann

Koran und

Konziliarismus.

nmerkungen

zum Verhältnis

on

Heymericus

e

Campo

und Nikolaus von Kues

275

Pepijn

Rotten

Secundum

processum

et mentem Ver-

soris :

John

Versor and His Relation

to

the Schools

of

Thought

Reconsidered ...

292

Pekka

Kärkkäinen

Theology,

Philosophy,

nd

Immortality

f

the Soul

in

the Late

ViaModerna f Erfurt 337

Reviews

M. Kardaun and

J.

Spruyt

eds.),

The

Winged

Chariot.Collected

Essays

on Plato

and Platonism

n

Honour of L.M. de

Rijk

{rev.

y

tefaniaonfiglioli

ndCostantino

armo)

36

1

Frans de Haas and

Jaap

Mansfield

eds.),

Aristode: On Generation nd

Corruption,'

Book

I

{rev.

y

Jack£upko)

367

Irène

Rosier-Catach,

La

parole

efficace:

signe,rituel, acré {rev. yL.G. Kelly) 369



iv CONTENTS

Claude Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts rev. y

Dominik

erler)

377

Richard

Billingham,

'De

consequentiis'

mit

Toledo-Kommentar.

Kritisch

herausgegeben,

eingeleitet

und kommentiert

on

Stephanie

Weber

(rev.

y

E.P.

Bos)

380

Books

Received

383



DreamBodies nd DreamPains in

Augustine's

"De

Natura

t

Origine

nimae"*

MARY

SIRRIDGE

"St.Perpetua,or xample,eemedoherselfndreamso be

wrestling

ith

certain

gyptian

fter

eing

urned

nto

man."

Augustine,

e

Natura

t

Origine

nimae

Abstragt

In

his De

Natura

t

Origine

nimae

an

answer

o a work

by

Vincentius

ictor,

Augustine

as drawn

nto

attempting

o answer ome

questions

bout what

kind

of

reality

ream-bodies,

ream-worldsnd

dream-pains

ave.

In

this

paper

I

concentrate

n

Augustine's

ttempts

o show that none of Victor's

argumentsor hecorporealityf the soul are anygood,and thatVictor's

inflated

laims

bout the

extent

f

the soul's

self-knowledge

re the result f

mistaking

elf-awarenessor

elf-knowledge.ugustine

akes he

position

hat

the

feelings

e

have

in

dreams nd the

feelings

f the

dead,

although hey

are real

feelings,

re not

always

he

feelings hey

eem to be. This

position

is

consistent ith

Augustine's

ater

works,

hough

t

departs

rom is under-

standing

f these

ssues

n

his

earliestworks.

In

De

Natura

t

Origine

nimae

written round 419

A.D.,

Augustine

was

drawn ntoattemptingo answer omequestions bout what kind of real-

ity

dream-bodies,

ream-worlds,

nd

dream-pains

ave.

Did

St.

Perpetua

really

feel that

she was

struggling,

r did she

merely

dream that she felt

that

way?

Was she

really truggling?

as

she

really

wrestling?

Was she

*

I

thank

arcia

olish ndFr.

Roland

eske,

hoheard r read

arlierersionsf

this

aper

ndmade

mportant

uggestions.

1

Augustine,

e

Matura

t

Origine

nimaeIV.

16.

26.

405,

d. C.F.

Urba&

J. Zycha,

CorpuscriptorumcclesiasticorumatinorumhereafterSEL) 0,Vienna 913, 01-419here-

afterNO

A).

Also itlede

Animat ius

riginePatrologia

ursus

ompletus

atrum

atinorum

(hereafter

L)

44,

475-548

I

have onsultedhe

nglish

ranslation,

he

ature

nd

Origin

of

he oul

in: TheWorks

f

aint

ugustine:

Translation

or

he

1st

entury

Vol.

23.1,

d.

and ransi..

Teske,

.J.,

yde

ark,

Y

1997,

66-561.

©

Koninklijke

rill

V,Leiden,

005 Vivarium

3,2

Also

vailable

nline

www.brill.nl



2

1

MARY

IRRIDGE

reallya male while wrestlingwith the Egyptian?And what about the

Egyptian?

Augustine ot

entangled

n

a discussion f these

questions

n

the course

of

responding

o a treatise n the soul

by

one Vincentius

Victor.

n

this

treatise,

which

has

excited effusive nthusiasm

mong Augustine's

wn

friends nd

associates,2

ictor

argues

that the human

soul is

corporeal.

In

support

f this

position,

e has cited the Bible

narrative bout Lazarus

and Dives.

Moreover,

Victorconsiders

t obviousthateach soul

is infused

directly y

God. Given the soul's

complete

knowledge

f its

"properties

and nature" {sua qualitate aturaque, Victor argues,simplyby reflecting

upon

his own soul

Augustine

hould have arrived

uickly

t the realiza-

tion that the soul

is

corporeal,

nd

that

each man's

soul,

then

his

spirit,

are created de novo

rom nd

by

the breath of God.

From this

position

on

the

origin

f the

soul,

Victor

argues

for

n

assortment

f

theses,

ome

of which are

typically elagian,3

.g.,

that

there s no

way

for the

soul

to inherit

riginal

in,

and that

unbaptized

nfants an

be

saved

by

the

prayers

f the faithful.

In

this

paper

I

will not deal

directly

ith

Augustine's

ttack n

Victor's

brand of

Pelagian theological

views. I will concentrate nstead on his

attempts

o show that Victor's

claims about the extent

nd

value

of the

soul's

self-knowledge

re

wildlyexaggerated,

nd that none

of Victor's

arguments

or he

corporeality

f the soul are

any good.

It is

in

the course

of

giving

his own

explanation

of the

story

of Lazarus and Dives that

Augustine

s drawn nto

a

discussion f

dreaming.

With

respect

o their

actions,

bodies and

feelings,

he dead resemble

dreamers,

e

says;

but it

is a

good

deal

easier to think bout dream

experience

han about after-

death

experience.

As an

example

of

dream

experience,Augustine ro-

2

Victor's orks

ost,

ndwe are eft ith

ugustine's

econstruction,

ncluding

fair

numberf

passages

hich

urport

o

be direct

uotations.

he

quotations

f

Book

V,

which akes he

form

f

a

letter irected

o Vincentiusictor

imself,

re

presumably

accurate

n

the

main,

ince

hey

match hose

n

Books

and

I,

which ere

riginally

addressedo

recipients

howere

amiliar

ith

incentiusictor'sreatise.

3

In

DNOA II. iii.3-xiii.

9,

Augustine

ists he arious

rrorsf

Victor's

ork:hat

the oul

was

made

y

Godout f

himself;

hat odwill

ontinuously

reateouls

orever;

that

he

oul ost omemerit

ybeing onjoined

ith

lesh;

hat he oul

egains

erit

fromeing onjoinedithlesh;hat he oul eservedo becomeinful;hat nbaptizedinfantsre aved;hatomewho re

predestined

obe saved

may

ot esaved;hat ome

ofthemansions

n

theFather'souse re outsidehe

kingdom

f

God;

that hristian

sacrifice

hould

e

offeredor hose ho ie

unbaptized;

hat hose

ho iewithout

ap-

tism

may

e saved t the ast

udgment.



DREAM

ODIES

AND

DREAM AINS

215

poses the dreamvisionsof St. Perpetuadescribed n the popularnarra-

tive of the

martyrdom

f

Perpetua

and

Felicitas.4He comes

to a sur-

prising

et of

conclusions:

n

our dreams t

is with dream-bodies

hatwe

have dream-adventures

n

dream-worlds;

onethelesswe are

really

our-

selves

n

our

dreams,

nd

the

feelings

we have

in

dreams

are real.

One

interestingmplication

f

Augustine's osition

on

dream-experi-

ence is that the

feelings

we have

in

dreams

and the

feelings

f the

dead,

although hey

are real

feelings,

re not

always

exactly

he

feelings hey

seem

to be.

Augustine

s aware of this

mplication,

which is

in

fact

n

keeping

withhis

understanding

f

self-awareness,

elf-knowledge,

nd

body

and soul

in

his later

works,

lthough

t constitutes

departure

rom he

understanding

f these ssues

expressed

n

his earliestworks.

Self-Awareness

nd

Self-Knowledge

In

the course

of his

argument,

ictor

has attacked

Augustine

or hold-

ing

that the soul

is not

corporeal,

but

spiritual.

urthermore ictor has

criticizedAugustine orhavingbeen either oo cautious or too obtuse to

make a definite ecision bout whether

he soul is

generated

ex

propagine)

or derived

ex

traducefrom he

parent's

oul

as

bodies

are

generated

rom

bodies,

or

whether,

ike the soul of

Adam,

each

soul is created de novo

by

God

by being directly

reathed nto

ts

body

(insufflata).5

ccording

o

4

Passio anctarum

erpetuae

t

Felicitatisi

d.

C.J.M.J.

an

Beek,

Noviomagi

936

here-

after

assio).

onsiderable

ontroversy

as surroundedhe

Passio anctarum

erpetuae

t

Felicitatis.here ave eendoubts,irstxpressedyAugustinenDNOA DNOA . x.

12),

boutwhether

erpetuactually

rote he ections

escribing

er

mprisonment;

Perpetua'suthorship

s

not, owever,

uestioned

n

Augustine's

ermon

81

for he east

of he

Martyrs

erpetua

nd Felicitas

Sermo

CLXXXI,

L

38,

1284-5).

he

author-

ship

f

he arrative

s discussed

y

Thomas

effernan,

hilology

nd

uthorship

n hePassio

Sanctarum

erpetuae

t elicitatis"in:Traditio0

1995),

15-25.

manuela

rinzivalli,

erpetua

the

Martyr

n:

Augusto

raschetti

ed.),

Roman

omen

Chicago

London

994,

18-40,

argues

or

erpetua's

uthorship

f he assiond ummarizeshe

cholarly

ebate

bout

whetherhe xtant reek ersionf he exts the

riginal,

hetherertullian

as he

authorf he

assio

s

a

whole,

nd

the xtento whichhe

assio

s

a

Montanistork.

5

DNOA

V. v. 6. 386:"Et absurdumxistimas

tque ncongruum

ationit nesciat

anima trumnamivinitusnsufflata

it,

n de

parentibus

racta."

f.

lso

DNOA

. xiv.

20."Itaquaerendumst dhuc nde et, trumxpropagine,icutpse uidemat, ed

tarnenx

propagine

at

corporis

embra;

n ueronouum

eque ropagatumingulis

insufflandoistribuât."or

description

f hese iews fthe

rigin

f

he

human

oul

and

Augustine'spproach

o the

roblem

n

his

ater

orks,

f.

R.J.

'Connell,

.J.,

he

Originf

he oul nSt.

Augustine's

ater

Works

New

York

987,

sp.

251-6.



216

MARY IRRIDGE

Victor,Augustine's eluctance o takea position n theorigin f the soul

is

well

nigh

ndecent:

But assure

ou

hat t

appears

o

me

completely

bsurd

ndunreasonablehat

man hould e

a

stranger

o

himself,

hat

ewho s held

ohave

cquired

he nowl-

edge

of

all

things

hould

e

supposed

o be

ignorant

f

his

very

elf.

orwhat

difference

s there etween

man nd a beast

f

he doesnot

know ow o delve

into

nd discuss

isnature

r what e is

like

sua

ualitate

aturaque),

o

that hese

words f

Scripture

re

ustly

pplied

o

him,

Man,

lthough

ewas n

honor,

idnot

understand;

e

hasbecomes one

f

he

easts,

nd s

likenedntohem"

Ps

xlix,

3).

For

since he

ood

God

established

othing

ithoutts

eason,

nd reated

an ratio-

nal nimal,apablef nderstanding,ndoweditheason,nd livewithhe ower

of ense

o as to

entrustll

things

evoid

freasono his

rudent

overnance,

hat

can

be more

nfitting

han

o

say

hat hat e cheated

an f

knowledge

nly

f

himself?

he wisdom

fthe

world,

hich

eachesowardshe

knowledge

ftruth

with

n

nquiry

hichs

pointless

ecauset

cannot now

im

hrough

hom

t

s

possible

o

earn rue

hings,

onetheless

as made

he

ttempt

o discoverome

things

bout he ature

f he oul

hat re

near othe

ruth,

ndeed

ractically

kin

to t.

How

unbecoming,

nd

ndeed

hameful,

t

s, he'n,

or

ny

eligiously

inded

man o

know

othing

bout his

ery

ubject,

r

completely

orbid

imselfo know

anything

bout t 6

The

comparison

withbeasts

rankles.

n

book

IV,

addressed

o Victor

per-

sonally,Augustine

eturns o the insult

gain

and

again

with

fugue-like

obsessiveness.

To what

extent,"

he

asks at one

point,

"will

you

allow

that

we can

be

ignorant

f our

nature nd

still

keep

safe

istance

rom

hose

beasts

f

he

ield

"7

n

addition,

t s no doubt

of some

concern o

Augustine

6

DNOA V. i.

2.

381:

Sed

mihi,

rede,

atis

uperque

ideturbsurdum

tque

ncon-

gruum

ationi,

t

homo

pse

xpers

ui it

ut

s,

ui

rerum

mnium

reditur

deptus

sse

notitiam,

ibi

psi

abeatur

gnotus.uid

utem iffert

omo

ecore,

i nescite

sua

qual-

itate

aturaqueisquirere

tque

isserere,

t

merito

n

lium

onueniat

uod criptum

st:

homoumssetnhonorenonntellexit;ssimilatusst umentist onparatusst is? am um eus

bonus

ihil on atione

condiderit

psumque

ominem

nimal

ationale,

ntellectus

apacem,

rationis

ompotem

ensuque

iuacem,

ui

omnia ationis

xpertiarudenti

rdinatione

is-

tribuât,

rocreaverit,

uid

am

nconuenienter

ici

otest

uam

t

eum ola ui

notatione

fraudarit?

t cum

apientia

undi,

uae

sese

sque

d ueri

ognitionem

uperuacua

ui-

dem

nuestigatione

rotendit,uia

scire

equit er

quem

icet

uae

sunt

era

ognosci,

aliqua

amen

icina,

mmoffinia

eritati

emptauerit

uper

nimae atura

ispicere,

uam

indecens

tque udendum

st

eligiosum

uemquam

e hoc

pse

ut

nihil

apere

ut

pen-

itus ibi

nterdixisse

e

sapiat "

7

DNOA

V.

2.

3.

382-3:

Die

ergo uatenus

obis

aturamostram

escire

oncedas,

ut

pecoribus

alva it

nostra

istantia."

lso V.

x.

14;

V.

xi.

15;

V. viii.

;

V. vii.

1.

Augustine

s also

bsessively

rritated

y

he illiness

fVictor's

sychological

heory,

ost

particularlyyVictor'somparisonfGod'snsufflationf he oul oourblowingpof

bags.

fVictor

upposes

hatwe

we

pour

urbreath

nto he

ag,

utwithout

ny

ess-

ening

fourselves

r ofour

breath,

ugustine

uggests,

etVictor

low

nto

bag

and

holdhis

nose nd

mouth,

nd ee

ust

how

ong

he continues

o think

hat

e has ost

none

fhisbreath

DNOA

II. iv.

4 ff

How

an

we consider

earning

bout

he

rigin



DREAM

ODIESANDDREAM

AINS

217

that Victor's workprovidesan accessible,pseudo-scientificationalefor

some

Pelagian

theses.But the

principal

rritant or

Augustine

n

dealing

withVictor's

work

s

that he is

faced

with

disarming position

which

s

neither

ery ogently

ramed

nor well

argued,

hough

t has

focussed

op-

ular interest

pon questions

that are

very

mportant

nd

centralto his

own

thought,

iz.,

the nature of

the

soul,

its

transparency

o itself nd

its

connectionwith the

body.

Augustine

tartshis refutation f

Victor

by

reading

"

sua

qualitate

atu-

raque

in

such

a

way

as

to attribute o Victor a

ridiculouslytrong

laim:

And o

you

eem o have

akenhe

osition

hatman

ught

o

be able o discover

anddiscusshe

ntirety

fhisnaturend

ttributes

n

uch

way

hat

othing

bout

himselfs

hiddenrom im.8

This

may

well be a

stronger

laim,

than Victor

meant to

make;

but it

allows

Augustine

o force

him

onto

a

slippery lope.

If

we

can be

allowed

ignorance

of

the number of

hairs on our

heads,

he

asks,

then

precisely

what

sorts

of

things

all

under

"

qualitatetque

natura?

Just

exactly

what

kind of

self-knowledge

ollows

mmediately

pon being

human?

If

there

is anything bout ourselvesof which we can be ignorant, ouldn'twe

just

as

well also be

ignorant

f the

answer to the

very

question

we are

examining?

he

way

is

open

for

Augustine

o

subject

Victor's

confident

claims

about self

knowledge

o critical

crutiny.

One of

Victor's

half-developed rguments

s that

t would be

strange

for man

to be

able to have

knowledge

f all

sortsof

things

ther than

himself,

nd

yet

not

to know what he

himself s

and is

like. He offers

no

further

xplicit

efense f this

claim;

but

tangledup

in

Victor's

messy

juxtaposition

f

"the wisdom

of the

world,"

which

attempts

o

investigatethe soul, and "the

religiously-minded

an,"

who refuses he

attempt,

s

a

relevant

oint

of

comparison.Worldly

wisdom falls

shortof

the truth

when it

looks to

things

utside the

soul,

because

it

is

ignorant

f some-

thing

hat

s

required

n

order to

come to know

truth.9

y

contrast,

ven

of

he

oul,

e

asks,

rom

omeone ho oesnot

ven now

owhe

goes

bout

lowing

up

a

bag?

DNOA

. iv.

4;

IV. iv.

5;

IV iv.

3).

8

DNOA V. ii.

3.

382:

quod

ensisseta

uideris,

amquam

e

uniuersaua

qualitate

atque

aturaichomo

isquireretque

isserere

ebeat,

t nihil

nim ui

ateat."

9DNOA V. ii.2. 381.The force f per uem"n.6 above)s unclear. ictor ay

mean

hat

hey

ack

knowledge

f

normal

pistemological

ntermediaries

ike he

enses

and

memory,

r

knowledge

f how o draw

nferences

rom

rior

nd better

nown

premises.

f

o,

he ntended

ontrasts between

ediated

ndunmediated

nowledge;

his

contrast

ould

ffectelievernd

unbelieverlike.More

robably,

hough,

quem'

ndicates



2

1

MARY

IRRIDGE

thisworldlywisdomcomesvery lose to the truthwhen t turns ts atten-

tion to the

the soul itself.

ictor's

point,

presumably,

s that betweenthe

soul and itself here

s no

intermediary

hat must

first

e

known

f

the

the soul

is

to

know itself

though

Victor

again

does not

make his

point

explicit);

ather

he soul's

self-knowledge

s a

direct nd immediate

on-

sequence

of its

presence

to

itself,

hus

requiring

o

prior knowledge,

o

methodof

investigation

r

inferences,

nd no

divine

llumination.

n

any

event,

his

s

the

strategy

hat

Augustine

eems to attribute o

Victor,

for

he

undertakes o

argue

that the

soul's

immediate

access to itself

s

of

extremely

imited

ognitive

alue.

In

arguing against

Victor,

Augustine

needs to differentiate

arefully

betweenhis own views

on

self-knowledge

nd Victor's

xtravagant

laims.

In

this

very

work,

Augustine

himself sserts hat

understanding

s essen-

tial to human

nature;10

hat

as

beings

with

understanding

e are

present

to

ourselves nd

aware of ourselves

n

a

unique

and immediate

way;11

and that

while we

live,

we

know

with

mmediate

ertainty

hat we

live,

and

that we

remember,

nderstand nd

will.12

n

the

arguments gainst

Victor,he is concernedto pointout that mmediate elf-awarenessnd

our natural

evel of

self-knowledge

o not

amount to

complete

knowl-

edge

of the soul's

nature

and

operations,

et alone

to

knowledge

bout

its

origin.

We do not

know,

Augustine rgues,

how it is

that

food

sustains ife

(DNO

A

IV.

iv.

5).

Nor do

we know:

that

omeone,

ot

omething,

s

acking;

he

worldly

ack ivinellumination

r

knowledge

ofGod. t

is

not

learwho

Victor's

worldly

ise"

re,

hough

ertullian,

rom

hom

Victorakes fair mountfhis heorybout he oul, escribeshe toic heoryf oul

with

pproval.

f.

Tertullian,

e Anima

,

ed.

J.H.

Waszink,

orpus

hristianorumeries

Latina

hereafter

C)

2,

Turnholt

954, 81-869,

sp.

786-7

hereafterA).

Victor ould

surely

onsider

he

material

heory

f oul ttributed

o the toics

y

Tertullian

o be a

clear

tep

n

the

ight

irection

n

theorizing

bout he oul.

10

NOA

V. xi. 15.

394:

nam

i

ntellegentia

ibi

lacet

n

natura

ominis,

uoniam

reuera

i earn on

haberet,

ihil

uantum

d animas

ertinet,

ecoribus

istaremus,

ntel-

lege uid

non

ntelligas."

11

NOA

V. xix. 0.

409-410:

Sicenim t nos

psos

ertius

uam

eteros

ouimus,

quia

nobis onscientia

ostra

ota st t

uoluntas,

uam lane

idemus,

t

n ea tamen

aliquam

orporis

imilitudinem

on

uidemus,

anc

n alio

quamuis

raesente

on er-

nimus."

12 NOAIV. vii.9. 389:"Eccemodo,modo um umus,umuiuimus,umnos

uiuere

cimus,

um

meminesseos

t

ntellegere

t uelle

ertissimi

umus,

ui

nosnatu-

raenostrae

agnos

ognitores

sse actamus

" Cf.Also

Augustine,

olloquia

I.

1-5,

d.

W.

Hörmann,

SEL

9,

Vienna

986,

-98;

Augustine,

nchiridion

0,

ed.

E.

Evans,

C

LXVI,

Turnholt

979,

9-114.



DREAM

ODIESAND

DREAM

AINS

219

. when umaneed s convertednto lood, hennto olid lesh; henhe ones

begin

ohardennd

o

fill

ith

marrow;

ow

many

inds

f

veins ndnerves

here

are;

y

what hannelsnd ircuits

he ormererveo

rrigate,

nd

he atterocon-

nect he ntire

ody,

hetherkin

s

properlyhought

f s

nerve,

r

eeths bone

or

again,

what

urpose

s

served

y

those eins

n

which ir

circulates

nsteadf

blood,

hose

hey

all he rteries

DNO

A

IV. v.

6).

Augustine

llows

thatVictor

perhaps

misspoke,

hathe meant

to

say only

that the soul had

complete knowledge

of its own

"nature

and

quality,"

and not

anything

bout its

body (DNO

A

IV. ii.

3).

The weaker

claim

fares

ittlebetter han the

stronger ne, however,

for

t is the

soul itself

that directs he

development

nd

functions f its

body.

And

if

we

do not

know

whether r how

the soul sets

the veins

in

motion to

animate the

body,

and the

nerves to make it

move,

then the

soul is

ignorant

f its

own

operations,

ven

though

he

body

is

below it

metaphysically,

more

able to

give

life to the

body

than to know

about it"13

such

knowledge

as there s of

these

things

s

a

matter f art and

possessedby

very

few.14

We also

do not know

fromwhat

part

of the

body

thinking

nd

willing

originate

r

how we

go

about

simple

ctions ike

moving fingerDNO

A

IV. vi. 7). The centralregionof the body that nitiatesifeactivitynd

actions

i egemonikon

remains

mystery

o

us. The

conclusion f

Augustine's

elaborate

discussion f the

inscrutability

f

the soul's

operations

s

sim-

ple:

If

we are

ignorant

f the

soul's own

present

operations

precisely

because we

are

ignorant

f

the

body

it

governs

,

then how

should we

expect

to have

comprehensive

nowledge

of

its

history,

ndeed,

of an

event

n

its

history

hat

s further

ack than

birth.And

even

if

the

soul

were to

have been aware

of its

startup,

s there

any

reason

to

suppose

that t

would know

how it

got

started?

DNO

A

IV. v.

6)

Another fVictor'sargumentss that t would be absurd for man to

have been

given

reason and

understanding,

hen left

unaware

of these

abilities nd

activities.

urely

Victor s

to some

extent

ight;

t

would be

extremely

trange

or a

rational

oul to be

able,

for

example,

to

under-

stand

number

heory

nd make wise

decisions

without

eing

at all

aware

of these abilities

nd activities

if

the

supposition

makes

any

sense at all.

13

NO

A

IV. v.

6. 386: "et cum

uiscera

ntrinsecus

ostra on

possint

ine

nima

uiuere,aciliusa potuitnima iuificareuamnosse."

14

Our

gnorance

s due t eastn

part

o

gnorance

f

he

workings

f

he

ody,

hich

remain

ncompletely

nown,

ven

o

cientists

ho

pend

heirives

tudying

hem

DNO

A

IV. ii.

3.

382-383).

hese

cientistso not

Augustine

dds,

o

around

alling

on-scien-

tists

cattle"ecause

hey

avenot

cquired

his

nowledge.



220

MARY

IRRIDGE

But here, too,Augustine rgues,Victor's confidencen the extent f the

soul's

self-knowledge

s unwarranted. ven

if

the soul must be immedi-

ately

aware that

t

remembers,

nderstands nd

wills,

Augustine

rgues,

it does not follow

ven that t knows what t remembers r understands

or how

trongly

t

wills;

he cites the case of one

Simplicius,

who did not

know that he knew all the books of

Virgil

from

memory,

ntil he had

performed

uch feats

as

reciting

loud the

last line but one from

very

book

(DNO

A

IV.

vii.

9).

Indeed we cannot even fathomhow

memory

works;

Augustine

offers ne of

his

memory

conundrums

n

evidence.

Suppose

there s something once knew,then could not remember, ut

now do remember:

We often

resume

hat

ewill

eep

omething

n

memory,

nd

hinking

his,

edo

notwritet down.

hen fterwardst doesnot

ome o mind henwe wantt

to,

andwe

are

sorry

hatwe believed

t would ome ack o us anddid

notwrite

t

down o as

to

prevent

t

from

ettingway.

hen,

lthough

e are not

earching

after

t,

t

uddenly

omes ack ous.

And

o were

we

not

urselveshen e

knew

it

<at the tart>?

nd hen

gain,

rewe notwhowe used o

be

<then>,

ow hat

we are not bleto

call t to mind? ow s

it, hen,

hat

we are somehowaken

away

romnd

lienatedrom

urselves,

ndthen

gain

omehow

rought

ack o

andrestoredo ourselvesas ifwe were omeonelse nd omewherelse ndwe

ourselves

ere nable o

get

o ourselvesecause

f

having

omehoween

put

somewhere

lsewhenwe seek

nddo not ind hatwe have

laced

n

ourmem-

ory,

nd s

if

we then

ame ack o ourselveshen e

find

t.After

ll,

where o

we

search,

f

not

withinurselves?ndwhat rewe

searching

or,

f

not or ur-

selves

as

if

we were

otwithin

urselves,

uthadwithdrawn

o some

lace

part

fromurselves?

o

you

notnotice

ndtrembleeforeuch astness?

ndwhat

s

this ut ur

nature,

ot s it

was,

ut

s it s now?15

As for

knowing

what we

know,

Augustine

ays

that he

himself as often

been

in

error bout

whetherhe knew the

answer to a

question

or

not,

thinking e knewtheanswerwhen he did not,and vice versa.And Peter,

he reminds

his

reader,

knew

that he was

willing

o die

forhis

Lord,

but

15

NOA V. vii.10. 389-90:

Saepe

nos

praesumimusliquid

memoriaetenturost

cum d

putamus,

on

cribimusec

nobis

ostea

um olumusenit

n

mentem

osque

paenitet

redidisse

enturum

ec itteris

nligasse

e

fugeret;

t subito

ursus,

um d non

quaeramus,

ccurrit:

umquid

os

non

ramus,

uando

d

cogitabamus?

ectamen oc

sumus

uod

fuimus,

uando

d

cogitare

on

possumus.uid

st

rgo, uod

nescio

uo-

modo ubtrahimur

egamurque

obis

temque

escio

uomodo roferimur

d nos

red-

dimurque

obis,

uasi

lii imus

t alibi

imus,

uando uaerimus

ec nuenimus

uod

n

memoriaostraosuimus,eque os psi d nos psos elutilibi ositoseruenireos-

simusttunc

erueniamusuando

nuenimus?bi

nim

uaerimus

isi

pud

nos?

t

quid

quaerimus

isi

os,

uasi

on imus

n

nobis t

liquo

ecesserimus

nobis? onne

dtendis

et

xhorrescisantam

rofunditatem?

t

quod

sthoc

liud

uam

ostra

atura,

on

ualis

fuit,

ed

qualis

unc st?"



DREAM

ODIESAND

DREAM AINS

221

was unaware of howweaklyhe willedto do so (DNO A IV. vii. 11). Thus

the

fact

that the soul has immediate elf-awareness

oes not add

up

to

the kind of

self-knowledge

ictor

would

need

to sustainhis claim that he

rational oul knows

even its own rational

operations

with

full

clarity

nd

certainty.

Augustine's

ommitment o the idea that self-awarenessoes

not lead

to

very

much

self-knowledge

hould not come as much of a

surprise.

Throughout

his

career,

Augustine

onsistently

ends to

identify

he self

with the

soul;

but

by

the

time

of De

Natura

t

Origine

nimae

Augustinehas come also to

emphasize

the factthat the soul is the soul of its

body,

a

body

that t animates nd directs

n

ways

that ie outside ts self-aware-

ness.

In

his discussion

f

the creationof

man in De

Civitateei

XIII,

he

says

that

man is

not

body

alone,

nor a

soul

alone,

but

is

"both

body

and soul

oined together."16

n

De Genesi d Litterame

appeals

tentatively

to the soul's "natural

appetite

for

managing

the

body"17

o

explain

the

resurrectionf bodies after he

ast

udgment.

But

although

he soul's ani-

mationand direction f the

body

is a

genuinepart

of its own

operation,

knowledge fsuchoperations fthe soul is not available from he imme-

diate data

of

introspection

nd

reflection. he soul's

ignorance

of how it

animates and directs

the

body

marks

a

limit to its self-awarenesshat

Augustine

onsiders

ignificant;

is

extended

argument gainst

Victor is

not a matterof

setting

ireto

a

straw man. Failure to understand

he

soul's

complex

interactionwith the

body

is

the first f several

ways

in

which Victor's

theorydisasterously

versimplifies

he soul's

"properties

and

nature,"

nd a

fortiori

he extent f the soul's

self-knowledge.

Furthermore,

he mind's

cognition

f its own

operations,

ike remem-

bering, hinkingnd willing,s neitherompletenor nfallible. s Augustine

has

argued

in

De

Natura

t

Orìgine

nimae

the mind can be

ignorant

f

16

Augustine,

e

Civitate

ei

XIII,

24.

409,

d.B. Dombert A.

Kalb,

CC

48,

Turnholt

1955.

Hereafter

e Civ.

ei).

17

Augustine,

e

Genesi

d Litteram

II. xxxv.

8,

485.

PL

34,

245-468.

hereafter

e

Gen.d

itt):

Sed i

quem

mouet,

uid pus

it

piritibus

efunctorum

orpora

ua

n

res-

urrectione

ecipere

siue

lia

atentiore

ausa,

iue deo

quia

nest i naturalis

uidam

appetitus

orpus

dministrandi;

uo appetitu

etardatur

uodammodo

e tota

ntentione

pergat

n

llud ummum

oelum,

uamdiu

on ubest

orpus,

uius dministratione

ppeti-

tus lle onquiescat."ugustineomes erylosehere osayingsomewhatnthe ash-

ion

of

Aquinas,

hat heminds not

eally

completehing

ithouthe

body,"

areth

Matthews,

ugustine

nd escartesnMinds

nd odiesn: G. Matthews

ed.),

he

ugustinián

Tradition

Berkeley

Los

Angeles

999,

30.

Matthewshinkshat

ugustine

oesnot ake

this

osition,hough

twould e

open

o

him

o do

so.



222

MARY IRRIDGE

the data of ts own internalife, .g., of what t willsor how stronglynd

unambiguously

t wills

something. lready

n

Confessiones

e find

a dra-

matic

picture

of the

mind's

propensity

or

obscuring

ts mixed motives

and

imperfectly

ealized commitments. nd

although

wareness of our

minds'

operations

s indeed the basis for our

knowledge

f the structure

and nature

of the

mind,

t is a

repeated

theme

n

Augustine's

ater work

that the mind's

self-awareness,

uch as it

is,

does not amount to knowl-

edge

of how it works.

The mind can be

ignorant

f how

it

carriesout

some

purely

mental

peration,

or nstance f whether he

will s

prompted

to remember

by images

of

experience

tored n

memory,

r is in fact

itself he cause of

remembering

De

trìn. I. 7.

12).

8

We have

difficulty

grasping

what

memory

s at

all,

and

only

a

lengthy rocess

of

reasoning

brings

us to

an

understanding

f such facts about

memory

s that the

mind s

present

o itself

y

way

of

something

ike a

present-

memory

De

triti. IV.

11.

14).

Finally,

t is obvious

that self-awarenessoes not lead

the soul to the

most basic and

important

actabout its

nature,

viz

,

the

incorporeality

f

mind. The mind does have an immediate ense ofwhat it is,Augustine

says,

.e.,

of

its

living,

remembering, nderstanding

nd

willing;

n

this

sense it knows ts own

substance.

"What is so

present

o

knowledge

s

what is

present

o

mind?" he

asks;

"And what is so

present

o mind as

the

mind tself?"

De

trìn. . 7.

10).

People

who

suppose

that the mind s

corporeal,

. overlookhe

act hat he

mind nows

tself,

ven

whent eeks

tself,

s we

have

already

hown. ut

we can

n no

way ightlyay

hat

nything

s known hilets

substances unknown.

herefore,

ince

hemind nows

tself,

t

knows

ts wn ub-

stanceDetrin. . 10.16).

From

this mmediate

wareness,

knowledge

f ts

ncorporeality

s avail-

able to the mind.

Still,

for

all its

powers

of

introspection

nd

reflection,

the mind

can make

a fundamental

mistake bout its own

nature nd take

itself o be

corporeal

because

it

easily

confuses

ts own substance

with ts

objects.

Self

knowledgeproperly

o-called

requires

that the

mind

strip

18

Augustine,

e

TrinitateI.

7.12,

d.

W.J.

Mountain

Fr.

Glorie,

C

50, 50A,

Turnholt,968hereaftere trin).f.AlsoDe trin.I. 8.13,where lengthyrgument

is

required

o establish

hat

what s stored

n

the

memory

s

not he ame s the esul-

tant

xpression

f

t

n

the

hought

fthe

erson

ho

emembers

quod

nden

cogitatione

recordantis

xprimitur)recisely

ecause

ntrospection

nd eflection

renot ufficientodecide

the

uestion.



DREAM ODIESAND

DREAM AINS

223

away what it is not from ts view of itself nd concentrate n what it

itself s.19

.... Letthemind hen

ot

go seeking

or look t

tself

s

if

t were

bsent,

ut

ratherake

ains

o discern

tself,

iven

hatt

s

present.

et t not

ry

o come o

knows f tdidnot now

tself,

ut ather

o

eparate

tselfut rom hat

tknows

to be other

De

triti. 9.

12).

Thus

in

more

sophisticated

orks ikeDe Trìnitatend

De Genesid Litteram

and even

in

the earlier

Confessiones

we

find a

smooth

fitwith the view

of self-awarenessnd self-knowledgen De Natura tOriginenimae.

TheDead and

Dreaming:

eal

Feelings

n Unreal odies

In

addition to

his

argument

or the soul's

knowledge

of its own

origin

based on the soul's mmediate wareness

f tself

nd its

operations,

ictor

has also

given

an account of how each soul

is

directly

reated

by

God.

Victor'sown

theory

eems to have been that the soul or "innerman" is

formedwithin

body

when the breathof God

whirling

bout

in

it causes

a substance o congeal [gelanteubstantia)hichis so molded that nside

the

body

another

body,

the "inner

man,"

comes to be enclosed as

if n

the

shape

of

ts

corporeal

heath uelutin

orma

aginae orporalisncimurrì)?®

to the extent hat

n

its

shape

it resembles he outer man.21

By

a simi-

lar

process

a third

corporeal

entity,

onstituted

y

sense and

intellect,

takes

hape

within

he

soul,

so that "the whole man

consists

f

three le-

ments: he

outer,

he inner nd the innermost"

DNOA

IV. xiv.

20).

On

19 husGareth atthews'laimMatthews999, . 17above),t225, hat ugustine

holds hat themind f ach fus

knows hat

mind

s

simply

nd

olely yknowing

itself,"

eeds o be understoodithers

very everely

estrictedo a kind fnon-thema-

tized ense f

elf,

hich he oul ndeed

lways

as of

tself,

r

as the

laim

hat his

non-thematizedelf-awarenesss the

ecessary

onditionnd ource

oth

f he

oul's

ar-

ticular

nowledge

f

ts

wn

tates

nd

cts

ndof

ts

genuinenowledge

f

tsnature.

20

DNOA

V. xiv.

0,

399-400.

De

hac enim

seil,nima]

oquebaris,

umdiceres:

'Et

gelante

ubstantia

uae conprehendi

on

poterai,

fficeret

orpus

liud ntra

orpus

naturaeuaeui et

spiramineonglobatum,

xindequenciperet

omo

nterior

pparere,

quem

eluti

n

forma

aginaeorporalis

nclusum,

d similitudinemuidelineauitxteri-

oris

ominisabitudo.'"

21

This ccountf he ormationf he oul s

essentially

he ne

given y

Tertullian

in DA IX, 7-9, 93-794.orTertullian,hoholds hat ouls regeneratedromouls

(ex raduce)

only

hefirstoul

results

rom

hedirect

nspiration

f

God;

n

subsequent

souls,

he ivine reathfGod

s

poured

ut s

a

kind f

vapor

with he eminalluid.

Cf.

DA

XXVII, -9,

23-4.

ertullianrawshe onclusionhat

riginal

in s transmitted

in

the

ropagation

f ouls.



224

MARY

IRRIDGE

thisaccount, souls,each createdseparately y God's breath, re entirely

corporeal.

Augustine

has

criticisms f this account

of

the

genesis

of the

soul,22

but he is far more concernedto attack the

scriptural

rguments

ictor

adduces forthe

corporeality

f the soul. Victor

has

cited the case of

the

dead

Rich Man of Luke

16:24,

who looks

up

and

recognizes

he

(also

dead)

Lazarus

in

the bosom of the

equally

dead)

Abraham and

begs

that

Lazarus come down to

bring

him

water to relievehis

tormenting

hirst.

Victor

has then

gone

on to make

the

explicit

laim that

being

able to

recognize

nything

nd

impose

a name

upon

it

implies

ts

corporeality:

You

say,

Names ease obe

given

hen orms

not

istinguished;

ndwherehere

is no

designating

f

persons,

heres no

giving

f

names,"

.. You

say,

Someone

whose

elp

s

mplored

ust,

ssuredly

ave

bodily

ormndbe seen

odily."23

So,

according

to

Victor,

f

it is

the

soul that survives

eath,

and after

death the soul

is

still

being

recognized

nd called

by

name,

and

is rais-

ing up

its

eyes

and

suffering

hirst nd

having

this or that

n

its

bosom,

then

clearly

the soul is

a

kind of

body,

which

has limbs to

move

and

sensesand the ability o feelpleasure,pain and emotions.According o

Victor,

bodily

members

re here ascribedto the soul as

if

t were

really

a

body."24

Augustine

makes

fairly

hort

work here of the reference o the bosom

of

Abraham;

ike

many

referenceso bodies and

bodilyparts

n

Scripture,

it must be taken

metaphorically,

o refer o "that remote and

separate

abode of rest

and

peace

in

which

Abraham now is."25With

respect

to

how Dives

recognizes

azarus and

Abraham,

Augustine rgues

hat

Victor

is

making

n

assumption

hat

s

demonstrably

alse, .e.,

that what lacks

bodily

reality

s

ipso

acto

formlessnd therefore annot

recognized

nd

22

He

argues,

or

xample,

hatt s

hard

o

seehow

omethingorporeal

an

ever e

constituted

n

the

mage

f

God,

who s

ncorporeal,

ut

lsohard o seehowVictoran

avoid

eing

ommitted

o the oul's

eing

f

he

ubstancefGod

DNOA

V.

14.

20).

23

DNOA

V. XV.

2.402:

Dicis

tiamcessarellic

omina,

bi

non

istinguitur

orma,

et

nihilllic

gere ppellationem

ominum,

bi

nulla st

esignado

ersonarum'

'cuius

auxilium

nploratum

st,'

nquis,

corporeustique

isus st

tque

ormatus."'

24

DNOA

V. xvi.

3. 402:

"'Denique,'nquis,

membrallic

nimae

escribuntur

t

uere it orpus.'"25

DNOA V.

xvi.

4.

403-4.

ugustine

ere

ives

he ame ort

f

ccountound

n

Irenaeus,

dverushaeresesand

n Tertullian's

A,

ch.

7 and 55. Cf.

L.J.

ander

Lof,

Abraham'sosomn

he

Writingsf

renaeus,

ertulliannd

ugustine

in:

Augustinián

tudies,

6

(1955),

09-23.

f. lso

De

gen.

d itt. II. xxxiii.



DREAM

ODIES

AND

DREAM AINS

225

named; does Victorneed to look at his face in a mirrorn order to rec-

ognize

who

he

is,

he

asks?26s it not insteadtrue

thatwe

know ourselves

better

han

we know others

precisely

ecause

we can

directly

ecognize

ourselves

by

our own

will and consciousness

conscientia

t voluntas

?

And

even

in

the

case of

others,

we do not

know

them,

properly peaking,

y

perceiving

heir

bodies;

we

most

properly ecognize

even others

not

by

their

bodies,

but

by

their ife

and will

(vitam

t voluntatem

,

even

if

that

spiritual

ecognition

s

mediated

by

bodies

in

this ife.27

But

Augustine

has still

got

to

explain

how Dives can lift

up

his

eyes,

suffer

hirst,

nd

beg

Lazarus to

dip

his

finger

nwaterto cool his

tongue

if

Dives

has

no

body. Augustine

ollows

renaeus and Tertullian

n

tak-

ing

the

story

f Lazarus and Dives

as a real

narrative,

nd not

ust

as a

parable

of some sort.

And

if

the

story

s taken

iterally,

hen the souls of

the dead

speak,

look

up

and

occupy space. Apparently

ives can see

Lazarus and

Abraham above

him

otherwise

why

would he

make the

effort

o lift

p

his

eyes?

And

apparently

e

is

tormented

y

thirst oth-

erwise

why

would he

beg

for water?

Dives,

Lazarus and

Abraham are

all dead, existing nlyas their ouls. It appears,then,that the souls of

the dead

are

corporeal.

Augustine

s

convinced

that

by looking

to dream

experience

we can

in

principle

find a

way

of

resolving

uch

questions

about

bodily phe-

nomena connected

with the dead

without

dmitting

hat these "bodies"

actually

re

physical

odies.The

bodily

ikenesses

n

dreams,

ays

Augustine,

are of the same kind

(ex

eo

genere)

s

bodily

ikenesses f the

dead,

but

they

re more accessible

o our

understanding.28

ictor

has himselfmade

reference o

St.

Perpetua's

dream visions bout

her

dead

brother nd has

26

DNOA V. XV.

1.

401:

"Sed,"

nquis,

si anima aret

orpore,uid

st

uod pud

inferosiues lle

ognoscit?'

haecdicens i

agnitionem

ominis

rouenire

on

putas

sine

orporis

orma,

t noueris

e

psum,

redo

uod

ssidue

peculum

dtendis,

e,

i

fuerisblitus

aciem

uam,

on e

possis gnoscere."

27

DNOA V. xviii. 0.409-10:

quis

utem ecte icat e

aliquem

ominem

ognouisse,

nisi

n

quantumotuit

ius itam

oluntatemqueognoscere,uaeutique

moles

on

habet

neccolores?icenim t nos

psos

ertius

uam

eteros

ouimus,

uia

nobis onscientia

nostra ota st

t uoluntas.

uam lane

idemust

n

ea tamen

liquamorporis

imili-

tudinem

on

uidemus,

anc

n

alio

quamuisresente

on

ernimus,

tiam uius bsentis

faciemouimus,ecolimus,ogitamus.ostramero aciemo modo osse, ecolere,og-

itare on

ossumus

t amen os

psos

obis

magisuam

lium

ognitum

erissimeicimus.

itadarum stubi it

otior

ominis

eriorque

oti

ia."

28

DNOA

V. xviii.

8.

408:

quamuis

nim tea

quae

imilia

orporibusogitamus,

x

eo

genere

int;

amen

uod

d mortuos

dtinet,

ptior

oniecturae dormientibusucitur."



DREAM

ODIES

ANDDREAM AINS

227

fear and shame,as shownby itsweakness, lushing nd pallor.32 y the

timeof De

Natura

t

Origine

nimae

Augustine

was familiarwithTertullian's

arguments,33

hich he had

previously

iscussed

n

De Genesi d Litteram

although

not

particularly

uccessfully.34

e was

aware, then,

that he had

to

give

an

account of the

mode of existence nd

experiences

f the dead

and

dreaming

that

allowed

him

to

separate

actions,

passions

and the

recognition

f others

rom

having

ome sortof

body;

to do so he needed

to

give

a

convincing esponse

o Tertullian's nti-dualistic

rguments y

showing

hat

the

experiences

nd actions of the dead described

n

the

scriptural assage

are in

principle ndependent

f embodiment.

In

dreams,

Augustine ays,

we

remain,

o be

sure,

ourselves.

By

con-

trast,

the

earth,

the

sea,

the

sun,

the

moon,

the

stars,

nd

the

rivers,

mountains,

rees or animals" that we see

in

our dreams are not

bodily

in

nature,

but

only very

ike bodies.35 t.

Perpetua

was herself

n

her

dream, then;

but her

opponent

was a

dream-Egyptian.

What about St.

Perpetua's

male

body?

f

we

suppose

ourselves

o have

corporeal

bodies

in

our

dreams,

Augustine

rgues,

then we would have

to concede that the mountains nd rivers f our dreams are corporeal,

for how could

a

corporeal body

ascend

a

dream-mountain?

ut,

as we

have

seen,

the mountains nd rivers

n

our

dreams are not

corporeal.

Thus St.

Perpetua'sbody

is

only

a

dream-body,

likeness

.

imilitudo

of

a

corporeal

ody DNOA

IV.

17.

25).

In

the case of St.

Perpetua,Augustine

32

DA

V,

5.

787:

Item,

orporalium

t

ncorporalium

assiones

ntere non ommu-

nicare;

orro

t animam

ompatiorpori,

ui aeso

ctibusulneribuslceribusondo-

lescit,

t

corpus

nimae,

ui

fflictaeura

ngore

more

oaegresciter

detrimentumocii

uigoris,uius udoremtpauoremuboretque alloreestetur.giturnima orpusx

corporalium

assionum

ommunione."

33

DNOA

I. 5. 9.

Here

Augustineorrectly

ttributeso Tertullian

he

iew hat

oth

Godandthe oul re

corporeal.

34

Althoughugustine's

e

GenesidLitteramas

probablyomposed

n

stages,

aking

a

definitive

ating

f thework

ery

ifficult,

ookX.

24-26

f

that

work,

n

which

Augustinexplicidy

iscussesertullian'se Anima

was

urely

rittenefore

ugustine's

answer

o Vincentius

ictor;

f.O'Connell 987

n.

5

above),

sp.

201-45.

n

De Genesi

ad Litteram

ugustinebjects igorously

o Tertullian's

aterialism,

ut

he

has not

got

much f n

argumentgainst

t;

he

s able o show

nly

hat

ertullian's

laim

hat he

corporeal

oul

akes n the

hape

f he

ody,

utnever

ncreases

n

size,

s

fairly

illy.

35

DNOA IV. xvii.

5.

404:

"nam

t

n

somnis

uando liqua

dura t molesta

er-

petimur,osutiqueumust,nisi uigilantibusobisliapraetereant,oenas rauissimas

pendimus;

ed

corpora

sse

redere,

uibus

ac

atque

liac

uasi

erimurt

uolitamus

n

somnis,

ominis

st,

ui parum igilanter

e rebus

alibus

ogitauit.

e his

uippe

iso-

rum

maginibus

aximenima

robatur

on sse

orporea,

isi elis t lla

orpora

icere,

quaepraeter

os

psos

ammulta idemus

n

omnis:

aelum,

erram,are,olem,unam,

stellas,luuios,ontes,

rbores,

mmalia,aec

ui orpora

sse reditncredibili

er

esipit."



228

MARY IRRIDGE

offers furtherrgumentgainst he real corporealityfherdreambody.

Who

could

doubt,

he

asks,

that St.

Perpetuai

soul was "the

likeness

f

a male

body,"

and

not

a true male

body

since her

own

body,

from

which she

was not

yet

sundered

by

death,

was

lying

n her

bed,

female

as ever.

If

the male

dream-body

was a

physicalbody, Augustine

sks,

why

id

t

not till ave he

hape

f

ts emaleexual

rgan

cur

onervabat

aginae

suae

ormam

)?

After

ll,

thadfound omale

enitals

n

the lesh

f

his

oman,

rom

whicht

could

ake

hape

y

ompressing

tself

or,

s

you ay

congealing.36

Augustinehere forces n application f Victor's own account of the for-

mation

of the soul

to

the formation f

dream

bodies;

the

body

of the

sleeping

St.

Perpetua

must

serve as

a

kind of "sheath" which lends its

shape

to the

bodily

parts

of the

corporeal

soul formedwithin t. But as

St.

Perpetua's

own

body

remains

female,

here

s

nothing

n

her

sleep-

ing

body

where

therewould

have to be

something

o lend

shape

to male

genitals.

hus her

male

dream-body

must

perforce

ave been some mere

likeness f

a

body.

Dream bodies

are

produced,

Augustine ays,

n the same

way

as the

likenesses f rivers nd mountains n dreams: the appearances peciesof

bodies

are formed

while we are awake and stored

n

memory;

hen

in

some

mysterious

ay

in

our

dreams we recollect

hem,

and

they

come

before

s as

if

we were

seeing

hem.37

he

process

s

none

too

predictable.

36

DNOA V.

xviii.

6.

405:

"quis

utem

ubitet,

n

lia imilitudine

orporis

nimam

eius

uisse,

on

orpus,

uodutique

n

suofemineoexu

manens,

opitis

ensibusacebat

in

stratis,

uando

nima ius n liauirilis

orporis

imilitudineuctabatur?

uid

hiedicis?

uerumne

rat

orpus

lia

uiri imilitudo

n non rat

orpus,uamuis

aberet

imilitudinem

corporis?lige uoduelis.icorpusratcur oneruabataginaeuaeormaniñeque nimn

illius

eminae

arne irilia

epereratenitalia,

nde ta

posset

ese

oarctando,t,

ut tu

loqueris,gelando

ormari'"

italicsmine). ossiblyollowing

ertullian,

e Resurrectione

Mortuorum

II,

8.

930,

d.

J.B.

h.

Borleffs,

C

2.2,

Turnholt

954,

21-1012.

ictor

ad

used

uagina

to describehe

body

s

a

sort

f heath

n

whichhe oul nheres

appar-

endy

n the

mannerf sword

n a scabbard.he

usage

s

classical;

uagina

used s

a

term or scabbard

s also

found

n

Tertullian,

e Resurrectione

ortuorum

X, 2,

932.

Augustine'saughty

hetorical

uestion

hus lso

has n

innocent

eading:

f

her oul>

was

body,

hen

hy

id tnot

reserve

he

hape

f

ts

bodily>

heath?

f. he rans-

lation

fR. Teske

Teske

997,

.

1

above):

If twas

body,

hy

id tnot

etainhe

formf ts

overing?"

37

DNOA IV.

xvii.

5.

404-405:

procul

ubio arnen

piritalis

st,

non

corporalis.

namqueuiusmodipecieselutorporum,on arnenorporatuigilantiumogitatione

formantur

t

profunditate

emorie

ontinenturt

ex

eius bditissimis

inibusescio

uo

mirabili

t neffabili

odo umrecordamur

rodeunt

t

quasi

nte culos

rolata

er-

santur

quid rgo

mirum,

i et

psa

ibi

n

sui

orporis

imilitudine

pparet

t

quando

sine

orpore

pparet?eque

nim

um uo

orpore

ibi

pparet

n somnist

tarnen

n

ea



DREAM ODIES

AND

DREAM

AINS

229

The dream bodies of thosewho have lost limbssometimes ppear with

fullgrown

ersions

of the

limbs

they

lost,

though

they

never seem

to

appear

with

the

tiny

arms

they

once had

(

ntegros;

and sometimes

he

appear

without

hem

ex

quacunque

arte

runcatos).

n Victor's

account,

t

is

impossible

o

explain

this

kind of

variability,

et alone

how Samuel's

soul

appeared

wearing

ts

customary arments

did

his

soul

and soul-

clothing

omehow

take

shape

in

his

living,

lothed

body

so

that at

death

his soul left

his

body wearing oul-clothing?38

What about St.

Perpetua's

wrestling? ugustine ays

explicitly

hat

f

our bodies in dreamsare likenesses f bodies,we

only

"seem to climb"

dream-mountains

nd "seem to enter"

dream-houses;39

nd so St.

Perpetua

is

only

dream-wrestlinggainst

he

dream-Egyptian.

till,

Augustine ays,

even

if

she had no

body,

therewas nonetheless "certain

ikeness f a

body"

(similitude*uaedam

in which she felt rue

struggling

r

strain

perus

labor)

nd true

oy

(

vera aetitia

.40

Applying

his

results

o the

question

of the

alleged

corporeal

souls of

the

dead,

Augustine roposes

that the souls of the dead

are

not

corpo-

real; afterdeath and beforethe final udgment, here are onlythe like-

nesses of

bodies,

ike the dream-bodies

f dreamers.

ust

ike the

souls of

dreamers, owever,

he souls of the dead feel real

sadness and real

oy

and real

pain,

not

ust

the likeness f such

feelings:

What

f

his

ame ort f

hing appens

n

hell,

ndthe

ead

recognize

ach ther

not

by

their

odies,

ut

by

ikenessesf

bodies? orwhenwe sufferadness ristia

patimur

,

even

f

only

n

our

dreams,

lthough

t s

only

he

ikenessf

bodily

imbs

which

cts,

nd

not

odily

imbs

hemselves,

tillheresnot

ust

likenessf

uffering,

but eal

uffering;oy

s felt

n

the ame

way.41

ipsa

imilitudine

orporis

ui

quasi er

oca

gnota

t

nota iscurritt aeta entit ulta

ueltristia."

38

DNOA IV. xix.

9.

409:

cur

Samuhelanctus

ost

mortem',

t

pse

uoque

om-

memorasti,

solito

ndumentoestitus

pparuit?'

numquid

ste e

corpore

estitus

xierat?"

39

DNOA V. xvii.

5.

405:

"sed

puto, uod

nectu audeas icere

iguram

llam or-

poris tque

membrorum,

uam

ibihabere idetur

n

somnis,

erum

orpus

sse, am

istomodo rit erus

mons,

uem

ibiuidetur

scendere,

t

corporea

omus,

uam

ibi

uidetur

ntrare,

t rbor ero

ignumque

erum

orpus

abens,

ub

ua

sibi idetur

acere,

et

aqua

uera,

uam

ibiuidetur

aurire,

t omnia

n

quibus

uasi orporibus

ersatur

corpora

runt,

i et

psa

orpus

st,

uae

simili

magine

nteruncta

llauersatur."

40

DNOA V. xviii.

6.

406: "si autem on rat

orpus,

t

tarnen

rat

liquid

imile

corporis,nquosane erusabor utuera aetitiaentiretur.."41

DNOA V. xiii.

7.

406:

"Quid

i tale

liquid

pud

nferos

eritur

t

n

eis e

non

corporibus,

ed

orporum

imilitudinibus

nimae

gnoscunt?

um nim ristia

atimurua-

muis

n

somnis,

tsimemborum

orporeorum

it lla

similitudo,

onmembra

orporea,

non st amen

oenae

imilitudo,

ed

poena;

ic tiam bi aeta entiuntur."his s essen-



230

MARY IRRIDGE

Augustine ites the example of Dinocrates,St. Perpetua'sbrotherwho

appeared

to

her after

his

death.

Surely,

he

says,

t must

have been

in

the likeness f

a

body,

not

a

physical

body,

that his soul

came to

her,

with ts

suffering

miseria}

evealed

n

its

"face."

It

appeared

s

f fflicted

n

ust

he

way

he

ody

adbeen fflicted

ecause,

hough

not

body,

n

being

he

ikenessf he

body

t

hadthe ikenessf ts ffliction

s

well. ut

till,

n

ts

unreal

ody

he

oulfelt eal

distress,

hich as

ignified

y

the

ppearance

f he

ody's

ffliction,

nd

rom hich is

oly

ister's

rayers

arned

his

deliverance.42

The deliberate ntithesis etween"unreal body" and "real distress" n

this

passage

calls

attention o

the

metaphysical eculiarity

f

Augustine's

position.

Dinocrates'

suffering

s

real,

not

a likeness f

suffering,hough

it is

in a likeness f

a

body,

not

a real

body,

that his soul

undergoes

hat

real

suffering.

Augustine

hus

manages

to

explain

the

story

f Dives and the dream-

visions

of

St.

Perpetua

without

onceding

that

the soul

is

corporeal,

but

at the

price

of

significant

etaphysical

wkwardness. he awkwardness

seemsunnecessary.Why allow that

the

feelings

f the

dead and dream-

ing

are

genuine?

Why

not

ust

concede that

they

re

only

similitudes f

feelings,

ust

as their

odies,

urroundings

nd

adventures

re

merely

imil-

itudes,

.e.,

dream-realities?

Augustine's

olution

s all the more

striking

or

standing

t the inter-

section of

philosophical

raditions

which

strongly

onnect

having

emo-

tions,

pleasures

and

pains

with

having

a

body.

Even

Neoplatonists

ike

Plotinus,

who

deny

that

the soul

can be affected

y

the

body,

hold that

many

emotions,

leasures

and

pains

are

activities

f soul

which

respond

to its observation f bodilyconditions.43ven more relevant s a strain

tially

he

ame ccount

ugustineives

n De Genesid Litteram

II.

32-4,

hough

e s

there

muchmore

oncernedo

argue

hat

ell s

spiritual,

ot

eally

ome

lace.

42

DNOA V. xviii.

7.

407:"et

quasi

ulnerata

isa

st,

icut

orpus

ueratulnera-

tum,

uoniam

orpus

on

rat,

ed

habebat

n

similitudine

orporis

tiam

imilitudinem

uulneris.

orro

utem

n nonuero

orpore

era

miseriauit

nimae,

uae significabatur

adumbrato

orporis

ulnere,

e

qua

sororisanctae

rationibus

eruitiberali."

43

For

relevant

exts rom

heAristotelian

ommentators

nd

mportant

eoplatonic

authors,

f.

Emotionin:

Richard

orabji,

hilosophy

f

he ommentators00-600

.D.:A

SourcebookLondon/Ithacaorthcoming.f. lso .Knuuttila,edievalheoriesndhe assions

of

he

oulin: S.

Knuuttila

ed.),

motionsn

AncientndMedieval

hilosophy

Oxford

004;

S.

Knuuttiland

J.

Sihvola,

ow he

hilosophicalnalysis

f

Emotions

as ntroducedin:

J.

Sihvola

nd .

Engberg-Pedersen

eds.),

he moüons

nHellenistic

hilosophy

Dordrecht/oston

1998, -19;

.K.

Emilsson,

lotinus

n he

motions,bid.,

39-63.



DREAM

ODIESAND

DREAM

AINS

231

of thoughtwhich can be traced to Plato himself,nd especially o the

Philebus

in

which

physicalpleasure

and

pain

are

explained

as a

sort of

intentional urface

f

needs

or

lacks and theirfulfillment.44

n

addition,

Augustine

had access to the Stoic

theory

hat

the emotions

necessarily

involve

and arise

in

consciousness

ut of

a

bodily

first

hase

or "first

movement".45 hus

Augustine

would have

gotten

from several

sources

the idea that where

thereare

genuine

emotions nd

feelings

f

pleasure

and

pain,

there s

real embodiment

n

some sense. ndeed

in

Conjessiones

Augustine

imself eems to be

adopting

Stoic

approach

n

his discussion

of the

pleasures

nd

pains

of

sensing

hat follow o

inevitably

rombod-

ily

states

s

to be unavoidable nd thusnot

subject

o moral assessment.46

In

the

ight

f this

background,

t seems that

Augustine's

roposal

that

the

real

misery,oy, pain

and

struggles

f the dead

and dreamers re felt

in

unreal bodies is

decidedly

dd.

Given the

theory

f "intentional

ur-

faces"or "first

movements" hat

Augustine

ppears

to

accept

n

Conjessiones

it is

surely

fair

question

about the

oys

and sorrows f

dreamers nd

of the dead how

they

an

be

fully

eal

if

there re

no

real

or

really

ppro-

priatebodies for hemto arise out of and be felt n. The problem s even

more

acute with

feelings

f

struggle,

atigue

nd

pain

how can

the feel-

ing

of

struggle

r

fatigue

r

physicalpain

be real or

"true,"

f

there s

no real

body

to wrestle r tire

or suffer roma lethal

cancerous sore?

Augustine

ought

to

concede,

it

seems,

that the

pains

and

passions

of

dreamers nd of the dead

are no more real than their

bodies.

It is

tempting

o

suppose

that

Augustine

has

forgotten

he

larger

con-

textof his

response

o

Victor,

which

requires

him

to

argue

for

the non-

transparency

f the

soul to

itself,

nd has

slipped

nto

assuming

ncritically,

as Descartes does in Meditation/, nd as Victorurges,that the mind's

operations

like

udging

and

willing)

nd internal tates

like

pain

and

seeming

to see the

light)being wholly

within he

mind,

are

necessarily

just

what

they

eem to

be,

because the mind's own

states nd

operations

44

Plato,

hilebus

3d-e,

3

a-c,

latonis

pera

I,

Oxford

901. f.Knuuttila

004

n.

3

above)

or

sketch

f

thePlatonicnd

post-Platonic

evelopment

ftheoriesf

feeling

and

motion.

45

Cf.R.

Sorabji,

motion

nd eace

f

Mind

Oxford

000,

sp.

355-6, 72-84,

or n

accountfAugustine'stoic ourcesndhis ppropriationf hem. f. lsoM. Colish,

The

toic radition

I,

Leiden

985,

sp.

207-13;

.

O'Daly,

Augustine's

hilosophy

f

Mind

London

987,

sp.

38-60.

46

Augustine,onfessiones

. 33. 49-34.

1, 181-182,

d. L.

Verheijen,

C

27,

Turnholt

1981

hereafter

onfi).



232

MARY IRRIDGE

are, so to speak, transparento its gaze. Even if he is dreaming, ays

Descartes,

t is

as

certain

hat he doubts

and wills and seems to see the

light

as that he

exists,

for none of these

things

re

"distinct rom his

thought,"

r

"separate

from

him":

For

example,

now ee

the

ight,

ear he

noise,

ndfeel heheat.

hese

hings

are

unreal,

ince

am

dreaming.

ut t s still ertainhat seem

o

see,

o hear

andto

feel heheat

.

Meditations

II).47

There is some evidence

or his

proto-C

rtesian

nterpretation

f

Augustine.

As we have seen,Augustine oes hold that the soul knows some things

about itself

n the basis

of immediate

wareness and

simple

reflection;

we know

immediately

nd

certainly,

or

example,

that

we

are,

that we

live,

and that

we

understand,

ill and remember.

ometimes,

n a man-

ner that

anticipates

Descartes'

strategy,

e cites

this

knowledge

s evi-

dence

against

he

sceptical osition

hat

we can

know

nothing.48

n

addition,

he

says explicitly

hatwe know

;

ovimusourselves

more

certainly

han we

do others

precisely

because

we know ourselves

directly y way

of our

consciousness

nd will

(DNOA

IV.

xix.

30).

If

Augustine

hinks hat

oy

(, audium, gladness <aetitia, sorrow i ristitia, pleasure («electatio, suffering

( poena

,

distress

miseria),isgust

offensio)

re real even

if

the

person

who

feels

hem

s

dreaming

r

dead,

thismust

be,

it

seems,because,

he thinks

that ike

understanding

nd

willing, eelings,

motions,

leasures

nd

pains

have to

be whatever

hey

seem to

be,

even

if

their

purported

xternal

points

of

reference re

merely igments.

With

respect

o

passions

ike

oy

and

fear,

t is indeed

Augustine's osi-

tion that

such emotions

re

wholly

n

the

soul;

and

in

a

passage

from

The

City

f

God

Augustine xplains

why. Augustine

s

arguing gainst

the

"view of the Platonists" hatthe emotions s such

invariably

ave their

origin

n the

body.

The

argument

tself

s an odd

one,

invoking

he

authority

f

Virgil

as a

spokesman

for the

Platonists;

ut it concludes:

Thus ven ntheir

wn

dmission,

t s not

nly

y

he

ody

hat he oul

s

affected,

so thatt

desires,

ears,

ejoices

nd

grieves;

tcan lso

be stirred

p

by

hese mo-

tions

arising>

ut

f he oul tself.

hats

mportant

s what he

will f man

s

47

René

Descartes,

editationsn

irst

hilosophy

transi.

oger

riew,

ndianapolis

000,

110.48

Cf.

De trin. V.

12. 21-2.

Other

vidence

or

Augustine

s a

proto-C

rtesians his

view hat

mathematical

efinitions

nd their

mmediate

onsequences

ould e

certain,

even

f were

reaming

r

mad;

f.

oliloquies

.

9-10,

CSEL

LXXXIX;

nchiridionII.

20,

ed.

E.

Evans,

C

46,

Turnholt

958,

3-114.



DREAM

ODIES

ANDDREAM AINS

233

like When econsentoour ppetiteorwhat ewill,heresdesire;utwhen

we consento

enjoying

hatwe

will,

hat s called

oy.

Similarly,

henwe dissent

from

hat

edo notwant o

happen,

his

illing

s

fear;

utwhen edissentrom

what

appens,

hough

e will t not

o,

uch

willing

s sorrow. nd hus or he

whole

ariety

f

hings

o which e aredrawn

y

ppetite

r from hich e

flee,

as thewill f man s attractedr

repelled,

t

s

changed

rturnednto

his

r

that

emotion.49

Whatever heir

ource, hen,

he emotions hemselves re thus ntentional

expressions

f the attachments f the

will;

the will's

positive

nd

negative

attachments

s

they

re

present

n

and to consciousness re emotions.

Thus, even ifsomefeelings o arise firstn thebody, bodily tates re

not

indispensable

o emotions.For one

thing,

not all

desires,

pleasures,

pains

and emotions re

corporeal.50

n

the case of

demons,

for

example,

it is their

very

minds which are tossed about on a sea of

ungovernable

passions De

Civ.Dei IX.

6);

their

airy

bodies"

hardly

ome into the

pic-

ture at all.

And the

devil,

who

has

no

body

at

all,

is nonetheless

ubject

to emotions

ike

envy

De

Civ. Dei

XIV.

6),

which is an emotion of

the

soul.

Angels

aside,

although

Augustine

ends to use

expressionsappetitus

and

6

libido

in

connection

withthe desires nd

pleasures

of sense and

sex,

in

Confessiones

e

refers o

"a

lust for the

knowledge

o be

gained

from

the senses"

appetitus

oscendi

{Conf.

. 35.

54)

and "the

lust for

revenge"

{libido

indicandi

e)'

we

get pleasure {libeat os)

nd

feel

oy

(gaudium

,

he

says,

from

being

feared and loved

by

others

Conf.

X.

36.

58-59).

And

even with

respect

o

those emotions hat do startwith

bodily

states

nd

responses,

t is

the

will

that

s

the direct ource of the emotions nd

pas-

sions,

which are themselves

holly

n

the

higherpart

of the

soul,

wholly

in

the realmof consciousness.51nd so

the fact hatSt.

Perpetua

s dream-

ingis no reason for upposing hather oy at her dreamvictory ver the

49

De Civ. eiXIV.

5-6.

21.

Vnde tiamllis atentibuson x

carne antumfficitur

anima,

t

cupiat,

etuat,

aetetur,

egrescat,

erum

tiam x

psa

his

potent

otibus

gi-

tari.

nterestutem

ualis

ituoluntas

ominis Sed cum onsentimus

ppetendo

a

quae

uolumus,

upiditas;

um utem

onsentimusruendois

uae

uolumus,

aetitiaocatur.

Itemque

umdissentimusb eo

quod

accidere

olomus,

alis oluntas

etus

st;

um

autem issentimusb eo

quod

nolentibus

ccidit,

alis

oluntasristitiast. t omnino

ro

uarietate

erum,

uae appetunturtque ugiuntur,

icut lliciturel

offendituroluntas

hominis,

ta

n

hosuel llos ifectus utaturt

uertitur."

50Cf.G.I.Bonner,Libidoand Concupiscentia"nSt.Augustinein:Studia atristicaI

(1962),

04-14,

here

ugustine's

road

ndvariableseof his

erminology

s

discussed.

51

Augustine's

ccountf

motions

trongly

esembleslotinus's

ccount

f

he

assions,

thoughugustine

oes

nothold hat he oul s not

ffected

y

he

assions,

reven

hat

it should

naffected

y

passions.

f. E.K. Emilsson998

n.

43

above),

sp.

339-63;



234

MARY

IRRIDGE

dreamEgyptians not real oy. She could also feelgenuine xtreme ear,

even

if

her real

body

were

lyingpeacefully

n the bed

without hintof

the

pallor

and

trembling

hich with which fear

usually

tarts.

Still,

even

if

Augustine

an

convincingly

how that

having

emotions

does not

require body,

t

is

hard to see how he can

give

the same sort

of "internalist" ccount of

feelings

ike

Perpetua's

sense of

fatigue

nd

struggle,

inocrates'

suffering

rom his

wound,

and Dives'

tormenting

thirst,

or these are the sort

of

feelings

which

normally

rise

fromthe

body

and

have

a

somatic

component.

t seems

extremely roblematic

philosophically

o claimthat

pleasures, ains,

thirst,nd

feelings

f

strug-

gle

and exhaustion are

real,

even when the soul is

not

appropriately

embodied or not embodied at

all,

like

souls of the dead.

Tertullianhad

in

factreasoned from he

reality

f the

torments f the

damned and from

he

principle

hat whatever an suffer as to

be cor-

poreal,

that ouls mustbe

corporeal

DA.

VII.

4).

Augustine

s,

of

course,

not nterested

n

denying

hatthe

sufferings

nd

oys

of the dead

are

real;

he

agrees

with Tertullian hat the souls of those who are not saved

are

really n torment. e does not,however, greewithTertullian hat very-

thing

that can be affected

n

any way

whatsoevermust be

corporeal.

Initially,

owever,

t is hard to see how this

helps

much

in

explaining

what is

going

on with the dead

Dinocrates and

Dives;

even

if

not

every

sort

of

suffering

nvolves

having

a

body,

still,

f

the

dead can suffer

en-

uine

thirst

nd

genuinepain

from cancerous

sore,

they

must,

t

seems,

have some sort of bodies.

Augustine's

olutionto the

problem

of

the

pains

of the dead

is

that

the souls of thosewho

are

not

saved,

ike Dinocrates nd

Dives,

are

really

in torment,hough heyhave no bodies;but they re notreally uffering

the

pains

they

think

hey

are

suffering

r the

pains

that

onlookers ike

Perpetua

think

hey

re

suffering.

he soul of Dinocrates that

comes

to

Perpetua

s

suffering,

nd Dives is

in

torment. ut

in

an

important

ense

Dives is not

feeling

what he thinks e is

feeling,

orhe

identifieshe tor-

ment he is

reallyfeeling

s a

bodily

sensation hat

he is

not

really

feel-

ing,

howevermuch he

may

appear

to himself o be

feeling

t. Dives is

said

to seek

to

repair

the

(real)

"ruins of his

soul,"

in

which "there s

J.M.

Dillon,

Metriopatheia"

nd

Apatheia":

ome

eflections

n

Controversy

n ater

reek

thics

in:

J.

Anton,

ndA.

Preus

eds),

ssays

nAncientreek

hilosophy

-II,

Albany,

Y

1983,

508-17.



DREAM

ODIES

AND

DREAM

AINS

235

truesuffering" hich "torments is soul";52he has no real body,how-

ever,

and therefore

o real thirst.

f

he

is

asking

for

water,

then he is

mistaken bout

whatkind

f

tormenthe is

feeling.

The same

goes

for

Dinocrates.

His soul feels real

torment;

ut it

is

not the

bodily

pain

he

thinks e is

feeling.

t must

be,

Augustine ays,

thatthe souls of the dead

associate with themselves similitudes" f

bodies,

as dreamersdo.

Here,

as

elsewhere,

Augustine

has

very

ittle

o

say

about how such similitudes

or likenesses f bodies

are

produced.

But

presumably hey

arise out of

the soul's own habitual

associationwith ts

body

and its habitual associ-

ation of

pleasure,pain

and the

passions

withcertain

bodily

tates.53 hus

Dinocrates

experiences

his

genuine spiritual

orment s

pain

from the

imagined

ancerous ore

n

his "shadow of a

body,"

and

his

genuine pir-

itual frustrations

experienced

s

frustrationt

being

unable to reach

the

golden cup

above

him

and drinkfrom

t.

When the dead take each other

o

be

embodied,

possibly hey

ust

per-

ceive

whatever

odily

ikenesses ther dead souls

project

for themselves.

But it is more

likely

hat

theyreallyperceive

each other

by

the kind of

"interior ense"bywhich we perceiveourselvesn life, hough n lifewe

do

not have this ame kind of mmediate ccess to the "mindsand wills"

of others.

hey

thenconstrue hisunaccustomed orm f

recognizing

th-

ers as

bodily recognition:

Butwhowould ave he

bility

o

nvestigate

hat

ower

f

cognition

ven ouls

that renot

ood

will eceivefter

eath,

nce reed romheir

orruptible

odies,

so

that

hey

re

ble

o

perceive

nd

recognize

thers

s bad

as

they

re and ven

the

ood by

heirnteriorenses?

ill

hey ecognize

hem ot

y

real

odies,

ut

in

the imilitudesfbodies?

r

by

the

good

r evilmovementsftheirminds

n

which

heres

nothing

ike he

hape

f

bodily

members

so

that

ven

hough

52

DNOA V. xix.

9.

409: cur

rgo

quae

tillam

esiderauit

pud

nferosiues?

sed

n

lio era

rat

molestia,

ua

cruciabatur

nima,

on

arnenerum

orpus

ui

uaere-

ret limenta."

53

n

De Genesid

Litteram

Augustineays

hat hemechanisms

yway

fwhich

mages

come eforehe

mind,

hether

hey

re

dreams

r

visions,

re

mysterious,hough

he

origin

f ll such

mages

s

experience.

f.De Gen.

d itt. II. 18. 39-40. bout he ike-

ness f he

body

hat

he oulhasafter

eath,

e

says nly

hat t s no more

eculiar

than he

odily

ikenesseshe

reaming

ssociate ith

hemselves

De

Gen.

d itt. II.

32.

60-61).he ource,owever,ay e the oul's naturalptitudeormanaginghe ody,"

which

s

so

strong

s to

prevent

t

from

ttaining

erfect

ulfillmentntil

t

s

reunited

with he

body,

so

that

t

hasthe

perfect

easuref ts

being, beying

nd

command-

ing,

ivifiednd

vivifying

ithuchwonderfulase hat hatwas

nce ts urden

ill

e

its

glory"

De

Gen.d. itt. II.

35.

68).



236

MARY

IRRIDGE

Abraham'sodilyormadnot eenknownohim, ives,ntorment,ecognized

Father

braham,

hose oul

had

managed

o hold n to a similitudef ts

body,

albeit n

ncorporeal

ne)?

ut

n

fact,

an

ny

fus ever

ay

hatwe haveknown

anybodyxcept

nsofar e were ble to know hat

erson's

ife nd

will,

which

assuredly

aveno

weight

r color?54

Probably,

hen,

the

Rich

Man

recognizes

Abraham's "consciousness nd

will"

directly, hough

he thinks e is

seeing

Abraham;

and so it does

not

matter hathe could not

recognize

Abraham

by sight.

However he

process

works

n

detail,

he dead

project

heir eal

recognition

f each

otheronto

an imagined recognition f bodies presumablybecause human souls

become

so accustomed o

recognizing

thers

by recognizing

heirbodies.

Augustine ives

no detailed

analysis

f

Perpetua's

visions;

her situation

s

somewhat

different,

e

notes,

since she is not herself ead when

she is

allowed

to

perceive

the

sorry

tate of her dead brother's oul.

Still,

ince

Dinocrates'

soul

has

got

no real

body,

it must be that she misidentifies

her "interior ense" of

his soul

as

seeing

him

bodily;

his

spiritual

orment

with

physical

suffering

rom his

sore,

his

thirst,

nd

his frustrationt

being

unable to reach

the

rim

of the

cup;

and his salvationwith

his

releasefrompain and thirst. ossibly his s because he sees himselfn

this

way;

but

perhaps

it is

only

that

Perpetua

is accustomed

to

seeing

her brother's

ody

whenever

he

recognizes

him,

and is unaccustomed

to

directly erceiving

he

pain

and

pleasures

of another

person's

soul.

Thus

Augustine

s

not

a

simpleproto-Cartesian.

his is

because

accord-

ing

to

Augustine

n

some

cases,

at

least,

the soul can make mistakes

bout

what it is

feeling,

ecause

it can make mistakes bout the mode of

its

embodiment. t.

Perpetua

n

her

wrestling

ream

and the dead Dinocrates

and Dives

are

reallyfeeling

omething

when

they

ense

fatigue, truggle

and pain, and theirfeelings re reallytheirs nd reallyof the general

kind

they ppear

to

be;

but

they

re not

reallyexacdy

the

feelings

hey

appear

to

be,

since

they

are not

really

the surfaces f

bodily

states nd

54

DNOA IV. xix. 0. 409:

"Postmortemero

uam

uim

ognitionisorruptibilibus

exoneratae

orporibus

nimae

ccipiant

tiam on

bonae,

t

uel

pariter

alas el

etiam

bonas aleantnterioribus

ensibusntueri

t

agnoscere

iue

n

psis

on

orporibus,

ed

similitudinibusorporumivenbonisutmalisffectionibusentis,nquibus ulla unt

quasi

iniamenta

embrorum,

uis

aleat

ndagare?

nde

st

t

llud,

uod atrem

braham

diues

lle,

um

n

tormentis

sset,

gnouit,

ui

figura

orporis

ius

non rat

nota,

uius

corporis

imilitudinem

uamuis

ncorpoream

otuit

nima etiñere,

uis

utem ecte icat

se

aliquem

ominem

ognouisse,

isi

n

quantumotuit

ius itam

oluntatemque

ognoscere,

quae

utique

moles

onhabet elcolores?"



DREAM

ODIES

ANDDREAM AINS

237

operations.55n theend, I think hatwe must read Augustine's eference

to

Perpetua's

verusaboť

in

her dream as

referring

o a real sense

f

trug-

gle

or

fatigue

or real

effort

projected

n

this case onto

a

dream

body

which

participates

n

dream adventures. ven

if

Augustine

does at one

point ay

that

her

soul wrestled

,

uctabatur

,

elsewhere e

says only

that he

"appeared

to herself

n

a

dream to wrestle"

visa

ibi

est n

somnisuctari

.56

It would be

open

to

Augustine

o abandon

proto-Cartesianransparency,

even with

respect

o

the emotions

hat

arise within

he mind itself.

His

accountof emotions

ives

us no

compelling

eason to think hatour emo-

tions are

invariably

he ones

they appear

to be. We can be mistaken

about what we

will,

and about how

strongly

nd

unambiguously

e will

something.

ven

if

the

genuineness

f

an

emotion s not

undercut

ust

by

the

unreality

r

inappropriateness

f its

object

and

circumstances,

till

if

we can make mistakes

bout other states of

consciousness,

nd

emo-

tions are

just

conscious

expressions

f statesof

will,

there s in

principle

no reason o

suppose

hatwe cannot

misidentify

ur

feelings.

ut

Augustine

seems not much inclinedto doubt that

n

the normal run

of

things

he

mind s prettymuch transparento itselfwithrespect o itsfeelings nd

emotions.

The

Delightsf

Dreamersnd

Sinning

n One's

Sleep

It

would not be

surprising

f

Augustine's

reatment f dreams

and dream-

ers

in

De

Natura

t

Origine

nimae

ontext

proved

to be at variance with

what he

says

elsewhere.Dream

reality

s

not

Augustine's

main interest

in

this

work;

and his discussion f dream

reality

s

clearly haped by

its

intendeduse, i.e., to serve as a model forunderstandingpparentbod-

ily

phenomena among

the dead. De

Natura

t

Orìgine

nimaetself s

topi-

cal and

polemical,

written

n

rapid

response

o a

particular

work,

which

55

n

hisfirstermonor he east fSt.

Perpetua

nd

St. Felicitas

Sermo

CLXXX.

v.

5,

PL

38,

1283)

ugustine

iscusseshe

epose

f

martyrs

nd

he ormentsf he ne

"who hirstsor

drop

romhe

inger

f

he

beggar,"

nd

ays

hat heres the ame

sort

f

differenceetweenhe

repose

nd

tormentsf these ouls

eforehe

Day

of

Judgment

nd afterhat

ay

when

hey egain

heir

odies s betweenhe

oys

nd

sufferings

f he

reaming

nd he

waking,

not ecause hese ouls re

necessarily

ak-

ing mistakeike he ouls fdreamers,"necesseit allibutbecauset s onethingo

have

epose

ithout

ny

ody

nd nother

o have

happiness

ith

glorifiedody.

56

Uisa

st'

must,

t

eems,

arkhe

wrestling

s

only

ream-wrestling,

ot eal

wrestling,

for

heres no reasono

suppose

t.

Perpetua ight

ave een

mistakenboutwhat ort

of

ream-actioner ream

ody

as

ngaged

n

that

he

might

nsteadave

een ream-

treading

ream-water.



238

MARY IRRIDGE

was, to all appearances,notverygood philosophicallyr theologically.t

is

aimed

obliquely

t both

Pelagius

and Tertullian.

There

are two

important

passages

that

suggest

that

Augustine

did

indeed

change

his mind

bout

dream-reality

nd related ssues.

n

Confessiones

X

Augustine

eems

to claim

that

we are not

morally esponsible

orour

dream-pleasures;

ut it is hard

to see

how he can

hold that

we are not

responsible

or

uch

pleasures

f

he also

holds,

as he does

in De

Natura

t

Orìgine

nimae

that we are

ourselves

n

our

dreams and

that our dream

pleasures

re real

and

really

urs.

And

in

the

very

arly

Contra cadémicos

Augustine

eems to answerthe

sceptic

who doubts thatwe can know

anything

y arguing

hat we

can know with

certainty

hat

pleasures

we

are

having

because

even

if

we

should be

asleep, pleasures

have

to be

the ones

they ppear

to

be;

this s

exactly

what

he seems

committed o

denying

n De

Matura

t

Origine

nimae.

In

Confessiones

.

30

Augustine

discusses

he occurrence

n

dreams

of

sexual

activities

nd

pleasures

that

would

be illicit

n

waking

ife.

The

lustful

mages

encountered

n

sleep, Augustine

ays,

move us

more

pow-

erfullyhanwakingexperienceof the realities hemselves. e thenpro-

ceeds

to

worry

bout

whether

he dreamer

has moral

responsibility

or

experiencing

he

pleasure:

But

n

my

memory,

bout

which

any hings

ave een

aid,

here

tillive

mages

of he

orts

f

hings

o

which once

lung y

habit.

When

encounter

hem ak-

ing,

hey

ave

no

power,

ut

n

dreams

hey

eadnot

nly

o

pleasure,

ut

ven o

somethingery

ike onsent

nd deed

usque

d consensionem

actumque

imillimum).

Am not hen

,

my

ord

God?

And

yet

n

that

moment

n

which

go

from

ere

into

leep

r come

ack

rom

leep

heres

such difference

etween

yself

nd

myself.

heres that

eason

y

which

person

wake esistsuch

uggestions,

nd

remainsnmoved,venhouldhe ealitieshemselveseforcedpon

im? oes t

closewith he yes? oes t leepwithhe ensesf he ody? ndhow oes thap-

pen

hat

ften

e

putup

resistance,

nd remindful

four

purpose,

ndremain-

ing

most

hastely

aithful

o

t,

give

no consent

o such

emptations?

nd

yet

he

difference

s

so

great

hat

hen

hings

urn

ut

therwise,

ereturn

o

peace

f on-

science

pon

waking

nd

on accountf he

reat

istanceetween

he

wo tates

we discover

hatwe did

not

do whatwas omehow

one

n

us,

o

our orrow.57

57

Conf.

. 30.

41,

176-177:

Sed

adhuc iuunt

n

memoria

ea,

e

qua

multa

ocu-

tus

um,

alium

erum

magines,

uas

biconsuetudo

ea

fixit,

t occursantur

ihi

igi-

lanti

uidem

arentes

iribus,

n

somnis

utem

on olum

sque

d delectationem

ed

etiamsqued consensionemactumqueimillimumnumquiduncgo onumdomine

deusmeus

et tarnen

antum

nterest

nter

e

psum

tme

psum

ntramomentum

uo

hinc

ad

soporem

ranseo

elhue

nde

etranseo'bi

st unc

atio

ua

talibus

uggestionibus

esis-

tit

uigilans

t,

i

res

psae

ngerantur

nconcussus

numquid

lauditur

um

culis?

umquid

sopitur

um ensibus

orporis?

t unde

aepe

esistimus

ostrique

ropositi

emores

tque

n



DREAM

ODIES

ANDDREAM AINS

239

Augustine's onsidered iew is clearly hatwe are notresponsible orthe

sexual

pleasures

n

our dreams.

He does not fault the

"peace

of con-

sciousness"

o which he returns

pon awaking.

There

is,

he

says,enough

distancebetweenour

sleeping

nd

waking

elves that "we discover

repe-

riamusthatwe did not

do" whatever

egrettable

ctions and

indulgences

"were

done

in

us"

in

sleep. Intuitivelyppealing

though

this view

is,

it

is

initially

ard to see how

Augustine

s

entitled o it. He does not doubt

thatthe

pleasures

nvolved re

genuine

or that

they

re ours or

that

they

are the ones

they

eem to be. And

so,

it seems he should be held

morally

accountable for them.58 he

only way

for

Augustine

o avoid

drawing

this

conclusion,

t would

seem,

s

to cast doubt on whetherwe are our-

selves

n

our dreams.

The

Confessiones

assage

does

indeed

look to be

far

more ambivalent

about whether we are ourselves

n

our dreams than the account of

Perpetua's

dream-visions.

he

question

of

first-person

ream

identity

s

explicitly

aised

here,

fter ll.

Perhaps

more

significantly,ugustine

ever

uses

a

first-personingular

erb to refer o his

sleeping

elf.Matters re

blurred urtherytherepeated eferenceo "so great difference"etween

waking

elf nd

dream-self nd

still

further

y

the forceful nd finalref-

erenceto our

regret

or what was somehowdone

in

us."

Still,

Augustine

is not

ultimately repared

to doubt that he is himself

n

his troublesome

dreams. The

question:

"Am

I

not

I?"

with which he

begins

the discus-

sion

clearly xpects positive

nswer.The first

ersonplural

forms resisti

mus

nostrique

and

"

adhibemusused to

describeour

sleeping

elves tilt he

passage

towards he

unquestioned

iew of De

Natura

t

Orìgine

nimae hat

we are ourselves

n

our

dreams;

and the second "me

psum

of the

para-

doxical

"

interestnterme psumt me psummore or less settles he matter

of

self-identity:

e are ourselves

n

our

dreams. But we now face

a

fur-

ther

question:

f

Augustine ltimately

as no doubt about

whetherhe is

himself

n

his

dreams,

hen

why

s

self-identity

reated

n

such

an

ambivalent

eo castissime

ermanentes

ullumalibusnlecebris

dhibemusdsensum?t tarnenantum

interest

t,

um

literccidit

uigilantes

d

conscientiae

equiem

edeamus

psaque

istan-

tia

repeňamus

osnon

ecisse

uod

arnen

n

nobis

uoquo

modo

actum

sse oleamus

"

58

n

On

Being

mmoralna Dreamn:

Philosophy

6

(1981),

7-54,

Gareth atthews

argueshat ugustinean void esponsibilitynly yholding1)that e s not isdream

self;

r

2)

that ream

uggestion,

onsentnd

pleasure

renot

eal;

r

3)

that e can-

not o otherwisehan e

does

n his

dreams.ince

Augustine

oesnot

ccept

1)

or

2),

and

considers

3)

rrelevant

orally,ays

Matthews,

ugustine

as not

got very

ood

reason or

enying

hatwe are

responsible

orwhatwe do andfeel n our

dreams.



240

MARY IRRIDGE

way, and whydoes the passage have such an ambivalent nd aporetic

tone overall with

respect

o

responsibility?

The nature f

Augustine's

mbivalence

n

Confessiones

becomes

clearer

if

we

compare

thisdiscussion

withhis much more

unambiguous

nd res-

olute treatment f

the "consents

f

dreamers"

onsensiones

omniantium)

n

De Genesi

d Litteram

where he

is

discussing

omeone who

is

dreaming

about

having

llicit exual

intercourse

De

Gen. d litt XII. 15.

31).

Such

dream

images, says

Augustine,

ome fromour

waking

ife.

Suppose

the

source of the

images

n

question

to be freeof

consent o

pleasure

placi-

tum onsensionisthe

images

come, let us

suppose,

from

thinking

bout

sexual

activity

while

composing

his

verychapter:

Then

f

he

mages

f he

orporeal

hings

hat have een orced

o thinkbout

in order o

say

his

hould

ppear

s

vividly

n a

dream

s bodies

ppear

o

the

waking,

omethingappens

hat

ould ot e done

withoutin

y

omeone

howas

awake.

orwho an

avoid

hinking

bout

what e s

discussing,

hen e s

speak-

ing

nd

finds imselfonstrained

y

he

ubject

attero

say omething

bout ex-

ual ntercourse

e

hashad? hen

f

his

mage

hat rises

nthemind

f

he

peaker

comes o

vividly

nto hevision

f the

leeper

hat t s

impossible

o

distinguish

between

t ndreal exual

ntercourse,

t

mmediately

oveshe

lesh,

nd hereol-

lowswhat aturallyollowspon hismovement.till,his appens ithoutin, o

the ame

xtents

we

say waking

an s withoutin

who

undoubtedly

as to

think

bout uch

thing

n

order

o talk bout t.59

In

this

passage,

the dreamer's

actions are

not real

ones,

only

dream

actions.

This

passage

is not

ambivalent;

he

dreamer does

not sin. The

reason

s

fairly

lear:

everything

hat

happens

to the dreamer

s

presented

to us

as

being

something

ver

which he

has no control.

The

speaker

has

entertained

he

mage

of

engaging

n

sexual

ntercourse;

hat ame

image,

now vivid

as

life,

s forced

upon

him in his dream.

The occurrence

f

such dream

images

is no more

significant

orally han the imagesthat

accompany

peaking

bout

sexual

activity

n

dreams

that re forced

pon

the

speaker

by

the

need to

speak

meaningfully.

nd

if

the dreamer's

lesh

then

responds

f

ts own

accord to

images

thatwould

hardly

erturb

im

59

De Gen.d

itt. II. 15.

31:

"porromagines

erum

orporalium,

uas

necessario

ogi-

tavi t haec

dicerem,

i tanta

xpressioneraesentarentur

n

somnis,

uanta

raesentan-

tur

orpora

igilantibus,

ieret

llud

uod

ine

eccato

ieri

vigilante

on

posset.

uis

enim el

cum

oquitur,

t

postulante

ecessitate

emonise

suo concubitu

liquid

icit,

possit on ogitareuoddicit?orropsaphantasia,uaefitncogitationeermocinan-

tis,

um ta

expressa

uerit

n visione

omniantis,

t nter

llam t veram ommixtionem

corporum

on

iscernatur,

ontinuo

ovetur

aro,

t

equitur

uod

um

motu

equi

olet,

cumhoctam

ine

eccato

iat,

uam

ine

eccato

vigilante

icitur,

uod

ut diceretur

sine

ubio

ogitatum

st."



DREAM

ODIES

AND

DREAM

AINS

241

at all ifhe were awake, and the inevitable nsues,this s a mere "nat-

ural

consequence,"

and thus not a matter of

responsibility

nd

guilt.

Generally peaking,

hen,

no

one

gets any

credit r

any

blame fordream

actions,

or for other

images

that

arise

in

dreams,

or for the

resulting

physical esponses.

t would

be

no

more

appropriate

o blame

Augustine

forwhat he does

and

experiences

n

his

dreams,

than to

clap

the now-

awake

Perpetua

on the back and

congratulate

er for her

plucky

tand

against

the

Egyptian

r for

feeling

xhilarated t her

victory.60

De Genesi d Litteram

II

offers

far

more nuanced examination

of

visions nd

images,

both natural nd

divinely

nd

demonically roduced,

than

Confessiones.

ut

in

addition,

here re

significant

ifferencesetween

the dreamer f

Confessiones

and

the dreamer

of

the

Genesis

ommentary

which

explain

how

Augustine

an

say

that

the Genesis reamer s inno-

cent

pure

and

simple,

while

remaining

mbivalent

bout

the moral

respon-

sibility

nd

guilt

of his

dreaming

elf

n

Confessiones

.

In

De Genesi

d Litteram

ugustine

has

deliberately implified

is

case

morally.

irst,

hough

exual

pleasure

s

mentioned ere as it

s in

Confessiones

X, it does not assume muchimportancen the tale of virtuous hetoric,

dream

images

and "inevitable esults."

econd,

our virtuousdreamer s

in

no

way currentlymorally esponsible

or

having

he

images

he has to

startwith.

Perhaps

most

importantly, ugustine

s

supposing

that the

"consent f the

dreamers,"

which

s

the

subject

he started ut to

discuss,

is

only

dream-consent. or

suppose

that

I

have

thought

bout

having

indulged

n all

manner of illicit ctivities

n

the course of

piously

con-

demning

hem,

nd that as a result hese

mages

now come vivid as life

before

my

sleeping

yes,

so that seem to

myself

o

be

doing ust

what

I talked bout. "The flesh esponds," ays Augustine, and the inevitable

results." ut

surely

f

am to be

dreaming

bout

acting and despite

he

misleading arallel

with

memory

mages

of the

doings

of

my

past

self,

this s the case

Augustine

as

in

mind,

nd

not

my dreaming

bout some-

one

very

ike

myself

cting

while

I

look

on),

then

in

my

dream,

there

has

got

to be some elementof

intention,

onsent or

involvement.Who

is

it, then,

that consents o

hopping

nto bed with Sean

Connery,

tc.?

According

o

Augustine,my

dream self

s

myself;

f

anyone

consents, hen,

it

must

be

I

who consent.To be entitled o the claim that

dream

pleasure

60

n

the ase

of

he

ery ood, ugustine

dmitshat he oul'smeritsre

ometimes

manifested

n

tsdream

hoices

nd

ctions;

ven

n

his

dream,

he

wise

olomon

sked

Godfor

wisdom

De

Gen.

d

itt.

II. 15.

31),

ndGod

was

pleased.



242

MARY

IRRIDGE

has no moralsignificance ere,Augustinehas got to hold out that there

is no real consent

nvolved

n

my dream-response

o the

mages,

but

only

dream-consent,

ust

as the

images

themselves

ccur

without

consentto

pleasure."

The

passive

and

impersonal

onstructionsf the

passage

show

that his

s

ust

what he

is

assuming.

No real

consent,

hen.And so unam-

biguously

no moral

responsibility.

All

of these

simplifications

re

lacking

n

the situationdescribed

n

Confessiones

.

First,

leasure

s

explicitly

nvolved,

nd

Augustine

nam-

biguously

akes dream

pleasure

to be real

pleasure. Secondly,Augustine

seems here to have in mind liminal states n which one is

drifting

ack

and

forth etween dream

and

waking,

nd therefore

more or less tenu-

ously

tied

to one's own

sleepingbody

and

waking

ife;

t is therefore ot

clear that

the consent nvolved

s dream-consent

lain

and

simple.

Most

importantly,

erhaps,

n

this

case the dream

images

are not introduced

into

Augustine's

nner

ife

by

the

melancholy

ecessity

f

speaking

bout

illicit exual

activity,

nd

they

are not

images

which exerciseno attrac-

tion for

him.

They

come

from memories

of what once attracted

him

strongly;hisattraction, e fears, s stillpresentas a secret nclination

that

s resistedwhen

he is awake and on

guard against

t

(vigilans),

ut

not

when his orientation

o

his main moral

purpose

is

dulled

and dis-

oriented

y half-sleep.

his is

why Augustine

wavers

n

Confessiones

.

In

this

case,

the

dreamer's onsent

may

indeed be

a

genuine

movement f

the

will,

and to that

extent

cause for moral

concern,

ven

though

he

dreamer's

will is so weakened

and

caught

so

completely

ff

guard

that

its movements

o not count

as consent

n

a

morally ignificant

ense.61

There is more

similarity

etween

treatments f dreamers

and their

experiencesn De Natura tOriginenimae nd Confessioneshan there ni-

61

This mbivalence

bout

reamonsents

neatly

irrored

y

he

eliberate

mbiguity

of consensionem

actumque

imillimum,"

hichan

mean consent

nd

omethingery

like he

eed,"

ut lso

somethingery

ike onsentnd

omething

ery

ike

he

eed."

ThusMatthews

981

n.

58

above),

ho

ays

hat

ugustine

oesnotdraw

hedistinc-

tion etween

ream

onsentnd

real onsentecause

fhis

tendency

o

view he

mind

and

ts

cts s

directly

nd

mmediately

nown

o tself"t

51,

underestimates

ugustine

onboth

oints.

lready

n Contracadémicos

II, xii, 8,

d.W.M.

Green,

C

29,

Turnholt

1970hereafteritedsCA),Augustineakes similarositionndream-assent.t ssue

there

s thewiseman's

ream-refusal

o choose

he

highestood.

Even

n

our

leep,

Augustine

ays,

e would

otdream f

denying

hat omeone

s wise

when e s

asleep

because

n

hisdreams

e assents

o falsehoods

n

place

f ruths

then

llowing

hat e

is wise

gain

s soon

s he wakes

p.



DREAM

ODIES

AND

DREAM

AINS

243

tially ppears to be. The two worksagree completely hat our dream-

pleasures

nd

dream-pains

re real and are

really

ours.

They agree

that

dream

mages

come

in

the

main

from he

experiences

nd habits of our

waking

ife;

n

De

Natura

t

Origine

nimaeas

in

the Genesis

commentary,

this

ccount

s extended o

explain

the

"somatic"

experiences

f the dead.

The two works

agree completely

hat we are ourselves

n

our dreams.

The ambivalence f the

Confessiones

passage

does not come fromdoubt

on

Augustine's art

about whether e

is

himself

n

his dreams.His

ambiva-

lence has to do insteadwith the

suspicion,

ll

too often

onfirmed,

hat

there s a

part

of his soul which s not

wholly

onverted o his

decision,

and

remains lien to himself nd his moral

purpose,

a

subversive ncli-

nation to lower

goods

that s

always present,

ut

ordinarily

esisted.

n

the

chapters

f

Confessiones

which

follow,

Augustine

epeatedly xpresses

his

anxiety

bout the

remnants f misdirected

esire,

both

physical

nd

the

ntellectual,

hichremain

n

his

soul and

cause it to slide

ndiscernibly

from

pleasures

that

are natural and

unavoidable into

some measure of

the

guilty

leasures

ssociatedwith

elf-love nd immoral

oncupiscence.62

It is significanthatAugustine oncludes the discussion f Confessiones

with an

appeal

to God to

free

him

from

uch dreams and

responses

o

them,

nd

thereby

o cause his own oul

freedfrom he

snares of concu-

piscence,

to

follow

him

to God.63

62

Ishtiyaqueaji,

On

Being

orallyesponsible

n

a

Dreamn:

Matthews999

n.

17

above),

22-232,

s

surely

n the

ight

rackn

his

guess

hat

ugustine

s

thinking

hat

a dreamer

an be to some

xtent

orallyesponsible

or

ntertaining

certain

hought

while

sleep,

f

he

hought

rises romhe

desires

f

waking

ife,

ven

f

t the

waking

thoughtas veiledrom er onsciousnessyrationalization,"t180. nthe ubsequent

discussion,

onf.

. 33. 49-X. 4.

51,

Augustine

escribeshe

difficulty

f

distinguishing

between

llegitimate

libido

and he

egitimate

nd

nevitable

uoluptates

uriumand

uolup

tates

culorumwhich

ttend

earing

nd

eeing;.

f. lsoContra

ulianum

elagianum

V.

14,

PL

44,641-874,

here e

distinguishes

etweenhe

egitimate

commoditatis

rovisio

"

which

leads

s to avoidwhats

unpleasant

nd

painful,

ndwhich

oesnot

yet

mounto lle-

gitimate

libido".f.

lsoDe trin.

ll, 3,

where

ugustineays

hat

easts removed

y

some

naturali

ppetitu

uae

oluptatis

tdeuitione

olestitiae"with ur

mortal

odies,

e are

moved

navoidably

n

the ame

way.

63

Conf.

.

30.

42.

177:

Numquid

on

otens

stmanus

ua,

eus

mnipotens,

anare

omnes

anguores

nimae

meae

tque

bundantiore

ratia

ua asciuos

otustiammei

soporis

xtinguere?

ugebis,

omine,

agis

magisque

n

me

muñera

ua,

t

anima

mea

sequature dteconcupiscentiaeisco xpedita,tnon it ebellisibi,tque t nsom-

nis tiam

on olum on

erpetrei

stas

orruptelarum

urpitudines

er magines

nimales

usque

d carnis

luxum,

edne

consentiat

uidem."

this

ge,

he

adds,

t s

surely

o

great

hing

or od o

prevent

im,

ven

n

his

reams,

rom

oing

hameful

hings

usque

ad

luxum

arnis

"

and ndeed o

prevent

ven

he

lightest

int

f

onsento them.



244

MARY

IRRIDGE

The differencesetweenAugustine's ccountofPerpetua'sdreamand

his assessment

f

his own

dream

activities

nd

experiences

n

Confessiones

X

have

to do

with the

peculiarities

of the

two

cases.

In

Confessiones

Augustine

does

not,

it

is

true,

raise the

possibility

hat the

sexual

plea-

sures

felt

n

dreams

are not

the

pleasures

they appear

to be.

This

may

be because

he

had not

yet

thought

f this

possibility

n

399-401

A.D.,

when

the

Confessiones

assage

was

written.

More

probably

t

is because

he

thinks

here

s no

reason

for

uncertainty

bout

what

kind

of

pleasures

these

are,

given

the

body's

obvious

nvolvement

n

a

liminaldream

state.

And in De Natura t

Origine

nimae

Augustine

pends

no time

worrying

about the

status

f the

sleeping

Perpetua's

"consent."

This is because

the

images

n

Perpetua's

dreams

are

not

ust

tossed

up

by

her

memory

nd

imagination,

ut

divinely

ent to

prefigure

er

passion

and

martyrdom.

Perpetua

herself

ntroduces

he account

of her

first wo

dream-visions

with

"

Mihi ostensum

sť

[Passio

VII.

3;

VIII.

1);

and

in

describing

her

visions

Augustine

ses

the

well-known

ormula

or

apparitions,

6

in somnis

visa est"

to describe

Perpetua's

dreams.64

t the end

of

her

description

ofher thirddream,Perpetuaherself rovides he interpretation:

I awoke.

nd

understood

hat

would

ight,

ot

gainst

easts,

ut

gainst

he

devil;

ut

knew

hat

ictory

ould

e

mine.

have

ompleted

his

short

ime

before

he

xhibition;

s to

what

akes

lace

t the

xhibition,

et

whoever

ishes

write

t

down.65

64

Ostensio/

stensum

st'

has

n established

ost

lassical

se,

ound

n

both

ertullian

andApuleius,avingodowithisions.heformulaugustineses odescribeerpetua's

dream

isions

s one

hat ften

escribes

ust

uch

ortents.

irgil

ses

m

omnis visus

est desse

ihi

to

ntroduce

ektor's

ream

ppearance

o

Aeneas,

bearing

he

wounds

(¡

ulnera

erms)

hat

e

received

n his

final attle

nd

afterwards"

Aeneid,

I.

270).

The

appearance

f the

orm

f

Mercury"

o

Aeneas o

tell

im o

make aste

o

flee

arthage

is

ntroduced

y

in omnis

ursusque

ta isa

monere

sť

{Aeneid

V.

554).

Cicero,

e

Divinatione

I.

iv.

49,

ntroduces

he

ision

f

Hannibal

ith,

visum

st n

omnis

love

ndeorum

on-

cilio

ocaď'

nd

Socrates

s said

o

have

egun

is

eport

f

his wn

ision

f he

woman

of

great

eauty

ho

foretold

is

death,

vidisse

nim

e n

omnis

[ibid.,

xiv.

2).

n the

second

fhis

ermons

or

he

east

fSt.

Perpetua

nd

St.

Felicitas,

ugustine

escribes

Perpetua:

It

delights

he

ious

mind o

behold

vision

spectaculum)

ike

he ision

fher-

self

t.

Perpetua

aid

he

had

been

hown

revelatum

sse),

hat

aving

een

urned

nto

man virume actamshefoughtith hedevil",ermoCLXXXI. i. 2 (n.4 above) t

1284.

65

Passio

.

14-15:

Et

experrecta

um.

t

mtellexi

e

non

d

bestias,

ed

ontra

ia-

bolum

sse

pugnaturum;

ed ciebam

ihi sse

victoriam.

oc

usque

n

pridie

muneris

ego;

psius

utem

muneris

ctum,

i

quis

voluerit,

cribat."



DREAM

ODIES

ANDDREAM

AINS

245

ClearlySt. Perpetuai feelingsnd dreamexperiences refigure ermar-

tyrdom recisely

y reflecting

he

disposition

f

her will.

Perpetuai

deci-

sions

and

feelings

n her

dream

are more

in

character han those of

the

sleeping ugustine;

hey

re

in

linewithher

main moral

purpose. omething

of her real commitment

o her

passion

and

martyrdom

shines

through"

in

her dream-consent

o

fight

he

Egyptian

n

the dream that

prefigures

her

passion.

n

the

passion

narrative

tself,

his close

connection

etween

dream and life s reflected

trikinglyy

the

tone

of

St.

Perpetua's

auto-

biographical

arrative,

n

which she describesher

imprisonment

nd trial

and her threevisions, nd even

by

its

grammar.66

Contra cadémicosII.

xi.

26

seems

to

present

us witha differentort

of

inconsistency.

n

this

early

work,

Augustine

ncludes

pleasure

and

pain

among

the

self-presenting

tates;

we can be sure that we

are

experienc-

ing

pleasure,

nd certain bout what kind of

pleasure

t

is:

This

say,

hatwhen man astes

omething,

e can swearn

good

aithhat e

knowst s sweeto his

palate

r that

t s

not.Nor an

any rickery

f

he

Greeks

dispossess

im

f his

nowledge.

orwhowould e so

outrageous

s to

say

o me

while am

icking

way

with

elight,Perhapsou

re

not

asting

t,

nd this s

only dream"?m contestinghis? ut venn a dreamt would elight e.67

There is some

slippage

n

this

passage.

It seems to start

with

the claim

that

am

warranted

n

saying

that

I

know with

certainty

whetherome-

thing

astes itter

r

sweet o

me or

not even

if I

am

only

dreaming

hat I

am

tasting

t;

but

it seems to

end with the weaker claim that

I

know

with

certainty

hat am

having

he

leasure

even

if

I

am not

tasting ny-

thing,

r not

tasting nything

weet. Even the weaker claim that

can

know

certainty

hat

am

feeling ensory

elight

f

feel

that

am,

even

if I am dreaming,s not reallyconsistentwithAugustine's pproach in

66

assio .

7,

26.

Gender

n

Perpetua's

hird

ream-vision,

n

which

he

"became

man" nd

vanquished

he

gyptian

n

a

wresding

atch

s

grammaticallynambiguously

feminine;

hewas ransformednto

man,

facta

ummasculus

{Passio

.

7,

26);

he

was

liftednto he

ir,

sublataum

(.

assio

.

1

26);

he

rbiterails er s

victor ithFilia

pax

ecum

{Passio,

.

13,

6);

nd hedescribeser

wakening

romhe

ream

ision,

Et

experrecta

um

Ç

assioX.

14,

26).

67

CA II. xi.

26.

50: "Illud

ico,

osse

ominem,

um

liquid ustat,

ona

ideurare

se scire

alato

uo llud

uaue ssevelcontra eculla alumnia

raeca b ista cientia

posse educi. uis nim amnpudensit, uimihi um electationeigurrientiicat: or-

tasse on

gustas,

edhoc omniumst?

umquidnam

esisto?ed mihi arnenn

somnis

etiam electaret."or

numquidnam

esisto"

John

'Meara

transi.),

t.

Augustine:gainst

he

AcademicsNewYorkNY

1951,

t

129,

eads Do I

stopmy

avoring?",

hichmakes or

a

slighdy

ifferentrain f

hought,

ut he ame

ort

f

onclusion.



246

MARY

IRRIDGE

De Natura t Orìginenimaewhere he wantsto say thatthe souls of the

dead and

dreaming

can

misconstrue heir

experience

to the extent of

making

mistakes

bout what sorts of

pleasures they

are

feeling.

But

in

any

event,

he

surrounding

ontextmakes t clear

that

Augustine

means

the

stronger

laim,

forhe

has

been

belaboring

he

point

that can know

that there

appears

to me to

be a bent stick

n

water

or

that

something

looks white to me

or that

something

astesbitter o me at this

moment,

even

if

it does

not stilltaste bitter o me

later,

or tastes weet

to a

cow

at this

very

moment

CA

III, xi, 26,

50).

Like instancesof

logical

or

mathematical ruths

CA

III, x, 23, 48), such claims are said to be in

absolutely

no

danger

of

being

undercuton the

grounds

that

they

are

indistinguishable

rom

very

similar

laims

that are false

CA

III,

xi, 26,

50)

in

this

case,

because

no

good

faith laims about

our own

intentional

states re ever

false.The distinction

etween

ppearance

and

reality

oes

not

apply

to intentional

ealities.The Academic

can startus down the

slippery lope

towards

ssenting

o

nothing nly

f

we ourselves

lip

over

into claims about

the extramental auses

of our intentional

tates,

y

say-

ing, e.g., "This ice cream tastes cruptious."

There is a

degree

of

genuine

disagreement

etween

he Contra cadémicos

passage

and the

much later

De

Natura

t

Origine

nimae. his is not

sur-

prising, iven

the

increasing

ophistication

f

Augustine's hilosophy

f

mind

and the fact

that the later works

put stronger mphasis

on

man's

essential mbodiment.68

qually important

s

the factthat the

philosoph-

ical

objectives

f

Augustine's

arliestworks

nd

his

later

works re

very

different.

n

Contra cadémicos

ugustine's

im is to disarm

epistemologi-

ca

skepticism.

is

strategy

s to

appeal

to immediate

erceptual

ontents

and feelings fpleasureand pain; these,he says,can be knownwithcer-

tainty.

ven

if

we are

dreaming,Augustine rgues,

we can be sure

about

the

"intentional

urface"of our

experience,

where

a

distinction etween

appearance

and

reality

makes

no sense.

A

pro

o-Cartesian

dentification

of

knowledge

with

certainty

nd the

idea that the immediate

nd com-

plete presence

of some

given

s sufficient

or

certainty

s

important

o

this

agenda.

De

Magistro

from he

same

period,puts

forward he actual

pres-

68 n stressinghe onnectionetweenody ndsoul,Augustineay e reactingo

Pelagian

riticism

fhisviews n

embodimentndrelated

ssues;

ut

he has

lso

begun,

perhaps

roma.

412

A.D.,

o work

n

the

ater ectionsfDe Genesi

d Litteramand o

he

cannot

ery

ell

gnore

he act hat mbodiment

s God

given.

f.O'Connell 987

(n.

5

above).



DREAM

ODIESANDDREAM AINS

247

enee ofsomethingo themind as a necessary ondition or earning ny-

thing

bout it.

If I

am asked about

something

ensible ike

the new

moon,

and

if

t is

present

o me

I

can answer

truly

bout

it:

But

f

he

erson

ho sksmedoesnot eethe

moon,

e

acquires

beliefboutt

(or,

s often

appens,

e does

not);

uthe doesnot earn

nything

bout t unless

he himselfeeswhats

being

alkedbout.69

In

his later

works,

by

contrast,

ugustine

oes not care as much

about

disarming cepticism.

ndeed,

given

the increased

prominence

f will

in

his laterphilosophy f mind and epistemology,e cannotafford o care

very

much about it.

Cognition

for

the later

Augustine

s

markedly

process

of

selection,

ttention,

hinking

nd

speaking,

which

requires

kill

and

strategy;

nd the

measure of

objectivity

f such

activity

s its suc-

cess.

Despite

Augustine's

ncreased

nterest

n

the soul's

multifarious

pac-

ity

to its own

introspective aze,

Confessiones

till

reflects o some

extent

the

epistemology

f

presence

of the earlier

period.

But

by

the

final

ec-

tions

of De Trinitate

Augustine's

iews

n

epistemology

ave

changed

con-

siderably,

n

large part

because

they

are now

shaped by

his

interest

n

showinghow the humanmind and itsoperations urnish n imageofthe

divine

Trinity.

he Academics

achieved their

paltry

uccess,

he

says, by

casting

doubt

n

obvious

ways

on our

perceptual

knowledge

f the world

based on

the data of the

senses.

Anyone

who

wants to read

more

against

the

Academics s welcome

to consulthis

youthful

ork,

he

adds. But

in

fact

the

Academics never

succeeded

in

casting any

doubt on a much

more

significant

ind of

knowledge

uch as

that we

live,

and think nd

will.

Furthermore,

e

concludes:

Farbe it fromstodoubt hat he hingse earnhroughhebodilyensesre

true,

or

y

them e have earned

bout eaven nd

earth nd all the

hings

n

them

hichre known

o

us,

o far s He who

reated oth

s

and

them illed

that e come o know

hem. nd ar

e t

from

s to

deny

hatwe know

hatwe

have earnedrom

he

estimony

f

others. therwisee

would otknow

hat he

69

Augustine,

e

Magistro

II, 39,

ed.

K.-D.

Daur,

CC

29,

Turnholt

970,

57-203,

t

197,

ays:

Namque

mnia

uaepercipimus,

ut

ensu

orporis

ut

mente

ercipimus.

lla

sensibilia,

aec

ntellegibilia

iue,

t more

ostro

um

oquar,

lla

carnalia,

aec

piritalia

nominamus.e

illis um

nterrogamur,

espondemus,

i

praesto

unt

a,

quae

sentimus,

uelut um

nobis

uaeritur

ntuentibus

unam

ouam,

ualis

ut ubi

sit.Hic

ille,

ui

interrogat,i nonuidet,rediterbistsaepenon redit,iscitutem ullomodo, isi

et

pse uod

dicitur

ideat,

bi amnon

uerbis,

ed

rebus

psis

t

sensibus

iscit."

retty

clearlyugustine

eans o allow

hat

,

who ee

the

moon,

hereby

ome

oknowome-

thing

bout twhen

t s

present;

e has

thusmoved

way

rom

he

earguardpistemo-

logica ampaign

gainst

heAcademicn

Contra

cadémicos.



248

MARY IRRIDGE

ocean xists,nd he ands nd ities eknowboutromopiouseports.ewould

notknow hat here

ere

eople

nddeeds hatwe earn

bout rom

eading

is-

tory.

We would ot

know he

hings

hat re

reportedaily

romll

over,

nd

re

confirmed

y

onsistent

nd onsonantvidence.

inally,

ewould otknow here

and fwhat

arents

ewere orn. Wewould

ot nowhese

hings>

ecausehese

areall

things

e

believe

n the

estimony

fothers. nd

f

t s

completely

bsurd

to

say

his

sc.

hat

we do notknow uch

hings],

hent

hasto be admittedhat

not

nly

ur

wn

odily

enses,

ut hose fothers ave dded

normously

o our

knowledge

De

trin.

V. xii.

21).

In

this

complex

process

of

knowing

nd

willing

f

things

nd

events,

we

dimly esembleGod; for ll thesethings,whetherwe come to know them

by

our

own

experience

or

by

the

testimony

f

others,

we have

a word

within.We

resemble

God

only dimly,

because

for

his

part

He knows

things

n a

single

Word

and does not

know

things

because

they

are;

rather

hey

are because

He

knows them

De

trin. V. xii.

22).

Conclusion

Augustine

hardly

ever

pursued

epistemology,

ntology

r

philosophy

f

mindfor theirown sakes; on any topic,what we find n his thoughts

a consistent

hilosophical

ore,

with the

actual

working

ut of the

posi-

tion

shaped

decisively y Augustine's

articular

rientation

nd

develop-

ing agenda,

by

his current

nthusiasms,

nd

by

the

opponent

of the

moment.

Like the other

ater

works,

De

Natura

t

Origine

nimae dheres

to

a

consistent

ore

of

thought.

rom

De Libero

rbitrionwards

Augustine

consistently

eclines

o

give

a

definite

nswer o

the

question

of the

soul's

origin,

f

how God

creates souls.

He never

deviatesfrom

his

discovery

that the

soul

is immaterial

nd

immortal,

r from

he

assumption

hat

first ersonexperiences re constitutivef personal dentitynd have a

special

and immediate

ivenness

o

the self.He

in

factholds

consistently

that dream-assent

nd dream-consent

n

normal

cases

are not

morally

r

epistemologically

ignificant.

De

Natura

t

Origine

nimae

lso fits nto

a

general progression

rom

naïve,

proto-Cartesian

hilosophy

f mind

to an interest

n

the

dynam-

ics

of embodiment

nd the

conviction hat

self-knowledge

emands

an

ongoing

abor of

psychological

nd moral

archaeology

nd

rigorous hilo-

sophical

reflection.

he

simple

view of

self-presenting

tates hat

Augustine

exploits

n Contra cadémicosas

given

way

to the

position,

lreadyclearly

present

n

Confessiones

and

articulated

owerfully

n

De Trinitatehat

the

self

s not

ust

the

sum

of its

first-person

xperiences,

ut

also

the

locus



DREAM

ODIESANDDREAM AINS

249

of reflection pon its own experiences, nd that self-awarenessmerely

supplies

ssential ata for

elf-knowledge.

s a

result,

ugustine

s

increas-

inglyopen

to

the

suggestion

hat

n

various

ways

our

first-person

xpe-

riences

may

not be

the

experiences hey ppear

to be.

Augustine's esponse

to Vincentius

Victor,

ranky, opical

and

polemical though

t

is,

is

never-

theless

irmly

ixed

n

the

landscape

of

Augustine's

ater works.

Baton

Rouge,

Louisiana

Louisiana tate

University

Departmentf

Philosophy



Emotionsnd

Cognitions

Fourteenth-Century

iscussions

n thePassions

f

the oul

DOMINIK

PERLER

Abstragt

Medieval

philosophers

learly

ecognized

hat motions

re not

simply

raw

feelings"

ut

complex

mental tates hat

nclude

ognitive omponents. hey

analyzed

hese

omponents

othon the

sensory

nd

on the ntellectual

evel,

paying

articular

ttention

o thedifferent

ypes

f

cognition

hat re nvolved.

This

paper

focuses

n William

Ockham nd Adam

Wodeham,

wofourteenth-

century

uthorswho

presented

detailed

ccountof

"sensory assions"

nd

"volitional

assions".

t intends

o showthat hese

wo

philosophers

rovided

both

a structural

nd

a functional

nalysis

f

emotions,

.e.,

they xplained

thevarious lementsonstitutingmotions nd delineatedhecausal relations

between hese

lements.

ckham s well

as Wodeham

mphasized

hat sen-

sory

passions"

re not

only

based

upon

cognitions

ut include

cognitive

component

nd

are

therefore

ntentional.

n

addition,

hey ointed

ut that

"volitional

assions"

re based

upon

a

conceptualization

nd an evaluation

of

given objects.

This

cognitivistpproach

to emotions

nabled them

to

explain

he

complex henomenon

f emotional

onflict,

phenomenon

hat

has its

origin

n the

co-presence

f various

motions hat nvolve

onflicting

evaluations.

I

Suppose

that,

duringyour

childhood,

you

had a best friend

who was

very

close,

withwhom

you

shared

not

only

most of

your

time,

but

also most

of

your

secrets.

The two

of

you

were

inseparable

at school and went

through

ll the

stormy tages

of

adolescence

together.

ut

then,

one

day,

your

friend

uddenlydisappeared

without

ny explanation.

You

heard

rumors hat

he

had

gone

to

Australia,

ut

you

receivedno

message

from

her no phone call, no postcard,nothing.t tookyou yearsto come to

terms

with his

trange

ehavior.

Yet one

morning,

hen

you

were

about

to leave

your apartment,

ll of a sudden

she was

standing

t

your

door,

smiling

t

you

as

if

nothing

had

happened.

How

would

you

react?You

©

Koninklijke

rill

V,

Leiden,

005

Vivarium

3,2

Also vailable

nline

www.brill.nl



EMOTIONS

ND

COGNITIONS

251

would be in a complexemotionalstate, assume, and you would go

through

arious

tages.

First,

you might

eel sheer

pleasure

at

seeing

her,

a

pleasure

that would

immediately rigger

odily

actions like

running

toward

her and

embracing

er. But then

you

might

lso feel

anger.Why

did she leave

so

abruptly?

nd

why

did she show

up

after o

manyyears

without

warningyou?

Finally,you might

lso feel a bit

guilty.

After

ll,

you

could have done

something

o learn about

her whereabouts.You

neglected

o

keep

in

touch

as

much

as she did.

It is

quite easy

to

imagine

such

a

situation nd to

give

a detailed

description

f the

complex

motional tate

person

s

likely

o be confronted

with.

However,

t is far from

asy

to

provide

a

philosophical nalysis

f

this state.

n

such

an

analysis,

we

need to do

at least two

things.

irst,

we

ought

to

give

a structural

xplanation

of the emotional

tate, .e.,

we

need to indicatewhat kind

of

components

r elements

re to be

taken

intoaccount nd how these lements

re interrelated.

hus,

it

s

necessary

to delineatewhat we need to considerwhen we describe

person

as feel-

ing pleasure, anger,

and

guilt.

Does such

a

person

have mere

feelings,

comparable o sensationsikefeeling ungrynd thirsty,r does she have

mental tateswith

cognitive

ontent?And how can we characterize his

content?

econd,

it is also

necessary

o

provide

a

functional

xplanation

of the

complex

emotional

state,

spelling

out what

causes the various

components

nd what

they

cause

in

turn. Should we

say,

for

nstance,

that

seeing

an old friend auses

pleasure?

And should we

assume that

pleasure,

n

turn,

auses

an action ike

embracing?

Or

should a different

causal role be

assigned

to

pleasure?

Philosophers

n

the aterMiddle

Ages

tried

o

answer

ll

of these

ques-

tionsby providing oth a structural nd a functional nalysisof emo-

tions

or,

more

precisely,

f

"passions

of the

soul"

(passiones

nimae

,

as

they

used to call

the

mental

phenomena

a

person experiences

r

"undergoes"

when she is

in

an affectivetate.1 ince

most

fourteenth-century

uthors

workedwith an

Aristotelian

heory

f the

soul,

they

examined two lev-

els

when

analyzing assions.2

irst,

hey

urned o the

sensory

oul,

which

1

Forthe echnicalse of

the erm

passio",

ooted

n

Aristotelian

etaphysics,

ee

V.

Hirvonen,

assionsn Williamckham's

hilosophical

sychology

Dordrecht

004,

7-73.

2Ockhamtresseshat hese wo evelsrereallyndnot implyonceptuallyistinct;

see

Quodl.I,

q.

10

OTh

X,

156-161).

ll

referenceso Ockham's

orks

pply

o the

Opera

hilosophica= OPh)

nd

Opera

heologica= OTh),

d.

by

G. Gài

et

l.,

t.

Bonaventure,

N.Y.,

1967-1988.n the

metaphysical

rameworkf his

psychology,

ee M. McCord

Adams,

WilliamckhamNotre ame

1987,

54-64,

nd G.

J.

Etzkorn,

ckham's

iew

f



252

DOMINIK

ERLER

was dividedinto two parts: "cognitive" nd "appetitive".They investi-

gated

the

passions

we findon this evel and the causal

role

theyplay

in

our actions.

econd,

they

xamined he evel of

the ntellectual

oul,

which

they

lso divided nto a

"cognitive"

nd

an

"appetitive" art, sking gain

what

kind of

passions

are to be

found

there and how

they

differ rom

sensory assions.

n

their

view,

we are

utterly

nable to understand

as-

sions unless

we

analyze

the

relationship

etween

ognitive

nd

appetitive

parts

on each

level as well as the nteraction etween he two evels.

Only

then do

we

get

a

clear

picture

of

all the structural

lements,

nd

only

then can we

explain

the causal role of all the relevant lements.

In

light

of this architecture f

the

soul,

I

intend o examine how two

prominent

ourteenth-century

hilosophers,

illiam

Ockham and

his

pupil

Adam

Wodeham,

analyzed passions

on both levels.

t

goes

without

ay-

•

ing

that will not be

able to take nto account

all

the dimensions

f their

complex

explanatory

model.

I

will discuss

neithermoral

aspects

e.g.,

the

importance

ttached

o

higher-levelassions

or

he

development

f

virtues)

nor

theological

nes

(e.g.,

the role

passions play

in

the

theory

f beatific

vision).3 ince I am primarilynterestedn structuralnd causal aspects,

especially

n

the

way

later

medieval

philosophers

elatedelements

n

the

cognitive art

of the

soul to those

n

the

appetitive

art,

will focus

on

the

interplay

etween

these

parts

and on the

impact

t

has foran

expla-

nation of human

actions.

To avoid

misunderstandings,

should

point

out

that

speaking

bout

parts

of the

soul does not amount

to

introducing

arious homunculi r

separate

faculties.

Ockham

emphasizes

that intellect nd

will are not

different

ntitieswithin

he human soul.

Ontologically peaking,

hey

re

one and the same substancethat s capable of bringing bout different

statesor acts.

Thus,

the intellect s

nothing

ut the

intellectual oul

inso-

far s it

produces

ognitive

cts,

and

the

will s the

very

ame soul insofar

as it

produces

volitional

cts.4There

is

only

a

real

distinction

etween

intellectual

nd

sensory

oul,

not between

intellect

nd will.

In

giving

such

an

ontologically arsimonious

xplanation,

Ockham

clearly

uses his

"cleaver"

to cut

away

a

multiplicity

f entities

nd

really

distinct

arts.5

the

umanassions

n the

ight

f

his

Philosophicalnthropology

in: W. Vossenkuhl

nd

R. Schönbergereds.), ieGegenwartckhamsWeinheim990, 65-87.

3

For

comprehensive

ccountfboth

moralnd

heologicalspects,

eeS.

Knuuttila,

Emotionsn

Ancientnd

Medieval

hilosophy

Oxford

004,

h.4.

4

See

Reportatio

I,

q.

20

OTh

V,

435-6).

5

On

this

methodological

rinciple,

ee

J.

Boler,

ckham'sleaver

n:Franciscan

tudies,

45

1985),

19-44.



EMOTIONS ND

COGNITIONS

253

It is therefore ardlyadequate to investigate he relationship etween

various

parts

understood s

special

entities,

ven

if

ones uses

the

expres-

sions

"intellect" nd

"will",

as

Ockham

(and

following

im

Wodeham)

himself oes. The

basic

questions

hould ratherbe how

intellectual

nd

volitional cts re

interrelatednd how

they

re

based

upon

acts

brought

about

by

the

sensory

oul.

II

If we want to understand he activities f the

sensory

oul,

we need to

look

at

the

way

Ockham

explains

sensory ognition notitia

ensitiva).

n

his

view,

this

type

of

cognition

provides

nformation bout

particular,

material

hings

nd can be

either

ntuitive r

abstractive,

epending

on

the senses

that are

involved.6

f

the external

enses

are

activated,

nd if

they

grasp

something resent

o them s

present

nd

existent,

n

intuitive

cognition

ccurs.

f,

however,

nly

the

imagination

s

an

internal

ense

is

active and

apprehends

thing

without

aking

notice of

its

existence,

there smere abstractiveognition. his distinctionan be illustrated ith

a

simpleexample.

Suppose

there s an

apple

in

front f

you

and

you

see

it as

an

existent

pple.

In

that

ase,

you

have a

sensory

ntuitive

ognition.

If

there s

no

apple

physically

resent

o

you,

but

you

are

terribly

un-

gry

and visualize an

apple

in

your

imagination,

hen

you

have

nothing

more than a

sensory

bstractive

ognition.

Normally,

uch an

abstractive

cognition

presupposes

n

earlier

ntuitive

ne,

for

you

cannot

visualize

an

apple

if

you

have not

already

seen

one.

So

far,

the

intellecthas not

been

involved

n

the

cognitive

process.

There is intellectual ognitionnotitiantellectivaonlywhen the intellect

starts

orming

mental

terms, .e.,

concepts,

nd when

it

apprehends

he

objectby

means of

these erms.7

ere,

Ockham

again

distinguishes

etween

intuitive nd

abstractive

ognition.8

ntuitive

ognition

ccurs

when

the

6

See

Reportatio

I,

q.

12-13

OTh

V,

256-61);

eportatio

II,

q.

3

(OTh

VI,

114-25).

he

thesis

hat

ensory

ntuitive

ognitionrovides

he

basis or

urther

ognition

s

already

stated

n

Ordinatio

,

prologusOTh

,

25).

7

On

Ockham's

dentificationf

concepts

ith

mental

erms,

horoughly

iscussed

y

recentommentators,ee C. Panaccio,esmots,es onceptst es hoses.a sémantiquee

Guillaume

'Occamt e

nominalisme

'aujourd'hui

Montréal-Paris

991,

ndD.

Perler,

heorien

der

ntentionalität

m

Mittelalter

Frankfurt.

M.

2002,

61-85.

8

See

Ordinatio

,

prologus

OTh

,

30-3)

nd

Quodl.

,

q.

5

(OTh

X,

495-500).

n

this

istinction,

idely

iscussedn

recent

econdary

iterature,

ee the

oncise

nalysis

provided

y

C.

Michon,

ominalisme.

a

théoriee a

signification

'Occam

Paris

994, 08-26,



254

DOMINIK

ERLER

intellect pprehendsa presentand existent hingas an existent hing.

More

precisely,

ckham

claims that

by

means of this

cognition

one

can

know whether

r not there

s

a

thing

uch

that,

f

there s

a

thing,

he

intellect

mmediatelyudges

that it is and

knows with

evidence

that it

is."9

Thus,

an intuitive

ntellectual

ognition

s

always

followed

y

a

judg-

ment bout

the existence

r non-existence

f the

cognitive

bject.

Abstractive

intellectual

ognition,

n the

other

hand,

is not followed

y

such

a

judg-

ment.

In

that

case,

the intellect

abstracts

from the

existence

or non-

existence

nd from

therconditions

which

contingentlypply

to

a

thing

or are

predicated

of a

thing."10

his means that fI

simply

onceiveof

an

apple,

I

do not

udge

about

the actual

existence f

an

apple.

I

merely

grasp

a certain

cognitive

ontent.

This distinction

etween

ensory

nd intellectual

ognition

s

crucially

important

or

n

understanding

f the

passions,

because

Ockham

empha-

sizes

that it

is

sensory ognition,

not

the external

object

or

intellectual

cognition

f

this

object,

that

immediately

auses

passions

such

as

plea-

sure,

desire,

and sadness.11

hus,

when

I

meet

an old

friend,

t is not

thefriend erselfrmythinkingbouther,butmyseeingher thatcauses

pleasure

n me. Before

activate

my

intellect

nd,

accordingly,

efore

form

r use

any

concepts,

my

seeing

mmediately riggers

passion.12

f

course,

Ockham

acknowledges

hat

n

mostcases

sense

and

intellect

oop-

erate

so that

the ntellect

works

upon

the

material

rovided

by

the

senses

and

comes

up

with

an intellectual

ognition.

But he

insists

n the

fact

that

sensory ognition

s not

necessarily

ollowed

y,

or transformed

nto,

an intellectual

ne,

as

becomes

clear

when

you

consider

nfants

who do

and E.

Karger,

ckham'

Misunderstood

heory

f

ntuitivend

Abstractive

ognition

in:

P. V.

Spade

ed.),

he

ambridge

ompanion

oOckham

Cambridge-New

ork

999,

04-26.

9

Ordinatio

,

prologus

OTh

,

31):

.

notitia

ntuitiva

ei st alis

otitia

irtute

uius

potest

ciri

trum

es it

el

non,

ta

quod

i res

it,

tatim

ntellectus

udicat

arn sse

t

evidenter

ognoscit

arn

sse

.."

10

Ordinatio

,

prologus

OTh

,

31):

Aliter

ccipitur

ognitio

bstractiva

ecundum

uod

abstrahit

b

exsistentia

t

non xsistentia

t b

aliis ondicionibus

uae

ontingenter

ccidunt

reivel

praedicantur

e re."

11

ee

Quaestiones

ariae,

.

6,

art.

(OTh

VIII,

251);

Quodl

II,

q.

17

OTh

X,

268-

72);

Ordinatio

,

dist.

,

q.

3

(OTh

,

420).

12

Ockham

akes

t lear hat

he

xternal

bject

annot

e more han

mediate

ause.

Quaestionesariaeq. 6,art. (OThVIII,252): Etper onsequensbiectumpprehensum

nullo

modo st

ausa

mmediatastarum

assionum.

ed olum

i sit

ausa

...],

est olum

causa

mediata

espectu

llius

assionis

t solum

ausa

ausae

uatenus

aturaliter

ausat

cognitionem

ntuitivam

n

sensu

t

earn

onservât,

uae

cognitio

ausat

mmediate

as-

siones

raedictas

odo

raedicto."



EMOTIONS

NDCOGNITIONS

255

notyetuse conceptsbut nevertheless ave sensory ognitions ausingpas-

sions

e.g., seeing

the mother r

tasting

milk

causes

pleasure).13

t is

even

more

obvious

n

the

case

of brute nimals. Ockham mentions

he famous

case of the

sheep

that fleeswhen

seeing

a

wolf.14 he mere act of see-

ing

terrifieshe

sheep

and makes it flee.

Thus,

there can be a

sensory

cognition ausing passion

without he

presence

f

any

ntellectual

ctivity.

This claim

inevitably

aises the

question

of how we should

understand

this

type

of

cognition.

What

exactly

does

it

mean

that we

(as

well as

brute

animals)

can see

something

without

making

use of

concepts?

Unfortunately,

ckham does not

give

a detailed answerto this

question.

Modern readers

may

mmediately

aise the

objection

hat t

hardly

makes

sense

to

speak

about

pre-conceptual eeing.15

f

seeing

s

more than the

mere

reception

f

sensory nputs,

t

always

nvolves n

explicit

r

implicit

use of

concepts:

we

always

see

something

s

something

nd

thereby

ate-

gorize

the

perceptualobject.

For

instance,

you

see the

red,

round

thing

in

front f

you

as an

apple

or

simply

s a

red,

round

thing.

That is

why

you

make use

of

concepts

n

the

very

act of

seeing

and not

in

a

later

act of intellectualpprehension. o, Ockham's claim that thereare pre-

conceptual ensory

cts of

cognition ausing

passions

before he intellect

provides

oncepts

ooks

questionable.

Although

t is

tempting

o

argue

in

this

way,

I

do not think

that

Ockham's claim

should be

dismissed o

easily.

Let

me

try

o

explain

this

by

probing

the

examples

he

discusses.The

most

illuminating

ases are

those

of animals that

have mere

sensory ognition.16

hen a

sheep

sees

a

wolf,

t

apprehends

the

so-called "external

sensible

qualities"

of the

wolf,

.e.,

its

color,

its

shape,

its

size, etc.,

and it

immediately ognizes

that a thinghavingall thesepropertiess dangerous.Ockham empha-

sizes

thatthe

sheep

does not

apprehend

he

concepts

of

color,

shape,

etc.

It

simplyperceives

ome

patches

that

happen

to have a

certain

color,

shape,

etc. Nor

does it

graspdangerousness

r

hostility

s a

special

quality

13

nfantsre

mentioned

n

Reportatio

V,

q.

14

OTh

VII,

314),

nd n

Quodl,

q.

15

(OTh

X,

84),

where

ckham

tates:

puer

idet

ensibilitert non

ntellectualiter

He even

ssumes

hat

hey

ave

ome orm

f

non-intellectual

udgment.

hey udge

that

omething

s

agreeable

r

disagreeable

ithout

sing

he

onceptsagreeable"

nd

"disagreeable".

14 ee Ordinatio, dist. ,q. 2 (OTh I, 410-1).

15

n

the

current

ebate,

.

McDowell,

ind

ndWorld

Cambridge,

ass.,

1994,

46-65,

akes hisine n

his

ritique

f heoriesf

pre-conceptual

erception.

16

ee

Reportatio

V,

q.

14

OTh

VII,

314-5),

nd Ordinatio

,

dist.

,

q.

2

(OTh

I,

410-1).



256

DOMINIK

ERLER

thatwouldbe added to the sensible ualities.Criticizingome of hispre-

decessors,

mong

them Thomas

Aquinas,

Ockham

holds that

there

s

no

special

intentio

as claimed

by

these

authors,17

hat

could be

grasped.

Dangerousness

s

simply

what results

rom

thing

isplaying

ertain

ual-

ities. That is

why

the

sheep grasps

the

sensible

qualities

of the wolfand

its

property

f

being dangerous

t

the same time.

n

addition,

he

sheep

is also

capable

of

distinguishing

he wolf from

other

thingsdisplaying

other

ensible

ualities.

Ockham even claims

that the

sheep

is

capable

of

making

ome kind of

udgment, lthough

he

hastens o add that t does

not form

full-fledgedudgment

hat would involve he use of

concepts.

The

sensory

udgment

s a mere act of

recognizing

nd

locating

a cer-

tain

pattern

of sensible

qualities.

When

performing

his

act,

the

sheep

sees the wolf as

something,

in

the

sense that t sees it as a

specific

undle

of

colors,

and it is

capable

of

discriminating

his

bundle from nother

one,

say

from

he one it sees when

looking

at

a

fellow

heep.

Yet it is

utterly

nable to see the wolf

as a

wolf,

imply

ecause it cannot

apply

an

appropriate oncept

to

what it sees.

In light f thespecific apacity hatan animalwithmeresensory og-

nition

has,

we can conclude that this

type

of

cognition

s

indeed

pre-con-

ceptual,

but neverthelessmore than the

reception

of an

unstructured

stream f

sensory nputs.

t has a distinct ontent hat

enables

an animal

to

distinguish

ifferent

hings

n

the

materialworld.This is

important

or

an

understanding

f the

genesis

of

sensory assions,

for t is

precisely

he

sensory ognitionhaving

a

distinct ontent

that causes them. Ockham

says

with

respect

o the

fleeing heep:

"Then

I

ask: what could cause this

act

of

desiring

o flee?Not the

hostility,

or

there s no such

thing

here,

and what does not existcannot be a cause of anything. herefore, his

act is caused

by

a

cognition

f

the

external

ensible

qualities

. ."18So it

is the

act of

seeing,

not the

thing

tself r a

mysteriousntity

alled

"hos-

tility",

hat causes

a

passion.

This

occurs

naturally,

ithout

ny

intellec-

tual ntervention. ckham

acknowledges

hatnot

only

nimals

experience

such

passions.

Human

beings

have them as well. That is

why

he claims

that human

pleasure

and desire are often

naturally

aused

by sensory

17 ee Thomas quinas,ummaheologiaeed.byP.Caramello,urin-Rome952, ars

I,

q.

78,

rt.

,

corp.

18

Ordinatio

,

dist.

,

q.

2

(OTh

I,

411):

Tunc

uaero: quo

causareturlle ctus

appetitivusugiendi?

on b

inimicitia,

uia

nulla

st

bi,

t

non-ensullius

otest

sse

causa;

gitur

ausatur

cognitione

ensibiliumxteriorum

.."



EMOTIONS NDCOGNITIONS

257

cognitions,without herebeing any use of concepts.To illustrate his

point

with modern

example,

we

may say:

when

I

see and

smell

a bou-

quet

of fresh

flowers,

t

is not

the use

of

the

concepts

"flowers"

nd

"fresh"

nd,

hence,

not the

conceptualization

f

the

present

ituation hat

makes me feel

pleasure.

Rather,

the

simple

fact that

experience njoy-

able sensible

qualities

causes

my

pleasure.

This has a

consequence

for an

explanation

of

how

passions

can be

controlled r corrected.

o

I

have

direct ontrol ver

my pleasure

when

I

see and smellfresh lowers?

ardly,

Ockham

would

respond.

he flowers

naturally

ause a certain

type

of

sensory ognition

n

me,

whichin turn

naturally

auses

pleasure.

cannot dictate to

my

senses not

to

provide

a

certain isual and

olfactoryognition,

nd not to cause

pleasure.

Similarly,

the

sheep

cannot decide not to be terrified hen it

sees the wolf. The

passion

arises

naturally.

However,

this

does not mean

that we have no

control

whatsoever ver our

sensory

passions.

Ockham

carefully

oints

out that human

beings,

unlikebrute

animals,

can exercise certain

on-

trol

over

them,

because

they

are

capable

of

bringing

bout acts of the

will. But these acts cannot directly hange or influence assions. They

are

only

capable

of

producing

certain

disposition

hat

influences he

way

we see

things.

Or,"

Ockham

continues,

perhaps

the act of

the

will

is a

mediate cause with

respect

o these

passions,

because it

is the cause

of

the cause. For it is the

partial

mmediatecause of an

apprehension

that

precedes

such an act

called

'passion'."19

This claim

can

easily

be

illustrated.

uppose

that decide to

go

to

a

flower

hop

where will

be

exposed

to

exquisite

cents

nd colors.

n

that

case,

my

decision

an

act

of the

will)

is

a

mediate

ause of

pleasure,

because it makes

me

go

to a

place where willacquirea certain ensory ognition. his cognitionwill

then

cause

pleasure.

But the act of the will

can

by

no

means

function

as

the immediate

ause of

pleasure.

Were

I

exposed

to

rotten

flowers,

could

not command

myself:

eel

pleasure

No matterhow

much

I

want

a

sensory

assion,

cannot have it

unless have

previously

ad

the nec-

essary

ensory ognition.20

The fact hat

acts of the will can

be an

indirect ause

showsthat

there

is an

important

ifference etween

human

beings

and

brute animals.

19

Reportatio

II,

q.

12

OTh

VI,

411):

Vel

forte

pse

ctus oluntatis

st ausamedi-

ata

respectu

llarum

assionum,

uia

st ausa

ausae. st nim

ausa

mmediata

artialis

apprehensionis

raecedentis

alem

ctum

ui

vocatur

assio."

20

Note

hat his

ognition

oesnotneed

o be

direcdy

aused

y

n

external

bject.



258

DOMINIK ERLER

When a sheep sees a wolf, t cannot want to avoid the passionoffear,

simply

ecause it lacks volitional cts. It

cannot even want to

be

in

a sit-

uation where it would not be scared. We human

beings,

on the other

hand,

can want to

expose

ourselves o situations

where we have different

sensory

ognitions

nd,

consequently,

ifferent

assions.

n

addition,

we

can use our intellect

n

order to conceive

of

one

and

the same

situation

in

different

ays. Suppose

you

suffer rom

wolf-phobiaust

like a

sheep,

but

you

learn that there are

nice,

tame wolves

n

the circus.

Then,

you

can want to

go

to the circus so that

you

will have a

sensory ognition

of a wolf that will be

shaped

by

what

you

have learned. That

is,

you

will no

longer

see the wolf

as a

mere bundle of sensible

qualities

that

scares

you.

You will see it as

a

tamed animal.

This

may

make

you

over-

come

your

wolf-phobia.

o,

unlike the unfortunate

heep, you

can do

something

o

change

your

passions.

This is an

important

oint

n

Ockham's

theory.

While

not

being

under the immediate ontrol f acts of the

will,

passions

are not out of control ither.We can forceourselves o

an

édu-

cation

entimentale

a) by exposing

urselves o situations

n

whichwe

acquire

certain ensory ognitionsnd (b) byconceptualizinghesebasiccognitions.

At this

point

someone

might

voice a fundamental

bjection against

Ockham's claim that

sensory ognitions

ause

passions.

Why

does he not

admitthat

objects

n

the world

play

this

ausal role? Could he not

appeal

to his famous

ontological

razor or "cleaver" and claim that the wolf

immediately

auses

fear when it is

present

to

a

person

or to

a

sheep?

No

doubt,

Ockham would

reject

his

uggestion

ecause it misses he cru-

cial

point

that

n

object

n

itself

imply

riggers

ur senses

nothing

more.

In

some

passages,

he

presents

n

explicit rgument ndorsing

he thesis

that it is the sensory ognition,not the externalobject,thatplays the

causal

role.21

f

the

object

caused

a

passion,

he

says,

the

passion

would

disappear

s soon as the

object

would be removed r

destroyed.

owever,

it

is

possible

for a

passion

to

persist

fter

he removal or destruction f

the

object. (Suppose

you

see a wild wolf

n

the dark

and are

terribly

scared.

Then the wolf

disappears.

Yet

you

are still haken

by

fearbecause

you

still

ave the

strong

mpression

f

something ig,

dark,

nd

threatening.

Since tcan also be abstractive,.e.,an act of magination,t can be caused ythe

sensory

oul tself.or

xample,

canforce

myself

o come

p

with

n

magination

f

delicious

pple,

which

ill ause

leasure.

21

ee

Quaestiones

ariae

q.

6,

art.

(OTh

VIII,

251-2);

uodl.

ll,

q.

17

OTh

IX,

268-9).



EMOTIONS

ND

COGNITIONS

259

It is thepersistingontent fyour previous ct of seeingthat maintains

your

fear.)

Ockham even adduces

an

argument

x

hypothesi

o corroborate

this claim:

"If

God

preserved

he

seeing

of

a

pleasurable

or

saddening

object

and

destroyed

he

object

of that

act of

seeing,

he

pleasure

or

sad-

ness

in

the

appetite following

the sense of

sight

could

immediately

be

caused,

as is clear from

xperience."22 ppealing

to

experiencemay

be difficult

n

this

case,

but the crucial

point

is

clear.

A

passion

can be

caused even without he

presence

of an

external

object;

therefore,

he

external

bject

cannot

be the immediate ause of a

passion.

This is an

important

hesisthat should not be

neglected.

n Ockham's

view,

pas-

sions should not be

explained

n

a

crude behaviorist

way,

because

it is

not

simply

he stimulus

temming

rom n external

bject

that causes a

passion

as a

reaction.

Rather,

our

sensory ognitionplays

the decisive

causal role. To

put

it

in

a

nutshell,

we

may say

that t is

not the world

itself,

ut our

sensory

ognitive

ttitude oward he world

thatcauses

pas-

sions. This is

why passions

are

"cognitively enetrable",

s

modern

psy-

chologists

nd

philosophers

f

mind would

say.23

hifts

n

the

way

we

cognizetheworld mmediatelyffect ur passions.

Now one

may

still

wonder

n

what sense

passions

are

"cognitively

en-

etrable".Does

that mean that we first eed

to have a

sensory

ognition

so thatwe can

acquire

a

passion

that,

aken

n

itself,

s

a

mere

sensation?

Or

does it mean that we

need to have a

sensory ognition

o that

we

can

acquire

a

passion

that has

in

itself

cognitive

ontent?This

ques-

tion

arisesbecause

in

his discussion

f

sensory assions,

Ockham mentions

not

ust pleasure

and

desire,

but also

pain.24

et

pain

seems to be a

state

without

cognitive

ontent.

Using

modern

terminology,

ne could

say

thatpain has a certain henomenal uality itfeels certainwayto have,

say,

a

headache),

but not

a

cognitive

ontent

a

headache is

not about

something

nd does not

represent

certain

object

or

quality

in

the

world).25

f

Ockham treats

ain along

withother

ensory assions,

t

seems

22

Quaestiones

ariae,

.

6,

art.

(OTh

VIII,

251-2):

Si

etiam eus

onservaretisionem

alicuiusbiecti

electabilisel ristabilis

tdestrueretbiectum

llius

isionis,

otest

tatim

causari electatioel

ristiia

n

appetituequente

isum,

icut

atet er

xperientiam."

23

borrowhis

xpression

rom

.

Pylyshyn,

omputation

nd

ognition

Cambridge,

ass.

1984.

24

Pain s the

passion

e

discusses ost

xtensively

n

Quodl.

II,

q.

17

(OTh

IX,

269-70).

25

This

s,

of

ourse,

controversiallaim

hatwould

ot e

unanimouslyccepted

n

the

ontemporary

ebate.t

is

usually

iscusseds "the

henomenological

heory",

or



260

DOMINIK

ERLER

as ifhe werereducing ll passionsto mere sensations hat ack a cognitive

content.

Tempting

as this

interpretation

ay

be,

it would not be a correct

account

of Ockham's

theory.

n

his

explanation

of various

sensory

as-

sions,

he

makes t clear

thatmostof them re about

omething,

nd there-

fore have

a

cognitive

ontent.He

states,

for

instance,

hat

pleasure

is

about

something

resent,

whereas desire and avoidance are

about some

thing

hat s not

present

nd not

possessed.26

his

clearly

hows

that he

takes

these

passions

to be intentional

tates:

hey

re directed

oward

pre-

sentor

non-present

bjects.

Even

pain

is intentionaln his view.27 r to

be

more

precise,

pain

as

a

passionate

ttitude oward

omething

ad that

affectshe

body

s intentional.

ckham

carefully istinguishesain,

under-

stood

in

this

sense,

from

pain

understood

s a mere

feeling.28

herefore,

it would be erroneous

o

say

that Ockham considers

assions

to be non-

intentional

ensations r

moods. Most of

them are

fully ognitive:

not

only

are

they

caused

by sensory ognitions,

hey

also have

a

cognitive

content

n

themselves.

Ill

Sensory

ognition

s

the

starting

oint

for

every ognitive

ctivity

nd the

first ause of

passions.

Yet it

is clear that human

beings

also have

an

intellectual

oul, which,

ust

like the

sensory

oul,

can

bring

about

cog-

nitive

cts

so-called

intellectual

cts")

and

appetitive

cts

so-called

voli-

tional

cts").

This

is

precisely

what

distinguishes

uman

beings

from rute

animals,

which re

only

endowed

with

sensory

oul.

Since human

beings

can have higher-levelcts,Ockhamintroducespassionsof thewill" that

play

a decisive

ole

n his

theory

f emotions.29

is most xtensive

iscussion

instance

y

P. Smith

ndO. R.

Jones,

he

hilosophy

f

MindAn ntroduction

Cambridge-

NewYork

986,

93-206.

26

Quaestiones

ariae,

.

6,

art.

(OTh

VIII,

256).

bid.

OTh

VIII,

252),

he

says

hat

desire

nd voidance

re

"respectu

biectorumbsentium

t

nonhabitorum".

27

Quodl.

ll,

q.

17

OTh

X,

271):

.

quando

st

electatioel

dolor e

aliquo

biecto,

cessâtctus

esiderandi."

ckham

xplains

he ransition

romne

passion

o

another

y

referring

o the

bject

f he

assion.

f

the

bject

f

desire,

hich asnot een

resent,

suddenlyecomesresent,esireeasesnd sreplacedypleasureif he bjectsgood)

or

pain

if

he

bject

s

bad).

his

xplanation

hows

hat

assions

redefined

ith

espect

to a certain

bject.

28

ee

Quodl.

ll,

q.

17

OTh

X,

269).

29

He

explicitlypeaks

bout

assions,

or

nstance

n

Quodl.

I,

q.

17

OTh

X,

187):



EMOTIONS

NDCOGNITIONS

261

of thesepassionscan be found n a contextthatmay look strange o

modern

readers,

but

was of

great mportance

n

the later Middle

Ages,

namely

the debate

about

enjoyment

fruitio). ccording

to traditional

Christian

doctrine,

God is the

highest

nd final

object

the

only object

human

beings

njoy

for ts own

sake,

not with

regard

o

something

lse.30

The most

perfect njoyment

will be reached

in

the beatific

ision,

when

human

beings contemplate

God

in,

and

for,

himself.

This

theological

thesis

immediately

raises the

philosophical question

of what kind of

emotional tate

enjoyment

s.

Given that the

human

soul,

separated

from

the

body,

can have

it,

it is

certainly

ot a

sensorypassion.

And

given

that

t is not

implemented

n

the

body,

it does not

bring

about

bodily

actions.

So,

what

is

it,

and how

is

it caused? These

questions sparked

a

general

discussion bout the structure nd the causes of

non-sensory

passions.

All

philosophers

nd

theologians

nvolved

n

this debate

agreed

that

enjoyment,

nlike

sensory

leasure,

s a

conceptualized

ormof

passion.

If

someone

enjoys

God's

presence,

ne loves

him

as God

categorizing

im

as thehighestnd mostdesirablebeing.Given thisobviousfact, ne may

be

tempted

o

say

that

enjoyment

nd other forms f

higher-level

as-

sions are

an

intellectual ffair. hat

is,

the intellectual

oul,

by

grasping

an

object

and

conceptualizing

t,

brings

about

all

these

passions

in

its

cognitive

ctivities.

"... dico

primo uodpassiones

unt

n

volúntate,

uia

amor t

spes,

imort

gaudium

suntn

volúntate,

uae

tarnenommuniter

onunturassiones.

imiliterelectadottris-

titia untnvolúntate,uaeetiam unt assiones;giturtc."Ockham asbyno means

the irst edievaluthor

o

speak

bout

assions

fthewill.He followed

cotus,

ho

already

resented

detailed

nalysis

f

hese

assions,

nd hiftedhe ocus romhe en-

sory

o

the

olitionalevel. his rucialhifts

analyzedy

.

Knuuttila,

motionsnAncient

andMedieval

hilosophy

n. 3),

265-71,

nd O.

Boulnois,

uns

cot: xiste-t-iles

assions

e

la volonté

,

n:B.

Besnier,

.-F.Moreau nd

L. Renault

eds.),

es

assionsntiques

tmédié-

valesParis

003,

81-95.

n

the ise fvoluntarist

sychology

n

general,

ee B.

Kent,

Virtues

f

heWill. he

ransformationf

thicsn he ate hirteenth

enturyWashington

.C.

1995.

30

eter ombardtateshis

hesis

nthe

ery

irstfhis 8

distinctions,

here erefers

to the

Augustinián

istinctionetween

njoymentfruitio)

nd

use

usus):

od s the

nly

object

njoyed

or

ts wn

ake,

otused or

omething

lse.Given his lassicalistinc-

tion, ll medievalheologiansommentingn theSentencesealtwith hequestionf

whatkind f emotionaltate

njoyment

s. On the

theologicalackground

nd its

impact

n

philosophical

ebates,

ee A. S.

McGrade,

ckhamn

Enjoyment

Towardsn

Understanding

f

ourteenth

enturyhilosophy

nd

sychology

in:

The Review f

Metaphysics,

33

1981),

06-28.



262

DOMINIK

ERLER

Ockhamfirmlypposessuchan intellectualistpproach,holdingnstead

that

"enjoying

s an act of the

will alone."31He

acknowledges

hat

con-

ceptualization

lays

a decisiverole.

But

in his

view,

this

does not amount

to

claiming

hat

enjoyment

s

nothing

but a

special

formof intellectual

activity.

ather,

t is

the will that

brings

bout an act

of

enjoyment

hen

the

intellect

resents

certain

object.

Thus,

when a

person

thinks bout

God,

he or

she

performs

n act of

enjoyment

hat

s a distinct olitional

act.

This

separation

f two

acts seems to

hint t

a

perfect

nalogy

between

"lower"

and

"higher"

passions.

As we

have

seen,

on the

sensory

evel,

thereneeds to be a

sensory ognition,

which,

however,

s not in itself

passion.

Rather,

a

sensory ognition

auses

sensory assion.

Similarly,

one

may

say

that on

the

higher

evel,

there needs

to be

a

conceptual

cognition,

hich,

aken

n

itself,

s not

yet

a

passion.

Rather,

conceptual

cognition

auses

passion,

.e.,

a volitional

ct such as

enjoyment.

Although

t

is

tempting

o construct

uch

an

analogy,

t

would not

express

Ockham's

opinion.

He

explicitly

ejects

he claim

that the

intel-

lect causes

passions

of the

will,

claiming

nstead:

". . . when

the intellect

presents n enjoyableobjectto the intellect

in a

clear

or

in an obscure

way,

in

particular

r

in

general

,

the will can

actively roduce

an

act

of

enjoyment

with

respect

to

that

object,

and this

happens

on natural

grounds."32

uite

obviously,

ckham

emphasizes

hat there

s no

simple

causal

mechanism

hat

makes the

will come

up

with

a certain

passion

whenever he

intellect

elivers

particular

ognition.33

he

will can

pro-

duce

an act

of

enjoyment,

ut

it need not.

Lurking

n

the

background

f

this thesis

s Ockham's

famousdoctrine

of

the

liberty

f the

will:

the will can

act

in

conformity

ith

objects

and

judgmentspresentedby the intellect, ut it does not have to.34 ven if

31

Ordinatio

,

dist.

,

q.

2

(OTh

,

395):

.

primo

stendum

st

uod

frui

st ctus

solius

oluntatis."

32

Ordinatio

,

dist.

,

q.

2

(OTh

,

397):

. dico

primo uod

biecto

ruibili

stenso

voluntati

er

ntellectum

ive

lare ive bscure

ive

n

particulari

ive

n

universali,

otest

voluntas

ctivelicere

ctum

ruitionis,

t hoc

x

puris

aturalibus,

irca

llud biectum."

33

Ockham

learlyejects

he

hesis,

efended

y,

mong

thers,

quinas

see

his

criptum

superrimům

ententiarum,

d.

by

P.

Mandonnet,

aris

929,

ist.

,

q.

1.,

rt. ad

1),

hat

the

will

lways

ollowshe

ntellect.

34

Ordinatio

,

dist.

,

q.

2

(OTh

,

399):

Sed

voluntas

espectu

uiuscumque

biecti

liberetcontingentergit,giturimpliciterepotentiaua bsolutaotestessareb actu

suo."

ee also

bid.,

.

6

(OTh

,

503);Reportatio

II,

q.

1

(OTh

VI,

355);Reportatio

V,

q.

16

OTh

VII,

350).

For

concise

nalysis

f he o-called

iberty

f

ndifference,

ee

M. McCord

dams,

ckham

n

Will,

ature,

nd

Morality

in:P.

V.

Spade

ed.),

he

ambridge

Companion

o

Ockham

n.

8),

245-72.



EMOTIONS

NDCOGNITIONS

263

the intellect onceivesofan objectas something ood and desirable, he

will

s

free

not o

accept

it

and,

consequently,

ot o

enjoy

t.

In

fact,

he

will has three

options:

t

can

accept

it,

not

accept

it,

or take

a

neutral

stance. For that

reason,

enjoyment

s not

automatically

aused

by

an

intellectual

pprehension.

When such

a

passion

arises,

t

requires

ts own

cause: the will.35

Now one

might

wonderhow the structure

f a volitional ct of

enjoy-

ment s

to be

understood. ince Ockham often

mphasizes

hat this act

is

distinct rom

n

intellectual

ctivity,

t

can

hardly

display

he

very

ame

structure.s it an act that has a mere

phenomenal

quality, omparable

to

a

good feeling?

Or

is it

an

act that also

comprises cognitive

om-

ponent,

ven

though

t differs rom n

intellectual ct? To answer these

questions,

we need to look at how Ockham

explains

the

relationship

between n act of

enjoyment

r a more

mundane

act

of ove

(

dilectioand

an act of

pleasure

delectatio

.

Criticizing

ome of

his

contemporaries,mong

them Peter

Auriol,

he

points

out that there s a

real distinction etween

these two acts. That

is,

a

loving

person

who feels

pleasure

has two

acts:

(i) an intentional ct of lovingdirected oward a certainpersonor state

of

affairs,

nd

(ii)

a

non-intentionalct of

experiencing leasure.

The rea-

son forthis distinctions

quite simple:

therecan be an act of

love

with-

out there

being

an

act of

pleasure.36

ckham adduces a

colorful

xample

to

illustrate his thesis.

A

devil can love

to seduce

a

human

being

and

make

him

sin,

but he does

not

experience ny

pleasure

n

this

despica-

ble

deed. He

has,

as it

were,

a

cool-hearted ove.37 his

example

shows

that an act of love is

neither dentical

to,

nor

necessarily

ccompanied

by,

an

act that has a certain

phenomenalquality.

t is

not

simply

n

act

of "feeling ood". Rather,an act of love (or in the case of love of God:

an

act

of

enjoyment)

s an act that s about

omething

nd can be

identified

through

ts content.This

content

may

be characterized

n

various

ways,

both as

being propositional

nd

non-propositional.

hus,

the devil's act

of

love has the content hat he

human

eing

hould in

whereas a human

35

t

should e noted hat

his

ppeal

o a distinct

ause oesnot nvolven

ontolog-

ical

commitmento a

spooky

ntity

alled thewill". s

pointed

ut bove

see

n.

4),

Ockham oesnot

ntroducehewill s an

entity

r

faculty

hatwould e

really

istinct

fromhe ntellect.heexpressionthewill" salwayso be understoods "the ntellec-

tual oul nsofar

s it

produces

olitional

cts". here s

only

n

ontological

ommitment

to

variousctsnot o

various

arts,

f he

oul.

36

ee

Ordinatio

,

dist.

,

q.

3

(OTh

,

407).

37

ee Ordinatio

,

dist.

,

q.

3

(OTh

,

408).



264

DOMINIK

ERLER

being'sact ofenjoyment implyhas the contentGod.No matterhow the

content s structured

in

a

"complex"

or a

"simple" way,

as

Ockham

would

say),

an

act of

love

always

has a

content,

nd is therefore o be

understood s

a

cognitive

ct.

An

act of

pleasure,

on the other

hand,

is

a

mere

feeling

hat

may

or

may

not

go along

with

the

cognitive

ct.

IV

So

far,

t has become clear

that volitional

passions

such

as

enjoyment

and love are not

only

based

upon

cognitive

cts,

but are themselvesnten-

tional

acts with

a

cognitive

ontent.But

how

then can

we

distinguish

them from

imple

ntellectual cts?

What,

for

nstance,

s

the difference

between

he mere act of

thinking

bout God and

loving

God,

if

t is not

just

a

phenomenal uality

hat

necessarily oes

along

with he second

act

and characterizes

t? t looks

as

if

the

cognitive pproach

Ockham takes o

the volitional

assions

risks

ssimilating

hem

ompletely

o intellectualcts.

In

light

of

this

difficulty,

t

is not

surprising

hat Ockham's

contem-

poraries and successorsanimatedlydiscussedthe question of how we

shouldcharacterize

he structure

f a volitional

assion.

Adam

Wodeham,

Ockham's

pupil

and

secretary,

eals with

this

problem

n

a

very

detailed

study.38

ollowing

his

teacher,

he subscribes o the thesis

hat

enjoyment

and love are

acts of the

will,

which are not

to be identified

with or

reduced

to intellectual

cts. He

unmistakablyejects

he ntellectualist

osi-

tion,

claiming

that

"the first

ognition

f

an

enjoyable object,

be it

an

intuitive r

an

abstractive

ognition,

s

really

distinct

rom n

enjoyment

of that

object,

and

vice

versa,

an

enjoyment

from this

cognition."39

Wodeham acknowledges, owever, hat ntellectual cts are necessary or

the

genesis

of

passions.

f

someone

had no idea whatsoever

f

God,

they

could

clearly

ave

no love

of God. This fact hows

hat

ognitions

rought

about

by

the

ntellect

lay

the

ndispensable

ole of

a

partial

ause.

However,

it

by

no means

proves

hat

hey

re the total r

unique

cause.40

n

addition,

38

Wodeham

as

by

nomeans

he

nly

uthor

odiscusshis

roblem.

alter

hatton,

Richard

itzralph,regory

f

Rimini,

eter

illy

nd otherslso

nalyzed

t

n

detail.

For

n

overview,

ee

A. S.

McGrade,

njoyment

t

Oxford

fter

ckham:

hilosophy,sychology,

and

he ove

f

Godin:A. Hudson

ndM. Wilks

eds.),

rom ckham

o

Wyclif,

xford

987,

63-88,ndS. Knuuttila,motionsnAncientndMedievalhilosophyn.3),275-82.

39

ecturaecundan

ibrum

rimum

ententiarum

ed.

by

R.

Wood,

t.

Bonaventure,.Y.,

1990,

ist.

,

q.

5,

§

4

(vol.

,

277):

.

prima

otitia

ruibilis,

ive ntuitiva

ive bstrac-

tiva,

ealiter

istinguitur

fruitione

iusdem,

t econtra

sta ruitio

b illa

ognitione."

40

Wodeham

rgues

hat

t is even

xcludedhat

hey

re the otal

ause,

ecause



EMOTIONS

NDCOGNITIONS

265

Wodehampointsout that"experience eachesthat we frequentlyppre-

hend

things

which we neither

hate

nor

love."41This

simple

fact

shows

that an intellectual

ognition

oes not

automatically

ause

a

passion:

we

can

simply ognize

God,

or

a

fellow

human or a material

thing,

with-

out

being

compelled

o have

any

passion.

Nor is

an

intellectual

ognition

in

itself

passion.

Otherwise

every

person

cognizing

a

certain

object

would

inevitably

e

in

a

passionate

state. The wide

diversity

f human

reactions

oward one and the

same

object

some

people

feel ove when

cognizing

certain

person,

others

do

not

clearly

shows that

passions

must not be identified ith ntellectual

ognitions.

Now Wodeham faces

a

dilemma.

On

the one

hand,

he concedes that

intellectual

ognitions

re the

partial

cause

of

passions,

nd

that

passions

comprise

a

cognitive

lement because

they

are

always

about a certain

object.

On

the other

hand,

he

rejects

n

identificationf

passions

with

cognitions

out ourt. ow are the two theses o be reconciled?Wodeham

tries o find a solution

by claiming

hat

passions

are

indeed stateswith

a

cognitive

ontent,

ut volitional tates hat are caused

partially y cog-

nitions f the intellect nd partially y the will itself. hat is whythey

are

higher-levelognitions.

n

fact,

Wodeham

presents

his second thesis

as

follows: Second

I

say

not as the

expression

f

an

assertion ut of

an

opinion

that

every

ct of

desiring

nd

hating,

nd hence

enjoyment,

is some

cognition

nd some

apprehension,

ecause

every

experience

of

an

object

s

some

cognition

f that

hing."42 bviously,

Wodeham

defends

a

strong

ognitivistosition.

Not

only

are

passions

of the

will

based

upon

(and

partially

aused

by)

a

conceptualization

f

things, assions

are

way

of

conceptualizing hings.

Therefore,

t

does not make sense to

open

a

gap between he ntellect hat s responsible or oncepts nd the will that

nothing

an

fully

ause

tself,.e.,

cognition

an

not

ully

ause

cognitive

assion.

ee

Lecturaecunda

dist.

,

q.

5,

§

4

(vol.

,

277).

41

ecturaecunda

dist.

,

q.

5,

§

4

(vol.

,

278):

Item,

xperientia

ocet

uod requenter

apprehendimusuae

nec

odimus ec

diligimus."

42

ectura

ecundadist.

,

q.

5,

§

4

(vol.

,

278):

Secundo ico non sserendoed

opinandoquod

omnis ctus

ppetendi

t

odiendi,

t ta

frui,

st

quaedam ognitio

t

quaedam

pprehensio,uia

omnis

xperientia

licuiusbiectist

uaedam

ognitio

ius-

dem."

lthough

autiouslyointing

ut hat eholds his

osition

opinando",

e

presents

it ndetailnd efendst gainston-cognitivistccounts.ote hat he cognitio"odeham

referso s not

basic

ognition.

t s

rather

cognition

hat

resupposes

basic

ogni-

tion

uppliedy

he ntellect.e makes

his learwhen

aying

n

Lectura

ecundadist.

,

q.

5,

§

6

(vol.

,

282):

.

dico

uod

ctus mandi

aturaliterausatus

equiritogni-

tionen

raeviamuae

non it mor."



266

DOMINIK

ERLER

merely auses non-cognitiveesires.Rather,the will s to be understood

as a

capacity

hat

makes use of the

concepts

uppliedby

the ntellect nd

produces

conceptualizedpassions.

Let me illustrate his

mportant oint

with a modern

example.

Suppose

that

you

meet

an

old

friend nd

are

immediately

illedwith

joy.

In

this

case,

you

do

not

only

have

a

sensory

ognition

you

see a

familiar

attern

f colors

and smell

a well-known

cent)

that

makes

you

have

the

sensory

assion

of

pleasure

or

"feeling ood".

You also

recognize

the

person

you

meet

as

your

friend

nd therefore

onceptualize

what

you

see and smell. This is what makes

you

feel

oy.

The

important oint

s

that

n

the

very

ct of

conceptualizing

our

friend

s

your

friend

ou

feel

joy.

Joy

s not to

be

separated

from his

conceptualcognition.

t

is some

form

of

cognition.

Yet it is

not a basic formof

cognition.

Otherwise,

everyone

conceptualizing

our

friend

s,

say,

the

neighbor iving

next

door

or

a

six-foot

all

person,

would feel

oy.

You need to

conceptualize

your

friend s

your

riend

r as a

good

erson

n

order

to feel

oy.

If

we understand

Wodeham's

claim

that

everypassion

"is some

cog-

nition and some apprehension" n thisway, it comes close to

what is

nowadays

known

as

the

cognitivist

heory

f emotions.

But

how then

s

the

special

way

of

cognizing

o be understood?

n

the current

ebate,

cognitivists

ive

a

clear

answer

o this

uestion.

M.

Nussbaum,

or

nstance,

claims

that emotions

re

"judgments

f

value," i.e.,

ways

of

evaluating

things

and states

of affairs.43

ollowing

this

line,

one

might nterpret

Wodeham

as

claiming

hat

passions

of

the will are

a

special

kind of

udg-

ment

a

judgment

by

which we evaluate

things

s

good

or bad

for us.

Although

Wodeham

clearly

defends

cognitivist osition,

we should

be carefulwhen appealingto udgments n a modernexplanation fhis

view.

If

one takes

a

judgment

to be

something omposed

of the

propo-

sitional ttitude

f

affirming

r

denying

nd

a

propositional

ontent

"I

affirm/deny

hat

p"),

then

Wodeham

clearly

denies that

passions

of the

will are

always

udgments.

n

his third

hesis,

he

unequivocally

ays

that

"a

volition

ne

has formed

s an

apprehending

ognition,

ot

an

assenting

one"44

nd

argues

for this

claim

as follows:

. . .

something

leasurable

can be

loved

if

it

is

apprehended

exclusively

y

a

simple,

non-complex

43

hecalls er

heory

the

ognitive-evaluative

iew";

eeM. C.

Nussbaum,

pheavals

ofThought.

he

ntelligence

f

motions

Cambridge-New

ork

001,

3.

44

ectura

ecundadist.

,

q.

5,

§

5

(vol.

,

281):

. volitio

liqua

reata

st

ognitio

apprehensiva

t

non ssensiva.

t haec

potest

sse ertia

onclusio."



EMOTIONS

ND

COGNITIONS

267

cognition. nd somethingan be loved when t is apprehendedn a com-

plex

way,

without here

being any

assent or dissent.

Therefore,

voli-

tional act is

only

an

apprehension."45

his

sounds ike

puzzling

cholastic

jargon,

but it makes

perfect

ense when we

illustrate t with the exam-

ple

I

just

mentioned.When

you

meet an old

friend,

ou

can

apprehend

her as a

friend

r as a

good erson.

his

simple apprehension,

which does

not involvethe

objective udgment

that she

really

s

a

good person she

might ppear

to be

good ust

to

you

or

ust

in

a

specific ituation),

uffices

for

a

cognitive assion.

You then

ove her as the

person you apprehendunder a certain

aspect.

And even if

you apprehend

your

friend in a

complex way",

i.e.,

by grasping

propositional

ontent,

ll

you

need to

apprehend

s that he is a

goodperson.

n

Wodeham's

terminology,

his

propositional

ontent s a

"complexe ignificabile"

hatcannot be

reduced

to

something on-complex.46

he

important oint

s

that

you

do not

have

to come

up

with the

full-fledgedudgment

"I

affirm

hat

she

is a

good

person" grasping

he

propositional

ontent

uffices. or it is

one

thing

to

grasp

such a

content,

uite

another

o

give

an

assentor dissent

o that

content.47

Wodeham

concedes that

there

may

be

judgments

n

some

cases,

and

provides

n

illustratingxample.48

f

someone is

happy

about

the death

of his

enemy,

he

does forma

judgment

n

the

very

act of

happiness,

namely

"The

enemy

s

dead",

which

ncludes an

assent to the

fact that

a certain

person,

apprehended

s

an

enemy,

s dead. It

may

be

spelled

out

as

follows:

I

affirm

hat

the

person

apprehended

as an

enemy

s

dead and

I

am

happy

about this fact."

But the

important oint

is

that

45

bid.: .

aliquid

electabile

otest

iligi

i

apprehendatur

antummodo

otitiaim-

plici

ncomplexa,

t

aliquid otest iligi

uando pprehenditur

omplexebsque

mni

assensuel

dissensu.

giturliqua

olitiost

pprehensio

antum."

46

He

presents

is

heory

f

he

complexe

ignificabile"

n

Lectura

ecundadist.

,

q.

1,

§

7-9

vol.

,

192-7).

or n

analysis

f his

heory,

ee D.

Perler,

ate

Medieval

ntologies

of

acts

in:The

Monist,

7

1994),

49-169;

.

Karger,

William

f

Ockham

Walterhatton

and

damWodehamn he

bjectsf

Knowledge

nd

elief

ivarium,

3

1995),

71-96;

. de

Libera,

a

reference

ide. héoriese

a

proposition

Paris

002,

57-226.

47

Note

hat his

istinctions not

denticalith

eneca's

amous

pposition

etween

the

irstndthe

econd

movementf n

emotion;

eeDe ira

I, iv, 1,

andthe

nalysis

providedy

R.

Sorabji,

motionnd eace

f

Mind. rom

toic

gitation

o

Christian

emptation

Oxford000, 6-75. eneca'sirst ovements nvoluntarynd merepreparationor

a

passion",

hereas

odeham's

pprehensive

motion

s an

act

of

hewill

nd onstitutes

in

tself

passion.

he distinction

etween

pprehensions

nd

udgments

s a

distinction

withinhe

ealm f

volitional

assions.

48

This s

hisfourthhesis.

ee Lectura

ecundadist.

,

q.

5,

§

5

(vol.

,

282).



268

DOMINIK

ERLER

theredoes not need to be a judgment n everycase of a cognitive as-

sion.

That

is

why

Wodeham

suggests

hat

we should

carefully

istinguish

between

a) cognitive

assions

that are

mere

apprehensions

nd

(b)

cog-

nitive

passions

that

nvolve

udgments.

This distinction

as an

important

consequence

for

the

problem

of

truth-values

f

passions,

s Wodeham

is

quick

to

point

out.49

f

one

has a

passion

of

type

a),

the content

f

the

passion

clearly

oes

not

have

a truth-value.

hus,

if

you simply

ove

your

friend

s a

good

person,

the

content

s

a

good erson

s neither

rue

nor

false.

f,

however,

omeone

udges

that

the

enemy

s dead

and

is

happy

about this

fact,

hecontent hat he

nemy

s dead s trueor false. t is

pre-

cisely

ts truth-value

hat

distinguishes

uch

a

propositional

ontent

rom

a

non-propositional

ne.

The crucial

point

s that

n

everypassion,

whether

t

involves

judg-

ment

or

not,

an

object

or

a state

of

affairs

s

apprehended

n a certain

way.

This

apprehension

s not

descriptive

ut

evaluative,

s

Wodeham's

own

example

of

ove

makes clear.

For even

if

the

loving

person

does

not

form

he

udgment

x is

a

pleasurable

thing",

he

apprehends

under

a

certain spect,namelyas something leasurable delectabik).

n

doingso,

she

clearly

evaluates

x as

having

a

positive

quality.

This differs

rom

mere

descriptive

pprehension,

n

apprehension

f

x as

being

tall or

dark,

for

instance.

This

example

shows

that

a

cognitive

passion,

though

not

being

an evaluative

udgment

n

the

strict

ense,

ncludes

an evaluative

element

that

distinguishes

t from

basic

cognitions.

This

is one

of the

main

reasons

why

a

cognitive

assion

s a

higher-level

ognition.

n hav-

ing

such

a

passion,

one

does

not

simply

describe

perceptible

eatures

f

an

object.

One

also

evaluates

the

object

as

good

or

bad,

agreeable

or

disagreeable.

In

light

of this

distinction,

e

can

draw

a

picture

with

the

following

hierarchy

f

cognitions:50

49

ee

Lectura

ecunda

dist.

,

q.

5,

§

7

(vol.

,

284-5).

50

This

icture

implyresents

he

ierarchical

tructure

ithout

aking

nto

ccount

ll

the

ossible

nterrelations

etween

he

arious

evels.

ince

uman

eings

ake imulta-

neous

seof

heir

ensory

nd ntellectual

apacities,

ctivities

n

a

higher

evel

may

ery

well

hape

hose

n

a lower

evel.

or

nstance,

he

way

we conceive

f

nd

categorize

objects

as

n

impact

n the

way

we

see

and

magine

hem.

or

hat

eason,

here

re

not nly reconceptualcts f eeingnd maginingnthe irstevelas n the aseof

brute

nimals),

ut

lso

onceptualized

nes.

ollowing

ristotle

see

An. ost.

I,

19;

OObl),

all

medieval

uthors

onceded

hat

we

do not

imply

ee

or

apprehend

ndividual

tems,

but

lso

universais

e.g.,

e ee

Callias

s a

man).

his

learlyresupposes

he

se f

on-

cepts

n the

ery

ct

of

eeing.



EMOTIONS

NDCOGNITIONS

269

sensoryognition seeingor imagining (pre-conceptual)

intellectual

ognitionapprehending

as

being

F

(conceptual

nd

descriptive)

volitional

ognition(a)

apprehending

as

beinggood/bad

conceptual

nd

evaluative)

(b)

judging

that

x

is

F

and

taking

this fact

to be

good/bad (conceptual

nd

evaluative)

To be

sure,

this

appeal

to differentevels of

cognition

was

by

no means

the standard

pproach

chosen

by

all

fourteenth-century

uthors.

Gregory

ofRimini nd PeterofAilly, or nstance, ejectedWodeham's claim that

there

re various

higher-levelognitions,

ome at the ntellectualevel

and

some at the volitional ne.

In

particular,

hey

criticized he thesis

that

passions

of the will should be treated

s forms f

apprehension.51regory

triedto

beat Wodeham with a

typically

ckhamist

weapon, namely by

appealing

to the

principle

of

parsimony.

He claimed: "He

[Wodeham]

superfluously osits

a

plurality

of

cognitions.

He

unnecessarily

and

superfluouslyosits something

s a

cognition."52

n

Gregory's

iew,

the

will does not

produce

an

additional

cognition

when it comes

up

with a

passion ikelove or hate. The intellect lready provides fullcognition,

both

descriptive

nd

evaluative,

while the will

simply

dds an affective

component.

This

reaction

o Wodeham's

analysis

hows

that

the

cognitivist

ccount

of

passions parked

heated debate about the structuref emotions. his

debate focused n the fundamental

uestion

of how

passions

can

acquire

a

cognitive

lement that

goes beyond

a mere

descriptive

ccount of

a

thing

r

a

stateof

affairs.

Whereas Wodeham tried o locate thiselement

in

a

specific

valuation,

thersdenied thatthe will s

responsible

or

uch

an element.

Consequently, hey

rejected

the

postulation

f

higher-level

cognitions.

Yet

Gregory

f Rimini's claim that the will does not

add

a

cognitive

element

ut

simply

n

affective

ne,

raises

n

important uestion.

s

there

any place

for

an

affective

omponent

n

Wodeham's

theory?

t looks as

51

ee

Gregory

f

Rimini,

ectura

uperrimum

t

ecundumententiarum.omus:

superri-

mům

rologus

tdist. -6 ed.

by

D.

Trapp

ndV.

Marcolino,

erlin-New

ork

981,

ist.

1,q. 1, 212-7; eter fAilly, ractatuse animaeditedn: O. Pluta, iephilosophische

Psychologe

es eteron

illy

Amsterdam

986,

3-4.

52

Gregory

f

Rimini,

ectura

uperrimum

t

ecundumententiarumdist.

,

q.

1

ed.

Trapp

and

Marcolino,

12):

.

superflueonit luralitatem

otitiarumt nutilitereu

uperflue

ponit liquam

em ssenotitiam."



270

DOMINIK

ERLER

ifhe were presentingn analysisof emotions hat identifies hem with

"cool-hearted"

igher-levelognitions.

or

instance,

oving

omeone

eems

to amountto

comingup

with

n

evaluation

f that

person

s

being good.

But what about

the

aspect

of

desperatelyonging

forthis

person

or feel-

ing good

when

being

with her?

Are these non-evaluative lements

miss-

ing

in

Wodeham's

theory?

Not

quite

so.

In

his

analysis

of

enjoyment,

Wodeham

emphasizes

hat beatific

njoyment

s

really leasure."53

nlike

Ockham,

he does

not

separatepleasure

<

electatiofrom ove

(<

ilectio

.

These

are

not two distinct

tates hat can but

need not co-exist.

n

Wodeham's

view,

ove or

enjoyment

lways

ncludes

pleasure

because

enjoyment

s a

state

by

which

misery

s

formally

xcluded".54

herefore,

t

hardly

makes

sense to

say

that

the devil

enjoys deceiving

human

beings

but feels

mis-

erable

about it.

If

he

really experiences

njoyment,

he

feeling

f

plea-

sure

necessarily oes

along

with

t.

Of

course,

he devil

may

have another

kind of emotion

that ncludes the

elementof

feeling

miserable.But this

emotion

would

not be

plain enjoyment

ut,

say,

sadistic

oy.)

The fact

thatWodeham

explicitly

ncludes

n affective

omponent

n

the emotion

and even considerst to be a definingeature f thatemotion, howsthat

he does

not

adopt

a

purely

ationalist

xplanation

f emotions hat

gnores

all

non-cognitive

lements.

Rather,

he offers

sophisticated xplanation,

taking

nto account

both

a

cognitive

omponent

an

evaluative

appre-

hension

or

a

judgment)

and

an affective

omponent.

n

fact,

t is the

presence

of both

components

hat

characterizes

full-fledged

motion ike

love

or

enjoyment.

or it

is neither "cool-hearted"

valuation

f

a

state

of

affairs or

a

simple

feeling,

ut

an evaluation that

includes certain

feeling.

V

I

hope

my

reconstruction

f Ockham's

and Wodeham's

account

of the

passions

makes

clear

that hese

philosophers

ook

passions

o be

thoroughly

"cognitivelyenetrated",

oth on

the

sensory

nd on the

ntellectual

evel.

In

their

view,

passions

are not

mental states

that are

somehow

opposed

to,

or isolated

from,

ognitions.

uite

to the

contrary,

either

he

genesis

53

ectura

ecunda

dist.

,

q.

6,

§

2

(vol.

,

295):

. teneo

rimo

llam onclusionem

quod

fruitioeatífica

st

ealiterelectatio."

54

ectura

ecundadist.

,

q.

6,

§

2

(vol.

,

295):

.

sola liaestfruitio

eatifica

er

quam

ormaliterxcluditur

iseria,

ic cilicet

uod

ibi

ormaliter

epugnet

iseria."



EMOTIONS

ND

COGNITIONS

271

of passions,nor their nternal tructure,an be explainedwithout n

appeal

to

cognitive

ctivities. his has an immediate

onsequence

foran

understanding

f the

relationship

etween the so-called

"cognitive"

nd

the

"appetitive"

art

of the soul. When Ockham and

Wodeham

referred

to

these

parts,

hey

did not intend o divide the soul into two

neatly ep-

arated sections.Nor did

they

want to introduce arious homunculi hat

would somehow be hidden but nevertheless ctive

in

a human

being.

Rather,

heir ntentionwas to refer o mental activities

hat

a

person per-

formswhen he or she

copes

with

complex

situations. t

is

in

fact the

coordination f various mentalactivities hat

distinguishes

person

from

a

brute

animal,

on the one

hand,

and

from n

angel,

on the other.

For

an

animal,

endowed with a

sensory

oul,

is

capable

of

having

mere sen-

sory

passions

that

enable it to behave

in

an

appropriateway.

But it is

utterly

nable to

conceptualize

he

situationwith which t is

confronted.

Consequently,

t cannothave

higher-level

assionsby

which t

would eval-

uate or assess a

given

situation.Nor

can it

try

o

conceptualize

he sit-

uation

n

various

ways,

so that t

would come

up

with different

assions.

It is a helpless ictim f tsnaturallyausedpassions.Angels, n the other

hand,

endowed with

an

intellectual

oul,

are

clearly apable

of

forming

intellectual nd volitional

cts,

and are therefore

ble to

develop

a

con-

ceptualized

passionate

attitude oward

things

with which

they

are con-

fronted.55et

angels

lack

sensory ognition

nd therefore annot

have

bodilypassions

that would

make them

cry

or

laugh.

As

fleshless

eings,

they

re condemned o have

fleshless

assions.

Occupying

middle

posi-

tion between nimals and

angels,

human

beings

have both

a

sensory

nd

an

intellectual oul. This allows them

to

bring

about lower-

and

higher-

levelpassions, .e., embodied andconceptualized motions. n fact, t was

this middle

position

on which

Ockham,

Wodeham,

and

many

other

medieval

philosophers

were

focusing

when

they

tried to

explain

human

passions.

This

enabled themto avoid

reducing

human

being

to

a

mere

bodily

reature,

ondemned o

have

naturally

aused

sensory assions,

r

to some kind of

free-floating

oul,

limited o immaterial

assions.

At this

point,

omeone

working

n

contemporary

heories

f emotions

and

influenced

y

neurobiological

esearch

may

raise

a

serious

objection.

If

Ockham and

Wodeham were

indeed

concerned with the

interplay

betweenvarious mentalactivities,nd if they ocated some of themin

55

Ockham

iscusses

ngelic assionshis

main

xample

s

love)

n

Quaestiones

ariae,

q.

6,

art.

(OTh

VIII,

257-8

nd

269-70).



272

DOMINIK

ERLER

thebody, whydid theynot analyzetheirmaterialmplementation? hy

did

they

not look

at how

they

re

present

n

the brain?

Should

an

ade-

quate theory

ot

give

detailed

xplanation

f

the

neurobiological

rocesses

that are

necessary

or the

rise

of

passions?

In

response

to this

objection,

one

could

point

out that

Ockham and

Wodeham,

like the

majority

f

later medieval

thinkers,

ertainly

id not

locate

all

mental activities

n

the

body.

Since

they

took

the intellectual

soul to be

an

entity

hat s not

subject

o

material

onditions,

hey

would

have

denied

that

there could be

a

neurobiological

xplanation

or

in

medievalterms: n

explanation

within he framework f the

physica)

f

all

the

passions.

They

were

quite

obviouslyonly

"semi-materialists"

n

their

metaphysics

f the soul.56 ut even on the

level of the

sensory

oul

and

its

activities,

hich

clearly

re

subject

o material

onditions,

ckham

and Wodeham did not

attempt

o

provide biological

r a

physical

naly-

sis,

as some of his

contemporaries

e.g.

the

members f the medical chool

of

Padova)

did for

good

reason.

For,

if

one deals with

passions,

one

should

carefully istinguish

etween

philosophical

nd

a

scientificnter-

prise. In a scientificnvestigation,ne does indeed look at the material

implementation

f

passions

nd

at

the

biological rocesses

hat re

required

for uch an

implementation.

n

the fourteenth

entury,

uch

an

investigation

would have concentrated n the

arrangement

f so-called

"ventricles"

n

the brain.

In a

philosophicalnvestigation,

owever,

ne

ought

to look at

the differentlements hat

play

a role

n

the

genesis

f

passions

nd at the

functional

mechanisms,

hich

may

be

biologically

nstantiated

n

one

way

or another.Such a functional

xplanation

must not be conflatedwith a

material

ne,

foreven

if

one has

perfect

nowledge

f the somatic

basis,

one stilloughtto explainwhathappenson this basis. And it maywell

be,

as modernfunctionalistsre keen to

point

out,

that a

certain

ype

of

passion

can have different aterial nstantiations

n

differentuman

beings.

Therefore,

Ockham's

and Wodeham's functional

xplanation

s

not

as

incomplete

s it

may

look at a first

lance.

It is an

explanation

that

appeals

(a)

to functional lements

rovidedby

the various mental activ-

ities,

nd

(b)

to functionalmechanisms hat relatethese elements o each

other. This

type

of

explanation

may help

shed

light

on the

problem

of

56

borrowhis

xpression

rom

.

Pasnau,

heories

fCognition

n he ater iddle

ges

Cambridge-New

ork

997,

6.



EMOTIONS NDCOGNITIONS

273

emotionalconflict, robablyone of the mostbewildering roblemswe

are

confronted

ithwhen

trying

o

cope

withemotions. et me

highlight

this

dvantageby

returning

o the

example

mentioned t the

verybegin-

ning

of this

paper.

I

asked

you

to

imagine

the case of a friendwho had left

you

without

any

explanation

nd

reappeared

fter

couple

of

years.

When she shows

up,

you

are

likely

o react withmixed emotions:

you

are

pleased, angry,

and

you may

also feel

guilty.

How is this

possible?

How can

you

have

both

positive

nd

negative

emotions?

Using

Ockham's and

Wodeham's

functional

model,

one could

give

the

following xplanation.

The

sensory

cognition ou

have when

seeing

your

friend

mmediately

auses the

sensory

passion

of

pleasure, passion

that arises

naturally.

et at the

same

time,

your

ntellect onceives f

your

friend

s

someone who had left

you

with-

out

any

warning.

This

triggers our

will,

which evaluates

the friend s

an

unreliable,

r even

a

betraying,

erson

and

brings

bout the

passion

of

anger.

Your intellect lso conceives of

yourself

s

a

person

who did

not

try

o remain

n

contactwith

your

friend. his

makes

your

will eval-

uate

yourself

s an

unreliable

r

betraying erson

as

well; consequently,

you

feel

guilty.

Given the

simultaneous

resence

of

all

these

acts,

you

have all

three

passions

at once. And

you

are

in

an

emotional conflict

because the three

passions,

based on

different

ognitions

nd

evaluations,

oppose

each other.

It was this

possibility

f conflict hat ate

medieval

philosophers

anted

to

point

out

in

their

functional

xplanation:

different

ognitionsplay

differentausal roles

in

the mechanismof

the

mind,

and

consequently,

they

give

rise to different

assions.

Their intention as

not

simply

o dis-

solve emotionalconflict y claimingthat,say, the will as a higherfac-

ulty

perfectly

ontrols ll

the

passions

and

unifies hem.

They

admitted,

of

course,

that the will has a

certain

rulingpower,

and

in

their heories

of

virtues,

hey ssigned

o it

the task of

bringing

bout the best

possible

higher-level

assions,

which

would become

some kind of second

nature

and

influence he

genesis

of our

sensory

passions.

Yet

they

nsisted n

the

fact that the

so-called

ower-level

assions

should

not be

neglected.

The

will

is not a

magic power

that

could,

or

should,

make the

sensory

passions

disappear.

Nor can it

arrange

all

the

higher-level

assions

n

a

harmoniousway. It is just one capacity of the soul that cooperates

with other

capacities

to

bring

about a

multitude f

passions passions

that

may

be

in

conflictwith

each other.

One can do

justice

to the



274

DOMINIK

ERLER

complexemotional ife of a persononlyifone acknowledges he possi-

bility

f such

a

conflict nd

if

one tries o

analyze

the elements hat

play

a

role

in

this conflict.57

Berlin

Humboldt-niversität

57

Earlier ersions

fthis

aper

were

resented

t the

Universitée

Montréal,

aint

Louis

University,

nd

Washington

niversity.

am

grateful

o the

udience

n all

three

places

or

timulating

uestions

ndcriticalemarks.



KoranundKonziliarismus.nmerkungenum Verhältnis

von

Heymericus

e

Campo

und

Nikolaus

onKues

FLORIANHAMANN

Abstragt

This

paper

deals with he relation

etweenNicholasof Cusa and the Dutch

philosopher

eymericus

e

Campo.

Nicholas

s celebrated orhis rather

os-

itive ttitude owards slam.

n

De

pace

idei 1453)

he

presents

he visionof

una

religio

n rituumarietatend

in

his Cribratio

lkorani

1460/61)

Nicholas ries

to

prove

Christian

ogmas

on the basis of the Koran. This

idea he had dis-

cussedwithhis

Dutch friend everal ecades earlier.

n

his

Disputatio

e

potes-

tate

cclesiastica

1433/34)Heymeric

crutinizes

he

question,

hetherhe

highest

authority

n

the

church

elongs

o the

pope

or the

council,

n the basis of

the Koran. He

presents

en

arguments

n

favour

f the

council nd one

in

favour f thepope. This shows hatNicholasdeveloped artsofhisexcep-

tional

hought

n

conversation ith

Heymeric

nd

suggests

hat closer xam-

ination f

Heymeric's

extswill reveal new

side

of

the

young

Cusanus.

I. War

Heymerich

erLehrer

es Cusanus?

Rudolf Haubst

und Eusebio Colomer

haben

in

ihren bis

heute

einflussreichentudien

Heymericus

e

Campo

als den Lehrer

des Nikolaus

von Kues

bezeichnet,

der das Denken

des Albertus

Magnus

und

des

Raimundus Lullus sowie die Theorien der theologiaircularisnd der

Koinzidenz

n

seinenSchüler

vermitteltabe.1Beide

verstehen

eymerich

dabei

nicht ls

originellen

enker,

sondern

bloß als Vermittler.

olomer

1

R.

Haubst, lbert,

ieCusanushn

ah,

n: G.

Meyer/A.

immermann

Hg.),

Albertus

Magnus

Doctor

niversalis280/1980Mainz

980

Walberger

tudien

).

Ders.,

as Bild

des inennd

reieinenottesnderWeltach

ikolaus

on

uesTrier

952.

ers.,

¡um.

ortleben

Albertses

Großen

ei

Heymerich

on

amp

nd

ikolaus

on uesin:

Studia lbertina.

estschrift

für

ernhard

eyer

um

0.

Geburtstage

Münster

952

BGPhThMA

upplementband)

420-47.

ers.,

er

unge

usanus

ar m

Jahre

428

zu

Handschriften-Studien

n

Pans in:

MitteilungenndForschungsbeiträgeerCusanus-Gesellschaft,4 (1980),198-205.

E.

Colomer,

ikolaus

on

ues nd aimundlull. us

Handschriften

er

ueseribliothek

Berlin

1961.

Ders.,

u

dem

ufsatz

on

udolf

aubst

Der

unge

usanus

ar m

Jahre

428

u

Handschriften-Süidien

n

aris ,

n:

Mitteilungen

nd

orschungsbeiträge

er

usanus-Gesellschaft,

15

1982),

7-70.

©

Koninklijke

rill

V,

Leiden,

005

Vivarium

3,2

Also vailable

nline

www.brill.nl



276

FLORIAN AMANN

schreibt:Dabei darfman deneigentlichenhilosophischenangHeimerics

nicht überschätzen.

Auch wenn

ihm

die

logische

und

systematische

Denkkraft icht

ehlt,

leibt ein

Denken dennoch

m

Großen und Ganzen

dem

Epigonentum

der

spätmittelalterlichen

hilosophie

verhaftet.

er

Eigenart

eines

Denkens

entsprechend

st die Rolle des

Heimeric

n

Bezug

auf Cusanus

die

philosophisch

escheidenere,

edoch geschichtlich

icht

unfruchtbare

ines Vermittlers

ewesen. 2

Die Vermitder-These

tützt ich auf die

Tatsache,

dass sich

Cusanus

1425

an der Kölner

Universität

mmatrikulierte,

n der auch

Heymerich

lehrte.3Doch ist es zumindest

diskussionswürdig,

b man aus dem

Immatrikulationsvermerk

on

1425

tatsächlich en

Schluss ziehen

darf,

Cusanus

sei ein Student

des niederländischen

enkers

gewesen.

nteres-

santerweise

istetHermann

Keussen,

der

die Kölner Matrikellisten

dierte,

Cusanus

unter den

Juraprofessoren

uf.4

Es muss also zunächst

der

Bildungsgang

eider Denker

verglichen

werden.

Nikolaus on

Kues

war 1401

geboren

worden,

erbrachte

as

Studienjahr

1416/

75 an der

Universität

eidelberg

und studierte on

1417 bis

14236

in Padua Kirchenrecht. bendorterwarb

Cusanus

14237

den

Titel des

doctor ecretorum

unter

dem er

sich auch

in

Köln immatrikulierte.

abei

wurden

hm

aufgrund

es

Ansehens einer

Person

{ob

reverentiam

ersonae)

die

Immatrikulationsgebühren

rlassen,

wie das bei

hochgestellten

Persönlichkeiten

blich

war.8 Der Titel

des doctor

ecretorumrhob den

Träger

in

eine

adelsähnliche

wenn

auch nicht

delsgleiche

tellung.

Der

Erwerb

des

Titels

in

Norditalien

unterschied en

Spitzenjuristen

om

Durchschnittsjuristen,

er nördlich

der

Alpen

studiert

atte.9 omit bot

der

Titel des

doctor

ecretorum

esonders für

reiche

Bürgersöhne

gute

2

E.

Colomer,

ikolaus

on

Kues nd

Heimericanden

Veldein:

Mitteilungen

nd

Forschungsbeiträge

er

Cusanus-Gesellschaft,

(1964),

98-213,

es.213.

3

E. Meuthen

Hg.),

Acta usana.

uellen

ur

ebensgeschichte

es

Nikolaus

on

ues,

d.

1,

Lieferung

(1401-1437

ai

17),

Hamburg

976,

Nr.

25,

9:

„Nycolaus

e Cusa

doctor

in

iure

anonico

reuerensis

yocesis.

ihil edit

b reverenciam

ersone,

ed uravit

complete.

4

H. Keussen

Hg.),

ie

Matrikeler

niversitätölnBd.

1

1378-1475),

onn

28,

ND

Düsseldorf

979,

Nr.

44,

72*.

5

AC

I

(s.o.,

Anm.

),

Nr.

11,

3.

6

AC I

(s.o.,

nm.

),

Nr.

15-18,

f. ür

ie rsten

tudienjahre

nPadua

ibt

s keine

gesichertenelege.7

AC

I

(s.o.,

Anm.

),

Nr.

18,

.

8

R.C.

Schwinges,

ie

Zulassung

ur

Universität,

nW.

RüeggHg.),

eschichte

er niversität

in

Europa

Bd.

1

(Mittelalter),

ünchen

993,

72-4.

9

P.

Moraw,

ber

elehrteuristen

m

pätmittelalter

in:

.

Petersohn

Hg.),

Mediaevalia

ugiensia.



KORAN NDKONZILIARISMUS

277

Chancen, in der spätmittelalterlichenirche Karriere zu machen. Da

Nikolaus

von Kues

bürgerlicher bstammung

ar,

wäre

ihm

ohne diesen

Titel die steile

Karriereverwehrt

ewesen,

die

ihn

bis zum Kardinal und

Bischof

on Brixen führen ollte.

Heymericus

e

Campo

indes wurde um 1395

in

Son bei Eindhoven

in

den

heutigen

Niederlanden

geboren,

tudierte

n

Paris die artes

owie

die

Theologie

und immatrikulierteich

1422

an

der UniversitätKöln.

1423

wurde er baccalaureus

iblicus,

424

baccalaureusententiarius

1425

bac-

calaureus

ormatus

nd

1428

schließlich

magisterheologiae

10Obwohl

Heymerich

etwa sechs

Jahre

älter als Cusanus war,

erlangte

r erst mehrere

ahre

nach

ihm

die

Promotion,

a das Studium

der

Theologie

üblicherweise

länger

dauerte ls das der

Rechtswissenschaft.

m

Vergleich

u dem

Titel

des doctorecretorum

röffneteer

magister

heologiae

auptsächlich

ie Chance

auf eine

Universitätskarriere,

ie

sie auch

Heymerich

n

Köln

und

später

in

Löwen

gelingen

ollte.

Aus dem

Vergleich

beider

Ausbildungswege

uss

festgehalten

erden:

Cusanus

besaß

im

Jahre

1425

eine

soziale

Stellung,

ie der

des

Heymericus

de

Campo

mindestens

benbürtigwar. ErichMeuthen hat bereits1964

darauf

hingewiesen,

ass Cusanus kein

gewöhnlicher

tudent

war,

son-

dern

aller Wahrscheinlichkeit

ach

in

Köln

Juravorlesungen

ielt.11 as

Verhältnis

eider ueinander ollte lso

eher als

kollegialer

ustausch der

intellektuellereundschaft

ewertet

werden.

Dennoch ist die

These,

Heymerich

ei

der Lehrer des Cusanus

gewe-

sen,

keineswegs

bwegig,

denn die

intellektuelle

iographie

des Nikolaus

von

Kues weist eine

Lücke auf: Cusanus

studierte

ediglich

in

Jahr

die

artes n

Heidelberg

und sechs

Jahre

Kirchenrecht

n

Padua. Ob er

in

diesenJahrendie Zeit und die Möglichkeit esaß, sich derartprofunde

philosophische

nd

theologische

Kenntnisse

nzueignen,

wie sie für die

Abfassung

on

De

docta

gnorantia

rforderlich

ind,

st

unklar.

Doch besteht

zwischendem

Ende seines Studiums n

Italien im

Jahre

1423

und der

Abfassung

on

De

docta

gnorantia

440 eine

Lücke von immerhin 7

Jahren.

Forschungen

ur

Geschichtees

Mittelalters.

orgelegt

on en

Mitgliedern

es

Konstanzer

rbeitskreises

flir

mittelalterliche

eschichte

Stuttgart

001,

25-47.

10

.

Meuthen,

ölner

niversitätsgeschichte

Bd. 1

Die

alte

Universität),

öln/Wien

988,

187-9..-D. avigioli,es crits'HeymericuseCampo1 95- 60) ur esœuvres'Aristoe,n:

Freiburger

eitschriftlir

hilosophie

nd

heologie,

8

1981),

93-371,

es.

96ff.

eussen

1928

s.o.,

Anm.

),

Rektoratr.

132,

mmatrikulationr.

124,

40.

11

.

Meuthen,

as

Triererchismaon

430

uf

em

asler

onzil.

ur

ebensgeschichte

es

Nikolaus

on

ues

Münster

964,

8f.



278

FLORIAN AMANN

In dieser Zeit unterhielt usanus tatsächlich inen engen Kontakt zu

Heymerich.

Beide

kannten sich nicht allein von der Universität

Köln,

sondern

nahmen

zeitgleich

on Ende

1432

bis zum

Frühjahr

1435 am

Basler Konzil

teil,12

o dass ein intellektuellerustauschvon

wenigstens

zehn

Jahren

anzunehmen

st. Hiervon

zeugen

die Basler Schriften es

Heymericus

e

Campo,

wie

sie

in

der

ehemaligen

ibliothek es

Nikolaus

von

Kues bis auf den

heutigenTag

erhalten ind.13

Da

die

biographischen

aten zu einem

zwiespältigem

rgebnis

ühren,

vermag

llein

ein inhalüicher

Vergleich

das Verhältnis

eider Denker zu

erhellen. abei müssenThemen

ausgewählt

werden,die fürbeideDenker

gleichermaßen pezifisch

ind.

n

wenigstens

rei Gebieten

ragen

die bei-

den

Philosophen

gemeinsam

us der

Masse der Denker des

frühen15.

Jahrhunderts

eraus:

Das erste ist die

Lullrezeption,

die bereits

von

Colomer untersucht

orden

st. Leider

hat er dabei die

Frage weitgehend

übergangen,

elche

Bedeutung

en lullschen

berlegungen

n

Heymerichs

eigenem

Denken zukommt.14

weitens

verfügen

eide

Philosophen

über

eine

geometrische

heologie.

Heymerich

ezeichnet

eine

theo

ogia iguralis

auch als sigillumeternitatisnd behandeltsie

in

wenigstens

ier seiner

BaslerSchriften.15

er niederländische

enkerdürfte

er

einzige

cholastiker

des

Spätmittelalters

ein,

der

eine

eigene

geometrische

heologie

entwik-

kelte.

Die

Untersuchung

ieser

Fragestellungen

ürde tief

n

Heymerichs

Denken

einführen,

was an dieser

Stelle

nicht

geleistet

werden

kann.16

Drittens

rezipieren

beide

Denker den

Koran. Letzteres

cheintvorerst

keine

Eigentümlichkeit

u

sein,

denn unter em

Eindruck es

Vormarsches

12

Vgl.

Für

Heymericus)

.

Keussen,

ie

Stellung

er niversität

ölnm

roßen

chisma

nd

zuden eformkonzilienes 5.Jahrhundertsin:Annalen esHistorischenereinsür en

Niederrhein,

15

1929),

25-54.

FürNvK)

Meuthen964

s.o.,

Anm.

1).

13

Bernkastel-Kues,

usanus-Hospital,

06.

eschreibung

es

Cod.Cus.106 n:

Heymericus

de

Campo,

pera

electa

,

hg.

vonR.

Imbach nd

P.

Ladner,

reiburg/

chweiz

001,

20/21.

14

Colomer

961

s.o.,

Anm.

),

5-46;

ers. 964

s.o.,

Anm.

),

198-213.

15

Heymericus

e

Campo,

ractatuse

igillo

ternitatisin:

Opera

electa

(s.o.,

Anm.

3),

99-128.

.

Ladner,

erAblass-Traktat

es

Heymericus

e

Campo.

in

Beitrag

ur

Geschichte

es

Basler

onzils

in:

Zeitschrift

ür chweizerische

irchengeschichte,

1

(1977),

54,

138.

Zudem ehandelt

r

sie noch

n

seiner

isputatio

e

potestate

cclesiastica

nd

n

den

vier

Figuren,

ie derCod. Cus.

106

enthält.ine

Teileditionieser exte

wird ls

Anhang

meiner

issertationitveröffendicht

erden.

ußerdem

reifteymerich

ie

iegelthematik

nochmalsnden 0er ahrenes15.Jahrhundertsuf. gl. . Burie,roeveotnventarisatie

van e

n

handschrift

f

ndrukewaarde

erkenan

e euvense

heologieprofessoren

it

eXVe euw

in:Facultas

.

Theologiae

ovaniensis

432-1797,

EThL

5

(1977),

30.

16

ies

stder

Gegenstand

einer issertation

it em

Titel:

as

Siegel

er

wigkeit.

Universalwissenschaft

nd

onziliarismus

ei

Heymericus

e

Campo.

er

vorliegende

ufsatzst




279

der Osmanen wurden seit den späten40erJahrendes 15.Jahrhunderts

diverse chriftenum

Islam

verfasst. och

Heymerichs

useinandersetzung

mit dem

Koran datiertbereits us dem

Jahre

1433 und ist damit viele

Jahre

älter als alle anderen bekannten

eugnisse

der

Koranrezeption

es

15.

Jahrhunderts,

umindest oweit ie aus der Basler

Theologengeneration

stammen.17 udem weist Nikolaus von Kues

in

seiner Cribratiolkorani

darauf

hin,

er habe

den Koran auf dem Basler

Konzil kennen

gelernt.18

So

ergibt

ich ein direkter

usammenhang

wischender

Koranrezeption

beider Denker.

Um

eine

vergleichendeUntersuchung

u

ermöglichen,

werden zunächst die

Grundüberlegungen

er cusanischen Auseinan-

dersetzung

mit dem Islam

dargelegt.

Die

Forschung

hat sich intensiv

hiermit

eschäftigt,

o dass ich

mir

nur

einige Anmerkungen

rlaube.19

II. Cusanus ndder slam

Nikolaus on Kues verfasstee

pace idá

kurznach dem Fall

Konstantinopels

am

29.

Mai

1453.

Darin

wird ein

Mann

geschildert,

er

die

prachtvolle

Stadtmiteigenen Augen gesehenhatte. Als dieser Mann die Nachricht

vom

Sieg

der

Osmanen und deren

angeblicher

Gräueltaten

ernommen

hatte,

verfiel r ins Grübeln und

flehteGott an. Darauf wurde

ihm

die

Schau

(visio)

ines himmlischen

eligionsgespräches

uteil.20

ufgrund

er

Leiden der

Religionskriege

abe der

Allmächtige

ie

Weisen aller Völker

eineVorstudieu einer mfassenderen

ntersuchung

er

Koranrezeption

m

Kontext

seines

hilosophischen

enkens.

17

Vgl.

F.

Hamann,

er

Koranls

kklesiologische

utoritätei

Heymericus

e

Campo

f 1460),

in:Freiburgereitschriftür hilosophiendTheologie,0 (2003), 50-62.18

Nikolauson

Kues,

Cribratiolkorani

hg.

v.

Ludwig agemann,

VIII,

Hamburg

1986,

rologus,

.

2,

5:

„Feci

uampotui iligentiam

ntelligendi

ibrum

egis

Arabum

quem

uxta

ranslationem

er

Petrumbbatem luniacensem

obis

rocuratam

asileae

habui um

disputatione

orum

obilium

rabum,

uorum

nus

ociusMahumetiisus

fuit lium

rahere,

ui

doctior

t

magnus

nter rabes hristianam

idem,

uam

elose

coluit,

stendit

otius

enendam.

19

.

Hagemann,

er

Kur3n n Verständnisnd ritik

ei

Nikolaus

on ues. in

Beitrag

ur

Erhellung

slamisch-christlicher

eschichteFrankfurt.

M. 1976.W. A.

Euler,

nitas

nd ax.

Religionsvergleich

ei

Raimundusullusnd

ikolaus

on ues

Würzburg

990.

20

NvK,

e

pace

idei,g.

v. R.

Klibansky

ndH.

Bascour, VII,

Hamburg

959, 1,

3f:

Fuit

x

hiis,

uae apud

Constantinopolimroxime

aevissimecta

per

Turkorum

regemivulgabantur,uidamir eloDei accensus,ui oca llarumegionůmliquando

viderat,

t

pluribusemitibus

raret mnium

reatorem

uodpersecutionem,

uae

ob

diversum

itům

eligionům

lus

olito

aevit,

ua

pietate

oderaretur.cciditt

post

ies

aliquot,

ortex

diuturnaontinuata

editatione,

isio

uaedam

idem

eloso

manifestaretur,

ex

qua

elicuit

uod aucorum

apientum

mniumaliumiversitatum

uae

n

religionibus



280

FLORIAN AMANN

und Religionenzu einem himmlischen onzil (inconcilioxcelsorumher-

beigerufen.21

nter

dem Vorsitz des verbum

ollten sie

die

Religions-

streitigkeiten

iskutieren,

ie

den

Anlass u so

viel Leid

gaben.

m

Gespräch

sollte

die

Wahrheit um

Vorschein

kommen,

ass der

innerste

inn aller

Religionen

dentisch st und bloß

die Riten

voneinander

bweichen,

es

also nur

religio

na n rituum

arietate

äbe.22

Die Weisen

aller Völker

disku-

tieren

nun unter

dem

Vorsitz

des

verbum

ie

wichtigsten

laubensthemen.

Die

Argumentation

ller

Vertretertützt ich dabei allein auf die

Vernunft

und nicht

uf

Autoritäten,

enn

Cusanus vertrittie

Auffassung,

ass allen

Religionen eigentlich er gleiche

christlich-platonische

ehalt zu

Eigen

ist.23 us

diesem

Grundebezeichnet

usanus den Vorsitzenden es himm-

lischen

Konzils

nicht

als

Christus,

ondern

als verbumum

aufzuzeigen,

dass

es

sich

um

das

allen

Religionengrundlegende

rinzip

des

göttlichen

Wortes handle.

Am

Ende

schließlich ekennen

ich

alle

Teilnehmer u

dem

Konsens,

dass tatsächlich lle

Religionen

n

ihrem Gehalt überein-

stimmen nd dass sich

lediglich

die Riten

unterscheiden.24

Im Winter

1460/61

verfasste usanus

schließlich eine Cribratiolkorani.

In der

„Siebung

des

Korans

versucht Cusanus

den Koran auf das

Evangelium

hin zu

„sieben .25

ie

Wahrheitdes

Evangeliums

oll aus

per

orbem bservantur

eritia

ollentium

nam

osse

acilem

uandam

oncordantiam

reperiri,

c

per

am n

religione

erpetuam

acem

onvenientic veraci

medio onstitui.

21

NvK,

De

pace

idei

I

2,

4:

„Raptus

st

nim

d

quandam

ntellectualem

ltitudinem,

ubi

quasi

nteros

qui

vita

xcesserunt

xamen uiusceei

n

concilio

xcelsorum,

rae-

sidente

unctipotenti,

tahabitůmst.

22

NvK,

De

pace idei

I

6,

7:

„Si

sicfacere

ignaberis,

essabit

ladius

t

odii

ivor,

t

quaeque

mala;

t

cognoscent

mnes

uomodo

on stnisi

eligio

na

n

rituumarietate.

23

Vgl.K. Flasch, ikolauson ues. eschichteinerntwicklung.orlesungenur inflihrungin eine

hilosophie

Frankfurt/Main

998,

30-82.

24

NvK,

De

pace idei,

IX

68,

62:

„Postquam

um

apientibus

ationum

aec

ie

per-

tractata

unt,

rodueti

unt

ibri

lurimi

orum

ui

de

veterumbservantiis

cripsere,

t

in

omni

inguauidem

xcellentes,

t

pud

atinos arcus

arro,

pud

Graecosusebius

qui religionům

iversitatem

ollegit,

t

plerique

lii.

Quibus

xaminatis

mnem iversi-

tatem

n

ritibus

otius

ompertum

stfuisse

uam

n

unius ei

cultura,

uem

b initio

omnes

raesupposuisse

emper

t

n

omnibusulturisoluissex omnibus

cripturis

n

unum

ollectis

eperiebatur,

icet

implicitasopularisaepe er

dversamenebrarum

rin-

cipis

otestatem

bducta on dverteret

uid

geret.

onclusa

st

gitur

n

caelo ationis

concordia

eligionům

odo

uo

praemittitur.

25

NvK,

Cribratio

lkorani

Prologus,

.

10,

1

f:

„Intentio

utem ostrast

praesuppo-

sito vangeliohristiibrum ahumetiribraretostenderella n pso tiamibro aberi,

per

uaeevangelium,

i

attestatione

ndigeret,

alde

onfirmaretur,

t

quod,

bi

dissentit,

hoc x

gnorantia

t

consequenter

x

perversitate

ntenti ahumetivenissehristoon

suam

loriam

ed dei

patris

t hominum

alutem,

ahumeto

eronondei

gloriam

t

hominum

alutem

ed

gloriam

ropriam

uaerente.



KORAN

ND

KONZILIARISMUS

281

dem Koran herausbewiesenwerden.26s handelt ich also um eine beson-

ders

usgeklügelte

hristliche

pologie,

ie den

Koran

nichtmitVäterzitaten

oder mit

Vernunftargumenteniderlegen

will,

ondern ich auf die höch-

ste Autoritätder Muslime selbst stützt.

Entsprechend

st der Tonfall

vergleichsweise

onziliant,

uch wenn

gewisse polemische Äußerungen

nichtfehlen.Dieses

Unterfangen

etztfreilich

oraus,

dass die

christliche

Botschaft wenn auch entstellt

im

Koran

durchscheint. it der

gesamten

mittelalterlichenradition erstand usanusden Islam nicht ls

eingeständige

oder

gar

neue

Religion,

ondern ls

christliche äresie. Cusanus erzählt

die klassische hristlicheolemik,wonachMuhammad den Koran unter

dem Einfluss es verstoßenenMönches

Sergius

und

von

Juden

aus der

Bibel

kompiliert

abe.

Es

handle sich somitum eine

nestorianisch

eprägte

christliche äresie.27Tatsächlich

handelt der Koran

an

vielen Stellen

von

Jesus

und

Maria,

was erst die

cusanische

Interpretationsstrategie

erlaubt.28

III. Die

Koranrezeption

ei

Heymerich

Heymerich

chrieb seine

Disputatio

e

potestate

cclesiasticawischen

April

1433 und Februar 1434 auf dem

Basler Konzil.

Er

erörtert ie

damals

aktuelle

Streitfrage,

b

dem Generalkonzil der dem

Papst

die oberste

Gewalt

in

der Kirche zusteht.Zunächst

werden die

Argumente

ür

die

Superiorität

des

Generalkonzils

angeführt,

nschließend die für die

Superiorität

es

Papstes

nd

n

der Determinatioird

die

Streitfrage

chließlich

entschieden.29

26

NvK,

Cribratiolkorani

Prologus,

.

4,

7:

„Ego

vero

ngenium

pplicui,

t

etiam x

Alkorano

vangelium

erum

stenderem..

27

NvK,

ribratio

lkorani,

lius

rologus,

.

11,

13:

Refert

obilis

lle

Arabs

hristianus,

de

quo upra

memini,

ergium

onachum

e monasteriouo iectum

echam

pplicuisse

ibique

uos

opulosepperisse

dolatrast udaeos

raedicasseque

bidemidem

hristianam,

prout

estoriusllam

enuit,

t fratresuos llius

ectae

lacaret

d

gratiam,

t omnes

idolatrasonvertissed fidem

uam,

nter

uos

Mahumetus

rat,

ui

conversuse idola-

tria

mortuusst hristianus

estorianus.edtres stutissimi

udaei e

Mahumetumoniun-

xerunt,

t

psum

verterent,

e

perfectus

ieret,

t

illi

uaseruntaria

mala.Post ero

mortemahumeti

mnibusd suam ectam

evertentibus

lli

udaei

ccesseruntalifilium

Habitalip,uiMahumetusuas ollectionesimisit,tpersuaserunti,ut icutMahumetus

itaet

pse

e

in

prophetam

levaret,

t

apposuerunt

t

deposuerunt

e libro

Mahumeti,

quae

voluerunt.

28

ur

usanischen

oranhermeneutik,

.

Hagemann

976

s.o.,

Anm.

9),

9ff.

29

Hamann

003

s.o.,

Anm.

7),

152ff.



282

FLORIAN AMANN

Obwohl die Disputatiour eine sehrenge Fragestellungehandelt, ählt

sie

samt den

Anhängen

an

die 100

fol.,

denn

Heymerich

versucht ie

Superioritätsfrage

uf

möglichst

reitem

Fundament u untersuchen.

s

ist sein erklärtes

iel,

hierzu lle Wissenschaften

nd

Gegenstandsbereiche

heranzuziehen:

das

Trivium,

das

Quadrivum,

die

Hauptwissenschaften,

die ars

generalis

ulls und schließlich eine

eigene

Universalwissenschaft.30

Doch

Heymerich reift

och weiter us und versucht ie

Superioritätsfrage

schließlich

ogar

auf der

Grundlage

des

Korans zu erörtern. er Koran

wird damit

zu einer

ekklesiologischen

utorität

ufgewertet,

ine

Stellung

die kein ndererAutordes Mittelaltersem Koran

zubilligte.31

m Einzelnen

listet

Heymerich

ehn

Argumente

ür die

Superiorität

es Konzils

auf;

ein weiteres

Argument

ür die

Superiorität

es

Papstes

findet ich unter

den

propäpstlichen

yllogismen.

1. Laut dem Koran

sei ein

Heilsgesetz

umso

besser,

e

mehr es den

Kräften

der

Gläubigen angepasst

st,

die

jenem

Gesetz

unterliegen.

a

dies eher auf das

Generalkonzil

ls auf den

Papst

zutreffe,

ebühre

der

Synode

die

Superiorität

ber den obersten

Pontifex. ies

ergibt

ich aus

dem Selbstverständnises Generalkonzils, onach es die gesamteKirche,

alle

Gläubigen

also,

repräsentiert.

as Konzil

als

gesetzgebende

Gewalt

ist demnach

mit den

Gläubigen,

die seiner

Gesetzgebung

unterliegen,

zumindest endenziell

dentisch.

Der

Papst

indes unterscheidetich von

den

übrigen

Gläubigen,

die seiner

Rechtsprechung

nterstehen.

olglich

ist die

Übereinstimmung

ei

dem Generalkonzil

rößer

ls beim

Papsttum,

woraus

dessen

Superiorität

esultiert.32

30

DieDisputatioe otestatecclesiasticairdlsDPEzitiert.ine rsteranskriptionindetsich uch n: Hamann 003

s.o.,

Anm.

7),

160-2.

PE,

Cod. Cus.

106,

fol.

158r,

Z.

27-31:

.

et

sicde aliis

rius er

discursum

eptem

rcium

iberalium,

rtis

ullii,

artis

mee,

ue

dicitur

igillum

ternitatis,

t

utriusque

uris

ecnon

er

uctoritatesacre

pagine

ssumptis,ue,

i ad

medium

evocentur,

edum

omparabitur

umerus

acionum

pro apa

dduci

ossibilium

acionibus

reinductusro

oncilio

enerali,

edhabundanter

excrescerent.

31

mUnterschiedu

fastllen

oraninterpretationen

es

Mittelalters

erfolgt

eymerich

hierkein

pologetisches

nteresse.

um

polemischen

rundton

erchristlichen

us-

einandersetzung

it em slam

m

Mittelalter,

. N.

Daniel,

slamnd he

West.he

Making

of

n

mage,dinburgh

960.

32

DPE,

Cod.

Cus.

106,

ol.

116r,

.

21-8:

Ad

dem

otestrgui

d hominem

x

Alchoranoachometi,nquodicitur,uod ex alvacionisroporcionatairibusecipien-

cium st

melior

uam, ue

non st alis. ed

certum

st,

uod

excanonica

onciliorum

generalium

st

cclesie niversali

alubrior

uam

ex

apostolicaape,

um

uia

divinior

utputa

mmediate

rocedens

providencia

piritus

ancti,

um

uia

universalior

tputa

regulans

apam

t uos

ubiectost

procedensque}

ex udicio

lurium

apientum

inodaliter




283

2. Der zweite yllogismuseht uf dieAussagedes Koranszurück,wonach

das

evangelische

Gesetz Christi die

Rechtleitung,

das Licht und die

Wahrheit ist. Der Koran stützt also das

Evangelium

und laut dem

Evangelium

musszwischen en versammeltennd den einzelnen

Aposteln

unterschieden erden. Petrus

st

zwar der erste der

Apostel,

doch ist er

selbstder Gemeinschaft er

Aposteluntergeordnet.

benso untersteht

er

Papst

als obersterRichterdem

Generalkonzil.33

3.

Im

dritten

Argument

tützt

ich

Heymerich

auf die mittelalterliche

Überzeugung,

ass der Koran eine häretische

ompilation

us

dem Alten

und Neuen Testament sei. Dadurch

impliziert

der Koran auch die

Auffassung,

ass die beiden

Testamente zusammen heilsamerund voll-

kommener ind als eines der beiden

Testamente

für sich allein.

Die

Autoritätdes

Generalkonzils,

cánones u

erlassen,

beruht auf beiden

Testamenten. as

apostolische

Gesetz des

Papstes edoch

stützt ich allein

auf

das

Neue

Testament.

Heymerich

eduziert as

päpstliche

Gesetz auf

die

Verpflichtung

ur

Pastoralfürsorge,

ndem er

Jo

21,

17 zitiert:

asce

oves

meas.34

4. Nach dem vierten chluss st dasjenigeGesetz vorzuziehen, as uni-

versaler

st,

ndem es viele

Menschen zum Heil führt. ies trifftuf das

kanonischeGesetz des Generalkonzils

u,

weshalb

hm

auch ein höherer

Rang gebührt

ls

dem

Papsttum.

Aus der

Universalität es Generalkonzils

resultiertuch seine

Legitimation

ur

Streitvorbeuge, etzerbekämpfung

und Sittenreform.a

Friede,

Glaube und Reformdie drei

Aufgaben

des

Basler Konzils

waren,

führt

Heymerich

uch sie über den

Mittelbegriff

der Universalität uf den Koran zurück.35

congregatorumt siedealiis, tpredictumst. rgo egitimauetoritasonciliieneralisest

ocior

uam otestasegitima

edis

postolice.

33

DPE,

Cod. Cus.

106,

ol.

16r,

.

28-31:

Ad

dem n

eodem lchorano

abetur,

quod

ex

ewangelica

esu,

ilii

Marie,

st

direccio,

ux

et Veritas

anifesta.ed

in

illa

habetur,

uod postoli

cclesiasticeollectiunt

udices

ingulorum

eorsum

elinquencium,

inter

uos

stPetrus

rimusapa.Ergo

dem,

uodprius.

34

DPE,

Cod.Cus.

106,

ol.

16r,

.

32-7:

Ad

dem

n

eodem

abetur,

uod

ex oni-

uneta x

ege

eteri

t

nova,

uius icit sse

egem

Machometi,

ediocriter

omplexa

st

perfeccior

t alubrior

uam

lteraantum.ed

ex,

x

qua

formantur

ánones

onciliorum

generalium,

on

st antum

wangelica,

ed ciam eteris

estamenti,

icut

atet

iffusen

volumineeere

orum,

ex

utem

postolica

ape

nnititurumtaxat

egi

nove,

tputa

llis

verbis

hristi:

asce

vesmeas

tc.

Ergo

tc.

35DPE,Cod.Cus.106, ol. 16r, . 37-41:Ad demneodem abetur,uod lia ex

est

prior,ue

estuniversaliort

plures

ucit d

salutem

uam,

ue

non

sthuiusmodi.

Sed

ex anonica

onciliorum

eneralium

st

huiusmodi,

x

quoper

hanc radicantur

ere-

ses,

ed ntecedunturites

treformanturoresn

totomundoeu

universohristiomine

dedicato.

rgo

tc.



284

FLORIAN

AMANN

5. Das fünfte rgument tützt ich auf die Aussagedes Korans,wonach

Gott durch

sein Wort

und

seinen Geist alles

geschaffen

abe.36

Derartige

Wendungen

inden ich tatsächlich

n

vielen

Stellen

des Korans.37 usanus

sah

hierin inen Hinweis

darauf,

dass

auch der Koran die

Logostheologie

aufweist,

wonach

Christusdas

Wort Gottes st. Selbst nach

dem Koran

wäre Christus nicht nur

Prophet

oder

Bote,

sondern Sohn

Gottes.38

Heymerich

ndes

interpretiert

iese

Suren

ekklesiologisch.

uhammad

habe sein Gesetz aus der

Vorsehung

des

göttlichen

Wortes

erhalten. as

Verhältnis

wischen dem Wort Gottes und

Muhammad

entspricht

lso

dem zwischen Konzil und

Papst. Heymerich

ieht hierin seine Grund-

bestimmung

es Konzils als

legislative

Gewalt und

des

Papstes

als exe-

kutive Gewalt

begründet.

Der

Zusammenhang

mit der

Logostheologie

ergibt

ich aus der konziliaristischen

berzeugung,

wonach das Konzil

vom

Heiligen

Geist beseelt st.

6.

Im

sechsten

Argument

itiert

Heymerich

die berühmte

ure

4,

3 des

Korans,

worin Muhammad

die

Polygamie

erlaubt. Dies verstand die

christlicheolemik ls Aufrufu sexueller

Ausschweifung,

ie sie

beispiels-

weise

Johannes

von

Segovia

den Muslimen vorwarf.39och

Heymerich

sieht elbst

n

der Sure

4,

3 einen Hinweisdes Korans auf die

Superiorität

des Generalkonzils. ie Erlaubnis ur

Polygamie

ürfe

nichtnur wörtlich

verstanden

erden,

ondernman

müsse

ie

auch

mystisch

erstehen. ach

der

chrisdichen

rautmystikepräsentiert

ie

Kirche

die

Braut

Christi.

Wenn die Kirche durch den

Papst repräsentiert

wird,

herrscht ine

monogame

Ehe

zwischenKirche und

Christus;

wenn

allerdings

as Konzil

die Kirche

repräsentiert,

önne

man

von einer

polygamen

he

sprechen,

da die vielen Konzilsteilnehmerie

Braut Christi usmachen.Wenn man

36

DPE,

Cod.Cus.

106,

ol.

16r,

. 41 fol.

16v,

.

6:

„Ad

dem

n

eodem

abetur,

quod

deus

er

uum

erbum,

uod

st xtra

psum

d

modum,

uo

Plato

onit

mentem

et

Perypateticionunt

ntelligencias,116v]

t cum ius

piritu,ui

se habet t anima

mundiecundum

latonemel nima obilisecundum

eripatéticos,

ecitniversat

per

concorsecretumllorumermo

eiMachometostdata ex

alvacionis,

x hoc

rguens

illius

egis erfeccionem,uodprodierit

e

superno

oncilio

lurium.

um

rgo

e

papa

habeatd concilium

enerale

icut

achometusd

providenciam

eiverbit

uscipit

uam

legem,

t

fingit,er

modum utui

oncilii

ictatam,

atet

ropositum.

37

Koran

,

171;

Vgl.

Koran

, 117;36,

82;

6,

73.

38NvK,Cribratiolkorani,13,n.60,52:„Adhucic ertumst x Alkoranoerbo ei

omnia sse

reata.

erbum

gitur

ei ncreatum

st,

uoniam er psum

mnia reata

sunt.

39

Johannes

e

Segovia,

ber

e

magna

uctoritate

piscoporum

n oncilio

eneralihg.

v. Rolf

de

Kegel,

reiburg/

chweiz

995, ,

6

§

1,

37 f.



KORAN ND

KONZILIARISMUS

285

den Wortlaut es Korans mittels es sensusmysticusnterpretiert,ann sei

die

Polygamie

atsächlich

er

Monogamie

vorzuziehen.40

7.

Laut dem

siebten

Argument

abe

Muhammad

den Koran

von

Gott

erhalten,

ls

er durch

einen

Diener,

den

Erzengel

Gabriel,

n

den siebten

Himmel

getragen

worden sei.41

Hiermit

gibt

Heymerich

die

muslimische

Legende

von

Muhammads

Himmelsreise

ieder.42

ei seiner

Himmelsreise

habe

Muhammad

den Koran

ohne

eigene

Verdienste ls

Gnadengabe

empfangen.

Muhammads

Funktion

war die

eines

Dieners

und Boten

Gottes,

was

tatsächlich em

Verständnis

uhammads

m

Koran

entspricht.Das Verhältnis ottes u Muhammad

gleicht

emzwischenGeneralkonzil

und

Papst.

Der

Papst

fungiert

lso als

Knecht und

Bote des

vom

Heiligen

Geist

inspirierten

onzils.

8.

Das

achte

Argument

verbindet den

Koran

mit

der

christlichen

Zweischwerterlehre.as

geistliche

nd

das

weltliche

chwert

tehenfiir

die zwei

Gewalten,

das

geistliche

ür

die

Amtskirche

nd

das

weltliche

für

Könige

und

Fürsten.

m

Konzil

sind nun

beiderlei

Gewalten

vertreten.

Der

Papst

indes

führt ach

Heymerich

ediglich

das

geistliche

chwert.

Folglich st die konziliareGewalthöheranzusiedeln ls die des Papstes.43

40

DPE,

Cod.Cus.

106,

ol.

16v,

.

6-14:

Ad

dem

ecundum

iffinicionem

lchorani

lex

poligamie

st

pocior

ege

monogamie,

ropter

uod

Machometus

oncedit edum

bigamiam,

mmo

uoscumque

uxurie

oncubitus,

ed

spiritualiter

t mistice

oquendo,

quisque

iscipulus

xterne

apiencie

ontra ic um

adem

uoddam

oniugium

upciale

secundumllud

apiencie

:

quesivi

ichi

ro ponsa

aberearn.

rgo

oncilium

enerale,

ubi

onvenit

ultitudo

apiencium,

ontinet

ale

multiforme

oniugium,

uod

n

olo

apa

est

uniformet

monogamum.

ciam

uilibet

astor

cclesie

st

piritualis

ponsus

ius-

dem,

oncurruntutemn

concilio

lures

cclesie

relati

eu

pastores,

t

papa

est antum

unus iusmodi.rgodem,uodprius.41

DPE,

Cod. Cus.

106,

ol.

16v,

.

14-21:

Ad

dem

ecundum

dem

Alchoranum

Machometus

uscipitegem

uam

deo

per

ministerium

abrielis

psum

uperiussque

ad

septimum

elum

ortantis

atificatam

er

estimonium

iusdem

abrielist

Michaelis

angelorum,

uius

egis rofitetur

e

servumine

meritis.

rgo,

um e

papa

habeat d

legem

ictatam

spiritu

ancto t

eius

testibuside

ignis

inodaliter

ollectis

icut

Machometusd

dictacionem

estesque

ue

egis,

atet

ropositum,

um

onstat

x

supra-

dictis,

uod

nuncius

t servus

st

ubiectusuo

missori.

42

Auf er

Basis er

ure

7,

1

hatteich ie

Legende

on

Muhammads

immelsreise

im

slam

ntwickelt.er

Liber

calae

achometi

urdem

13.

Jahrhundert

ns

ateinische

übersetztnd

wurde

n

einigen

ersionen

er ollectio

oletana

itüberliefert,

. E. Werner

(Hg.),

iber

cale

achometi.ie

ateinische

assung

es

Kitabl

mi'radj,

üsseldorf

986.

43DPE,Cod.Cus.106, ol.116v, . 21-30: Ad dem iciturneodem lchorano,

quod

deo ex

Machometi

st

potissime

alutaris,

uia

coniungit

ladium

piritus

ladio

temporali,

bedientes

ariis

landimentis,

abulis,

romissionibus

t

ibertatibus

onsolando

et

delectando,

ebellesero

enaliter

ohercendo.n

signumretor

llius

egis

enet

udatum

gladium

n

manu.

ed

n

concilio

enerali

terque

llorum

ladiorum

niversaliter

oncurrit,



286

FLORIAN AMANN

Heymerichkann hierfür en Koran zitieren,da der Islam tatsächlich

keine

Unterscheidung

wischen

geisdicher

nd

weltlicher ewalt

kennt.

9. Laut dem neunten

Argument

erbietet er

Koran das

Hören,

Studium

und die Riten

jedweden

anderen Gesetzes.44Ebenso verhält sich die

Gesetzgebung

es Konzils

gegenüber

em

Papst.

Das Generalkonzil

ann

also dem

Papsttum

Gesetze

und Urteile

untersagen.

Heymerich

bringt

dies ausdrücklich itdem

Nichtigkeitsdekret

decretam

rritam)

n

Verbindung,

das

1433

auf dem Konzil diskutiert

urde.

m

Rahmen der

Kirchenreform

versuchte as Konzil die Ämter-und

Pfründenvergabe

urch die Kurie

zu reduzieren,was imWahldekret

eschah.45

Während der

Vorbereitung

dieses Dekretes

kam es unterden Konzilsteilnehmern

um

Streit,

b

ihm

eine clausula

rritons

ingefügt

erden sollte oder nicht. Demnach

wären

alle

Eingriffe

n

die

Amtervergabe

urch

das

Papsttum,

ie dem Wahldekret

zuwiderliefen,

vorab

für

ungültig

erklärt

worden,

was eine harsche

Beschneidung äpstlicher

Vorrechte

gewesen

wäre. Doch

in

der

verab-

schiedeten

Fassung

des Wahldekretes vom 13.

Juli

1433 findet sich

diese Klausel

nicht,

denn

die

gemäßigte

Linie des

Konzilspräsidenten

Giuliano Cesarini hatte sich durchgesetzt.46 it der These, dass sich

das

Nichtigkeitsdekret

us dem

Koran

ergebe, pricht

ich

Heymerich

n

dieser Stelle fürdie

radikalere raktion

nnerhalbdes Konzils aus.

10. Der zehnte

Syllogismus

tützt ich

auf die

Unterscheidung

on

vis

coactiva nd

vis executiva.aut

dem Koran ist

dasjenige

Gesetz

gerechter,

bei dem beide

am ehesten übereinstimmen.47

ie vis coactiva telltdie

ex

quo representai

cclesiam

atholicamt

potestatibus

egalibus

eli t terre irtuosam

secundumllud: ata stmihimnisotestasncelo t nterrat llud: cceduogladii

sunt

ic,

apa

autem

abet umtaxatsum

ladii

piritualis

ecundumllud:mitte

la-

dium n

vaginam.rgo

llud,

uodprius.

44

DPE,

Cod. Cus.

106,

ol.

16v,

.

30-4:

Ad

dem

ex

fungens

ecreto

niversaliter

irritantest

potissima,

iquidem

alis st ex

Machometi

rohibens

uditum,

tudiumt

ritumeuusum

uiuslibet

lterius

egis

ub

pena

mortisut ributi.

ed ex anonicaon-

ciliorum

eneralium

st uiusmodi

espectuape,

icut

atet

e

plerisque

asibus

n

corpore

iuris

ontentis,

ontra

uos impliciterrohibeturispensacio

ummi

ontificis.

45

Conciliorum

ecumenicorum

ecreta

hg.

v. G.

Alberigo

.

a.,

Freiburg

.

Br.

1962,

essio

XII,

13.

Juli

433,

45-8.

.

Zwölfer,

ie

Reform

er

irchenverfassunguf

em

onzilu

Basel

in:

Basler eitschrift

ür eschichte

nd

Altertumskunde,

8

1929),

69ff.um

äpsdichen

Pro isionswesen

.

A.

Meyer,

urich

nd om. rdentliche

ollaturnd

äpstliche

rovisionen

m

Frau-nd roßmünster316-1523Tübingen986, 5-114.46

COD

(s.o.,

Anm.

5),

essio

II,

13.

Juli

433,

45-8.

47

DPE,

Cod.

Cus.

106,

ol.

16v,

. 34-43:

Ad

dem x eodem

ccipitur,uod

ex,

cuius is oactiva

st

roporcionata

irtuti

roprie

uinunciiive

xecutoris,

st

quior

t

iustior

uam, ue

non

potest

uiusmodi

dequari.

n

signum

uius icit

Machometus,



KORAN ND

KONZILIARISMUS

287

Richter dar und die vis executivaührt hre Urteile aus. Zur Konzilszeit

stimmen eide

überein,

denn

die

apostolische

Kirche

und die

katholische

Kirche machen die

Gesamtkirche

us,

die vom Konzil

repräsentiert

ird.

Der

Papst

allein kann

für sich nur die exekutive

Gewalt

beanspruchen,

die der Gewalt der

Gesamtkirche

ntergeordnet

st.

Heymerich

zitiert

hierfür ie klassische

hristliche

olemik,

wonach

der Koran nichtdurch

Wunder,

ondern llein durch die

Gewalt des weltlichen

rmes

bestätigt

worden sei.48

Im zweitenTeil derDisputatioührtHeymerichdie Gegenargumenteür

die

Superiorität

es

Papstes

an. Dabei

stützt

r

sich

weitgehend

uf

die

gleichen

Autoritätenwie

in

den

Argumenten

ür

die Oberhoheit

des

Konzils. Doch ist

der

propäpstliche

bschnitt esentlich ürzer

nd zählt

lediglich

in

Argument

uf

Grundlage

des Korans.

Laut dem Koran sei

jene

Rechtsprechung

heilsamer,

die

sich den

Bedürfnissender

gefallenen

Natur des

Menschen

anpasst

und ihm

angenehmes

und leichtes

vorschreibt

ls

jene

Rechtsprechung,

ie den

Menschen die volle Härte

des abstrakten

Gesetzes

auferlegt.49

iermit

thematisierteymerich as Spannungsverhältniswischendem Sinnund

dem Wortlautdes

Gesetzes. Durch die

unerbittliche

nwendung

kann

sich ein

Gesetz

in

sein

Gegenteil

verkehren,

as an

dem Umstand

iegt,

dass

ein Gesetz

notwendigerweise

bstrakt

st und nicht

eden

Einzelfall

berücksichtigen

ann.

Heymerich

spricht

hier also den

Grundsatz der

Epikie

an

und zitiert

ie

einschlägige

telle aus

der aristotelischen

olitik,

wonach

es besser

sei,

dass ein

Gemeinwesen om

besten Mann als

vom

quod ua exnon st onfirmatairaculis,edfortitudinemorisrachiiecularis.edvis

executivaurium

n

concilio

enerali

ecretorum

dequatur

iribus

postolicis

uorum

executorum,

x

quo

dem

unt

empore

oncilii

xecutores

udicii,

ui

udicesuxtallud:

quecumquelligaveritis.

ed constatoc

udicium

upervenire

udicium

ape,

x

quo pse

est

per

llud

udicabilisecundum

llud

relibatum:

i

peccaverit

n

te

frater

uus,

ie

ecclesie.

48

Vgl.

Daniel

960

s.o.,

Anm.

1),

73ff.

49

DPE,

Cod.Cus.

106,

ol.

52v,

.

19-29:

Si

iceat aciocinad

d hominemx

ypo-

thesi lchorani

psius erversorisegis

hristiane

achometi,

unc

iqueret

x

ege

ua

upe-

rius

ecollecta,

uod

lla

urisdiccio

stfinaliter

alubrior,

ue disponit

mnia

uavitert

leviter

ecundum

xigenciam

nfirmitatis

ature

apse

t d fruendum

blecta

entis,

arnis

vehementer

nclinate,

uam

lla,

ue imponit

nus

is<pro>porcionatum

t difficileali

nature,icenteomino:ugumnimuave tonus evemeum.ed urisdiccioegisnimate

boni

hominis,

uiusmodist

papa, ui

deodicitur

ater

anctissimus,

sthuiusmodies-

pectu

urisdiccionis

egis

bstracte,

uam

fert

oncilium

enerale,rout atet

x

aucto-

ritate

hilosophi

icentis

II

Politice,

uod

melius

stcivitatem

egi

iro

ptimouam

lege ptima.

rgo

tc.



288

FLORIAN

AMANN

besten Gesetz regiertwerde.50 er Papst müsse nun dieserbeste Mann

sein,

der

das Gesetz

im

Einzelfall

außer Kraft setzen

könne,

um die

Gerechtigkeit

u wahren.

Das Generalkonzil ei indes fürdie abstrakten

Gesetze

verantwortlich,

ie

in

den Konzilsdekreten ormuliert erden.

Da

der

Papst

die Gesetze außer

Kraft etzten

kann,

um

unnötige

Härten

zu

vermeiden,

teht r auch über

dem Generalkonzil. ndem der Koran

ein

leichtes

Gesetz

st,

pricht

r sich also fürdie

Epikie

aus.

Interessanterweise

wird hier abermalseine

christliche olemik

gegen

den Koran

ins

Positive

gewendet,

enn dass der

Koran von seinen

Gläubigen

keine

Strenge

er-

lange,

sondern

ogar

zu einem

angenehmen

asterhafteneben ermuntere,

ist ein klassisches hristliches

orurteil.

IV. Die ähnliche

oranhermeneutik

eider enker nddas Basler

Konzil

Schon

in

De

pace

idei

ässt Cusanus

Auffassungen

rkennen,

ie

mit dem

BaslerKonzil

zusammenhängen,

as

sichvor allem an

der

angenommenen

Gesprächssituation

eigt:

Es wird von

einem Konzil als

Versammlung

der Weisengesprochen. s hatuniversalen harakter, a alle Völkerund

Religionen

vertretenind.

Den Vorsitzübt das

verbum

us,

das zumindest

die christlichen

Vertreter unschwer

mit Christus identifizieren. ie

Teilnehmer ind

prinzipiell

leichberechtigt,

er Christ hat also keinen

Vorrang

vor dem

Araber. Es besteht

Redefreiheit nd

im

Gespräch

soll

die

Wahrheit um Vorschein

kommen,

woraus

am

Ende

der

einmütige

Konsens

aller Teilnehmer

resultiert.

Cusanus konstruiert

ier also den

Idealtyp

ines

Generalkonzils,

obei

er

weniger

n

eine

vom

Papst

dominierte

ynode

denkt

ls vielmehr

n

die BaslerVerhältnisse, enn das Basler Konzil verstand ich ebenfalls

als eine

universale

Versammlung

er

Weisen,

nämlich der Kleriker

us

der

gesamten

westlichen hristenheit.

as Konzil solltedirekt

on Christus

gelenkt

werden

und

nichtvom

Papst,

was freilich

pirituell

u verstehen

ist.51 ie verschiedenen

onzilsteilnehmer

esaßen trotz

unterschiedlicher

50

Aristoteles,

ol.

II

15,

1286a9-ll.

.

Mörsdorf,

equitas

in:

Staatslexikon,

.

Aufl.,

Bd.

1

(1957),

4-60.

51DieseAuffassungehtuf asKonstanzerekret aecanctaurück,as inewichtige

Basisfür onziliaristisches

edankengut

arstellt,

.

COD

(s.o.,

Anm.

5),

Concilium

Constantiense,

essio

V,

6.

April

415,

85:

„Et

primo

eclarat,

uod psa

n

Spiritu

sancto

egitime

ongregata,enerale

oncilium

aciens,

tecclesiam

atholicamilitantem

repraesentans,

otestatem

Christo

mmediateabet..




289

Weihegradedas gleicheStimmrecht52nd durften ich frei ußern.53n

den

Konzilsverhandlungen

olltedie Weisheit

hervortreten,

a das Konzil

als vom

Heiligen

Geist

erleuchtet erstandenwurde. Schließlich

ollten

die Diskussionen

n

den Konsens der

Konzilsentscheidungen

ünden.

n

Glaubensfragen

ar dabei nicht

die

Mehrheitsentscheidung,

ondernder

Totalkonsens

as

Ziel,

wie er

in De

pace idei

räsentiert

urde.54

Das

Basler

Konzil,

wie

später

auch

das Konzil von

Ferrara-Florenz,

sah tatsächlich

eine

Aufgabe

unter anderem

darin,

die

Glaubenseinheit

wiederherzustellen.

ber die

Streitpunkte

ollte

disputiert

nd verhandelt

werden,

bis schließlich ine

einmütige ösung gefunden

werdenkonnte.

Dazu fanddie

große

Hussitendisputation

m

Frühjahr

433

in

Basel statt.55

Nach den

anschließenden

Verhandlungen

chloss

das Konzil schließlich

die

PragerKompaktaten

b und führte ie Hussitendamit

n

den

Augen

der

Konzilsväter ur katholischen

Kirche zurück. Ebenso strebtendie

Konzilsteilnehmernd

deV

Papst

eine

Vereinigung

mit der Ostkirche

n,

wie sie nicht

n

Basel,

sondern

uf dem Konzil von Ferrara-Florenz

439

verabschiedet urde.56

Die Vision des Himmelskonzils on Nikolaus von Kues hat also eine

realgeschichtliche

Basis

in

den konziliaren

Bemühungen

um die

Glaubenseinheit. er literarische

unstgriff

er Schau des Himmelskonzils

erlaubte es

Cusanus,

die

realpolitischen

robleme dieser

Bestrebungen

auszublenden,

um den

Idealtyp

eines

Glaubenskonzils zur

Geltung

zu

bringen,

wie

er

es offensichdichuch mit den Muslimen anstrebte.

Möglicherweise

urde eine

solches Konzil mit den Muslimen zumindest

theoretisch

m Rande des Basler Konzils erörtert.

Mit Sicherheit

edoch

wurde

n

Basel auch die

Möglichkeit

iner

posi-

tivenKoranhermeneutikwischenHeymerich nd Cusanusdiskutiert,as

sich an ihrer sehr ähnlichen

Interpretationsstrategie

achweisen ässt.

HeymerichsVerwendung

des Korans

als

ekklesiologische

utorität etzt

nämlich

voraus,

dass man die Wahrheitdes Christentumsuf der Basis

52

P.

Lazarus,

as Basler

onzil

Seine

erufung

nd

eitung,

eine

liederung

nd eine

Behördenorganisation

Berlin

912,

3-7.

53

J.

Helmrath,

asBasler

onzil

431-1449.

orschungsstand

nd roblemeKöln

1987,

7ff.

54

Vgl.

W.

Krämer,

onsensnd

ezeption.

erfassungsprinzipien

er irchem asler

onziliarismus

Münster980 BGPhThMA9).Vgl.Helmrath987 s.o.,Anm. 3),32ff.erBegriff

„Totalkonsens

urde onHelmrath

eprägt.

55

.

Šmahel,

ie

Hussitischeevolutionübers,. Thomas

rzenk,

d.

3,

Hannover

002,

1560ff.

56

COD

(s.o.,

Anm.

5),

Concilium

lorentinům,

essio I

(6.Juli 439),

99-504.



290

FLORIAN AMANN

des Korans beweisenkann,wie es CusanusJahrzehnte päter n seiner

Cribratiolkorani

nternommen at. Der Aufbau der

Kirche beruhtnach

christlicher

Überzeugung

selbstverständlich uf der Bibel

und dem

christlichen lauben. Wenn

nun

ekklesiologischeragen

aus dem

Koran

heraus beantwortet

werden

können,

muss

der

Koran die christliche

Botschaft wenn auch

dunkel beinhalten.

Die

einschlägigen rgumente

aus der

Disputato

e

potestate

cclesiasticand die Cribratio

lkorani

eruhen

also auf der

gleichen

Überzeugung,

wonach

der Koran selbst on Christen

positivgedeutet

werden

kann.

Der niederländische

hilosoph

erläutert eine Koranhermeneutikur

kurz,

ndem r

mehrfach arauf

erweist,

ass

es sich

bei

seinen

Darlegungen

um eine

örf-Aowz^m-Argumentation

andle.57 Bei einer

derartigen

Argumentationsweise

erden

fremde Thesen für den

eigenen

Beweis

herangezogen,

uch

wenn zweifelhaft

st,

ob sie wahr sind.

Heymerich

kann somit die

Superioritätsfrage

uf

der

Grundlage

des Korans disku-

tieren,

elbst

wenn er den Koran

fürhäretisch ält. Eben diese Theorie

findet ich auch bei

Cusanus

in

einem

Brief,

den er am

29.

Dezember

1454 an Johannesvon Segovia schrieb: Die Paradiesfreuden, ie der

Koran

seinen

Anhängern

verheißt,

ürfe

man

nicht

wörtlich erstehen.

Schon

Avicennahabe

in

seiner

Metaphysik

as intellektuelle

aradies dem

der Sinnenfreuden

orgezogen.

Muhammad habe

also durchdas Bild der

sinnlichen

Freuden die intellektuelle

lückseligkeit

eschrieben.Wenn

man von der wörtlichen

edeutung

des Korans

absehe,

könne

man

ihn

für

eine

eigenen

hristlichen

rgumentationszwecke

erwenden.58usanus

verweist

also ebenfalls auf

eine

arf-Aomm^m-Argumentation,

m seine

Koranhermeneutik

u skizzieren.

emnach

verfolgen

eide Denker eine

sehr ähnlicheKoranhermeneutik,ie derartungewöhnlichst,dass ein

57

Die konziliaristischen

rgumente

erden ie

folgtingeleitet,

PE,

Cod. Cus.

106,

fol.

16,

.

2

f:

Ad

dem

otestrgui

d hominemxAlchoranoachometi

,

ebenso

das

propäpsdiche

rgument,

PE,

Cod. Cus.

106,

ol.

52v,

.

19-21:

Si

iceat

acioci-

nan d hominem

x

ypothesi

lchorani

psius

erversorisegis

hristiane

achometi..

58

NvK,

pistula

d.oanneme

egobia,g.

.

Raymond

libansky

. Hildebrand

ascour,

h

VII,

99:

„De

paradiso

otest

e

facili onclusio

api,

tiam x dictis

uorum,

axime

Avicennae,

ui

n

Methaphisica

ua

praefertaradisum

ntellectualium

eliciarum

aradiso

sensibilium

nAlchorano

escriptum.

tiam idetur

criptorem

lchoraniocutum

er

imili-

tudinemorporaliumeliciarume futuriseliciis. ampostmultasecitationesetse

glosât

icens:Ista t sta

abebitis,

oc

st mne onumt

quidquid

esiderabitis.'

nde

videtur

uod

emper

d

hocconandumit

uod

iber

ste,

ui

apud

os

est n auctori-

tate,

ro

nobis

llegetur.

am

eperimus

n

eo talia

uae

erviunt

obis;

t

alia

quae

con-

trariantur,

losabimus

er

lla.




291

Diskussionszusammenhangwischen hnen als erwiesen eltenkann. Auch

die historischen mstände

bestätigen

iese These: Beide

pflegten

inen

jahrelangen

Kontakt und

Heymerichs isputatio

e

potestate

cclesiasticast

nach

heutigem

enntnisstandllein

n

der Cusanus-Bibliothek

n

Bernkastel-

Kues überliefert.

Obgleich Heymerichs

isputatio

ber

20

Jahre

älter st als der Briefdes

Cusanus

an

Johannes

von

Segovia,

lässt

sich hieraus nicht

schließen,

Cusanus habe seine Koranhermeneutik

on

Heymerich

übernommen.

Anders als Lull und Meister Eckhart

kannte

Cusanus

Heymerich

nicht

vornehmlich us seinen

Büchern,

ondern tand mit hm in

engem

per-

sönlichen

Austausch.Die

Diskussionen,

ie beide am Rande des Basler

Konzils

führten,

anden lso auch

Eingang

n

Heymerichs

asler Schriften.

Falls seine slamkenntnisse

auptsächlich

us

solchen

Gesprächen

tammen

sollten,

würde dies

erklären,

ieso seine Koranzitatederart

ngenau

sind.

Heymerich

war demnach

weniger

der innovationslose ehrer des

ungen

Cusanus,

wie Colomer

meinte,59

ls vielmehr einer seiner

wichtigsten

intellektuellenreunde und ein

origineller esprächspartner.

Schöne ussicht

D-30989 Gehrden

59

Vgl.

Colomer

964

s.o.,

Anm.

),

213.



"

Secundum

rocessum

t mentem

ersons

John

Versornd His Relation o theSchools

f

Thought

econsidered*

PEPIJN

UTTEN

Abstract

Johannes

Versor

f

after

1482)

was a

prominent hilosopher

n the late

fifteenth

entury,

hose workswere

widely

diffused.n

recent

cholarship,

Versor has

been associated with two schools of

thought:

homism and

Albertism.

hese,

however,

ererivals

especially

n

Cologne,

where

Versor's

workswere

printed epeatedly.

Given

this historical

ontext,

ow should

Versor's

osition

midst he

quarrels

f the

schools e

interpreted?lthough

he

evidently

sed the

works f both Albert nd

Thomas,

there s no evi-

dence thatVersor ver committed

imself o eitherAlbertismr

Thomism.

In

addition,

he

Cologne printings

f

his

works

uggest

hat Versor's on-

temporaries

onsidered

im n

independentuthority.

herefore,

ersor an-

not be rated mongthemembers f either chool.

1

John

Versornd the chools

f Thought

n

the

ifteenth

entury

When the

fifteenth-centuryhilosopher

ohannes

Versor

(f

after

1482),

in

his

commentary

Quaestiones

on

Aquinas'

De ente t essentia

discusses

*

Researchor his rticle asfunded

y

theNetherlands

rganisation

or cientific

ResearchNWO) nd onductedspart f he rogramhomism,lbertism,ominalism.he

Dynamics

f

ntellectualraditions

n

the ateMiddle

ges.

ome fthe

opics

iscussedere

were

resented

n firstraft

uring

he

workshop

radition,ruth,

ransition.ntellectualnd

Spiritual

ulture

f

he

ifteenthentury

t Radboud

niversityijmegen,

-5March

004.

thank aarten

oenen,

allan

edsham,

ndrea

obiglio

nd

Sigrid

Müller or

heir

many

elpful

ommentsnd

uggestions.

1

quote

romhe

following

dition:

ohannes

ersor,

uper

mnesibrosovae

ogicae,

Köln

1494,

Unveränderterachdruckrankfurt/ain 1967. hisvolumelso ncludes

Versor's

ommentary

n De entet ssentiaentitledere

Questiones

agistřiohannis

ersoris

super

e

entetessentiaanctihomee

Aquino

rdinis

ratrum

redicatorumbelow: ohannes

Versor,

uestiones

uper

e entet

ssentia),

n ff.

4ra-u2rb.

he

quotation

s from

.

2,

f. 5ra-b. f.

L.

Hain,

Repertoriumibliographicum

vol.

I-2,

tuttgartiae-Lutetiae

arisiorum

1838, 87a *16029,16030);. Voulliéme,erBuchdruckölnsis um nde esunj.ehn-

ten

ahrhunderts,

onn

1903,

20

no. 1215).

As for hename f

John

ersor:cholars

generally

eem

o

prefer

he urname

Versor",

lthough

heres some videncehat his

philosopher

hould athere

called

Versoris";

f.L.

Mahieu,

ominique

eFlandre

XVe

siècle).

a

métaphysique

Paris

942,

2-5.

©

Koninklijke

rill

V,Leiden,

005

Vivarium

3,2

Also vailablenline www.brill.nl



VERSOR

NDHIS RELATIONO

THE

SCHOOLS F THOUGHT

293

thequestionwhether he essence of a composite ubstance omprises oth

matter nd

form,

e first

ollows

homas'

answer,

but then

adds

a short

note on how to

respond ccording

o Albert he Great: "Dubitatur

primo

qualiter

st

respondendum

d

quesitum

ecundumAlbertům."Versor ex-

plains

that

ccording

o Thomas the definition

omprises

oth

matter nd

form,

whereasAlbertbelieves that t

comprises

orm,

nd that matter

s

only

ncluded

s the end term f the

luxus

f a form.2 t first

ight

Versor

seemsto take over Thomas'

view,

but he does so without

ejecting

lbert's

opinion.

The doubt

"Dubitatur

.

.") obviously

oes not concern he truth

of Albert's nswer to the

question,

because the

passage

merely

ells us

what that answer s.3

This

awkward

passage

is

difficulto

interpret

or

two reasons:

First,

Versor s

generally egarded

s an

important

homist.4

2

Johannes

ersor, uestiones

uper

e

ente

t

essentia

if.

4vb-s5ra:Conclusio

rima:

Essentiaubstantìe

omposite

on stmateria

antum,

ecforma

antum,

ecrelatio

ue

est nter ateriamt

formam,

ec

liquiduperadditum

stis Conclusioecunda:ssentia

in

substantiis

ompositiser

e

comprehendit

ateriamt formam Dubitatur

rimo

qualiter

st

respondendum

d

quesitum

ecundumlbertům.

espondeturuod

contra-

riumententieamhabitest eopinionelberti.. Et dicit lteriuslbertusuodmate-rianon

onitur

ndiffinitioneubstantieaterialis

anquamars

ssentieormeotius,ed

tanquam

erminusluxusormeaturalis."

luxuss a

centralotion

n

Albert's

hought,

whichannote

discussed

ere;

hat oncernss here s

merely

he

way

nwhich ersor

treats

lbert's

osition.

lbert

ives long

ccountf henaturef

flowing

n

his

om-

mentary

n

the

Book

f

Causes

cf.Albertus

agnus,

e causist

rocessu

niversitatis

prima

causalib.

1,

tr.

,

ed. W. Fauser

ed.

Coloniensis,

ol.

XVII-2),

Monasteriiestfalorum

1993, 2.35-58.30;

his

assage

s discussed

y

T.

Bonin,

reations Emanation.he

Origin

f

Diversity

n

Alberthe reat'sn theCauses nd theProcessionfthe

Universe,

Notre ame

200

1

-2

Cf. lso

A. de

Libera,

lberte

Grand

t

a

philosophie

Paris

90,

117-77. n thenotionf

orma

otiussee

below,

4.2.

3

K.

Feckes, owever,

ees n indubitable

ejection

fAlbert's

iews

n

Versor'som-

mentaryexceptor he istinctionetweeneingnd ssence);f.K. Feckes,asopuscu-

lum eshl. Thomason

quin

De

ente

tessentiaim

Lichteeinerommentarein: A.

Lang,

J.

Lechner,

. Schmaus

eds),

usderGeistesweltes

Mittelalters.tudiennd exte artin

Grabmann

ur

Vollendung

es

0.

Lebensjahres

on reundennd chülern

ewidmet

Münster

935,

1.

Halbband,

67-81,

t

672.

4

C.

Prantl,

eschichte

er

ogik

m

Abendlande

Reprint

erlin

955, V,

200

note 26),

220-1;

M.

Grabmann,

ittelalterlicheseistesleben.

bhandlungen

ur

Geschichteer cholastiknd

Mystik

Band

II,

München

956, 30;

Feckes 935

above,

.

3),

671-672;

.

Birkenmajer,

Die

Wiegendrucke

er

hysischen

erke

ohannes

er

ors,

n:

Bok- ch

ibliotekshistoriskatudier

illäg-

nadesak

Collijn,

ppsala

925,

21-35

Repr.

n: A.

Birkenmajer,

tudes

'histoire

es

ci-

encestde a

philosophie

u

MoyengeStudia

opernicana,

),

Wroclaw-arszawa-Kraków

1970,

51-65],

t

121;

C.

Lohr,

Medievalatin ristotleommentaries.uthors:

ohannes

e

Kanthir-Myngodus,n: Traditio:tudiesnAncientnd Medieval istory,hought,nd

Religion,

7

(1971),

51-351,

t

290;

E.J.

Ashworth,

he

clipsef

Medieval

ogic

in:

N.

Kretzmann,

.

Kenny,

Pinborg

eds),

he

ambridgeistoiyf

ater

edieval

hilosophy

Cambridge

tc.

1982, 87-96,

t

788.

For

further

eferences,

ee O.

Weijers,

e

travail

intellectuella Faculté

es rts eParis: extestmaîtres

ca.

1200-1500

,

V.

Répertoire

es oms

commençant

ar

(suite:

partir

e

Johannes),

Turnhout

003,

70-6.



294

PEPIJN

OTTEN

Second, his commentary n De ente t essentiaas so manyof his other

works)

was

printed

n

Cologne

home of the fiercedoctrinal

quarrels

betweenAlbertists

nd

Thomists.5

Why

does Versor refrain rom

aking

a standon

a matter f obvious

disagreement

etween

Albert nd Thomas?

Scholastic

hought

n the fifteenth

entury,

f which Versor

would seem

a

typicalexponent,

has one

ubiquitous

characteristic:

he formation f

schoolsof

thought. hilosophers

nd

theologians

t

many

universities

on-

sidered

themselves

s

belonging

o

a

particular

ntellectual radition hat

was

in

one

way

or anotherdistinct

rom ther ntellectual

raditions.

o

distinguish

hese

traditions,

hey

used such denominationss thomistaesco-

tistae,

ominales,

lbertistae

nd of course

antiqui

nd modernit

he

University

of

Paris,

where

Versor

studied and

taught,

was no

exception

to this.7

What,

then,

s Versor's

role

in

this

etting?

oes he

belong

to

one of the

schools of

thought

r

not?

This

question

s relevantfor

three

reasons:

First,

Versor'sworks

were

so

widespread

hat

he became one

of the most

influential

uthorsof

his time.

His commentaries

n Aristotle nd

Peter

of

Spain

all

appeared

in

print

before

1500

and were

reprinted

everal

times.8 econd, in the recent iterature here is a tendency o regard

5

Cf.Voulliéme

903

above,

.

1),

58-60

nos.

44,145,147,

148)

nd518-33

nos.

1211-43);

ohr

971

above,

.

4),

290-9.

ee also

below,

§

2

and6.

ForAlbertism

nd

Thomism

n

Cologne,

ee

the iteratureisted

n thenext

ote,

sp.

Meersseman935.

6

Fundamental

tudies

re:G.

Ritter,

tudien

ur

pätscholastik,

:

Via

ntiqua

nd

iamod-

erna

uf

en eutschen

niversitäten

esXV.

JahrhundertsHeidelberg

922;

F.

Ehrle,

er

Sentenzenkommentar

eters

on

andia,

es

isaner

apstes

lexandersEin

Beitrag

ur

cheidung

der

chulennder

cholastikes

ierzehnten

ahrhunderts

nd

ur

Geschichtees

Wegestreites

Münster

1925;

.

Meersseman,

eschichtees

lbertismus,

eft: DiePariser

nfänge

es

ölner

lbertismus,

Lutetiae

arisiorum

933; d.,

Geschichtees lbertismus

HeftI:

Dieerstenölner

ontroversen

Romae 1935.Morerecent itlesnclude: . Zimmermanned.),AntiquindModerni.

Traditionsbewußtsein

nd

ortschrittsbewußtsein

m

päten

ittelalter

Miscellanea

ediaevalia,

),

Berlin-New

ork

974;

.

Kaluza,

es

uerelles

octrinales

Paris.

ominalistes

trealistes

ux

confins

u

XIVe tduXVe

iècles

Bergamo

988;

M.J.F.M.

oenen,

.H.J.

chneider

nd

G. Wieland

eds), hilosophy

nd

earning.

niversities

ntheMiddle

ges,

eiden-New

ork-

Köln

1995;

M.J.F.M.

oenen

ndA. de

Libera

eds),

lbertus

agnus

nd

er lbertismus.

Deutsche

hilosophische

ultur

esMittelalters

Leiden-New

ork-Köln

995.

7

For he

octrinal

uarrels

n

Paris,

f. hrle

925

above,

.

6),

114-40

nd

297-326;

Kaluza1988

above,

.

6).

ForVersor

n

Paris,

f.

H.

Keussen,

ieMatrikeler

niversität

Köln,II,

Bonn

1931,

4

(n.

897);

Lohr1971

above,

.

4),

290;

Weijers

003

above,

n.

4),

170-1

with

urther

eferences).

he main ource

or he

now

o

ongerccepted)

view

hat ersor

aught

t

Cologne

eems

obe

J.

Hartzheim,

ibliotheca

oloniensis,

oloniae

1747, 06.Hartzheimay ave ome o his onclusionthat ersorirst as member

of the

BursaMontana

nd

subsequendy

f the

Corneliana)

n thebasis

f some

f the

colophons

f

Cologne

ditionsf

Versor's

orks;

f.

elow,

§

2

and6.

8

Prand 955

above,

.

4),

220-1;

irkenmajer

925

above,

.

4),

121.

On Versor's

influence

n

Cologne

f.G.-R.

Tewes,

ieBuren er

ölnerrtisten-Fakultät

is

ur

Mittees



VERSOR

NDHIS RELATIONO

THE

SCHOOLS F THOUGHT

295

Versornot as a Thomist, ut at least n someof hisworks) s an Albertist,

whichreinforceshe

mpression

hatVersor

s a

problematic

ase.9

Third,

the "Versor case"

urges

us to reflect n the

very

notion of

philosophical

schools. The real

problemmay

not be Versor'

position,

ut rather hat

we

need

to

fine-tune

ur

concepts

n

order to be able to understand hat

position.

There has been some discussion

n

the literature bout what

a

school

of

thought eally

s. Hans Gerhard

Senger

raised

the

ssue when he

ques-

tioned he existence f an Albertistchool

n

the fifteenth

entury. iscussing

the influence f Albert the Great on thinkers uch as

Heymericus

de

Campo (1395-1460),

enger

harply istinguished

he

writings

f

Heymericus

from hose of his successors t the BursaLaurentiana

n

Cologne.

He con-

sidered

Heymericus

who

was

certainlynspired y

Albert)

loser o Cusanus

and to

humanism,

han to those ater heads

of the

Laurentianawhom he

regarded

as

mere

epigones

of

Albert.

n

Senger's

view,

this

difference

meant that the BursaLaurentiana

ay

have been the home of

an

Albertist

school

during

he

ate fifteenth

entury,

ut that

ts

nstigator eymericus

was not properly peaking n Albertist.10his conclusionfollowed rom

16.

Jahrhunderts

Köln-Weimar-Wien

993,389-90;

n his nfluence

n

Cracow,

f.

S.

Swiezawski,

a

philosophie

l'universitée Cracovieès

rigines

u XVIe ièclein: Archives

d'HistoireoctrinaletLittéraireu

Moyen ge,

0

1963),

1-109,

t

89;

M.

Markowski,

Die

wissenschaftlichenerbindungen

wischen

er ölnernd er rakauerniversitätmMittelalter

in: A. Zimmermann

ed.),

ie Kölnerniversitätm

Mittelalter.

eistige

urzeln

nd

oziale

Wirklichkeit

Miscellanea

ediaevalia,

0),

Berlin-Nework

1989,274-86,

t

285;

Z. Kukse

icz,

ie

Einflüsse

er ölner

hilosophieuf

ieKrakauer

niversität

m

5.

Jahrhundert

in:Zimmermann

989, 87-298,

t

289-292.

ee also

below

§

2).

9

For

nstance

eijers

003

above,

.

4),

170;

her ources E.P.

Bos,

John

ersoťs

AlbertismnhisCommentariesn orphyrynd he ategories,n:P.J.J.M.akkered.), hemins

de a

pensée

édiévale.tudes

ffertes

Jfenon

aluza,

urnhout

002,

7-78. f.

lso

Lohr 971

(above,

.

4),

290,

who

otes,

ithout

eference

o

source,

hat ersors a

"Thomist,

sed

Albertizabať";

f. lsoBos

2002,

9,

nd

C.H.

Kneepkens,

am efecatumas

uandoque

servatmatum.

lementaryids-to-study:

nUnconventionalccesso ate-Medieval

niversity

hilo-

sophy

in:Bulletine

philosophie

édiévale,

5

2003),

05-29,

t 116

note 9).

am

n-

debtedo Henrik els or

ointing

ut

o

me

the ource f he

uotation

iven y

Lohr

('sed

Albertizabať):

t was

Versor's

upil

ominicfFlandersho

ualified

he

pinion

f

his eachern

the

ubject

f

ogic

s

being

nfluenced

y

AlbertheGreat. f.Dominicuse

Flandria,uaesüones

uper

II

ibros

etaphysicorum

ib.

,

q.

5,

.

2,

d

5,

ed.Venice

499

Nach-

druckrankfurt

967),

.15ra. he

passage

as

lreadyuoted y

Mahieu

942

above,

.

1),

22,

nd

thoughncorrectly)

y

G.

Meersseman,

enVlaamsch

ijsgeer:

ominicusan laanderen

in:Thomistischijdschriftoor atholiekultuurleven,-2 1930), 85-400,t 395.

10

H.G.

Senger,

lbertismus?

berlegungen

ur

via lberti

im

5.

Jahrhundert

n:A. Zimmermann

(ed.),

lbert

er rosse:eine

eit,

ein

Werk,

eine

irkung

Miscellanea

ediaevalia,

4),

erlin-

NewYork

981, 17-36,

sp.

29-36.

n

thebursae

n

Cologne,

eeTewes 993

above,

n.

8),

esp.

279-394.



296

PEPIJN

UTTEN

the criteriaSenger formulated:n order to speak meaningfullyf an

Albertist

chool,

he

argued,

there

must be

a

distinguishable,

onsistent

and coherent

hilosophical

ystem

which

s

based

upon

Albert's

rincipal

philosophical

enets

nd which can

be reconstructed

istoriographically.11

Senger convincingly rgued

that

by

such criteria

Heymericus

was not

simply

n

Albertist;

or one

thing,

he was

heavily

nfluenced

y

other

traditions nd

thinkers,

uch as

Raymond

Lull.

Still,

Heymericus

wrote the Tractatus

roblematicus

bout the differences

betweenAlbertism nd

Thomism,

which

paved

the

way

forthe doctrinal

quarrels

that were to

pervade

intellectual ife at

Cologne

for the next

hundred

years.

Maarten

J.F.M.

Hoenen therefore

ighdy

riticized

enger's

criteria nd showed that t is

possible

to

identify

school of

thought y

its own

(limited)

et of characteristicheses.12 his is

obvious,

e.g.,

from

Heymericus'

method

n his

Albertist

manifesto,

he so-called

Tractatus

rob-

lematicusHe

does

not

present synthetic hilosophical

rogramme,

ut

a list of

eighteen roblems

problemata

divided over

all

branchesof

phil-

osophy.13

Whether or

not,

in

the case of

Albertism,

he characteristic

thesesall derive fromAlbert s of secondary mportance.The interests

of

fifteenth-century

hilosophers

may

have been differentromAlbert's

interests. o a certain

egree

the

appeal

to Albert's

uthority

s

a

different

issuefrom he actual nheritance

f

Albert's

hought.

urthermore,

oenen

distinguished

he notion

of a

philosophical

chool from he more

general

notion of

an

intellectual radition.He defined

philosophical

chool as

a

tradition f

thought

which

(1)

expressly

laims to follow he doctrine

of

a school

leader,

2)

is connected

mainly

o a

teachingprogram

or to

a

particular

cientific ducation

in

which

philosophy

has

a

preparatory

or instrumentalunction),3) defends particular et of axiomatic heses,

and

(4)

is also characterized

y

external

actors,

uch as the

writings

n

which its doctrine

s

based.14

The schools of

thought

re

not restricted

to

university

ducation.

As C.H.

Kneepkens

has

recently

hown,

the

11

Senger

981

above,

.

10),

18-9.

12

M

J.F.M.

Hoenen,

eymeric

an e Velde

f

1460)

und ieGeschichtees

lbertismus:

uf

der ucheachen

uellen

erlbertistischen

ntellektlehrees

ractatus

roblematicus,

n:

Hoenen

and

de Libera 995

above,

.

6),

303-31,

sp.

305-6.

13

Heymericus

e

Campo,

roblematanterlbertům

agnum

t anctum

homamd

utriusque

opinionisntelligentiamultumonferentiaCologne 496; f.Meersseman935 above, . 6),

Voulliéme903

above,

.

1),

246

no.546).

14

M.J.F.M.

oenen,

homismus,

kotismusnd lbertismus.

as entstehennd ie

Bedeutung

von

hilosophischen

chulenm

päten

ittelalterin: Bochumer

hilosophisches

ahrbuch

ür

Antike

nd

Mittelalter,

(1997),

1-103,

sp.

81-94

definition

t

81-5).



VERSOR ND

HIS RELATIONO

THE

SCHOOLS

F THOUGHT

297

differentiaemanifest hemselves ven on the very elementaryevels of

linguistics

hat were

taught

n

grammar

chool.15

A

confession

f

discipleship

the

first haracteristic

entioned)

hould

not be

regarded

as

an

external

characteristic r

a

purely

strategical

manoeuvre,

ven

if

t does have rhetorical

ualities.

There are numerous

examples

of authors

who

explicitly

laim to follow

a

leader.

Consider

these

examples

of Albertists ho

pledge

their

oyalty

o Albert:

uxta iam

et

xpositionem

enerabilidomini lberti

octoris

agnicerrimiquehilosophi

Arnold

of

Tongeren),

ecundumententiam

eripatheticorum,uam

tribuitis venerbilis

dominuslbertus

agnus

Johannes

e Nova

Domo), ego

.

.

.)

subtilitatis

agni

peripateticorum

lberti

.

.

.)

interpreti

s ncultus

iscipulusHeymericus

e

Campo).16

A

school is named

after he

philosopher

who

is

regarded

as its

leader;

this school name

is

used

by

the authorsthemselves:

lbertistede

quorum

numero e esse

ateor

Heymericus).17

tatements uch as these

may

seem

obligatory,

ut

they

are historical ata

that must be accounted for.

n

fact,

they

are

(or

should

be)

the

reason

why

we

investigate

chools of

thought

n

the first

lace.

In

the

historiography

f late medieval

thought

(and ofphilosophyn general)we may use whatever abels we consider

convenient o

categorize

ndividual

hilosophers

nd

philosophical

move-

ments. or

instance,

we

may say

that

Albertisms a form f

neo-platonism.

This

may

not

be

uninformativer

inaccurate,

but we should

carefully

distinguish

uch

categories

from those

that are

present

n

the sources

themselves.

nderstanding

he

philosophical

chools of the fifteenthen-

tury

means

interpreting

he use

of school

designations

n

the

sources;

t

does not mean

ustifying

hatever lternative

esignations

e

may

prefer.

When we

investigate

he

works f

John

Versor

anew,

theseworks

may

be used as a test ase forthe notionofphilosophical chools as described

above.

If

the characteristics entioned

re

universally pplicable, they

15

Kneepkens

003

above,

.

9),

125-7

with

urther

eferences).

f.

lso he nswerf

the

University

f

Cologne

24

December

425)

o the etterf he rince

lectors,

dited

in Ehrle

925

above,

.

6),

281-5,

t

283.

The

professors

laim hat ll studentsave

already

een ntroducedo

oneof

he

iae efore

hey

ome

o

the

niversity,amelyy

theireachers

n

grammar

chool.

16

Arnolduse

Tungeris,

pitomata

ive

eparationesogice

eteristnove

restotelis,

ologne

1496,

itle

age;

f.Voulliéme903

above,

.

1),

9

no.164).

ohannes

e Nova

Domo,

Tractatuseesse t ssentiapraefatio,d. G. Meersseman,n: Meersseman933 above,

n.

6),

91-191,

t

91;

Heymericus

e

Campo,

robiematanterlbertům

agnum

tSanctum

Thomam

above,

.

13),

.

2r.

For

imilar,

homistic

xamples,

ee note

11

below.

17

Heymericus

e

Campo,

robiemata

nterlbertům

agnum

tSanctumhomam

above,

n.

13),

.h6v.



298

PEPIJN

OTTEN

should enable us to defineVersor'spositionwithrespectto the philo-

sophical

debates of

the schools

whether

e will

eventually

e

regarded

as

belonging

o one of the schools or

not);

and that s

the aim

of this

paper.

Of

course,

t is

not

necessary

hat

Versor was

either Thomist

or

an

Albertist. e

may

have been

neither

r

he

may

have been

both,

at different

oments

n

time

or

in

different orks.

n

the

following,

will first iscuss

the reasons

put

forward

n

the

literature or

considering

Versor

a

Thomist or an

Albertist

§

2),

then Versor's

alleged

confession

of Albertism

§ 3),

next Versor's

position

on

some of the

fundamental

doctrinaldifferencesetween Albertists nd Thomists

§ 4)

and his use

of Albert's nd Thomas' Aristode

commentaries

§ 5),

and

finally

ome

aspects

of the

Cologne

editions f Versor's

works hat

urge

us

to recon-

sider his

"Thomism"

§

6).

2.

Was Versor

Thomist?

The

Parisian Master of Arts

Johannes

Versor s

generally

at

least since

Prantl's GeschichteerLogik mAbendlande)onsidered one of the most

influential

homists f his time.18

n

the last two

decades of the

fifteenth

century,

is

commentaries n

the

corpus

ristotelicum

ere

printedmany

times: ll

of

them

n

Cologne,

some

of them lso

in

Lyon,

one

in

Leipzig

and one

in

Metz.19

ater,

his works

were

printed

or

nstance t Cracow

(Questions

on De anima,

1514)

and

in

Venice

(Commentaries

n Peter of

Spain,

1572).20

.J.

Ashworth otes that

"the Thomist

John

Versor" was

perhaps

the

most uccessfulommentator"

n the

ogical

works f

Aristode

and Peterof

Spain.21

rantl,

Grabmann nd

Swiezawski

ll

qualify

Versor

as a Thomist, lthought hey ppreciatehisworksn differentays.Where

Grabmann

inds rich ontentsnd

clarity",

rand ees

"dry

nd dull"

xpla-

nations nd Swiezawski "banal and

popular

form f Thomism".22

he

18

or

references,

ee

above,

otes and8.

19

ohr 971

above,

.

4),

292-9.

20

ohr

971

above,

.

4),

296;

Petrus

ispanus,

ummulae

ogicales

um ersoriiarisiensis

Claríssima

xpositione

Venetiis

572

reprint

ildesheim-Nework

981).

Versor'som-

mentary

n Peter f

Spain

was

printed

s

early

s 1473 nd

1477

in

taly)

nd s late

as

1622

in

Cologne);

f.Ashworth

982

above,

.

4),

788,

ndHain1838

above,

.

1),

487 nos. 6031 nd16032).

21

Ashworth

982

above,

.

4),

788.

22

Prantl 955

above,

.

4),

200

n.

126:

der ntschiedene

homist

ersor"),

00-21

("zeigt

r sich ls einen rocknennd

angweiligen

rklärer");

rabmann956

above,

n.

4),

230

"Inhaltsfülle

nd

Klarheit");

wiezawski

963

above,

.

8),

89

"thomisme



VERSOR ND

HIS

RELATIONO

THE

SCHOOLS

F THOUGHT

299

reasonwhythesescholarsput the label "Thomism" on Versorseems to

be a

general

impressiongiven by

his

writings.

n

Prantl's

perception,

Versor

basically explains

the works of Aristotle

ccording

to

Thomistic

principles:

He does not

quote many

authorities,

ut

generally

follows

Thomas.23

Moreover,

he wrote

commentary

n Thomas'

De

ente tessen-

tia

In

this work

he

may

not

always

dismissAlbert's

opinion decidedly,

but on thewholehe

certainly

eems

o takeoverThomas' line of

thought.24

Versor

might

also be considered

a

Thomist for other reasons. The

Thomists t

Cologne repeatedly

ommissioned

ologne printers

o

printhis works.The BursaMontana ad some of his

Quaestiones

n Aristotle's

physical

works

namely

hose

on De

generatione

De

cáelo,

Meteora

nd Parva

naturatici)

rintedby

Theodoricus

Molner

in

1485/6,

again by

Conradus

Welker

n

1488,

and

again by

Henricus

Quentell

n

1493.25 etween 1489

and

1497,

Quentell

also

printed

Versor's commentaries n the

Physics

(twice),

e animatheArsvetusnd the

Nova

ogica

all

of them

ommissioned

by

the

ThomisticBursaCorneliana.ewes

argues

that there

probably

were

personal

contactsbetweenmembers f

this

college

and Versor himself.26

The colophons of these Cologne printings uggestthat Versor was a

Thomist of the

Cologne type:

Et sic est

inisquestionum

ersoris

uper

uos

librosrestotelis

e

generatione

cilicett

corruptione

ecundum

rocessum

ursemontis

Questiones

ersorisuxta extume anima

diligentissime

onecte

n bursaCorneliin

Colonia]

tc.27t seems reasonable o

presume

hat heseworkswere meant

to be used

in

the educational

programs

f the

colleges

mentioned.This

presumption

s corroborated

y

the fact that Thomists of the Montana

refer o Versor

n

their

wn

writings

in

spite

of the

fact hat t was rather

unusual to mention

contemporary

uthors

by

name).28

Thus,

it would

seem that Versor can indeed be regarded s a Thomistic uthor.

sous ormeanalisée

t

populaire,

omme ans esécritse

JeanVersorius").

arkowski

also

ualifies

ersor's

hought

s a banal ormf

Thomism;

f.M.

Markowski,

lbertnd

der lbertismusnKrakauin:Zimmermann981

above,

.

10),

177-92,

sp.

187.Cf. lso

Ritter

922

above,

.

6),

73,

note :

"tatsächlich

ehören

ersorsehrbücher

soweit

ie

mir

ekannt

ind)

u dem

Verwaschensten

nd

Farblosesten,

as es damals

ab.

Eben

darauferuhteohlhre

roße erbreitung

nd hre

erwendbarkeitls

Materialsammlung."

23

rantl 955

above,

.

4),

200-21.

24

eckes 935

above,

.

3),

672;

cf.

bove,

1.

25Tewes 993above, .8),389;Birkenmajer925 above, .4),esp.134.

26

Tewes

993

above,

.

8),

389-90.

27

Cf.

Voulliéme903

above,

.

1),

520-9

nos.

214, 216, 220,

224, 225, 230,

1234).

28

Copulataulcherrima

iversisx utoribus

ogice

nunum

orrogata

nveteremrtem

restotelisum



300

PEPIJN

UTTEN

However,EgbertP. Bos has recentlynvestigatedome of Versor's og-

ical

writings

namely,

is commentariesn

Porphyry's

sagoge

nd Aristotle's

Categories)

nd has come to an

entirely

ifferentonclusion.

According

o

Bos "Versor

unquestionably

as a

prominent

Albertist

n

Paris

between

1407 and 1437".

9

Just

s

Prantl's onclusion

based

on the same

works )

that Versor was

a

Thomist,

Bos'

contrary

onclusion that he

was

an

Albertist lso reflects

general mpression

f the contents f these

ogical

works. os notes hat n several ssues

such

s the number f the

categories,

the

analogy

of

the

notion

f

being,

he nature f

substance nd the

theoryof

universais)

Versor

agrees

with Albert.30n

addition,

Versorrefers o

Albertmore often

han to

Aquinas.31

More

importantly,

e rates himself

among

the Albertists.

n

a

passage

in

his

commentary

n the

Categories

where

he

explicitly

laims to follow

Albert,

Versor

repeatedly

peaks

of

"our

way

of

understanding".

os

explains

this

phrase

as

a

confession f

loyalty

o the Albertist chool: When Versor writes our

way"

he refers

to the Albertist

way.32

On the basis of these

facts,

the

long-standing

conclusionthat Versor

was a

Thomist

suddenly

eems to have become

untenable.

3.

Verof

Alleged onfession

f

Albertism

In

view of the

importance

ttached to what

I

have labeled "confessions

of

discipleship"

cf.

§

1),

the

first

oint

to consider

s

Versor's

lleged

con-

fession

f Albertism.33

s

said

above,

in

his

commentary

n the

Categories

textuiusdemecundumiam ivi octorishomee

Aquino

t

uxta

rocessum

agistrorum

olonien

bursa ontisegentium,ologne494, .22vb: ethanc pinionemscilicetgidii e Roma

de

principio

ndividuations,

R) tangit

ersor

uper

e ente t essentiaancti home t

earn bidem

mprobat."

f.Voulliéme903

above,

.

1),

51

no.134).

29

Bos

2002

above,

.

9),

78.

30

Bos

2002

above,

.

9),

65-75.

31

Bos

2002

above,

.

9),

53.

32

Bos

2002

above,

.

9),

53

and 78. For

Versor's

ext,

ee

Appendix

below.

33

This

tudy

s based

n severalfVersor's orkss

they ppeared

n

print

t the

end f he ifteenth

entury.

n

general,

will

ave o

assumehat

hese

rereliabledi-

tions f uthentic

ritings.

t should owevere noted hat heir

uthenticity

asnot

yet

been

roven;

ndeed,

y

easonf ome ttributions

n

manuscripts

of

everal

f Versor's"

worksoother

uthors)

heirttributionoVersor

n

the ncunable

ditions

ay

e doubted:

Cf.C. Flüeler,ie verschiedeneniterarischenattungener ristoteleskommentare:urTerminologie

der

Überschriften

nd

olophone

in:

J.

Hamesse

ed.),

Manuels,

rogrammes

ecours

t

echniques

d'enseignement

anses niversitésédiévales.ctesu

olloque

nternationale

ouvain-la-Neuve

9-11

septembre

993 Louvain-la-Neuve

994, 5-116,

t 80-4. n the ther

and,

theruthors

may

ave

dapted

ersor's

ritings

nd husransformedhem

nto heirown"

ommentaries,



VERSOR ND

HIS RELATIONO

THE

SCHOOLS F THOUGHT 301

Versor uses thephrase"ourway ofunderstanding";n the same passage

he mentions

lbert

xplicitly

nd also follows

is

explanation

f Aristotle's

text.

Hence Bos'

interpretation

f that

phrase:

According

o

Bos,

Versor

"professes

o

belong

to

a certain

way

of

thought, amely

Albertism"

nd

"is

conscious

f

belonging

o

a

distinct chool

n

contrast o

others",

when

he uses the

phrase

"secundum

nostrum

modum

ntelligendi".34

owever,

this

nterpretation

s a

misunderstanding.

he

expression

secundumnos-

trummodum

ntelligendi"

oes not refer o

a

particularway

of

thought

at

all

in

which case one should have

expected something

ike

the usual

via,

expo

itio,

octrinar

processus

but notmodus

ntelligendi

35Versor'swords

concern he human

way

of

understanding

n

general.

He uses themwhen

discussing

he

question

whether he notion of substance

s

the most

gen-

eral

genus

n

the

category

f substance.36

is

exposition

f the

problem

closely

resembles

passage

fromAlbert's

ommentary

n the

Categories

37

Indeed,

a

comparison

f the two texts

uggests

hatVersor

based his text

on Albert's.

I

have

included both texts

n

Appendix

1.)

Versor

distin-

guishes

three

meanings

of the term "substance":

(1)

the

metaphysical

a

procedure

hich as

ertainly

ot ncommont the

ime;

f. .

Rutten,

ontraccani-

cam iscoliam odernorum:

he o-Callede universalieali nd he issemination

f

lbertist

Polemics

gainst

he ia

moderna,

n: Bulletine

philosophie

édiévale,

5

(2003),

31-65

(which

emonstrateshat he

Tractatus

roblematicus

f

Heymericus

e

Campo

metwith he

same ate

uring

he ourse f thefifteenth

entury).

ohr

1971

above,

.

4),

297-8,

already

oted hat ome

manuscripts

fVersor's orks ave variant

ncipitseflecting

possibly

ifferentedactionsr different

uthorship."

s Flüeler as stressed

lsewhere,

Aristotle's

edievalommentators

including

ersor

imself;

f.

elow,

5)

usually

ased

theirommentaries

nthosef ther

ommentators;

f. .

Flüeler,

ie temmatischenerhältnisse

der

ristoteleskommentare,

n:

Freiburger

eitschriftür

hilosophie

nd

Theologie,

8

2001),

182-90.34

Bos

2002

above,

.

9)

discusses

his

assage

n

71-3;

or is

nterpretation

fthe

phrase

secundumostrum

odum

ntelligendi"

as

quoted),

f. 3 and78. use he ol-

lowing

dition

which

s the ame s Bos

used): ohannes

ersor,

uaestiones

uper

oarn

veteremrtemKöln 1494

unveränderter

achdruckrankfurt/ain

1967).

he table f

questions

n ff. 5rb-76rafthis dition

ives

he ides or hedifferent

arts,

ome f

which will sewhen

eferring

oor

quoting

romhis dition:

uestiones

primi

ibri

cilicet)

quinquéredicabiliumorphirii,

uestiones

ibri

redicamentorum

restotelis,

uestiones

rimi

ibri

Perihermeniarumrestotelis.

35

Cf.

M.J.F.M.

oenen,

ia

Antiqua

nd ia

Moderna

n he

ifteenth

entury:

octrinal,

Institutional,

nd hurch

olitical

actors

n

he

Wegestreit,

n:R.L. FriedmanndL.O. Nielsen

(eds.),

heMedieval

eritage

n

arly

odern

etaphysics

ndModal

heory,

400-1700,

ordrecht

2003, -36, t 1 -4. eealso he xamplesn note below.

36

Johannes

ersor, uestiones

ibri

redicamentorum

restotelis

above,

.

34),

.

6,

f. 30rb:

"Queritur

trumubstantiait

genus eneralissimům."

37

Albertus

agnus,

iber e

praedicamentis

tr.

2,

c.

1,

ed. A.

Borgnet

Opera

mnia,

vol.

),

Parisiis

890,

66a-67b.



302

PEPIJN

OTTEN

notion of essence[essentiaimplex, which s the firstnd principalpartof

a

being

(

prima

t

principalisars

entis

, (2)

the

logical

notion of the

first

thingpredicable

of

any

substance

primům

t

simplicissimum

redicabile

,

and

(3)

the

notion

of an

individual ubstance

substantiaarticularis

,

which is

the

subject

of all

other

things

accidents)

nd

of

all

predications.38ogic,

says

Versor,

s concernedwithtwo notions

f

substance,

amely

he sec-

ond

and the third

meaning

of the term.

The second

meaning

of "sub-

stance" s a

generic

notion

and is

the

subject

of

logical enquiry,

ecause

it is

the

"first

redicable",

o which

anything

lse that

can be

predicatedof

any

substance whatsoever

e.g.,

"horse", "man",

"angel")

can be

reduced.39With

respect

to this

primumraedicabile

ersor

(still

following

Albert)

ormulates

sub-question:

What is

this

genus

composed

of,

since

there s

nothing

efore

t,

of

which t could be

composed?

n his

answer

to this

question,

Versor

mentions

nostrum

odum

ntelligendi.

he

highest

genus

itself annot be

composed

of

genus

and

difference,

ecause there

is

no

highergenus: Being

[ens)

s

not

a

genus

with

respect

o the cate-

gories

of

being,

since therecannot be

specific

ifferences

onstituting

he

categories, ecause nothing vades being in the way that a difference

evades a

genus.

Hence,

in

the

highest enus

there

s

no real

composition

of

genus

and

species,

nor of

matter

nd

form.

Nevertheless,

e conceive

of

this

genus

as

being composed

of

potency

nd

act,

or

quod

st nd

quo

est

or

ens

and

per

se.

In

Albert's

words,

there s an

"intellectual

ompo-

sition" of

ens

and

per

se:

"Est enim

ens,

et est

per

se,

quod

addit

super

ens intellectualem

ompositionem."40

n

Versor's

words:

secundum

ostrum

modum

ntelligendi

e can

only

think f the most

general genus according

to the

model of

composition

f act and

potency:41

38

Albertus

agnus,

iber e

praedicamentis,

r.

2,

c.

1,

ed. A.

Borgnet

Opera

mnia

vol.

),

Parisiis

890, 66a;

ohannes

ersor,

uestiones

ibri

redicamentorum

restotelis

above,

n.

34),

.

6,

f.30rb-30va.he

complete

extsre

n

Appendix

below.

39

Albertus

agnus,

iber e

praedicamentis

tr.

2,

c.

1,

ed. A.

Borgnet

Opera

mnia

vol.

),

Parisiis

890,

66a-

67b;

ohannes

ersor, uestiones

ibri

redicamentorum

restotelis

(above,

.

34),

.

6,

f. 30va. ee

Appendix

.

40

Albertus

agnus,

iber e

praedicamentis

tr.

2,

c.

1,

ed. A.

Borgnet

Opera

mnia

vol.

),

Parisiis

890, 67a;

ohannes

ersor, uestiones

ibri

redicamentorum

restotelis

above,

n.

34),

.

6,

f. 30va. ee

Appendix

.

41

n

other

ords:

he

composition

s not eal ut ational.homas

quinas

ses he

expressionmodusntelligendi"albeit ithoutddingnoster")nthe ameway, on-

trasting

hats real

secundum

emin

e

r

realiter)

nd

whats

merely

n

the

ntellect

tantum

in ntellectur ecundumodum

ntelligendi).

f.Thomas

quinas,

criptumuper

ibros

ententiarum,

lib.

1,

d.

2,

q.

1,

a.

3,

corp.,

d. R.P. Mandonnet

vol. ),

Parisiis

929,

8: ". sicut

nosdicimuse relationibus

uae

ex

tempore

e Deo

dicuntur;

ujusmodi

nim elationes



VERSOR

ND

HIS

RELATIONO

THE

SCHOOLS F THOUGHT

303

. accordingo ourway funderstandingsubstances understoodo be com-

posed

f

being

nd

per

e,

which

omposition

e understand

yway

f

compo-

sition

fact and

potency,

amely

f

by-which-it-is

quo

st)

nd that-which-is

uod

est)

However,

here

s no

composition

here

f

genus

nd

difference,

ecause

eing

can

haveno

differences,

ince heres

nothing

hich vades henotion

f

being.

And hust

s clear hatmatter

ndformo not

ompose

ubstance

n

general,

or

genus

nd

difference,ut,

s

said,

ccording

o our

way

f

understanding

t s com-

posed

f ct

nd

potency

r of hat-which-is

nd

by-which-it-is.42

In

using

the

expression

our

way

of

understanding"

ersor is not

pro-

fessing

o

belong

to

the Albertist

ay

of

thought,

ut nonetheless

is text

is evidently ased on Albert's see Appendix 1). In as much as Versor

rephrases

Albert's

text,

he also seems to adhere

to Albert's

philosophy.

For that

reason,

Versor

might

till

e

regarded

s

an Albertist. ne could

argue

that doctrinal

ongruence

s more

important

n

this

respect

than

overt

oyalty

o Albert

or the Albertist

chool.

4. Fundamental

octrinal

ifferences

When we look for

doctrinal

greement

r

disagreement,

n

order

to find

symptoms

f school formationn a

particular

eriod

of time,the ques-

tion

is what

problems

or

positions

re relevant

n

that

particular

ime.

With

respect

o

philosophy

n

the late Middle

Ages,

a

general

doctrinal

agreement

etween two or

more thinkers oes

not

necessarily

onstitute

a

philosophical

chool. Yet for some

scholarsthis was

precisely

he cri-

terion

for

using

abels such

as "Thomist" and

"Albertist"

n

relation o

Versor

cf. § 2).

Above

(§ 1)

it was stated that the

doctrinal

rofile

f

a

inDeo secundumemnon unt,edsequunturodumntelligendirationesorum

attributorumunt antum

n

intellectu,

t non

n

re,

quae

Deus

est."Cf. Thomas e

Aquino,

uaestiones

e

quolibetQuodlibet

,

q.

1,

a.

1,

corp.,

d.

Leonina,

ol.

XXV-2,

Roma-Paris

996,

95.42-5:

. unitas

ersonae

on

ponit

n

numerumumunitate

essencie

uasi

ealiterb

ea

differens,

et olum ecundum

odum

ntelligendi."

losely

related

o this

opic

s the

uestion

bout

omposition

n

the ntellectual

ubstances;

hese

are lso aid o be

composed

f

quo

st nd

quod

st.

f.,

.g.,

homas e

Aquino,

e ente

et ssentia

cap.

4,

ed.

Leonina,

ol.

XLIII,

Roma

1976,

76.90-377.166;

homas

quinas,

Summa

heologiae

la,

q.

50,

a.

2,

ad

3,

ed.

Leonina,

ol.

V,

Romae

889,

b.

42

Johannes

ersor, uestiones

ibri

redicamentorum

restotelis

above,

.

34),

.

6,

f. 30va:

". secundumostrumodum

ntelligendi

ubstantia

ntelligituromponi

x

ente t

per

se,

uequidemompositio

nobis

ntelligitur

er

modum

ompositionis

x actu t

poten-

tia, cilicetxquoest tquod st Non arnenst bi ompositioxgeneretdifferentia,

quia

ensdifferentiasabere

on

potest,

um

nihil

it

uod

rationemntis

ubterfugere

possit.

t ic

patet uod

materiat

formaon

omponunt

ubstantiam

n

communi

ccepta

ñeque

tiam

enus

t

differentia,

edutdictumst ecundumostrum

odum

ntelligendi

componitur

x actu t

potentia

eu

x

quod

st t

quo

est."

See

also

Appendix

.)



304

PEPIJN

UTTEN

school ofthought ather nsues from set of axiomatic heses oncerning

fundamental

ssues.

What,

in

the case of Albertism s.

Thomism,

these

issues

re

becomes

apparent

rom everal ources

ontemporary

o Versor's

writings.

n

this section

will discussthreeof these ssues:

First,

Albert's

doctrine

f nchoatio

ormarum

incipient ctuality

r inchoateness f

forms);43

second,

the distinction etween

orma artis

nd

forma

otius

§ 4.2);

third,

the

principle

f individuation

§

4.3).

A

consideration f Versor's

position

on these ssues will cast

light

on his

place

in

the battle of the schools.

4.1 TheDoctrinef nchoatioformarum

When

Aristotle,

n

the

first ook of the

Physics

discusses he

principles

f

nature,

e

distinguishes

hree

rinciples:

matter,

orm nd

privation.

hese

are the

three

principles

hataccount for ll

change

n

the

physical

world.

Matter

s

the

subject

which is

in

itself ndetermined nd which

under-

lies the forms

etermining

t. Form and

privation

re two

contrary

rin-

ciples

that account for

any particular hingbeing

so-and-so r not

being

so-and-so.

Change

means that matterreceives ome formwhich it was

previously eprivedof; it is a transition romprivation o form.Every

form

s a

kind of

perfection,

r

"something

ivine,

good,

and

desirable",

as

Aristotle dmits

n

his discussionwith

Plato,

whereasmatter s

imper-

fect.

All

natural

change

should thus be considered s

a

natural

striving

for

perfection:

Matter desires

to

be

perfected

y

form.44 t this

point

difficultiesrise.

On the one

hand,

it is matter hat desires

form,

or

pri-

vation is

contrary

o form:When

any

form

s

received

by

matter,

he

corresponding rivation

ontrary

o that formmust

necessarily

ease to

exist.

Nothing,

owever,

esires ts own destruction.

herefore,

he desire

for formcannot be in its privation, ut must be in matter tself.45 n

43

The

metaphysical

ndhistorical

ackgrounds

f

Albert's

octrinef nchoatio

ormarum

are

explored

y

B.

Nardi,

a dottrina

'Alberto

agno

uli "inchoatio

ormae

'

in:

d.,

tudii

filosofia

edievale

Storia

letteratura,

8),

Roma

1960,

9-101

Reprint

rom endiconti

dellaClasse

i Scienzi

Morali,

toriche

Filologiche

ell'Accademiaei

Lincei,

er.

,

vol.

12,

fase.

-2

1936), -38].

f.

M.J.F.M.

oenen,

he

Reparationes

ibrorumotiusatu-

ralis

hilosophiae(Cologne

494)

s a source

or

he atemedieval

ebatesetweenlbertistae

nd

Thomistae

in: Documentistudi ulla radizione

ilosofica

edievale,

V

(1993),

07-44,

esp.

23-6.

hetranslation

incipient

ctuality"

s

suggested

y .A.Weisheipl,

he

oncept

ofMatternFourteenthenturyciencein:E. McMullined.), he onceptfMatternGreeknd

Medieval

hilosophy

Notre

ame

1963, 47-69,

t

151-2.

44

Aristotle,

hysics

,

9,

ed. .

Bekker,

erolini

831,

92a

6-34.

45

On Albert's

iscussionf henature

fmatter's

ppetite

or

orm,

f.Hoenen 993

(above,

.

43),

324-6.



VERSOR ND

HIS RELATIONO

THE


the otherhand, since matterhas nothing n common withform,how

can it

be

susceptible

t all

to

the

perfection

ntailed

by

a

form?There

mustbe some

ntrinsic

rinciple

o account for he fact

hatmatter esires

form,

n

particular

because

that desire must be

natural,

not violent.46

According

o

Aristotle,

rivation

s

that

principle.

he

controversy

etween

Albert and

Thomas concerns

the

question

whether

privation

s to be

regarded

s

purelypassive potentiality,

r rather s

a

potency

which

is

in

some

way

active.

According

o

Albert,

privation

n

itself

s

just

the

absence

of

a

form

(

arenila

ormae)',

t does not contribute

nything ositively

nihil

onit).A1

his

is

in

accordance withAristotle's

istinction etween

matter nd form s

the

principles

er

se

of

any composite

being

and

privation

s a

principle

per

accidenswhich distinction

s taken over

by

Albert nd Thomas alike.

Yet

privation

annot be

reduced to

absolutely

othing,

n

Albert's

words,

because it

leaves an

aptitude

behind

n

the

subject

relinquitptitudinem

n

subiecto).

his

aptitude

s

the

potentiality

f matterwith

respect

o

form;

it

s

therefore

lso thatwhich

makesmatter

eceptive

o

change.48 othing,

however, esires nythinglse,unless t alreadyhas someincompleteike-

ness to it.

Therefore,

he

appetite

for form

n

mattermust

be of such

a

nature

that t has

a

beginning

f form:

n inchoatio

or

incohatio)ormae

49

As

Albert

xplains,

he

"Peripatetic"

ccount

he

gives

of the nature

of

matter's

usceptibility

o form avoids the

problems

caused

by

the two

46

Albertus

agnus,

hysica

lib.

1,

tr.

3,

c.

15,

ed. P. Hossfeld

ed.

Coloniensis,

vol.

V-1),


987,

9.22-30.

47

Cf.Albertus

agnus, hysica

lib.

1,

tr.

3,

c.

9,

ed.

P.

Hossfeld

ed.

Coloniensis,

vol. V-1),Monasteriiestfalorum987, 4.74-91.48

Albertus

agnus,

hysica

lib.

1,

tr.

3,

c.

9,

ed. P. Hossfeld

ed.

Coloniensis,

vol.

V-1),


987,

4.39-50.

49

Albertus

agnus,

iber e

praedicabilibus

tr.

5,

c.

4,

ed.

A.

Borgnet

Opera

mnia

vol.

),

Parisiis

890,

6b:

. materiaon stmateria

er

hoc

quod

stnudum

ubjec-

tum ormaeb omni

orma

enudatum,

ed

potius

n

materia

lege,

otentia)

d formam

per

nchoationemormae

n

psa.

Et deo

dicitur,

uod

materiaesiderat

ormam,

icut

foemina asculum:

on n

quantum

st

oemina,

ed

n

quantum

st

mperfecta.

. )

nec

perficiotest,

n

quo

non st

ptitudo

d

perfectionem.ptitudo

utemlla necessario

aliquid

st

erfectionis,uia

liter on

ppeteret

d

perfectionem."

he

uggestion

oread

"potentia"

or materia"omes rom

ardi

960

above,

.

43),

84.

Albertus

agnus,

Physica

ib.

,

r.

,

c.

10,

d.P.

Hossfeld

ed.

Coloniensis,

ol.

V-1),


1987, 2.92-73.6:Et deoverissimeictumst, uodnihilppétitliudnisi er imili-

tudinem

ncompletam,uam

habet

d

ipsum.

t ideo

appétitomplerier

transmuta-

tionemd

ipsum,

uod ppétit;

icet

nim

ns

ompletum

alvari

ppetat,

amen

ppetitus

transmutationis

on stnisi

ncompleti.

t

deo alis

ppetitus

st

materiae,

uaeper

mix-

turam

rivationis

um

psa

formaeabet

ncohationem,

d

quam

ransmutanesiderat."



306

PEPIJN

UTTEN

extremepositions fAnaxagorasand Plato (whichAristotle imself lso

discusses).Anaxagoras postulated

he latent

pre-existence

f

all

forms

n

matter

latentiaormarum

,

which

entails he false onclusions

hat

generation

is

really

alteration

and that

ultimately verything

s

everything

lse.

According

o

Plato,

on the other

hand,

matterhas no

privation

nd no

incipient

orm;

ll forms ome from

the

giver

of forms

datorormarum).

This leads to

the false conclusion

that

change

in

the

physical

world is

not

natural,

but violent

violentimi),

ecause it

has an

external

efficient

cause.50

According

o

a

Peripatetic

ictum,

however,

orms re extracted

frommatter

educuntur

e materia

.51

Therefore,

lthough

the

positions

of

both

Anaxagoras

and Plato

are to be

avoided,

the

Peripatetic

olution o

the

problem

s closer

to

Anaxagoras

than to Plato.52

On this ast

point

Thomas

Aquinas

agrees

with

his

teacher:

The idea

of

ncipient

orms omes close

to

assuming latency

f forms

n

matter.53

For

Thomas,

this s

all

the

more reason to dismiss he

idea of

incipient

formality,

hich he does

consistently,

oth

in

his

theological

nd

in his

50Albertusagnus,hysica,ib.1,tr.3,c. 15, d.P. Hossfelded.Coloniensis,ol.

IV-

),

Monasterii

estfalorum

987, 8.72-70.76,

nd

bid.,

.

16,

71.15-73.27.

51

The

origin

f he

ormula

ormae

ducunturematenar

ormae

ducunture

otentia

ateñae

is

unclear. he

referenceo

De

generatione

nimalium

n Mandonnet'sdition

fThomas'

Scriptum

eems

mistaken;

f. he

uotation

n note 6 below.

ajetan

alls

t secretum

eri-

pateticum

nddoesnot

give

reference;

f.

Thomas

quinas,

umma

heologiae,

a,

q.

90,

a.

2,

ad

2,

ed.

Leonina,

ol.

V,

Romae

889,

87b

Commentaria

ardinalis

aietani).

52

Albertus

agnus,

ibere

raedicabilibus,

r.

,

c.

4,

ed.

A.

Borgnet

Opera

mniavol.

I),

Parisiis

890,

5a-b:

Adomnia utem

aecdeterminanda

raenotandum

st,

uod

ut

dicit

verroes,

enus

on st

materia,

edforma

eneralis,

t

confusa,

t

ndistincta,

t

diffusa

n

materia

on eterminata

er

ormam:

uam

iffusamormamt

onfusam

ocant

quidamormaenchoationem:ropteruamnchoationemormaenmateriaiffusampsa

materia

quibusdam

ntiquis

ocus

ormae

icebatur,

n

quo

atentormae:t deo aten-

tiam ormarum

rincipium

ecerunt,

tdictumst

n

Physicis,

t rat oc ictum

naxagorae:

propter

uod

tiam

ristotelest

omnes

eripatetici

ixerunt

duci e materia

mnes or-

mas,

tnon sse

as a datorextrínseco.

Elsewhere

lbert

laims ith verroeshat

he

other

hilosophers

eant

he ame s

Aristotle,

ut

acked hewords

o

express

hem-

selves

orrectly;

f.Albertus

agnus,

umma

heologiaepars

2,

q.

4,

m.

2,

a.

4,

ed.

A.

Borgnet

Opera

mniavol.

XXXII),

arisiis

895,

0a: "ideo

icit ommentator

uper

XI

primae

hilosophiaequod

mneslii

Philosophi,

cilicet

t

ponentes

atentiam,

t

ponentes

datorem

ormarum,

ui

mediantibus

irtutibusoelestibus

t elementalibus

t

formativis

generantium

irtutibus,

nfluitt

nvehitormas

n

materiam,

oluerunt

dem

icere

uod

dixit

ristoteles,

uod

cilicet

ormae

otentia

n

materiassent:

ed erbis

ropriis

esciverunt

exprimere.."

53

Thomas

quinas,

n duodecim

ibros

etaphysicorum

ristotelis

xposition

ib.

7,

ect.

,

ed.

M.-R.

Cathala R.M.

Spiazzi,

aurini-Romae

950,

52-3

no.

14426):

Haec

autem

opinio

idetur

ropinqua

onentibus

atitationem

ormarum.um

enim

ihil

gat

nisi

secundum

uod

est

n

actu:

i

partes

el nchoationes

ormarum

uae

sunt

n

materia,



VERSOR

ND

HIS RELATIONO

THE

SCHOOLS

F THOUGHT

307

philosophicalworks. n the Summa heologiaein his commentary n the

Sentences

nd

in

his commentaries

n the

Physics

nd the

Metaphysics

Thomas

rejects

the notion

of inchoatio

ormae

n

the

sense

explained

by

Albert.54

Thomas

explains

that

matter annot

have an intrinsic

ctive

principle.

Such

a

principle

would

mean that

something

has the

ability

to effect

change

in

itself,

which

only

occurs

in

living

creatures,

ot

in

inanimate

things.55

homas endorses

he

view thatforms

re extracted

rom

matter,

but

denies

thatthis

entails

n

active

potency

n

matter.He

also

expressly

counters

lbert's

rgumentoncerning

he

supposedly

iolent

i.e.

unnatural)

character f

change

effected ithout he

participation

fan active

potency

in

matter;

ormatter

ssists

n

generation,

ot

by

actively

ontributing

o

the

process,

but

by

reason

of its

aptness

to receive forms.

That

aptness

may

be called

"appetitus

materiae"

or "inchoatio

formae",

but

it is a

purelypassive

potency.56

habentliquamirtutemctivam,equituruod int liquomodo ctu, uod stponerelatitationemormarum."

54

Thomas

Aquinas,

n

octoibros

hysicorum

ristotelis

xpositio

lib.

1,

lect.

13,

ed.

M.

Maggiolo,

aurini-Romae

954,

8

(no. 114):

Patet

rgo

ecundum

ntentionem

Aristotelis

uod

privatio,uae

poniturrincipium

aturae

er

ccidens,

on st

liqua

aptitudo

d

formam,

el nchoatio

ormae,

el

liquod rincipium

mperfectum

ctivum,

ut

quidam

icunt,

ed

psa

arentiaormae

el ontrarium

ormae,

uod

ubiectoccidit."

Cf.Thomas

quinas,

n duodecimibros

etaphysicorum

ristotelis

xpositio

lib.

7,

ect.

,

ed.

M.-R. athala R.M.

piazzi,

aurini-Romae

950,

52-3

no. 442oc-Q;

homas

quinas,

Scriptum

uper

ibros

ententiarum,

ib.

,

d.

18,

.

1,

a.

2,

ed. P.

Mandonnet

vol. I),

Parisiis

1929, 50-4;

homas

quinas,

umma

heologiae

Ilia,

q.

32,

a.

4,

corp.,

d.

Leonina,

vol.

XI,

Romae

903,

37a-b.

55Thomas quinas,n duodecimibrosetaphysicorumristotelisxpositiolib.7, ect. ,ed.

M.-R.

Cathala R.M.

Spiazzi,

aurini-Romae

950,

53

no. 1442e).

56

Thomas

quinas,

criptumuper

ibros

ententiarumlib.

2,

d.

18,

.

1,

a.

2,

corp.,

d.

R.P. Mandonnet

vol. I),

Parisiis

929,

50-454:

. aliidicunt

uod

um mnes

or-

mae,

ecundum

hilosophum,

e

gener.

nimal

,

lib.

I,

cap.

3,

de

potentia

ateriae

du-

cantur,

portet

psas

ormas

raeexistere

n

materia

ncomplete,

ecundum

uamdamuasi

inchoationemaliter

nim on sset

eneratio

utatio

aturalis,

edviolenta Hoc

autem erum

on idetur:

uia uamvis

ormaeducanture

potentia

ateriae,

lla

arnen

potentia

ateriaeon st

ctiva,

ed

passiva

antum;

icut

nim..

in

motuocali

portet

esse liudmovenst

motum,

ta etiam

n

motu

lterationis;

t

ponit xemplumuod,

quando orpus

aturaliter

anatur,

or

st

anans,

t alia membraanata

Nec tamen

sequitur,

i

n

materiast

potentiaassiva

antum,

uod

non it

generatio

aturalis:

uia

materiaoadjuvatdgenerationemon gendo,ed nquantumsthabilisdrecipiendum

talem

ctionem,

uae

etiam abilitas

ppetitus

ateriaeiciturt nchoatio

ormae

Et

ideo concedo

uod

n

materia

ulla

potentia

ctiva

st,

ed

purepassiva".

f.

Thomas

quinas,

umma

heologiae,

a,

q.

45,

a.

8,

corp.,

d.

Leonina,

ol.

V,

Romae

1888, 77a-b,

nd bid

,

q.

65,

.

4,

corp.,

d.

Leonina,

ol.

V,

Romae

889,

52a-153a.



308

PEPIJN

OTTEN

Albert'sposition s adopted by his earlyfollowers,uch as his pupil

Udalricus de

Argentina

Ulrich

von

Strassburg).57

t is

again

taken

up by

fifteenth-century

lbertistsuch

as

Johannes

e Nova Domo and

Heymericus

de

Campo.

In his treatise n

being

and

essence,

ohannes

de

Nova

Domo

ascribes

n essence to

prime

matter,

ecause

everybeing

esse)

s the

act

of

an

essence

and

in

matter here

s

formable ormal

being

(esse ormale

formabile

as

opposed

to

formaleormans

nd

formaleormátům).

his

essence

of

prime

matter

omprises

subjective

otency

nd an

aptitude

orform.

From

this essence

flows

fluii

the formable ormal

being,

which is also

called esse

ormalis

nchoationisnd which is

essentially

he same as form.

Thus,

Johannes

takes over Albert's

position

that matter's

potency

with

regard

o

form s

already omething

ormal

tself.58

eymericus

e

Campo

does the

same

in

the treatisewhich

explicitly

iscussesthe

"problems"

betweenAlbertists

nd

Thomists,

he Tractatus

roblematicus.59

eymericus

also

adopts

Albert's

doxographic erspective

n the

history

f

philosophy

(from

Albert's

ommentary

n the

Metaphysics

,

according

o

which

there

are three

main

philosophical

ects:

Peripatetics, picureans

and Stoics.60

The PeripateticsollowAristotle,heEpicureans includinghepre-socratic

natural

philosophers)

follow

Anaxagoras

and the Stoics

(including

Pythagoreans

nd

Platonists)

ollow Plato.

Heymericus'

account of

the

Platonist,

Epicurean

and

Peripatetic

Peripatetici

. .

viammediam

enentes)

57

Cf.Ulrich on

Strassburg,

e summo

ono,

ib.

4,

tr.

2,

cap.

7,

ed. S.

PieperhofF

(De

summo

ono,

iber

,

Tractatus

-2,7), amburg

987,

28.251-131.364;

t

128.257-8:

"materiaon

ppétit

ormam,

isi

nquantum

st

n

psaprivatio,uae

est ncohatioor-

mae

n

materia";bid.,

t 131.345-6:

formast

n

materia

er

ssentiamecundumsse

imperfectumt confusumotentiale."58

Johannes

e

Nova

Domo,

ractatuse

sset

ssentia,

.

4,

prop.

,

ed.

G.

Meersseman,

in: Meersseman933

above,

.

6),

91-191,

t 135-7

with

eferenceso

Albert):

Quia

esse

ecundum

otumuum mbitům

st ctus ssentiae ideo

bicumque

ecipitur

sse,

ibi

recipitur

ssentia.

mnis

nim ssentiaormalis

st,

uia

b

ea

fluit

sse,

t tahabet

modůmormalis

ormae;

ormalis

ico elformabilis

el

formantisel

formatae.

n

natura

materiae

rimae

eperitur

sse

ormale

ormabile,

t

proportionabile

eperitur

n

essentia.

In essentia

rimae

ateriaenvenitur

liquid

uod mportatur

omine

otentiae

ubiecti-

vae,

ui oncreata

st

ptitudo

euhabilitasd

formam;

uaequidemptitudo

um

oten-

tiamateriae

ocatur

ssentia,

qua

fluitsse

ormale

ormabile,

uod

ocatursse

ormalis

inchoationis,

e

quo

solet

ici

uod

st dem

ecundumssentiamum

orma."

59

Heymericus

e

Campo,

roblematanter

lbertům

agnum

tSanctum

homam

above,

n. 13), robi. ,f.elr-v: . privatiostnegatioormeum ormaliptitudined ean-

dem,

t

per onsequens

portetonere

nmateriaormalem

ptitudinem

t nchoationem."

60

On Albert's

hilosophical

oxography

n

his

commentary

n the

Metaphysics,

f.

G.

Santinello,

toriaella

ibsofia

storia

ei

ilosofi:

l commento

iAlbertol ibrodella

Metafisica",

in:

Medioevo,

VI

(1990),

3-70.



VERSOR

NDHIS RELATIONO

THE


views on the relationbetween matter nd formcompletely orresponds

to

Albert's.61

eymericus

warns that the Albertists ith their"formable

formal

ssences"

may

incline owards

Anaxagoras'

theory

f

atent

forms,

whereas he

Thomists,

who

acknowledge nly passive

potency

n

matter,

may

inclinetowards

he "stoic"

theory

f "sterile"matter.62

The

passage

from

he Tractatus

roblematicus

n

which

Heymericus

ketches

this

pectrum

f

positions

s

incorporated

lmost

word forword

n a

work

thatwas

published

y

the Bursa aurentiana

n

1494,

the

Reparationes

ibrorum

totius aturalis

hilosophiae.

In

addition,

his

work also includes

an inde-

pendent

ssimilationf Albert's

hought,

hich

repeats

hemain

arguments

advanced

by

Albert:

Only

on account of the nchoate tatus f forms an

one

explain

that forms re extracted

from

matter,

hat

mattercan

be

perfected

y

form,

nd that

change

n

natural

hings

oes

not come from

outside.64

n

sum,

there s an

obvious,

Albertist

ine

of

thought

which

clearly

has a

direct

relation o the

writings

f Alberthimself.

61

Cf. bove.

eymericus

e

Campo,


agnum

t anctumhomam

(above, . 13), robi. ,f.d5r-v:Dicebat nim lato uodmateriast oeternaatoriformarumcui lledator ola uabonitatetimulatusmprimitmaginesonformesuis

ydealibus

ationibus..

E

contrautem icunt

picurei,

uorumaput

uit

naxagoras,

quod

materia

st

universorum

rimum

t

perfectissimumrincipiumuod

n

se

prehabet

omniumormas

uas

subiectiveustentâted velamentoccidentium

psam

estientium

occultantur

e alicui

ppareant

reter

arn

ue

dat

materie

n hoc

vel

n lionomen.

t

dicit uiusmodiatentiasllucescere

er gentia

aturaliaemoventiab

ipsa

materiaalia

accidentiaccultantiatobumbrancia

ucem alium

ormarum,

ta

uod

generatio

on st

aliud

uam

evelatioormeubstantialisntus

epulte

n

caligine

aterie.

t alteratiost

revelatiolicuiusormeccidentalisimiliteratitantis

Peripatetici

ero,

uorumrchipa-

ter uit

restoteles,

iammediamenentesixeruntateriamecomnino

sse

nudam

t

sterilem,

icut iunt latonicit

Stoyci,

ec

prorsus

ecunditateormarum

ctuatam,

icut

pretenduntpicurei,ed rehabereasformasecundumotentiamt bagentibusxpectare

illius

otentie

ormativos

formativus

d.

actus,

ui

ermob

omnibusectatoribusrestotelis

concorditer

ccipitur."

62

Ibid.,

.

d5v:

Sedeius

ntelligentia

deo

dispar

nvenitur

ic,

uod

hii

videnturec-

linared

opinionem

toycorum,

iivero d

positionem

picureorum.

obis

nim,

uxta

viam t ntellectumoctoris

agni

ales ormas

reesse

n

materia

er

ssentiasuas or-

males ormabiles

onentibus,nponitur

rror

naxagore,

icut

t

sectatoribusoctoris

Sancti,

olam

otentiam

ubiectivamaterie

onfitentibus,

rror

mpingiturtoycorum."

63

Reparationes

ibrorumotius

aturalis

hilosophiaeanonymous),

ologne

494;

f.

Voulliéme

1903

above,

.

1),

443

no. 1016).

ee the

part oncerning

he

Physics

lib.

1,

tr.

,

ff.

c2v-c3r.

n these

eparationes

nd the

genre

f

reparationes

n

general,

f.Hoenen 993

(above,

.

43).

64Reparationesibrorumotiusaturalishilosophiaeabove, .63), nPhys.ib.1,tr. ,f. 2r:

"Queritur

uomodoatet uod

ormeecundum

liquod

sse arum

intnchoate

n

mate-

ria . .

Rationeic

primo atet,

uia

nihil

duciture

aliquo

isi

liquo

modo

refuerit

in

o. Sedformeducunture

potentia

aterie,

rgo

ecundum

liquod

sse arumuerunt

in

materia.oc autem

sse

stformale

ormabile.ecundo

robatur

ic. n

omnimotu



310

PEPIJN

UTTEN

JohannesVersorbriefly iscusses he same topicofincipient ormality

in

his

commentary

n the

sagoge

Again

(cf. § 3),

his text s based

loosely

on Albert's

ommentary,

ut he

keeps

his distance rom he kindof

oyalty

to Albert

isplayed y Heymericus

r the

Reparationes.

nsteadof

defending

either Albert's or

Thomas'

position,

he

juxtaposes

their views without

showing

a

preference

or either one.65The

theory

of

inchoatio

ormarum

is encountered ere

n

a

logico-metaphysical

ontext,

ecause it elucidates

the

relationbetween

a

genus

and its differences.

ust

as

prime

matter

is not

purelypassive

and

uninformed,

o a

genus

is a

"general,

onfuse

and indistinct orm"which

potentially

i.e.

on account of a

potestas)

on-

tains the

specific

ifferencesnd which s called inchoatio

ormae.66

ersor's

paraphrase

of

the

passage

fromAlbert's

ommentary

oes not contribute

a

single original thought,

ut he does mention the fact that Thomas

Aquinas

holds

different

pinion:

It seems hat

he

Holy

Doctor

contradicts

him,

negating

he inchoateness

f forms

n

matter."67

n

the next

page,

Versor mentionsthe same

disagreement

etween Albert

and Thomas

velmutationeportetliquodntrinsecet formalitererfici.ed hocquod ic ntrinsece

perficitur

on

otest

sse ubstantia

aterie,

cilicet

otentia

ius

ubiectiva,

uia

lia em-

per

ademmanetubdiversisormis.ed erit

liquod reter

ateriam

psi

materie

uper-

additum,

cilicet

otentia

ormalisaterie

ue

denticeransit

n

actum. t hocvocatur

formenchoatio.ertio

robatur

atione

ic.

Si non

ssent

orme

ecundum

liquod

sse

in

materia

nchoate,

unc

mnes ormeenirente

foris,

uod

amen st

ontramnes

rationales

hilosophos."

65

Albertus

agnus,

iber e

praedicabilibus,

r.

5,

c.

4,

ed.

A.

BorgnetOpera

mnia

vol.

),

Parisiis

890, 1b-97a;

ohannes

ersor,uestiones

uinquéredicabiliumorphiriiabove,

n.

34),

.

26,

ff.

1ra-21vb.

66

ee Albertus

agnus,

ibere

raedicabilibus

tr.

,

c.

4,

ed. A.

BorgnetOpera

mnia,

vol. ),Parisiis890, 5b quotedbove, .52).For he uestionfwhetherne hould

speak

í

potentia

r

otestas

cf.

bid.,

4a-96bnd he

ummaryy ohannes

ersor,uestiones

quinquéredicabilium

orphiriiabove,

.

34),

.

26,

f.

2

vb.

67

Johannes

ersor, uestiones

uinquéredicabilium

orphirìiabove,

.

34),

.

26,

f.

2

1

b:

"Ex

quo

oriturubitatio

e modo

uomodo

ifferentie

pposite

unt

n

genere,

t a

quo

genus

abet

as,

ut cilicet

seipso

el b alio

respondet

enerabilisominuslbertus

notando

liqua,

t bi n

aliquibus

unctis

ibi ontradicereideturoctor

anctus,

icut

notabitur

aute dvertenti.otât

giturrimo

enerabilisominus

lbertus

quod

enus

non

st

materia,

ed st

orma

eneralis,

onfusatdistinctaiffusa

n

materia,

uam

or-

mam ocatAlbertus

nchoationemormarum

n

materia,

ui

ponit

uod

n

naturalibus

forma

nte

enerationem

ormaliter

reest

n

materia,

n

esse amen

onfuso,ndistincto,

formabilit

distinguibili.

. )

Doctor anctus ideturibi ontradicere

egans

nchoat-

ionemormarumnmateria. )Etde sta nchoationeormarumabeturrimohisicorum.

Vide bi."Note hat he

pronoun

sibi" s used

n

a non-reflexive

ay

here,

hich as

commont

the

ime;

f.G. Du

Cange,

lossariumediaet

nfimae

atinitatis,

ol.

,

Parisiis

1846,

35b;

O.

Weijers

M.

Gumbert-Hepp,

exicon

atinitatis

ederlandicae

edii

evi,

ol.

VII,

Leiden

002,

602

S 433):

sibi,

ei:

passim".



VERSOR ND

HIS RELATIONO

THE

SCHOOLS

F THOUGHT 3

11

twice.68 et comparedto theway in which,for nstance,Heymericus e

Campo opposes

Albertto Thomas

and

refutes

homas'

views,

Versor's

textreads like

a truce.Versor does

not side withAlbert

ike

Heymericus

or

Johannes

de

Nova Domo

did,

he

merelyrepeats

him.

He does not

side with

Thomas either.He mentions

he difference

f

opinion,

nd that

is all.

In

his

commentary

n Aristotle's

hysics

however,

ohn

Versor

unam-

biguously ejects

Albert'snotion

of inchoate

forms.69

lthough

hiswork

bears traces of both

Albert's nd Thomas'

influence

through

heir om-

mentaries n the

Physics)

Versor

decidedly

follows

Aquinas

on the issue

of matter's

usceptibility

o form.70

s

in

his

commentary

n the

Isagoge

Versor mentions

he

controversy

etween

Albertand Thomas

explicitly.

Here,

he also devotes

separatequestion

o its solution.71 fter

lengthy

discussion

of

arguments,

ncluding

a sketch of the doctrinal

spectrum

(Anaxagoras,

lato,

Peripatetics),

ersor oncludeswith

Thomas

"Conclusio

responsalis

um doctore

sancto")

that substantial ormshave

no formal

being

n

matter efore

he

composite

hing

s

generated.

The

main

argu-

menthe advances here to support his onclusion s that ubstantial orms

give

substantial

eing;

hence,

f

a

substantial

ormwere

essentially resent

68

Johannes

ersor, uestiones

uinqué

redicabiliumorphiriiabove,

.

34),

.

26,

f.

2

vb:

"Et cum

uerebatur

n differentieint

n

genere

icut

n

quodam

eminario,

espondit

dominuslbertus

uod

ic,

uia

realisnchoatioormarum

n

materiaicitursse emen

omniumormarum

pecificarum

Sed

sanctus

homas ene onvenitum o

in

hoc

quodgenus

st

rincipium

ifferentiarum

n

genere

ause ormalison ormantistdeter-

minantis,

edformabilist

distinguibilis.

ed

n

ponendo

alemnchoationemealem is-

convenit

um o. Ideo non

ponit

uod

differentieint nchoate

n

genere

ealitered

tantumecundumationem."69

use the dition

rintedy

Mathias uss

n

Lyon:

hisica

ersoris,

yon

1489

(=

Hain

16023),

f. lva-c4va.

his ditionncludes

uestions-commentaries

n ll

physical

works

Physica

De

cáelo,

e

generatione,

eteora,

e

anima,

arva

aturalia).

f.

Birkenmajer

1925

above,

.

4),

131-5;

ain 1838

above,

.

1),

486.

70

One

of

the

manuscripts

Praha,

nihovna

etropolitníapituly,

od.

L

37,

at

f.

252r)

fVersor's

hysical

orks

xplicitly

otes hat

hey

re Collectex Commentariis

clarissimorumt llustrium

irorum,

idelicetoctorisancti

home e

Alquino

tdomini

Alberti

agni piscopi atisponensi";

s

quoted

sic)

y

Fliieler994

above,

.

33),

3.

71

hisica ersons

above,

.

69),

f. clvb: "secundumanctumhomamalis

ptitudo

(scilicet

ptitudo

ateried

formam,

R)

non st

liquid

ealiter

reale d.]

istinctum

materiaed olum atione Dicit arnen lbertus

uod

hec

aptitudo

eu

appetitus

st

habitualisnchoatioormauperadditaateriet distinctaealitermateria,uiatalis

inchoatiost iusdemssentie

um

forma

De

ista ontroversia

n

sequentibus

atius

videbitur."

he

discussion

f

the

ontroversy

hen

ollows

n

the econd ext

uestion;

Ibid.,

.

c2vb:

Queritur

ecimooctavo

trumormaubstantialisnte

generationem

ei

cuius st ormait

n

materiaecundumsse ormaleormabile."



3

1

PEPIJN

UTTEN

in matterbeforethe generation f the composite hing, ubstantial en-

erationwould be

impossible

nd

only

ccidental

hange

would be

possible:

All

generation

would be mere alteration.

hus,

Versor accuses Albertof

falling

nto the error of

Anaxagoras.72

his is the same

argument

hat

Thomas

Aquinas

had

already

advanced

against

Albert.73

To sum

up:

Versor is

obviously

ware of the

controversy

ver the

notion of

inchoate

formality,

ut,

whereas

in

his

commentary

n the

Physics

e defendsThomas'

position,

n

his

commentary

n

the

sagoge

e

leaves

the matterundecided.

n

order to know whether his

disparity

s

accidental or

structural,

e will have to

investigate

ther contentious

issues.

n

the

following

will

briefly

iscusstwo more

problems

put

for-

ward

by

Versor himself. he

first

oncerns

he

distinction etween

orma

totiusnd

forma artis

n

substances

omposed

of matter nd form

§

4.2);

the second

concerns he

principle

f individuation

§

4.3).

4.2.

The

Theoiy

f

forma otius

nd forma

partis

The

theory

of

forma artis

nd

forma

otius

lays

an

important

ole

in

Albert's hought.n his discussion f the ontological tatusof universais

in

his

commentary

n

Porphyry,

lbertraises the

question

whether he

universal

s matter r form.

ince it cannot be

matter,

he next

question

is: Is it the

forma artis

r the

forma

otiusThe

forma artis

s

the

form

which s

part

of

a

composite

nd which nforms he other

part, namely

matter. he

forma

otiuss the form

f a

composite

whole,

.e. its essence.

In

man,

the

forma artis

s his soul which nforms is

body,

whereas the

forma

otius

s

human

nature.The

forma

artis

annotbe the

universal,

ince

it

is

not

predicated

f that

which

t

informs:Man is not his soul.74 ence

72

hisica ersoris

above,

.

69),

f. c4ra: Conclusio

esponsalis

um

doctoreancto:

Forma ubstantial

nte

enerationem

ei uius st

forma on st

n

materiaecundum

esse ormale

ormabile

Probatur De rationeormeubstantial

stdare sse im-

pliciter.

i

ergo

orma

ubstantialst

n materiaecundum

ssentiam,

equituruod psa

datesse

impliciter

aterie

t

per

onsequensuicquid

dvenit

ost

st ccidens.t

ta

destrueretur

mnis

eneratio

ubstantialist

omne ierisset

lterali,

t

ponebantntiqui

Philosophi."

73

Cf.

bove,

. 53.

74

Albertus

agnus,

iber e

praedicabilibus,

r.

2,

c.

8,

ed. A.

Borgnet

Opera

mnia

vol. ),Parisiis890, 7b: . quaeriturujusmodiormait? st nim ormaotius,t

humanitas

stforma

ominis:utforma

artis,

icut

nima stforma

orporis

umani.

Forma utem

artis

ivemateriae

on

praedicatur

e

re

cujus

st

forma,

eduniversale

bene

raedicatur.

niversale

rgo

on st orma

artis

elmateriaeecundum

uod

mate-

ria

perficitur

er

formam."



VERSOR ND

HIS RELATIONO

THE

SCHOOLS F

THOUGHT

313

the universalmust be theforma otiusbut thisform an be designatedn

two

ways:

Either t

is

designated

s the mere form

forma antum)

r for-

mal

essence

essentiaormalis)

f

the

composite

being;

or it

is

designated

s

expressing

he whole

being

(totumsse)

f a

composite

of which it

is the

form.

n

the

first

ase,

a

man's form

s

expressed

by

the word "human-

ity" (humanitas).

n

the second

case,

a man's form s

expressed

by

the

word

"man" or "human"

[homo). nly

when

designated

n

the second

way

can the

formof the whole

{forma otius)

e

predicated

of

the

com-

posite

whole,

for we cannot

say

"Socrates

is

humanity"

ut we can

say

"Socrates s human".75

herefore,

he universal s the form f the

whole,

designated

s

expressing

he whole

being

of the

particular hing.76

One of

Johannes

Versor's

questions

on

the

praedicabilia

s whether he

universal

s

matter

r formor the

composite

whole;

it mirrors

he

pas-

sage ust

discussed romAlbert's

ommentary

n

Porphyry.77

ersor takes

over both Albert's

division f the two kinds of form

nd his account of

the twofold

esignation

f the

forma

otius™

aving

concluded that the

universal s the form f the

whole

in

as much as it

expresses

he whole

75

Albertus

agnus,

iber e

praedicabilibus,

r.

2,

c.

8,

ed. A.

BorgnetOpera

mnia,

vol.

),

Parisiis

890,

8a: "Sedformaotius

upliciteresignatur

n

nomine:

esignate

enim t forma

antum,

icut umanitas

stforma

esignata

t forma

antum,

uae

est

essentiaormalis:

t deonon

raedicatur

e eo

cujus

st

orma,

uia

homo on

st

ssentia

sua

formalis,

ec

liquid

liorum

uae

formasabent.

esignatur

tiam

t

formaotius

totumssedicens

ujus

st

forma:t tunc

esignaturer

sse

uod

dat i

in

quo

est t

nomen,

icut

omo icit sse ormale

uod

formaotiusathuic

ompositouod

st

hie

homo."

76

bid.:

Relinquitur

rgo,uod

niversaleit

orma

otiust otumsse icens

esignata".

Cf.G.Wieland,ntersuchungenumeinsbegriffmMetaphysikkommentarlbertses rossenBeiträge

zurGeschichteer

Philosophie

nd

Theologie

es

Mittelalters,

eue

Folge,

),

Münster

1972,

7-31.

77

Johannes

ersor, uestiones


.

34),

.

15,

f. 3va-

14ra;

Albertus

agnus,

iber

e

praedicabilibus

tr.

2,

c.

8,

ed. A.

BorgnetOpera

mnia

vol.

),

Parisiis

890,

7b-39a.

78

Johannes

ersor,

uestiones


.

34),

.

15,

.

13va-b:

"Sciendum

uodduplex

st

forma,

cilicet

orma

artis ue

est ctus t

perfectioartis

compositi

antum,

cilicet

aterie,

icut nima

n

hominest ctusmaterieominis.lia

estformaotius

ue

sciliceton st ctusmaterie

antum,

edest ctus otius

ompositi

ex materiat forma

artis.

t

hec forma

upliciteresignatur:

no modo

er

nomen

abstractum

er uod ignificaturer

modumormeantumum

rescisione

aterie,

icut

hoc nomen umanitasignificaiormamotiusermodum ormeantum,t deonon

predicatur

e eo cuius st orma. liomodo

esignaturer

nomenoncretum

er uod

significatur

tdiceresotumsse ius uius st

forma,

t ta

ignificatur

ormaotius

er

universaleomen t

st

n

habente,

icut ocnomen omo

ignificai

ormam

otiust st

in

habente,

t ob hoc

predicatur

e eo cuius st orma."



3

1

PEPIJN

UTTEN

esseof that of whichit is the form,Versorgoes on to ask whether he

form f the

part

and the form f the

whole are one and the

same form

secundum

em.79ersor

responds

o

this

question

by distinguishing

he

opin-

ions

of Thomas and

Albert.

They agree

as far as the

separate

ubstances

are

concerned,

n

which there

s no

real

composition ccording

o both

Dominican

doctors,

ut

theydisagree

with

respect

o

composite

ubstances.

Thomas

says

that

n

composite

ubstances here s also

a real

distinction,

because the

forma

otius

omprises

he essence of both

matter nd

forma

partis

and hence the

forma artis

s a

part

of the

forma

otius

According

o

Albert,

owever,

he

orma

otiusf a

composite

ubstance oes not nclude

matter,

ut

merely

orm.80

Versornotes

hat he Albertists

lbertiste

explain

his

position

n

different

ways.81

ome

Albertists,

ays

Versor,

nterpret

lbert'swords

n

terms f

a rational

istinction,

hereasothers

ake

him

to mean a real distinction.82

He does not

mention

ny

Albertists

y

name,

but it seems reasonable

to

assume that

f

he knew

anything

bout

Albertism,

e would have been

acquainted

with some

worksof the

Parisian Albertist

ohannes

de

Nova

Domo (Versorhimself eing activein Paris).Johannesde Nova Domo

also elaborates

on the

relationbetween the two forms

n

order to solve

79

Ibid.,

.13vb: Conclusio

ecunda: niversale

st ormaotiust otumsse

ei icens

illius uius st

forma Dubitatur

rimo:

trum

orma

artis

t formaotiusint

na

format eadem ecundum

em."

80

bid.' Ad

hoc

espondet

anctus

homas

uod

n

rebus

ompositis

xformat

materia

distinguuntur

ecundum

em,

uia

secundum

psum

ormaotius

omplectitur

ssentiam

forme

artis

t

etiammaterie.

t sicformaotiuse

habet d formam

artis

icut

otum

ad

partem.

ed

nrebus

eparatis

materiaorma

artis

tformaotius

on

istinguuntur

secundumem,uiaunanihilontinetreterliam. t nhacparteene onvenitlbertus

cumdoctoreancto.

ed

in

rebus

ompositis

x materiat

forma icitAlbertus

uod

forma otius

t humanitas

n

homine on

ncludit ateriamed

estformaantum."

Cf.

Thomas e

Aquino,

e ente

t ssentia

cap.

2,

ed.

Leonina,

ol.

XLIII,

Roma

1976,

373.281-91:

nomenutem

ignificans

d unde umitur

atura

peciei,

um

precisione

materie

esignate,ignificai

artem

ormalem.

t ideo humanitas

ignificatur

t

forma

quedam,

t

dicitur

uod

st

orma

otius;

on

uidem

uasi uperaddita

artibus

ssentialibus,

scilicet

ormet

materie,

icut orma

omus

uperadditur

artibus

ntegralibus

ius: ed

magis

st orma

ue

est

otum,

cilicet

ormam

omplectens

t

materiam,

arnen

um

re-

cisione

orum

erque

nata stmateria

esignali."

orAlbert's

iew,

f.Wieland

972

(above,

.

76),

9-31.

81

Johannes

ersor,

uestiones

uinqué

redicabilium

orphirii

above,

.

34),

.

15,

. 13vb:

"Et llud iversimodexponuntlbertiste."

82

bid

,

f.13vb-14ra:

Quidam

nim

icunt lbertům

ntellexisse

uod

formaotius

non

distinguuntur

forme

artis>

e

sed

rationeantum

. Sed

alii dicunt lbertům

intellexisse

cilicet

uod

x unione

orme

artis

ummateriaésultat

naformaistincta

realiterforma

artis

t

a materiat

a toto

omposito

t materiat

forma."



VERSOR NDHIS

RELATIONO

THE

SCHOOLS F

THOUGHT 315

theproblemwhether he distinctions real or rational.83 is account of

the

relation

places

him in

the second

group

of Albertists

mentioned

by

Versor.

According

o

Johannes

de Nova

Domo,

in

substances

omposed

of matter nd form

there s

a

real distinction

etween

orma artis

nd

forma

otius.Mhe

Copulata ulchenima

ompiled by

the

Thomistsfrom he

Bursa

Montana t

Cologne

also

note that the

opinions

concerning

he dis-

tinction f

forma artis

nd

forma

otius

iverge.

This

text

argues against

those who

deny

that

n

composite

ubstances he

distinctions

real,

and

thus t

represents position orresponding

o Versors

accountof Thomas'

position namely,

hat he distinctions

real).85

n this

point,

hen,

Thomas

Aquinas,Johannes

de Nova Domo and the

Thomists eem to

agree.

Both

Versor nd the Thomists

n

Cologne

mention he

opinion

of

others

some

of

the

Albertists,

ccording

o

Versor)

hatthe distinctions

rational.Now

this

position

an be found

n

the worksof

Heymericus

e

Campo

not

in

the Tractatus

roblematicus

but

in

the

Compendium

ivinorum.

ere,

Heymericus

xplicitly

enies that the

distinction

s

real.86

hus,

although

it is obvious that

the

problem

of the

distinction etween

orma

otius

nd

forma artis laysa role in the school debates,at thispointit seems too

complicated

o contribute o our

understanding

f Versor's

place

in

those

debates.

From

a

doctrinal

oint

of

view,

t remainsunclear

which

posi-

tion would

count

as

distinctly

homisticdoctrine nd which

as

distinctly

Albertist octrine.

However,

the

way

in

which Versor

treats he

problem

does

reveal

something

lse:

Although

Versor mentions

he

Albertists,

e

does not

count himself

mong

them.

Moreover,

s

in

the case of his dis-

cussion of inchoatio

ormae

n

his

commentary

n the

Isagoge

he does not

83

Johannes

e Nova

Domo,

ractatuse sset

ssentia

q.

4,

prop.

,

ed.G.

Meersseman,

in:

Meersseman933

above,

.

6),

149-68.

84

bid

,

149-50:

Quamvis

n

substantia

omposita

ecundumem it

eperire

ormam

partis

istinctam

ealiterontraormam

otius,

amensse ormae

otiusésultatt

emanat

ab esse ormae

artis.

sse ormaeotiusoco

uodper

diffinitum

icitur

mplicite

t

per

diffinitionem

xplicite,uod

uidam

ocant

uiditatem

ei,

lii

ssentiam

ei,

lii

naturam

formalem.

sse ero ormae

artis

st sse nthelechiae

orporis.

ctusutem

ive nthelechia

corporisistinguitur

toto

sse ei."

85

Copulata

ukherrimaabove,

.

28),

.

lrb.The

famousambertuse

Montes some-

times

egarded

s themost

mportant

ontributor

o worksuch s

these

opulata

which

are

collectiveffortsf the

mastersf the

BursaMontanacf.

Kneepkens

003

above,

n.9),117. ambertuse Monte ashead f heMontanaor ineteenears1480-1499);

cf.Tewes 993

above,

.

8),

34.

86

Heymericus

e

Campo, ompendium

ivinorum

V,

ed.

J.B.

Korolec,

n:

J.B.

Korolec,

"Compendium

ivinorum

Heimeryka

e

Camporkp.J

95.

ohoňczenie

n: tudia

ediewistyczne,

9

(1968),

-90,

ee

55.860-56.925,

sp.

56.911-9.



316

PEPIJN

OTTEN

even takeposition n thedebate.Here, VersormerelyistswhatThomas,

Albertand the different lbertists

ay.

But

again

there

s anotherwork

in which he discusses

he

same

topic

and

argues

in

favourof Thomas.

In his

commentary

n

De ente t essentia,

Versor

poses

the same

question

about

forma

artis

nd

forma

otius

gain.87

Here,

he

is not

commenting

upon

an Aristotelian

r

Porphyrian

ext,

but on

a work of Thomas

Aquinas.

The difference

ith the

parallel

passage

from

his

commentary

on the

Isagoge

s

revealing.

Again,

Versor

writes

hat Thomas

Aquinas

argues

that

in

composite

substances

here

s a

real distinction

etween

forma artis

nd

forma

otius. ne reasonis thatthe form f the

part

can

remain

when the form

of

the

whole is

corrupted;

.g.,

when Socrates

dies,

his soul survives.

et

now Versor adheres

to thisview

and

declares

that,

although

Albert

and othershold the

opposite,

their

opinion

"can

easily

be

proven

wrong."88

4.3.

The

Principle

f

ndividuation

The last

topic

I

want to

address

briefly

s

advanced

by

Johannes

Versor

himself s a much disputed problem:the principleof individuationn

corporeal

substances.89

n

Versor's

commentary

n De ente

t essentiat

is

the third

question

he

proposes;

his

discussion

reflects

he controversial

statusof

the issue.90

Having

said that

there were

many opinions

about

87

Johannes

ersor,

uestiones

uper

e entet ssentia

above,

.

1),

q.

6,

ff.

lvb-t2ra:

"Dubitatur

rimo

trum

n substantiis

ompositis

ormaotius

t forma

artis

b invicem

realiter

istinguuntur."

88

Ibid.,

.

t2ra:

In

oppositum

st

doctoranctus

t Avicenna.

t

arguitur

atione

ic,

quia n eodem otestorrumpiormaotiusemanenteormaartis,tcorruptoorte

corrumpitur

umanitas

ius t non

ua anima.

gitur

orma

artis

t formaotius

ealiter

distinguuntur.

unc

espondetur

d dubium

uod

n

substantiis

aterialibus

orma

artis

et

forma

otius

unt

ealiteristincte

Unde

icet

lbertust

uidam

lii eneant

ppositum,

hoc amen

otest

x

supradictis

aciliter

mprobari."

89

Backgrounds

nd

nalyses

n:

.A.

Aertsen

ndA.

Speer

eds),

ndividuum

ndndividualität

imMittelalter

Miscellanea

ediaevalia,

4),

Berlin-New

ork 996.

f. n this olume

sp.

A.

Speer,

Yliathin

uod

st

rincipium

ndividuando.

ur

iskussion

m

as

ndividuationsprinzip

bei

ohannes

e

Nova

omo,

lbertus

agnus

nd homas

on

quin

266-86,

Hoenen,

"Aliter

utemicunt

homistae".

as

Prinzip

er

ndividuation

nder

useinandersetzung

wischen

en

Albertisten

Thomisten

nd

cotisten

es

usgehenden

ittelalters

338-52;

or

lbert,

f. nthe ame

volumelso

H.

Anzulewicz,

rundlagen

on

ndividuum

ndndividualität

n

der

nthropologie

es

Albertusagnus124-60,sp.132-6. or he homisticiew f. lsoM.J.F.M.oenen,he

Thomistic

rinciple

f

ndividuation

n

15th-Century

homistic

nd

Albertist

ources

in:

Medioevo.

Rivistai storia

ella ilosofia

edievale,

VIII

1992),

27-57.

90

Johannes

ersor,

uestiones

uper

e

ente

t ssentia

above,

.

1),

.

3,

ff. 5ra:

Utrum

materia

it

principium

ndividuationis."



VERSOR ND

HIS

RELATIONO

THE

SCHOOLS

F THOUGHT

317

the principle f individuation, ersor decides to consideronlythree of

them:

The

first,

hich s

ascribed

to Giles of

Rome,

is

that the

princi-

ple

of individuation

s

quantity;

he

second,

which

is

ascribed to Albert

the

Great,

s

that

t is

matter;

he

third,

which

is

defended

by

Thomas

Aquinas

in

De ente t essentiais that t is

signate

matter.91

Heymericus

e

Campo

offers similar

ccount

f this ssue

n

theTractatus

problematicus.

e does not

considerGiles'

view,

but he

represents

lbert

and

Thomas

in

the same

way.92

he

same

holds

for the

professors

ho

lead the BursaLaurentianafter

Heymericus,

uch as Arnold of

Tongeren

and Gerald of

Harderwijk. hey

defend he "sententia enerabilis omini

Alberti"

Arnold)

hat the

principle

f

individuation

s

matter

gainst

the

Thomistic hesis hat t is matter

ignatedby quantity

a

position

which

is indeed defended

y

the Thomistic

CopulataulchemmaP gain,

the same

issue nd the same Albertistnd Thomist

ositions

ccur

n

the

Promptuarium

argumentorum

Cologne

1492),

whichdiscusses lbertistnd Thomist olutions

to a number of

logical questions.94

n

short,

t is

apparent

from

many

91

bid

,

f. 5va: Sciendumst ecundo

uod

de

principio

ndividuationsulte uerunt

opiniones,ed olumdpresensetribusidendumst. rimapiniost gidiie Rhoma

dicentis

uodquantitas

e

se est

principium

ndividuationis.ecunda stAlbertiicentis

quod

materia

stde se hec t

ncommunicabilist de se sufficienseddereormam

uam

suscipit

ncommunicabilem;

t

sicest otale t sufficiens

rincipium

ndividuationisecun-

dum

psum.

. )

Tertia ero uit

pinio

ancii home icentis

uod

materia

ignatauan-

titatest

rincipium

ndividuationistnonmateria

uocumque

odo

ccepta."

f.Thomas

de

Aquino,

e entet ssentia

cap.

2,

ed.

Leonina,

ol.

XLIII,

Roma

1976,

71.73-7:Et

ideo ciendumst

uod

materiaon

uolibet

odo

ccepta

st ndiuiduationis

rincipium,

sed olummateria

ignata;

tdico

materiam

ignatam

ue

subdeterminatisimensionibus

considerato."

92

Heymericus

e

Campo,


agnum

tSanctum

homam

above,

n. 13), robi.,ff. 4v-b6v.or ohannese NovaDomo, f. peer 996above, .89).93

Heymericus

e

Campo,

bid. erarduse

Harderwyck,

ommentaria

n

sagogasorphirii

(part

f his

complete

ommentary

n

the

old

ogic), ologne

494,

f.

Elra-EE2vb;

cf.Voulliéme

903

above,

.

1),

195

no. 439).

Arnolduse

Tungeris,

pitomata

ive

reparationesogice

eterist

nove restotelis

above,

.

16),

f.

2v-d3r:

Querituruid

st

prin-

cipium

ndividuationis.olu io

uod

de hoc unt

pud

iversosalde iverse

tvarie

pin-

iones,

uibus

mnibusimissiserior

ideturententiaenerabilisomini

lbertiicentis

quod

materiae sola est

principium

ndividuationis."

opulataulcherrimaabove,

.

28),

ff.

0vb-21va,

t

f.

20vb:

relictismnibusstis

pinionibus

icendum

uod

n

materialibus

materia

ignata

it

rincipiumdequatum

ndividuationis."rnoldf

Tongeren

lso iscusses

and

rejects

he cotist

heory

fhaecceitas

Arnoldus

e

Tungeris,

bid.

,

f.

d3r),

nd the

Thomistsf heMontana

ven iscuss

besides

lbert

ndof

ourse

homas)

he iews f

Scotus,enryfGhentndGiles fRomeCopulataulcherrimaabove,.28), f.0vb-21va).

94

The

Promptuarium

rgumentorum

as

anonymously)

rintedy

H.

Quentell

n

Cologne

in

1492;

t hasbeen

alsely

scribedo

Heymericus

nd

was

reprinted

s

Heymericus

e

Campo,

romptuarium

Frankfurt/Main

992.

Cf.

Voulliéme903

above,

.

1),

431

no.

980).

ee

Promptuarium

ff.lr-i3v

ndHoenen

992

above,

.

89),

51-3. or

he

uestion



318

PEPIJN

UTTEN

sourcesthattheproblemof ndividuation as a highly ontroversialssue

at the time

and,

in

particular,

hatAlbertists

nd

Thomistsheld

different

opinions

about

it.

In

his

commentary

n De ente t essentia

Johannes

Versor,

determining

his solution o the

question

proposed,

akesover

Thomas'

standpoint

nd

states hatmatter

signated"

by

quantity

s the sufficient

rinciple

f ndi-

viduation.95

e reaffirms

his

n

the second

conclusion,

tating

hat the

only

difference etween

the essence of a

species

and the essence

of an

individual ies

in

the fact that

in

the

first ase matter

s not

signate,

whereas n the second case it is.

Again,

theseare almost

iterally

homas'

words.96

hereafter,

ersor discusses he

doctrines f Giles of Rome and

Albertthe

Great. His

rejection

f both

opinions

s

unequivocal.97

s

in

the case

of the distinction

etween

orma artis

nd

forma

otiusVersor

s

commentary

n Thomas'

text mounts

o a clear-cut efence

f the doctor

sanctus. here

is

no

sign

at

all of

sympathy

owards Albert's

point

of

view.98

ompared

to

his

writings

n the

logica

etusthe

commentary

n

of

uthorship

nd

n

analysis

f he

ontents,

ee

M.J.F.M.oenen,

ateMedieval

chools

ofThoughtn theMirrorfUniversityextbooks.he romptuariumrgumentaramCologne

1492),

n:

Hoenen,

chneider

ndWieland 995

above,

.

6),

329-69.

95

Johannes

ersor,

uestiones

uper

e entet ssentia

above,

.

1),

.

3,

f. 5va: Conclusio

prima:

ateria

uantitate

ignata

st ufficiens

rincipium

ndividuationis."

96

bidr.

Conclusioecunda:

ssentia

peciei

t

individui,

t Sortis t

hominis,

on

différantisi

enes

ignatum

t

nsignatum."

f.Thomas e

Aquino,

e entet ssentia

cap.

2,

ed.

Leonina,

ol.

XLIII,

Roma

976,

71.77-87:Hec utem

ateria

n

diffinitione

que

est

hominis

n

quantum

st

homo on

onitur,

ed

poneretur

n diffinitioneortisi

Sortes iffinitionem

aberet.

n

diffinitione

utem ominis

onitur

ateria

on

ignata:

non nim

n diffinitione

ominis

onitur

ocos ethec

aro,

edos et caro

bsolute,

ue

suntmateria

ominison

ignata.

ic

ergo atet uod

ssentia

ominist essentia

ortis

nondifférantisi ecundumignatumtnon ignatum."97

Johannes

ersor,uestiones

uper

e entet ssentia

above,

.

1),

.

3,

f. 5va-b:Dubitatur

primo

trum

uantitas

e se sit

principium

ndividuationis

ufficiens,

t dicit

gidius

e

Rhoma

Respondetur

d dubium

uod

quantitas

e se non st

ufficiens

rincipium

individuationis

Dubitaturecundo

trum ateria

it e se totale

t ufficiens

rincipium

individuationis,

t dicit lbertus

Respondetur

d dubium

uod

materia

ecundum

e

accepta

on st otale

ec ufficiens

rincipium

ndividuationis."

98

Ibid.,

f. 5vb-s6ra:

Dubitatur

ecundo trum

ateriait

de se totale

t sufficiens

principium

ndividuationis,

t dicit

lbertus.

t videtur

uod

ic,

uia

seclusis

seclusus

ed.]

mnibus

ccidentibus

Sorte t

Platone

dhuc emanent

uo ndividua

t habent

formast

materiasealiter

istinctas.

espondetur

d dubium

uod

materiaecundum

se

accepta

onest

totale

ec sufficiens

rincipium

ndividuationis.

atet

uia

materia

secundume acceptastcommunist ndifferensd multaspeciesel ad multandi-

vidua.

gitur

onest

principium

eterminationis

d hic et

nunc el ad

particulare.

t

sic

materia

ecundum

e

accepta

on

otest

ici ufficiens

rincipium

ndividuationis.

d

rationemubii

icitur

uod

eclusis

mnibus

ccidentibus

SortetPlatone

dhuc

emaner-

ent

ndividu

i]

,

quia

in

quolibet

sset

materia

ignata,

ammateria

etineret

uam



VERSOR

ND

HIS RELATION

O

THE SCHOOLS F

THOUGHT 319

De ente t essentias of an entirely ifferentharacter.Whereas n thefirst

Versor

remains

neutral n

the issues

of inchoatio

ormae

nd

forma

otius

in

the

second

he sides

with

Aquinas,

not

ust

on these

issues but

also on

the

principle

f

ndividuation.

herefore

t seemsthat

his

neutrality

owards

Albert

n

his commentaries

n

Porphyry

nd the

Categories

s a matter f

choice rather

han

a

slip

of the

pen.

How could

this

pparently

eliberate

strategy

e

accounted for?

5. Versori seofAlbert'snd ThomasCommentariesn theOldLogic

The reason

why

Versor ften

eems o

agree

withAlbert

n his

commentaries

on

Porphyry's

sagoge

nd Aristotle's

ategories

s

that

arge parts

of these

commentaries

re based on

thoseof

Albert.We have

seen several

xamples

of this

n

the

previous

sections

see

also

Appendix

1).

The reason

why

he used Albert's

commentaries

s obvious:

Thomas did

not write com-

mentaries n

these works.

Hence,

even

if

Versor

preferred

o draw

on

Thomas'

writings,

n

the case of the

Isagoge

nd the

Categories

e had

no

choice but to relyon Albert.For a fifteenth-centurycholastic uthor

such

as

Versor,

Thomas and

Albertwere the

most

prominent

uthorities

fromwithin

the scholastic

radition.

He

may

have

preferred

homas,

but

stillAlbertwould

have been

the natural second

choice.

Below,

we

will

see that Versor

indeed

preferred

homas,

for

in

the case

of Peri

hermeneias

e did

have a

choice,

and

he chose to use

Thomas' commen-

tary.

First,

ome more

samples

will illustrate

recisely

how Versor used

Albert's ommentaries.

The second

question

Versor

poses

in his

commentary

n

Porphyry's

Isagoges: Whether ogic should be called a part of philosophy."Albert

the

Great discusses

he same

question

n

the second

chapter

of the first

treatiseof

his Liberde

praedicabilibus.

A

comparison

of

the two texts

clearly

ndicates hatVersor's

text s

an

adaptation

in

some instances

no

more than

an

excerpt)

from

Albert's

hapter,

lthough

Versor does not

refer o Albert

t all.101 ersor

rephrases

Albert's

rguments

ccording

o

signationem

uam rius

abuitub

uantitate,

ationeuius sset eterminata

d esse

ar-

ticolare."

99Johannesersor,uaestionesuperotameteremrtemabove, . 34), . 2,ff. vb-3ra.

100

lbertus

agnus,

iber e

praedicabilibus,

r.

1,

c.

2,

ed. A.

Borgnet

Opera

mnia

vol.

),

Parisiis

890,

b-4a.

101

f.Fliieler

001

above,

.

33),

sp.

183,

or n accountf his ommon edieval

practice.



320

PEPIJN

UTTEN

the rigidscheme ofhis own text,which s composedand formulatedn

a

way

that

guarantees

maximum

structural

larity:Questions

start

with

queritur

arguments

re counted

primo,

ecundo

etc.)

and series

f

arguments

and

counter-arguments

re introduced

y phrases

ike

arguituruod

non in

oppositum

rguitur

etc.

n

addition,

onclusions

re marked s

conclusio

rima

etc.;

important

istinctions

nd other

points

of nterest re

marked

by

sci-

endum

rimo

etc.;

additional

ounter-arguments

re introduced

y

dubitatur

and their

rejections

y respondetur.

ersor's

argumentation

ollows

long

the

lines set out

by

Albert.Their

answer to the

question

raised

is that

logic

is a

part

of

philosophy,

f

philosophy

s taken n a

general

ense.102

In the first

rgument

uod

non

to prove

that

ogic

is not a

part

of

phi-

losophy)

Versor

rephrases

Albert'swords

in

the manner described

and

also adds

a reference o

Aristotle:

Albertus

agnus,

iber

e

praedicabilibus

tr.

1,

c.

2,

ed.

A.

Borgnet,

b-3a:

"Hanc utem

cientiam

ui

modus

st mnis

philosophiae,

uidam

ullam

artem

sse

philosophiaeontendunt,icenteson isi resesse

arteshilosophiae,

cilicet

hysicam,

athe-

maticamive

disciplinabilem,

t

metaphysicam

sive

ivinarti."

Johannes

ersor,

uestiones

uinqué

redicabilium

Porphirii,.

2,

f.

2vb:

"Arguituruod

non

rimo

utoritate

hilo-

sophi

exto

Metaphisice

onentis

antumres

parteshilosophiescilicethisicam,athematicamet

methaphisicamergo

t cetera."

The second

argument

uod

non lso

corresponds

o Albert's

rgument

see

Appendix

2).

The third

rgument

wordly

eflects lbert's

ext

gain,

the

only changes

being

some

stylistic

nd

linguistic implifications.

n

Albert's

text,

the

argument

begins

by:

"Addunt etiam ad suae

assertionis

confirmationem,

uod

. . Versor

replaces

this

phrase

by

the words

"Tertio arguitur."Likewise,Albert'sfinalphrase "nec videtur . . con-

tineri"

s

abridged

by

Versor:

Albertus

agnus,

bid.,

a:

"Addunttiam

d suae ssertionis

onfirma-

tionem,

uod

nullius

ei

modus,

um e

ujus

modus

st,

enit

n

eneris

ui

ivisionem.onstat

autem,

uod

ogicaeneraliter

icta

modus

philosophiae

st.

on

rgo

enireidetur

d

philo-

sophiae

ivisionemnec

videtur

n

aliqua arte

hujus enerisuod

st

hilosophia

ontineri."

Johannes

ersor,

bid

,

f. 3ra:

"Tertio

rguitur:

ullius

eimodus

ume uius

estmodusenit

n

ui

eneris

ivisionem.

ed /o-

gica

stmodus

hilosophie,

rgo

on enitndivi-

sionem

hilosophieanquam

ars

ius."

102

lbertus

agnus,

iber e

praedicabilibus

tr.

1,

c.

2,

ed.

A.

Borgnet

Opera

mnia

vol.

),

Parisiis

890, a-b;

ohannes

ersor,

uestiones

uinquéredicabilium

orphiriiabove,

n.

34),

.

2,

f. 3rb.



VERSOR NDHIS RELATION

O THE

SCHOOLS F THOUGHT

321

The arguments uodsic are again roughlythe same in both texts,

although

Versor'sversion f

the

first

s

considerably

horter han

Albert's:

Where Albertoffers

lengthy xposition

f the diverse

ways

in which

beings

can be

related

to human

understanding,

ersor omits this

part

and

simply

oncludes

hat ince

ogic

concerns

econdary

ntentions,

hich

are

beings,

t is a

part

of

philosophy.

ersor's

econd and third

rguments

are

again copied

almost

wordly

romAlbert's

ext

see

Appendix

2).

In

his

commentary

n Perìhermeneias

published

n

the same volume as

the commentaries

n

Porphyry

nd the

Categories103)

ersorfollows similar

procedure.Only

this

time,

his text does not derivefromAlbert'scom-

mentary,

ut

from hat

of

Thomas

Aquinas.104

he close

relation etween

parts

of Versor's text and

that of

Aquinas

becomes

apparent

from

a

passage

concerning

Aristotle's emarkthat truth nd

falsity

ertain

to

the intellect

n

so

far as

it

composes

and divides.105 ersor lists several

points

to notice

,

ciendum.

.)

that are

all

taken from

Thomas. His

own

contribution

onsists

mainly

f

changing

he

orderof the words:Whereas

Thomas firstnames both

operations

("indiuisibilium

intelligencia"

and "secundumquod huiusmodiSimplicia oncepta simul componitet

diuidit")

nd then

states that truth

nd

falsity

re not

in

the first ut

in

the second

operation

"in

hac secunda

operatione

. . inuenitur

eritas

et

falsitas

..

in

primaoperatione

on

inuenitur"),

ersor

places

the

denial

of truth nd

falsity

n

the

first

peration ight

fter he

description

f this

operation

"Una

est

simplicium

ntelligentia

..

et

in

hac

operatione

. .

non est

Veritas

vel falsitas .

.

Alia

est . .

compositio

et divisio .. et

in

hac

operatione

.. est Veritas

vel

falsitas).

n

addition,

Versor

sim-

plifies

homas'

text

by omitting

he word

"indivisibilia" nd

instead

using

"simplicia"twice,whereas Thomas uses both words to denote simple

concepts:

103

Johannes

ersor,

uaestiones

uper

otameteremrtem

above,

.

34).

104

f. lso

Kneepkens

003

above,

.

9),

116-7.

105

he

complete

ext fthis

assage

s

given

elow

n

Appendix

.

Cf.

Thomas e

Aquino,

xpositio

ibri

eiyermenias,

ib.

1,

ect.

,

ed.

Leonina,

ditio ltera

etractata,

ol.

1*1, oma-Paris989, 4.39-16.138;ohannesersor,uestionesrimiibrierihermeniarum

Arestotelis

above,

.

34),

.

3,

f. 1va-b. or ther

xamples,

ompare

homas

e

Aquino,

Ibid.

6.80-8.168,

bid.

lect.

,

9.20-11.133

nd

12.184-208,

bid.,

ect.

,

21.85-107

nd

23.207-24.279

o

Johannes

ersor,bid.,

f.

9va-b,0rb-60va,

0vb, 2va,

nd

62vb-63ra,

respectively.



322

PEPIJN

OTTEN

Thomas e Aquino, xpositioibri eryer-

menias,

ib.

1,

ectio

,

ed.

Leonina,

ol.

*1,

14.39-16.138.

Johannesersor, uestionesrimiibrieriher-

meniarum

restotelis,

.

3,

ff. 1va-b.

Vbi

portet

ntelligere

uod

na

uarum

pera-

tionumntellectus

st

ndiuisibilium

ntelligencia

in

uantum

cilicetntellectus

ntelligit

bsolute

uius-

cunque

ei

uiditatem

iue ssenciam

er

e

psam,

puta uid

st

homoel

uid

lbum

el

aliud

huiusmodi;

lia ero

peratio

ntellectus

st ecun-

dum

uod

huiusmodi

implicia

oncepta

imul

componit

t

diuidit.

icit

rgo uod

n hac

secundaperationentellectus,cilicetomponentiet

diuidentis,

nuenitur

eritast

alsitas,

elinquens

quod

n

prima

peratione

on

nuenitur

Sciendum

ecundo

uod,

t

prius

icebatur,

duplex

st

peratio

ntellectus.

na st

implicium

intelligentia,uando

cilicet

ntellectusbsolute

ntel-

ligit

uiuscumque

ei

uidditatem

ive

ssentiam

er

seipsam,

tputauid

st omo

el

uid

st

lbum

et

n hac

operatione,

t

habet

extus,

on

est

Veritasel

falsitas.

lia st

peratio

ntellec-

tus

ue

st

ompositio

t

divisio,

ue

fit um

intellectusimpliciaimulomponittdividit;t

in

hac

peratione

ntellectusic

dividentis

t om-

ponents

st entas

el

alsitas.

In

Versor's

next

three

tems,

fragments

f Thomas'

commentary eep

appearing

see

Appendix

3).

From these

textual

omparisons,

t becomes

clear

that

John

Versor

does

not

limit his resources

o

the works

of

a

single

authoritative

hinker.

He draws

inspiration

rom

both Albert

and

Thomas.

In

particular,

his use of

Albert's commentaries

n

the

Isagoge

and the

Categoriesxplains

why

he would

seem to

agree

with Albert

n

his own commentariesn these

writings:

is discussion f

Porphyry's

r

Aristotle's ext

s often

not

much

more than

a

copy

of

Albert's

xposition.

This has been

demonstrated

or

he

passage

about

the

category

f

substance

from

Versor's

commentary

n the

Categories

§

3;

cf.

Appendix

1)

and

for

two

passages

from

his

commentary

n

Porphyry:

ne

about

incipient

or-

mality

§

4.1),

and one

about

ogic

as

a

part

of

philosophy

this

ection).

However,

the consensus

s

only

apparent.

n the same

sections

and

in

§

4.2)

I have shown

that

Versor

does

not take

sides

with either

Albert

or Thomas in theselogicalworks,whereas n some of his otherworks

(his

commentaries

n the

Physics

nd

on

De ente t

essentia)

e commits

himself

o

the doctrine

f

Aquinas

even

if

these

works

re based

(as

is

the case

with

he

commentary

n the

Physics

cf.

§

4.1)

on

the commentaries

of both

Thomas

and

Albert.

6.

Versor's

Thomism"

econsidered

The reason

why

Versor

relies

on

Albert

for

his own commentaries

n

the Isagogend the Categoriess thathe had no choice,because Thomas

did not

write

commentaries

n

those

works.

This

also

explains

Versor's

neutrality

owards

Albert.

t

would

have

been

no

sinecurefor

Versor

to

base

his

own

commentary

n

Albert's,

while

at the

same

time

criticising



VERSOR

ND

HIS

RELATIONO

THE

SCHOOLS F THOUGHT

323

Albert foreverydisagreementwith Thomas. However thatmay be, it

should

be clear

by

now that neither n account

of his use of Albert's

works,

or

by

reason

of the

philosophical

iews

defended

n

his own works

Versor can be

regarded

s an Albertist.106

n the

whole,

Versor's doc-

trinal

profile

eems ndistinct

nd at best

a

blurred

form f Thomism.107

This

"albertizing

homism"

may

have

been

typical

f

a

realist radition

in

an

environment

probably

Paris)

where "Albertists"

nd "Thomists''

were not

so much rival

parties

as allies

facing

a

common

enemy e.g.,

nominalism r

Scotism).108

owever,

everal f Versor's

workswere

printedat

Cologne by

orderof the

Thomists,

who

evidently

lso used them.This

was one of

the reasons

put

forward or

accepting

the view that Versor

should be considered

Thomist

cf.

§ 2).

Let

us have a closer look at

those

Cologne

editions f Versor's

philosophical

works.

At the end of the

fifteenth

entury, ologne

was

at

the same

time the

centreof

Thomist-Albertist

ivalry

nd

of the

promotion

nd

expansion

of Versor's

egacy.

Both

phenomena

re

closely

elated o the educational

program

of the arts

faculty

n

Cologne,

and

they

are both reflected

n

the bookproductionn Cologne during he ast two decadesof the fifteenth

century.

he worksof Aristotle

nd the Tractatusr Summulae

ogicales

y

Peter of

Spain

occupied

a central

place

in

the educational

program

of

the artsfaculties

t late medievaluniversities.109

n

his Der Buchdruckölns

bis

zum

Ende des

ünfzehntenahrhunderts

E. Voulliéme

compiled

a

list of

books

printed

t

Cologne

before

1500,

which includes over

1200

titles.

Among

these are 88 titles

oncerning

ifferentindsof works

quaestiones,

106

ememberhat ersor,hen iscussingncipientormalitynhis ommentaryn

Porphyry,

efersothe irstook f he

hysics

inwhich e

rejects

lbert's

heory;

f. he

quotation

n

note 7 above.

hat t s not

uspicious

or Thomisto

quote

lbert

even

quite requently)

s

shown,

ith

espect

o

John apreolus,y

S.-Th.

Bonino,

lberte

GrandansesDefensionese

Jean

abrol

f 1444).

Contributionla rechercheur es

ňgines

deValbertisme

ardif,

in: Revue

homiste:evue

octrinalee

théologie

t de

philosophie,

99-1

1999),

69-425.

107

f. he emarks

y

Ritternd

Zwiezawski

uoted

n n.

22

above.

108

or he

albertizing

homism"f.note above.

nteresting

n

this

espect

s

the

explicit

f

manuscript

f

Versor's

ommentary

n

the

Metaphysics

hich

emarks

hatt

followshe

modus

arisiensis.

f. he

manuscript

raha,

árodnínihovnaeské

epubliky,

cod.

V.E.25,

.

96v,

s

quoted y

Flüeler

994

above,

.

33),

2:

"Expliciuntuestiones

XII librorumetaphysicaeecundum odumarisiensem". Cf.also thequotation

fromnother

anuscript

n

note 0

above,

o the ffecthat ersor's

hysical

orksre

collectedromhe ommentariesfbothAlbertheGreat ndThomas

quinas.

109

or

Cologne,

ee

F.J.

on

Bianco,

ie lte niversitätöln nd ie

pätem

elehrten-chulen

diesertadtI.

Theil,

öln

1855,

1

statutes

f

heArts

aculty

rom

398).



324

PEPIJN

OTTEN

copulata,eparationesetc.)related owritingsf Aristotle nd PeterofSpain

{Tractatus

r Summulae

ogicaks

nd Parva

bgicalia

.110

n

a

general

sense

I

will refer o these works

as

"commentaries".

ll

of these are works

by

fifteenth-century

uthors;

not one of Albert'sor Thomas' commentaries

on the

corpus

ristotelicumere

printed.

The titles nd

colophons quoted

by

Voulliéme

give

a clear indication

of

the

situation t

Cologne:

31 of

the 88 commentaries

nclude a reference o the Thomisticdoctrine

of

the Bursa

Montana

20

include

a

reference o

the

Albertist

octrine f the

Bursa

Laurentiana'

hree

nclude

a

reference o

Scotism;

one

volume of

copulata

on

Peter of

Spain's

Summulaehas no reference o

any

viam

Clearly

the

only

school doctrines

elevant

n

Cologne

at the time were

Thomism and Albertism.

he rest of the 88 titles

re works

by John

Versor:

in

total

33 titles of commentaries n works

of Aristotle

28)

and Peter of

Spain

(5).

112

Thus,

John

Versor s the author of more than

one third

of all commentaries

n the basic

philosophical

works

printed

at

Cologne

before

1500,

which

makes

him

by

far

the

most

printed

uthor

in this domain.

110

f.

Voulliéme903

above,

.

1).

Voulliéme's

tudy

s

precious

ecausef ts xtensive

quotations

romitle

ages

nd

colophons.

small umberf dubiousases

such

s

untraceable

orksisted

y

ther

epertories)

s isted ithout

uch

uotations;

hese

have

not ncluded

n

my

tatistics.

t should e noted

hat ome fthe

itlesisted

eparately

by

Voulliéme

and

egarded

y

him

s

separatelyublished

olumes)

ere

ctuallyub-

lished

ogether

as

parts

f ne nd he ame

olume);

f.

Birkenmajer

925

above,

.

4).

111

ome

xamples

f

itles

re:

Copulata

ukhmima

iversis

x

utoribus

ogice

nunum

orrogata

inveteremrtemrestotelisum extuiusdemecundumiam ivi octorishomeeAquinot uxta

processumagistrorum

olonie

nbursa ontis

egentium

no.133);

Metheororumrestotelis

ecundum

processum

lbertistarum

urseaurentiitudii

oloniensis

no.

149);

Commentarla

ibrorume

elo t

mundorestotelis

uxta iam enerabilisomini

lbertit

rocessumagistrorum

egentium

olonien

bursaaurentii

no.

408);Copulatauper

resibroseAnima

restotelisum

extuuxta octrinam

excellentissimi

octoris

anctihomee

Aquino

no.723);Copulata

mnium

ractatuumetri

ispani

etiam

incathegreumatum

t

arvorumogicalium

um extuecundum

octrinamivi

home

quinatis

iuxta

rocessum

agistrorum

olonien

bursa ontis

egentiumno.

28);

ositionesircaibros

hisi-

corumtde nima

restotelisuxtardinarium

t

disputativum

rocessum

agistrorum

olonienbursa

montis

egentium

d

opponendum

t

espondendum

on

minustiles

uam

ecessarie

no. 77);

ll

quoted

after oulliéme

903

above,

.

1).

have

ot ncluded

orkshat

rerelatedothe ursae

but

not

explicitly)

o Aristotle

r Peter f

Spain,

uch s

the

Promptuarium

rgumentorum

(above, .94)or commentariesn Donatus.

112

or

example:

uestiones

enerabilis

omini

oannis

ersoris

uper

otameteremrtem

no.

1213);

icta ersoris

upereptem

ractatus

agistři

etri

yspani

umextu

no.1240);

f.Voulliéme

1930

above,

.

1).



VERSOR ND

HIS RELATIONO

THE SCHOOLS F THOUGHT

325

Table 1: CommentariesnAristotlendPeterf pain rintednCologneefore500.

School

designation

Voulliéme os.

Total

number f

or author

titles

Commentaries

n Commentaries

n

Aristotle

Peter f

Spain

ThomisticBursa

132-134,

36-140, 921, 922,

927-932,

31

Montana

13

150,

720-731,

77

1135

Mbertist/ursa 141,142, 149, 159, 167,443(b), 20

Laurentiana

14

160,

164, 165,

408,

444-446

438-443(a),

10,

10 61

5

Johannes

ersor

144,

145, 147, 148,

1239-1243

33

1211-1218,

220-

1222,

1224-1236

"ad mentem

352-354

3

Johannis

coti"

no

designation

925

1

Source:

oulliéme903

cf.

bove,

.

1).

Of those 33 works

by

Versor,

25

contain

no references

o the

Cologne

bursae

t all. Five are works

hatwere

according

o their

xplicits)

evised

by

masters

f the Bursa

Corneliana.f the three

remaining

works,

wo are

presented

s

being

secundum

rocessum

ursemontisnd one

as in via sancti

Thome.

Whereas 51 works

by

other uthors ontain

referenceso the

rival

parties

Thomists

nd

Albertists)

f

the

University

t

Cologne,

only

these

three outof33) works yVersor uggest hathe mayhave been regarded

as a Thomist

at

Cologne.

Two of

the

25

titleswithout eference

o the

colleges

n

Cologne

are

intriguing

ecause

of their

xplicits,

which men-

tion

a

processus

t mens

VersonsEt sic terminantur

uestiones

ersoris

uper

uos

113

he most

mportant

uthor

mong

heThomists

s Lambertuse Monte

nos.

720-731).

114

he most

mportant

uthor

mong

he

Albertistss Gerardus

e

Harderwyck

nos.

438-446).

o.

442,

lthough

scribed

y

Voulliéme

o

Gerardus,

s

actuallyy

Johannes

de

Nürtingen;

f.

Birkenmajer

925

above,

.

4),

135,

n. 1.

115 o. 1016 s the rypto-lbertistork eparationesibrorumotiusaturalishilosophiae

secundum

rocessum

lbertistarumtThomistarum

above,

.

63),

whichummarizesristotle's

physical

orks

n

accordance ith

Albert,

lthough

hetitle

might

uggest

neutral

approach;

f.Hoenen 993

above,

.

43).



326

PEPIJN

UTTEN

libros egenerationetcorruptionerestotelisecundumrocessumt mentemiusdem

verorts

iligentissime

onecte

no.

1231);

Et

sic terminantur

uestiones

agistři

Joannis

ersons

uper

uos ibros

e

generatione

t

corruptione

restotelisecundum

verum

rocessum

tmentemiusdem

ersons

iligentissime

orrecte

no. 1232).

These

titles

uggest

different

olution

o our

problem.

Could

it be that

Versor

was

regarded

s an

authority

ui

generisi

Table

2:

Versori

ommentaries

nAristotlend

Peter

f pain

printed

n

Cologne

efore

500.

School

designation

Voulliéme

os.

Total

number

of

titles

no

designation

144,

145, 147, 148,

1211-1213,

23

1215, 1217,

1218, 1221,

1222,

1226-1228, 233,

1235, 1236,

1239-1243

revised

y

masters

f the

1214, 1216,

1220, 1224,

1225

5

Bursa orneliana

"secundumrocessum 1230,1234 2

burse

montis"

"in

via

sancti home"

1229

1

"secundum

verum)

1231,

1232

2

processum

t mentem

eiusdem

ersoris

diligentissime

orrecte"

Source:oulliéme

903

cf.

bove,

.

1).

The twoeditions f Versor'squestions n De generationetcorruptioneVoull.

1231

and

1232)

that

are

presented

s

being

secundum

rocessum

t mentem

eiusdem

ersoris

ere

printed

by

Henricus

Quentell

in

1489 and

1493

respectively.

hese

questions

were

also

printed

wice

before,

namely

by

Theodoricus

Molner

n

1485/6

and

by

Conradus

Welker

n

1488

(Voull.

1230

and

1234).

In all four

cases,

the

questions

on

De

generatione

ere

part

of a

larger

volume

which

also included

Versor's

questions

n De

cáelo

etmundothe

Meteora

nd the

Parvanátur

lia 116

n

addition,

he

first

Molner

1485/6),

third

Quentell

1489)

and fourth

Quentell

1493)

volumes

all

includedworks ytheThomistGerardusde Monte:bothhiscommentary

on De ente

t ssentia

with

homas'

text)

nd

his

Tractatusstendens

oncordantiam

116

Birkenmajer

925

above,

.

4).



VERSOR

NDHIS RELATIONO

THE

SCHOOLS

F THOUGHT

327

dictorumancii Thomae tDominiAlberti}11hese volumes were therefore

probably

ommissioned

y

the

BursaMontanaof whichGerardusde Monte

(critic

f

Heymericus

de

Campo)

had been one of the most

illustrious

leaders.118

hat

explainswhy

the first wo editions

Voull.

1230

and

1234)

of

Versor's

commentary

n

De

gener

tione re

(according

o their

xplicits)

secundum

rocessum

ursemontis.

his means that he Thomists f the

Montana

initially

sed Versor's

commentary

s

if

t were

a

genuine

Thomistic

ext.

They may

even

have

adapted

it to make it harmonize

with their own

doctrines.

owever,

the

reprintsVoull.

1231

and

1232)

indicate hatthe

texthas been

"carefully

orrected

ccording

to the true

procedure

and

intention f

Versor",

which makes sense

if

it means that the text has

been restored o its

original

form.So it would seem that

the Thomists

of the

Montana irst

egarded

Versor

as a

Thomist,

but

eventually

ad to

recognize

hat he was

not "one of theirown". The

contraposition

f the

processus

ursemontisnd the

verus

rocessus

ersoris

learly

howsthatVersor

does

not fit

n

the Thomist-Albertist

ivalry.

The editions hat were

in

all

probability

ommissioned

y

the Bursa

CornelianatheotherThomistic ollegeat Cologne) confirm hat Versor's

writings

were used for

nstruction,

nd also that

they

were revised for

that

purpose:

Some of them

are

only

accuratissimeonecte.. in bursa

mag-

istři orneliie

Dordracod communemcholariumtilitatem

Voull.

1225;

1220

and

1224

similar),

ut

others re a

magistris

urse ornelii

uibuspsas

ncumbit

exercereummo

tudio

tque iligentia

erno eviseconectec emendate

Voull.

1214

and

1216).

From the

fact

that

they

used Versor's textsfor

nstruction,

t

is evident hat the Thomists

n

Cologne recognized

Versor's

affinity

ith

Thomas

Aquinas.

One edition of his

commentary

n De cáelo

included

in thevolumeprintedby Quentellin 1493; Voull. 1229) bears the title

Questiones

ubtilissimen via sanctiThome

magistřiohannis

ersons

uper

ibros

de celo t mundowhich

s an

explicit

onfirmationf

that

recognition.

ut

it is also the

only explicit

tatement f Versor's connection o the

"way

of

Thomas

Aquinas"

n

the tides nd

colophons

f all the

Cologne

editions.

Moreover,

fourof the fiveworks

orrected

y

the Corneliana asters nd

printed y

Quentell

bear

a

woodcuton their itle

ages,

which

s

the ame

in all

four of them: The woodcut

depicts

a

teacher surrounded

y

four

pupils.

Written

elow

it are the words: "Versor cum

discipulis

uis."119

117

bid.

118

f.

nter

l. Meersseman

935

above,

.

6),passim.

119

f.Voulliéme

903

above,

.

1),

520-4

nos.

214, 216, 220,

225).



328

PEPIJN

UTTEN

Similar woodcutsdepictingThomas or Albert n the same way can be

found

n

many

works of

the

other

colleges

{Montana

nd

Laurentiana).™

This is

another

lear indication

hat Versor was not

deemed

a

Thomist,

in

which

case

a

woodcut

representing

homas and his

pupils

would have

been

more

appropriate.

nstead,

thesewoodcuts

n

Versor'sworks

edited

by

those Thomists

t

Cologne

who

supposedly

ad the

closest

onnection

to

Versor)121

romote

his

authority

s an

independent

eacher,

n a level

with

Albert nd Thomas.

7. Conclusion

All

of Versor's

ommentaries

n Aristotle nd Peterof

Spain

were

printed

in

Cologne,

most

of them severaltimes.The

Thomists

n

Cologne,

espe-

cially

at

the

Bursa Corneliana

used them for nstruction. et

in

most of

the titles

nd

imprints

here s no linkbetweenVersor nd

theseThomists

which

s

telling recisely

ecause

of Versor's

ffinity

ith

Aquinas.

Rather,

the

titles

uggest

as

does the sheer

quantity

f

editions)

hat

Versor

was

an authorityn a par withAlbert nd Thomas.122 ersor'scommentaries

do not follow he

processus

homistarumr the

processus

lbertistarumbut are

composed

secundum

rocessum

t mentemiusdem ersoris.n the

eyes

of the

Thomists nd

Albertists t

Cologne,

Versor

obviously

had

his

own

way

of

commenting

n Aristotle.

he factthat he was not from he

Cologne

milieu,

hat he was not

a memberof

one of the rival

colleges,

s decisive

here. The books

printed

y

orderof

the

bursae

how how

the

philosophical

schools

n

Cologne

defined hemselves:

y

reference

o the

via

of Thomas

or Albertand

to the

processus

f

theirown

college

(in

most

cases either

theMontana r theLaurentiana.123n this etting, ersorhad to be regarded

as

an

outsider,

ot as a Thomist.

120

f.Voulliéme

903

above,

.

1),

56-7, 1,

66, 70, 197,199, 13,

487

nos.

41,

142,150,

59, 64, 41,

42,932,

1135)

nd

XLVIII-LV. relevant

tudy

f

his

ype

ofwoodcutss

W.L.

Schreiber

nd P.

Heitz,

ie deutschen

Accipies"

nd

Magister

um

is-

cipulis-Holzscfmitte

ls

Hilfsmittel

ur

nkunabel-Bestimmung,Strassburg

908.

121

f.

bove,

2,

andTewes 993

above,

.

8),

389-90.

122

his s

also

uggested

y

he act hat

e

was

mentioneds an

authority;

f.

bove,

§

2,

esp.

n.

28.

Markowski

981

above,

.

22),

83 nd

187,

ven

peaks

f

Versorismus".

123eethe xamplesnnote above nd Hoenen 003 above, . 35),1 -4.The

examples

have

ivenuggest

as

opposed

o

Hoenen,

bid.)

hat

n the ncunables

rom

Cologne

he erms

via" nd

processus"

ave ifferent

eanings,

ince

via" s

generally

connected

ith n authoritative

hilosopher,

hereas

processus"

s

associated

ith col-

lege.My onjecture

ould

e that

via" efersbove

ll tothe

octrinal

ontent

nd hat



VERSOR

ND

HIS RELATION

O

THE SCHOOLS F

THOUGHT

329

In sum, it has been shownthat neitherVersorhimself or his con-

temporaries

ttest

to

his

alleged

Thomism

(not

to

mention

his

alleged

Albertism).

rom

a

doctrinal

oint

of

view,

one

might

till

want to

argue

that

Versor

nevertheless

as

a Thomist.

After

ll,

upon

examination

f

some of the

fundamental

ssues that divided

the

schools of

thought

in

particular

Albertism

nd

Thomism)

in

the

fifteenth

entury,

Versor's

writings

eveal

more

affinity

o

the

thought

f

Thomas

Aquinas

than to

thatof

Albert

he Great.

However,

f

John

Versor

receives

he

designation

"Thomist"

on

account

of this

affinity,

hat

predicate

s not

historically

justified.

n his

proper

historical

ontext,

.e. the

philosophical

school

debates

of

the fifteenth

entury,

ersor

cannot be

regarded

s a Thomist.

Thus

John

Versor's

position

n

the

Wegestreit

as become

clearer

by udging

it in relation

to the four

characteristics

f schools

of

thought

cf. §

1):

Although

his works

were used

by

Thomists

and

his views

accord

with

Aquinas

and the

Thomist school

on

several fundamental

ssues,

they

do

not reveal

any

confessions

f

loyalty

o

Aquinas

and

they

are

certainly

not

exclusively

ased on

Aquinas'

works.

Whetherthat

is

precisely

he

reason why theywere so popular, as Rittersuggested, emains to be

investigated.124

Nijmegen

Radboud

University

ijmegen

Faculty

f

Theology

"processus"

efers ore

o the

edagogical

ractice

theway

ndorder f

xplaining

he

authoritative

exts),

ut his eeds

urther

nvestigation.

124

ee

above,

.

22.



330

PEPIJN

UTTEN

Appendices

The

followingppendices

fferome of the

passages

discussed romVersor's

commentaries n the

sagoge

the

Categories

nd Perihermeneias.

n

each case

Versor's source

text

i.e.,

Albert'sor Thomas'

commentary)

s

presented

in

the eft olumn. To facilitate he

comparison,

have

italicised

he

cor-

responding

words.

Therefore,

he

original

talics

n

Borgnet's

dition of

Albert's ext have been omitted.

Appendix

Cf.

§

3.

Albertus

agnus,

ibere

raedicamentis,

r.

,

c.

1,

d.A.

Borgnet

Opera

mnia

vol.

),

Parisiis

1890,

66a-67b:

Johannes

ersor,

uestiones

ibri

redicamento-

rumrestotelis

above,

.

34),

.

6,

f.

0rb-30va:

Caput

. In

qua ignificarne

ubstantia

ccipiatur.

Jam

de

praedicabilibus

ecundumrdina-

tionem

orum d unum

uod

est

gene-

ralissimůmnordinelio ractandumst. uia

autem mnium

rima

st

ubstantia,

deo

rimo

de ubstantia

icamus.st utemubstantiae

riplex

considerato.na

quidem

ecundum

uod

ub-

stantiast

ars

ntis

rima

t

rincipalis

quae

in evera st t ausa st mnibus

liis

xis-

tendi. ecundautem

ecundum

uod

ub-

stantia

raedkabile

st

rimum,

d

quod

st eductio

omnium

raedicabilium

uae coordinationis.

Tertia

utemecundum

uod

ubstantia

ri-

mům

ubjectum

st,

d

quod

icut

d

subjectum

omnium

uocumque

odo

raedicabilium

est eductio,icutd ddequo st raedicatio.

Primo

uidem

gitur

odo ubstantiast

ens

per

e

existens,

ec

n

alionec b alio

suae xistentiae

ausam abens:thocmodo

substantiast

primum

t vere

ns,

t est

essentianvariabilist

incorruptibilisuae

omnibus

liis ausast xistendi.st utemctus

simplexrimae

ausae,

er uem

mniaub-

sistunt

uaeper

e sunt: ttalemctum

d

similitudinemubstantiae

uae

roducit

rima

causa: t est

per

e existens

uia

non

per

aliud el b alio st

uod

it

ausatum,

ed

ipsumst ausatumrimumn modo xis-

tendi d similitudinem

rimae

ubstantiae

productum.

t haec substantia

implex

st

essentiasicut abetur

x ibro

ausarum.t

Sciendum

rimo uod

ubstantiast

rimum

ens,

uiapřecedit

lia

natura,

iffinitionet

tempore,

t habetur

eptimo

etaphisice.

Ideo epredicamentoubstantieriusractandum

est. t

primo

idendumst n

ua ignificatone

accipiatur

ubstantiaecundum

uod logico

consideratur.st

gitur

irca oc dvertendum

quod,

t

nquit

ominus

lbertus,

ubstantie

est

riplex

onsideratio.

rima st

nquantum

substantiast

prima

t

principalisars

ntis.

Secundast ecundum

uod

st

rimumredi-

cabile

d

quod

st mniumeductio

redicabilium

et

subiicibilium

ue

substantiam

ignificant.

Tercia st ecundum

uod

st

rimum

ubiec-

tum

uod

omnibusubstat.

Primo odo ubstantiast ssentia

implex

que

n

se vere st t omnibusliis st ausa

essendi.t secundum

e nec st

enus

ec st

species

ec ifferentia

ec

roprium

eque

ndi-

viduumec ccidensecuniversaleec

par-

ticulare,

ed

hec omnia ibi ccidunt.t

substantiamoc modo onsideratam

onsi-

dérât

rimushilosophusqui

onsidérât

ualiter

substantiaensibilisd insensibilemeducitur

t

insensibilisd

intellectualem,

t ntellectualisd

divinam.ed substantiaecundo odo on-

sideratastprimumnter mnia icibilia

incomplexa,ue

ubstantiam

ignificant.

deo

ad

ipsam amquam

d

primum

t

simplicis-

simum

redicabile

mnialia

que

ubstantiam



VERSOR ND

HIS

RELATIONO

THE

SCHOOLS

F

THOUGHT 331

haec ubstantiaecundumrocessumabet

materialitatemt variabilitatemt

particu-

laritatem:

uorum

ihil

abet ecundum

quod

n

prima

ausa

st,

t

secundumoc

quod

st b

ipsa.

Et sicde substantia

gi-

tur,

bi ensibilisubstantiad nsensibilemeduci-

tur,

t

nsensibilis ad ntellectualem

et

ntellectualis

addivinam:

ujusmodi

ractatuse substantia

pertinet

d

primumhilosophum

Philosophum

ed.].

ecundomodo ubstantiast

primum

commune

raedicabile,

d

quod

mne

raedkabile

(quod

st

ubstantia)

educitur.t

quia

nihil

praedicature aliquonisi uodesttotum

ipsius

tformaotius

uae

otumicit

psius,

et esse

psius uod

st

n

potentia

el ctu.

Cum

ubjectum

utem

rimum

n

ubstantia

(de

quo

omnia

lia

praedicantur)

it om-

positum,

portetuod

t

propriumrimum

praedicatum

it

ompositum,

t

forma

otius

totum

sse

otius icens ecundum

uod

est

ipsius

otum,

n

quo praedicatiootest

e-

signali:

t haec st ubstantiae

qua

inten-

dit

ogicus.

aec utem

ubstantiast

rimum

quod upponiturel ubjiciturntota oor-

dinatione

orum,a

er

rdinemescensust

species

pecialissimas

t ndividua:oc nim

est

enus

ormabile

n

omnia

uae

unt

uae

coordinationis

enera

t

pecies

t ndividua.

Et cuilibet

otest atere,uod

haec

otius

illius oordinationisst

primumrincipium

et

est

ompositum,uia

aliter on sset

n

se

per

eexistens.st utem

ompositumormale

a

forma

quae

dicit

otumsse

ecundum

ňmam

notionem

ubstantiae,

n

ua

atioubstantiaentel-

ligi otest

Tertio utemmodo

ubstantia

diciturb actu ubstandiet tunc iciturub-

stantia

uae per

e

substat,

t omnibus

liis

quae

ubstant,

at

uod

ubstant:thocmodo

substantiandividuast ubstantia

ola,

qua

tamen ullaut nferius

atebit,

st

raedica-

tiosed

mnis

ubjicibilitas

mnium

uae uibus-

cumque

ubjiciuntur

st b

ipsa.

Et

quia

nos

in hoc

ibro ntendimuse

praedicabilium

secundumuas

coordinationeseductioned

unum,

deo

anc ubstantiam

rimam

portet

ponere:

uae

tamen

ltima st ecundum

ordinem

rimo

t ecundo odo

ictaeub-

stantiae.ecundumrgo rimamntentionem

substantiast

ssentia,

uae

nec

enus

st,

ec

species,

ec

ndividuumsed st

implex.

ecundo

autemmodo icta

ubstantia

omposita

st,

significanteducuntur.t sicdicituronfuset

in

potentia

otumsse uiuslibet

ubstantie,

t

est

uid

ormabile

t

determinabile

er iffèrentias

ad diversas

pecies

ubstantie.t

hocmodo

logico

onsiderato^

cilicetub ratione

rimi

predicabilis

d

quod anquam

d

genus ene-

ralissimůmmnia

ue

ubstantiam

ignificant

reducuntur.erciomodo st b ctuubstandi

dieta. t hoc modo ola ubstantia

articularis

dicitur

ubstantia,

qua

ulla

redicatio

xit.ed

est ubiectummnium

ue uocumque

odoubi-

idunturt ubstant.t

quia

n

hoc ibrontendit

Philosophuse ordinabilingeneream n

rationeubiicibilis

uampredicabilis,

deo

substantiastomodo

ccepta

tiamonsidérât

logicus,

cilicetubratione

rimi

ubiecti

n

quo

omnia

unt elde

quo

omnia icuntur.

Et sic

patet uomodo

ubstantia

logico

consideratur.



332

PEPIJN

UTTEN

etestprimůmenusmnibusequentibus

differenüis

ormabile

t eterminabile

d sse

pecmum

et ndividuorum.

ertio

utem

modo

icta

substantia

st

eterminata

ateria

t

uper-

ficie t

oco

d hoc

ingulare

el llud."

Ibid.,

67a

between

ratio

ubstantiae

intelligi

otest"

nd "Tertio

utem

modo

substantia"):

"Si autem

uaeritur,

uae

sint

omponen-

tia

psum,

um

ihil

abeatnte

e x

uo

om-

poniossitiicendumuodnihilxtrinsecum

ei ante

e

habetntra

e tarnen

abetntel-

lectum

omponentium

psum.

st nim

ns

et est

er

e,

uod

ddit

uper

ns ntellec-

tualem

ompositionem:

uia

exente

st,

t

ex

eo

quod

st

er

e,

st

hoc.

Et,

ut dicit

Boetius,

liud

habet

uo

st

liquid,

liud

habet

uo

oc st t

haec

st orma

omposi-

tionis

jus,

uia

nihil abet

materiae,

uamvis

habeat

d

quod

st

tesse. t

haec st

rima

notio ubstantiae

uae

de omnibus

raedi-

catur

uae

n

recta

inea

praedicamentali

suntnpraedicamentoubstantiae.unt

tarnen

uae

dicuntur

ubstantiae,

on

uia

hanc ubstantiae

ecipiunt

el

participant

rationem,

ed

uia

unt

rincipia

ssentialiter

constituentia

ubstantiam,

icut orma

ici-

tur

ubstantia,

tmateria

icitur

ubstantia,

ut

dicit

ristoteles.

ed

haec

non unt

n

substantia

ecundum

ectum

rdinem

praedicamenti,

ed

reducuntur

d substan-

tiam

t

principia

ubstantiae

er

hanc

ig-

nitatem,

uod

nihil

uod

per

ui

ssentiam

facitubstantiam,stnon ubstantia.oc

igitur

odo ubstantiaonsiderata

logico

t

est

praesentis

ntentionis."

Sed

hic riturubium

e

compositione

ub-

stantiet

est

genus eneralissimům.

es-

pondetominuslbertusuod ubstantia

in

genereeneralissimo

ccepta

icit

liquid

formátůmer

ormam

istinguentem

otum

esse uiuslibet

ubstantie

ecundum

rimariam

notionem

eu rationem

ubstantie,

n

qua

ci-

licet

atioubstantie

rimo

ntelligiotest.

t

huiusmodi

orma

qua

sic sumitur

rima

notio ubstantie

ihilnte

e habet

x

quo

it

composita,eque

e

neque

atione.

t ta ub-

stantia

n

genere

eneralissimo

ccepta

on

est

composita

ompositione

ctuali

x

aliquibus

recedentibus

psam

ormaliter,

t

ideo on st iffinibilis.st arnenic dver-

tendum

uod

secundum

ostrum

odum

intelligent

ubstantia

ntelligitur

omponi

x

ente

t

er

e,

ue quidem

ompositio

nobis

intelligiturer

modum

ompositionis

x ctu

et

potentia,

cilicet

x

quo

st

t

uod

st,

ta

quod

nshabeat

modum

otentie

t

quod

est,

t

per

e

habeat

modum

ctus t

[ex

ed.]

uo

est.

Non amen

st

bi

compositio

ex

genere

t

differentia,

uia

ns ifferentias

habere

non

potest,

um

nihil it

quod

rationemntisubterfugereossit. t sic

patet

uod

materiatformaon ompo-

nunt

ubstantiam

n ommuni

ccepta

eque

etiam

enus

t

differentia,

edut

dictum

st

secundum

ostrummodum

ntelligendi

om-

ponitur

x actu

t

potentia

eu

x

quod

st

et

quo

est."

Appendix

Cf.

§

5.

Albertus

agnus,

ibere

raedicabilibus,

r.

c.

2,

ed.

A.

Borgnet

Opera

mnia,

ol.

),

Parisiis

890,

b-4a:

Johannes

ersor, uestiones

uinqué

redicabi-

lium

orphirii

above,

.

34), .

2,

ff.

vb-3ra:



VERSOR

NDHIS

RELATIONO

THE


"CaputI. Utrumogicait ars hilosophiae"

Hanc utemcientiam

ui

modusst mnis

philosophiae,

uidam

ullam

artem

sse

philosophiae

ontendunt,

icenteson isi res

esse

arteshilosophiae,

cilicet

hysicam,

athe-

maticamive

disciplinabilem,

t

metaphysicam

sive ivinam.

Cum nim

iffinitio

icens

uid

t

propter

quid

medium

it n s ien

ia,

t

diffinitio

on

possit

anan isi

ñpliciter

scilicet

uod

aut

concipiat ateriamensibilemquaecummotu

est t

mutatione;

ut

oncipiat

ateriamntel-

ligibilemcujus

ssentia

on st ummotu

t

mutationeecundum

ationem,

uamvis

secundumsse it

n

materia

uae

est um

mutationet

motu,

icut st

magnitudo

t

numerus;

utnec ecundum

ssentiam,

ec

secundumsse

oncipiat

ateriam

ensibilem'.

ide-

tur

uod

philosophia

onhabeat isi res

partes

ssentiales,

icut t Aristotelesicere

videtur.

ropter

uod

nonnulli

ogicam

ci-

entiamive

ationalem,

ullam

artem

icunt

essehilosophiae.

Addunttiam

d

suae ssertionisonfirma-

tionem,

uod

nulliusei

modus,

um e

ujus

modus

st,

enitn

eneris

ui

ivisionem.onstat

autem,

uod

ogica

eneraliter

ietamodus

philosophiae

st.

on

rgo

enireideturd

philo-

sophiae

ivisionemnecvidetur

n

aliqua arte

hujus enerisuod

st

hilosophia

ontineri.

Hanc utem

pinionem

lii

quidam

m-

pugnantes

icunt

hilosophiaeeneralis

sse

intentionem

mnem,

mnium

uocumque

odo

entiumomprehendereeritatem,uantumomini

possibile

st

omprehendere

arn ecundumationem

et

ntellectum.

a

autem

uae

sunt,

icuntur

esse ut b

opere

ostro,

ive

volúntate,

sive

tiam b intellectucientiam

uae-

rente:

ut

natura

eneraliter

icta,

uae

ab

opere

ostro

ausari

on

otest.

t cum

ea

quae

a

natura

unt,

ostraeint ausae

scientiae,

t nonnos umusausa

psorum,

non

potest

e illis sse cientia

ractica.

Relinquiturrgo, uod

de talibus

pud

nos

non

estnisi cientia

ontemplativa,uae

luminentelligentiaeerficitur.orumutem

quorum

os umus ausa

per

voluntatem,

non

otest

sse

pud

os cientia

peculativa,

sed tantum

ractica.

adem

nim unt

n

"Queriturecundo:trumogicaebeatici

pars hilosophie

Arguituruod

non

primo

utoritatehilo-

sophi

exto

Metaphisiceonentis

antumres

partes

hilosophie,

cilicet

hisicam,

athematkam

et

methaphisicam,

rgo

t cetera.

Secundo

rguitur:

iffinitio

stmediumemon-

strationis

acientis

cire

ergo

ot unt

artes

philosophie

t non

plures uot

modis

diffinitionesariantur.eddiffinitioneson ari-

antur

isi

ñpliciter,

uia

veldiffinitio

ei

on-

cipit

motumel materiamensibilemt est

diffinitio

hisica,

el

abstrahltmotu t

materia

ensibili,

icet on matena

ntelligi-

bili et sic est diffinitio

athematica,

el

abstrahit

enitus

motu t matena

am

en-

sibili

uam ntelligibili,uia

talis esbene

potest

sse ine

materia,

t

sic est

diffinitio

metaphisica.

t non

ossuntluribus

odis

rerumiffinitiones

arrari,

rgo

ogica

onst

pars hilosophie.

Tertio

rguitur:

ullius

ei

modusum

e

cuiusstmodusenitn ui

eneris

ivisionem.ed

logica

stmodus

hilosophie,

rgo

on enitndivi-

sionem

hilosophie

anquamars

ius.

In

oppositumrguiturrimouiaphilo-

sophia

ecundum

enus

uu<m> st

ompre-

hensiomnium

uorumeumque

ntium,

ecundum

quod ossibilest ominialia ntia omprehen-

dere

ecundumationemt ntellectum.ed

ogica

est

omprehensio

licuius

ntis,

uia

estde

secundisntentionibusdiunctis

rimis;rgo

est

pars

hilosophie.



334

PEPIJN

OTTEN

quolibetcibilirincipiatcausae t eie-

menta

ognoscendi,uae

sunt

rincipia

essendi:

uia

liter

equeretur,

uod

d

quod

scitur

nobis,

on citur

ecundum

d

uod

st,

sed

potius

cireturecundum

d

quod

non

est.Et sicfalso

modo cireturmne

uod

scitur,

uod

bsurdum

st.

Relinquiturgi-

tur

uod

de entibus

natura

ausatis,

on

potest

sse

cientia

er

a

quae

unt

nobis,

sed

potius

cientia

orum abetur

x

prin-

cipiis

ausantibusssentiam

t esse orum

in

natura,uae

nonnisi

per contempla-tionemuntnomnibus.orumutemuae

sunt

nobis,

on

potest

sse cientiaera

apud

nosnisi

er

a

principiauae

unt

n

nobis,

erquae

nos sumus

ausa

eorum,

quae

nobisunt:

ujus

inison st

erum,

sed

bonum,

uod

nobis

onumst. imiliter

igiturlicujushilosophiae

ritntentio

om-

prehendere

eritatem

jus uod

ationisuctu

via est

n

omnem

ognitionem

mnium

eorum

uorumognitio

it

n nobis

er

a

quaecognita

unt

pud

nos,

x

quibus

os

proficiscimurd scientiamncognitorum.rit

igitur

e intentione

hilosophiae

tiam

o-

gica

cientia

uae

est ationalis.

Adhuc

utem

ujusignum

icunt,

uod

pud

Peripatéticoshilosophia

ntres

artesrima

ivi-

sioneivisa

st,

n

hysicam

cilicet

eneraliter

ie-

tarnetethicam

eneraliter

ictam,

t

rationalem

similiter

cceptam.

ico autem

hysicam

ene-

raliter

ictam

quae

comprehendit

tnaturalemt

disciplinalem

t

ivinam.

thicamutem

enerálem

quae

n econtinettmonasticam

t economicam

et ivilem.

ationalemutem

enerálemuae

om-

prehenditmnemodůmeveniendie notod

ignotumuocumque

odo:

uod

er

multa

e-

nera

robationum

it

ut

n

equenti

stendetur.

Manifestumst

gitur,uod

gicaliqua

ars

est

hilosophiae.

Adhuc utemi

aliquid

stde ntentione

philosophiae:

unc oc

maximee ntentione

philosophiae

rit,

ine

uo

ullus

n

philosophia

in

aliquam

evenire

otest

ognitionem.gnorans

autem

ogicam

ullus

gnoti

erfectamotestcquirere

cognitionem

eo

quod

gnorât

odum

er uem

devenire

portet

e noto d

gnoti

otitiam.

Videturrgoogicamraecipuesse e nten-

tione

hilosophiae

"

Secundo

pud

hilosophos

cilicet

eiypoteti-

cos

hibsophia

widitur

rima

ui

ivisionen

hisi-

cam

eneraliter

ictam,

thicam

eneraliter

ictam

et ationalemive ermocionalem

eneraliter

ic-

tam. hisica

ero

eneraliter

ictaecundum

omnes

erypoteticos

omprehendit

aturalem

philosophiam,

athematicam

t

metaphiskam.

thica

vero

eneraliter

ietaontinetub e

monasticam,

yconomicam

t

oliticam.

ationalisutem

ene-

raliterietaomprehenditmnemodumeveniendi

denotod

gnoti

oticiam,

uod er

multa

enera

propositionum

it. rgo

hilosophi

erypotetici

dixerunt

ogicam

sse

artem

hilosophie.

Tertio

rguitur:

lludnecessariost

de

intentione

hilosophie,

ine

uo

ullus

otest

evenire

in

cognitionem

licuius.ednullus

gnoransogi-

cam

licuius

gnotierfectam

otestcquirere

og-

nitionem

ergo

ogica

st

de ntentione

hilosophie

et

pars

ius."



VERSOR

ND

HIS

RELATIONO

THE


Appendix

Cf.

§

5.

Thomas

e

Aquino,

xpositio

ibri

eryermenias,

lib.

1,

ect.

,

ed.

Leonina,

ditio ltera

retractata,

ol.

*1,

oma-Paris

989,

4.39-

16.138:

"Vbi

portetntelligereuod

na uarum

pe-

rationumntelkctusstndiuisibilium

ntelligencia,

in uantumcilicetntelkctusntelligitbsoluteuius-

cunque

ei

uiditatem

iue ssenciam

er

e

psam,

puta uid

st

homo

el

uid

lbumel

aliud

huiusmodi;

lia ero

peratio

ntelkctusst ecun-

dum

uod

uiusmodi

impliciaoncepta

imul

componit

tdiuidit.icit

rgo

uod

n hac

secunda

peratione

ntelkctus,

cilicet

omponenti

set

diuidentis,

nuenitur

eritast

alsitas,

elinquens

quod

n

prima peratione

on

nuenitur,

t

etiam raditur

n

II

De anima.

. Ad

huius

gitur

uidenciamonside-

randumst

quod

ueritas

n

aliquo

nuenitur

dupliciter:nomodoicutneoquodst erum;

alio

modoicut

ndicenteel

ognoscente

erum;

inueniturutemeritasicutn o

quod

st erum

tamn

implicibusuam

n

ompositis,

et icutn

dicenteel

ognoscente

erum,

on nueniturisi

secundum

ompositionem

t

diuisionem.

Quod quidem

ic

patet.

Verum

nim,

t

Philo

ophus

icitn

VI

Ethicorum,

st onum

intelkctus,nde,e uocunqueicaturerum,portet

quod

it

er

espectum

d ntellectum.

omparantur

autem

d

ntellectumoces

uidem

icut

igna,

es

autemicuta

quorum

ntelkctusuntimilitudines.

Johannes

ersor,

uestiones

rimi

ibrieriher-

meniarumrestotelis

above,

.

34),

q.

3,

ff.

61va-b:

"Sciendumecundo

uod,

t

prius

ice-

batur,

upkx

st

peratio

ntelkctus.na st im-

pliciumntelligentia,uandocilicetntellectus

absolute

ntelligituiuscumque

ei

uidditatem

ive

essentiam

er eipsam,tputauid

st omoel

quid

st

lbum;

t

n

hac

operatione,

thabet

textus,

onestVeritasel

falsitas.

lia st

operatio

ntelkctus

ue

st

ompositio

t

ivisio,

ue

fit um ntellectus

implicia

imul

omponit

t

dividit;

t

n

hac

peratione

ntelkctusicdividen-

tis t

omponentis

st entasel

alsitas.

. Sciendumercio

uod

Veritas

eperitur

in

aliquo upliciter.

nomodoicutn eo

quodest erumeu icutnrequeest era; thoc

modo

eperitur

entasamn

implicibusuam

n

compositis.

liomodonveniturn

liquoamquam

in

ognoscente

t icente

erum;

t ic non>nveni-

tur isi

n

compositione

tdivisionentelkctuset

hocmodo

ntelligiturhilosophus

um icit:

circa

ompositionem

t divisionemntellec-

tus stVeritas

alsitasque,

icut

n

dicentet

cognoscente

erum el

falsum.

Pro cuiusdeclarationest sciendum

quartouod,

t iciturexto

etaphisice,

erum

est onumntelkctus.abeturarnenbiquodverumt falsumuntn

mente,

d est n

intellectu;

onumutem

t malum

unt

n

rebus. x

quo equituruod

e

quocumque

diciturerumecessest

uod

it

er espectum

ad intellectumcuius ntellectuserum t

bonumst

perfectio.

d

ntellectum

omparan-

tur ocesicut

igna

onceptuum

ius;

t

ta

voces

dicuntur

ere

uia

sunt

igna

eri

quod

st

n

conceptione

ntellectus.es utem

ad

intellectum

omparantur

icuta

quorum

on-

ceptiones

ntelkctusuntimilitudines

t

ita

res

nonpotestici eranisi errespectumd

intellectum.ed

si

quereretliquis

trum

res eodemmododicatur era ecundum

quod

ad diversosntellectus

omparatur,

respondetur

uod

non.



336

PEPIJN

OTTEN

Considerandumutem uodaliqua es

comparatur

d ntellectum

upliciter.

no modo

sicut

mensura

d

mensuratum,

t

siccom-

parantur

esnaturalesd ntellectum

pecu-

latiuumumanum.t deo

ntellectusicitur

uerus ecundum

uod

onformatur

ei,

al-

sus utem ecundum

uod

discordâtre.

Res autem aturalison

dicitursseuera

per omparationem

d ntellectum

ostrum,

sicut

osueruntuidam ntiqui

aturales,

estimantes

erum

eritatemsse olum n

hoc

quod

estuideri:ecundumoc

enim

sequereturuod ontradictoriassentimul

uera,

uia

contradictoriaaduntub

diuer-

sorum

pinionibus.

icituramen

liqua

es

uerauel falsa

er omparationem

d ntellectum

nostrum,

onssencialiterel

ormaliter,

et

ffectiue,

in

uantum

cilicetata

st

acere

e

eueramel

falsamstimationemet secundumoc

dicitur

aurum

erum el falsum.lio ero odoes

comparantur

d intellectumicutmensuratumd

mensuram,

t

atet

n ntellectu

ractico,ui

st

causa erum.nde

opus

rtificis

icitur

sse

uerumnquantumttingitd rationemrtis,al-

sum eron

quantumeficit

rationertis"

Pro uiusolutioneciendumuintouod

quelibet

es

aturalisonstituíast nteruos

ntel-

lectusscilicet

nterntellectumivinum

d

quem

omparatur

es sicut

rtificiatad

artem

t effectusd causam ive

mensura-

tum d

mensuram;

t

proportionabiliter

dicereture artificialid

intellectumos-

trum

racticum.

deo es

aturalis

er

om-

parationem

d

ipsum

iciturssentialiter

vera

ro

uanto er

ormam

uam mitatur

artem ivinam

eu llud

uod

de re

ipsa

producendoreconceptum

rat

n

ntellectu

divino;t icomninoomparaturdipsam

sicut ensuratumd

mensuram.t

proportion-

abiliter,

tdictum

st,

iceretur

e e

rtificiali

in ordined

intellectumostrum

racticum

ue

verasse

icitur

nquantumttingit

ationemrtis

que

est

n

intellectu

ractico

rtificis,

alsa

verum

nquantumeficit

rationertis.i

ergo

resnaturalis

onstituiturnterntellectum

divinum,

d

quem omparatur

t effectus

ad

causam,

t interntellectumostrum

pe-

culativum,

d

quemomparatur

icut ensurad

mensuratumtuncer espectumd psumon

diciturera

ssentialiterel

ormaliter

ed

ffective,

inquantum

cilicetatast

pud

ntellectumos-

trum e e

facere

eram

xistimationem,

uius

oppositum

ixerunt

liqui antiqui

on-

stituenteserum

eritatemonsistereolum

in hoc

quod

stvideri

obis

eu

pparere.

Ex

quo

errore

equereturuod

duo con-

tradictoria

ssentimul era. t sic

patet

qualiter

eritas

n

aliquo

nvenitur,

ualiter

etiam es

naturalesiversimoded diversos

intellectus

omparate

icunturere."



Theology,hilosophy,ndImmortalityftheSoul in the

Late

Via Moderna

of Erfurt

PEKKA

KÄRKKÄINEN

Abstract

In

1513 the Fifth

ateran Council determinedhat the

immortality

f the

rational oul

s not true

only

n

theology,

ut also

in

philosophy.

he deter-

mination an be related

lso to the actual

teaching

f

philosophy.

n

the

university

f

Erfurt,

artholomaeusrnoldi

e

Usingen

ndjodocus

Trutfetter

wrote

xpositions

n

natural

hilosophy

t that ime.

Usingen's

nd Trutfetter's

expositions

f

De anima

epresent

position,

hich

aithfully

ollows

n

method-

ology

nd

aspirations

he tradition f the

via

moderna.

urthermore,

hey ive

an

interpretation

f the

relationship

etween

hilosophy

nd

theology,

hich

Trutfetteronsidered onsonant

with he ntentionsnd the formulations

f

the Fifth ateranCouncil;and finally, rutfettervenpresents practical

application

f the Council's

recommendations.

In

the

early

16th

century

he

question

of

immortality

s.

mortality

f

the

human soul became

a

crucial

point

in

understanding

he

relationship

between

heology

nd

philosophy

f nature.

As

one

culmination

oint

of

this

evelopment,

he Fifth ateranCouncil

of 1513

determined

n the

point

thatthe

immortality

f

the rational oul is not

only

true

n

theology,

ut

also

in

philosophy,gainst

ome

of

the so-called ecular

ristotelianritics.1

This

determination

an also be related to the actual

teaching

of

phi-

losophy,

s seen

in

the case of the

University

f

Erfurt,

heretwo notable

figures

f the ate

German via modernaBartholomaeus rnoldide

Usingen

(d. 1532)

andjodocus

Trutfetter

d. 1519),

wrote

expositions

n natural

philosophy

t that time. These two

men,

later known

as

teachers f the

young

Martin

Luther,

ncluded section

n

psychology

n

severalof

their

workson natural

philosophy.

Also

in

theircareers

they

were borderline

figures

etween

philosophy

nd

theology.

Whereas both were

originally

1

On the

preceding

iscussionn

immortality

f the oul ee

Eckhardt

eßler,

he

Intellective

oul,

n:

Charles. Schmitt

ed.), ambridge

istory

f

enaissance

hilosophy

Cambridge

1988,

85-534.

he ext f he

etermination

s

cited ere

ccording

oNorman. Tanner

(ed.),

ecrees

f

he cumenical

ouncils,

olume:

Nicaea

to ateran

,

London

990,

05-6.

©

Koninklijke

rill

V,

Leiden,

005

Vivarium

3,2

Also vailablenline www.brill.nl



338

PEKKA

ÄRKKÄINEN

teachers of philosophyn the artistic aculty, singenlater became an

Augustinián

riar

nd

a

fierce

dversary

f the

Reformation,

hileTrutfetter

movedfrom

he artistic

aculty

o the

theological aculty,

irst o

Wittenberg

in

1506.

In

1510

he came back to

Erfurt,

o the

theological aculty,

ut

in

1515 he

was commissioned s a lecturer

n Aristotle

n

the artistic

faculty,

hich

was

quite

exceptional

for doctorsof

theology.2

To illustrate he

theme,

I

shall treat some relevant

passages

from

Usingen's

and Trutfetter's orkson natural

philosophy,

where

they

dis-

cuss the

problems

f

psychology.

he earliest f them s

Usingen's

Pawulus

philosophie

aturalisrom1499. Next

follows,

hronologically,

is collection

of

questions

called

Exercitium

e

anima

published

n

1507,

several

years

before he Council.

Finally

omes Trutfetter's

nly publication

n

natural

philosophy,

umma n

totam

hysicen^

hich

came out

in

1514,

in

the

year

following

he determination.3

I

shall

not,

however,

egin

by

analyzing

he discussion f the immor-

tality

f the soul

by Usingen

and Trutfetter

mmediately,

ut

I

shall first

make some remarks n theirnominalistmethod

n

general

and then on

theirpsychologyn particular.Only thereafter ill I proceedwith their

views on

immortality

s.

mortality

f the

soul,

particularly

n the central

question

of the

origin

of

human

souls,

focusing

n how it relates o the

question

of the

relationship

etween

theology

nd natural

philosophy.

The

question

of the

origin

of the

soul,

whether here are causes other

than material

beings

n

its

generation

s,

in

the medieval

discussion,

ied

to the

question

of

the

mortality

f the

soul,

and the answerto the

ques-

tion

determines,

hether he soul is conceived

n

a

materialistic

ay

as

mortalwith the

body,

or whether t is seen as

being

immortal,

xisting

in some form fter hebodilydeath.4

2

Erich

leineidam,

niversitastudii

rffòrdiensis

/,

eipzig

992,

05-7.

n

Usingen's

andTrutfetter's

ives,

ee Kleineidam

992, 90-1;

98-9.

3

Bartholomaeus

rnoldie

Usingen,

awulus

hilosophie

aturalis

Leipzig

499;

xercitium

de nimaErfurt

507;

odocus

rutfetter,

umma

ntotam

hysicen:

oc st

hilosophiam

atu-

ralem

onformiteriquidem

ere

ophie:

ue

st

Theologiaer

.

Judocum

sennachcensisn

gimnasio

Erphordensis

lucrabata

t ditaErfurt

514. shall ot iscussere he urther

evelopments

in

the

ater ditions

f

Usingen's

nd Trutfetter's

orks,

hich ould e

interesting

or

the ake f ncreasingumanistnfluence,speciallynUsingen'sritings.

4

Apart

rom his

articular

uestion

here

re several

hemes,

here

he

nterplay

between

heology

nd

philosophy

s

realized.

ee,

for

xample,

he

uestion

n the

lu-

rality

f

forms,

herehe

notion

f

he oul

eparated

romhe

ody lays

n

mportant

role n the

rgumentation.

ee

Usingen,

awulus

ff.

6r .



IMMORTALITYF

THE

SOUL

N THE LATE VIA

ODERNA

F

ERFURT

339

1. Philosophicalethodfthe rfurtiania Moderna

The

University

f Erfurtwas one

of

the most famous

mong

the via mo-

derna f the ate Middle

Ages.

If

we

pass

the

difficult

uestion

of

what,

n

general,distinguished

etweenthe via

antiqua

nd via modernat the

time,

I shall

refer o the witness f the

Erfurtians

hemselves,

hich considers

their

philosophical

method

s a

characteristic

f

their

position.

This is

to

be found

n

Trutfetter'summuleotius

ogice

where the author

cites

the

conclusions f the influential

uodlibetaldispute

n

1497,

which became

a starting ointof the ockhamistic eform f studies n Erfurt.5

According

o Trutfetter's itness he

position

of via moderna

termin-

ist as he calls

it)

is based on

a

careful

nalysis

f the

signification

f the

terms,

hereby

voiding

overlyhasty

conclusions

bout

the

ontological

structure f the

world,

ccording

o the

principle

f

economy.

The error

of the

rival

realist )

osition,

which

presupposesmanyunnecessary

nto-

logical

entities,

s

based on

ignorance

of the art of

dialectic,

particularly

concerning

he connotations f the terms.6 his is seen as an

integral

part

of the semantic

nalysis,

which has been

commonly

onsidered

s

necessary reliminary orkfor he other ciences, .g. in physics r meta-

physics.7

rutfetter otes that

early theologians

nd

philosophers

were

5

Jodocus

rutfetter,

ummuleotius

ogice

Erfurt

500,

f.

M1V-M2V.

6

Trutfetter,

ummuleff.

Mlr

: Nec

portet

llis

ffingere

ntitates

roprias

b aliis

is-

tinctas

ro ualitate

odorum

ignificandi.

inc

n

his multis

ncaute

c

propriam

educ-

tionem

equiritur

etaphysica,

bi

perfacile

onsuleret

ialecticus.cciditnim rrorste

ex sola

artis ialecticaet connotationiserminorumescientia.d

quod

anno

natali

Christiano497

n

universali

isputatione,uam uotlibetum

ocant,

n haec

verba on-

clusimus. ;ummulef.Mlv: Errantgituronnullinpropriameductionemncaute eta-

physicamequirentes,

bidialecticusacile

onsuleret,

uorum,

tveritatiicetAristoteli

nostro,

dversastuniversalium

onfictio,

tque

erum

ignorům

umero

ultiplicado.

7

Trutfetter,

ummulef.Mlv: Sed

cclamant

lii,

uod

de entibusationisihil

urant.

Vadamus,

nquiunt,

d

res,

ilem abentes

erministam,

rridentes

uod

mnia eferátd

signa.

os,

nquiunt,

em

erquirimus,

d rem

mus,

uid

d nosde

terminis,

uasi

de

rebusine

erminis

ossit

sse

ermo,

uasi

ialéctica

enitus

upervacua.

ic

fuitt est

n

pluribus,ui

se

gratis

nvolvuntura t erroribus

nextricabilibus,

uos

ola eit t

potest

dialécticaesolvere

efiniendo,ividendo,

erminorum

enique

onnotationes

um

modis

significandi

ivaciter

xponendo,

ec non

ophismatumaralogisationes

antasticas

ete-

gendo.

ecob d dico ufficere

ialecticen

ro

ognitione

etaphysicae

t

theologiea,

ta

quodplurimorumerscrutatione

aud

opus

it,

uom

dialécticaon

dat

cognitionem

illarumcientiarumedcertis odister xpedit,uoad illas enitur. s Urban otes,

the

passage

s

paraphrased

rom

ean

Gerson's ollectorium

uper agnificat,

ract.

.

See

Wolfgang

rban,

ie viamoderna'n der

Universität

rfurt

m

Vorabender

eformation,

n:

Heiko . Oberman

ed.),

regor

on

imini,

erk

nd

Wirkung

is

ur

eformation

Berlin

981,

311-30,

sp.

327,

n. 54.



340

PEKKA ÄRKKÄINEN

alreadyaware of differentigurativemodes of speech, and interpreting

them

presupposes

careful attention o those

figures.

Moreover,

all

the

realists o

observethe

possible equivocations

f

terms,

n

which

they

do

not differ

rom erminists.8

One could

illustrate he difference

y saying

that,

as

in

the

case

of

relational

erms,

t

does not

imply

hat these terms

ignify

ome kind of

relational

ntity

which s

really

distinct rom

ingularbeings,

but rather

that the relational erm

merely ignifies

ll

beings

of its

scope

and addi-

tionally

onnotes

their

tanding

n

relation

o

otherentities.

n a

similar

way,

the existence f severalother entities s

being

really

distinct rom

substances

nd absolute

qualities

was

denied.9

In

addition

to this

general

semantic

orientation,

he

frequently

sed

authorities

re also found

among

the

représentants

f

the via moderna.

Here it

should be

noted

that Erfurtian

eaching

followed

traditionally

along

the lines of

Jean

Buridan

and Marsiliusof

Inghen

rather han that

of

Ockham,

the

Venerabili

nceptoralthough

Ockham,

together

ithPierre

d'Ailly

nd

Gregory

f

Rimini,

was

strongly

avored,

specially

y Usingen

and Trutfetter.10n exampleof thecontinuingmportance f Buridan s

seen,

however,

n

Usingen's

Exercitiume anima

published

n

1507. The

8

Trutfetter,

ummule

.

M2r:

Hancveritatem

mnes

ntiqui

octores,

hilosophi

t

sancti

on

gnorarunt.

.. Et

quia

non

emper

nimadverteruntel dvertere

ogitarunt

ad sermonis

roprietatem,

ed

liquandomproprie,

igurate

t

tropice

unt

ocuti,

ever-

enterunt

nterpretandi

t

llorumicta on

n ensu

uem

erba

aciunt,

ed

potius

uem

ipsi re

e

ferunt

ccipienda,

t ta

eorum

mproprietates

d

proprietatem

unt educen-

dae

nequaquammpliandae.

lioquinuid

mirumi

augetureceptio.

n hac veritate

omnes

eaiistae,

ui

altemon berrant

terministis,

inime

issident,

icet

epius

ominis

aequivocationcomponibilemitemnteros constituât.9

Cf.

Trutfetter,

ummuleMlv:

In

tamnumerosaerum

arietate,

uobus

raedica-

mentis,

ubstantia

t

qualitate,

ntrinsice,

eliquis

cto xtrinsecisabitudinisbunde

significata.impliciter

ulla st

entitas

niversalis,

espectiva,

ndivisibilis,

rivativa,

ut

successiva,

ullum

omplexe

ignificabile,

orma

otius,

ut

totalitas,

quolibetingulari,

absoluto,

c

permanentiequestrata.

willnot

give

detailed

ccount ere f how

therelationetween

ignification

nd

ontology

asunderstood

y

Trutfetternd other

nominalists.

10

ee

Kleineidam

992

above,

.

2),

141.Kleineidam

otes

ibid., 42), ommenting

upon

he

uodlibetalispute

n

1497,

hat

Usingentrongly

avoured

ckham,

ierre

d'Ailly,

nd

Gregory

f

Rimini,

ven

gainst

ld

uthoritiesike uridan

ndMarsiliusf

Inghen.

his

doesnot

ayvery

much

oncerning

he

general

tand

f

these

uthorities,

becausen this articularuestionuridanndMarsiliusepresentedhe pinionhared

by

via

ntiquagainst

he

ontraryosition

fOckham

nd

d'Ailly

seeUsingen,

awulus

f.

125r).

oncerning

he

uthority

f

Ockham,

hich

as

not bsolute

or

Usingen,

ee

Urban

981,

25

nd

329;

but lso

hemuch-favored

regory

f

Rimini as

disregarded

on the

uestion

f

omplexeignificabilia

as we shall

ee.



342

PEKKA ÄRKKÄINEN

Psychology, ccording o Usingen,properly onsists fknowledgen the

latter wo

meanings,namely

s

concerning

he soul5 s the

subject

term

of

a

demonstrated

onclusion nd as

an

entity

f which uch

a

conclusion

claims some state of

affairs.16

For

him

t

is

enough

to

say

that ince a

proposition

s assented

hrough

a

previous

demonstration,

hrough

t the truth f some state of affairs

s

also assented

oncerning

he

subject

term

nd the

entity

t

signifies.

his

is

due to

Usingen's

denial of the existence f so-called

omplexeignificabilia.

This means that the conclusion

tself oes not

signify nything

hat its

individual ermsdo not

signify.

o there s

again

no need for uch addi-

tionalentities s

signification

otaleas the

thing ignified y

the

whole

prop-

osition

was called

by Gregory

f

Rimini

and other

adherents

f

complexe

significabilia

octrine. s

a matter f

fact,

he existence

f

complexeignificabilia

was one of the

things

lready

denied

in

the

programmatic uodlibetal

dispute

of 1497. Because there

s

only

one

entity,

he

soul,

which the

conclusion nd its

subject

term

ignify,

here s also no need for diverse

acts of

assent,

which

form

he

psychological nowledge

n

question.

t

is

thevery ame act,whereby heconclusion,tssubject erm, nd thething

signified

re

assented,

which s called

knowledge.

o here also the semantic

analysis

f

signification

ends owards

implifying

heview of the

ontological

structure f

being.17

divisionf the

bject

f

science

o combinet with he

erminology

f Marsilius.he

authenticity

f he dited

ext f he irstedaction

f

Buridan's

uaestiones

asbeen

ues-

tioned.

ee

J.M.M.H

hijssen,

ate-Medieval

atural

hilosophy:

omeecentrends

n

cholarship

in: Recherchese

Théologie

t

Philosophie

édievales,

7

(2000),

58-190,

t 179-80.

However,ince hererenootherditionsf he uestionst handvailable,have elied

on Patar's dition.

16

Usingen,

x.

n.,

.A3r:

Quibus remissisespondetur

d

questionem

er

duas on-

clusiones.

rima onclusio.e anima st cientia

anquam

e scibili emotot remotis-

simo. aec conclusio

abet uas

partes,uarum rima

ult e ilio ermino

nima sse

scientiam

anquam

e scibili

emoto,

uia

lle

otestngredi

onclusionem

emonstrabilem,

ergo otest

emoteciri. ecunda

ult e re

significataer

llum erminům

nima

sse

scientiam

anquam

e

scibili

emotissimo,

uia

lia

potest

ignificaner

conclusionem

demonstrabilem

t subiectum

ius,

ut

patet

n

illa demonstratione

el

consimili,

t

quidquid

nhaeret

orpori

st ctus

orporis,

t

nimanhaeret

orpori,

gitur

nima st ctus

corporis.

17

Usingen,

x. an

,

if.

A2rv:

Idem

nim

ignificant

um

omplexe

ignificabilia

on

sint onendauaeposuit regoriusriminensist Henricuse Hassia tpatet irca .

Physicorum,

sta nim

nquantum

alis

ec

st

ropositio

ec

pars

ius,

uare

emotissime

terminâtctum

dhaesivum

ntellectus,

uorum

xemplaris

eclaratio

atet

nhacdemon-

strationeel

consimili,

t

omne nimal st

risibile,

t omnis

omo

st

nimal

ationale,



IMMORTALITYF

THE

SOUL N

THE LATE

VIA

ODERNA

F ERFURT

343

Similarlyherewereotherdoctrines onnected o thesethemes,where

there was a

notable

disagreement mong

the

adherentsof

the via mo-

derna. or

example,Usingen argues

against

he

position,

hat there

would

be

knowledge

f

the

thing

tself

rimary

o the

propositional

onclusion

concerning

t.

This

passage

is

found

n

Usingen's

earlier

work,

Parvulus

philosophie

aturalis

1499),

where

he notes that this

opinion

s

obscure,

not

internally

onsistent,

ecause

knowledge

of

an

extramental

ntity

includes,

properly peaking,

he

knowledge

f

conceptsthey

ignify,

nd

so

the

contrary

pinion

s easier to

understand

nd

compatible

with the

common

presuppositions

f the via moderna.he issue was also consid-

ered as

being

a

sharply

ivisive

uestion

within he

via modernaas

it was

argued

from he common

presuppositions

f that

chool.

n

the same

way

Gregory

f

Rimini,

whom

Usingen

mentions s an

adherent f

the com-

plexe ignificabilia

octrine,

was

in

many

ways

a

respected

uthority

f

the

via

moderna

n

Erfurt.

Usingen's positions

reaffirm

he

importance

f the

semantic

nalysis

s the

first

tep

in

the

philosophical

method,

s

it was

vehemently

onfessed

y

the Erfurtiansn

1497.

8

The procedureof semantic nalysis lso precedesthe definitionf the

term souP s an

object

of

knowledge

n

psychology,

ifferentiating

t from

the

understanding

f the term

without

eference o its

operations

n

the

body,

contrary

o

metaphysics.

ne

must note here

that

Usingen

con-

ceived the

soul

as

the

substantial orm

f the

body,

and

denied,

together

with the

common tradition

f the via moderna

ckham's

idea of

the

plu-

rality

f

substantial orms

n

man.19

Calling

soul

a

substantial orm

does

not

contradict t

being

a

substance,

when it

informs

he

body,

because

essential

arts

of

substances re

also called

substances.20

urthermore,

he

humansoul is immaterial nd independent f the body,so that after ts

separation

rom

he

body

it

can

exist as a

substance

n

the

meaning

res

per

se

subsistens. 21

igitur

mnis

omo st

risibilis.ciuntur

utem sta ria

cibilia

na

scientia,

uae

est

assensus

onclusionis,

uia

ssentiendo

onclusioni

ropinqueanquam

otali

entatiimul

assentitur

ubiectoius

emote,

d est

artialiter,

trei

ignificatae

er

arn

anquam

biecto

eius

emotissime.

18

Usingen,

arvulus

ff. v-9r.

19Usingen,arvulus,.87r,ccordingowhichhe efenseeliesnGregoryfRimini's

arguments

gainst

cotus nd

Ockham.ee

alsoEx. an.

ff.

2V-E1V.

20

Usingen,

x.

an

,

ff.

5r-C6r.

21

Usingen,

x. an

,

ff.

3r-L4v;

4r-Nlr.



344

PEKKA

ÄRKKÄINEN

Soul is consideredby Usingenas the mostgeneralterm n psychology,

which then confers

pon

it the reason for the

unity

f this

science and

for ts distinction

rom ther

ciences.

Soul

is,

however,

nderstood ere

in a

qualified

ense,

namely

onnotatively,

onnoting

ts

operations

n

the

body.22

he

operations

of soul are

not,

strictly peaking,

he

object

of

psychologicalnowledge,

or

s

the soul

n

itself,

part

from hese

perations.

This

is defined

by

describing

he semantic haracter f the term

oul

in

this context.

n

psychology

soul'

is

namely

a connotative

oncept,

ince

it connotescertain

operations

n

the

body.

It

is

defined

s

a substantial

form,

which s called 'soul'

by

virtueof its

vivifying

tatus s a formof

a

body. Solely metaphysics

onsidersthe soul

in an

absolute

manner,

without

ny

concern

whether his ubstantial orm

ctually

nforms

body

or

not,

because

metaphysics

onsiders he

things

from he

viewpoint

f

their absolute formative

rinciples

.

ecundumationesarum

bsolutas).23

Therefore he

notionof a soul

separate

from he

body,

or

a

soul as mover

of celestial

bodies,

is excluded from he

psychological oncept

of soul.24

3. Usingenn Theolog))ndPsychology

This definitioneaves room

for

certain

theological

onsiderations,

s

is

the case

later

n

Exercitium

where

Usingen

treats he

question

whether r

not the

soul is a formof

body

both

on the basis of Catholic

teaching

22

Usingen,

x.an

,

f.A3r: Secundaonclusio.lle erminus

nima

onnotative

aptus

est ubiectum

ttributioniscientiae

e

anima,

uia

huic onvenitiffinitioubiecti

t ausae

assignationsiusdem.bid. .A2V:Quartootandumst ubiectumttributionissse er-

minůmommunissimum

n

aliqua

cientia

otali

quo

sumit nitatemxtrinsicam

t ab

aliis cientiis

rguitivam

istinctionem.

23

Usingen,

x. n. .

A2V:

Tertio otandumst

irca

artemuaesiti,

nimam

upliciter

considerali,

am

rimo

bsolute,

test

uaedam

orma

ubstantial,

on urandon ab

informando

el oris anendo

ieta,

ualiter

nima

eparata

corpore

tiam icitur

nima,

et

tanon ebet

api

n

praesenti,uia

ola

metaphysica

onsidérâtes ecundum

ationes

earum

bsolutas.ecundo

onnotative,

test

uaedam

ormaubstantialisb

informando

dicta

nimans,

d

est

ivificans

orpus,

n

quo

est

rincipium

perationum

italium,

ualiter

diffinit

am

Philosophus

ecundo uius icens

arn sse ctum

orporis,uod

facit ita-

liter

perari

t tadebet

api

n

praesenti.

ee also

bid.,

.A3V.

n Parvulus

f. 1r)

singen

makes o such istinction

etween

bsolutend onnotative

ses f

soul,'

ut

notes,

.g.,

the onceptf body'uch hat t can be understoodabsolutely,s in the ategoryf

substance

nd

in

the

ategory

f

quality,

s it s an abstracterm.

f. similar

is-

tinction

oncerning

od

n

theology

nd

n

metaphysics

nMarsiliusf

nghen,

uaestiones

I, 2,

ed.

Noya,

29,

7-23.

24

Similarilylready

n

1499,

ee

Usingen,

arvulusf.81r.



IMMORTALITY

F

THE

SOUL

N THE LATEVIA

ODERNA

F

ERFURT

345

and as a philosophical uestion.25Moreover,the following uestionson

the

unity

f

the intellectual oul and on

immortality

f the rational oul

are

explicidy

reatedbecause

of the

heresies

related to them.26 ere

it

should be

noted,

that the

seminal

quodlibetal dispute

of 1497

already

addressed

the

question

of the

origin

of the human

soul,

among

other

topics,

reaffirming

he Catholic doctrine f the creation nd

immortality

of individual ouls.27

The

questionconcerning

he intellection f

a

soul

separated

from he

body

is a

special

case,

which

Usingen

does not deal with

n

Exercitium

in accordancewith the definitionhat this theme s not treated n

psy-

chology.

n

Pawulus

hilosophie

aturalis

1499) Usingen

has

indeed addressed

such

a

question,

ut also

therehe noted thatAristotle oes not deal with

this theme

n

De anima28

In

Pawulus

Usingen

tends to

make a

difference

etween

pure philo-

sophical

analysis

and

the

philosophical nalysis

from

the

viewpoint

of

Christian

heology.

here he

notes,

commenting

n the text

concerning

habits f the

soul,

that he author reats he

subject

not as

a

pure philoso-

pher,but as a theologian, hat s, as a Catholic philosopher. The dis-

tinction

made

there

s the one between

cquired

and infused

abits,

which

according

o

Usingen

cannot be done

by

a

pure philosopher,

who does

not need the

concept

of infusedhabits.29

As we shall

see,

a similardistinctions seen

in

Usingen's

treatment f

the

origin

f the rational oul

in

Pawuluswhich he

sees

as a

central

ues-

tion

determining

he nature

of the intellectual

oul,

because

many

hea-

then

philosophers

iffer ere

from

he Catholic Christiandoctrine.His

aim

is to

consider,

ot

only

f

the Catholic and heathenviews differ rom

each other,but also in whichrespect heydiffer.30n the indexof ques-

tionsfound t the end of the

work,

he

question

was entitled s

whether

25

Usingen,

x. an

,

if.

L4V-M2V,

uestions

Utrumntellectusumanusit ormaub-

stantial

orporis

umani nd

Utrum,

ircumscripta

ide

atholica,

atio aturalisictaret

intellectumumanumsse ormam

orporis

umani.

26

Usingen,

x.

an ff.M3r-Nlr.

27

Trutfetter,

ummaf.P4r.

28

Usingen,

awulusf.

124r.

29

Usingen,

awulusf.

112v:

Et talis ecundum

utorem

uplex

st,

cilicet

cquisitus

per perationes,t nfusus,d est cquisitusine raeviisperationibus,bi utoroquitur,

non

anquamurus

hilosophus,

ed

tanquamheologus,ui

est

philosophus

atholicus,

quiapuri hilosophi

ihil

overunte habitibusnfusis.

30

Usingen,

awulusf.

1

: Pro

olutione ultarum

uestionumuaepossent

iefieri

de

potentia

ationalit ntellectu

umano,

otandum

st

uid hilosophi

thnicit

gentiles



346

PEKKA ÄRKKÄINEN

human intellect s derived from he potenciesof matter, lthough his

titledoes not

appear

in

the text.The

main

question

can be

formulated,

so that t asks whether he

generation

f

a

human soul

happens by

virtue

of natural

gents,

hat

s,

without

ny supernatural

nfluence.31

he

ques-

tion

was

important

rom

he

viewpoint

f creationistic

heory oncerning

the

origin

of the

soul,

which

Usingen

shared,

ccording

o which human

souls are created

ndividually,

ogether

with

the formation f the

body,

to which

they

are then

infused,

which

was

considered s the

Catholic

Christian

iew on the matter.32

In this

question,

Usingenpresents

ot

only

the three

ommonly

nown

positions

f Alexander

Aphrodisias,

verroes,

nd

Aristotle

s

in

the aver-

age

Buridanian

radition,

ut he

also

presents

lato

as a

fourth

osition.

Concerning

Alexander'smaterialistic

osition,

e

says

that t

is

shared

by

many gentilephilosophers,

hile it is difficulto

falsify

t

merely

n the

basis of naturalreason

(.

ecundum

urum

umen

aturae).

3

He also

maintains

that

manypeople

of his own time share Alexander's

position,

ut

his

tar-

get

here

is hard to

identify.34

n

the 14th

century,

lasius of Parma had

representedhe Alexandrist osition,but the contemporaryhilosophers

favored

mainly

he Averroistic iew.35

Usingen'spoint

reflects,

n

some

sense,

the

position

of the via moderna

in

which Alexander's

position ppears

to be the most convenient orthe

natural reason. He does

not,

however,

hare

Buridan's

and Ockham's)

view that ts falseness annot be

demonstrated

y

arguments

f

natural

reason

alone,

but thinks

nly

that t is difficulto

falsifyffectively.

his

formulation iffers

ignificantly

lso fromPierre

d'Ailly's

formulation

n

his Tractatuse anima that

Alexander's

position

s for the naturalreason

senserunte anima

ationali,

t imul ideatur

n

quo

cum eritateatholicaoncordent

et

n

quo

discordent.

31

Usingen,

arvulus,

.140v:Utrumntellectus

umanusit ductuse

potentia

ateriae.

32

Usingen,

arvulusf.

112v.

creationistic

iews articulatedlso

by ohannes

orsten,

whowas n influential

heologian

n Erfurt

n

the ate15th

entury.

orstenould

lso

explain

he ransmission

f

riginal

in

espite

his

iew,

asing

is

rgumentation

n Giles

ofRome's iews.

ee Adolar

umkeller,rbsünde,

nade

Rechtfertigung

nd erdienst

ach er

Lehreer

rfurterugustinertheologen

es

pätmittelaltersWürzburg

984,

24.

33

Usingen,

arvulusf.

1

v: Haec

pinio

uit

uondam

ultorum

entiliumhilosopho-

rum,

uoniam

ecundum

urum

umen aturaeifficulter

otesteprobali

fficaciter.

34Ibid., .1 v: Ettimeo odie arn ssemultorumnsensatorumominum,uinon

creduntorde ivinis

loquiis

t

scripturae

anctaeestimoniis.

35

Keßler

988,

87

above,

.

1);

Olaf

luta,

ritikerer nsterblichkeitsdoktrin

nMittelalterund

Renaissance

Amsterdam

986,

1.

Such

ontemporaryhilosophers

ncludedietro

omponazzi,

who

ater

ecame amous

or

efending

he

hilosophical

alidity

fAlexander's

osition.



IMMORTALITYF

THE

SOUL

N THE LATE

VIA

ODERNA

F ERFURT

347

the most probable.36There are some terminological imilarities o be

observed

n

Lawrence of Lindores5

Quaestiones

e anima

which maintains

that

according

to the natural

ight

of reason

(

tando n

lumine aturali

it

cannot

be conceded as

proved

that

the human

ntellect

s

either mmortal

or

corruptible.

Philosophically

peaking

j

bure

hilosophiceoquendo,

the

opinion

of Alexander

appears

to

be more

probable

than the Averroistic

position.37

distrust f the

probability

f Alexander's

view,

even

in

a

philosophical nalysis,

llows

Usingen

uch

extreme

xpressions

s

of those

who defend

he Alexandrist

osition,

who do not

believe

n

their

hearts

in the divine

sayings

nd the testimonies f the sacred

Scriptures,

nd

who think f the

Christian aith s a

mere fabulation.38

Against

the solution

of

Averroes,

which

presupposes

one common

intellect,

singen

notes

that t is

condemned

by

the

Church. There he

supposedly

has in

mind

the statutes f the

Council of Vienna in

1312,

wherethis

doctrine f

Averroeswas first

ondemned,

lthough

he

mpor-

tance of

Averroes

n

psychology

ersisted

ntil

the late 15th

century.39

Usingen

brings

o

arguments

gainst

his

position,

ut refers o

the author-

ityofAugustine nd further o that ofGregory fRimini,whoseproofs

that

this is not a

correct

reading

of

Aristotle as

Averrois hinks

he

takes for

granted.40

36

On

Buridan,

eePluta

986

above,

.

35),

1;

on

Pierre

'Ailly,

eehis

Tractatuse

anima,

, 1,

ed. Olaf

luta,

ie

philosophische

sychologu

es

eteron

illy

Amsterdam

987,

35,

ndon

his ater

iews,

luta

986,

2.

37

awrencef

Lindores,

uestiones

e nima

III,

4,

citedn

Pluta

986,

07.

38

Usingen,

arvulusf. llv:

Et imeo odie arn

ssemultorum

nsensatorum

ominum,

quinon reduntorde ivinisloquiistscripturaeanctaeestimoniis,ed nnitentesuis

capitibus

icunt

a,

quae

fides

atholica

ocet,

sse

omposita.

n

quorum

ersona

oquitur

sapiens:

x

nihilo ati

umust

postea

rimus

anquam

on

fuerimus.tem

cclesiastes:

Unus

st nteritus

ominumt umentorum

t

aeque

utriusque

onditio,

t

nihil

abet

homo

umento

mplius

tc.Haec

opinio er

catholicam

octrinam

udum

xplosa

st,

quare

on

it ure

atholico

hilosopho.

39

Usingen,

arvulus

f.

1

v: Sed

haec

pinio

amnatast

b

ecclesia,

uia

fide red-

imus

uemlibet

ominem

uum abere

ntellectum

umeraliter

istinctum

b intellectu

alterius. .ee

Keßler 988

above,

.

1),

486.

40

Usingen,

arvulusf.

1

v: Et hoc

dicit

Augustinus

n

secundo e

libero

rbitrio:

Manifestumst

ationalesentes

ingulos

uosque

ostrum

ingulas

abere. t hanc

osi-

tionem

robat

regorius

riminensisirca

ecundum

ententiarumon

fuissee inten-

tione ristotelis,edCommentatoremeridendumsse,uia scribitamntentioniristoteli,

ubi

videasi

placet.

ee

Gregorius

riminensis,

ectura

uper

rimum

t

ecundum

ententiarum

II,

d. 16 et

17,

q.

1,

art.

,

ed. A.

Damasus

rapp

OSA,

Berlin

979,

omus

, 330,

36-331,

. The

argumentgainst

he

Averroistic

osition,

hich

singen

rings

ut

s dis-

cussed

y

Gregory

bid.,

rt.

,

ed.

Trapp,

26,14-9;

27,

-329,

7. The

same

ext

f



348

PEKKA

ÄRKKÄINEN

Plato is passed overbyUsingenwithno discussion oncerningwhether

or not his ideas contradict he Catholic

doctrine,

n

contrast

o

what he

does with the other three

philosophers.Usingen only briefly

escribes

Plato's doctrines f the

pre-existence

f souls and

anamnesis-theory

nd

his

notion of the soul afterdeath.41

Aristotle s

again

discussed

n

detail,

and

particularly

is relation

to

Catholic doctrine

s

examined.

n

evaluating

Aristotle's octrine rom he

viewpoint

of Christian

theology

he detects one

point,

where Aristotle

clearly

deviates

from

t.

This

is the

question

of whether he human soul

is

generated

from the

potencies

of

matter,

where

Usingen

thinks hat

Aristotle lso understands he

generation

here

takingplace by

virtueof

natural

agents

which does

not consider

any supernatural

nfluence. or

this

reason

Usingen

thinks hat Aristotle lso understood

he

generation

of the soul

as

being

derived from he

potencies

of matter

.

entit

nimam

rationalem

duci e

potentiis

ateriae

,

where t

does not

differ

rom he

gen-

eration

f animal souls.

Usingen

understands hat

Aristotle ould not have

known

any

other manner of

generation, eing

a

pure philosopher;

ut

for the Christiantheologian,such an understanding f generation s

insufficient.

he Christiannotion of

creation,

which s not the same as

the

purelyphilosophical

oncept

of

generation, resupposes, ccording

o

Usingen, predisposed

ubject,

where the soul will be

created,

but does

not take

place

by

virtueof natural

agents,

but rather s the divine act

of creation nstead.

Concerning

he

generation

f

the

soul,

Usingen

eems

to

imply

here that there were

no lines of

argumentation

hat Aristotle

could have

established,

ased

upon

his naturalreason. This comes

close,

by

the

way,

to Buridan's view that Alexander's

position,

which

in

this

matters sharedbyAristotle,annotbe falsifiedynatural eason alone.42

Augustine

rom e libererbitirio

, 7,

15 s alsocited

y

Gregory

ere

ed.

Trapp,

26,

33-4).

41

Usingen,

arvuliis,

f.

llv-112r.

42

Usingen,

awulus,

f.

112r

: Sed

quando uaeritur,

n haec

positio

ristotelica

n

omnibus

oncordetum eritate

atholica,

espondetur,uod

ic,

raeter

nam

articu-

lam,

ua

sentit

nimamationalem

enerali,uia

non

eneratur

liomodo

uo

Aristoteles

loquitur

e

generatione,

uia

ecundumristotelem

enerali

st

rocedere

e non sse d

esse

n materia

raedisposita

irtute

gentium

aturalium,

uod

non st liud

uam

duci

de potentiis ateriae.t sic Aristotelesensitnimamationalemducide potentiis

materiae

icut

rutalem,

uia

secundum

umoctavo

hysicorum

on

est

liusmodus

emanandiffectussua

ausa,

uam er

enerationem,uae

st

rocessus

ormaee non

esse

d essevirtute

gentium

aturalium,

uoniam

ctio

pecialis

ei vel

upernaturalis

puro hilosopho

on

uit

ognita

icut st reatioel

nnihilatio... Et

lla

reationimae

rationalisst

uasi

ctio

medianterreationemxtraubiectumt ductioneme

potentiis



IMMORTALITYF

THE

SOUL

N THE LATEVIA

ODEMA

F

ERFURT

349

On the immortalityf the soul afterdeath Aristotle hinks therwise,

according

o

Usingen, greeing

forthe most

part

with the Catholic view

whichunderstands he human soul

as

being

mmortal.

lthough, singen

himself hares the

view

expressed

by

Pierre

d'Ailly

and

Gregory

of

Rimini43

hat

Aristotle

peaks

on thesematters

mbiguously,

nd he refuses

to harmonize

the

contradictory

tatements ound

n

Aristotle's

writings.

In

his

opinion,

Aristotle

s

more

likely

o

hold the

opinion

of the

perpe-

tuity

f the human

soul,

and therefore

onceding

to Christiandoctrine.

It is

evident,

evertheless,

hat

Usingen

understands hisas

a

mere

opin-ion of

Aristotle,

hich s

again groundedupon

no conclusive

philosoph-

ical

proofs.44

A

similar

olution

s evident ater

n

1507,

when

Usingen

discussed ev-

eral related

questions

n

his Exercitiume

anima.

The central

question

of

whether r

not the intellectual oul is derivedfrom he

potencies

f mat-

ter

s

not

discussed

here,

but

Usingen

notes that Aristotles

holding

he

affirmativeiew on the

question against

the Catholic doctrineof cre-

ation.45 n the mmortalityf the soul after odilydeath,whereby singen

is

persuaded

f ts

existence,

s conceded as truth

n

the

philosophy

ecause

it does not contradict he natural

reason,

but

is

proved

on the

contrary

by

dialectical

rguments although

ot

by ogically

alid

proofs. dditionally,

materiae,

uiapraesupponit

ubiectum

ispositum

t tarnenon

producitur

irtute

gen-

tium

aturalium,

uare theologisuandoque

ocatur

reatio,

uandoque

ocatur

ene-

ratio,

ed

non d

sensum

ure hilosophicum.

43

Petrus

lliaco,

ractatuse nima

6, 1,

ed.

Pluta, 5;

Gregorius

riminensis,

ectura

II,

d. 16 et

17,

.

1,

art.

,

ed.

Trapp,

30, 7-331,

.

44Usingen,awulusf.1 r: Etdixitummpliussse erpetuum.tquamvisristoteles

videturalia ensissearnenon dducitfficaces

robationes,uia,

ut Cameracensise

eo

testatur,

uando

ristoteles

oquebatur

e

his,

uae

n

discrimen

eligionům

onabant

et

pertinebantaucis

ransivit

amhoc

otius

liud

ersequendo.uare epetitur

n

plerisque

locis e

eadem e

contrarie

cripsisse,uia

n

primo

e anima

icit: onreminiscimur

post

mortem,

n

secundo ero icit:

eparetur

oc ab hoc

tanquamerpetuum

cor-

ruptibili,uae

duomanifeste

mpugnant

e,

ut

patet

lare. ec

est

pus xponere

t

con-

cordare,

c

si

n

nullo rrassetec

n

aliquo

ibi

ontradixisset,

uodpotius

ivinumst

quam

humanum.

Quia

autem ristoteles

agis

nclinatusuerituic

ositioni

uam

oppositae,ignanter

e

perpetuitate

nimae,

laretx

hoc,

uod

ius

cripta agis

onant

pro

lio.

45

Usingen,

x.an

,

f.L3V: Tertio

otandumst mnemormamubstantialemate-

rialemenerabilemtcorruptibilemepotentiisateriaesse ductamenerandotrur-

sum etransire

n

potentias

ateriae

orrumpendo,uia

secundum

hilosophumrimo

Physicorum

ateriast

rimum

ubiectumalis ormae.t

quid orrumpitur

nhoc

bibit

ultimum,

ed nima ationalisuxta eritatem

atholicamon ic

ducitur,

ed mmediate

a Deo

creatur

n

corpore.

ecretransit

n

morte

ominis

n

potentias

ateriae,

ed

epa-

ratur

corpore

cquirens

sse

er

e

subsistentiae.



350

PEKKA

ÄRKKÄINEN

Aristotles reckoned mongtheadherents f mmortality,n spiteofsome

contrary rguments,

hich

Usingen

discusses,

mong

others.46

On the

question

whether

he

human

soul

is the

substantial

ormof

the

body,

Usingen

defines

his view

of the

relation

between

heology

nd

philosophy.

After

discussing

he

question

on the

basis

of the

Catholic

Christian

osition

s a

part

of his

argumentation,47

e asks

n a

separate

question,

f the

position

an be

defended

rom he

standpoint

f the

argu-

ments

of

pure

natural

reason

(utrum

ircumscriptaide

atholica

atio

aturalis

dictaret

ntellectum

umanum

sse

ormam

orporis

umani

.48

His

final

nswer

s

contrasted ithOckham's

position

n his

Quodlibeta

wherethe atterholds

the

view

that

the

natural

reason

cannot

demonstrate

r

prove

as evi-

dently robable

hat

he

ntellectual

oul s

the form

f the

body.

According

to

Usingen

this

s

naturally

elievable

natur

liter

ersuasibile)

nd dialecti-

callyprovable

<

ialectice

onclusibile

,

which

s

enough

for

him

to

answer

his

main

question

affirmatively,

amely

that

according

o the

naturalreason

this

position

s to be

considered

true.49

similar

view

is

expressed

n

Usingen's

Exercitium

hysicorum

oncerning

he

question

whether

t is to

be

conceded,according o thephilosophy fnature, hat theFirstmover s

omnipresent,

hich

he

answers

ffirmatively.

he

answer

s

grounded

n

reasoning

hat

this

ruth,

hich

s known

o

be true

from

evelation,

oes

not contradict

he

principles

f

natural

cience

because

of the

coherence

of

all

truths,

nd this

s a sufficient

ondition

for ts

being

true

also

in

natural

cience.

So

in

theory, singen

ncludes

uch

articles

f

faith,

which

do

not

contradict

he

principles

f natural

cience

as a

part

of the

natural

sciences

themselves.

He

also

finds

t

important

o note

here,

however,

that

this

truth

an

be

deduced

from

he

principles

f natural

science

as

a probable,althoughnot evident, ruth.50

46

Usingen,

x. an

,

ff.

M4V;

lr.

47

Usingen,

x.

an.,

f.

4V-M1V.

48

Usingen,

x.an

,

ff.M1V-M2V.

49

Usingen,

x.

an

,

f.

M2V:

Adtertium

icitur

ecundum

uilhelmum

ckham

on

esse

atione

aturali

videnter

robabile

eldemonstrabile

ntellectum

umanum

sse

or-

mam

orporis

umani,

t

dočet

n

Quodlibeto;

st

nim aturaliter

ersuasibile

tdialec-

tice

onclusibile,

eclusa

t

ircumscripta

ide

atholica,

uod

ufficit

d

veritatem

esponsionis.

An autem

rticuli

idei t

n

conciliis

er

cclesiam

eterminata

int

emonstrabilia

ec

ne,

habet

ideri

n

theologia.

singen

ses

he

xpressions

umen

aturae

ndratio

aturalis

interchangeably,ndhedifferslearlyromawrencef indores'se f he onceptumen

naturae

which

ncluded

nly

vident

r

naturally

emonstrated

ruths.

ee

Usingen,

x.

an

,

f.

Mlr nd

Ex.

Phys.,

.

çlv;

Lawrence

f

Lindores,

uestiones

e nima

III,

q.

4,

cited

in Pluta

986

above,

.

35),

107.

50

Usingen,

x.

hys.,

f.

2r

:

Quibus

raemissis

espondetur

d

questionem

ffirmative.



IMMORTALITY

F

THE SOUL N

THE

LATE

VIA

ODERNA

F

ERFURT35

1

FollowingMarsilius f nghen,Usingen explains hatthisdoes not con-

tradict he

idea that

Christian

faith

does

not

depend

on

philosophical

proofs.

Only

some

articles f

faith,

ike

the ones

concerning

he

Trinity

and the

Incarnation,

re

known

only through

evelation;

here are sev-

eral

others hat

re known

by

natural

reason

also,

but one's

faith

n

them

does not

rely

on their

philosophical

emonstrability,

ecause

they

would

be believed

lso,

even when there

were no

philosophical

roofs

or

hem.51

So we can sketch

the

position

n

these controversial

matters

n

Erfurt

before he determinationf the FifthLateran Council. In the

questions

discussed

above,

Usingen

seems

to think hat

in

the controversial

oc-

trines

oncerning

he intellect

here re no evident

philosophical rounds

that would

necessarily

ontradict

he Catholic doctrine.

There are some

doctrines,

ike the soul

being

derived from

potencies

of

matter,

where

pure

philosophers

ike

Aristotle ollow

heir rroneous iews

ystematically,

because

they

know

nothing

f Christian

evelation,

ut Christian octrine

does not

really

contradict heir

views,

but rather ncludes

t since it is

insufficient

n

itself.

otably,

hisdoctrinewas not

among

those ondemned

by

the Fifth ateran

Council,

but

only

the related

uestion

n the

mmor-

tality

f

the soul afterdeath.52

Usingen

does

not

see

in

this doctrine

necessary

onnection

o

the

question

of

immortality,

s

Aristotle

olds both of them.

n

thisdoctrine

Aristotle,

nd most

philosophers,

ven

agreed

with the Christian

ogma,

but their

proofs

were a

type

of dialectical

demonstration,

nd not

logi-

cally

valid

consequences. iscussing

he

question

n the soul as a substantial

form f the

body,

the dialectical

proof

was taken

by Usingen

as

a

philo-

sophically lausibleway ofaffirmingruthn the natural ciences. t may

seem that

this view exceeds the limitsof

natural

philosophy,

which he

set for himself

n

the initial

question

of Exercitiume anima.There he

defined he

knowledge

f the soul

to be founded on the demonstrated

Haec

responsiorobatur

u

o itatet ratione. Ratione

ic,

uia

non

répugnâtrin-

cipiis

aturalisationisum it

erum,

t testaturides

rthodoxa,

edomne erumero

consonai,

rincipia

utem aturalisationismnia unt

eracum nnitanturivine

veritati,

uae

estmetrumt mensuramniumerorum.tiam

otest robabiliter

educi

ex

principiis

aturalis

ationis,

ed non

evidenter,

t dicit

ondorius,

uia

est

quedam

veritasonformisumini aturalisationis,d quampossunt overerincipiaaturalia,

sed

non

evidenter

robare. singen

efers

ere

xplicitly

o Lawrence

f

Lindores

(Londorius).

51

Usingen,

x.

an.,

.

M2V.

52

ee Decrees

f

he cumenicalouncilsed.

Tanner,

05-7.



352

PEKKA

ÄRKKÄINEN

truths f thesoul,althoughhe did not discuss herewhether hedemon-

strationmust

be evident

or not.53

One

shouldnote

here

concerning

he

doctrines,

hich he Fifth

ateran

Council

later declared

as

orthodox,

hat

Usingen

thought

hey

were also

philosophically

he most

probable,

although

not

to be demonstrated

y

logically

valid

proofs.

He even

strived o refute

ny arguments

gainst

them,

s

the

Council

also

recommended

nd

urged.54

4. Trutfetternd the ifth ateranum

As one

might xpect,

there

are some

new

aspects

n Trutfetter's

umma

in totam

hysicen,

which came out

in

1514,

the

year

after he decree

of

the

Fifth

ateran Council.

Trutfetter

escribes

his work as

an

epitome

an

introduction

nto natural

philosophy,

which

mainly

describes he

position

of the

via moderna ithout

going

into a detailed

discussion

n individual

topics.55

rutfetter's

ork

can also be considered

s a

nominalist

oun-

terpart

or a via

antiqua ompendium

f

philosophy:

Margaritahilosophica

by Georg Reisch (1503),whichwas actuallyone of its sources.56

The latter

ontainsextensive

iscussions

n

theological

matters

n

its

book

on

psychology,

hich Trutfetter

ould

make use of.57

he

theolog-

ical

interest

n

Margarita

itwell

within

Trutfetter's

oncept,

as he con-

sidered

Summa

ccording

o its title

an

exposition

f natural

philosophy

in

conformity

ith the true

wisdom,

which

is

theology.

Despite

this

emphasis

Trutfetter

oes

not contain

as much

theological

discussion

n

53 eeabove, . 13.54

Decrees

f

he cumenical

ouncils

ed.

Tanner,

06,

7-10.

55

Trutfetter,

umma

5r: Has

siquidem

mnes

uum

nec etiam

n

transitu,

t

dici

solet,

t

superficie

ommemorare

ompendii

atio

inat,

ollibeataltem

ost

abitis

is-

ceptationibus

upervacaneis,

peculationibus

uperioribus,robationibusque

inus

eces-

sariis

aucula

uedam

eneraliora

t necessariora

quae

antillae

etati,

ui

hoc

Epitome

dedicare

onstituimus,

ongruere

t initiatorum

nimos

blectare

imul c

ad altiora

capescenda

reinstruere

aleant)implici

arratione

c stilo

lano,

orum

olum,

uos

nominales

ocant,

ententiam

ecitando

um

nnotationibus

uibusdam

n

marginae

ro

fusiorem

mpliorem

ectionem

raelibare.

he

works

a

compendium

fnatural

hilos-

ophy

n

the

mannerfhis

wn

ompendium

f

ogic

reviarium

ialectice

1500,

ater

nder

thename

pitome

eu reviarium

ogice).

umanist

hristoph

cheurlalls

rutfetter's

umma

compendiumeupotiusnchiridionniversamaturalemhilosophiam,hristophcheurls

Briefiuch,

in

eitrag

ur

Geschichteer

eformation

nd

hrere

eit,

d. F.

F. vonSoden

nd

J.

K. F.

Knaake. ol.

1,

Potsdam

867,

37.

Letter

o Trutfetter

3 December

514).

56

use

here he

1508 dition

f

Margaritahilosophica

Strasbourg

508.

57

ee

e.g.

Trutfetter,

ummaff.

4r

nd

Zlr,

where

eisch

s

explicitly

ited.



IMMORTALITY

F

THE SOUL

N

THE LATEVIA

ODERNA

F

ERFURT

353

his exposition s Reisch, and focusesmore along the lines of Usingen's

Powulus

presenting

mainly

an introduction

o natural

philosophy,

with

certain

discussions

n the relevant

heological

ssues.58

The

beginning

f

Trutfeier's

xposition

f

psychology

n

Summa esem-

bles Reisch's

Margarita

but

rearranging

he material

rom

Augustine,

hich

Reisch cites

word-for-word.

irsthe removes

doubts that

no such

thing

as the soul

existswhatsoever.

e

does this

by

an

early

form f

Cartesian

cogito

from

Augustine's

e trinitate.

his states hat

no wise

man

would

deny

the existence

f a

soul,

while the

doubt tselfndicates

living hing,

the

doubting

ndicates

memory

nd

finally doubting

person

under-

stands

himself

oubting.

o

three basic

elements f

a

soul,

namely

ife,

memory

nd

understanding,

re indicated

by

its reflective

cts

concerning

the

very

doubt

of its existence.59

After hat

Trutfetter

roceeds

by

introducing

he

variety

f

opinions

concerning

he

essence

and

origin

of the

soul,

with

a

special

considera-

tion of

their rroneous

nature.

Some of them

mply

he

mortality

f the

rational

oul,

since

they

see

the soul as material

or

being

some

sort of

bodily omposition. e sees theerror f the soul'smaterialnaturerefuted

(as

Reisch

does) alreadyby

Aristotle

n

the first ook

of

De

anima

where

the

Philosopher

reats

ome views

of his

predecessors.60

ater on

Trutfetter

admits,

s

does

Usingen,

that Aristotle

imself s not

unambiguous

on

58

Summa

n

totam

hysicen,

oc st

hilosophiam

aturalem

iquidem

erae

ophiae,

quae

est

heologia,er

D.

Judocum

sennachcensem

n

gymnasio

rphordiensi

lucrabata

et

edita .

ccording

o his riend

hristoph

cheurl,

rutfetter's

ame as o

widespread

in Germanniversitieshat

n

autumn513

ome dherentsf

heviamodernaromhe

UniversityfFreiburgnBreisgauervendysked or rutfetter'sooks, hichcheurl

subsequendy

eliveredo them.

specially

xpositions

f

physics

nd

metaphysics

ere

eagerly

nticipated,

ut

nly

extbooks

n

ogic

were vailable

t

that

ime. ee

Christoph

ScheurVs

riefbuch

ed.von

oden

above,

.

55),

125.

Letter

o

Trutfetter,

5

August

513.)

About

year

fterwards,

rutfetter

adfinishedis

Summand theres

again

vidence

fromcheurl

hat he

writing

f his

irst orknnatural

hilosophy

asno

minorccom-

plishment

or rutfetter.

ee

Christoph

cheurls

rìefluch

ed. von

Soden,

38.

Letter

o

Trutfetter,

3 December

514):

Laborasti

am

ongo empore

t noctes

noctisd.]

i-

xisti

nsomnes,

bsolvistiovum

pus

um

magna

aude,

ervenisti

d dulcem

etam:

ogo

te

quiesce

modo,

bsecroe

resume

ires,

ormi,

de,

bibe, aetare,

ura

valetudinem;

nam evalentealet

rphordia,

alet

riburgum,

alet tudiosa

uventus,

alet

osteritas.

59

Trutfetter,umma,

. X4V:

Tale

equidemliquid

ssenullus

apientum

ubitavit.

Quandoquidemvt eatus ugustinusib. 10De trinitate. 10ait) nimiquisdubitai,

vivit;

i

dubitai,

nde

ubitet, eminit;

i

dubitai,

ubitare

e

intelligit.

60

Trutfetter,

ummaf.X4V: Et

hi

omnes

nimam ortalemsse

enserint,

uia

sive

corpus

sset ive

liqua orporisompositio,

on

posset tique

mmortaliter

ermanere.

See also

bid.,

.Y3r.



354

PEKKA ÄRKKÄINEN

the questionof immortalityf the rationalsoul, and cites here Pierre

d'Ailly.

He

even

suspects

hat

mmortality

ould not conform o

Aristode's

ideas on the

eternity

f the world and the denial of

an

actual infinite.61

The interest

n the

question

f

mmortality

onforms

o decisionsmade

by

the Lateran

Council towards he end of the

previous

ear 19

December

1513),

which were

transmitted o Trutfetter

arly

in

1514.

2

In

fact,

Trutfetter's

xposition

follows

long

the basic

guidelinesposed by

the

Council,

which

strictlynjoinneach ndeveryhilosopherho eachesubliclynthe niversi-

ties r

elsewhere,

hat hen

heyxplain

r addresso theirudiencehe

rinciples

or onclusions

f

hilosophers,

herehese

reknowno

deviate

rom

he

rue aith

as

in

the ssertion

f he oul's

mortality

r of

here

eing nly

ne oul rof ter-

nity

f theworld nd other

opics

fthis ind

they

re

obliged

o devote

heir

every

fforto

clarify

or heir

isteners

he

ruthf heChristian

eligion,

o teach

it

by onvincingrguments,

o

far

s thiss

possible,

nd

o

apply

hemselves

o the

full xtentf heir

nergies

o

refuting

nd

disposing

f he

hilosophers'pposing

arguments,

ince

ll

the

olutionsre vailable.63

This kind of method

s followed

quite clearly

n

Trutfetter's

xposition

on De animaculminatingt thepointwhere he presents collection f

certain sentences

concerning

the rational

soul,

which

every

Christian

should

agree upon

for his salvation.64

One must

remember,

n

any

case,

thatTrutfetter as

writing

is Summa

as

a

teacherof

the

theological

aculty,

hich would have

given

him

par-

61

Trutfetter,

umma

3V:

Quid

utem ristoteles

e hac re

senserit,

x libris

psius

autenticis

erspicue

on

habetur,

uia

de his

uae tangunt

ectas t

religiones

ominum

communitermbiguetobscureoquitur.octamenertumst, uodnonnullaibi epug-

nantia

onit.

onvideo

nim

uod

ibi onsonant

undumuisseb

aeterno,

ingulorum

hominum

ingulas

sse nimas

mmortalest

perpetuas

t nonessemultitudinem

ctu

infinitam.ee Petrus

illyaco,

ractatus

e nima

6,

1,

ed.

Pluta,

5.

Also

Gregory

f

Rimini

oted his

rgument

hich

s directed

gainst

he

deaof he

mmortality

f ndi-

vidual

ouls,

ut

ccording

o

him

he

ternity

ftheworld nd

the ctual xistence

f

the nfinite

umberf ouls

re

possible

n

potentia

ei bsoluta.ee

Gregorius

riminensis,

Lectura

II,

d. 16 et

17,

.

1,

art.

,

ed.

Trapp,

31,

-8.Alexander's

ndAverroës'

osi-

tions

redescribed

hortly

eforehat

f

Aristotle,

ollowing

long

he ame

ines s

Usingen

in his arlier orks.

62

A

letter

rom

hristoph

cheurl

o Trutfetterated

3

March 514

learly

ndicates

that

rutfetteras

amiliarith he

ounciliarecision

t

that

ime. ee

Gerhard

beling,

LutherstudienVol.2/2,Tübingen982, 6,n. 60.Anexplicitllegationo thedecrees

found

n

Trutfetter,

ummaf.

Y4r:

Quam uidem

onstitutionem

odernus

ontifex

eo

decimus

n

concilio

ateranense

ovissimisisdiebus

nnovavit.

63

Decrees

f

he cumenical

ouncilsed.

Tanner,

06.

64

Trutfetter,

ummaf.

Y2V.



IMMORTALITYF

THE

SOUL

N

THE LATE

VIA

ODERNA

F ERFURT355

ticular nterestn theologicalmatters ere. Interestingly,he Council also

takes a

position

on the

length

f the studies

n

natural

philosophy,

when

immediately

fter

he

afore

cited

passage

it is recommended hat

after

five

years

of studies

n

natural

philosophy,

ne should

proceed

in

this

area

only together

with

theological

tudies,

n

order to avoid the embell-

ishment f heresies

mong

the secular

philosophers.65

On

the

other

hand,

Trutfetter imself nderlines he

importance

f

the

study

of

psychology

or

theologians.

After

having

discussedthe dis-

tinction f the

potencies

of the

soul,

he

emphasizes

the

importance

f

this

study

for

theologians, lluding

to the

theological

notionof the soul

as an

image

of

the

Trinity.Although

he leaves the detaileddiscussion n

the

theological mplications

o

theological

tudies,

he

implies

a connec-

tion

between

philosophicalpsychology

nd

theology,

he former

eing

helpful

n

the clear

exposition

f this

theological

octrine. t is not to be

overseen,however,

hat the

psychological nalogy

was

widely

used,

for

example,

n

the sermons n the

Trinity.66

In

accordance

with

Usingen,

Trutfetter otes that the 'soul'

is

here

usedas a soul connectedwith hebody, excludingGod orvariousmovers

of celestial

bodies,

etc.67He even

explicates

he science of

psychology

n

a similar

manner,

noting

hat

metaphysics

xplicates

he soul

in

absolute

terms,

while

psychology,

s

a

part

of natural

philosophy,

reats t with

terms hatconnotemovement

nd

change.

Of

some interest

s

Trutfeier's

notion that the

absolute termsof

metaphysics

re of the kind that

they

are

essentiallyredicated

f

a

soul.68 therwise e is satisfiedo

distinguish

65Decreesf he cumenicalouncilsed.Tanner,06.66

Trutfetter,

ummaf.Z4r: Seddiceret

uis: uid heologis

um

am tudiosa

isqui-

sitione

istinctionis

otentiarum

nimae;

ideur

amque

elinquendahilosophis.

s sciat

earn on

parum

onferre

heologis

d

convenientem

ssignationemmaginis

eatissimae

Trinitatis

n

nima

ationali,

uam uidam

onsisterestruunt

n

his

ribus

otentiis,

emo-

ria

cilicetntellectu

t

volúntate,

lii

terum

liter,

ecentioresero

n

essentianimae t

duobusctibus obilissimarum

otentiarum,

cilicet

ntellectust

voluntatis,

t

patet le-

nius irca ist. .

Magistři

libri]

.

[Sententiarum]

quae

missafaciod

specialemoten-

tiarum

ractatum

roperans.ontemporaryxamples

fuseof he

sychologicalnalogy

canbe

found,

.g.,

n

Martin

uther,

. Martin

utherserke

Weimar

dition

WA),

Weimar

1883-, , 85, 29-86, ; 4, 599,

10-21.

67

Trutfetter,

ummaf.X5r.

68Trutfetter,ummaf.X6V: Caeterumuianunc e animaractatumnstituimusci-

endum,

on ssenostri

ropositi

unc ractaree anima

er

érminos

bsolutost essen-

tialiter

raedicabiles

e

pronomine

nimam

emonstrante

quodmetaphysica

e ea

considérât),

sed

per

términos otumt mutationem

onnotantes

qui

ad naturalem

hilosophiam

spectant).



356

PEKKA ÄRKKÄINEN

psychology romthe othersciences,such as physics,moral philosophy,

rhetoric,

otany,

nd

zoology,

with briefremarks.69

Although part

of

natural

philosophy,

rutfetter

onsiders he

empir-

ical or

rational

philosophical

pproach

to

psychology

nsufficient,

f

its

conclusionswould

strive

gainst

certainbasic

theological

ruths

which,

s

noted

above,

are to

be believed

by

every

Christian t the foundation

f

divine revelation

n

the

Scriptures

nd

in

the

testimony

f the

Catholic

fathers.

s

such,

neither f

these truths ontradict

he

teachings

f

many

pagan philosophers,

ut are

in fact lso found

n

their

writings,

s several

theologians

n

history

ave also noted.70

In

addition

to

its basic

positive

attitude,

Trutfetter's

xposition

does

reveal a

consciously

ominalist

eading

of

the determination

f the

Fifth

Lateran

Council.

First f

all,

he finds t

necessary

o

emphasize,

s

Usingen

did

in his Exercitium

that he does

not

imply houghts

uch that

doctrinal

truths

were to

be understood

y

natural reason

alone.

So,

he alludes to

several

explanations

s to

why

some

theological

ruths

re to be found

in

the

writings

f some

pagan philosophers.

Morover,

his

emphasis

upon

thesedoctrinal entences oncerning he rational oul are to be believed

in

the case of

contradicting

he

philosophical

rgumentation,

hich

eads

to similar

houghts.71

Thereafter

rutfetter

entions

hat

Aquinas

discusses he

doctrines f

the soul

as a form

f

body

and its

mmortality

ut,

as Ockham

has

shown,

his

proofs

re not conclusive.

o Trutfetter

enies,

as does

Usingen,

he

possibility

f

conclusive

hilosophical

roofs

orthese

doctrines,

ut

relies

instead

on ockhamistic

rinciple

f

non-demonstrability

f

the articles

f

faith.Trutfetter

ay

have

thought,

ike

Usingen,

that the

immortality

f

69

Trutfetter,

umma

f.X6V.

70

Trutfetter,

ummaff.

2v-Y3r:

Haec

Veritasatis

bundeque

irmatast anctarum

scripturarum

atholicorum

uoque

doctorum

estimoniis,

uae

cuique

hristiano

onge

amplius

alere ebent

mni

umana

xperientia,

ersuasione

ut

uantumcumque

fficaci

demonstratione.

anc

praeterea

acrae

idei eritatem

ut

et

omne ivinae

eligionis

archanum)

articulatim

iversis

iversa

nvenientibus

ut

Lactantius

it ibri ivi,

nstitu.

7. c.

7.)

philosophi

ttigerunt,

uamvis

ummam

ullus

omprehendere

otuerit.

71

Trutfetter,

umma

f.

Y3r: Nec

tamen

uspiceris

elim

andide

ector,

e

n earn

delapsum

toliditatem,

uo

sentiam

acrae idei

ostrae

nscrutabilia

ystéria

umana

rationeomprehensa,ed a in ibrisentiliumparsa,el xpaternanstructione,elMosi

prophetarumque

viditate

cienditudiosa

ectione,

el

peciali

ivinaut

diabolica

eve-

latione,

el

quia

lla

gentilium

ibris alse

b haereticis

et

Pelagianisotissimum)

scripta

sint,

uo

fidei ostre

rchana

uris

aturalibus

t

non

gratiae

scribebant.

ee also he

previous

ote.



IMMORTALITY

F

THE

SOUL

N THE

LATE VIA

ODERNA

F

ERFURT

357

the soul can, in some weakersense,be provedby thephilosophers, ut

belongs basically

o

the articles

f faith.72

Trutfetter's

ollectionof

sentences,

which

he

required

to

be believed

regarding

he

rational

oul,

s

in

itself

n

elucidating

ccount

of his views

on the

relationship

etween

theology

nd

philosophy.

As noted

above,

the

passage

seems

to be influenced

y

the

newly

ssued decree

concerning

the

mmortality

f the

soul. For this

reason Trutfetterlso comes

to note

on the

soul as

being separated

from the

body, although

he had

just

excluded

it

from

the

foregoing

reatise.73

he other

important

ource

seemsto be the Sentences

ommentary

f Gabriel

Biel,

which was used

extensively

n

the Summa.

Trutfetter

ntroduces ome

sentences

oncerning

he

origin

of human

souls. He states hat

rational ouls are created

ndividually

fter he

for-

mation

of their

respective

odies,

and that

they

are infused nto their

bodies, viz.,

unitedto inform

hem as their ssential

orms.74he notion

thathuman souls

are created

ndividually

fter he bodies

s

already learly

articulated

n

the

Sentencesf Peter Lombard

(2

Sent.

17).

Trutfetterites

Lombard word forword earlier n the Summadealingwith the creation

of

man.75

There

he also notes

that this theme was

already

discussed

n

the influential

uodlibetal

dispute

of

1497,

which

preceded

an

extensive

ockhamistic eform

n

the studies of the

philosophical

faculty

of

the

University

f Erfurt. rutfetter

oints

out the

unanimity

f

the

Catholic

position

ormulated

y

Lombard nd the

main conclusion f theErfurtians.76

72

Trutfetter,

ummaf.Y3r:

Nec

prorsus

e

fugit

octoremanctum.

q.

75

ar. 6

animae

mmortalitatem,

tem

6. ar.

1

animamntellectivamsse

ormam

orporis

et

ta

alios lios uosdamictae eritatisrtículos)ttentasseemonstrare,ed d minusfficaciter

effectum

robat

octorubtilisi.

4.

dist. 3.

q.

2.

et

post

GuilhelmumckamGabriel

ubi

upra tque roinde

omini

ola

fide redita.

73

t must e

admittedhat

n

this

espect

here

ad

been

previous

eviations,

.g.

Usingen

ad reatedhe

uestion

f he ntellectionf he oul s

being

eparate

rom

he

body

lready

n

1499,

lthough

e mentions

hat his hemes not ound

n

Aristotle.

ee

Usingen,

arvulus,

.

124r.

74

Trutfetter,umma,

.

Y2V:

Cuique

orpori

am

formatoc sufficienter

ispositoro-

pria eculiarisque

nima deo

creatur,

reandoque

nfunditur

lli,

uae [quod

d.],

an-

quam roprioerfectibili,er

ealem

nformationem,

t

per

e etessentialis

orma,nitur,

ut nibi eo creatoriuofamulans

aioremnnonam ereatur.

75

Trutfetter,

umma,

f.

3v-4r

iting

etrus

ombardus,Sent.,

.

17,

.

2.

76Trutfetter,umma,. P4r: Hocsiquidemntellectut sensu ec secus nno alutis

nostre497

n

disputatione

e

quolibet

nterlia onclusimus.

raelarga

onditorisemen-

tiahomininimantium

restabilissimo

c omniumacile

ptimo

orpus

on inemembrorum

decora t commodaommensurationeonans

apiti

mnemoeli rnatum

nscribendo,

animam

mmortalem

iberi

rbitrii

uñere

raeditam

d

scientias

irtutesqueapescendas



358

PEKKA ÄRKKÄINEN

Apartfrom he word infusion' sed by Lombard,Biel adds the word

'union5

saying

hereto that

rational souls are created

by

God,

and

the

meaning

of Gen.

2:7,

whereby

he soul

is said to be insufflatednto

man,

is to be understood

s God

making

he individual

pirit

nd

uniting

t

with the

man.77 he Council

and Peter Lombard

talk

only

of the infu-

sion

of

souls,

so it

is naturalthat Trutfetter

ombines hese two formu-

lations.The

notion of the

soul as an essential orm

s also found

n

the

determination

f the

Council,

which ites he decreeof

the Vienna Council

of

1312,

whereby

he Averroistic

iew of one commonrational

oul,

which

merely overns

he bodieswithout

eing

their ssential

orm,

as

rejected.78

Furthermore,

ational

ouls

are immaterial nd

independent

rom he

determining

f

a

body

and

not to be located

in

any particular art

of

the

body. Again,

they

are

immutable,

ndivisible,

nd

immortal,

o that

in

death

the soul leaves

the

body,

but without

ransmigration

n an animal

or a

plant.

Their

final

destiny

s to be

led into eternal ife

n

the blessed

vision

f God or

intoeternal

unishment,

oth

according

o their ndividual

merits,

whereby

hey

re reunited

o theirbodies which

they

had before

theirdeath.79

semina

abentem

ndidit

aturalibus

otentiis

c

viribus

odo oelestium

phaerarum

is-

tinctisarn

nsignando

insignendo

d.].

f.

Usingen,

x.

an.,

. L3V: Sed

anima atio-

nalisuxta eritatem

atholicam

on ic

ducitur,

ed mmediate

Deo creatur

n

corpore.

77

Gabriel

iel,

Collectorium

irca

uattuor

ibrosententiarum

II, 17,

.

1

G,

37-8,

d. W.

Werbeck

U.

Hoffmann,

übingen

973-92,

94:

Sexta

pinio

t

catholica

st,

uod

animammediate

Deo creatur

t non ducitur

e

potentia

ateriae.

bid.

I, 17,

.

1

D

2-3,

d.

Werbeck,

91:

Ad

primam

icendum

uod

inspirare'

el insufflare'

ecun-

dum

liam ranslationem

n

praedicta

uctoritate

idem st

uod piritum

aceret'

eum

corporinire. iel cites ereBonaventure'sommentaryn the ame ext. f. also

Trutfetter,

umma

f.P3V:

Quam

ecDeusde sua

ssentia

ut uidam

aeretici

utaverunt),

necde

aliqua

materia

ormatam,

ed

<de> nihiloreatam

nivit.

78

Decrees

f

he cumenical

ouncilsed.

Tanner,

05,

1-5:

Cum lianon olum

er

e

et ssentialiter

umani

orporis

orma

xistât,

icut

n

canone elicis

ecordationis

lementis

papae

V

praedecessoris

ostri

n

generali

iennensi

onciliodito

ontinetur,

erumt

immortalis,

t

pro

corporumuibus

nfunditur

ultitudine

ingulariter

ultiplicabilis,

t

multiplicata,

t

multiplicanda

it.

he term

essentialorm'

n Trutfetternstead

f sub-

stantial

orm'

n

Usingen's

orks

see

Ex. an

,

f.

A2V

nd Parvulusf.

81v)

lludes o the

influence

f he etermination.

ee also

Trutfetter,

umma

f.Y4r: Maledictus

uoque

lle

Averrois

as

non sse ormas

ubstantiales

orporum,

ed

per

ssistentiam

umtaxat

niri

corporibus

roinde

tque

ectores

avibus,

uem

rrorem

cclesia

amnavitt

haereticum

declaravit,t habeturnClementinanicaDe summarinitatet fide atholica,uam

quidem

onstitutionem

odernus

ontifex

eo decimus

n

concilio

ateranense

ovissimis

hisdiebus

nnovavit.

79

Trutfetter,

umma

f.

Y2V:

Immaterialis

iquidem,

ecullam ibi

orporisarticulam

determinans,

ed

omnibus

roprii

orporis

articulis

ota

imul ssistens.

on maior

n



IMMORTALITY

F

THE

SOUL

N

THE LATEVIA

ODERNA

F

ERFURT359

This latterpartof thepassage seems to be influenced y the Council

regarding

he

mmortality

f the soul

only

n

general

erms,

nd

it describes

the different

estinies f the

rational oul

in

far more detailed

a manner

than the Council's

Determination.

n

it Trutfetter

athers

and refutes

various

philosophical

pinions

hatwould contradict

he Catholic

Christian

doctrine.

o

if

he

were at first

nspired

y

the

Determination,

e continues

far

beyond

ts actual

contents.

y doing

this,

he

brings

orth

ome results

of

a

previous

discussion

n

theological

doctrines

n

psychology,

o

point

out to his readers

his

problematic

n

the

very

ntroduction

o

psychology.

One cannot

pass

overthe allusionto similar hemes n the

disputation

by

Trutfetter's

upil

and a fellow

olleague

from

neighboring

niversity

some

years

ater.

n

the

philosophical

heses f the

HeidelbergDisputation

in

1518,

Martin

Luther lso discussed

he

immortality

f the

soul as one

of the themes.

Luther's

main

point

was to show that

Aristotle

ystemat-

ically

teaches

the

mortality

f the

soul,

in

which

Luther

clearly

differed

from

his teachers.

His main

argument

was

linking

he

question

to the

doctrine

f the

eternity

f

the

world,

which

was also noted

by

Trutfetter

as a questionable oint gainstAristotle.n addition o this,he also exten-

sively

iscussed

argely

he textual vidence

fromAristotle n

immortality,

but considered

t

in

support

f

his

own

interpretation.80

5.

Concluding

emarks

Concerning

he

relationship

etween

heology

nd

philosophy

n

the

early

16th

century, singen's

nd Trutfetter's

xpositions

f

De anima re note-

worthy,mainly

n

two

respects.

irstly, hey represent position,

which

faithfullyollows,n methodologynd aspirations,he tradition f the ate

medievalvia

moderna.

econdly,

rom hat

tarting oint

theygive

an inter-

pretation

n

the

relationship

etween

philosophy

nd

theology,

which

maioribus,

ec

minor

n

minoribus,

ed ndivisibilis

npartibilisque,

ec ad membrieo

tionemivisionem

atiens,

ec

retrocedens,

ed

membrumissectumivificare

esinens,

nonmoriens

n

corpore

ec

post

nteritura.

on

n

caelestia,estiarum,

lantarumque

corpora

ut demonumaturas

ransmigrans,

ed mmortalis

erseverans,orpore

xuta

pro

meritorum

uorum

ualitate

nisi

ebitum

liquod

atisfaciendi

dhuc

ropeccatis

venialibus

ut

mortalibus,

uo

ad

culpam

ic

dimissis,

etardaverit)

el

impidissimam

divinitatiseatificamisionem,el eternaeamnationisoenam ox onsequitur.andem

in

adventuistrictiudicis

pso

odem

orpore,uod

hie

per

mortem

eposuerat,

terum

supervestienda

n lio

uoque,

ut

ro

ustitia

remio,

ut

ro

celeribus

oena,

eternaliter

afficienda.

80

Luther, A,

9,

410,

15-420,

.



360

PEKKA

ÄRKKÄINEN

Trutfetteronsidered onsonantwith he formulationsf the Fifth ateran

Council of 1513 on the same

matter,

ven

showing

imilar ntentions s

the Council

in

its

expressions;

nd

finally,

rutfetterlso

provides prac-

tical

application

of the Council's recommendations.

University

f Helsinki

Department

f

Systematicheolog)}



Reviews

The

Winged

hariot.

ollected

ssays

n

Plato nd latonism

n

Honour

f

L.M.

de

Rijk

eds.

M. Kardaun

nd

J.

Spruyt.

rill,

eiden-Boston-Köln

000,

xvi 331

p.

ISBN

90 04

11480

Introduction

It s

not oo ate

o

review

good

ook,

hat ot

nly

ffers

complete

ibliography

f

prof.

.M.

de

Rijk

nd detailed

icture

fhis

ively

nterest

n

andof

his

deep

knowl-

edge

f ncient

nd

medieval

hilosophy,

ut

ives

lso

n dea f

howhis chool

ollows

his

path

without

ust

ccepting

he

Word f he

Teacher

or

better,

f he

uriga

as the

tide

uggests),

ut

iscussing

is

nterpretations

nd ometimes

orrecting

hem.

The volume

resents

tself

s a sort

f

monography,

ivided

nto en

hapters,

ach

dealing

ith

neor more

uthors

r

topics,

ollowingchronological

rder.

he

choice

of the hemes

nd

their

istribution

hrough

he

enturies,

rom

ntiquity

o theLate

Middle ges, eflectsomehoweRijk'scientificroduction:ive ver en haptersre

devoted

o

Antiquity

Plato,

f

ourse,

utnot

nly);

ourf hem ealwithheMiddle

Ages;

nd

only

ne s dedicated

o

a

Neoplatonic

uthor

John hiloponus).

In what

ollows,

e

will

resent

nddiscuss

hese

hapters,

ealing

ith he

irst

art

as a

whole,

hen ith

hose bout

llth-century

uthors,

nd

finally

ith he

emnants.

1. The hird

ay

f

he

ogos

In

introducing

his

ollection

f

ssays,

he

ditors

emarkhat

the ore f

Plato's

ork

is

formed

y

he

emantics

nd

ogic

f he

Being"p.

XII). Undoubtedly,y

his

laim

they

ntend

ighlighting

ere,

s in

many

ther

assages,

he ebt heir

tudies

we ode

Rijk's pproachoPlatonicssues,speciallys arguedn hisCommentaryn the ophist.

However,

hey

pecify

hathis hematicomains

developed

nly y

oneofthe

ssays

expressly

evoted

o Platonic

exts.

heeditors

eferoD. O'Brien's

rticle

chapter

wo),

wherehe

uthor

ompares

armenides'

ndPlato's

ositions

bout

whats

not'.On

the

contrary,

e thinkhat

his

reliminary

ssertion

ight

eveal

fruitful

erspective

n

ordero

give

n account

f he irst

art

f he ook s

a whole.

Let us

start,hen,

rom he

end of this

irst

art,

.e.

from heconclusions

hat

M.

Kardaun

raws

n

her

ssay

bout

hePlatonic

onception

f rt.

According

o

her,

this

onception

esultseither

ompletely

egative

owards

or ifferent

romhe

heory

of rtheld

y

Aristotle

n hisPoetics.

eading

latonicrt

heory

n

this ew ndmore

complex

ay

s

made

ossible

y preliminary

econsideration

f he

ivotal

ermmime-

sis

which ardaunhooses

o translate

y

representation'

atherhan

y

he sual

imi-

tation'.heprefersouse he econd ordnly or ignifyingheworse indfmimetic

art,

he ne

mplied

n the

production

f mere

hantasmata

nd,

onsequently,

he

ne

which lato

efusesoadmit

n

the deal

ity

f he

Republic.

onetheless,

t s

possible

o

find

higher

evel

f rtistic

roduction

hich

s

not

ondemned,

ince

t s based

pon

the

epresentation

f

omething

f he

World f deal

Forms.

©

Koninklijke

rill

V,

Leiden,

005

Vwarmm

3,2

Also vailable

nline www.brill.nl



362

REVIEWS

Kardaunffirmshat ristotlenheritedrom lato he onsiderationf rtisticitera-

ture s

a mimetic

edium,

n

the

ense hatt

represents

ts

bject

n

picturelike,

mme-

diate,

on-discursive

ay"

p.

161).

To

support

er

hesis,

he cholar

uotes passage

from ristotle's

oetics

1460b),

here

he

poet

s a mimëtës

s

compared

o

a

painter

(, õgraphos

orto

any

ther

mage-maker

<

konopoios(p.

139,

ote

7).

But rewe sure hat

a

literary

exts

mimetic

notwithstanding

tsuse

of

words",

s claimed

y

Kardaun?

A

Platonic

ialogue,

n

particular,

iscusseshe

roblem

f he wo

indsfmimesis-,

he

Sophist

thats

exacdy

he

ialoguenalysed

y

O'Brien

romn

ontologicaloint

fview.

In

his

very)ong

nd

fascinating

verview,

he cholar

nquires

nto third

ntological

wayproposed

y

Plato,

way

hat s able to

go beyond

he

Parmenidean

ichotomy

between

whats'

and whats

not',

he

atter

esulting

nthinkablend

unsayable.

hat

third

ay,ntailingeing

nd

not-being

ithout

ny

ontradiction,

s the

way

fother-

ness,s O'Brienemarksp.55ff.).etusquoteome therassagesf he ialoguere-

ceding

nd

following

hose n

which 'Brien's

ssay

s focused.hetwo

main haracters

of

he

ophist

the

leatic

tranger

nd

Theaetetus,

eed otacklehe

uestions

oncerning

otherness,

ecause

heir

roblem,

irst

f

all,

s to define hat

n

image

s. Theaetetus

claims

hat n eidolon

the erm

hosen

n

the

ialogue

omean

image'

n

general,

s noth-

ing

ut

heteronoiouton

an

other

uch)

n

ts

eing

imilar

o

<

phomoiõmenon

what

s true

(240a).

However,

s soon s

image

eatures

re

fixed

hat

way,

he

haracters

f

he

ia-

logue

anno

onger

peak

bout idolon

viz.

mimëmabut

nly

nd

xpressly

bout

mage

qua

con

eikãn:

40b),

hats about

ne f he wo

indsf

mage

resented

n

the

ialogue.

Thediaeresis

etween

ikõnnd

hantasma

considered

espectively

s the etter

nd

he

worse

ind fmimëma

derives,

n ts

urn,

rom

he

eed or

rasping

he

ophist's

ssence

by clear ormula.heaptestefinitionfhisnatureadbeen oundnhis eing con-

troversialist

<ntilogikos

225b,

32b)

ble o

deny

ny rgumentation

nd,

onsequently,

n

his

eing

n

mage-maker

eidõla

oiein:

34b

also

uoted

y

Kardaun

t

p.

139).

n

fact,

in

denying

verything,

he

ophist

eems

o

possess

real

knowledge

bout

ll

233b-d),

even

hough

laiming

t

cannot

orcely

e

anything

ut n

llusoryoke

234a).

lso he

art

f

creating

mages,

owever,

s

a

joke

foundedn the

reationf

false

ppearances

which,

n

the

aseofthe

ophist,

re "said

mages"

eidõlaegomena

234c).

rom his

t

deriveshat

mages'

ay

f

being,

.e. their

therness,

an notbe

dissociatedrom

he

semantics

fthe

ogos

n

anyway,

lthough

he

diaeresis

oncerningmages

eals ssen-

tially,

n

the

ophist235d-236c),

ith isualrtistic

imëmata.

hereby,

hat

ind f

mages

are

sophistic

iscourses

oncerned

ith?

he conclusive

efinitionfthe

ophistepicts

him

s a

phantasmata

akernd

connects

im

o

a mimëtikëechnë

nly

bleto create

knowledgeoundedn theopiniondoxa).he mimësisracticedithpistëmëviz. he

higher

evel

fmimësisis

considered

nsteads

only

elatedo

sophoslinguisticepresen-

tations

266d-268d).

t remains

ow o understand

hat ind f

mages

he

higher

imë-

sis

hould e concerned

ith.

Let

us eave or

hemomenthe

uestion

nanswered

nd ontinue

eading

he

Mélanges

de

Ryk.

he

opposition

pistëmë-doxa

omes ack

n

J.M.

van

Ophuijsen's

ssay,

hichs

focused

n Plato's

oncept

f

pistis

trust),

onsidered

rom

he

erspective

f ts

possible

influencen

the

ollowingeligious

otion

ffaith.

an

Ophuijsen's

laims

re

negative

about he

egacy

t

ssue,

nless ne

ntends

istis

n

the ense

of

llowing

neselfo be

guided

y,

f

relyingpon,

nother;

reliance

hats

n this ase orrect

orthori)

ecause

the

uide

s the

erson

ho

knows

has pistëmë)"p.

124).

n

the

Republic,

istis

s associ-

ated o

a hierarchical

adder f

knowledge,

n

whicht

s collocatedt

the econd

ung

fromhe ottom,ealing ith oxastikëognitionndopposedo the wo igheregrees

of

knowledge,

hat

re,

romhe

op,

pistëmë

nddianoia.

he ame

pposition

s

also

pre-

sent

n Plato's

Górgiasnot

y

chance,

he

name fa

sophist),

here,

ccording

o

van

Ophuijsen,

there

re

two

ypes

f

persuasion:

ne that

urnishes

elief-upon-trust

ith-



REVIEWS

363

outknowing,ndone that oesfurnishnowledgeepisteme)"nd s consequentlyan

instructingeachingype"

see

.

1

5,

or he

uotations

rom

órgiasoo).

Whereas

hetoric,

thats

sophistic

rt,

elongslearly

o the irst

ype,

n the

ontrary

hedidactical

ype

of

persuasion

ill

ertain

o the

philosopher's

or

ophos

)

way

f

peaking

bout

hings.

The

paideutic

urpose

f

hilosopher's

ogos

eads

s

back

xactly

o

he

Republic's

uestions

concerning

ducation

paideia

offutureitizens

n

virtue

f

he

higher

ind fmimesis

in

the

ery ay

n which

hey

re

discussed

y

Kardaun

pp.

143-4).

he

problem

s

really

the

ame,

ince he emantic

reationsf he

ogos

as we have

lready

een,

re

mages.

Following

'Brien's

ightnterpretation

fPlatonicmoves"

n

the

ophist

p.

55ff.),

he

third

ntological

ay

fothernesss

in

themiddle etweenhe wo

ways

resented

y

Parmenides,

ecauset s not

way

f

not-being

n

anyway

t all midamos

Soph.

37b,

240e),

ut

way

f

not-beingand ontemporaneouslyeing)

n

some

espectj os,

ata

ti24 d).Beingotherhan'means ot-beinguabeingifferentrom'.ence, ewould

like o add to O'Brien's

nalysis,ny mage

hares

n

the

not-being

fothernessnsofar

as it

s,

t the ame

ime,

ifferentromnd

n

relationo whatt

represents

its

model:

paradeigma,

35d) cf.

oph.

55d).

n

other

erms,

lato s here

alking

bout he emiotic

naturef

every

mage,

ts

weaving

.

ymploke

of whats' and whats not'

240c)

n

ts

beingomething

hichtandsor

omething

lse.

Qua ther,

ll

mages,

lso hose

elong-

ing

o

the

inguistic

omain,

hare

n

falsehood

n

relationo

their

aradigms

hich

nly

aretruenasmuchs

really

ntõs

240b-c)

eing.

ut t this

oint,

ow an the ontent

of

discourse,

ecessarily

alse

n

virtuef ts emantic

ature,

e

paideutic

nd ble o

offer

nowledge

n

anyway?

There

s

anotherlatonicelevant

assage

hat s not eferredo

n

this

olume,

ut

thatsstrictlyinkedo hesessues,incet alksbout he emanticsf ikonesnd roposes,

once

more,

parallelism

etween

anguage

ndvisual rts.

n

Cratylus

32b-d,

oth n

onoma,

.e.

a

significant

ord,

nd

a

picture

,

õgraphêma

are

firstly

escribed

s mimëmata

(430b-d),

hen

pecified

s eikonesfwhat

hey epresent,

ecause

hey

o

nothave o

be

similar

homoia)

o t

n

all

respects

pantachêi.

Otherwise

hey

n

factwould e a

double,

not

sign

fthe

model.

n

parallel:

heir elationf

imilarity

o themodel

nvolves

semanticelectionf tsfeatures.

ust

his emanticelection

s

the

eason or

escribing

images

s

hetera,

ifferentrom

heir

model,

n

the

ophist.

ut,

n the asis f

he ame

selection,

ikones

ay

e also

defined

s

such',

aturally

n

some

espects,

ince,

hough

false

ua

ther,

hey

re able o

preserveomething

f

what s

represented.

his some-

thing',

hich

n

the

Cratylus432e)

s

called

ypos

trace),

n

the

ophist

orresponds

o

that

true

roportion

lëthinë

ymmetriœ.

35e)

whose

resence

n an

image

llows o

distinguish

eikonesromhe ompleteemanticalsehoodf hantasmata.

The

passages

romhe

ophist

nd

he

Cratylus

how

hat ardauns

right

n

her nder-

lining

heneed or

istinguishing

t east wo latonic

onceptions

f

mimesis.

owever,

we do

not

gree

with er laimsbout henon-discursiveharacterf he

higher

ind f

mimesisthat s the conic

ne,

t least

ccording

o the

erminology

sed

n

the

ophist

(to

which e hall efer

n

the

ollowing

ines

oo).

t s difficulto dmithat he

emantics

of texts mimetic

notwithstanding

tsuseof

words",

fter

eading

n

the

Cratylus

hat

a

single

ord s

considered

y

Plato s a

miměma.

he

conic emantic odel

eems

n

fact

xtendedromhe

meaning

fwords o

that f exts.

esides,

n

the

ophist

at the

level f

propositional

ogoi,

lato ses

nly

ne

erm,

ymploke

weaving),

n

order

o

define

both heir

conic ontentnd heir

iscursive,

hats

syntactical,

omposition.

he

ymploke

of

n

onomand rhëmas

n

fact he east onditiono

create

logos262c)

nd,

onse-

quendy,ts emanticmages,ntheir urnnvolvingweavingfbeingndnot-being.

Not

nly:ogos

elongs

othe

eings

ta

nta)

hich

eriveromhe

ymploke

f

Formsnd

share he

mage

ature

259e).

o,

the

ath

we have ollowed

o far

n

reading

he irst

part

f he

Mélanges

eemso oincide ith ne

f he

many

ensesnwhich

lato's

ntology



364

REVIEWS

mighteread rom semanticnd ogicalerspective,uch s the ditorsintntheir

introduction.

The third

ay

f

otherness,

n themiddle etween

whats' and

whats

not',

s the

semantic

ay

f

inguistic

mages.

heneverhese

re

conic,

hey

re wice

n

the

middle,

as

far s their

imilarity

s

a

third

ay

etween

ruth

nd

falsehood,

etween

dentity

nd

complete

therness.

e thinkhat

t s

ust

n

virtue

f

this

hirdconic

ay

hat

lato

may

till

lace

his

rust

n

ogos,

o such

point

o claim

n the

ophist

hat

without

ogos

any

orm

f

philosophy

ould

ot

xist ither

260a).

ven

f

xpressed

n other

erms,

this

might

e considered

he

hematic

ore f

he

wo

ssays

ot

uoted et:

he ne

by

J.

Mansfeld,

oncerning

he latonic

ialectical

ay

f

proceeding

n

cosmological

ebates

in the haedo

and he

ne

by

D.T.

Runia,

ocused

n theTimaeus.

rust

n

ogos

ets

lato

use t

nd

specially

esttsmost

omplex

echanisms

n

ordero

tacklehe

ighest

ssues

ofhis hilosophy,uch s the osmologicalnes. o,beginningromhe dialecticalethod"

ofdiscussion

Mansfeld,.

13ff.)

p

to the

ategorialyllogism

hich

unia ees

n the

Timaeus

cf.

.

107ff.),

n

Plato's

orks

logica

teris

according

o the wo

cholars,

ould

have

lready

een

hinted

t,

ven

f t hadto

expect

ristotleo

be

explicitely

heorized.

In

conclusion,

t s

clear hat

inguistic

imesiss

not ble

o offer

pisteme

mmediately.

In

the

ophist

263d,

64a-b),

n

fact,

he

ogos

oes

not esult

isjoined

rom

he

reation

of

doxai;

owever,

hese

may

e

correctr

true nd

make oom or

n

nquiry

nto

eing.

Naturally,

his

s not he

ase f

he

pinions

outourtthose

alse nd

inkedo the

han-

tasmata

f

ophistic

iscourses.

n the

ontrary,

he conic

ay

f he

anguage

eems o

be the

way

ollowed

y

he

hilosopher

n

his earch

or ruth

y

races

nd

n

his

ry-

ing

o communicate

ome

nowledge

bout t.

2.

Medievallatonism

almost)

ithout

lato:he

igh

iddle

ges

If,

s we

will

ee,

n the ate

middle

ges

Aristotelian)

ealism

idn't

o

hand

y

hand

with

latonism,

n the

previous

enturies

hings

ent

ifferently.

n IXth

entury,

or

instance,

n authentic

eoplatonic

uthor,

he

s.

Dionysiusreopagita,

tarted

eing

ery

influenciai,

t least

n

theology

nd

metaphysics.

t is

only

n

Xllth

entury,

owever,

that

lato

himself

cquired

prominent

osition

s

authority,

t

least or ome

writers

such

s William

f

Conches,

hanks

o the

Latin ranslation

f

his Timaeus.

he contri-

bution

f

W.

Otten,

evoted

o the

ntegration

f

Christian

ndPlatonic

osmologyy

William,

akes lear

how

deep

was

the nfluence

f Plato'smodel

oth

n

stimulating

speculationsbout heuniverseormation,nd nshapingmethodology.s far s the

first

oint

s

concerned,

illiamf

Conchesook

lato's imaeus

s the

pportunity

o

get

an

nsight

nto

nvisible

ealities

such

s the asic

lements

hat

onstitute

veryhysical

object);

uthe saw

n

t also

literary

odel

orth

o be

continued,

hrough

he

ppli-

cation f

ntegumentum,

hat

s

myth

r

allegoric

arrative,

o

give

rational

ccount

f

nature.

s W. Otten

ays

oncluding

is

hapter,

in nother

ecade r so

Plato

would

succumb

o

Aristotle

n a

scholastic

hange

f

uthorities

hatwould

evolutionise

hilo-

sophical

nd

heologicalpeculation".

his

xplains

hy

he

wo

ollowing

hapters

f his

volume

70

pages,

early

third

f he

whole

ook)

rededicatedo

one he

most

mpor-

tant

llth-century

heologians,

hose

emantic

heories

ave

een tudied

y

de

Rijk

n

various

rticles,

ilbert

e

la Porrée.

s

we will

ee,

Plato

oesnot

ppear

mong

is

sources,

is nfluence

eing

mediated

y

he

derived)eoplatonism

f

Boethius.

Thetwo haptersealwitheryifferentopics.hefirstne,writtenyJ.Spruyt,s

about

he istinction

etween

ifferent

ses

f

anguage

nGilbert'sheories

f he

meaning

of erms

ealing

ith

he

ranscendent

omainnd

thenatural

ne;

he econd

hapter,

by

C.H.

Kneepkens,

roposes

very

nteresting

omparison

etween

eter

elias

nd



REVIEWS

365

Gilbertn some rammaticalnd semanticalroblems.he two haptershare ome

points,

ut fferwo ifferent

pproaches

o the

tudy

fGilbert's

inguistic

nd

eman-

tic

hought

hat

ntegrate

nd

complete

ach

ther

n

a

very

ruitful

ay.

As

ts

uthor

ays

t the

eginning,hapteright

riesto

xplore

ilbert'sdeas s to

how

he

ignificates

ftermsre nfluencedhen

ransportation

rom ne domain

i.e.

the

Transcendent]

o the ther

the

ublunary

ne]

akes

lace"

p.

205).

The

exposition

of

Gilbert's

hought

s

very

etailed;

tdiscussesnd orrects

revious

nterpretations,iv-

ing

not

nlyong

uotations

rom ilbert's

orks,

ut lso

a

difficult

ask

ndeed )

he

English

ranslationsf

ll

of

hem,

hich

elp

nd

guide

he eader

hrough

he ntrica-

ciesofa not

lways erspicuous

atin ext.

s said

bove,

Gilbert'slatonismoesn't

derive rom

lato,

ut

fromhe atin

ssimilationf

Neoplatonism

ade

by

Boethius.

Notionsuch s

participatio

r denominato

the istinctionetweend

quod

st nd d

quo

st

that recentralnGilbert'sndhisfollowers'emantics,tem ack oBoetius'heologi-

cal treatises.

pruyt's

ffortsre

completely

evotedo

the econstructionfGilbert'she-

ories rom is

ommentaries

n

Boethius'

heological

ractsnd

they

ffer

convincing

picture

f

hem,

specially

hen

ealing

ith he otionf

ersona

hat,

n

spite

f ts en-

tral ole

n

rinitarian

heology

nd

ontrarily

oother ords

ertaining

o he

ranscendent

domain,

as ts

roper

sefor

aturali

hings

nd t s tranferredothe ther omain

nly

ex

proportioned

o

that

only art

f

the

ignificative

ontentf

personapplies

o Divine

persons"

p.

234).

Gilbert

orks

ut

his

theory ainly

s

theologian,

nd

sometimes

referso

other

hilosophers,

s at

p.

209.

Some fthem

he

says

hold

hat,

hatever

object hey

peak

bout,

by

he ame ause

s

they

re

esse),

hey

re

something

esse

aliquid).

herefore

heyay

hat he

erb

is'

s said

f

ll

things

quivocally";

ome

th-

ers, nthe ontrary,aintainhatentitieshat ubsistre esse)wingotheirubsisten-

ce and re

something

esse

liquid)

wing

o the

hings

hat

ccompany

he

atter",

hat

is

quantities

nd

qualitiesowing

o all other

ategories,

ubsistent

hings

either

re or

are

something

).

he authorf

his

hapter,eing oherently

nd

xclusively

edicatedo

the

nterpretation

f

Gilbert'sexts

which

s not n

easy

ask),

eaves oweverhe eader

with ome

uestionspen

bout he

dentity

f

hese

hilosophers

ndthe

osition

aken

by

Gilbertn the

ubject. ortunately,

he

following

hapter ives

hereader

hese

answers.

The

approachdopted

y

Kneepkens

n

this

hapter

s the

pposite:

ilbert'sndhis

followers'heoriesre onsidered

n

relation,

nd

n

opposition,

o

those

f

he

hartrians,

and

mong

hem

specially

o

those

f

Peter

elias,

hemostnfluenciai

ommentatorn

Priscian'snstitutiones

rammaticae.

e

doesnot

ry

odescribehe

whole heoriesf he

wo

authors,utpreferesoanalysehe espectiveositionsbout he emanticsf heverb

esse

the

ubstantive

erb)

s a relevant

xample,

n order o show

heir ifferences.he

opposition

etweenhe wo heories

s centeredround hedifferent

onception

f ub-

stances

special

meaning

r res erbif

he erb sse

heydopt. ccording

o Peter e-

lias,

t

signifies

ubstantias it

derives

rom

ubstarewhich

orresponds

o theGreek erm

hypostasis

nd s

tobe identifiedith he earer f

formshat niteshem

o tselfnd o

each

ther,

ut

egardless

f

what orms

hey

re.This s the

eason

hy

he erb sse

s

predicated

roperly

f

substances

as

instances

f the

Aristotelian

ategory),

nd

only

improperly

r

transumptive

f

ccidents.

his

doesnotmean

hat sse

ignifies

verything

in an

equivocal ay significare

mnia

t

quivocum),

ut

nly

hat t s said

quivocally

f

everythingdici quivoce

e

mnibus)

pp.

252-55).

his

oint

s

made,

s

Kneepkens

hows,

very learly

n

the

older

ersionf Helias'

ommentary

n

Priscianus

inor,

hat s

not akennto ccounty he ditorfHelias' umma.tmustlsobesaid hat his oint

ofdoctrine

s

very

ubtle,

ut t s

crucial or he

nderstanding

fboth

heories.

hen

he comes

o

Gilbert's

ndhis

followers'

heory,

t

s

clear

hat

eter elias s

oneof

he

possible

epresentatives

f he

irst

roup

f

philosophers

bove

mentioned,

nd lso

hat



366

REVIEWS

Gilberts "a partisanf hegroupfphilosophershomake distinctionetweenhe

causes

fesse nd esse

liquid",

hat s

substance,

n one

side,

nd

quality

nd

quantity,

on

the

ther,

eavingpart

he

thereven ccidentia

p.

260).

n

the ast

art

f his

hap-

ter,

neepkens

hows owGilbert's

ositions

ere

doptedy

he

orretani,

uch

s Peter

of

Poitiers

nd the uthorfthe

Grammaticaorretana

edited

n

CIMAGL

7, 1988,

y

Fredborg

nd

Kneepkens

we

regret

hat his eferences

missing

n

the

bibliography),

both

n

theology

nd

n

grammar

with

ome elevant

mplications

or

yntax).

n

con-

clusion,

oth

hapters

hed

ight

n each thernd

help

s

getting

betternderstand-

ing

of the emantical

ebate round he

mid-XIIth

entury.nly

ne

point

emains

obscure,

ccording

o us: the ole

f

mpositio

or he reationf hose

erms,

uch s esse

and

bonum,hat,

n

Gilbert's

iew,

ave s their

rimaryeaning

he ivine

orm,

hile

all other

hings

anbe said o

be or

good nly ypartaking

his

orm.

iven he

mpor-tance f mpositioor rammariansnd ogicians,newondershethernd nwhichexts

an

opposition

etween

theologicalerspective

nd

philosophical

newould

merge

n

this

opic,

oo.

3. Late

ntiquity

nd ateMiddle

ges:

s t

ossible

o onciliatelatond ristotle?

Going

ome

teps

ackwards,

hapter

ive,

y

M.

Kardaun,

s followed

y very

nter-

esting

ontribution

n

Philoponus'

ttempt

o reconcilelato's

heory

f

earning

s

rec-

ollection

ndAristole's

heory

fhumanntellect's

otentiality,

onceivedf s that f

writing

ablet

ith o

sign

n it. The authorfthis

ontribution,

rans

.J.

e

Haas,

seems o

focus n this heme

ainly

or

eclaring

is

gratitude

o

prof,

e

Rijk

han or

its onnectiono oneof he ontributionsfhis eacher:s a matterffact, e stresses

the

ole f he eacher'sntellects the

ctiventellecthat

emoveshematerial

mped-

imentsowards

he

knowledge

f ruth

and

hat's

hy

we

lways

we hankso

him",

p.

183).

Thereferenceo

he

Neoplatonic

ccount

fhowmen

et

o he

nowledge

f

niversais,

however,

epresents

lso

link

etweenhis hemes

nd ome

evelopments

f hirteenth-

century etaphysics,

hat ound

n

Scotus'

ritings

nd Scotism kind f

pex.

To the

way

n

which ne

ofScotus'

ollowers,

etrus

homae,

istinguished

heAristotelian

at-

egories

romne

nother,

s devoted

he ast

hapter

f his

olume,

y

E.P. Bos.As the

author

akeslear tthe

nd fhis

ntroductory

emarks,

etrus

homaecan e abelled

a

Platonist",

nly

if ne takes his abel

n

broad

ense"

p.

278).

As

a

matter

f

fact,

even hemost ealisthilosophert the nd f hirteenthenturyould ave ejectedhis

label,

s Scotus imself

mplicitely

id

n his irst

uestions

n

the

eri ermeneias

q.

1).

n

Xlllth

entury,

ll

philosophers

anted

or

pretended)

obe

Aristotelian,

nd

hey

idnot

acceptedeparate

latonicdeas.

t s thenmore

ppropriate

otalk

bout ealismather

than f

Platonism,

or

his

eriod,

nd

this

s what os

ends

p

doingp.

285:

he

i.e.

Petrus

homae]nterprets

he

different

ategories

s

principles

f

hings.

is

conception

is

realist.").onsidering

or

nstance

n

author,

uch s

Robert

rosseteste,

n

spite

fhis

direct

onnectionso

Neoplatonism,

nd

n

particular

o

Philoponus'

ommentary

n the

Posterior

nalytics

would ave

ed to the

ame onclusion:

HIth-century

ealist

hiloso-

pher,

ven

when e

accepted

he xistence

fPlatonic

deas

n

God's

mind,

lways

ried

to

reject

hat

was onceived

f s the

ore

latonism,

hats the tatement

bout

sep-

arate xistence

f deas

cfr.

rosseteste,

n Post.

n

, 1.15,

wherehese

deas

redefined

asmonsters,rodigiaformedy hentellecthentfails ounderstand).etrushomae's

tracts

however

nother

ery

nterestingxample,ogether

ith

he

ogica

ontrackham

by

he

s.

Richard

f

Campsall,

fhow he heoretical

ools

orkedut

y

cotus,

ainly

in

his

heological

ritings

such

s distinctio

ormalis,

ltimata

bstraction

is

heory

f

predi-



REVIEWS

367

cationndivinis)ereystematicallyppliedo the iscussionf ogico-metaphysicalrob-

lems,

uch

s the

ntological

tatus

f he

ategories.

Bologna

Stefania onfiglioli

§ 1)

andCostantino

armo

§§

2-3)

Frans e Haas

and

Jaap

Mansfeld

eds),

Aňstotle:OnGenerationnd

Corruption

Book

.

Symposium

ristotelicum.

larendon

ress,

xford

004

47

p.

SBN0

19

924292

Thisvolumes

a collection

f

papers

romhe 15th

ymposium

ristotelicum

eld t

Deurne,

he

Netherlands,

n

1999. t s

organized

n

keeping

ith he ormatf he

ym-

posium,ith ach f hemain articipantsivingclose eadingf pre-assignedor-

tion

fthe

ext,

ocusing

n the tructure

fAristotle's

rguments

nd their elationo

other

exts ithinhe

Aristotelian

orpus

s well s toother

igures,specially

hose ristode

took o

be his

pponents.

he volumeeatures

en

ssaysorresponding

o the en

hap-

ters

fDe Generatone

t

Corruptione

(hereafter

C

),

plus

n

ntroductory

nd

oncluding

essay.

herationale

ehindhe hoice

fGC as the

opic

or he15th

ymposium

the

14th,

ublished

y

Oxford

n

2000,

pplied

he

ame,

hapter-by-chapter

nalysis

o

Metaphysics

II)

s ts

entrality

n

the

evelopment

fAristotle's

hysical

heory,specially

its rticulationf he

oncepts

ot

nly

f

generation/corruption

ut lso f lterationnd

growth/decay,

ll of which re essential

or

nderstanding

he

ccount

n GC I and

Meteorology

V of he onstitution

fhomoeomerous

atter

flesh,

lood,

nd

bone)

rom

the

our lements.

n

this

way,

GC

may

e seen s a text

f

applied hysics

hat s

preparatoryor he ife ciences.hrought,we earn ow he eneralccountfmotion

in

the

Physicspplies

o the

ublunary

ealm,

hich

n turn

rovides

herudimentsor

understanding

he

motionf

ivinghings

n

theDe Anima

ndthe arva

aturalia.

here

is also

he act hat

GC

has

been n

especially

ifficultext

or oth ncient

ndmod-

ern

eaders,

o

that,

s one

of

he

ditors

emarks,

there

s room or

mprovement

n

existingcholarship"

1).

Thevolume ore han

meetsheseims. ach

ssay

rovides

carefully

easoned

xe-

gesis

f

ts

portion

fthe ext s

well s an

interpretation

f

ts

ignificance

ithinhe

broader

rogram

fAristotelian

atural

hilosophy.

f

ourse,

hereheres

nterpretation

theres

also

ontroversy,

ut he ontributors

re t east

orthright

bout heir

isagree-

mentssevered

fwhich

ave een arriedver rom iscussion

t the

ymposium

and

thenotes regenerousnougho allow on-specialistso seepreciselyhat s at stake.

The contributors

re lso iteratebout he

ommentary

raditionn GCfrom

implicius

to

C.

J.

F.

Williams,

o that

or hosenterested

n

ts

mpact

n scientific

osterity,

he

fortunesf

particularnterpretation

or,

more o

the

oint, isinterpretation)

an

be

reli-

ably

racked.

f

course,

Cwasoneof he books

f

Aristotle'

n the rts urriculum

f

medieval

niversities;

hemasters

harged

ith

ecturing

n it were

nfluenced

n

what

they

aid

y

he ommentariesf arlier

igures,specially

y

Averroes

via

Michael cot's

thirteenth-century

atin ranslation

f

his

Middle

ommentary

n

GC),

Avicenna

through

variousntermediaries

nd

eventually

n

a late

hirteenth-century

ranslationfhisKitãb

al-Shifã

,

and

Philoponus

viaAverroes).

One of he

trengths

f he

olumes the

way

ach

ssay

escendso the elevant

ar-

ticulars,

ndthis n two ronts.n the ne

hand,

he

uthorsre

single-minded

bout

tryingo recoverhedialecticalontextfAristotle'srguments,speciallynconnection

with is

eply

o the

tomists,

ismost ormidable

pponents

herehe

heory

f

matter

is concerned.n

the

ther,

hey

redeterminedo followome

f

he

racticalmplica-

tions f

Aristotelian

aturalcience

iven

he

rinciples

fmaterial

hange

ketchedn GC

©

Koninklijke

rill

V,

Leiden,

005

Vivarium

3,2

Also

vailable

nline

www.brill.nl



REVIEWS

367

cationndivinis)ereystematicallyppliedo the iscussionf ogico-metaphysicalrob-

lems,

uch

s the

ntological

tatus

f he

ategories.

Bologna

Stefania onfiglioli

§ 1)

andCostantino

armo

§§

2-3)

Frans e Haas

and

Jaap

Mansfeld

eds),

Aňstotle:OnGenerationnd

Corruption

Book

.

Symposium

ristotelicum.

larendon

ress,

xford

004

47

p.

SBN0

19

924292

Thisvolumes

a collection

f

papers

romhe 15th

ymposium

ristotelicum

eld t

Deurne,

he

Netherlands,

n

1999. t s

organized

n

keeping

ith he ormatf he

ym-

posium,ith ach f hemain articipantsivingclose eadingf pre-assignedor-

tion

fthe

ext,

ocusing

n the tructure

fAristotle's

rguments

nd their elationo

other

exts ithinhe

Aristotelian

orpus

s well s toother

igures,specially

hose ristode

took o

be his

pponents.

he volumeeatures

en

ssaysorresponding

o the en

hap-

ters

fDe Generatone

t

Corruptione

(hereafter

C

),

plus

n

ntroductory

nd

oncluding

essay.

herationale

ehindhe hoice

fGC as the

opic

or he15th

ymposium

the

14th,

ublished

y

Oxford

n

2000,

pplied

he

ame,

hapter-by-chapter

nalysis

o

Metaphysics

II)

s ts

entrality

n

the

evelopment

fAristotle's

hysical

heory,specially

its rticulationf he

oncepts

ot

nly

f

generation/corruption

ut lso f lterationnd

growth/decay,

ll of which re essential

or

nderstanding

he

ccount

n GC I and

Meteorology

V of he onstitution

fhomoeomerous

atter

flesh,

lood,

nd

bone)

rom

the

our lements.

n

this

way,

GC

may

e seen s a text

f

applied hysics

hat s

preparatoryor he ife ciences.hrought,we earn ow he eneralccountfmotion

in

the

Physicspplies

o the

ublunary

ealm,

hich

n turn

rovides

herudimentsor

understanding

he

motionf

ivinghings

n

theDe Anima

ndthe arva

aturalia.

here

is also

he act hat

GC

has

been n

especially

ifficultext

or oth ncient

ndmod-

ern

eaders,

o

that,

s one

of

he

ditors

emarks,

there

s room or

mprovement

n

existingcholarship

1).

Thevolume ore han

meetsheseims. ach

ssay

rovides

carefully

easoned

xe-

gesis

f

ts

portion

fthe ext s

well s an

interpretation

f

ts

ignificance

ithinhe

broader

rogram

fAristotelian

atural

hilosophy.

f

ourse,

hereheres

nterpretation

theres

also

ontroversy,

ut he ontributors

re t east

orthright

bout heir

isagree-

mentssevered

fwhich

ave een arriedver rom iscussion

t the

ymposium

and

thenotes regenerousnougho allow on-specialistso seepreciselyhat s at stake.The contributorsre lso iteratebout he

ommentary

raditionn GCfrom

implicius

to

C.

J.

F.

Williams,

o that

or hosenterested

n

ts

mpact

n scientific

osterity,

he

fortunesf

particularnterpretation

or,

more o

the

oint, isinterpretation)

an

be

reli-

ably

racked.

f

course,

Cwasoneof he books

f

Aristotle'

n the rts urriculum

f

medieval

niversities;

hemasters

harged

ith

ecturing

n it were

nfluenced

n

what

they

aid

y

he ommentariesf arlier

igures,specially

y

Averroes

via

Michael cot's

thirteenth-century

atin ranslation

f

his

Middle

ommentary

n

GC),

Avicenna

through

variousntermediaries

nd

eventually

n

a late

hirteenth-century

ranslationfhisKitãb

al-Shifã

,

and

Philoponus

viaAverroes).

One of he

trengths

f he

olumes the

way

ach

ssay

escendso the elevant

ar-

ticulars,

ndthis n two ronts.n the ne

hand,

he

uthorsre

single-minded

bout

tryingo recoverhedialecticalontextfAristotle'srguments,speciallynconnection

with is

eply

o the

tomists,

ismost ormidable

pponents

herehe

heory

f

matter

is concerned.n

the

ther,

hey

redeterminedo followome

f

he

racticalmplica-

tions f

Aristotelian

aturalcience

iven

he

rinciples

fmaterial

hange

ketchedn GC

©

Koninklijke

rill

V,

Leiden,

005

Vivarium

3,2

Also

vailable

nline

www.brill.nl



368

REVIEWS

I. Theresultsrenot lwaysonsistentith hat efindnother orks,ut he olume

leaves he

mpression

fan Aristotle

trugglingaliantly

o fit he

pieces

ogether

and

struggle

e must

fhe

s

to

bridge

he

ap

between

elatively

nert,

lementary

atterf

the osmosnd he

omoeomerousatter

f

ivinghings,

stuff uch icher

n

possibilities.

From

scholarlyoint

f

view,

heres not

weak ink

n

the ntireollection.

Medievalists,owever,

ill e

especially

nterested

n

three

opics.

irst,

here

s the

ues-

tion f he

lace

fGCvis-à-vishe theribri aturales

n theAristotelian

orpus.

n

the

introductoryssay, yles urnyeat

ontendshat

C

must

ave eenwrittenor n audi-

ence

lready

amiliarith

he

hysics

and hat

tructurally,

as the

hysics

f he

ottom,

GC s twin o

deCáelo..

we

might

hinkfdeCáelo and

GC

as

a

pincer

ovement,

one

tarting

rom

he

ery op

nd

moving

own

o the

lements,

he ther

tarting

rom

the

very

ottom

nd

moving p

to homoeomerous

ixtures,

reating

thehabitat

for he ivinghingsowhich ristotleill evote ismostcrupulousttention14-15).

This

ught

o

suggest

research

rogram

or he

history

fnatural

hilosophy:

ow

did

medieval

eadersf

GC

nd

deCáelo nderstandhese exts

n

relation

othe

hysics?

ith

a few otable

xceptions

I

will

mentionere

nly

he ine olumedited

y

Hans

hijssen

andHenk

raakhuis,

he

Commentary

raditionnAristotle's

De

eneratione

t

orruptione}Bre-

pols,

urnhout

999)

recentcholarsave ended

o

gnore

ommentaries

n

subsidiary

texts

ikeGCwhen

hey

antedo find ut bout

he

heory

nd

practice

fnaturalci-

ence

n

the

Middle

ges.

he

only

roblem

ith his s that

medieval

hilosophers

id

not

gnore

hem,

uggesting

hat ur

picture

fthe

period

ill emain

ncomplete

ntil

we can understand

hat

hey hought

hey

ere

oing

n

theirommentaries

n those

texts.

There s alsothemuch-vexedssue fprimematter,iscussednthreessaysnthevolume.oesAristotleave doctrinef

prime

atter,

nd f

o,

what ormoes ttake

in GC?

Keimpe

lgra

hows

hy,lthoughrime

matter

lays

o role

n the ext f

GC

1.3

ndmodernommentators

ind henotion

basically

n-

ristotelian,

r even ntrinsi-

cally

ncoherent,

any

lder

ommentators,

ncluding

oth

hiloponus

nd Thomas

Aquinas,

ound

t

necessary

o

ascribettoAristotle

n ordero make ense

f henotion

of

non-being

implicité

s

the erminus

quo

f ubstantial

hange

92).

arah roadieol-

lows

with n

essay rguing

hat

or

Aristode,

rime

matter

isa

principle

f

hangenly,

not f

being

requiring

or tsrealization

not

tuffing

ut

potentiality

138).

he then

gives

n

elegant

ereading

fthe ccount

felemental

hange

n GC 1.4

whereby

ach

simple

ransition

romlemento element

ccurss

part

f

four-stagerocess

riven

y

the

ingulargency

fthe

un;

hange

s then nderstood

s

proper

o the ntire

ycle

of ransformations,ithlementaryodieseft,ppropriatelynough,odo the onkey-

work f he

ublunary

orld

141n58).

avidCharles

rovidesslightly

ifferent

nter-

pretationnspired

y

the

oncept

f

logical bject

n KitFine's

easoning

ith

rbitrary

ObjectsOxford

985).

ike he

oncept

f

the

now'

n

Aristotle's

hysics'prime

atter'

is

the

mmaterial

and

hence

mperceptible)

ubstratum

r

ogical

underlier'

hat

ersists

through

lemental

hange

ven

hough

o materialubstanceoes.

hus,

he

oncept

f

prime

atter

raditionally

scribed

o

Aristotle,

.e.,

s materialr

quasi-material

ubstratum,

can be avoided

ntologically,

ollowing

harles'

uggestion,

r

physically,

n

termsf

Broadie's

ycles

f lemental

hange.

Finally,

here

s the

opic

f mixturesreated

n

GC 1.

0,

which

as taken

p

with

renewednterest

n

the

fourteenth

enturyollowing

he

ppearance

f

Avicenna'siber

tertiusaturalium

e

eneratione

t

omtptione.

orothearede

xplores

ome

f he easons

or

the eeminglynduettentionristotleivesomixtures:mixiss not asilylassifieds

a

kind

f

change

ithinne of the

en

ategories,

he

points

ut, nd,

unlike

roper

patkê,

ixed

ngredients

etain

ut o not

isplay

heir

riginalualities,

ince

hey

emain

potentially

eparable

290-92).

f

course,

edieval

ristotelians

ere lso

worriedbout

extra-categorialhenomena,

r at east

bout hose hat

idnot

ppear

o be

ofdivine



REVIEWS

369

origin.rede lso hedsightnAristotle'sarger roject ithninterestingomparison

of

he reatmentsfmixturend

homogenous

attern

GC1.10 ndhomoeomerous

is-

sues f

ivinghings

n

Meteorologica

V.8-12.

What his howss that hile he

Aristotelian

naturalcientistas n economical

ccount

f he

materialniverse

n

terms

f

he

our

elementsnd

heir asic

roperties,

his ame

conomyroduces

a

desperate

hortage

f

differentiaet a

higher

evel f

complexity,

.e.,

when t

comes

o

explaining

henon-

homogenousarts

f

organisms,

or ere nature

eeds ifferentndmore

ophisticated

means f

production

312-13).

hevolume

loses ith brief

ssay y

ohn

ooper

on-

tending

hat ommentatorsince

hiloponus

ave

een

uick

o read

Aristotle's

heory

f

mixture

s

involving

he otal nterfusionf

ngredientsdespite

vidence

n

GC 1.10 o

the

ontrary)

ecause

hey

were

surreptitiously

nfluenced

y

theStoic

doctrine

f

Chrysippus,ccording

o whom a

mixtureontains ithintself

n

fully

ctualizedorm

allof tsngredients325). gain,heater istoryf his toic eadingfAristotlehould

be of

great

nteresto

scholars

s

they

ncover ore f he

ommentary

raditionn

GC.

In

short,

necould ot

hope

or

better

hilosophical

ntroductiono

Aristotle'sC.

In

its

ages,

necan

appreciate

hy

GC

was

of

entral

mportance

o

philosophers

rom

late

ntiquity

ntil he

arly

modern

eriod,houghowadays

e

tend o think

hat

he

Physics

ells s allwe need

o

know

bout he

way

Aristotelians

onceivedf he

workings

of

henatural orld.

Emory niversity,

tlanta,

A

Jack

Zupko

Irène osier-Catach,aparolefficace:ime,ituel,acré.ditionsuSeuil, aris, 004, 80 .

ISBN

2 02 062805

In

her a

parole

omme

cte

1994),

rèneRosier-Catach

ave

us a

foretaste

f

this ook

with

section

n

scholasticiscussionsf he

acramentss

signs.

utwhere hat

hort

discussionas

ssentiallyynchronic,

ere he raceshe

evelopment

f

acramental

pec-

ulative

heology

rom

he

pectacular

nterventionf

Berengarius

f

Tours

ca

1010-1088)

to the

ncompromisinglyhilosophical

pproach

fDuns

cotus

ca 1265-1308).

The book

pens

with forward

y

Alain e

Liberawhich iscusses

wodistinctions

crucialo Rosier's

ase,

hose

etween

ublic

nd

privateigns,

nd between

ign

nd

symbol.

he need or

hese istinctionsas

mply

llustrated

y

he uriousebatesur-

rounding

he aw

of 10

February

004

forbidding

he

wearing

f

religiousymbols

n

schools:hey layedast nd oosewith hedistinctionetweenignsndsymbols,nd

lacked

theological

imension,

ven

hough

uch

f

he

easoningmplicit

n

these ebates

and n

the aw tselferives

romhe atholicismf

pre-revolutionary

rance.

n

his

iew

the

emedy

o the

woolly

hinking

vident

n

that

ontroversy

ies

n

books

ike

his

ne,

which

nvestigates

he

rcheology

f

he

eligiousign

ndrelatests

indings

o modern

work n

anguage

cts.

Rosier-Catach's

wn

ntroduction

laces

he acraments

hemselves

n

the ontext

f

a

societyermeated

ith

eligious

nd ecular

itual,

nd

their

heology

ithints xtra-

ordinarily

ich iscoursen

anguage.

er

aim s to

reconstitutehe

heoreticaloher-

ence fmedieval

hought

n the

acraments

y

xamining

ow

hey

sed

he

anguage

theory

ftheir

imes,

n

approach

edieval

heologians

ould ave

understood:lbert

the

Great itests

tymology

o show hat

heology

asdiscourse

boutGod.However

she oesnot im oclarifyssues fmedievalheology,ut heologians'deas n anguage.

Thisdemands

hefocus n the

ontextualisationf

anguagehrough

ts

communica-

tive

unctions,

hich

ere

nvestigated

n

some

epth yRoger

acon n

particular,

nd

trace he

heologian's

daptation

f he

urrent

inguistic

nd emioticdeas

o

their

wn

purposes.

©

Koninklijke

rill

V,

Leiden,

005

Vivarium

3,2

Also

vailablenline

www.brill.nl



370

REVIEWS

The book xamineshe rticulationetweenhenaturefthe acramentalign,he

causality

hich

overns

he

operation

f the

acraments,

he acramental

ormulas,

the ntentionsf minister

nd receiverf the acrament.he

chapters

etting

uthow

thesessues

eveloped

refollowed

y

massive

hapter

n the

rguments

ver

he

words

of consecrationt Mass.Each

of

these

hapters

s

supportedy

an annexe

ontaining

extendedxtracts

rom er

uthorities

xcellently

ranslatednto

rench,

ith heLatin

originals

nd ome ther

mportant

ocuments.

he concludeser ookwith

carefully

crafted

onclusion,

hugh

eries f

ndnotes,

comprehensiveibliography,

nd

ubject

and

person

ndexes.

The first

hapterpens

with n accountfthe ontroversial

laim

yBerengarius

f

Tours

ca 1010-1080)

hat he ubstancefbread

emainedfter

he

wordsf onsecration

hadmade t nto

sign

fChrist. e

supported

is ase

gainst

he

olid efencef he

traditionaloctrinef ranssubstantiationyLanfranc1005-1089)ith massiveossier

from

ugustine,entring

tona dialectician's

xegesis

f

Augustine's

efinition

f he

ign:

Signum

st nim es

raeter

peciemuam

ngerit

ensibusliud

liquid

x se faciens

in

cogitationem

enire.

A ign

s

a

thing

hich,

uite part

romhe utward

ppear-

ance t

presents

othe

enses,

akes

omething

lse ome nto he

mind.]De

doctrina

Christiana

.1.1)

Berengarius

eads his efinition

ery

iterally.

s

a

sign

s

by

nature

erceptible

o the

senses,

nd

presents

omething

ifferent

romtself

aliquid

liud)

o

the

mind,

e draws

the onclusionhat

he

mage

he

ucharist

rings

o the

mind

s

n a relationf imili-

tude o

Christ,

ot

n oneof

dentity.

his emiotic

rgument

e reinforces

y

dialectical

principlesrawnromategories4andPorphyry'ssagoge,ndby he rinciplehatcci-

dents

an

only

e

supported

y

n

appropriate

ubstance:

human

ody

annot

upport

the ccidentsfbread

ndwine.

These

rguments,

s Rosier-Catach

oints

ut,

et

ut he ermsorater

evelopments

in

sacramental

heology.

t would eem heirmost

ong-lasting

esult

as

replacing

he

vague escription

f sacrament

s a

sign

fa sacred

hing

. ignum

ei

acrai)

y

the

definition,

an

outward

ign

f nward

race

nstituted

y esus

hrist ,

hichs still ound

in

modernatechisms.

he mmediate

ssue,

owever,

as

defusing

erengarius's

nter-

pretation

f

Augustine'sign

heory,

nd

developing

rationalasis

or raditionaloc-

trine

y

more

lexibleseofhis

methods.o this

nd

heologians

orked

ndependently

of he

aculty

fArts o build

nterpretation

nto heir

odel f

perception.

heir xam-

ination

f

he

notionf

visibility

et ff

igorous

edefinitionf

Augustine's

erms:

etrus

Cantor ornstance,istinguishesetweenhe directisibilityf omethingmmediately

obviouso the

enses,

nd he

indirect

isibility

f

omething

idden,

ike hand nside

a

glove.

osier-Catach

reditshis

ort

f

thinking

ith

lurringugustine's

lear is-

tinctionetween

ignifier

nd

signified:

or

nstance,

ichard ishacre

d.

1248),

neof

the

ioneers

fAristotelian

hilosophy

t

Oxford,

bserves

hat oth he ensibile

nd he

intelligibile

an

be

signs

nd

ignificates.

is

corollary

as hat he

word,

acrmentummeant

three

hings:

material

ign,

ts

ignificate

res

acramenti

,

and he

ermanent

ffect

f he

sacramental

ite.

Berengarius's

hief

ticking-point,

hat heEucharist

as cause

s well s a

sign

f

grace,

as

dealtwith

y

killedecourse

o dialectic.

ven

hough

acraments

ere

igna

data

y

eason

f heir

nstitution,

homas

quinas

nd

Bonaventurenvoked

he

otency-

and-act

odel hichs

frequent

n

grammar:

ike

wordsacraments

ave natural

pti-tude rpotencyosignify,hichasses oactwhen heirignifications realisedna

context.

he contradictionetween

ignification

y

naturend

ignification

y

nstitution

wasresolved

y

he

ssertion,

hich

eems obe

due o

Roger

acon,

hat

natural

ign

could

e

designated

o

signify

elations,

o that t could

e

in

both

relationf imili-



REVIEWS 371

tude nd a causal elation ithts ignificate.aptism,ornstance,asa naturalign

signifyingy

imilitudeith aternd ts

ower

f

leansing,

utChrist

ave

t the asks

of

mpartingrace

nd

cleansingriginal

in

by

nstitution.

Similitude

etweenhristndhis

resence

othemind nd he ack f tbetween

im

and

he read

adbeen ne f

Berengarius'srguments

gainst

ransubstantiation.osier-

Catach races ow he hirteenth

entury

et his

rgumentydeveloping

he

oncept

f

proportional

imilitude.

hiswas

n

part

unction:or

xample,

read ndwine retem-

poral

oods,

he ucharist

piritual.

ut he howshat here

eveloped

distinctionetween

relationf

ign

o

thing y

imilitude,

hich as

natural,

nd

by

nstitution

hich

as

voluntary.

hile

rammarians

ite he

arrel-hoop

anging

eforetaverns a

conventional

sign

fwinewithouturther

omment,

ishacres

among

he irstocite t s a

sign

hich

requiresnterpretation

ecausets

meaningepended

n similitudeot

mmediately

bvi-

ous. t s a sign fwine odrink,ecausetwas part f he arrelhewinewas hipped

in.

Likewise,

ven

f

acramentsidnot ave

physical

imilitude,

hey

ave

conventional

similitude

o

their

ignificatehrough

unction.

This

hapter

lso

traces

evelopmentsndependent

f

Berengarius,

ike

he cholastic

typology

f

demonstrative,

rognostic

ndcommemorative

igns.

t is

through

he

ocial

repercussions

fthese arious

ypes

f

signs

hat acraments

lay

n

importantart

n

teachingeligious

ruthsnd

n

the ohesionf heChristian

ommunity.

here s also

short

ccount,

hich osier-Catachater eturns

o,

fhow iscussions

entred

n

Anselm's

concept

f he ruthf

sign

rectitudo

.

As a

sign

must

e true n

both nstitutionnd

use,

he dministrationf sacramentas

ntimately

inked

ithts nstitution.he rest

of

his

hapter

utlines

he

medievallaborationf

Augustine's

atterndform odel

of he acraments.welfthenturyiscussionf hematteras omewhataphazard,utthe hirteenth

entury

ormalisedt on Aristotle's

ylomorphic

odel. he matterfa

sacramentas

thing

r an

act,

r both

ogether,

nd ts orm as he

poken

ords.

The

form

f he

poken

ormulaas ts

ignification,

hich

efineshe

urpose

nd

ntent,

andfrom hichts

fficacy

s

derived.he

prime

mover

f

this

evelopmentccording

to Rosier-Catachas

Hugh

fSt Cher

1190-1263).

Thetwo ival

ypotheses

bout

he

fficacy

f he

acraments,

physicalausality

nd

causalité-pacte

causalityybindinggreement)

iscussed

n

thenext

hapter,

llustrateow

theologians

eveloped

he

rinciple

f

ign

s cause rom

nalogies

ith heworldt

arge.

Physical

ausality

asfirst ooted

y Stephen

angton

ca 1150-1228),

ho

ompared

sacramentso medicines.t

was

further

evelopedy

Hugh

fSaint-Cher

mong

thers,

who

ppealed

o Avicenna's odel f he

eception

fform

y

matter.vicenna

ostu-

lated wo arallelauses: newhichreparedhemattero receivehe orm,he econd

which

ttributedhe ormo thematter.

ugh

scribed edicinesnd sacramentswo

efficientauses:

pothecaries

repared

edicinesor

specificurpose

nd

God nstituted

the

acraments,

hile

doctordministerededicinend a

ministerhe acraments.

Secondly

he

hypothesis

hat acramentscted

hrough

ome

irtusnherent

n

tsmatter

either

reated

y

God or

placed

n

the

matter

hrough

nstitutionr a

special

nterven-

tion ad ts

ounterpart

n

the ommon

elief,

hich asbiblical

ackingcf.

cclesiasticus

38.4)

hat odhad

given

edicinal

roperties

ocertainubstancest the

ime f reation

and

occasionally

nfusedhemnto

hingslready

n

existence.

In

thatntellectuallimatehe

nalogies

ith

opular

eliefsnwhich

hysicalausality

was

asedwere

nevitably

ubjected

o

earching

cientific

esting.

he

uthortates

lundy

that he

bjections

hus aised

layed

n

importantart

n

the

development

f

causalité-

pacte.o mymindhey ecall he hreemeaningsishacreave heword,acramentum.

Unlikehe irtusreata

f

medicines,

he ature

ndmode f ction

scribedo acraments

could ot e

described

n

physical

erms,

here asno

way

f

knowing

hetherhe irtus

of

sacramentasconferred

t the ime f nstitutionf

dministration,

nd

there as



372

REVIEWS

no sense fhowong he fficacyf sacramentasted.urther,he ssumptionhat he

virtusf sacramentas n nternalccidentan ounterothe

rinciple

hat acraments

are n

relation

o

he

race hey ring.

onsequently

he irtue

f

sacramentdds

othing

its

ssence,

or an t be a basis or ts ction

cf.

Aristotle,

hys.

.2.225.bl

).

Rosier-Catach

ives

ishacre

pivotal

ole

n

the

stablishment

f

ausalité-pacte

in

his

viewGodwas he

nly

roper

ause

f he

acraments.

onsequently

he

ausality

n

the

sacramentsesulted

rom

contractetweenodandMan.Manfulfilledis ontractual

obligations

y

faith

n

the onventionsod

mposed.

his

rincipleheologians

llustrated

by

Augustine'sxample

f

money:

ts alue s not

n

accident

ising

romhe ssencef

the

oins,

ut relationetweent nd ts aluemaintained

y greed

onventions.

hey

also

ompared

acramentso

nsignia

f fficend

rings

ike

weddinging

r

bishop's

ring.

When

ubliclyonferred,

hese ctas

signs iving

he

ecipientparticular

tatus

and mposingesponsibilities.herefersrieflyohow ausalité-pactempingednthe lmost

universalelief

n

magic uring

heMiddle

ges.

he

begins

ith

ugustine's

istinction

between

uperstitiousractices

nd rue

eligion,

nd

goes

n to a briefiscussionfhow

medieval

heologians

sed

Augustine'suling

o

distinguish

etweenhe

acraments,

hich

were

upernatural

nterventions

n

human ffairs

egitimatedy

a

pact

with

God,

nd

magic,

hich as also ntervention

y

supernatural

orces,

ut hesenterventionsere

invited

ypacts

with atan.

From he enor fRosier-Catach's

iscussion,

t s clear

hat

ausalité-pacte

asno

ess

controversialhan

hysical

ausality.unninghrough

er ccount f mid-thirteenth-

century

iscussionss the

mplication

hat he

rgumentsgainsthysicalausality

o not

always

pply,

nd hat everal

heologians,ncluding

homas

quinas

nd

Henry

f

Ghent,

who o not se he erm,ignumfficiensìo denote signwhichroducesneffectnthe

observer,

aw

physical

ausality

s an instrumentf

causalité-pacte.

he

passes

nto the

fourteenth

enturyy howing

ow he

oncept

f

fficacyisplaced

nselm'sectitudo

s

a

measuref he

alidity

f

sacrament.

he

Franciscan,

eter

livi,

ostulated

hat he

administrationf sacramentould

nly

ctuatets

ignification

nd

fficacy

f

he ntentions

ofministernd

recipient

ere onsonantith he

ivine

ntention

overning

ts nstitution.

ThisDuns

Scotus

eveloped

nto definitiveersionf

causalité-pacte,

n order

o refute

Aquinas's

iew f

he

matter.s

a

signumffkiens

sacraments n relations relativeo

correlativeo both ts

ignificate

nd

the

lement

hat hat

ignificate

s

founded

n,

a

relation

n

whichntention

lays pivotal

ole.

he

chapter

inishesith comment

n

discussionsbout

meaning

n

the

Faculty

f

Arts.

osier-Catach

raws ttention

o

two

opposing

endencieshich

un

arallel

o he

heologians'

ausalité-pacte

nd

hysical

ausality

respectively:heAugustiniándea thatword-meaningaspurelyonventional,nd the

Aristotelianiew

dopted

y

he

modistaen

particular,

hat

meaningepended

n

part

n

featuresf he

ignificate.

he eaves he

uestion

fwhetherhere as ome ross-influence

betweenhe

wo aculties

anging

n

the ir.

would hink

here

as.

Quite

deliberately

he uthor

mplies

hat

upporters

f

both

hypotheses

bout he

efficacy

f he acraments

ere

ealing

ith n

assembly

f ntractableariableshat ven

themost

minent,

ike

Aquinas,

onaventurend

Scotus,

ould ot

manage.

he reader

is left ith he ense

hat he ssue f

causality

asnever

esolved,

r

perhaps

t could

not e resolved.

The most

mportant

lement

n

the ubtext

f

Rosier-Catach's

hapter

n sacramental

formulass the

ole f uthoritativeradition

n

building

octrine

n

the ace

f n

almost

complete

ack f

Scriptural

uthority.

he medievaislaimedhat

he acramentalor-

mulas adbeen uthoredy heChurchna manneronsonantith he piritfwhat

Biblicalccountshere

ere. or

xample,

he

baptismal

ormula

N.,

go

te

baptizo

n

nomine

atris,

t

Filii

t

Spiritus

ancti

N., baptise ou

n

the

name f he

Father,

of he on ndof he

Holy pirit.],

s based n Christ's

andateothe

postles,

Euntes



REVIEWS

373

ergo ocete mnes entes:aptizantesos n nomineatris,tFilii, tSpiritusancti.

[Go

forth,herefore,

nd each ll

nations,

aptising

hem

n

the ame

f he

ather,

nd

ofthe

on,

nd of the

Holy pirit.]

Matthew

8.19),

which

heologiansrgued

as

a

command

othe

Aposdes,

ven

fChristad ouchedt

n

termsf

description

f heir

responsibilities.

The secondssue s

the

dequacy

fthe

ormulas,

hose

mportance

ose utofthe

twinssues

f heirnstitution

ndtheir unction

s forms

f

he

acraments.

he

author

remarks

he nconscious

ssumption

n

the atin

hurchhat

atinwas he

anguage

n

whichhese

ormulas

ad

originally

een rafted.

eraccounts

fminuteiscussionsf

the

orcef ach

word

n

the atin

aptismal

ormulahow

he

heologians'eep

oncern

with he

orensicffectf

words. or t s not

nly

he

meaning

hat

s at ssue:t s the

social

unction

f achword

n

the

ormula,

uch s the

riest'sssumption

f

responsi-bilityhroughhe edundantronoun,gothe reciseesignationf he ctby he erb,

baptizo

andthe

recise

esignation

fthe

ecipient

y

te.

Her

nteresting

ection

n the

almost nknown

roposals

hat acramental

ormulashould

e translated

nto hever-

naculars

or

astoral

easonsecall

he

rgumentsustifying

he ntroduction

fvernacu-

lar

iturgiesuring

he wentieth

entury.

gain

hedemonstrates

hat

heological

ssues

were esolved

y

ecular eans:

he

fficacy

f he

ormulasould e

preservedepended

onthe

rinciple

hat

rammar

as

he ame

n all

anguages

nd nAristotle's

rguments

for he

dentity

f the

passions

cross

anguages.

his

guaranteed

he

universality

f

significates,

rto

put

tmore

echnically,

he mitasominis

unity

f he

word),

hichould

not

be

impugned

y anguage

ifferencesecause

hey

were

y

nature

ccidental:or

example,

omond

avGpomoç

ere onsideredhe

same word ecause

hey

hare

he

same efinition,ndpaterndbeireere denticalecauseheyrerelatedy tymology.The ast ubstantive

ssue,

nwhich

heologians

idnot

lways

ee

eye

o

eye,

was he

integrity

f he ormulas

hen

ronounced,

worry

ecause

f he ncertain

atinity

f

many

f hemedieval

arishlergy,

nd,

ne

uspects,

he

tylisticretensions

f he et-

ter ducated.

he one fRosier-Catch's

ccounthowshat

heology

as

becoming

uch

more ormalist

n

ts utlook.

welfth-centuryheologians

ike ernardfClairvaux

rgued

that

f

minister

ad the

proper

ntention,

angling

he

formulaid not

damage

he

meaning,

s the irtusf

formulaesided

n

ts ntention.

n the ther

and,

most

hir-

teenth-century

cholasticsaw

virtuss a featuref he

ign

tself,

nd

rgued

hat he or-

mulas

ad

obe

word-perfect

s

they

ere ot fficaciousnless oth

ignificatum

ndmodus

significarteli

emainedntact.

hey istinguished

odificationsarmfulo the

fficacy

f

sacramentrom armless

ygrammatical

ndrhetorical

nalysis.

or

xample

enitor

a

titleocussingn the ctofbegetting,ould otbe substitutedor aterwhich enoted

the ather

s a

person.

The

hapter

n

ntentionevolves

round

he

bligationsmposed

n

minister

nd

ecip-

ient

y

he ivinenstitution

f he acramentsnd heir

cceptance

y

he hurch.osier-

Catach's

riefook t the

elations

osed

etweennstitution

nd ntentionouldndicate

that

heologians

aw nstitutions akin o

the

mposition

f a word.Where

properly

qualifiedmpositormposed

meaning

na

word,

hrist

s the

roperly

ualifiedimpos-

itor ad

given specific

eaning

othematter

f

sacrament

ndunifiedhe

isparate

elementsfthe acramental

ign. onsequently

heministercts s Christ's

eputy

nd

takes

n

the

bligation

f

ulfilling

he onditions

aiddown

y

he nstitutionf he acra-

ment

n

question.

he

chapter

hen

ives

n accountf he

ively

ebatesbout he

alid-

ity

f acramentsdministered

y

hereticsnd

priests

n

the tate

f

in,

heirntentions

atthe imef dministration,nd heminister'sbligationorespecthe rescribedituals.

Concernhat

ollowing

he itualaid

down

y

he

Church ade t difficulto

udge

he

sincerity

f heminister's

ntention,

roduced

ome iscussion

ver

he

rimacy

fword

or ntention

n

a

liturgical

itual.



374 REVIEWS

Theologiansxpectedhe roductionnd eceptionf acramentalormulasobesubject

to a

symmetry

f

ntentionetween inisternd

recipient

f

sacramentnd lso o

harmony

between outhnd

heart .

ven

f

he

rammarianlike

hemodern

inguist,

itmust e

said)

oncentratednthe

roduction

f

n

utterance,

he

heologian

as

qually

interestedts

reception,

hose

fficacy

epended

n the

ntentions,

nowledge

nd ntel-

lectual

apacity

f he

ecipient,

ndhis ssentothe

roceedings.

he

authoretailshe

uncomfortableiscussionsbout orced

aptisms

nd

marriagesrovokedy

heneed or

assent.herole f ssentften

epended

nwhat

ort

f

ausality

he

heologian

oncerned

postulated

or hese acraments.

The ectionn

oaths,

ies nd

perjury

rawshe eader'sttentionothe eenmedieval

sense fthe

esponsibility

f

speaker

o

express

is

meaning

nd the

esponsibility

f

thehearero

reciprocatey nterpreting

im

withinhe

ense

nd

ntent

f

hisutterance.

This ense fresponsibilitynderlieshemportancelaced y heologicalebatesn the

moralnd ocial

epercussions

futterancesnd heir

earing

n

the

alidity

f he acra-

ments.

n

oathwas

public

tterance

alling

odto

witness

he

ruthf statementr

the

incerity

f

promise.

eliberateieswere ins n the

art

f

person

nd lso

cts

withocial

epercussions.

n

utterance

s true

f

he

modes

f

nderstanding

nd hemodes

of

ignifying

atch.

lie

thereforearmshe

ocial

abric

yfrustrating

he

xpressive

and

ommunicative

urpose

f

anguage.

aths

nd

ies

ome

ogether

n

perjury,

hich

callsGodto

witness

he ruthf false

tatement,

r the

alidity

f

promise

nedoes

not ntendo

keep.

Hence,

hough

ies nd

deceptionegate

he

alidity

f

otheracra-

ments,

hey

re

crucially

armful

n

matrimony

hose ssences the

ublic xchange

f

consentetweenride nd

groom.

Underlyinghewholehrustf hishaptersthemoral rinciple,nunciateds earlyas

Hilary

f

Poitiers,

hat he

ignificance

f statementhoulde

udged

ot

nly

n ts

meaning,

ut lsoon ts ntention.his

principle,

hich as

part

f he awof ontract

Rosier-Catach

ootnoteso

Gratian,

he ould lsohavementioned

hatt

had

ts ource

in

Roman aw.

The

problems

osed

heologiansy

he ucharistesult

n

the

ongest

ndmost

omplex

chapter

n

thebook.

he

Eucharists the

nly

acramenthich

rings

bout

omplete

transformationf tsmatter

the

read ndwine ecome he

ody

ndblood f

Christ),

andwhoseacramental

ormula

s ts ole fficientause.Moreoverhewordsf onsecration

are he

nly

acramentalormulaohave

omething

lose overbatim

criptural

uthority:

they

re

a

conflation

f

hewordsttributedo Christ

n

the hree

ynoptic

ospels

nd

in

St

Paul,

1

Corinthians

1.23-24.

nce

again, heologians

ased ll their

rgumenta-

tion nthe atin ext.

The

chapter

pens

with return

o

Berengarius,

ndhis laim

hat

oc st nim

orpus

meumenoted

mpanation

ecausetwas

ogicallynadequate

odenotehe

omplete

rans-

formation

ostulatedy

transsubstantiation.

osier-Catach

hows

ow

heologians

oun-

tered

im

with

ophisticated

se fhis wn

weapons.

he

gives long

ist f

hirteenth-century

paraphrases

hose

urpose

as

exegesis

f this ormuland eliminationf

heresyy

couching

he octrinef ranssubstantiation

n

termsf movementetweenterminus

quo

and terminusd

quern.araphrases

ike

anis

ransitn

fit) orpus

hristiere

cceptable;

de

ane

it orpus

hristifor

nstance,

asnot

cceptable

ecauset

mplied

causal ela-

tionship

etweenhe read

nd he

resence

fChrist.he ums

p

thewhole

rgument

in

an nformativeablewhichmatches

he xtant

araphrases,egitimate

nd

llegitimate,

withmodel entences

rom andbooksfdialecticndthe

rincipleshey xemplify.

Herdiscussionf he ormulashemselvesocussesn how heologianssed rguments

drawn rom

rammar

nd the

Physics

o

clarify

hebalance etween

eaning

nd

per-

formativeunction.s t

denotesubstancendnot

erson,

heneuteremonstrative

ro-

noun, oc,

tateshat oth he ubstance

fbread nd he ubstancefChrist

re

present



REVIEWS 375

onthe ltar. herewasneverompletegreementverwhen he readeased obepre-

sent

nd

Christecome

resent,

nd ver he aturef

resence

othemind.

heologians

hadmore uccess ith he ubstantive

erb,

st

is),

which enotes

xistence

ather

han

change,

nd

ts elation

o

the

onversionf

he lements.

hey

were,

f

ourse,

ound

y

the

Gospel

ext.

uggestions

hattwould ave een

etter

f

Christ

ad

used

itbecomes)

or

a

jussiveubjunctive

sit

r

iat)

ere ismissedn the

grounds

hat st s a

performa-

tive

y

unctionecause sacramentalormula ust

ignify

he utcomef ts

acrament,

which an

only

e

done

y

the

resent

ndicative.he third

ifficulty

asthe

uppositio

ofmeumit didnot eem

ogical

hat t should efero

both

he

erson

ho aid

t and

toChrist howas

being eported.

inally,

onsecrating

he

read

eparately

rom

he

wine

raised he nsoluble

uestion

fwhetherhrist

as

ntirelyresent

nder

oth orms.

Unlike

erengarius

ho

had

applied

he aws

f

dialectic ithout

aking

ontextnto

account,heologiansook t for rantedhat hewords fconsecrationould nly unc-

tionwithinheir

iturgical

ontext.

hey

re the limax f

short arrative

f

heLast

Supper.

osier-Catach'sccount

f he

ively

iscussions

f

he

riest's

ole llustratesow

the

heologians

ollifiednease ith he irect

uotes

n

the

iturgical

arrative

y

lightly

twisting

henormsfdialectic.herewas

greement

hat

riestegins

y

peaking

ecita-

tive

that s

as narrator.

ut

when

e reciteshewords f

consecration,

e is

taking

n

the

ersona

f

Christ,

hich aised he ssue fwhethere s still

peaking

s

narrator,

or

significative

as Christ ad.The

majority

nswero this

onundrumas hat he

riest

was

peaking

oth ecitativend

ignificative,

solution

emanding

eumavedouble

up-

position.

he

development

fthe

heory

f

demonstratio

n

the ate

1240s

wascrucial

n

solving

he

ragmatics

f he ucharistieormulas.

osier-Catach

uccinctly

racests evel-

opmentygrammariansnd ogicianssa prefaceo n accountf he heologians'ejec-tion fdemonstratio

oncepta

concept

f

demonstration)

s the

perative

actornfavourf

demonstratioxercitad intellectum

demonstration

rought

bout o the

ntellect).

he takes

Aquinas

nd

Bonaventures the

pivotal

heorists,

uilding

n ideas rom

many

thers,

including

obert

ilwardby.

owever,

he

gives

uns cotus he inal ord. orhe took

the

rgument

bout he

validity

f the

Eucharistieormula

eyond

nselm'sdeasof

rectitudond ettledn the

fficacy

f

the ormulas a

gauge

f ts

validity.

or

Scotus

the

mechanismf ranssubstantiationas ubstitutionf

nother

eing

atherhan onversion

of

what

ad

been

here,

ndhis eems o be the astword n

the

ubject.

The conclusion

ums

p

the hree

major

essonsfthebook. t

emphasises

hat he

interactionetween

heology

ndthe

anguage

ciencesose utof ources

n

common,

like

Donatus,

risciannd theAristotelian

orpus,

ut hat

hey

sed hem

ifferently

because f he ifferencesnattitudeso anguageetweenrts ndtheology.his s as

one

would

xpect,

ecause

rammar,ogic

nd

theology

avedifferent

bjects,

hich

inevitably

esult

n

different

xpectations

f

data. he secondssues the

elationetween

the

fficacious

ign

f he itle ndmodern

heoriesf

anguage

cts. he author akes

easy

onnectionsetweenhework fGrice n

mplicature,

ustinndSearle's

language

acts ,

nd

Thomas eid's social cts ndthe ctus

xercitatus

act

broughtbout)

r the

signumjficiens

f

hermedieval

heologians.

his

he

strengthensy sidelonglances

t

Augustine

ndothers ho

nalysedanguage

s a tool f

eaching.

erthird

oint

akes

up

an

issuemade

xplicit

y

de

Libera's

oreword,

hedifference

etween

sign

nda

symbol.

he

makes

particularlytriking

emark

hat acramental

heology

s one

mmense

gloss

n

Augustine's

e

doctrinahristiana

drawing

he eader'sttentiono

overridingmpor-

tance f

he

heologians'xegesis

f

Augustine's

efinitionfthe

ign. hey mphasised

the wo elationst entersnto: s a sign roperlyo-called,t s nrelationorealityo

its

ignificate,

ut s a

symbol

t s in

relationo the

person

ho

receivest and nter-

prets

t. This hen

evelops

nto short iscussionf

thedouble alue f the

ign,

s

something

ith

meaning

nd s

something

hat as n

effect

n

ts eceiver.



376

REVIEWS

The mostmportantonstantnthis ook s the xplicitankingffaiths an intel-

lectual

ower,

hich

rings

omind t

Anselm'sefinition

f

heology

s

fides

uaerens

ntel-

lectum

faith

n

earch

f

nderstanding),

n

aphorism

hichet ut he

elationship

etween

the ervant

ciencesnd

heology.

hey

re hereo

explain

elief,

ot o overturn

t.As

versatile

andmaids

f

heology,rammar

nddialecticuffer

he

ndignity

f

being

ver-

ruled

r retrainedhen

hey egin

o

push

eyond

he ounds

f anctioned

elief.et

the ate

nd

ontinuing

nacknowledgedresence

f

Berengarius

re

mple

estimony

o he

power

heology

ested

n

the ciences

f he

Trivium.

The econd

mportant

lement

n

his

ooksthe uthor's

areful

nalysis

f he ifference

between

he

heologians'pproach

o

anguage

nd hat

f he

rammarians.

his s

only

to

be

expected

s the wo

ciencesave

ompletely

ifferent

bjects

s far s

language

s

concerned.

he hows

hat,

ven

f

heyxemplifygain

nd

gain

he

rinciple

hat

od

is not ubjectogrammar,heirelativelyrthodoxnalysisfutterancesscoupled ith

a keen ense

f

anguage

n

context,

hethertbe social

r

iturgical.

hetherhiss

due

solely

o

developments

ithin

he

anguage

ciences,

doubt

f

Rosier-Catach

s

n

a

posi-

tion o

determine.

y

own

feeling

s that

heology

tself ith

tsmoral oncerns

nd

medieval

ociety

hich

alued he

poken

anguage

ver he

written,

admuch o

do with

developing

he

trong

ense

f

anguage

unctions

ighlighted

n

this ook.

The third

ssue s the

kill ith

which

heologiansdapted

erengarius's

eapons

o

dealwith he

pectres

e raised.

erengarius'sroblems

ose rom

is

violently

ontext-

free

ealings

ith

ugustine's

efinition,

hich as

ountered,

nconsciously

osier-Catach

implies,

y

he ealisation

hat

ugustine

ad onstructed

is efinitionround

hree

erms,

sign,

ignifier

nd

nterpreting

ind. he

moral nd ocial

evelopments

f

his

rinciple

throughechniqueseneralo themedievalciencesonstituteneof hemostmportantthreads

unning

hrough

hebook. heir ther

chievement,

hose

mportance

o the

sacraments

he uthor

ets ut

n some

etail,

s their

ereading

f

Augustine's

atertight

distinction

etween

ign

nd

thingignified.

his,

f

course,

as relevance

lsewhere:

t

turns

p

n

the

elationetween

es

ndratio

ntelligendi

which

ere onsidered

o be

in

a

relationship

f

hing

o

ign,

nd

his

elationship

as

replicated

n

the

elationetween

ratio

ntelligendi

nd

ratio

ignificando

Since first

eadRosier-Catach's

a

parole

omme

cte have t times

ound

yself

on-

dering

hether

oger

acon's

unctionalist

iew f

grammar

ould ave

ad he

nfluence

it did

fhe had

not een

skilled

heologian.

ut unctionalist

iews

ere ot he

rop-

erty

fBacon

lone,

nd wonder

f

hey

ere

eveloped

n discussions

ith is

friend,

Bonaventure.

he

gives

n excellent

icture

f he

igour

f

heological

iscussion

ndof

its reedomndferocityndoriginalityithinhe oundsfreceivedoctrine.hecites

a whole

alaxy

f

heologians,iving

reditor

ignificant

nnovation

hereredit

s due.

The

mportance

he ccords

he

Franciscan,

onaventure,

ndthe

Dominican,

homas

Aquinas,

s no

surprise,

or

heir

nalysis

f he acraments

with

efinements

rom uns

Scotus),

asstill

hereceived

ersion

n

twentieth-centuryheological

anuals. hat

s

telling,

owever,

s the ttention

iven

esser nown

igures

romhe

arly

hirteenth

entury,

like ichard

ishacre,

ichard

iddleton,

ndWilliam

fMeliton.

y

eason

f heir

io-

neering

ontributions

hey

tand ut

among

he

huge

number

f

theologians

etween

Abelard

nd

William

fHades ho

ontributed

ignificantly

o

he

uilding

f he heoretical

coherence

osier et

ut o find.

The

astvirtue

fthis ook

s the

uthor'sober

ccount

fthe

development

fthe

theory

f he

ignum

fficiens

nd

ts

kinship

ith

modern

deas n

anguage

cts,

hich

ies

at the entrefher nterprise.he srightnshowingow lowwas he evelopmentf

demonstratio

nto

prototype

f he

heory

f

he

ignumfficiens,

ven

f

opics

ssential

o

language

cts,

ike

ntention,

ruth

nd

ignification,

ermeate

he ook.

Her

comparison

ofthe

point

eached

y

Duns

Scotus

ith he

modern

ork f

Searle nd

Austins

a



REVIEWS 377

veryellingommentn thehumanropensityo gnore hat oes n under ne's ose.

One

might

ave

xpected

hat

ighly

itualised

ociety

ohave rawnhe onclusionhat

acts r utterancesould

enerate

heir

wn

ignificates

nd have

major

ffectn the

their

ecipients

omewhatore

xpeditiously.

As Rosier-Catach

ays

n her

ntroduction,

he s not

rimarily

oncernedith acra-

mental

heology.

er

book,

owever,

ives

well-documented,

erceptive

ccountfhow

theologiansevelopednalytical

ools

rom

he

anguage

ciences,

nd

s,

n

effect,

e

Libera's

archeology

f he

eligiousign . y

henaturef

ts

ubject

t s an

extremely

complex

ookwhich emandsareful

eading,

t east

rudimentaryrasp

f

acramen-

taldoctrine

nd,

would

hink,

amiliarity

ith he

philosophical

ontext.ven

hough

those ho

xpect

medieval

asuistry

o

reach irm

onclusions

bout

he acraments

ill

certainly

e

disappointed,

osier-Catach

onclusively

howshat

rgument

nddiscussion

amongheologiansttainedoherencefprinciplendmethod hilellowingor he is-

agreements

ver

major oints

hichurvivedhe hrewd

nalysesy

Alberthe

Great,

Thomas

quinas

ndBonaventure.

I

would

ope

hat istorians

f

heology

ndmedievalists

n

general

ould enefitrom

this ook s much s

I

have.Once

gain

Rosier-Catachasmade

major

ontribution

to our

knowledge

f he

anguagecholarship

f heMiddle

ges.

Darwin

ollege, ambridge

L.G.

Kelly

Claude

anaccio,

ckhamn

ConceptsAshgate

tudies

n

Medieval

hilosophy).shgate,

Aldershot004, i + 197p. ISBN0 75463228

Ockham's

heory

f

oncepts

asbeen

ubject

oheated ebatesor he ast

wentyears.

A

numberf

distinguished

ommentators

arefullynalyzed

he

ignificance

ndfunction

of his

heory

n

philosophy

f

anguage,ntology

nd

pistemology.

et,

espite

he us-

tainedfforto hed

ight

nthisnfluential

octrine,

any

uestions

emainednanswered.

Is Ockham reductionistn his ccountf he asic

tock

f

oncepts?

s

he committed

to the

osition

hat

oncepts

re omehowsimilitudesf

hings

n

theworld? oes he

provide

n

explanation

or he

rigin

f

ogicaloncepts?

hese

nd

many

more

roblems

gave

ise o

controversial

nterpretations.

n

his

highly

nnovativend

stimulating

ook,

Claude anaccio

resents

solution

o

all of

hem,

hus

rovidingcomprehensive

nter-

pretation

nd defensef

Ockham's

heory

f

concepts.

e doesnot onfineimselfo

addingome etailso anongoingebate,ut ntendso demonstratethatmostf he

current

nterpretativeisagreements

bout is

Ockham's]heory

f

oncepts

anbe set-

tled

. ]

on the asis fwhat e

actually

rote.

p.

2)

No

doubt,

hiss

a

bold

laim.

But anaccio

uccessfully

howshat

number

f

disagreements

an ndeed e settled

nd

that he

heory

ckhamefendss

not

nly

oherentndwell

rgued

or,

ut lso ston-

ishingly

imilaro

ontemporary

heories,

specially

o hosehat

ppeal

o

emantic

tomism

and

representationalism.

In

his

econstruction

nd

nterpretation

fOckham's

heory,

anaccioombinescareful

examinationf

key

exts ith critical

ssessment

f

recent

econdary

iterature.his s

certainly

he

ight

ethodo choose.

iven

he

ast mountfrecent

ublications,

t s

not

necessary

o start romcratch hen

pproaching

ckham's

heory.

or hould ne

simply

ummarizehemain

heses

n a

descriptiveay.

Whats neededs a discussionf

the roblemsnd llegednconsistenciesointedutbyrecentommentatorsa discus-

sion

hat

s

based

pon

detailed

nalysis

f

he elevant

rimary

ources.t s

precisely

to this eed hat anaccio

esponds.

e tackleshe rucial

roblems

hatM. McCord

Adams,

. V.

Spade,

.

Normore,

.

Michon,

.

Biard,

.

Karger

nd thers

mphasized

©

Koninklijke

rill

V,Leiden,

005

Vivarium

3,2

Also

vailablenline

www.brill.nl



REVIEWS 377

veryellingommentn thehumanropensityo gnore hat oes n under ne's ose.

One

might

ave

xpected

hat

ighly

itualised

ociety

ohave rawnhe onclusionhat

acts r utterancesould

enerate

heir

wn

ignificates

nd have

major

ffectn the

their

ecipients

omewhatore

xpeditiously.

As Rosier-Catach

ays

n her

ntroduction,

he s not

rimarily

oncernedith acra-

mental

heology.

er

book,

owever,

ives

well-documented,

erceptive

ccountfhow

theologiansevelopednalytical

ools

rom

he

anguage

ciences,

nd

s,

n

effect,

e

Libera's

archeology

f he

eligiousign . y

henaturef

ts

ubject

t s an

extremely

complex

ookwhich emandsareful

eading,

t east

rudimentaryrasp

f

acramen-

taldoctrine

nd,

would

hink,

amiliarity

ith he

philosophical

ontext.ven

hough

those ho

xpect

medieval

asuistry

o

reach irm

onclusions

bout

he acraments

ill

certainly

e

disappointed,

osier-Catach

onclusively

howshat

rgument

nddiscussion

amongheologiansttainedoherencefprinciplendmethod hilellowingor he is-

agreements

ver

major oints

hichurvivedhe hrewd

nalysesy

Alberthe

Great,

Thomas

quinas

ndBonaventure.

I

would

ope

hat istorians

f

heology

ndmedievalists

n

general

ould enefitrom

this ook s much s

I

have.Once

gain

Rosier-Catachasmade

major

ontribution

to our

knowledge

f he

anguagecholarship

f heMiddle

ges.

Darwin

ollege, ambridge

L.G.

Kelly

Claude

anaccio,

ckhamn

ConceptsAshgate

tudies

n

Medieval

hilosophy).shgate,

Aldershot004, i + 197p. ISBN0 754632288

Ockham's

heory

f

oncepts

asbeen

ubject

oheated ebatesor he ast

wentyears.

A

numberf

distinguished

ommentators

arefullynalyzed

he

ignificance

ndfunction

of his

heory

n

philosophy

f

anguage,ntology

nd

pistemology.

et,

espite

he us-

tainedfforto hed

ight

nthisnfluential

octrine,

any

uestions

emainednanswered.

Is Ockham reductionistn his ccountf he asic

tock

f

oncepts?

s

he committed

to the

osition

hat

oncepts

re omehowsimilitudesf

hings

n

theworld? oes he

provide

n

explanation

or he

rigin

f

ogicaloncepts?

hese

nd

many

more

roblems

gave

ise o

controversial

nterpretations.

n

his

highly

nnovativend

stimulating

ook,

Claude anaccio

resents

solution

o

all of

hem,

hus

rovidingcomprehensive

nter-

pretation

nd defensef

Ockham's

heory

f

concepts.

e doesnot onfineimselfo

addingome etailso anongoingebate,ut ntendso demonstratethatmostf he

current

nterpretativeisagreements

bout is

Ockham's]heory

f

oncepts

anbe set-

tled

. ]

on the asis fwhat e

actually

rote.

p.

2)

No

doubt,

hiss

a

bold

laim.

But anaccio

uccessfully

howshat

number

f

disagreements

an ndeed e settled

nd

that he

heory

ckhamefendss

not

nly

oherentndwell

rgued

or,

ut lso ston-

ishingly

imilaro

ontemporary

heories,

specially

o hosehat

ppeal

o

emantic

tomism

and

representationalism.

In

his

econstruction

nd

nterpretation

fOckham's

heory,

anaccioombinescareful

examinationf

key

exts ith critical

ssessment

f

recent

econdary

iterature.his s

certainly

he

ight

ethodo choose.

iven

he

ast mountfrecent

ublications,

t s

not

necessary

o start romcratch hen

pproaching

ckham's

heory.

or hould ne

simply

ummarizehemain

heses

n a

descriptiveay.

Whats neededs a discussionf

the roblemsnd llegednconsistenciesointedutbyrecentommentatorsa discus-

sion

hat

s

based

pon

detailed

nalysis

f

he elevant

rimary

ources.t s

precisely

to this eed hat anaccio

esponds.

e tackleshe rucial

roblems

hatM. McCord

Adams,

. V.

Spade,

.

Normore,

.

Michon,

.

Biard,

.

Karger

nd thers

mphasized

©

Koninklijke

rill

V,Leiden,

005

Vivarium

3,2

Also

vailablenline

www.brill.nl



378

REVIEWS

and tries o show itherhat ckham asthe heoreticalesourcesoresolvehem,r

that

hey isappear

fone

combines

ll the

pieces

fhis

heory.

etmefocus n three

problems

hat ave een t the

enterf

cholarly

ebates.

Thefirst

roblem

oncernshe

tatusf onnotativeerms.t swell nownhat ckham

takes

oncepts

o be

parts

f mental

anguage

hat ncludes

oth

bsolutendconno-

tativeerms.ut

how s

the elation

etweenhese wo

ypes

f ermso be understood?

P. V.

Spade

rgued

hat,

deally,

llthe

imple

onnotativeermsrereducibleo bsolute

ones. et his

ould ave atal

onsequences.

or

f

he dealmental

anguage

s

purged

of

imple

onnotative

erms,

here

re no

simple

elational

oncepts.

hat

s,

t has no

concepts

uch s father'r taller'. uthow anthere e

a

language

ithouthese on-

cepts,iven

hat

hey

annote constructed

xclusively

rom on-relationalnes?t seems

that ckham's

eductionist

pproach

s doomedo failure:t

gnores

he

imple

act hat

relationalonceptsrenon-reduciblendnon-eliminable.

Panaccio

onvincingly

howshat his

roblemriginates

rom false

nderstanding

f

mental

anguage.

ckham oesnot

ake his

anguage

o be some ort f deal onstruct.

Nordoeshe choose

reductionist

pproach

hen

xplaining

he arious

ypes

fmental

terms.

n

his

view,

onnotative

ermsre not

dispensable

nd cannot

e

completely

eliminated

n

nominalefinitions.or

nstance,

he

definitionf father' ould e some-

thing

ike male nimal

aving

child',

child'

eing

notheronnotativeerm.

n addi-

tion,

anaccio

oints

ut

that

n

many

ases he onnotativeerms

not

ynonymous

with ts

nominal efinition.he definition

imply

ndicatesthe

ntologicalmport

(p.

90)

of

term,.e.,

tmakes

learwhat

bjects

n

theworldre

ignifiedy

hat erm.

But hese

bjects

an be

signified

n

many

ifferent

ays.

hat

s

why

he onnotative

term annotimplyereplacedythenominalefinition.nd nfact,uite ftent s

not

eplaced

y

he

peaker

tohave

concept

s not he ame

s to

pell

ut tsnominal

definition.

This

ejection

f

Spade's

nterpretation

s farmore han

correctionf small etail.

It elucidateshe

asic

dea hated

Ockhamo ntroducehe

heory

f

mental

anguage.

His aimwasnot o construct

pure anguage

n whichll connotativeermsre

lim-

inated,

ut

o

explain

hat

ind fmentalerms

speaker

cquires

hen e or she s

n

naturalontact ith

bjects

n

theworld.

ince hese

bjects

re

lways

rdered

n a cer-

tain

way,

he et

of

mentad

erms

nevitably

ncludesonnotativeerms

hat

ignify

he

various

rderings.

t s thereforen

ontological

hesishat

urks

n

the

ackground:

rder-

ings

n

theworld

equire

ermshat

o not

imply

ignify

solated

hings,

ut he

way

they

rerelatedo each ther.

Anotherontroversialoints Ockham'shesishatonceptsre similitudesf hings

in

theworld. his

hesis akesense

n

the

ight

fhis

arly

cto-theory,

or

icta

i.e.,

special

ntitiesith

objective

eing )

an ndeed e taken o be intellectual

ictures

f

external

hings.

ut

how an the hesise understood

ithinhe ramework

f he ater

act-theory?

ow an

mentalctbe

a

similitudef

n

external

hing?

ome ommentators

thought

hat

ckhamailedo

provide

satisfying

nswer

o

this

rucial

uestion.

thers

argued

hat e

gave p

the dea f imilitude

nfavorf causal

xplanation

f

oncepts.

Panaccio

trictlyejects

oth

nterpretations.

eferring

o crucial

assages

n Ockham's

later

orks,

e showshat

he deaof imilitude

lays prominent

ole

n

the

ct-

heory.

Andhe contends

hat his deacan be

given

clear ense

f

one

compares

ntellectual

acts o

physical

cts uch s

catching

ball.When

grasp

ball,

my

ands ave cer-

tain

osition

hat itshis all

nd llother alls

hat ave he ame

hape.

ikewise,

hen

I intellectuallyraspnobject, yntellectakes certainposturehat its his bject

and ll other

bjects

hat re

relevandy

ike t.The

mportant

oint

s thatt

fits

many

objects

nd

thereby

ecomes

general

oncept:

What ransformshe

grasping

ct nto



REVIEWS 379

a generalepresentationsthattfitshe hape f he raspedbject,hus esemblingt

to some xtent

(p.

124).

No

doubt,

hiss an

elegant

xplanation

hat as

t

east

wo

dvantages.

irst,

ttakes

Ockham's

alk

bout imilitude

eriously

ithout

urning

t nto naive

icture-theory.

Second,

t makes lear

why

imilitudes

required

n

additiono

causality.

or

causality

relates

n act

to

a

single bject

nly,

hereasimilitudeelatest to

many bjects

nd

thereforenableshe ct o be

a

generaloncept.espite

ts

legance,

anaccio's

xpla-

nationeaves crucial

uestionpen.

n

the aseofthe

ball,

t s understandable

hy

the

osition

f hehands anfit he all:

hematerial

hape

fone

hing

hands)

anfit

thematerial

hape

f nother

hing

ball).

n

the

aseofthe

bject

hat

s

intellectually

grasped,

he imilitudes not o

easily

nderstandable.owcan the mmaterial

posture

of he ntellect

it

he

material

hape

f n

object?

anaccio

requently

ses he

xpressionposture ,nfortunatelyithoutivingt precise eaningnthemmaterialealm. hat

exactly

oes

t mean

hat

my

ntellectakes certain

osture

hent

grasps,

ay,

tree?

Does t

acquireomething

ike n immaterial

hape

f he

ree,

istinguishable

romhe

immaterial

hape

f ball r a house? nd s there one-to-oneelationetweenmma-

terialndmaterial

hapes?

t seems o

me

that he

omparison

ith manual

oncept

(p.

124)

s nformative

nly

f

hese

uestions

re

fully

nswered

questions

hat

nevitably

arise

within

n

ontological

rameworkhat

istinguishes

etweenmmaterialndmaterial

entities.

A

thirdssue hat asbeen

agerly

ebated

y

ecentommentatorsoncernshe

rigin

of

ogical oncepts.

ckham

learly

ncludeshese

oncepts

n

mental

anguage

hen e

claims

hat

hereremental

yncategorematic

erms.

ut n

what asis

re

hey

ormed?

Categorematicermsrenormallyormednthe asis f n mmediateerceptualelation

with

hings

n

the

world;

y eeing

f

tree

nables e o come

p

with he ermtree'.

But heres

no

thing

uch s

an f

thatwould

rigger

he ormationfthe ermif'.

So

how an come

p

with his

yncategorematic

erm?anaccios well ware fthis

problem.

his erm annot

imply

e formedn thebasis f

spoken

r

written

erm.

Otherwise

significantart

fmentad

anguage

ould ecome erivativef onventional

language.

hat s

why

anaccio hinkshat ckhamubscribeso nnatismi

.

these

logical

cts

orrespond

o nnate

apacitiesf

hemind

(p.

154)

his s

a

convincing

xplana-

torytrategy,

ven

f

he extsre

not

ery xplicit,

s

Panacciooncedes.t

provides

n

elegant

nswero the

uestions

f

a)

why

ll

human

eings

re ble o

acquire

he ame

stockf

ogicaloncepts,egardless

f he

bjectshey

re

n

touch

ith,

nd

b)

why

he

formationf hese

oncepts

oesnot

depend

n the

mastering

f

specific

onventional

language.n addition,his xplanatorytrategyicelyllustrateshe trikingimilarity

betweenckham'sndFodor's

pproach

o mental

anguage.

etone

hould ot ver-

look

n

importantonsequence

his

xplanation

as: t makes ckham

o some xtent

rationalist,.e.,

philosopher

ho oesnot

xclusively

ppeal

o

conceptualmpiricism ,1

butwho laimshat

significant

art

f he

onceptualpparatus

s not

cquiredhrough

sensory

xperience.

Panaccio'sareful

nterpretation

hows hatmost

perhaps

ot

ll)

exegeticaluzzles

canbe resolved.nd

he

omparison

e draws

etweenckham's

nd

Fodor's

to

ome

extentlso

Putnam's)

heory

f

oncepts

akeslear

hat heres nofatalncommensu-

rability

p.

181)

etween edievalndmodern

octrines.t s

n

fact he

ommensurability

that llows

im

o

present

ckham

s a

philosopher

ho

laborates

theory

f

oncepts

1

This s how

M. McGord

dams,

Williamckham

Notre ame:Notre ame

University

Press

987, 95,

haracterizesckham's

roject.



380

REVIEWS

that sappealingotuttomedievalists,ut lso oanalytichilosophershodefend

representationalist,

xternalist,

ndnominalist

onception

f

oncepts.

hat

merges

rom

hisbook

s a Guilelmus

esurrectusho an

easily ngage

n discussionsith

ontemporary

thinkers.

Humboldt-Universität

u

Berlin

Dominik

erler

Richard

illingham,

De

onsequentiis

mit oledo-Kommentar.

ritisch

erausgegeben,ingeleitet

und

ommentierton

tephanie

eber.

.R.

Grüner,

msterdam/

hiladelphia

003.

(Bochumer

tudienur

Philosophie,

and

8).

xxviii 335

S.,

SBN90

6032

67

X

In derGeschichteer

mittelalterlichen

ogik

st er

ngländer

ichard

illinghamfloruit

um

1350)

weifelsohneekannt

egen

eines

raktates

peculum

uerorum

ive erminusst

in

uem.

iese

Arbeitst ine

mpiristisch

rientierte

ogik,

.h.

n

diesem

all,

ine

ogik

die besonders

ndividuelle

egenstände,

igenschaftsgraden

d.h.

die

Untersuchung

on

Sätzemit

mehr der

weniger',

um

Beispiel

Sortesst

grösser

ls

Plato')

nd

physische

Gegebenheiten

'Anfang',

Ende'

sw.)

erücksichtet.

iese

Logik

st,

laube

ch,

uf iese

Weise

ine ivalisierende

heorieu

der

uppositionslehre

es ummulisten

etrus

ispanus.

Richard

illingham

at

bermehr

eschrieben,

nter

nderenin

Traktate conse-

quentiis.

r.

Stephanie

eber at

n demhier u

besprechenden

uch uf

vorzügliche

Weise ieses

raktat

ritisch

erausgegeben

nd rklärt.

Sie hat

nicht ur as

Traktat

illinghams

n dreiVersionen

nd inen ommentaru

Billinghamsextder ichn Toledo efindet,atedral,ab. 4-27, f. 5r-90v,neiner

kritischen

dition

orgelegt

ndhistorisch

ituiert,

edoch

iesen

uchkritischommen-

tiert.

ie

gibt

weiter

inige

emerkungen

ber

illinghams

eben ndWerke.

Zum

Ersten ie

Editionelbst.

r. Weber

räsentiert

ie

Handschriften,

icht ur

diejenigen

ie zur

Ausgabe

illingham's

rbeiterwendet

erden,

edoch

uchdie

zur

Editiones

Toledo-Kommentars

um

Billinghams

raktat.iese etzte

indet

an ndrei

Versionen

Salamanca,

ibi. niversitaria

882,

f.

20r-123v;

xford,

odleian

ib.,

at.

misc.

E

100,

ff.

6r-62r; oma,

ibl.Casanatense

445,

f. 08

Ar-119v).

s

gibt

inevierte

Version

Barcelona,

CA,

Ripoll

166,

ff.

r-5r),

edoch,

wie Dr.

Weber

agt,

stder

Handschriftu stark

eschädigt,

o dass ine dition

ichtinnvolläre.

Die

Versionennterscheiden

ich

u

sehr

m inen inheitlichen

ext

bzufertigen:

er

apparatus

riticus

ürde nübersichtbar

ein.

n

denEditonen

es

Speculum

uerorumdie

vonA.Maierùn1970 nd, ufneueWeise,onL.M. deRijkn1975hergestelltind,

lässt

ich uch

iese

chwierigkeit

ehen. ast

edes

Manuskript

as inen ext es

péculums

enthält,

ibt

ine

igene

ast

elbständige

ersion.

Im

nterpretationsteil

espricht

r.Weber

um rstenen

olgerungsbegriff

mTraktat

Billinghams.

eiter ommentiert

erVerfasser

ie materielle

olgerung

§

1.2),

nddie

Definitioner

ültigen

nd

ngültigen

olgerung

mToledo-Kommentar

§

1.3).

n

diesem

Interpretationsteil

espricht

ie weiter

ie

speziellen

nd

generellen

egeln,

ie sich

n

Billinghams

raktatorfinden.

ine

Bibliographie

nd ndexe

Eigennamen

nd ateini-

sche

nicht eutsche

Begriffe)

chliessen

as Buch b.

Dr. Weber ehandelt

in

wichtiges

hema: ie

Folgerungslehre.

ie ie

auseinander-

setzt,

stdiese ehre

in neues

lement

n dermittelalterlichen

ogik.

ie

Logik

es

Aristotelesar yllogistisch,nd rientiertufTermini;ieFolgerungslehreagegenuf

Sätze,

asmehr

rinzipiell

st. ie mittelalterlicheehrestnichtuf ieder toa

basiert,

aber

besonders

m

14.

Jahrhundert,

eu entwickelt.

m

12.

Jahrhundert

ab

es

auch

Neueuntwicklungen,

ber

ieMeisteres

14.

Jahrhundert

aben iese

icht

ekannt,

ie

sie

mit

Recht

agt.

©

Koninklijke

rill

V,

Leiden,

005

Vivarium

3,2

Also

vailable

nline www.brill.nl



380

REVIEWS

that sappealingotuttomedievalists,ut lso oanalytichilosophershodefend

representationalist,

xternalist,

ndnominalist

onception

f

oncepts.

hat

merges

rom

hisbook

s a Guilelmus

esurrectusho an

easily ngage

n discussionsith

ontemporary

thinkers.

Humboldt-Universität

u

Berlin

Dominik

erler

Richard

illingham,

De

onsequentiis

mit oledo-Kommentar.

ritisch

erausgegeben,ingeleitet

und

ommentierton

tephanie

eber.

.R.

Grüner,

msterdam/

hiladelphia

003.

(Bochumer

tudienur

Philosophie,

and

8).

xxviii 335

S.,

SBN90

6032

67

X

In derGeschichteer

mittelalterlichen

ogik

st er

ngländer

ichard

illinghamfloruit

um

1350)

weifelsohneekannt

egen

eines

raktates

peculum

uerorum

ive erminusst

in

uem.

iese

Arbeitst ine

mpiristisch

rientierte

ogik,

.h.

n

diesem

all,

ine

ogik

die besonders

ndividuelle

egenstände,

igenschaftsgraden

d.h.

die

Untersuchung

on

Sätzemit

mehr der

weniger ,

um

Beispiel

Sortesst

grösser

ls

Plato )

nd

physische

Gegebenheiten

Anfang ,

Ende

sw.)

erücksichtet.

iese

Logik

st,

laube

ch,

uf iese

Weise

ine ivalisierende

heorieu

der

uppositionslehre

es ummulisten

etrus

ispanus.

Richard

illingham

at

bermehr

eschrieben,

nter

nderenin

Traktate conse-

quentiis.

r.

Stephanie

eber at

n demhier u

besprechenden

uch uf

vorzügliche

Weise ieses

raktat

ritisch

erausgegeben

nd rklärt.

Sie hat

nicht ur as

Traktat

illinghams

n dreiVersionen

nd inen ommentaru

Billinghamsextder ichn Toledo efindet,atedral,ab. 4-27, f. 5r-90v,neiner

kritischen

dition

orgelegt

ndhistorisch

ituiert,

edoch

iesen

uchkritischommen-

tiert.

ie

gibt

weiter

inige

emerkungen

ber

illinghams

eben ndWerke.

Zum

Ersten ie

Editionelbst.

r. Weber

räsentiert

ie

Handschriften,

icht ur

diejenigen

ie zur

Ausgabe

illingham s

rbeiterwendet

erden,

edoch

uchdie

zur

Editiones

Toledo-Kommentars

um

Billinghams

raktat.iese etzte

indet

an ndrei

Versionen

Salamanca,

ibi. niversitaria

882,

f.

20r-123v;

xford,

odleian

ib.,

at.

misc.

E

100,

ff.

6r-62r; oma,

ibl.Casanatense

445,

f. 08

Ar-119v).

s

gibt

inevierte

Version

Barcelona,

CA,

Ripoll

166,

ff.

r-5r),

edoch,

wie Dr.

Weber

agt,

stder

Handschriftu stark

eschädigt,

o dass ine dition

ichtinnvolläre.

Die

Versionennterscheiden

ich

u

sehr

m inen inheitlichen

ext

bzufertigen:

er

apparatus

riticus

ürde nübersichtbar

ein.

n

denEditonen

es

Speculum

uerorumdie

vonA.Maierùn1970 nd, ufneueWeise,onL.M. deRijkn1975hergestelltind,

lässt

ich uch

iese

chwierigkeit

ehen. ast

edes

Manuskript

as inen ext es

péculums

enthält,

ibt

ine

igene

ast

elbständige

ersion.

Im

nterpretationsteil

espricht

r.Weber

um rstenen

olgerungsbegriff

mTraktat

Billinghams.

eiter ommentiert

erVerfasser

ie materielle

olgerung

§

1.2),

nddie

Definitioner

ültigen

nd

ngültigen

olgerung

mToledo-Kommentar

§

1.3).

n

diesem

Interpretationsteil

espricht

ie weiter

ie

speziellen

nd

generellen

egeln,

ie sich

n

Billinghams

raktatorfinden.

ine

Bibliographie

nd ndexe

Eigennamen

nd ateini-

sche

nicht eutsche

Begriffe)

chliessen

as Buch b.

Dr. Weber ehandelt

in

wichtiges

hema: ie

Folgerungslehre.

ie ie

auseinander-

setzt,

stdiese ehre

in neues

lement

n dermittelalterlichen

ogik.

ie

Logik

es

Aristotelesar yllogistisch,nd rientiertufTermini;ieFolgerungslehreagegenuf

Sätze,

asmehr

rinzipiell

st. ie mittelalterlicheehrestnichtuf ieder toabasiert,

aber

besonders

m

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REVIEWS 381

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382

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Books

Received

Albertus

agnus, pera

mnia.omus

Pars A:

Superorphyrium

e V

universalibus,

d.

M. Santos

Noya.

Aschendorff,

ünster. Westfalen

004

xxv

201

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ISBN

3

402 04752

Cahierse 'InstitutuMoyen-Âgerect atin75 2004),20pp. SSN 0591-0358.ontents:

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scribedo

RogerfHereford

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Friedman,

rinitarian

heology

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. Rosier-CatachSt.

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etruse

AlverniaBoethiuseDacia

Syllogizantemonendum

st

erminus;

Addendat

orrigenda

oCIMAGL

8,

71, 72,

74

Richard

ross,

uns cotusnGod.

shgate,

ldershot

Burlington

005302

pp.

SBN

0 7546

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[Hbk]

403

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Documentistudiulla

radizione

ilosofica

edievaleXV

(2004)

03

pp.

contents:.

Cerami,

The ristotelian

nalysisf

Generation:

hysics

and

Metaphysics

Luna,

lessandro

di

Afrodisia

Sirianoul ibro della etafisica:ecnicastrutturael ommento

A.

Longo,

Siriano i

precedentire-

ristoteliciel

rincipio

ella

ontraddizione

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Juárez,EstudiontroductoriolaQuaestioe deis e anAugustin.latonismomedievomodernidad

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Sebti,

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pître

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calluq

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orps):

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istory

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Development

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Giovanni,

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the

Doctrine

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s

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.

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resuppositionsf

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verroistndThomistic

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f

ntellectionG.

Galluzzo,

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tructure

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G.

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bsolutaonsideratioaturae: ommaso

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l'essenza

M.

Bertagna,

a divisio

extus

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Egidio

omano

gli

Analitici

Posteriori.arteII M. Pickavé, etaphysicss a Firstcience:he ase f eteruriol

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Conti,

a

conoscenza

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Alexandria,

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ature

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ssence;

ndiceei

manoscritti;

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Franciscana.olletinoella ocietà

nternazionale

i tudi

rancescini,

I

(2004)

i 381

pp.

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1129-230X

ontents: .

Rusconi,

rancesco'Assisila

politica:

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potere

elle

stituzioni

e l'annuncioella

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Simoni,

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torico-letterariaraXII e XIII

secoloD.

Ruiz,

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Ashgate,

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005

SBN 0 86078

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Volume wo: e intentionibus

by

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Brill,

eiden Boston

005

xi

894

pp.

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384

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Christopherellard,roiret avoir.es rincipese a connaissanceelonicolas'Autrécourt.

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J.F.

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IDEM,

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005

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Pironet.

repols,

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004

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193

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VolumeI: Medieval

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1638

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Logiknd heologie.asOrganonm rabischenndm ateinischenittelalterherausgegebenon

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005

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SBN 90 04

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ell'Altoedioevo.

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004

105

pp.

SSN

1128-7217

AION.

Annali ell'Università

i

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L'Orientale'.

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di studi

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el Mediterraneo

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contents:

ditions

f:

Quae

unt

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nd

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Claude

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ckham

n

Concepts.shgate,

ldershot

Burlington,

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2004

xi 197

pp.

SBN 0 7546

3228

Les

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6 (RencontresédiévalesEuropéennes,) contents:M. Cazeaux,ntroduction;

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Brague,

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Moyen

ge

n

ialogue

ntre'islamt e

christianisme?;

.

Piatti,

Bagdad

Beauvais

Bruges;

.

Jolivet,

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XIIe

ièclet

es

prémices

'une

ouvelle

hilosophie

e

'esprit

M.

Lejbowicz,

éveloppement

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et cculturationissimuléeR.Arnaldez,'amourhezes oètesrabest esmystiquesusul-

mansKh. Abou

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004

316

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ISBN

3 515

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Sacrisrudiri.

Journal

n henheritance

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13

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contents:

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Leemans,

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Courtay,

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RomualdoPier amiani

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Karfiková,

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Geoffroy,'origine

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rin,

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métaphysique

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SBN

2-7116-1729-7

Bibliothèque

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philosophes)

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Agustín

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vivarium - vol xliii, no 2, 2005

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