vivarium - vol xlvii, no. 1, 2009

8/9/2019 Vivarium - Vol Xlvii, No. 1, 2009

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VIVARIUM

An nternational

ournal

or

he

Philosophy

nd Intellectual

Life

f

he

Middle

Ages nd Renaissance

Aims

Scope

Vivariums an international

ournal

edicated o the

history

f

philosophy

nd

the

history

f

deas

from

he

arly

Middle

Ages

o

the

arly-modern

eriod.

t

takes

particular

nterest

n

the

profane

ide f

philosohy

nd ts

elationship

ith

other reas f

thought

nd

earning

rom

hese

eriods.

t is

widely

ecognized

as

an

unrivalled

esource

or he

history

f

ogic,

emantics

nd

metaphysics.

t

publishes hilosophical

nalyses

s well s

historicaltudies f

deas,

exts

nd

the nstitutionalontext fmedievalndearly-modernhoughtnd earning.t

also welcomes ditions f texts.t

publishesnnually

special

ssuedevoted o

a

particular

heme r

philosopher.

Editor

L.W. Nauta

Groningen)

EditorialBoard

L.M. de

Rijk

Leiden),

AG.

Braakhuis

Nijmegen),

.H.

Kneepkens

Groningen),

W.J.

ourtenay

Madison),

.P. Bos

(Leiden)

nd

D.

Perler

Berlin).

Advisory ommittee

T.

Gregory

Rome),

.

Zimmermann

Cologne),

.E.

Murdoch

Cambridge,

A).

InstructionsorAuthors

Contributionso the

ournal

hould e sent s an e-mail

ttachmentnd

paper

version o

Lodi

Nauta,

Faculty

f

Philosophy,niversity

f

Groningen,

ude

Boteringestraat

2,

9712

GL

Groningen,

ie

Netherlands

[email protected]).

style

heet s availablet

www.brill.nl/vivrcanbe

obtained

rom he

ditor.

Contributionsust e written

n

English

UK

or

US),

Frenchr

German;

hey

must e

grammatically

nd

tylistically

orrect.

anuscripts

ust e

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ype-

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footnotes,

ot ndnotes.itle ndname f

he uthorhould

ppear

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separate

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age

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order o facilitate

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eer-review.

ach article houldbe

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y

10-line

bstract,

hich hould tate he

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onclusions

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aper

nd

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or

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oth bstractnd

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ontributionseceive ne setof

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eserveshe

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o

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uthors or orrections

adeto the

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ther han

orrections

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rrorshat

ccurred

n

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ypesetting

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sion

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Authorseceive

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opies

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s

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ontribution

or

rivate

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RILL,

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ublishing,

IDC Publishers,rtiusijhoffublishersndVSP.

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ights

eserved.

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his

ublicationay

e

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therwise,

ithout

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ritten

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ublisher.

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i}

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BRILL

VIVA

RIUM

Vivarium

7

2009)

-23

www.brill.nl/viv

Robert Grosseteste's Conclusiones

and

the

Commentary

on the Posterior

Analytics1

David

Bloch

UniversityfCopenhagen

Abstract

This rticlexamineshe

nature

f

Robert rosseteste

commentary

n

Aristotle

Posterior

nalytics

ith

articular

eferenceo his

conclusionsconclusiones

.

It is

argued

using

ook

1,

chapter

,

of he

ommentary

s a

case

tudy)

hat he

imple

demonstrative

ppearance

f he

ommentary,

hichs

very

much he esultf he 4

conclusions,

s

n

part

n

llusion.

hus,

he

xposition

n

the

ommentary

s not im-

ply ased n the trictrinciplesf he osteriornalyticsnd n the roof-procedures

of

Euclidean

eometry;

atherhe

ommentary

s a

complicated

ixturefdifferent

elements

f

welfth-century

exts

nd he

cholarship

f

Grosseteste

day.

Keywords

Robert

rosseteste,ristode,

osterior

nalytics,

edieval

ogic,

emonstrativecience

I.

Introduction

Robert rossetestecommentaryn thePosteriornalyticss a somewhatdio-

syncratic

iece

of work.2t

is,

of

course,

literal

ommentary,

ut there s a

long

way

to the

more

regular

ype

f the

thirteenth

entury.

n

a

relatively

recent

rticle,

ten Ebbesen even

used the

heading

Literal

Commentary

without

rinciples

o

describe his

particular ommentary,

eaning

hat

Grossetesteoes nothave

standard

rocedure

n

the ndividual

hapters,

ut

1}

Textsre

ited romoth

rinted

ditions

nd

medieval

anuscripts

n

the

resent

rticle.

However,haveometimesadehangesn rthographynd/orunctuation.ll ranslations

are

my

wn. owe

hankso ten bbesen

nd he ditorial

oard

f

Vivariumor

omments

and riticism.

2)

Robertus

rosseteste,

ommentarius

n Posteriorum

nalyticorum

ibros

ed. Pietro ossi

(Firenze981).

Koninklijke

rill

V,

eiden,

009

DOI:

0.1

63/156853408X383015


8/156

2

D. BlochVivarium

7

2009)

-23

ratherllowshimselfocomment,xplain, efine,onclude tc. ntheorder

he seesfit.3

n

this

rticle shall xamine

he

ommentary

nd

try

o

establish

its

naturemore

recisely.

n

particular,

shall

focus ttentionn

the onclusio-

nes s relevanto this

urpose.

At first

eading

he

ommentary

eems o be

composed

n strict

nd sound

methodologicalrinciples.

rosseteste

roceeds

hapter

y

hapter

although

his

divisions

nto

hapters

o not

lways

orrespond

ith he nes

usednowa-

days.

n

each

chapter

e

interprets

ristotle's

ext,

f

course,

ut it is

done

with

heuse ofhisown

conceptual

ools: definitions

herefore

must

e

false.43

he

undesirable

4)

simply

annot e

inferred.

William nd Alberts omments n the Socrates-Minus

rgument

how

that

hey

ame to the ameconclusion s van

nwagen

oes

n

theDescartes-

Minus

Argument,

ut

by

a

differentoute.

They

reason:A

and

C

must

havebeendifferent

bjects

efore

,

ince

A is the

numerically

ne and whole

and

complete

ocrates'

nly

fter

. On their

nalysis,

before

i.e.

Socrates-

Minus,

ould not

really

e

any

ort f

numerically

ne,

whole nd

complete

physical bject

t all

before

because

t

s

only

fier

that

A

in

fact ecomes

whole ndcomplete hysical bject, n itself umericallyne per eunum).AA

This is clear from heir

ejections

f Parts

a],

[],

and

[y],

which

mply

that

A

mustbe some ort f

numerically

ne whole nd

complete

before

.

Hence,

like van

Inwagen,

hey

would

also claim that

premise

2)

of the

Descartes-Minus

rgument

s

false,

nd the entailment

f the undesirable

(4)

of the Descartes-Minus

rgument,

rom

1), (2),

and

(3)

cannottake

place.

Hence,

their

rguments

nd conclusions

re historical orerunnersf

Peter an

nwagens.

42)

an

nwagen,

The octrine

f

Arbitrary

ndetached

arts',

25-126.

43)

bid.,

26.

44)

f. lso

Heytesbury,

ophismata

f.

47va-vb.


75/156

M.

.

Fitzgerald

Vivarium

7

2009)

4-73 69

4. A pragmatic esolution o theModem Descartes-Minus rgument:

Embracing

he

dentity

f

ndiscernibles,

nd a Weak

Antrhopic rinciple'

Albert

nd

Williams

nalysis

ftheir ocrates-Minus

rgument

s

philosophi-

cally

nteresting

oday

because

t

provides

s with a

pragmatic

esolution

to the

modernDescartes-Minus

rgument.

t is Alberts nsistence

n

the

Socrates-Minus

rgument

hat ocratesmustbe a man whole

nd

complete

and

numerically

ne

n

himself,

n

particular,

hat

uggests pragmatic

eso-

lution o the

Descartes-Minus

rgument.

he

pragmatic

esolution e has

n

mind s thatwe mustbe able to discernocrates o be whole nd complete

and

numerically

ne

in

himself,

hether

eforeduring,

r

after

t.

Indeed,

Leibniz'saws s

really

compound

f

an

epistemological

nd

a

metaphysical

claimwith

espect

o

physical bjects.

As I

see

t,

he

ndiscernibilityf

denti-

cals s

the

metaphysical

laim. t maintains:

Necessarily,

f

wo

physical

bjects

are

numerically

dentical,

hen

they

have all the same

properties

nd are

indiscerniblerom ne

other,

.e. we cannot

iscern

hem

o be differentrom

one another. he

dentityf

ndis er b le

,

on the

ther

and,

s the

pistemo-

logical

laim. t

maintains:

Necessarily,

f

two

objects

re

ndiscerniblerom

one other nd have all the sameproperties,henthey renumericallyne

physical

bject

becausewe cannotdiscern hemto

be differentrom ne

another. he

metaphysical

laim is

logically

necessary,

ut the

necessity

involved

n

the

pistemological

laim s at best

nlynaturally

ecessary,

iven

the

way

we

perceive

hysical bjects.

ndeed,

Hans

Reichenbach,

hetwenti-

eth-century

hysicist-philosopher,

as

pointed

ut theres a

crucial

pistemo-

logical

ifficulty

nherent

n

the our-dimensionalist

ccount f

physical

bjects.

In

uch

space

i.e.

our-dimensional

ne]

ven he uman

ody

ould efour-dimen-

sional,nd ts erceptualpparatusouldeveryifferent.nsteadf he wo-dimensional

retina

f he

ye,

here

ould

e

three-dimensionaletina.

hereashe isual

xperience

of he hird

imension,

he

depth,

s now

chieved

rimarilyy

he

ombinedffect

of he wo

yes

nd s therefore

ualitatively

ifferentromhe

xperience

f he ther

two

imensions,

he hree-dimensional

xperience

n

four-dimensional

pace

ould e s

immediatestwo-dimensional

xperiences

n

ur

hree-dimensional

pace.

he

ombined

effectf

he wo hree-dimensional

ictures

n he etina

ould

upply

swithhe isual

experience

f he our-dimensional

pace.

f

we

ry

o

magine

uch

xperience

n

ermsf

our

resent

ensations,

e

hall indhatherere

ertainimitations.he ew

erceptual

experience

ewishodescribe

ould ave ew ense

ualities

hat

onot xist

nderhe

conditionsith hich e re amiliar.

We an

hereforendicate

nlyndirectly

i.e.

ia

bstractathematical

odels]

hat

kind f

erceptual

xperiences

ouldesult

n

uch

world.45

45)

Hans

Reichenbach,

he

hilosophyf pace

nd

Timetransi. aria

eichenbach

nd

John


76/156

70

M

J.

Fitzgerald

Vivarium

7

2009)

4-73

Hence,even f a givenfour-dimensionalemporalwhole s madeup of its

four-dimensional

emporal arts,

here

s no natural

ossibility,

ith ur

pres-

ent

perceptual

pparatus,

hatwe

can see

rdiscern

ither hefour-dimensional

parts,

r

thefour-dimensional

hole

o be

in tself whole

nd

complete

nd

numerically

ne

space-time

orm.

We

simply

o

not discern

ne

temporal

slice

of t

from nother

r

the

whole nd

complete

emporal

worm.

o be

discernible

or

s

simply

means hat

f

our

perceptual

pparatus

s function-

ing

normally

nd a

physical

bject

s

directly

resent

o

us,

thenwe

perceive

t

to be as

it s so

geometrically

tructured.

or

thing

o be

numerically

ne and

whole ndcomplete hysicalbject or s s fort to bea setof patiallyoor-

dinated

physical

lements

nd

nothing

more.

This means

physical

bjects

arediscernable

y

us

precisely

ecause

hey

re

n fact o

three-dimensionally

structured,

.e.

three imensional

bjects

re

in

themselves

umerically

ne

and

whole nd

complete per

e

unum t

erfectibilis)

I am

appealing

ere o

the

weakform

f

what

Roger

enrose

alls he

4

anthropicrinciple

i.e.

... the

universe

e

perceive

bout us

must

be of

such a

nature

s will

produce

nd

accommodate

eings

who

can

perceive

t. 46

lthough

realize

he

nthropic

principles

verall

rgumentative

alue

may

e of

imited

se,

nevertheless,

ased

on thecosmicmicrowave

ackground

adiation rom he

Big

Bang

at2.7 K

(i.e.

2.7

degrees

above

absolute

ero),

our

three-dimensional

erceptual

ability

eems

pretty

eliable

ndicator

f

thethree-dimensional

tructure

f

Freund,

ith

ntroductory

emarks

y

Rudolf

arnap

New

ork,

958),

91.

Prof.

enneth

Curry,biologist

t

the

University

fSouthern

ississippi,

akesssue

ith

eichenbachs

account

ere.

n

private

onversation

ith

e,

rof.

urry

as

ointed

ut

if

have

ccurately

understood

is

iew),

hat

lthough

ur etinal

tructure

tthe issue

evel

f

rganization

s

primarily

wo-dimensional,

he erve

ndings

t the

ellularevel

ave

three-dimensional

arrangementndwill ive s imitedhree-dimensionalerceptualbilityvenfwehad nly

one

ye.

While

his

hree-dimensional

isual

bility

s further

nhanced

yhaving

wo

yes,

Reichenbachs

laim

hat

he hree-dimensional

nhancement

s

qualitatively

ifferent

rom

the

wo-dimensional

etinal

mage

n he

issue

s

uspect.

or

xample,

t ould e

biologically

possible

o

nhance

hree-dimensional

ision

y pacing

he

yes

arther

part,

nd

ltering

he

eyes

nderlying

etinal

tructure.

his

mightive

s

enhanced

hree-dimensional

ision,

ut

would

ot mount

o

ny qualitative

ifference

etween

his

ew isualization

nd he

revi-

ous

ne.

oth

ssentially

ould

e

hree-dimensional

isualization.

oreover,

uch

n nhance-

ment

ould

nly

elp

s

n

eeing

istant

bjects,

nd

would e

ost or

earbybjects,

s s

he

case

ow

with

ery

mall

bjects.

rof.

urry,

owever,

oes

gree

ith eichenbachs

ain

point,amely,hatny qualitativeifferenceetweenhree-dimensionalnd our-dimensional

visualization

ould

eunlike

nything

nyone

an ow

iologically

magine.

46)

Roger

enrose,

he

oad

o

Reality:

Complete

uideo

he aws

f

he

niverse

New

ork,

2005),

8.6,

57-8.


77/156

M.

J.

Fitzgerald

Vivarium

7

2009)

4-73

7

1

physical bjects n the universe t large, . at leastout to the imits f the

observable

niverse hich

extends o a distance

hat ncludes round

1011

galaxies,

ontaining

ome

1 80

aryons. 47

e

simply

o

not

directlyerceive

four-dimensional

hysical bjects

s whole

nd

complete

nd

numerically

one. The

perduran

ist ccount

f

physical bjects

s that hree-dimensional

physical bjects,

ike

Socrates,

re

really

ncompleteour-dimensional

hysical

objects

These atter re

only

whole nd

complete

nd

numerically

ne when

theirmaterial

emporal

worms

aper

ut

of

existence,

.e. death

n

the ase

of

organisms. pistemologically,

hey

re

only

indirectly

ccessible

o

us,

namely,ia mathematical odels.But,discerninghree-dimensionalhysical

objects

s

numerically

ne and

whole nd

complete

ver ifferent

imes,

eems

to be

an

evolved

ragmatic

atural

apacity

fhuman

eings

hathas survival

valuefor hem.Human

beings

eemto haveevolved

ia natural election o

be able to discern

three-dimensionalhole nd

complete

nd

numerically

one

enduring

ion,

ay,

s a threat o their

urvival,

uthavenotevolved o

as

to discern

a

perduring

our-dimensional

ion

space-time

orm o be such

a threat. o

great

urvival

dvantage

as been conferred

n us as

surviving

organismso discern four-dimensionalerduringion,

but

there

oes

seem

to be

a

survival

dvantage

onferredn us to discern

three-dimensionalne.

Four-dimensional

survivalalue would

have

o

be cashed

n

by

the

perdu-

rantists our

ability

o

conjoin

ll the

temporal

lices f

the

ion,

perceive

that

onjunction,

ndthen ake

light

tthat

onjunction,

hich s no

mprove-

ment n

perceiving

he hree-dimensional

ion as

in

himself

umerically

ne

and whole nd

complete.

ur three-dimensional

atural

erceptualapaci-

ties,

herefore,

eem to function s the

epistemic

nd

pragmatic round

o

resolve heDescartes-Minus

rgument.

his sort f

epistemic

nd

pragmatic

groundingeems o bepreciselyhat s ackingntheperdurantistvaluations

of

the Descartes-Minus

rgument,

ut

is not

lacking

n

the evaluation f

the

ocrates-Minus

rgument

y

our

fourteenth-century

ogicians.

ocratess

whole nd

complete

nd

numerically

ne

in

himself',

n

their

nalysis.

While it is

true

thatwe can conceive f some abstract our-dimensional

temporal

ocrates r

Descartes,

ur

discerning

f

any

patially

oordinated

elemental ifferences

etween he three

nd four-dimensional

ocrates r

Descartes an

only

ccomplished

y

omparing

wo

very

ifferentnd abstract

geometrical

tructures ith one another.

A

four-dimensional

space-time

Socrates r Descartes s conceivednd locatednly ndirectly,ia an abstract

47)

bid,

18.


78/156

72

M

J.

Fitzgerald

Vivarium

7

2009)

4-73

representationf a certain ype fgeometrictructure.either redirectly

perceivable y

us,

precisely

ecause

hey

re not

temporally

nd

numerically

complete

n

the

present.

Although

eithermedieval

ogician

xplicitly

aintains hat

ocrates

as

physical

temporal

arts, perdurantist

ight

laim

hat heir

cceptance

f

Socrates

aving

hysical

qualitativearts

s no

more

omplicated

han laim-

ing

thathe has

temporal

arts.

et,

orWilliam

nd

Albert,

he

physical

ual-

itative

arts

f

physical

bject

re

ignificandy

ifferent

rom he

ontemporary

perduran

ists

hysical

temporalarts.

orboth

William

nd

Albert,

ualita-

tiveparts fa physicalbject retemporallyound to thepresentime, nd

spatially

ounded

y

he

kind f

physical

bject

t

s. he

temporalarts

f

four-dimensional

bject

for he

perdurantist

renot

o

temporally

r

spatially

bounded,

nless he

bject

was

suddenly

o

cease o exist n

the

present.

According

o

perdurantists

e are

merely

metaphysically

prejudiced

n

the

three-dimensional

ay

whenwe

carve

up

the

spatial

pread

f

physical

objects.48 perdurantist

ight

laim that

Socrates-Minus

nd Socrates re

numerically

istinctnd

discerned

o be

so,

even

hough

hey

ccupy

he ame

space.

Socrates-Minuss all of

Socrates

xcept

is

finger

nd

is

mapped

nto

Socrates ith ll

his

fingers.

e

directly

ee both f

them

ccupying

he

ame

space

at the same

time,

because

Socrates-Minus

ills

p

the

same

space

as

Socrates

except

or

finger.

ence,

we can

see them s

numerically

istinct,

yet

oth

n

the ame

pace.

William

would

probably

eply

o

such

perdurantisty

rguing

hat

iven

perdurantist

ccount

we

should also see an

infinite

umber f

Socrates-

Minuses

filling p

the

same

space

as

Socrates t the

same time

except

or

some

part.

This,

he

would

think,

ouldbe too

absurd or

he

perdurantist

o

defend. lbert,n the ther and,wouldprobablyrgue hat ocrates-Minus

simply

oesnot xist t the

ame ime nd

n

the

ame

roperpace

with

ocrates

and ten

fingers.

ocrates-Minus

s

simply

ot

in

himself,

hole

nd

complete

and

numerically

ne. 49

evertheless,

n

their

eplies

o

the

perdurantist,

oth

Albert

nd Williammake n

implicit

pistemological

ppeal

o our

mmediate

perceptual

warenessfSocrateso avoid he

perdurantist

conclusion.

In

conclusion,

he

primary

hortcoming

f

the

ontemporaryerdurantist

Descartes-Minus

rgument

s that

n

emphasizing

he

metaphysical

laim

n

Leibnizs

aws,

hey

latandy

isregard

ts

pistemological

laim.

erdurantism,

48)

Loux,

etaphysics

228-229.

49)

Impossible

st

uod

uo

orpora

int imul

er

e n

eodemoco

roprio.

L

tract

,

no.

59,

51.


79/156

M.

J.

Fitzgerald

Vivarium

7

2009)

4-73

73

ifembraced,wouldconstantlyequire s to reformulateour-dimensional

objects

nto

morefamiliar hree-dimensional

nes,

to

generate

ny

sortof

plausible

aturalized

pistemology.

he

rejection

fSocrates-Minuss a

really

existing

bject,

y

bothAlbert nd

William,

nd

the

requirement

hatwhat-

ever

bject

s

being

onsideredmustbe

in

itself

umerically

ne whole nd

complete,

eminds s

today

hat he

medieval

ragmatic

esolution o the

Socrates-Minus

rgument

lso can be

applied

o the

ontemporary

escartes-

Minus

Argument.

ence,

the

contemporary

escartes-Minus

rgument

s

far

more

medieval,

r

perhaps

he

medieval

ocrates-Minus

rgument

s far

moremodern,hanhasbeenpreviouslyhought.


80/156

h /*

f)

BRILL

VIVA

RIUM

Vivarium

7

2009)

4-96

www.brill.nl/viv

John

Wyclif

and the

Theory

of

Complexly

Signifiables

Richard

Gaskin

Universityf iverpool

Abstract

John

Wyclif

laims hat herere elations

f

ssential

dentity

ndformal

istinctness

connecting

niversais,

omplexly

ignifiables,

nd ndividuals.

n

some

espects

yc-

lif

position

n

complexly

ignifiables

oincides

ith

what callthe dvanced es

theory,

he iew hat

omplexly

ignifiables

re

eally

dentical ith ut

ormally

is-

tinct rom

orldly

ndividuals.

uttheres no

question

n

Wyclif

treatment

fa

reductionf

complexlyignifiables

o ndividuals.

argue

hat

Wyclif

opulates

is

most undamentalntologicalevelwith ropositionallytructuredntitiesothndi-

vidual nd

universal,

nd

hat his

pproach

s

uperior

othat f tsnominalist

ivals.

But

Wyclif

hares

ith ther ersionsf he

dvanced

es

heory

n

mplausible

heory

of

dentity,

nd

this ffectshe oherencefthe

laimed

eal

dentity

etween

ndi-

vidualsnd

omplexly

ignifiables.

Keywords

complexly

ignifiables,

dentity,

ssence,

ormal

istinction,ealism,

niversais

1 Introduction

According

o the atemedieval

heory

f

complexly

ignifiablescomplexeig

nificabilid

,

championed

y

Adam

Wodeham

nd

Gregory

f

Rimini,

heulti-

mate

ignificate

f a

spoken

r written eclarative

entence,

nd

the

object

f

scientificnd

theological

ssent, issent,

nd

knowledge,

s an

extra-categorial

worldly

tructure

anonically

pecified

y

nominalizing

he entence

n

ques-

tion.Thus the

ignificate

f

thesentence God is three nd one

( Deus

est

trinus t

unus )

s taken

o be the

object

hatGod

s three

nd

one

.

eumesse

trinumtunum)}Thetheory asdevelopednoppositionoth o William f

0

A.

Wodeham,

ecturaecundan

Primmententiarum.

rologus

tDistinctio

rima,

d

.

R.Wood ndG.

Gal,

St.

onaventura,

990),

sp.

80-208;

regory

f

Rimini,

ectura

uper

Koninklijke

rill

V, eiden,

009

DOI: 0.1

63/156853408X345927


81/156

R. GaskinVivarium

7

2009)

4-96 75

Ockham,whoheld herelevantignificatend bearer fpropositionalttitudes

to be a

propositio

entalisand to Walter

hatton,

who heldthat herelevant

itemwas

in

the

implest

ind f

case)

the

ignificate

f the

entences

ubject,

typicallynon-complex

xtra-mentalndividual

God,

n

the aseofour am-

ple

sentence.2

n

contrast ith he

simple

res

heory

f

Chatton,

ome ater

philosophers,

uch

s

Andr

e Neufchteaund

Hieronymus

ardo,

dopted

what

we

might

all n advanced es

heory,

hich

greed

with

Gregorys

heory,

in

the irst

nstance,

ut imed

o reconcilehe

esultingntology

ith

Aristote-

lian

category

heory,

nd

usually

lso

with

nominalism,

y

arguing

hat om-

plexlyignifiablesouldbe reduced o ndividuals.3hedoctrineypicallyook

the articulatedorm

f

claiming

hat

ppropriate

omplexly

ignifiables

nd

individuals

re

really

denticalut

ormally

istinct.

o,

for

xample,

od would

be

really

dentical

ith,

ut

formally

istinct

rom,

he

ntity

hat

God

s three

and one Elsewhere

havediscussedhe dvanced es

heory

n

some f tsnom-

inalistmanifestations.4ut

the

theory

lso ent tself o

a

realist

onstruction,

and t s on a

prominent

uchversion

fthe

heory

hat wish o focus ere.

John

Wyclif

rote is famous

reatisen

universais

ith he

principal

im

of

defending etaphysical

ealism. ut

n

the

ourse

f

pursuing

his

bjective

he

developed

version f the

theory

f

complexly

ignifiables

hat s of con-

siderable istoricalnd

systematic

nterest.

orresponding

o these wo fea-

turesof

its

interest,

he

discussion

which followshas two main

aims,

a

descriptive

ne and a

polemical

ne. Alessandro onti noted

n

1997

that

until he

publication

n

1985

of

thefirst

ritical

dition

f

Wyclif

treatisen

universaischolars ad

generally eglected

Wyclif philosophy

n

favour f

his

theology

nd

politics.5

onti own

work,

long

with hat f

others,6

as

Primumt ecundumententiarumt./, rologustDist. -6,ds.A.TrappndV.Marcolino

(Berlin,981),

sp.

-40. n the

heory

enerally,

ee

G.

Nuchelmans,

ate

cholastic

nd

Humanistheories

f

he

roposition

Amsterdam,

980),

-140;

.

J.

Ashworth,

anguage

nd

Logic

n

he ost-Medievaleriod

Dordrecht,974),

7-76;

tudiesnPost-Medievalemantics

(London,985),

h. V.

2)

For eferenceso he elevant

exts,

ee

my

Complexeignificabilia

nd

Aristotle's

ategories

,

inj.

Biardnd . Rosier-Catach

eds.),

atraditiondivalees

atgories

Louvain,003),

87-

205,

n.

and

.

3)

See

my

Complexeignificabilia

nd he ormal

istinction',

nA.

MaierndL. Valente

(eds.),

edievalheories

f

ssertivend

Non-Assertive

anguage

Rome,004),

95-516.

4)

See rt.it., reviousote.5)

A.

Conti,

Analogy

nd

ormal

istinction:n the

ogical

asis f

Wyclif

Metaphysics',

Medieval

hilosophy

nd

Theology

, 1997, 33-65,

t

p.

134.

6)

Here shall e

specially

oncerned

ith

pade's

Introduction'o

John

yclif:

nUniversais

(Tractatus

e

Universalibus

,

trans.

Kenny

Oxford,

985).


82/156

76

R.

Gaskin

Vivarium

7

2009)

4-96

gone omeway orectifyinghatmbalance, ut ofcourse here smuch till

to be

done,

and one

aspect

f

Wyclif

philosophy

hathas

suffered

ndue

neglect

ven

from

istoriansf

ogic

nd

anguage

s his

realistic

reatmentf

the

heory

f

complexly

ignifiables.

hat

argely

escriptive

rogramme

s

the

topic

f

2-4

of

his

aper.

As for

my

polemical

genda,

twill

be

argued

hat

Wyclif

version f

the

theory

f

complexly

ignifiables,

hough

ot

without

difficulty,

s

philosophically

uperior

o ts

main

nominalist

ivals

4-5).

The

principal

espect

n

which

t s

problematic

s

one that

t

shareswith

ts

rivals,

and stems

rom he

very

dea of

attempting

o

combinereal

dentity

ith

formal istinctness;or headvanced es heory as

difficulty

aking ood

sense f

therelation

f

real

dentity

6).

2

Complexe

ignificabilia

n

the

Tractatus e

Universalibus

In

his

Tractatus

e

Universalibus,

hich

orms

he ixth

ract f

the

first ook

of

he

o-called

umma eEnte7

nd was

probably

omposed

n

1373-4,

Wyc-

lif,

n

the

course f

defending

ealism

bout

universais,9

dentifies

niversais

with ruths n theonehand,10nd with omplexlyignifiablesn theother.11

For

xample,

he

universal

umanity

s

dentifiedoth

with

he ruth

theres

a man

homo

st),

onceived s a

worldly

ntity,

nd with

he

omplexly

ig-

nifiable hat

heres a

man

hominem

sse).12

n

the

De

Logica

he

proposition

is

defined s an

ens

complexe

ignificans ,

r

more

accurately

s

a

racio

indicativa,

ongrua, ignificans

omplexe

icut st

vel

sicutnon

est ,

nd the

7)

On this

orkn

general,

ee

J.

Robson,

yclif

nd

he

xford

choob

Cambridge,

961),

Part

I.

8)See .Muellersntroductionohis ditionf he ractatuseUniversalibusTdU),Oxford,

1985),

ix-xxx.ll

eferenceso he

dU

will

e o his

dition.

9)

For seful

urveys

f he

ssential

oints

f

Wyclif

metaphysics

nd

heology,

eeA.

Kenny,

Wyclif

Ox

ord,

985);

.

Leff,

The lace f

Metaphysics

n

Wyclif

Theology',

n

A.

Hudson

andM.

Wilks

eds.),

rom

ckhamo

Wyclif

Ox

ord,

987),

17-32.

n

Wyclif

treatment

of

universais,

ee

Conti,

Studio

torico-critico'

n

Johannes

harpe:

uaestio

uper

niversalia

(Florence,

990),

sp.

98-309,

nd

Analogy',

50-8.

10)

TdU,

5,93-56,104;

9,184-84,315;

67,429-172,539;73,490-6.

All

itations

ollowhe

format:

age

umbers,

ine

umbers.)

f.

ohannis

yclif

ractatuse

ogica

vol.

Logica

2)),

ed.M.

Dziewicki

London,

896),

3,12-30;

ohannis

yclif

umma

e

nte,

ibri

rimi

rac-

tatusrimust ecundusSdE),d. . H.ThomsonOxford,930),4,22-45,28.n)

TdU

22,109-11;

4,88-99;

7,161-78,168;

9,184-84,315;

11,17;

67,429-172,539.

f.

Logica

2),

33,12-30;

9,21-41,35;

e

Ente

ibrorum

uorum

xcerpta

ELD),

d.M. Dzie-

wicki

London,

909),

0,10-11;2,31-9;

dE, 7,16-29,16;4,22-45,28.

,2)

TdU

70,13-16.

f.

69,457-172,539;

81,754-5.


83/156

R.

Gaskin

Vivarium

7

2009)

4-96

77

significatesf thepropositionsDeus est and homoest arespecifieds

Deumesse

nd hominem

sse

espectively.13yclif

grees

with

Adam

Wodeham

and

Gregory

f Rimini

hat hese

ntitiesrethe

ultimate

bjects

f

cientific

knowledge,

nd the

reasons e

gives

re

reminiscentf

Gregorys

n

particular:

one

can have

hat

knowledge

ithout

eing cquainted

with

he

relevant

po-

ken

or

writtenerms r

mental

oncepts,

nd that

knowledge

an

survive he

demise f

poken

r

written

igns

nd mental

oncepts.14 yclif

laims,

gainst

the

Ockhamist

radition,

hatno

spoken

r written

entence ould

be true r

necessary

xcept

n

thebasis

fthe

xistencef

truth r

necessity

parte

ei

and that uchreal xistences independentftheexistence fsigns: t s the

universal

orldly

ignificates

f

general

erms,

ot

those erms

hemselves

r

their

corresponding

ental

oncepts,

hat

ives

cience ts

generality.15

As

far s

worldly

ruthsre

concerned,

Wyclif

grees

with

Walter

urleigh

that heres

such

thing

s a

propositio

n

re>

r real

predication,

s he calls

t.16

In

his

De

Logica

Wyclif

n

fact

istinguishes

wo

kinds

f

real

proposition.17

(i)

First,

heres

whathe calls

he

propositio

ealis ,

xamples

fwhich

re ste

homo

nd iste

apls.

Wyclif

lassifies

hese s

propositions

ecause

hey

have

implicit

and

real)

subject- redicate

tructure:

n

the case of

iste

homo for

instance,

umanity

s

implicitly eally

redicated

f the

man

in

question.

(ii)

Secondly,

heres

the truth

ignified

n

the

ide

of

he

hing,

ike

he ruth

thatman

s

Veritas

ignificataparte

eiy

icut

sta

Veritas:ominem

sse).18

ike

Burleigh,

yclif

estricts

eal

predication

o

truths,19

nd

indeed t

one

point

he even

refuses

hetitle

predication

o

false

redications.20

ut

Wyclif

oes

further

han

Burleigh

n

one

mportant

espect:

hereas

urleigh

llowed he

copula

of true

egative

entence

o have

real

orrelate,

amely

he

diversity

of the

things

or

which

heextremes

upposit,Wyclif

enies

eal

xistenceo

13)

Johannis

yclif

ractatuse

Logica

vol.

.

ogica

1)),

d.

M.

Dziewicki

London,

893),

14,1-24;

f.

ogica

2),

03,24-31.

yclif

oes ot

istinguish

etween

he

ignificates

f

rop-

ositionsnd f

heir

ominalizations

dicta):

dE,

7,16-28,4;

9,17-30,20.

,4)

TdU,

44,444-149,564.

f. dE,

35,11-13;

. H.

Thomson,

A

Lost

hapterfWyclif's

Summa

e nte

Speculum

, 1929,

39-46,

t

pp.

42-3.

15)

dU

140,356-65;

44,444-61.

16)

dU

16,24-28,170.

n

Burleigh,

ee

.

inborg,

Walter

urleigh

n

he

Meaning

f

rop-

ositions',

lassicat

Mediaevalia

8,1967,

94-404.

,7)

Logica1),14,25-15,25.f. he efinitionf ere redicationtTdU18,41-4.18)

f.

Kenny,

The

Realismf

he e

Universalibus'

nA.

Kenny

d.,

Wyclif

n

hisTimes

(Oxford,

986),

7-29,

t

pp.

8-19;

onti,

Analogy',

38-42.

,9)

TdU

27,160-28,169;

40,356-65;

f. LD

13,20-3.

20)

TdU, 3,231.

ee

pade,

Introduction,

l-xli.


84/156

78

R. Gaskin

Vivarium

7

2009)

4-96

negative ropositionsout ourt}1 o forWyclifnly ositiverue redications

can be

real. ndeed

he

ntroducesurther

estrictionsn

the

cope

ofreal

red-

ication:

ruths

boutthe

past

nd

future,

ike

negative

ruths

nd

ogical os-

sibilities

re,

for

Wyclif,

mere ntia

rationis

hose

real

correlates

God.22

n

denying

eal

xistence o

negative

ropositions

yclif

position

s more

ir-

cumscribedhan

Burleigh's;

ut

n

another

espect

t s

muchmore

adical.We

can

see this

f

we note hat

Burleigh's

octrine f

the

ropositio

n re

s

wrongly

so

called.

For,

iven

hat

he ocates

he

opula

n

the

mind,

nd

given

hat,

n

his

view,

he

orrelatesf

true

ositive

nd

negative

entences

n

the

world re

the dentityrdiversityf he hingsorwhich he xtremesf hose entences

supposit,

espectively,

urleigh

n

fact nds

up

with

position

n

the

proposi-

tion

not

ubstantially

ifferentrom hat

fhis

nominalist

pponents:

heres

not,

or

urleigh,nything

ropositionally

tructuredhat

s

wholly

n

the

world.

Butfor

Wyclif

ropositions

nvolving

hathe

callsreal

predication

re

ndeed

wholly

n

theworld: o forhim

the

world

eally

oes contain

ropositionally

structured

ntities.23

These

propositionally

tructured

ntities,

hich re

n

effecthe

same as

what

Gregory

alls

omplexlyignifiables,

refurther

dentified

yWyclif

ith

appropriate

ndividuals rawn rom he en

categories.24

yclif

alls he

den-

tity

n

question

essential

dentity,

ut

by

hishe

meanswhat s

usually

alled

real

dentity:

e

uses he

word essence o

denote

hings,

hetherf

generic,

specific,

r

numerical

nity,25

eserving

he erm

quiddity

or

ssences

n

the

usual

ense,

hat

s,

for

collections

f)

constitutive

roperties,

nd

reserving

the

notion real

dentity

or

sub-class f

essential

dentities hich

neednot

concern

s here.26

Like other

roponents

f what

have

calledthe

dvanced es

heory

1),

whoheld that omplexlyignifiablesrereallydenticalwith,butformally

distinct

rom,

orldly

ndividual

hings,

Wyclif

ombines

claim f essential

identity

etween

ndividualsnd

appropriate

omplexly

ignifiables

ith he

thesis hat

ndividuals

re

formally

istinct rom

he

complexly

ignifiables

2,)

TdU,

7,157-28,169.

22)

dU

27,157-28,169;28,77-9;

38,312-18.

f.

Lost

hapter',

42;

ohannis

yclif

e nte

Predicamentali

EP),

d.

R.

Beer

London,

891),

h. .

23)

eehere

gain ogica

1),

14,1-15,25.

24)

TdU72,48-73,67.ee urtherdU74,88-99;0, -20; ,79- 4,322;76,83-277,84.

Cf.

Logica

2),

203,24-31;

LD

37,6-38,19;

dE

19,4-5;

2,1-13;

5,18-27,15;6,11-26;

44,22-45,28.

25)

dU

90,126-91,130;29,110-130,119.

f.

Kenny,

yclif

1-2.

26)

dU

p.

91,131-7.

f.

pade,

Introduction,

xi.


85/156

R.

Gaskin

Vivarium

7

2009)

4-96 79

withwhichthey reessentiallydentical.27nd,givenhis identificationf

universais

ith

omplexly

ignifiables,

hathas the

consequence

hatuniver-

sais re

essentially

dentical

ith,

hough

ormally

istinct

rom,

ndividuals:

I

agree

that

very

niversals

ndividual,

nd ice

ersa,

hough

he wo

re

ormally

is-

tinguished

romach ther.

How,

ask

ou,

ould

nowing

niversally

he

pecies

f

man

elp

oknowhis

man,

nless

hisman ere

species?

imilarly

hathis ans s hat

man

s,

nd

n

his eal

redication

he

uperior

s

omething

ommon

o ts nferior.28

Thispassages nterestingnasmuch sittells s that heres nfact complete

worldly

oincidence etween

niversais,

omplexlyignifiables,

nd ndividu-

als. We have

lready

een

that,

or

Wyclif,

niversais

re to be identified

ith

complexly

ignifiables

nd

complexly

ignifiables

re to

be identified ith

individuals:

t

follows

hatuniversais

re ndividuals.

he above

passage

on-

firms

his

mplication,29

ut

t also affirms

he onverse

mplication

and

vice

versa ),

ndicating

hat

very

ndividual

s a universal.30

t follows hatthe

three

xpressions

universais ,

complexly

ignifiables ,

nd individuals

ick

out

exactly

he same

worldly

hings.

It

follows urther

hat

very

ntity

s

essentiallydentical ith t east ne ndividual.econd-orderniversais,uch

as

being redicable f

many,

re no

exception.)31

ny

given

ntity

icked

ut

underone

of these haracterizations

s,

in

Wyclif

terminology,ssentially

identical

ith,

hough ormally

istinct

rom,

n

entity

icked

ut

under

ach

of

the ther wo haracterizations.

s far s the

upposition

frelevant

xpres-

sions

goes,

hismeans hat noun

phrase

uch s

being

lind

caecum

sse)

can have either

ersonal

upposition,

n

whichcase it

supposits

ither or

blind ndividuals

hemselves

the

ubstances)

r for

ny

ftheir

ccidents,32

r

27)

TdU, 78,695-9;

f.

LD

37,6-38,19.

28)

TdU

87,57-69

I

have

dapted

enny's

ranslation):

concedo...

uod

mne niversale

est

ingulare

t

contra,

icet

istinguantur

ormaliterb nvicem

Quomodo,

uaeso,

oret

pertinens

ognoscere

lium

ominem,

ognoscendo

niversaliter

peciem

ominis,

isi lle

homo oret

pecies,

icutlium

ominem

sse

sthominem

sse,

n

quapraedicatione

eali

communicatur

uperius

uo

nferiori? .ee lso

TdU, 02,100-4;39,346-140,351;84,262-

285,278;89,380-91;

08,176-97;38,193-212.

f.

ogica

2),

37,3-18;

LD

37,5-39,26;

SdE

61,8-12.

29)

f.

TdU, 50,8-16;dE, 5,16-27.

f.

pade,

Introduction,

xiv-v.

30)

f.TdU, 37,281-4.31)

f.

pade,

Introduction,

xv.

32)

Not

ust

he ccidentf

eing

lind,or,

swe hallee

hortly,

ccidental

roperties

re

at

leastn

Wyclif

official

iew)

denticalithheir

ubjects,

nd

hough,

swe hall

lso

ee,

he

relationf ssential

dentity

snot

n

general

ransitive,

yclif

view

ppears

obe hat niversais


86/156

80

R. Gaskin

Vivarium

7

2009)

4-96

simple upposition,n whichcase it supposits or he form r propertyf

blindness.

he abstract

oun

blindness

caecitas

,

on theother

and,

lways

supposits

or

form r

property,

hough parte

rei

there s no

distinction

between

lindness

nd

being

blind

they

re both

essentially

dentical

with

blind

ndividuals).33

he essential

dentities

n

question

an

be

conveyed

oth

by

what

Wyclif

alls

formal

redication

nd

by

whathe calls

essential

red-

ication :

etus examine

hese

otions.

3 Wyclifn Predication

Formal

redication,

e are

told,

nvolves

heformal

nherence

f the

predi-

cate,

taken

s a real

that

s,

worldly)

ntity,

n

the

subject,

aken

s a real

entity,

hile ssential

redication

s said to

involve ne

and the

ameessentia

featuring

s both

ubject

nd

predicateagain,

aking

ubject

nd

predicate

s

real

ntities).34

ow

Wyclif

treatment

f these

arieties

f

predication

ives

rise o some

exegetical

ifficulties.35

irst,

he official

efinition

f essential

predication

lainly

upplies

nly

necessary

nd

nota sufficient

ondition

f

it,36or hererecaseswherereal) ubject ndpredicaterethe ameessentia

but

where

Wyclif

efuses

he title

essential

redication

o

the structure

n

question.37

econdly,

lthough

Wyclif

laims

n the Tractatus

e Universalibus

that ssential

redication

ncludes

ormal

redication,38

n

thefourth

reatise

ofthe

first ook

of

the umma

e ente

.

urgans

rroresirca

niversalia

n

com-

muni)

9

he

states hat

ssential

nd

formal

redication

re

mutually

xclusive.

But

for ur

purposes

t suffices

o

note he

following

wofeatures

ommon

o

both

formal nd

essential

redication

s

they

re

presented

n

the

Tractatus

e

Universalibus.

oth include

ccidental

s

well as

quidditative

redication,40

that

onverge

n

n

ndividual

re

ssentially

dentical

ithach ther:

dU, 1,138-47;

71,800-

272,806

quoted

n

he

ext

elow).

f.

dE,

4,1

-19.

33)

TdU, 32,171-133,194.

f.

ogica

2),

0,39-41,35;

2,38-43,27;

dE, 3,21-27,15.

34)

dU

28,171-33,234.

f.

Lost

hapter',

42-4.

35)

f.

pade,

Introduction,

xxv-xli.or

ur

urposes

e an

gnore

third

ariety

f

redica-

tion

hat

Wyclif

dentifies:

raedicatio

ecundum

abitudinem.

36)

ace

onti,

Analogy',

56.

37)

TdU, 2,219-33,233;

59,514-22.

38)

TdU, 5,258-36,267.39)

Lost

hapter',

42.

40)

n he ase

f

uidditative

nd

ccidental

ormal

redication,

nd

uidditative

ssential

red-

ication,

hiss

lear rom

he fficial

efinitions

tTdU

28,170-35,249;

orccidental

ssential

predication,

ee,

.g.,

dU, 40,49-59;

f.

LD, 5,26-32;

Lost

hapter',

42-3.


87/156

R.

GaskinVivarium

7

2009)

4-96

8 1

and both nvolve heessentialdentityfsubject ndpredicate,aken s real

entities.

Wyclif

husfollows

standard

medieval

heory

f

the

truth-conditionsf

simple

ingular resent-tensed

on-modal

eclarative

entences,

he

o-called

identityheory ,

ccording

o

which he ruth f

uch

entences

equires

hat

subject

nd

predicate,

aken s

linguistic

ntities,

upposit

or he

ame

hing;

in

Wyclif

case,

given

hathe

is

construingubject

nd

predicate

s real

nti-

ties,

he

requirement

s

expressed

s a

requirement

hat

ubject

nd

predicate

actually

e

the ame.41

o forestall

ossible

erminological

onfusion,

t

would

be welltostate learly ow the dentityheoryfpredicationiffersromhe

simple

nd

advanced es

heories f

sentence

meaning

we

have

already

men-

tioned. he

dentity

heory

imsto tell

us what he

truth f a

declarativeen-

tence onsists

n

namely

he

dentity

f

subject

nd

predicate,

n

Wyclif

version,

r

the

dentity

f their

ignificates,

n

the

usualversions.

he res

he-

ory, y

contrast,

ims to tell

us what

the

meaning

f a

declarative

entence

consists

n

namely

he

ndividual

ignified

y

ts

subject

erm.

hat s the

simple

ersion f

theres

heory,

o which

he

dvanced ersion

dds that he

relevant

ndividuals

really

dentical

ith,

ut

formally

istinct

rom,

herel-

evant

omplexly

ignifiable.

It is

noteworthy

hat

while

n

Ockhamsmore

amiliar

ersion f

the den-

tity

heory,

o-supposition

f

subject

nd

predicate

s

not

only

necessary

ut

also

sufficientor he

ruth f

the

orresponding

entence,42

yclif

nsists hat

(casting

he

theory

n

his

terms)

dentity

f

subject

nd

predicate

s

only

necessary,

nd not also a

sufficient

ondition,

f

truth.43or

there re

sen-

tences,

uch

s The

Fathers the

Son ,

Man is an

ass ,

The

Deity

s

begot-

ten,

ies

tc. ,

nd

The

uiddity

f man

s

white ,

atisfying

he

requirement

that ubjectndpredicatee identicalnrebutthat reneverthelessottrue.

These

entences eed o

be

subjected

o

exportation

to

borrow

uine

term)

of

critical

xpressions

n

order o

render hem

rue:44

or

xample,

he

first

proposition

eeds o

be

convertedo

The Father

s

that

hing

which s

{illud

quod

est)

he

Son ,

the

econd o

Man

is what n

ass

is ,

etc.45

We arrive

t

predications

hat re

presumably

to

put

it in

Wyclif

terminology)

essen-

tial ,

nd

true;

utwe

do not

have

common

uppositum.

n

saying

hat

uch

41)

n

the

dentity

heory

with

urther

eferenceso

relevant

exts),

ee

my

berlegungen

ur

Identittstheorieer rdikation',issenschaftndWeisheit, 1997,7-103.42)

umma

oeicae

ed.P.Boehner

t l.

St.

onaventura,

974),

I,2,

249,8-250,16.

43)

TdU,

2,219-33,233;

59,514-22.

44)

f.

my

Complexe

ignificabilia

nd

he ormal

istinction',

4.

45)

f.

TdU, 9,

4-

02,

04;

40, 9-67;

64,

22-267,

06.


88/156

82

R.

Gaskin

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4-96

predicationsrepresumablyssential,take ssuewith .V.Spade,whoargues

that

n

order o

captureWyclif

real

ntentions

e

should dd

the

require-

ment

f a

common

uppositum

o

the

definitionf

essential

redication.46

f

that s

correct,

he

relevant

xported'

redications

Man

is

what n

ass

is ,

etc.)

will

not

nvolve ssential

redication

fter

ll,

nd so

notreal

predication

either

since

hey

re

certainly

ot

cases

of

formal

redication).

ut t s

one

thing

o hold

that Man

is an

ass

does not

nvolve

eal

predication

it

s

after

all

false

nd,

whatever e think

f

he

point,Wyclif

oes,

s we

have een

2),

restricteal

redications

o

truths;

t

wouldbe

quite

nother

hing

o

holdthat

Man iswhat n ass s ,which strue, oes not nvolve eal

predication,

nd

think

we

should

ry

o

avoid

imputing

uch

strong

octrine

o

Wyclif.

Whether r

not

I

am

right

bout

this,

t is

clear

hat

adding

o

Wyclif

definition

f

truth,

hich,

s we

have

seen,

yields

merely

ecessary

nd not

also

sufficient

onditions,

he

requirement

f

common

suppositum

or,

o

put

it

in

Spades

terms,

dding

he

requirement

hat

he

relevant

redication

e

real)

will

not

patch

up

that

efinition.

nsteadwe will

flip

rom

specification

of

necessary

utnot

ufficient

onditions

or ruth

o

one of

ufficient

ut

not

necessary

onditions:

eal

dentity

n

its own

was

not

sufficientortruth,

because here

re

cases f

falsehoods

nvolving

uch

dentity

Man

is an

ass );

real

dentity

ogether

ith

common

uppositum

s not

necessary

or

ruth,

because here

recases

ftruths

ot

involving

common

uppositum

Man

is

what n

ass

s ).

Rather,

n

order o

convert he

official

efinitionf

truth

nto

specifica-

tionof

both

necessary

nd

sufficient

onditions

we

have to

allude

explicitly

to

supposition

heory.

ow

in

the

reatisen

universais

yclif

s

unwilling

o

do

this,

becausehis

realist

pproach

o

predication

s

precisely

esigned

o

obviate heneedto talk boutrelationsetweenlanguagend theworld.But

how

otherwisere

we to

accountfor

he

datum

hat Man

is an ass

fails

o

be

true,

nd fails ven

to

involve n

essential

redication

n

spite

f

thefact

that man

and ass

have the

same

essentia

the

genus

animali

y),

7

whereas

Man is

that

hing

which s an

ass

ucceeds

n

being

both

rue

nd

presum-

ably)

an

essential

redication?48

here

an

only

be

one

explanation

f

this

difference,

amely

hevariation

etween

hese wo

entencesn

the

upposi-

tionof

the relevant

inguistic

erms

occurring

herein:

here s a

shift ither

from

ersonal

upposition

n

the

firstaseto

simple

upposition

n

the

econd,

461

'Introduction,

xxvii-xxxviii.

47)

TdU, 3,227-32.

48)

TdU, 9,34-43.


89/156

R. Gaskin

Vivarium

7

2009)

4-96

83

or fromimple uppositionf the pecies nthefirstasetosimple upposi-

tion of the

genus

n

the

second.49

y

contrast,

s

long

as we

remain t the

levelof

ontology

we

do

not

have the

resources

o

distinguish

etween

he

complexly

ignifiables

hatman s

an ass

nd thatman

s that

hing

hichsan

ass.

In

this

onnection

t s

interesting

o

note hat

n

the

Logice

ontinuado

which

s

exclusively

oncerned ith

herelation

etween

poken

nd written

terms

nd their

ignificates,50yclif

ad

followed

presuming

hat

he Trac-

tatus

e

Universalibus

as written

ater51

a more

raditional

ay

of

dealing

with

these nd

similar

roblems,

n

terms f

standard

upposition

heory,

accordingowhich ophismsrise romllicithiftsnthe uppositionfkey

linguistic

erms.)52

Hence,

while

find

ttractive

pades

exegetical

uggestion

hat

Wyclif

doctrine f

formal nd

essential

redication

lays

for

real

predication

he

same

role

hat he

heory

f

personal

nd

simple

upposition

lays

t

the evel

of

linguistic

redication ,53

t

seems

o me

that,

f

he

doctrine

eally

s meant

to

render

upposition

heory

edundant

n

respect

f real

predication,

t

fails.

On this

point,

t

least,

f

not on

others,

he

grand

project

which,

s

Conti

plausiblyuggests,54yclif

s

engagedn,namely

he

hypostasization

f

ogi-

cal

and

linguistic

istinctions the

attempt

o

replicate

hese

istinctions

n

detail

t the

evel f

ontology

breaks

own.

It is an

important

eature

f

Wyclif

version f the

dentity

heory

as,

mutatis

mutandis

of other

ersions)

hat

heessential

dentity

f

subject

nd

predicate,

aken s real

ntities,

oes

hand

n

hand with

distinction

n

the

way hey

re

presented.

s

Wyclif

otes

concerning

ssential

redication

and

he

implies

similar

oint

n

the

case of formal

redication),

hile

he ame

essence s

real)

ubject

nd

predicate,

heratio

raedicati

iffersrom

he

ratio

subiecti55Wyclif position,s so far haracterized,s clearly version fthe

advanced es

heory;

ut here

re

everal

mportant

espects

n

which

is

posi-

tion

diverges

rom

he

typical

nominalist)

ersions f that

heory.

turn

o

these

n

the

next

ection.

49)

or

he

etailsf

Wyclifs

heory

f

upposition,

ee

ogica

1),

9-42.

50)

Logica

2),

5,16-18.

51)

ee

Mueller's

ntroductiono

TdU t

pp.

xxvii-xxxviii;

f.N.

Kretzmann,

Continua,

ndi-

visibles,

nd

Change

n

Wyclifs

ogic

f

Scripture',

n

A.

Kenny

ed.),

Wyclif

n

hisTimes

(Oxford,986),1-65,tpp. 0-1.32)

ee

ogica

2),

4,30-47,2.

53)

'Introduction',

liii.

54)

'Analogy',

64.

55)

TdU,

8,173-4;

0,194-7.


90/156

84 R

GaskinVivarium

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4-96

4 Wyclif's ersion f theAdvancedResTheory

First,

lthough

Wyclif

official

osition

s

that ccidentals well s

quiddita-

tive

redications,

hether f theformal r essential

ort,

nvolve he ssential

identity

f

real)

ubject

nd

predicate,

ogether

ith heir ormal

istinctness,

we find hat

n

practice

Wyclif

ften estrictsis

attention,

hen

onsidering

combinations f

essential

dentity

nd

formal

distinctness,

o

identities

betweenndividuals

nd

their

uidditative

niversais,

hat

s,

to those niver-

sais that

ttach o individualss a condition f

their

xistence,

nd so to the

genera,pecies, nd differentiaen thecategoryf substancepplyingo the

individual

n

question.56

Wyclif

ven uccumbs o a

temptation

t

one or two

points

n

the Tractatus

de Universalibus

though

his s

certainly

othis

onsiderediew nd s

amply

contradictedlsewhere

n

thetreatise to

deny

hat

ccidents an be res ni-

versales57He

also notes

with

pproval

heAristotelianiew

as

he construes

t)

thatwhile

n

per

e

that

s,

quidditative) redications

he

ubject

s

identical

with hat

hings eing

idem

stsubiectumt

psum

sse),

n

the aseof cciden-

tal

predications

his s not so: so a white

hing

album)

nd

(its)

being

white

{album sse) this atter eingdentical ith heuniversal hiteness aredis-

tinctnatures.58

He

interprets

ristotle's

pparently

nconsistent

ronounce-

ments n the

relation

etween

pecies

nd

genera

n

the

ategory

f

ubstance,

on the one

hand,

nd

primary

ubstances,

n the

other,

s

anticipating

is

own view:

formally

uch

species

nd

genera

re

distinct rom

rimary

ub-

stances;

ssentiallyhey

re

dentical.)59

lsewhere

Wyclif

dds that heacci-

dental

properties

f a substance re

consequential pon

that substances

essential

eing,

nd arenot

identical ith)

hat

ubstance,

utare ccidental

modes f

substance;

nd

in an

argument

or he

dentity

fman

homo)

with

the

omplexly

ignifiable

hat man s{hominemsse), hefact hatneithers

an accident ftheother

lays

n

important

ole.60

56)

dU

88,78-89,98;2,163-94,195;

05,182-90;19,207-10;

28,70-131,156

on

his

as-

sage

ee

Conti,

Analogy',

48-50);

96,327-36;

98,390-199,401;

01,440-57;04,527-37;

206,585-207,589;

76,79-277,86.

57)

ee

TdU, 7,140-58,143;8,355;1,138-92,170;18,230-5.

lsewhere

yclif

s

unequiv-

ocal hatherere ommonr niversalccidents

swell

s

econdary

ubstances:

dU, 44,

58-

65; 55,428-32;59,524-260,552;

71

800-272,806;

f.

Lost

hapter',

43; dE, 4,27-59,23.

AtTdU, 70,755e peaksf heuidditiesf eneratherhanhatf ubstance,n context

wheret s learhat

quiddity

s universal.

58)

TdU, 2,48-55.

f.

2,59-73,67;21,257-61.

59)

TdU, 4,196-96,236.

60>

dU

127,65-128,69;20,221-121,261.


91/156

R.

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85

However,espite hismarkedendencynthe TractatuseUniversalibuso

downplay

he

dentity

heory

f

predication

n

the ase of accidental

redica-

tion,

heofficial

haracterization

f

formal nd essential

redication,

ccord-

ing

to which

not

only

quidditative

ut also

accidental uch

predications

involve he essential

dentity

but

formal

istinctness)

f

subject

nd

predi-

cate,

s

certainly

ot n

oversight

n

Wyclif

part:

or he laim hat ccidental

predications

nvolve n

essential

dentity

f

subject

nd

predicate

s

repeated,

or

presupposed,

t a number f

points

lsewhere

n

histreatise.61

ut

t

would

appear

hat

Wyclif

preferred

iew the

ne that e most

onsistently

pplies

inpractice is that nly uidditativeuchpredicationsnvolve hatdentity.

The

second

respect

n

which

Wyclif

position

iverges

rom

he tandard

versions f the dvanced es

heory

s that

Wyclif

maintains

self-predication

thesis

n

respect

f the

species

nd

genera

hat re

essentially

dentical

with,

but

formally

istinct

rom,

he

ndividuals

alling

nder hem:62he

species

man,

which

ollects ndividual

men,

s tself

aid

to

be an

aggregate

an.63

n

theninth

hapter

fthe

Tractatuse Universalibus

yclif

ackles he

problem

raised

y

the

Third

Man

objection

o

self-predication,

nd claims hat elf-

predication

f

species

nd

genera

oes not

precipitate

n

infinity

f distinct

individuals: e

argues

hat

ll

aggregates

f

ndividuals

n

the ame

pecies

r

genus

re themselves

ndividuals

n

the relevant

pecies

r

genus,

ut claims

that t is

unnecessary

o

posit

distinct

ggregates

f

aggregates,

or

ny

uch

higher-level

ggregates

ollapse

o first-level

ggregates.

ence two

original

individuals

n

a

species

two

men,

ay)

generate

hree esultant

ndividuals

n

that

pecies

the

riginal

wo

plus

he

ggregate),

hree

riginals

enerate

even

resultants,

nd so

on,

according

o

the

principle

hatn

individuals

enerate

2n

-

1

resultants

there

eing

no

empty

esultant).

iven

that here

will

be

generics well as specificndividuals, largenumber foriginalndividuals

will

obviously

enerate

very

arge

umber f

resultant

ndividuals: ut

how-

ever

arge

he

number

f

original

ndividuals,

s

long

s that

number s finite

the

number f

resultantndividuals ill lso

be finite.

In

the

ase

of

the

Trin-

ity,Wyclif

rgues

hat here re

n

fact

ight

esultant

ntities,

incehe distin-

guishes

he

Trinity

aken s an

aggregate

rom he

divine

ssence,

nd both f

these rom he

three

ersons

aken

everally

nd

from he

aggregate

airs.)64

But

although

Wyclif

oes not

concede hat

onsiderationsf

self-predication

61)

TdU, 1,138-47;

7,262-72;32,171-9.

62)

TdUy

91,211-193,266;

94,289-195,296;25,403-19.

63)

See,

.g.,

^,74,88-99;

40,351-5;

53,90-154,94;

57,174-82;

91,200-193,254.

641

dU

187,107-188,136.


92/156

86

R. GaskinVivarium

7

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4-96

generatenfinitiesforiginalnd resultantndividuals,e neverthelessoes

think hat here

re infinities

f

such

ndividuals,

incehe

claims hat

ny

genus

will

ontain

n

infinity

f

pecies,

o that ven

ne

original,

pecifically

unique

ndividual

Wyclif

lludes

o the

phoenix,

standard

xample)

will

involve n

infinity

fother ndividuals.65

The third

espect

n

which

Wyclif

position iverges

rom he dvanced es

theory

n its standard

manifestationss this:

given

he essential

dentity

f

individuals

nd

suitable

niversais,

yclif

s

prepared

o

say

that ndividuals

are

predicable

f

many,

hough

not

qua

individuals,

nd thatuniversais

re

impredicablefmany,hough gainnotqua universais.66urther,universal

is both

ssentially

he ameas an individual

falling

nder

t

and

essentially

different

rom since

t s

essentially

he ame s other ndividuals

hat iffer

essentially

rom and from ach

other. here eedbe

no

contradiction

n

this

position, rovided

e nsist

hat,

f

is

essentially

ifferentrom

it

does

not

follow hat is

not

essentially

he same as b' universais

rovide

counter-

instance

o the

entailment,

ince

they

re both

essentially

he same as and

essentially

ifferent

rom heir

nstantiating

ndividuals,

utwe

may

not nfer

that

hey

re,

bsurdly,

oth

ssentially

he

ame nd

not

essentially

he

ame

as those ndividuals.67

ndividuals,

n theother

and,

renot

only ssentially

different

rom,

ut lso

not

ssentially

he

ame

s,

each

other.68encethe ela-

tion

of essential

dentity,

hough

eflexivend

symmetrical,

s not transitive.

(But

note

hat

n

the

pecial

ase

where

dentity

elations

onnect

upposita

the

relation fessential

dentity

s

transitive.)69

returno

this

oint

elow.

Fourthly

nd

finally,

here

s no

suggestion

n

Wyclif

treatisen universais

that elevant

ssential

dentities

erve he

purpose

f

reducing

omplexlyigni-

fiables,

hichwould

otherwise

e

extra-categorial

ntities,

o

non-proposi-

tionallytructuredntra-categorialndividuals.70his s the most mportant

point

n which

Wyclif approach

o

complexlyignifiables

iffers

rom tan-

dard

nominalist

ersions

fthe dvanced

es

heory.

s a staunch ealist bout

universais,

nd

given

his

policy

of

identifying

omplexly

ignifiables

ith

appropriate

niversais,

yclif

maintains

hereal xistence

f

complexlyigni-

fiables

s

genuine

ropositionally

tructured

orldly

ntities.

f

any

reduction

65)

TdU

1

0,

8-

91,198.

or different

pproach

o he Third

an

roblem,

hichenies

that

ggregates

re

istinct

romheir

omponent

ndividuals,

ee

LD

43,1-45,3.

66)

TdU,3,174-94,195.f. 56,142-9.67)

TdU, 6,243-9.

68)

f.

TdU

153,90-154,94.

69)

Spade,

Introduction,

xxviii.

70)

f.

onti,

Analogy',

39-40.


93/156

R. GaskinVivarium

7

2009)

4-96

87

were n theoffing,t wouldrather aveto run n thereverse irection. nd

indeed

we find hat

n some

passages

n

the Tractatus

e Universalibus

yclif

follows

he

Porphyrian

nd Boethian radition

f

dentifying

ndividual ub-

stances ith

nique

bundles f ccidentalnd non-accidental

roperties.71

n

that

pproach,

he

fundamental

ntities

n

each of the

ategories

illbe uni-

versais;

ndividuals

ill be derived ntities. ut

then,

iven

his dentification

of universais ith

complexly

ignifiables,

yclif

mostfundamentalnto-

logical

evelwillconsist f

proposi

ionally

tructured

ntities.

Now we

should

no doubtbe

wary

f

treating

hese

assages

vivarium - vol xlvii, no. 1, 2009

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