voices of mexico issue 60

NUMBER 6 0 J U LY • S E P T EMBER 2 0 0 2 M E X I CO $ 4 0 U S A $ 9 . 0 0 C AN ADA $ 1 1 . 7 0

™

CISAN • UNAM

www.unam.mx/voices

100 Hundred Years of LightThe Photography OfManuel Álvarez Bravo

An Interview with Mexico’sMinister of Foreign Affairs

Jorge G. Castañeda

Mexico’s Commercial TreatiesArticles by Antonio Ortiz Mena

And Alejandro Chanona

The Hispanic MarketIn the Western U.S.

Esther González and Erika González

15th ANNIVERSARY

ISSUE

No. 60 July • Septem

ber 2002 V

oices ofM

exico

ManuelÁlvarez Bravo

Voices of Mexico is published byEl Centro de Investigaciones sobre América del Norte, CISAN (Center for Research on North America),of the Office of the Coordinator of Humanities, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, UNAM

(National Autonomous University of Mexico).

EDITORIAL BOARDSergio Aguayo, Adolfo Aguilar Zínser, Jorge Bustamante, Jorge Carpizo, Emilio Carrillo Gamboa,

Alonso García Chávez, Guadalupe González, Rosario Green, Roberto Gutiérrez López,

Andrés Henestrosa, Julio Labastida, Miguel León-Portilla, Jorge Alberto Lozoya, Antonio Luna Arroyo,

Paz Consuelo Márquez Padilla, Mario Melgar, Silvia Núñez García, Olga Pellicer, Elena Poniatowska, Federico Reyes Heroles,

José Sarukhán, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, María Teresa Uriarte, Mónica Verea, Luis Villoro.

Address letters, advertising and subscription correspondence to: Voices of Mexico, Canadá 203, Col. San Lucas, Coyoacán, 04030 México, D.F. Tel: 5336-36-01, 5336-35-95and 5336-35-96. Electronic mail: [email protected]. Web site: http://www.unam.mx/voices. Annual subscription rates: Mexico Mex$150; USA U.S.$34; CanadáCAN$44.80; other countries U.S.$68.50, prepaid in U.S. currency to UNAM. Opinions expressed by the authors do not necessarily represent the views of Voices of Mexico.All contents are fully protected by © copyright and may not be reproduced without the written consent of Voices of Mexico. The magazine is not responsible for the return ofunsolicited manuscripts. Publicación trimestral, año quince, número 60, julio-septiembre de 2002. ISSN 0186-9418. Certificado de Licitud de Contenido No. 2930 y Certificadode Licitud de Título No. 3340, expedidos por la Comisión Calificadora de Publicaciones y Revistas Ilustradas. Reserva al uso exclusivo del título No. 04-2002-060413383000-102,expedida por el Instituto Nacional del Derecho de Autor. Correspondencia nacional de segunda clase. Registro 0851292. Características 220261212. Correspondencia inter-nacional de segunda clase. Registro Cri D F 002-92. Preprensa: Ediciones de Buena Tinta, S.A. de C.V., Insurgentes Sur 1700, 6o. piso, Col. Florida, Álvaro Obregón, 01030México, D.F. Tels. 5661-66-07, 5662-28-3. Impresa por Editorial Offset, S.A. de C.V., Durazno No. 1, Col. Las Peritas, Tepepan, Xochimilco, México, D.F.

Rector, UNAM

Juan Ramón de la Fuente

Coordinator of HumanitiesOlga Elizabeth Hansberg

Director of the CenterFor Research

On North America (CISAN)José Luis Valdés-Ugalde

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ISSN 0186 • 9418

CISAN Publications CoordinatorDolores Latapí Ortega

Assistant EditorMaría Cristina Hernández Escobar

LayoutMa. Elena Álvarez

Editor-in-ChiefDiego Bugeda Bernal

Copy Editor & TranslatorHeather Dashner Monk

Sales & Circulation ManagerTonatiuh Soley DíazWalls

EditorElsie Montiel

Art DirectorPatricia Pérez

Business ManagerMaría Soledad Reyes Lucero

DirectorJosé Luis Valdés-Ugalde

Our Voice

Mexico’s NewDiplomacyInterviewwithMinister of ForeignAffairsJorge G. Castañeda

Political Parties inMexicoSince the Changing of theGuardCésar Cansino

Growth and PovertyTwo Persistent Faces ofMexicoJesús Francisco Estévez García

Mexican BusinessesAWorld of InequalityIsabel Rueda Peiro

TracingU.S. PredominanceInMexico’s Foreign Trade (1870-1948)Sandra Kuntz Ficker

The PossibleWorldOf Álvarez BravoRoberto Tejada

Mexico,ModernDiplomacyAnd the EuropeanUnionAlejandro Chanona

TenYears of NAFTAAMexican PerspectiveAntonio Ortiz Mena

Number 60 July • September 20024

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Contents

Art and Culture

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Society

History

Economy

Politics

Editorial

CoverManuel Álvarez Bravo, Portrait of the Eternal, 1935.

Back CoverManuel Álvarez Bravo, Reverie, 1931.

TheHispanicMarketIn theWesternUnited StatesErika GonzálezEsther González

Oil, the State and NAFTAIs CanadianOil Up for Grabs?Aaron Roth

LaHuaxteca in Time and SpaceLorenzo Ochoa

El TajínFirstApproximations of a CivilizationArturo Pascual Soto

History and Ecology of VanillaMariana Hernández Apolinar

Science andArt at the XalapaAnthropologyMuseumRubén B. Morante López

Strategies for DevelopingACervical Cancer VaccineRicardo Rosales

Writers of TierraAdentro PublishersTwoMexicanWomenNovelists of the 1990sGraciela Martínez Zalce

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And If I Were Susana San Juan…(Fragment)Susana Pagano

A Way of Dying (Fragment)Vizania Amezcua

MarianaYampolsky’s ProfoundMexicoElsie Montiel

La pinturamural prehispánica enMéxicoÁreamayaLeticia Staines Cicero

Territorio de leonas. Cartografía de narradorasmexicanas en los noventaEdith Negrín

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United States Affairs

In Memoriam

The Splendor of Mexico

Canadian Issues

Reviews

Science and Technology

Literature

Museums LeticiaArriaga

4

Nothing is possible without men,but nothing lasts without institutions.

JEAN MONNET, 1888-1979

Recently, intense discussions have been taking place in academia —and to a lesser extent also in polit-ical circles— in Mexico, Canada and the United States about the North American community. Before

centering on how to design concrete political proposals, the debate has first involved, among other issues,the need to define what is understood by “community” and why an initiative of this magnitude should besupported. This is important if we ask ourselves how the integration of a community could be conceivedof among three countries that have encountered certain difficulties in defining their bilateral, trilateral andmultilateral agendas and priorities. As we have already said in other editorials, Mexico and Canada haveput forward some guidelines for beginning the discussion. However, Washington has been unclear about,if not reluctant to accept the feasibility of a community.The challenge of this kind of a discussion makes it necessary for both academics and politicians to for-

mulate questions before they try to put forward answers about the scope of a project of these dimensions.Above all, it is worthwhile considering that this issue has begun to be discussed in political and academiccircles —mainly in Canada and the United States— with the intention of sparking a profound debate inwhich the different scenarios for building a North American community can be explored. In Mexico, thishas been initially put forward in political circles, generating a debate still in its infancy among academics.In political milieus, the issue is beginning to be discussed at the highest level, certainly a new develop-ment. The discussion should aim to determine the steps needed to guarantee that if a Community of NorthAmerica were created, we would have a national and tri-national perspective that would be, if not sym-metrical, at least relatively similar.To this effect, we should keep some historical precedents of our trilateral relations in mind. Even before

there was talk of a trade treaty, Mexico began a process of liberalization with its entry into the GeneralAgreement of Tariffs and Trade in 1986, followed by one of integration which crystallized with the cominginto effect of NAFTA in 1994. Thus, a trade mechanism began to function de facto before it was formalized;integration began without being covered formally, something that was later implemented unsatisfactorily.The same thing might be happening in the case of the Community of North America: at the same timethat the community is being discussed, it may have begun to function de facto. This is why it is importantto establish a moment in trilateral relations that would prevent an atmosphere wherein the institutionalintentions and capabilities to deal with the essence of the matter in a timely, appropriate fashion in thethree countries could be overwhelmed.The following is a list of the central aspects of the discussion that in our opinion should be taken into

account in the academic debate and in the application of public policies in Mexico:

1. The need to define “community.” It is fundamental to define the concept of “community.” It is aterm and a reality that could have three radically different meanings in each of the three countries.In any case, the construction of the Community of North America should be a gradual process ofaccords, negotiations and agreements in which the parties define common objectives based on theirown interests but that encompass the basic proposal of the community.

OUR VOICE

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2. When should a community be constituted? About this, two spaces for reflection are proposed:a) the societal agenda and b) the state agenda. Three moments for negotiation are also proposed: a) theshort term: gathering consensuses; b) the medium term: the consensus of institutional construction;c) the long term: the consensus of the construction of the community. In this context, we can pro-pose that four types of relationships are possible: Canada-U.S., Canada-Mexico, U.S.-Mexico or anarticulated trilateral relationship that would lead to the establishment of solid bases for the construc-tion of a community.

3. What kind of community should be set up? A Confederation of North America or a Consortiumof North America (the latter implies the strengthening of existing trilateral institutions or creating newones. There is certain skepticism in the three countries about this.).

4. How should a community be set up?• First goal: reformulating the concept of national sovereignty with the aim of defining the bases forthe defense of the national interest;

• Create a high level commission to deal with trilateral issues in a preliminary, preparatory fashion tobe able to set the agenda and develop a coherent position about the question of “North America”;

• Discuss among the three countries on an academic and political level what “thinking about theNorth American Community” means;

• Give Mexicans even more information about their two partners and about the meaning of integra-tion at all levels;

• Put forward a strategy for national development through development funds (the so-called socialfund);

• There are six basic issues involved in the community negotiation: trade, energy, borders, the envi-ronment, migration and security.

5. Why a community?• The strategic meaning of community;• The political will to create a community;• The political and economic viability of a community.

6. Obstacles to the creation of a community• NAFTA opened up borders to trade and posed the maturation and deepening of the treaty, a taskwhich has not been completely realized;

• Prior to NAFTA, at the end of the 1980s, the treaty as such was not discussed as “the community” isnow being discussed. If we stopped doing so, we would be running a grave risk;

• The gravest possible of political moments, 9/11, partially postponed the viability of this opening.

Since it is now inevitable that this issue be part of the trilateral agenda, these and other elements willhave to be taken into consideration and discussed in coming issues of Voices of Mexico to be able to thinkas clearly as possible about how far our three countries would want and would be able to go. However, weshould recognize that at least for Mexico, this will be an arduous exercise considering that Washington hasnot responded very favorably about many topics on the bilateral agenda that are part of the integrationprocess. This would have to change if we hope to achieve a relationship of true cooperation and reciprocity.

* * *The topic of the community of North America is anchored in Mexico’s bilateral and trilateral relations withthe other countries of the region. In this issue of Voices of Mexico, we include an interview with Ministerof Foreign Affairs Jorge G. Castañeda about the fundamental issues of our bilateral agendas with theUnited States and Canada, such as migration, security, borders, trade and culture. He also deals with moregeneral topics linked to the new strategies of Mexican foreign policy, which has sought —without a doubt,successfully— to play a more active role than in the past, a role that truly has an impact on changes in theinternational order in light of phenomena like globalization and September 11. A good example of this new

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philosophy of Mexico’s foreign policy is its favorable performance in the U.N. Security Council, where ithas been a member since the beginning of the year, a balance sheet of which Castañeda presents in hisinterview.For Mexico, the community of North America also implies thinking about its recent experiences in inter-

national trade, the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages, the successes and failures of integrationin the region through NAFTA, and about the need and importance of diversifying trade through other treatieslike the one signed with the European Union. Alejandro Chanona andAntonio Ortiz Mena, two of Mexico’smost widely recognized specialists on these topics, present articles in this issue.Thinking about a community of North America also implies dealing with the inequalities and asymme-

tries of the countries that would integrate with each other. In our “Society” section, we present articlesabout two social problems that have undoubtedly been a hindrance to our development and internationalcompetitiveness and that Mexico must overcome in the medium term: poverty and the no less thorny prob-lem of inequality, on this occasion with regard to businesses, their access to credit and growth.The North American community also presupposes recognizing the growing economic and political

importance of the population of Mexican origin in the United States. That is why we present a panoramaof the Hispanic market in the U.S. West, with a look at its buying power and specific weight in the region’seconomy. We also include a contribution about the interaction between Canada’s provincial and federalgovernments in oil exports to the United States in the context of NAFTA.The centrality of the U.S. economy for Mexico and its resulting dependence is not new, but neither has

it been completely constant, as historian Sandra Kuntz Ficker demonstrates in her article about Mexico-U.S. trade from the end of the nineteenth century to 1948.

* * *

This year is the hundredth anniversary of the birth of one of the greatest artistic geniuses of the twentiethcentury: Mexican photographer Manuel Álvarez Bravo. Voices of Mexico could not remain on the sidelinesof the national homage that is being paid to him, and therefore we include in this issue a photographic port-folio with some of his best work in order to disseminate it to the U.S. and Canadian public.We have dedicated “The Splendor of Mexico” to some aspects of the vast historical, cultural and artis-

tic wealth of the state of Veracruz. One article deals with the little-studied but undoubtedly influential civ-ilization of the Huaxtecs; another looks at the cultural and architectural achievements of El Tajín and itsTeotihuacan influences; yet another examines the ecological, cultural, economic and nutritional impor-tance of vanilla, a typical Veracruz product. Our “Museums” section presents one of the state’s most inter-esting institutions, the Xalapa Anthropology Museum.In this issue, we are inaugurating the section “Science and Technology,” through which we aim to dis-

seminate some of our university’s and our country’s important contributions to the world of science. Thesection’s debut article is by UNAM researcher Ricardo Rosales, who has made important discoveries in the questfor a vaccine to treat cervical cancer.Graciela Martínez Zalce has contributed an article about the rise of literature written by women in

Mexico, including the work of Vizania Amezcua and Susana Pagano, fragments of whose novels we havealso translated and included in this issue. Lastly, we have dedicated our “In Memoriam” section to remem-bering another great Mexican photographer, Mariana Yampolsky. From our pages, we wish to thank her forher sensitivity in portraying rural, indigenous Mexico. We are sure her work will endure.

José Luis Valdés-Ugalde

VOICES OF MEXICO: In the days priorto September 11, spectacular advancescould be foreseen in the negotiationson migration with the then-recentlyinaugurated Bush administration. Eightmonths later, what has been done toreactivate those negotiations and whathas been achieved?MINISTER JORGE G. CASTAÑEDA: Theterrorist attacks against the United

States meant a pause in bilateral nego-tiations on migration, but certainly nota suspension of our dialogue. What haschanged is the pace in reaching our ob-jectives. A little after 9/11, PresidentsFox and Bush recognized that the fun-damental conditions that made a broadmigratory agreement necessary werestill present in both countries, with theimportant addition of the issue of secu-

rity as amatter of concern to the UnitedStates, particularly regarding its bor-ders and ports of entry..We understand that our two coun-

tries’ bilateral agenda must take into ac-count new priorities. Nevertheless, bothgovernments are aware that mi grationplays a central role in that agen da, as wasshown by the rapid resumption of thework of the High Level Group on Migra -

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P O L I T I C S

Mexico’s New DiplomacyInterview with Minister of Foreign Affairs

Jorge G. Castañeda

Photos cou

rtesy of the

Ministry of F

oreign

Affa

irs Press O

ffice

Minister Castañeda at the Monterrey Summit.

Voices of Mex ico • 60

tion after 9/11. Our view of mi gra tion hasnot been fundamentally al tered, sincethe main problem has not changed either.We continue to acti ve ly promote a broadmigration accord that would includethe most generalized regularizationpossible for Mex ican residents in theUnited States; the issuing of more H2visas for our workers; the definition andimplementation of a temporary workersprogram; the promotion of in creas edborder sa fety; and the fostering of devel -opment in the Mexican communitiesthat send more migrants to the U.S.

A crucial achievement in the nego-tiations has been the launching of pro-grams for regional economic develop-ment in Mexico, particularly in thosestates and municipalities that have thehighest migration rates. This point is acentral component of the Partner shipfor Prosperity that we establish ed lastMarch in Monterrey, one of the mostambitious initiatives that we have everundertaken to promote a greater socio-economic convergence of our peoples.The new concerns that stem from

the attacks and the international cam -

paign against terrorism have been addedto the negotiations with the UnitedStates more as opportunities than asobstacles. The agreements reached byboth countries in Monte rrey were madepossible by this shared vision, whichdem onstrate the importance of the bor-der, both as an economic link and a portof entry.

VM: President Fox once said in theUnitedStates that with NAFTA we shouldwork toward not only free transit ofgoods but also of people. But, whatmea-sures and policies has the Mexican gov-ernment developed to protect Mex icanswho cross the border illegally?MJC: Within the framework of thebroad negotiations, Mexico introduc edthe issue of security as a priority on themigration agenda. This allowed Mex-ico to emphasize the im portance ofknow ing the profile and location of ourmigrants as a major element in bolster -ing U.S. internal security, as this wouldmean greater orderliness and protec-tion of our fellow countrymen who arein the United States to work and makemoney, not to threaten U.S. nationalsecurity. We should never lose sightof their great contribution to the Amer -ican economy.We have already made significant

progress, particularly with regard tobi-national programs for migrant se -curity, efforts to prevent border vio-lence and trafficking in persons, coo p-eration in cases of emergency in thearea, and me chanisms for safe, order-ly repatriations. These issues were partof the Plan of Action that Mexico andthe United States signed in June 2001.We must not forget that, more than astarting point, these actions go straightto the heart of the matter. Mexicanswho cross the border, particularly in

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Pol i t i cs

summer, are ex posed to grave dangersin desert areas where there is less sur-veillance and no walls separating thetwo countries. Many die in the attempt.For the Mex ican government, avertingmore Mexican deaths is a priority andto that end we have put into practicedifferent systems of protection and aidalong the border, in coordination withU.S. authorities, such as the INS, theBorder Patrol and local police forces.For our part, the authorities of the Na-tional Migration Institute, the BetaGroups and the Mi nistry of Health,among other institutions, have rein-forced a variety of safe ty measures inthese remote areas, in clud ing surveil-lance and rescue missions in aid of thosewho find themselves in situations ofdanger, dis tribution of water and easy-to-prepare food and transfer of mi grantsto safe places where they are given themedical atten tion they require. As a re -sult, the number of mi grants who die intheir attempt to cross the border hasdropped significantly.

VM: Globalization and its collateralphe nomena have placed the conceptof sovereignty under discussion. Doyou think that our traditional foreignpolicy principles of non-interventionand self-determination continue to bevalid, or is it time to move toward otherways of conceiving and implementinga strategic foreign policy in today’s in -ternational relations?MJC: This is one of the issues thatsparks the greatest debate in Mexicoamong those interested in foreign po l-icy, and I believe that it has led toseveral misunderstandings. The prin-ciples of foreign policy incorporatedin the Mexican Constitution in 1988already existed in the United NationsCharter. They are universal and time-

less in nature and we do not questiontheir validity. Nevertheless —and herelies the first misunderstanding— theyare values, criteria that serve as a guidefor decision-making; they are not, in

themselves, therefore, a program forfo reign policy, as many would like tobelieve. Until recently, these principles—in particular those of non-in ter ven -tion and self-determination— wereused as shields to avert foreign scruti-ny, at a time when the country wasclearly lagging behind other na tionsin areas such as democracy and res -pect for human rights. This abuse ofthe principles distorted the way theywere understood, blurring their rela-tion to other government objec ti ves,

such as ensuring full ob servance ofindividual rights and protecting humanrights in general. Secondly, it is a recognized fact that

several of these principles have under -

gone profound changes in recent de -cades. Principles do not disappear; theyevolve. States have decided to cedesovereignty in many fields of action,both for the common good and in theirown interests. The universal trend offavoring the protection of individualsover the protection of states has infact reduced the breadth of those prin-ciples. This positive evolution has beenthe result of continuing internationalnegotiations and is rooted in com-monly accepted legal norms we would

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With President Vicente Fox.

Both governments are aware that mi gration plays a central role on the bilateral agen da, as was shown

by the rapid resumption of the work of the High Level Group on Migration after 9/11.


like to see applied in all states. Today,Mexico’s internatio nal behavior fullyincorporates this evolution. Withoutfalling prey to rhetoric about thoseprin ciples, we can become front lineplayers in the current internationalsystem and active participants in itstransformation.

VM: One of the main objectives ofVoices of Mexico is to contribute to

sup porting and disseminating Mex -ican culture, art, history and thinkingin the international community. Couldyou explain to our readers the kindsof activities and policies that havebeen developed to strengthen cultur-al policy in the United States to favorthe social climate in which communi-ties of Mexican origin live there?MJC: One priority in Mexico’s inter-national strategy today has been trans-forming people’s perceptions of Mex -ico abroad. At the same time that thegovernment works domestically to fightthe evils that have damaged our inter-national image so greatly —like corrup-tion or insecurity— the Mi nistry ofForeign Relations has promoted a bet-ter understanding of our country’s polit-ical renovation, econo mic potential andcultural wealth.Here, I would like to stress that we

are promoting Mexico’s culture abroadin two main directions. On the onehand, we have undertaken an ambi-tious strategy to promote Mexico’s rich

culture abroad, thus fostering an opendialogue between Mexico’s arts andhumanities community and those ofother countries. On the other hand, andindependently from the first stra tegy,the federal government is committedto keep supporting the populations ofMexican origin living in other coun-tries, most particularly in the UnitedStates, establishing close ties betweenthem and our country, fostering both in-

dividual and community development.Both tasks are government priorities, butI think that to carry them out effective-ly, it is necessary to make a clear dis-tinction be tween their objectives andstrategies. In one case, we are trying toattract other peoples to Mexico; in theother, the purpose is to support ourfellow citizens abroad, particularly inthe United States.With regard to cultural promotion

abroad, we have strengthened the Mi n -istry of Foreign Relations’ Office forCultural Affairs so it can be more ef -fective in disseminating Mexican cul-ture and therefore contribute to therebranding of Mexico as a modern, plu-r al and democratic nation. As an essen-tial part of this strategy, we de cided tocreate the Institute of Mex ico, a newentity within the ministry that willbring under one roof Mex ico’s cultur-al centers around the world providingthem with a common identity and asingle legal framework. Our aim is notonly to promote Mexico’s culture or cul-

tural products abroad, but also to pre-sent our country as an attractive placefor foreign tourism and investment.Regarding the second policy area,

the ministry’s Program for MexicanCom munities Abroad is the instrumentthat the government has established tobring people of Mexican origin closerto Mexico’s culture. But this programgoes much further than that, as it carriesout many other academic, education-al, health, cultural and sports projectsthat seek both to strengthen their tieswith our country and facilitate theirown insertion into the communitiesthey live in. To this end, we have car-ried out intense di plomatic efforts toeliminate the barriers and obstaclesmost Mexicans face due to their con-dition as migrants or minorities, or oftentheir cultural and educational back-ground. Additionally, we are also pro-moting greater personal and groupdev elopment among Mex ican immi-grants and their families.This program has already had im -

portant successes in education, healthand culture. For example, in educa-tion we have increased the coverageand depth of the programs the mi nis -try conducts along with the Ministryof Public Education, as well as otherpublic and private institutions in Mex-ico and the United States. With re gardto health, we have coordinated a seriesof activities aimed at promoting pre-ventive medicine and health care forthe most vulnerable sectors of the Mex-ican community in the United States,on issues such as addictions, cancer,diabetes, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, anddomestic violence. We have also sup-ported cultural activities in these com-munities through “Spanish-languagereading circles” in Ca li fornia, Ari zo na,Illinois, New York and Texas; children’s

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Our fellow countrymen are in the United States to work and make money, not to threaten U.S. national

security. We should never lose sight of their great contribution to the Amer ican economy.

Pol i t i cs

drawing contests; touring painting andphotography exhibits; courses and lec-tures; and radio campaigns.

VM: Relations with Canada have be -come strategic for Mexico, both be causewe are partners in NAFTA and becausewe each border on the United Statesat a time in which U.S. national secu-rity has become an issue that has aninfluence on the dynamics of interna-tional politics. Where do relations withCanada fit into the government’s for-eign policy priorities?MJC: President Fox has decided thatMexico’s new foreign policy should de -velop along two central guidelines: onthe one hand, deepening our stra tegicrelationship with North Amer ica, and

on the other, achieving a more activeparticipation in the internatio nal sys-tem. Under this dual conception, therelationship with Canada plays a cen-tral role. Since the signing of NAFTA,trade relations between our two coun-tries, as well as their relationship withthe United States, have generated astrong economic convergence that notonly increased the exchange of goodsand services among all three countries,but also revealed the potential for greaterintegration in other fields. The logicalevolution of the treaty and the politi-cal and economic maturity of Mexico,which made our democratic changefeasible, open up the possibility of mov-ing toward the creation of a new su -pranational institutional frame work in

the North American region, designedon the basis of open markets —in clud-ing the labor market— and a new senseof community. Ca nada’s experience issignificant in this regard because of itsgreater integration to the U.S. eco nomyand, at the same time, because it ulti -mately offers a different perspective.This economic convergence and the

creation of a trilateral institutional fra me-work are similar to those we havebeen witnessing in Europe for nearlyfive decades, although they will of ne -cessity have their own dynamics andcharacteristics. What is important isthat this transition is possible and closeat hand, and that it offers advantagesfor all three countries, not just Mex ico.The strategy of integration in North

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America promotes our foreign policyinterests and at the same time will be ananchor for Mexico’s emerging de moc -racy, just like the European EconomicCommunity was for Spain’s democra-cy in the 1980s. The difference is thatSpain was able to take advantage ofalready existing institutions, while Mex-ico must first promote their creation.This is the ultimate purpose of estab-lishing a new, closer and more profound

relationship with the United States andCa nada, which will nurture a new in -ternational identity of Mexico and a newsense of community in North America.VM: Beyond the anecdotal, the matterof Fidel Castro and Mexico’s vote inthe Human Rights Commission in Ge-neva make for a conceptual trans -formation of the role Mexican diplo-macy must play in the internationalsphere, a diplomacy that is more ac -ti ve and more committed to democra-cy, the free market, human rights, thefight against drug trafficking, etc. Inthat sense, what position will Mexicotake, as a firm defender of multilater-alism, vis-à-vis the United States’ grow -ing unilateralism on such importantissues as the International Cri minalCourt?MJC:Multilateralism and internatio n -al law are the foundations of ourshared international system. In the lastdecades we have witnessed a strength-en ing of multilateralism, as the inter-national community gets involved in

new issues such as the environmentand sustainable development, inter-national organized crime or the rightsof minorities, issues that together formwhat is known today as the “new in -ternational agenda”.Mexico is committed to strength-

ening the international system and itsrules. For that reason we supportedand took part in the negotiation of aninternational convention to protect and

promote the rights of the disabled dur-ing the Durban Conference AgainstRacism, Racial Discrimi nation, Xeno -phobia and Related Intolerance inSeptember of 2001. At the UnitedNa tions, we also presented a proposalfor a convention against corruption thatis now being negotiated in Vienna.As a matter of course, as was the

case with the great majority of na tions,we have also watched with concernthe United States’ tendency —it mustbe said that this is not only attribut-able to the current administration— towithdraw from or avoid involvementwith a great many important interna-tional agreements, not only the onecreating the Inter na tio nal CriminalCourt, but also, to mention just a few,the Kyoto Protocol on the environ-ment; the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty; the Con vention onthe Prohibition of the Use, Stockpil -ing, Production and Transfer of Anti -per sonnel Mines and Their Des truc -tion (or Mine Ban Treaty); and the

protocol to the Biological WeaponsCon vention. We should also remem-ber that the United States withdrewfrom UNESCO in 1984 and has not madeany plans to rejoin this organization.We believe that no power can be apart of the international system with-out subjecting itself to a minimum setof rules adopted to improve interna-tional coexistence. Never the less, par-ticularly after the September terroristattacks, the United States seems tohave become aware of the limits ofunilateralism and of the support it hasreceived from the global community,which in reciprocity re quests its soli-darity on many other issues. We would like this policy of “mul-

tilateralism a la carte” to move into aterrain of firmer global commitment.We also believe that in the complexworld created by 9/11, all nations shouldresist the grave temptation of reduc-ing policy options to a simple dualistor Manichaean ethic. In any case, thisis an argument that Mex ico is puttingforward today in all in ternational fora.

VM: In this framework, we have oneobligatory question: What is Mexico’sposition vis-à-vis certain U.S. actionsabroad and unilateral foreign policypositions, for example, the certifica-tion of other countries’ fight againstdrug trafficking or some of its stancesabout the recurring and increasinglyprofound crises in Latin Americancountries (Argentina, Venezuela, Co -lom bia, Guatemala)?MJC: Clearly, the United States istoday the international system’s hege-monic power, possessing a political andeconomic weight that greatly enhan c -es its capability for action. Its condi-tion as an unrivaled power may lead itto make unilateral decisions that di rect-

12

For the Mex ican government, averting more Mexican deaths is a priority and to that end

we have put into practice different systems of protection and aid along the border.

Pol i t i cs

ly serve its interests and —it should berecognized— may sometimes affectthe interests or rights of other nations(I have already referred to some im por-tant examples, like the Kyoto Pro tocolor the Statute of Rome). Addi tio nally,due to the tragic events of Sep tember11, the United States has focused itsforeign policymore on regions and issuesspecifically linked to the fight againstterrorism and, as a result, seems to bepaying less attention to Latin Amer ica.Nevertheless, Mexico and the UnitedStates continue to exchange points ofview about the situation in the region,as in the cases of Colombia, Venezue -la and Ar gen tina. These discussions arevery constructive, for they help strength-

enmutual cooperation efforts and arepart of a bilateral commitment to builda new, broader and more mature rela-tionship, one that does not compromiseMexico’s foreign policy principles oractions. The process of certification in the

fight against drugs is an excellent exam-ple of what can be achieved throughdialogue. As a result of intensive lob-bying efforts, Mexico managed to per -suade U.S. authorities, particularly inthe U.S. Congress, of the fact that cer-tification was a counterproductive andunilateral policy, rightfully achievingits temporary suspension. Those effortswould not have been successful if wehad not been able to show that Mex -

ico was committed to continue fight-ing drug trafficking, and living up to itscommitments. As the recent arrests of important

drug traffickers prove, Mex ico is keep-ing its word. Only through commit-ment and delivery was Mexico able tostop the certification process. It is withconcre te actions of this kind that thegovern ment of President Fox is strength -ening our mutual trust and coope ration,factors that are indispen sable for deal-ing with the common chal lenges weface.

VM: Could you draw a balance sheetof Mexico’s role as the chair of the UNSecurity Council?

13

Castañeda with other U.S. and Mexican cabinet members at the White House.


MJC: The record of the first Mex icanchair of the Security Council in Fe b -ruary is very positive, just as is, inbroader terms, that of our participa-tion in the council since January 2002.We are a member who is listened toand respected; we dutifully carriedout all our obligations, managing theworkload on issues such as internatio n-al peace keeping operations and pro b-lem solving in other areas. We had no

difficulty in assuming the chair in Fe b-ruary (the post, as you know, is ro tatedmonthly) despite the fact that we hadonly recently joined the council.When we chaired the council, we

especially advanced two issues high-lighted since our 2001 membershipcampaign: greater transparency in thecouncil’s work and greater democrati-zation with the active participation ofmore members of the internationalcommunity. At our initiative two pub-lic debates were held, one on the sit-uation in Burundi, with the participa-tion of its president, and another onthe problem of refugees, with the par-ticipation of UN High Commissionerfor Refugees Ruud Lubbers. In addi-tion, following its program, the councillooked at the situation of more than 10countries, mainly in Africa and Asia. Italso held an emergency meeting aboutthe crisis in the Middle East, with theparticipation of Secretary Ge neral KofiAnnan and delegations from Israel andPalestine. For the first time, at the end

of our chair there was a session to reviewthe month’s work, which allowed for ad -ditional dialogue among council mem -bers and other UN member states.I think we can feel satisfied with

Mexico’s role in the council, particu-larly while we chaired it. Moreover, Iwould like to emphasize that the cat-astrophic predictions about the suppos-ed problems we were going to face inadvancing our positions vis-à-vis the

great powers, particularly the UnitedStates, were all ill founded.

VM: Eight years after NAFTA and withthe prospect of the Free Trade Agree -ment of the Americas, what policiesand strategies have been consideredwith regard to regionalization and tradediversification?MJC: Just as the World Trade Orga ni -zation is the main mechanism for pro-moting multilateral trade liberalization,bilateral and regional accords allow usto foster our trade relations with othernations and regions. In turn, these ac -cords complement and foster greatermultilateral liberalization. That is whywe will continue implementing them.For Mexico, signing regional accordsdoes not limit hemispheric integra tion;rather, it serves as a first step in reachingbroader accords. In fact, the different accords that

have been signed are com patible withgreater hemispheric integration and, inaddition, are con sistent with the guide-

lines already es tablished by the WorldTrade Organization. Mexico’s membership in NAFTA and

in many other commercial treatiesplaces us in a vantage position. Suchaccords have allowed for an unprece-dented expansion of our foreign trade,they have given us considerable expe-rience in the process of trade liberal-ization, which will continue in com-ing years, and they have allowed us todeepen our dialogue and relations withother countries and regions, particu-larly with the countries of North Amer-ica and the European Union.One of the aims of creating a free

trade area in the hemisphere, as hasbeen proposed, is to contribute to in -creasing the competitiveness of na tio naleconomies and, to that extent, in ducegreater economic growth, job creationand, thereby, a higher standard of liv-ing for the hemisphere’s po pulation.But we should not lose sight of the otherfactor that I have pointed out: the deep -ening of our dialogue and political linkswith other countries, with the ensuingstrengthening of our international po -sition.

VM: Do you have anything more toadd?MJC: I would just like to express mygratitude to Voices of Mexico. For morethan a decade this publication hasdone an extraordinary job of dissemi-nating contemporary Mexican thinkingbeyond our borders. I think that theseefforts become even more im por tantdur ing the current period of change inour country, a time for leaving behindold habits and trying to consolidate anew civic and democratic culture inMexico, while we seek to take on a moreactive and constructive role in the world.Thank you very much.

14

The strategy of integration in North America will be an anchor for Mexico’s

emerging democracy, just like the EEC was for Spain’s democracy in the 1980s.

After more than 70 years of do-mination of a single politicalparty, alternation in the presi-

dency since the 2000 elections hasmade for enormous challenges forMex-ico’s main political parties, includingthe previously “official party.” Theyhave had to struggle to remain or turnthemselves into viable options for powerin a context in which, at the end ofthe day, the real competition charac-teristic of a democratic system was im-posed. Nevertheless, as I will attemptto show here, neither the InstitutionalRevolutionary Party (PRI) nor the Na-tional Action Party (PAN), today’s gov-erning party, nor the Party of the Dem-ocratic Revolution (PRD) have been upto the challenges. What is more, noneof the country’s three main politicalforces has read correctly the new rolethey have been called upon to play inthe political-economic scenario that

opened up because of alternation inthe presidency. They all seem to beholding tight to the script from thepast that satisfies their particular short-term interests but which in the endeludes all commitment to the big prob-lems and challenges inaugurated bythe twenty-first century.

INTERNAL DEMOCRACY

The PRI, PAN and PRD, each in its ownway, have shared the challenge of beingup to the new political zeitgeist and oftherefore making the internal institu-tional and programmatic transformationsthat these new conditions demand. Allthis has the aim, in particular, of exorcis-ing the dangers of weakness or politicalirrelevance or, worse, the threats of inter-nal splits that plague them all to a greateror lesser degree. Another vital issue hasbeen their political, strategic reposition-ing vis-à-vis the executive branch.The high point of the internal life

of the three parties was reached dur-

ing each of their respective nationalassemblies in 2001 and the subse-quent election of their main leaders.Of course, the PAN replacing the PRI inoffice forced the latter and the PRD tocarefully review the reasons for theirelectoral defeat, while demanding thatthe PAN evaluate the implications of itsnew situation as governing party. How-ever, none of the national assembliesled to a significant redefinition of posi-tions or countered the inertia of the past.The PRD, for example, could not

change or balance the presence of strongcharismatic leaderships or factionalgroups that not only slow the party’smuch-needed institutionalization butalso present it before public opinion asan organization divided and crisscrossedby factional, patronage and corporatistinterests, all highly contradictory withthe democratic ideal that is apparentlyincreasingly maturing among ordinaryMexicans. The PRI has also been unableto concretize its efforts and initiatives forstructural transformation. Quite to thecontrary, its leadership has not been

15

Political Parties in MexicoSince the Changing of the Guard

César Cansino*

* Professor and researcher at the UNAM

and the Autonomous University ofPuebla. Editor of Metapolítica magazine.

None of the country’s three main politicalforces has read correctly the new role they have been called upon

to play in the political-economic scenario that opened upbecause of alternation in the presidency.

Voices of Mexico • 60

self-critical in its analysis of its 2000defeat nor in introducing correctivemeasures. There has been, however, astage of extraordinary repositioning byRobertoMadrazo, one of the party’s oldguard. Despite the fact that he repre-sents all the vices the party must over-come in a real institutional transforma-tion, in achieving control over the party,to a certain extent Madrazo has solvedthe irrefutable problem of the lack ofan effective party leadership. Finally,the PAN has not managed to define itsideal relationship with President Vi-cente Fox. Mutual attacks are numer-ous and range from the president’sunacceptable pragmatism to the clear,traumatic marginalization of PAN cadrefrom senior posts in the administration.Tomakematters worse, the present and

future of the PAN are tied —perhapstragically— to the charismatic figureof Fox. The correlation is irrefutable:the drop in the president’s popularityhas been accompanied by a marked de-cline in the party’s electoral results.Another important moment in the

dynamic of the parties after the onsetof the PAN administration was reachedin October 2001 when, after threemonths of lobbying and negotiations,the political parties and the administra-tion decided to sign the Political Agree-ment for National Development, alongwith other actors in the country’s polit-ical and economic life.In practice, however, this agreement

gave rise to very poor and only momen-tary gains since it left out the most pres-sing issues that would give substance

andnewhorizons to the democratic tran-sition, such as the reform of the state.Nevertheless, the inability to live

up to challenges like this one is notthe exclusive responsibility of the par-ties; it also lies with the federal ad-ministration whose political operativeshave been ineffective and ambiguous.In conclusion, the political parties

have been intensely active since the2000 alternation in power. However,in the main, their achievements havebeen poor. What is more, the changesin each political force are not enoughto create the appropriate conditions foradvancing in the transformation and/orconsolidation of our young democracy.In effect, a profound change in our in-stitutions and norms that would marka departure from the authoritarian pastpresupposes the existence of strong,solid, mature parties that can serve as in-termediaries with an experienced, effi-cient executive branch (in contrast withthe wavering, imprecise one we havehad). In the absence of all of this, itwould not be possible to carry forwardthe still unfinished and desirable task

16

The PRI has not beenself-critical in

its analysis of its 2000 defeat.

From left to right: Felipe Bravo Mena, president of the PAN; Rosario Robles, president of the PRD; and Roberto Madrazo, president of the PRI.

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Pol i t i cs

of giving shape to a reform of the state,themost finished expression ofMexico’sdemocratic transition. Up until now, theprocess of political change has not en-couraged these outcomes, among otherreasons because the parties, exhaustedby their own internal crises, have notbeen capable of coming to an agreementamong themselves and with the exec-utive branch about the kinds of reformsrequired, how profound they should beand what direction they should take toconcretize the indispensable institution-al and normative change that the coun-try’s new political situation demands.

A REVIEW OF THE DAMAGES

How does Mexican society perceivethe three main parties’ response to theimportant challenges that the consol-idation of democracy requires in ourcountry?For the PRI, the most significant risk

it has run after losing office is a break-up that could precipitate the alreadyadvanced process of Balkanization ex-pressed in regional leaderships, localpower groups and increasingly discon-nected sectors. Insisting on imposingpublic figures on the rank and file andthe organization itself brings with it therepercussions that the PRI has alreadyfallen victim to and that political ra-tionality would advise against. Never-theless, what seems to have the up-per hand is the PRI supposition that a“leader” can, Messiah-like, guaranteethe political strength needed given theinsufficiency of political resources inthe party’s formal and institutionalstructure and the absence of an exter-nal source of power (like the presi-dency and administration constituteduntil very recently).

From that point of view, perhapsthe PRI’s main risk is the possibility ofsuch a problematic confrontation thatwould lead to schisms impossible toheal by institutional means.The PRD’s situation is different. The

PRD exemplifies the tortuous road thattheMexican left has taken in its attemptto become an alternative governmentwhen faced with an electorate that isincreasingly critical and predisposed tosplitting and reasoning its vote. How-ever, it has positioned itself before thepublic as a party with a democratic dis-course that it does not apply internal-ly, where it is Balkanized and fraughtwith fraudulent practices assumed tobe exclusive to other parties. This series

of inconsistencies noticeably affectsthe PRD’s electoral outcome: in recentlocal elections, the best it has been ableto do is to not succumb to some emerg-ing parties, and it has shown clear symp-toms of stagnation, with vote countslower than those of the PAN and the PRI,maintaining a shaky third place na-tionwide.One of the main obstacles to the

consolidation of the PRD as a left (or“center-left”) electoral alternative is itsinternal conflicts. It reproduces theMexican left’s endemic proclivity to dis-persion and cannibalism. At times,paradoxically, it would seem that thePRD still needs leaders and charismaticstrong-men who can coherently meshthe different internal forces and avertgreater clashes and dispersion.

It is no exaggeration to say that thePAN’s future depends to a great extenton the strategy it adopts vis-à-vis theFox administration. The PAN has suf-fered a significant decline in its electoralresults under the current administra-tion. At the very least, it has lost manyposts that under other circumstancesit would have been able to maintain orwin. That is why the party leadershiphas to carry out a serious, objective bal-ance sheet of its activity in recent yearsand, based on that, renew its politicalproposal, but above all, assume the fullimplications of its role as a governingparty.A second, equally important, chal-lenge for the PAN in coming years willbe taking the active role that it his-

torically has as the architect and pro-moter of the normative and institution-al change the country requires to givethe democratic transition that beganwith the alternation in office in 2000direction and a new horizon. Untilnow, the PAN’s commitment to the re-form of the state has been mainly rhe-torical and ambiguous.In summary, as long as there are no

solid advances in creating a democracy,in a new design of our system of normsand the construction of real rule of law,we will be left with the impression thatthe alternation of power our countryhas experienced with the PAN, the PRIand the PRD as its main protagonists hasnot been translated into lasting changesthat will make legitimacy and demo-cratic governability feasible.

17

The present and futureof the PAN are tied, perhaps tragically, to

the charismatic figure of Vicente Fox.

Macroeconomic data showsup the contradictory trendsthat have affected Latin

American countries differently over thelast decade. Mexico did not escapethe impact of a regional slow-down ineconomic growth. This, together withwell-known specific national develop-ments, had an impact on foreign in-

vestment in 1994 and 1995,1 createdvolatility in labor markets and escalat-ed the rate and intensity of poverty inthe mid-1990s. On the other hand, thestate not only maintained, but tenden-tially increased social spending as apercentage of gross domestic product(GDP) in the years 1999-2000, stabiliz-ing the achievements with regard tosome indicators linked to the satisfac-tion of the population’s basic needs.However, on-going national economicinequality, expressed in the concen-tration of income in few hands, con-tinues to hinder higher growth ratesthat could be beneficial if their results

were distributed in a balanced wayamong the population.

DEVELOPED MEXICO

The Mexican economy is growing.Recent evolution of national GDP showshow the country has recovered fromthe 1995 crisis, achieving its largest in-crease in 1999-2000 (see table 1).

With the exception of the interme-diate period of 1994 to 1996 when itsubsided, Mexico’s GDP has grown, andin 2000 was 28 percent higher than the1993 figure. Concretely, per capita GDP

19

S O C I E T Y

Growth and PovertyTwo Persistent Faces of Mexico

Jesús Francisco Estévez García*

* Visiting professor at the AutonomousMetropolitan University (UAM), Azca-potzalco campus Sociology Departmentand director of statistical studies ofMexico’s National Association of Uni-versities and Institutions of HigherLearning (ANUIES).

AntonioNava/

AVEPhoto


growth rate between 1999 and 2000wasa respectable 5.4 percent, U.S.$5,080per capita in absolute terms, main-taining Mexico’s status as a countrywith an upper-middle income accord-ing to World Bank classifications.2

According to the famous “trickle-down” theories that sustain that ben-efits will sooner or later be transferredto the less privileged sectors of the pop-ulation, we must think that in theme-dium term, growth, even with the ten-dency to concentrate wealth in a smallpart of the population, will bring with itan improvement in the quality of lifefor ordinary citizens. This suggests thatMexico’s evolution implies substantial,sustained improvement in the livesof its people in general.

IMPOVERISHED MEXICO AND

SOCIAL SPENDING

The truth of the matter is that evenwhen living conditions improve, theyare framed in a clear context of eco-nomic insecurity; this insecurity char-acterizes everyone who, even if notconsidered poor, can only satisfy theirimmediate basic needs and cannotsave or invest in household assets. Thismeans that in periods of growth, cer-tain layers of the population just bare-ly surpass the poverty level, so thatin critical economic periods, they fallbelow the poverty line, catastrophical-ly elevating poverty and marginaliza-tion figures. One of the fundamentalcauses of this is the characteristicvolatility of Mexico’s labor market.Low open unemployment only masksthe high level of employment in theinformal sector. In addition, low wagesand their scant participation in thenational product are traditional char-

20

TABLE 1EVOLUTION OF MEXICO’S GDP AT CONSTANT 1993 PRICES

SERIES: 1993-2000

TOTAL NATIONAL VARIATION

PERIOD GDP* (BASE YEAR, 1993=1)

1993 1,155,132,188 1.00

1994 1,206,135,039 1.04

1995 1,131,752,762 0.98

1996 1,190,075,547 1.03

1997 1,270,744,066 1.10

1998 1,334,586,475 1.16

1999 1,382,935,488 1.20

2000 1,474,725,467 1.28

* Millions of pesos at constant 1993 prices.

Source: INEGI, Sistema de cuentas nacionales de México: Producto Interno Bruto por entidadfederativa, 1993-2000.

There is a clear tendencyto improvement with regard to the satisfaction

of basic needs: education,housing, electricity, drainage and running water.

Soc iety

acteristics of the functioning of theMexican economy (see graph 1).3

It should be noted that the cost oflabor, already cheap compared to Mex-ico’s partners in the North AmericanFree Trade Agreement (NAFTA), dropsdespite the increase in worker produc-tivity in the same period (see graph 2).In addition, we should recognize therole to which Mexico might be relegat-ed in the international context of glob-alization. We should consider whetherthis is not one of the stable charac-teristics of Mexico’s development thatwill cause cyclical retreats in the fightagainst poverty given that the countryhas inserted itself in the world econ-omy using cheap labor and, conse-quently, low production costs as itscompetitive advantage. The words ofFerdinand Piëch, the German presi-dent of Volkswagen, leave no roomfor doubt:

The workers of Volkswagen’s Czech sub-

sidiary, Skoda, discovered that from

the advent of the Wolfsburg auto giant,

their productivity had risen 30 percent,

but their wages had hardly changed at

all. “If this continues, we will not reach

conditions comparable to Germany’s

even in 50 years,” complained Zdenek

Kadlec, spokesman for the Skoda com-

pany committee. But Ferdinand Piëch,

president of Volkswagen, coldly blocked

the satisfaction of the Czech workers’

wage demands. The Skoda work force

should not interfere with their local

advantages, he warned. Otherwise, “un-

doubtedly we would have to consider

if production would not be more advan-

tageous elsewhere like, for example, in

Mexico.”4

Mexico’s low wages and volatilejob market are associated with and

21

After the 1995 economic crisis, povertyincreased and, while it did declinesomewhat later, it has not returned

to 1994 levels.

TABLE 2POVERTY RATE IN MEXICO

% OF HOUSEHOLDS % OF HOUSEHOLDSYEAR UNDER POVERTY LINE UNDER INDIGENCE LINE

1989 39.30 14.00

1994 35.80 11.80

1996 43.40 15.60

1998 38.00 13.20

Source: Data from CEPAL, Panorama social de América Latina, 2000-2001 (Santiago de Chile:United Nations, 2001).


can explain some of the extreme vari-ations in poverty measurements (seetable 2) when economic downturnsoccur. The increase in the percentageof households under the poverty andindigence lines immediately after the1995 economic crisis should be noted:almost eight points in the first caseand four in the second.5 The improve-ment in living conditions in 1998, how-ever, was not very rapid given that only5 percent and 2 percent of the house-holds, respectively, crossed upwards.In addition, the reader should take intoaccount that the poverty rate is mea-sured here in terms of a percentage ofhouseholds and not individuals, whichwould tend to lower the rates becausepoor households are often the mostnumerous.

Poverty rates we have measuredquarterly show that counter-tenden-cies exist with regard to the achieve-ments in the fight against poverty.On the one hand, the rates used bythe unsatisfied basic needs method arelowered and those linked to the pover-ty-line method show an increase (seetable 3).6

The results shown in table 3 arenot strictly comparable with the pre-vious figures given that a) the 38 areasanalyzed are metropolitan, which tendto have a lower poverty rate than therest of the country; b) they are appliedto the population and not households;c) goods and services have been addedto the UBN method; d) the povertylines are more demanding (they re-quire a higher income); and e) the onlyincome considered is what comes fromwork, disregarding the total incomeof household members. However, weshould note that there is a clear ten-dency to an improvement in the coun-try situation with regard to the satis-

faction of basic needs that, in addi-tion to education, include the infra-structure associated mainly to publicspending, that is: housing, electricity,drainage and running water. Clearly,after the 1995 crisis, whose impact onthe satisfaction of basic needs (UBN)can be seen mainly in 1996, therewas a rather negligible deterioration(from 57.66 percent to 57.92 percent)with a rapid recovery from 1997 on.Incomes do not follow the same trend,however: the results show that afterthe crisis, poverty increased and, whileit did decline later, the poor popula-tion has not been able to return to1994 levels.

The slow recovery of the PL rates islinked, among other things, to thelabor problems we mentioned previ-ously. The systematic drop in povertylevels using the UBN method, on theother hand, can be explained by tak-ing into account the fact that the statedid not reduce its social spending from1990 on (except momentarily and very

relatively). Despite this the achieve-ments are overshadowed by the mag-nitude of the problem, inwhich econom-ic contingencies make a historicallyprecarious situation more serious. Ifwe examine Mexican government socialspending per inhabitant, we will seethat it rose fromU.S.$250 in 1990-1991,to U.S.$402 in 1998-1999.7 This isan important increase which is slight-ly greater than that of Latin Americaas a whole. We should add, however,

that this spending is systematically lowerthan expenditures by other countriesin the region since 1990 if taken in termsof the percentage of national GDP thatit represents.

In conclusion, we can say that withgreater degrees of disaggregation ofthe measurements, the rates have notimproved in certain areas of the coun-try nor in some sectors of the popula-tion. Thus, poverty is not the only prob-lem that Mexico faces. One of thefundamental questions is, in fact, thatMexico continues to be a country ofcontrasts to the extent that the im-provements derived from economicgrowth are only localized in certaingeographical areas and strata of the pop-ulation. Today, according to the UnitedNations Development Program (UNDP),the poorest 10 percent of the popula-tion receives 1.6 percent of total in-come, while the richest 10 percentreceives 41.1 percent.8 We should re-member here, just as a footnote, thatMexico is in fifty-first place in the world

in terms of its per capita GDP, accordingto the UNDP itself. However, CarlosSlim, with his U.S.$11.7 billion fortune,occupied seventeenth place on the lastForbes list,9 and he is only one of the12 billionaires the country has pro-duced: in 2002, their combined for-tunes came to U.S.$31.6 billion.

Thus, poverty and inequality in Mex-ico can be seen as two elements of asingle socioeconomic phenomenon thatmakes growth relative as it limits the

22

The improvements due to economic growthare localized in certain geographical areas

and strata of the population.

Soc iety

access of certain strata of the popu-lation in the formal sector to micro-enterprise investment and makes it im-possible for them to potentially demandcollectively goods and services on amarket whose development requiresthe existence of a middle class with rel-ative economic security. Currently,poverty indicators have improved butgreater GDP growth (of about 4.5 per-cent) is needed to beat poverty andinequality in the medium term. How-

ever, this is not enough in and of itself:the state must also maintain its socialspending and create redistributionmech-anisms that orient growth toward ap-propriate goals.

NOTES

1 The author is referring to the December 1994economic crisis that occurred a few days afterErnesto Zedillo took office as president andwhich produced severe social effects, among themskyrocketing unemployment and increasedpoverty. [Editor’s Note.]

2 World Bank, Informe sobre el DesarrolloMundial 2002 (Madrid: Mundiprensa, 2002).

3 Julio López G., “El empleo durante las refor-mas económicas,” Fernando Clavijo, comp.,Reformas económicas en México 1982-1999(Mexico City: FCE, 2000).

4 Hans-Peter Martin and Harold Schumann,La trampa de la globalización (Madrid: Tau-rus, 1998).

5 The indigence line expresses the income strict-ly necessary to obtain enough food for sur-vival; the poverty line adds other basic goodsand services needed for a decent life.

6 There are two traditional focuses for theanalysis of poverty: the unsatisfied basic needsmethod (UBN) and the income line method(also known as the “poverty-line” method, orPL). The former is applied by identifying andproving whether the members of householdspossess a series of goods and services gener-ally associated with a) public spending; b) theinvestment that households make in infra-structure and equipping their homes; c) theinvestment that households make in develop-ing their members’ human capital. That is,the traditional application of the UBN methodallows researchers to observe everything fromthe existence or lack of a dwelling itself, in-cluding its being outfitted with drainage,electricity and running water, to whether thechildren go to school or not. Thus, those house-holds that lack some of these satisfiers to avarying degree, depending on the number ofgoods and services not supplied, would beconsidered poor. The PL method is appliedestimating the monetary cost of a basic bas-ket of goods and services generally associatedwith normal household expenditures, an esti-mate that is then contrasted with whether themembers have sufficient income for food,clothing, shoes, personal hygiene and trans-portation. Once the figure, which varies overtime and according to geographical location,is arrived at, those who do not have the min-imum income needed to acquire this basketare considered poor, which means that theycannot satisfy their needs, paying for the sat-isfiers at current market prices.

7 Both figures are expressed in constant dollaramounts at 1997 rates. ECLAC, PanoramaSocial de América Latina 2000-2001 Síntesisat http://www.cepal.org.

8 United Nations Development Program, HumanDevelopment Report 2001 (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2001).

9 In 2001, he occupied twenty-fifth place withU.S.$8 billion, and in 2000, thirty-third placewith U.S.$7.9 billion. http://www.forbes.com

23

TABLE 3THE POOR AND NON-POOR IN 38 METROPOLITAN AREAS

UBN* AND PL** ANALYSES (1994-1999)

STRATA OF POPULATION UBN ESTIMATE % PL ESTIMATE %

Year 1994All Non-Poor 41.88 47.81All Poor 58.12 52.19

2nd. Quarter 1995All Non-Poor 42.34 35.94All Poor 57.66 64.06





Source: Data from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (INEGI) for the years cited. Theresults were originally obtained for a project commissioned by the IberoamericanUniversity (Santa Fe Campus) and developed out by the author of this article.

* Unsatisfied Basic Needs.** Poverty Line.

24

Mexico suffers from markedinequality on all economicand social levels, an inequal-

ity that has sharpened since the crisisthat began in the 1980s. Increased eco-nomic inequality can be seen, for exam-ple, among regions, sectors and branch-es of activity, the social classes, familiesand businesses. Here, I am going to lookat businesses, pointing to the distinc-tions among those of different sizes. FirstI will examine some data about the evo-lution of their structure with regard tothe number of workers and employeesin each of the three sectors (manufac-turing, the wholesale and retail tradesand services) from 1989 to 1999. Then,I will point to some differences in the

way each strata operates and the mainproblems small businesses face. Fina-lly, I will outline some proposals to mi-tigate those problems.

DIFFERENT STRATA OFBUSINESSES AND THEIR EVOLUTION

Since March 1999, the then-Ministryof Trade and Industry (today Ministry ofthe Economy) classifies Mexican com-panies as micro, small, medium-sizedand large according to the number oftheir employees and the sector in whichthey operate (see table 1).1

In 1989 there were a total of1,306,254 economic units; this figurerose to 2,184,558 in 1994 and 2,726,366in 1999. The number of people theyemployed went from 6,528,643 to

9,257,079 and 11,937,791 respectively.Thus, the number of businesses increas-ed 108 percent over the entire period,while the number of employees onlyrose 82.9 percent. Both increased morein the first five years than the second:the number of businesses rose 67.2 per-cent from1989 to 1994 and 24.8 percentfrom 1994 to 1999, while the numberof employees rose 41.8 percent and 29.0percent respectively. The variation wasdifferent for each sector and each stra-ta of companies (see table 2).We can see that from 1989 to 1994

the sector where the number of busi-nesses increased the most was manu-facturing, followed by services, whichthen rose the most from 1994 to 1999.In the first five years, micro-enterprisesunderwent the greatest increase in allthree sectors of the economy. This is

Mexican BusinessesA World of Inequality

Isabel Rueda Peiro*

* Researcher at the UNAM Institute for Eco-nomic Research.

Hen

ryRo

mer

o/Re

uter

s

Soc iety

25

due to self-employment. In the secondfive years, however, the increase of mi-cro-enterprises was surpassed by thatof large companies in all three sectors.This shows the effects of the crisisfollowing the December 1994 pesodevaluation on micro-businesses andconfirms that large companies werethe least adversely affected. The num-ber of small companies shrank over the10 years, indicating their vulnerabilityand the difficulty for micro-enterpris-es to grow.The number of medium-sized ma-

nufacturing companies dropped overthe 10-year period while the numberof service-providers and wholesalersand retailers dropped in the first five-year period and remained the same inthe second. The percentage of com-panies classified as large dropped inthe first period due to the proliferationof micro-enterprises, but did not changein the second period despite the factthat their absolute numbers increasedfrom 3,497 in 1989 to 4,927 in 1994and 6,775 in 1999 (93.7 percent high-er at the end of the period than at thebeginning).Table 3 shows the variation in the

number of employees by sector of acti-vity and company size. We can observehow in the first five years, the firmsthat most increased their number ofemployees were micro-businesses, fol-lowed by small companies. In the se-cond five years, in contrast, it was largecompanies that most expanded theirpersonnel rosters, while the lowest risewas among small companies, and mi-cro-businesses increased considerablyless than in the previous five-year period.The service sector shows the great-

est expansion in the number of employ-ees in both periods, followed by thewholesale and retail trades in the first

TABLE 1COMPANY SIZE BY NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES

MANUFACTURING WHOLESALE AND SERVICES

RETAIL TRADE

Micro Up to 30 Up to 5 Up to 20

Small 31 to 100 6 to 20 21 to 50

Medium-sized 101 to 500 21 to 100 51 to 100

Large 501 or more 101 or more 101 or more

Source: Diario Oficial de la Federación, 30 March 1999, pp. 5-6.

TABLE 2VARIATION IN NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTSAND STRUCTURE BY SECTOR (PERCENT)

SECTOR VARIATION PERCENT OF TOTAL NO.1994/1989 1999/1994 1989 1994 1999

Manufacturing 91.2 29.6 100.0 100.0 100.0Micro 97.7 30.5 91.6 94.8 95.4Small 20.1 8.7 5.0 3.2 2.7Medium-sized 20.9 19.6 2.7 1.7 1.6Large 11.7 45.1 0.6 0.4 0.4

Retail and Wholesale 60.3 19.3 100.0 100.0 100.0Micro 61.8 19.4 93.9 94.8 94.9Small 40.9 15.6 5.0 3.2 2.7Medium-sized 24.3 21.5 2.7 1.7 1.6Large 57.5 43.1 0.2 0.2 0.2

Services 71.8 32.4 100.0 100.0 100.0Micro 72.4 32.3 97.6 98.0 97.9Small 41.6 39.4 1.6 1.3 1.4Medium-sized 56.1 21.6 0.5 0.4 0.4Large 57.5 43.1 0.3 0.3 0.3

Total 67.2 24.8 100.0 100.0 100.0Micro 68.9 25.0 94.8 95.8 96.0Small 38.0 18.0 3.8 3.1 2.9Medium-sized 27.7 21.0 1.1 0.9 0.8Large 40.9 37.5 0.3 0.2 0.2

Source: Based on data from Nacional Financiera, El mercado de valores, Year LXI,10 October 2001, p. 46.


five-year period and manufacturing inthe second. The figures also indicatethat larger companies tended to bestrengthened, particularly in services,followed in the second five-year peri-

od by manufacturing. From 1989 to1994 large manufacturing establish-ments only insignificantly increasedtheir number of employees, diminish-ing their share of total employment in

the first five-year period and raising itin the second. In micro-enterprises,the opposite occurred. Small and me-dium-sized companies reduced theirproportional share of employees overthe whole 10 years.

DIFFERENCES INCOMPANIES’ OPERATIONS

Most micro-enterprises operate on acash basis, without resorting to cred-it. About 70 percent of their sales aremade in the local market and to thefinal consumer. Therefore, their invol-vement in productive chains as sup-pliers to other companies is very low.On an average, this strata has a lowertechnological level and many micro-enterprises go under very quickly. Infact, almost half these companies havebeen in business for less than five years;31 percent for under three years; andonly 31 percent for over 10.2 These com-panies’ vulnerability increased with theabrupt opening to the external marketin 1986 when Mexico joined the Gen-eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.Most small companies make their

sales on credit; less than half sell tothe final consumer; and the marketsfor their products are local, regionaland even national. Many have advancedtechnology and manage to consolidateand become medium-sized or largebusinesses.3

Medium-sized companies sell morethan 60 percent of their products tothe national market and less than 35percent to the final consumer.More thanthree-quarters of their transactions aredone on credit. On the average, theyuse medium-level technology.4

The large firms dominate nationalsales, representing 75 percent of them,

26

TABLE 3VARIATION IN NUMBER OF WORKERS AND STRUCTURE BY SECTOR

SECTOR VARIATION PERCENT OF TOTAL NO.1994/1989 1999/1994 1989 1994 1999

Manufacturing 22.9 30.4 100.0 100.0 100.0Micro 68.6 25.4 19.5 26.7 25.7Small 21.3 9.2 14.4 14.2 11.9Medium-Sized 19.3 22.6 30.5 29.6 27.8Large 1.7 53.0 35.6 29.4 34.5

Wholesale andRetail Trade 48.1 17.8 100.0 100.0 100.0Micro 61.6 14.8 54.6 59.6 58.1Small 36.1 17.2 16.5 15.1 15.0Medium-Sized 23.2 21.5 16.2 13.4 13.9Large 37.2 29.3 12.8 11.8 13.0

Services 62.8 40.1 100.0 100.0 100.0Micro 64.2 33.4 60.5 61.1 58.2Small 42.8 36.5 11.6 10.1 9.9Medium-Sized 57.0 27.1 8.0 7.7 7.0Large 72.3 65.9 19.9 21.0 25.0

Total 41.8 29.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Micro 63.9 24.0 42.0 48.5 46.6Small 31.5 18.6 14.3 13.3 12.2Medium-Sized 24.3 22.9 19.8 17.4 16.6Large 23.5 52.3 23.9 20.8 24.6

Source: Based on data from Nacional Financiera, El mercado de valores, Year LXI,10 October 2001, p. 46.

Large firms dominate national sales,covering 75 percent, and also effect

the immense majority of exports,80 percent of which are from the manufacturing sector.

Soc iety

and also effect the immense majorityof exports, 80 percent of which arefrom the manufacturing sector. Onlya few companies sell abroad: in 1996,20 percent of foreign sales were madeby only five companies and 80 per-cent by 630 businesses.5

The enormous inequality amongMexican companies is also reflectedin the degree of training their employ-ees have: generally it is higher in larg-er companies, a circumstance linked tothe wages they can pay and the gov-ernment support they receive, since itis medium-sized and large companiesthat are able to take better advantageof that support. This is due, for onething, to their better access to infor-mation. Also, government red tape isvery complicated, time-consuming and

often redundant, harming smaller com-panies more since they do not have thespecialized personnel needed to dealwith it, leaving the owners themselvesto dedicate an important part of theirtime to it.For this reason, the government

should carry out a real administrativereform to cut down on red tape and cre-ate training programs for its employ-ees that deal with micro- and smallcompanies. Non-subsistence micro-enterprises also require temporary sup-port from the government to consoli-date and grow, as well as fixed-rate,low-interest loans, up-to-date, timelyinformation about how to link up withother companies as suppliers or sub-contractors and preferential treatmentand training so they can be govern-

ment suppliers. It is also important tofoster a greater link-up between com-panies and universities.

NOTES

1 Before March 30, 1999, companies wereclassified according to the number of workersand annual sales, regardless of the economicsector to which they belonged.

2 Gerardo Flores, “Viven menos de cinco años50% de las microempresas,” El Financiero(Mexico City) 18 September 1996.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Alejandro Souza Vidal, “El entorno económi-co y financiero de México y las PYMES,”(Mexico City: Confederación Patronal de laRepública Mexicana [Coparmex]-Internation-al Labor Organization [ILO], 1997), p. 12.

27

28

P O L I T I C SH I S T O R Y

TheUnited States’ beingMexico’smain trade partner is so obvi-ous and familiar a fact that we

forget that it is a historic phenomenon.Themain aim of this article is to explainthe process whereby the United States,despite the striking fluctuations in itsparticipation in Mexican foreign tradeup until the end of World War II, be-came our most important trade part-ner. It should be said that, more thana steady increase, it took the form ofwaves of differing intensity.

Let me begin by explaining the gen-eral evolution. Graph 1 illustrates U.S.participation in Mexican imports andexports from 1870 to 1948. To simpli-fy annual fluctuations and look at thebasic trends, Graph 2 presents the samedata in three-year averages. Severalpoints are worth noting. In the firstplace, it is little known that in the1870s, the United States was still onlya secondary trade partner for Mexico,particularly in terms of imports. Aheadof the U.S. was Great Britain and attimes France, which together repre-sented 60 percent of Mexico’s pur-chases abroad.

In the second place, the UnitedStates starts to play a more preponder-ant role after 1880, although the tradepattern was subject to strong fluctua-tions that suggest that this was not byany means a linear, irreversible process.In the 1890s, imports from the U.S.dropped somewhat and in the firstdecade of the twentieth century, so didexports. Both imports and exportsdropped consistently from their maxi-mum at the end of the first decade ofthe twentieth century until the end of the1930s, rising again during World War II.Regardless of the causes of these fluc-tuations (to which we will return later),

Tracing U.S. Predominance InMexico’s Foreign Trade (1870-1948)

Sandra Kuntz Ficker*

* Professor and researcher at the Autono-mous Metropolitan University, Xochimil-co campus. ([email protected])

UNAM’sManuelToussaintPhotographyArchives

The 1880s. The railways facilitated the aqcuisition of capital goods for setting up modern Mexican industry.

Histor y

29

their very existence seems to contra-dict the commonly held opinion thatthe ties of dependency with the UnitedStates tightened progressively and thatthese ties were not only increasinglyintense but also practically impossibleto override. To the contrary, the dataon the graph suggests significant flex-ibility in the geographic distributionof Mexico’s foreign trade. One way oranother, our country was capable of reori-enting its exchanges and broadeningout its clientele and suppliers whendomestic or international conditions sodemanded.In the third place, the graphs show

that U.S. participation in Mexicanimports was much smaller than in ex-ports for quite a prolonged period, atleast until the first decade of the lastcentury. There is a gap, then, betweenthe earlier and —as of the 1880s—very high concentration of exports andthe later, more moderate concentra-tions of imports from a single country.This differential suggests that Mex-ico’s making a high percentage of itssales in the United States was not aconsideration in its picking its suppli-ers on the international market. Thisagain contradicts the image of depen-dency and obligatory reciprocity. Thisrelative autonomy was neither transi-tory nor brief: it lasted no less than 45years (between 1870 and 1915), and in-cluded a stage in which the concentra-tion of Mexican exports sent to theU.S. market was almost overwhelming(over 70 percent after 1887).

THE FIRST WAVE: THE 1880S

The first important U.S. presence inMexico’s foreign trade began in the1880s. This coincided with Mexico’s

first opening to the international econ-omy and is associated with the cre-ation of certain material conditions thatmade the two countries’ geographicalproximity concretely significant. In thisperiod, Mexico imported railroad track,machinery, rail equipment and construc-tion tools. By the end of the decade,three important rail lines that linkedthe northern border withMexico’s inte-

rior had been built. These investmentssoon brought others aimed at mineraldeposits close to the U.S. border, whichtranslated into imports of more ma-chinery and production goods. Therailways also facilitated the acquisitionof capital goods for setting up modernindustry, even if it was of modest sizeand heavily concentrated by region.The modification in import patterns

not only implied a drastic change intheir origin, but also in their composi-tion; the traditional basket of luxuryconsumer items began to combine withmore machinery and inputs for pro-duction. The latter went from 26 per-cent in 1880 to 40 percent in 1882 and60 percent in 1892, compared to lessthan 30 percent in the previous 50 years.

The case of exports is different sincethe United States was traditionallymore important for Mexico as a mar-ket than as a supplier: by the 1870s,the U.S. was buying 45 percent ofMex-ican exports for different reasons. Onthe one hand, an important number ofthem were precious metals used formaking payments abroad. The UnitedStateswas themain destination for theseresources since it was Mexico’s finan-cial intermediary with the rest of theworld. In terms of trade in goods prop-er, a large part of Mexican exports weremade up of articles produced in coastalareas: hemp, coffee, vanilla and tincto-rial woods, all items that could be eas-ily shipped by sea so that the lack ofland transportation would not interferewith their commercialization in theUnited States.During the 1880s, U.S. participa-

tion in Mexican exports rose consid-erably: from the 45 percent of the1870s to 60 percent in the 1880s andaround 74 percent as of the 1890s.This jump should be associated withthe participation of U.S. capital inrailway construction and the wave ofinvestments that this produced. Therailroads made it possible to mine Cen-tral-Northern Mexico’s ore depositsand opened vast areas of the countryto production for export. Exports byland to the United States went fromU.S.$1 million in 1877 to U.S.$12 mil-lion in 1890.Naturally, this process also implied

a progressive change in the composi-tion of exports: starting with a modestmix of precious metals and a few agri-cultural goods, it began to broaden outto includeminerals andmetals with dif-ferent degrees of refinement: first lead-silver compounds, then copper and laterzinc.Other traditional exports, such as cat-

It is little knownthat in the 1870s, the United

States was still onlya secondary tradepartner for Mexico,particularly in terms

of imports.


30

tle and animal skins, increased with theavailability of rail transport. At a certainpoint, the diversification of exports madeit possible to decrease the importance ofthe transfer of metals that had tradition-ally served to cover the trade deficit.In summary, the proximity of Mex-

ico and the United States and the riseof the railroads were historic pheno-mena that made it possible for the U.S.to achieve the absolute, insurmountableadvantage in trade with Mexico vis-à-vis its traditional European partners.

THE SECOND WAVE: THE TEENS

In the first decade of the twentiethcentury, U.S. presence in Mexico’sforeign trade seemed to stabilize atabout 76 percent of all its exports and60 percent of imports, despite cycli-cal fluctuations. Nevertheless, in thefollowing decade, World War I causeda severe break in international trade

patterns. The war led the Europeanpowers to concentrate their productionand energies on military objectives, in-terrupted the circuits of inter-oceaniccommercial traffic and reoriented alarge part of maritime transport to war-time use. The United States becamethe great distributor of goods, con-centrating an unusually large portionof world trade. This was felt through-out LatinAmerica, although in Mexico,where this had already been happen-ing before the war, the impact led theconcentration of trade to extreme levels:in 1917, 91 percent ofMexican exportswent to the United States, while 93percent of its imports came from there.In the case of Mexico an addition-

al factor contributing to this concen-tration was the Mexican Revolution,whose most severe stage of civil wartook place between 1913 and 1916. Itwas very difficult for European part-ners to cover the particular needs ofthe Mexican market in that context

(arms,munitions, horses, explosives andbasic consumer items like grain, suetand soap). In addition, the border be-came more penetrable given the worldsituation. To obtain these goods, Mex-ico had to orient a large part of its ex-ports to the U.S. market. In additionto the difficulties of international traf-fic, the needs created by the MexicanRevolution imposed greater concentra-tion of trade with the United States.As a result, for the first time export pat-terns matched import patterns and theUnited States acquired absolute dom-ination over Mexico’s trade abroad.In contrast with the first wave, on

this occasion, the factors that explainedtrade dependence on the U.S. werenot economic, but derived from polit-ical-military conditions and thereforewere transitory: they ceased just assoon as international trade routes reo-pened in 1919. Mexican imports fromthe United States plummetted from 90to 72 percent in only three years anddespite certain fluctuations, they con-tinued to drop throughout the decadeuntil they reached 60 percent in 1933.Changes in exports were even more sur-prising since from being 85 percent ofMexico’s total in 1919, they dropped to63 percent in 1927 and only 48 percentin 1933. This put the U.S. at its lowestshare of Mexican exports since 1877.

THE DECLINE: 1920-1938

It is easy to suppose that the end ofWorld War I would signal a return topre-war trade patterns. However, thefirst surprising piece of information isthat Mexico’s dependence on importsfrom the U.S. between 1915 and 1919reversed itself to the extent that in themid-1930s they had only the same

Histor y

31

relative importance as in the first de-cade of the twentieth century. Thatis, the extreme concentration of Mex-ican trade (91 percent on the averagebetween 1915 and 1919) did not cre-ate lasting dependence on U.S. sup-pliers since it was a reversible trend inthe medium term.It is even more noteworthy that in

the 1920s and 1930s there was animportant de-concentration of exportswith regard to the main trade partner,which is significant for several reasons.First of all, because it was the firsttime there was a drop of this magni-tude and duration since the appear-ance of U.S. domination of Mexico’sforeign trade. Secondly, because thisde-concentration of exports lent a kindof authentic bilateral character to theexchange with the U.S., in which tradein both directions evolved similarly. Itwas not that Mexico sold the UnitedStates the same amounts that it boughtfrom it, but that the proportion ofMex-ican trade that went to theU.S. was nowvery similar both in exports and imports.In the third place, the duration of

this phenomenon was very signifi-cant. It was a gradual transition con-sistent with greater geographical di-versification of foreign trade. Thistrend was reinforced by the effect ofthe international crises of 1921 and1929 on the U.S. economy but lastedlonger than they did, as can be seenin the fact that the drop in U.S. pres-ence in our foreign trade did not stopafter 1933. In fact, the lowest partic-ipation of the U.S. in a normal yearwas in 1937 (56 percent) for exportsand 1938 (58 percent) for imports. Itwas, then, a trend that lasted almost20 years, something unexpected in viewof the closeness of previous decades.We should ask ourselves why this

descent was so drastic and prolonged.One of the reasons was obviously thereactivation of trade with Europe, thereappearance of traditional partners(Great Britain, France and Germany)and the emergence of new partners,among whom Belgium, Italy, Hollandand Sweden took on certain impor-tance. In the second place, the rela-tive importance of the United Statesdiminished as of the 1920s as a resultof U.S. trade policy. Between 1922 and1930, the U.S. government establishedprotectionist trade tariffs and signeddifferent trade agreements and treatieswith countries with similar exports toMexico’s. After the 1929 crisis, theserestrictive policies accentuated, withthe establishment of quotas for copper,oil and other imports that were basiccomponents of Mexico’s exports.In addition, Mexico’s revolutionary

governments’ domestic policies con-tributed to this result in at least twoways. On the one hand, relations be-

tween Mexico and the United Statesbecame very tense between 1920 and1925 mainly because of the former’s1917 legislation about property andlabor rights and the continual threat ofmaking the Constitution retroactive.On the other hand, the regimen thatcame out of the Revolution was nation-alistic in its economic orientation andchanneled some of its energies into re-ducing dependence on its dominanttrade partner. In fact, in some casesthere appears to have been the expresspurpose of redirecting Mexican exportstoward Europe, whether to lessen vul-nerability of the given sector with re-gard to the U.S. economy or to strength-en Mexico’s negotiating position withregard to prices and supply. Thus, forexample, in 1922 Yucatán hemp grow-ers were given the privilege of export-ing a certain amount of their productwithout paying export duties on it underthe condition that it be shipped direct-ly to Europe.


32

The trends of the 1920s accentu-ated after the 1929 crisis, so that in the1930s, until the outbreak ofWorldWarII, the United States saw its presencedecline even further inMexican foreigntrade. Among other factors are thepolitical variables, like the sharpeningof tensions between the Mexican gov-ernment and foreign companies dueto the expropriations of 1936 to 1938and the semi-embargo on trade thatfollowed. The oil expropriation sparkeda strong reaction among corporations, areaction backed up by the U.S. gov-ernment, which, among other things,suspended purchases of Mexican oilas well as the negotiations for a tradetreaty between the two countries.

THE THIRD WAVE: WORLD WAR II

By the end of the 1930s, trade rela-tions between Mexico and the UnitedStates were at a considerably low pointcompared to the standards establishedin the last decades of the nineteenthcentury and the first decades of thetwentieth. Bilateral trade representeda bare 60 percent of Mexico’s foreigntrade, a proportion that had been nor-mal for imports in the first decade ofthe twentieth century, but which hadbeen surpassed for exports since 1884.What is even more significant is thatthis situation did not seem to be tran-sitory or extraordinary, but, rather, theresult of a deterioration that had lasted15 years. Given the intensification oftrade with Europe and a certain open-ing with regard to other countries ofthe world, there was nothing to sug-gest that the state of bilateral tradewith the United States would changeradically in the short run. Everythingseems to indicate that the factors that

brought about the third wave of U.S.presence were again exogenous; morespecifically, they were linked to theinternational situation created byWorldWar II.This war broke traditional trade links

even more radically than had the pre-vious world war. It turned the UnitedStates into the only country capable ofsustaining trade in the hemisphere.The U.S. actively took on this role andpromoted the creation of the Develop-ment Commission for Latin Americato foster trade both with the UnitedStates and among the Latin Americannations. In the case of Mexico, otherfactors favored an increasing U.S. pres-ence. Mexico’s declaration of war onthe Axis in 1942 severely restricted itstrade with Europe. Shortly thereafter,Mexico and the United States signeda cooperation agreement and the firsttrade agreement in the history of theirbilateral relations. As a result, Mex-ican exports to the United States wentfrom 56 percent of total exports in 1937to as much as 91 percent in 1941 and1942. Imports from the U.S. increasedfrom 58 percent of the total in 1938to 90 percent in 1944.At the end of World War II, a new

decline in U.S. presence in Mexico’sforeign trade began, suggested by thetrade figures, which began to declinein the last years that this article covers(1948). On the one hand, this was dueto the fact that Mexico’s trade balancehad deteriorated by the end of the war;on the other hand, the Mexican gov-ernment had embarked on a projectof industrialization through import sub-stitution. In order to move ahead withthis project, the government began torestrict trade, leading to the joint can-cellation of the bilateral trade agree-ment in the mid-1950s and a protec-

tionist policy that would last severaldecades.

CONCLUSIONS

The United States was a secondarytrade partner for Mexico until the lastthird of the nineteenth century. Afterthat its importance increased until itbecame Mexico’s main partner in theinternational market. Initially, the fac-tors that brought this about were theconstruction of railroads and the di-rect investment of U.S. capital thatreoriented part of Mexico’s exports tothe United States. Despite everything,it is significant that the U.S. was for along time much more important asa market for Mexican exports than as asupplier of imports. This disparity isnoticeable to the extent that it suggeststhat Mexico maintained a relativelybroad spectrum of suppliers and pre-served its autonomy in selecting themdespite the growing concentration ofits exports in the U.S. market.On the other hand, although the

U.S. predominates Mexico’s foreigntrade from the end of the nineteenthcentury, historically it was subject tomore or less severe fluctuations. Thisquestions the broadly accepted ideathat the growing U.S. predominancein Mexico’s trade was continuous. Farfrom it, the evidence shows that in theseyears, trade patterns were very mal-leable and adapted to changing con-ditions on the domestic level, in bilateralrelations and in the world’s economy.This means that patterns in internation-al trade depend on many different fac-tors, which makes it wrong to attributetheir evolution to the simple will of oneof the participants, even if that partic-ipant is the dominant partner.

A R T A N D C U L T U R E

The Possible WorldOf Álvarez Bravo

Roberto Tejada*

�Mattress, 1927.

34

�Angels in Truck, 1930.

An interior landscape ofdesire, haunted by imagesof statues and mirrors as

emblems of the body.

35

In his photography, Manuel Álva-rez Bravo has represented all man-ners of complexities and contra-

dictions by exploring a set of relateddifferences. Urban and rural realities,or themargins where they become con-fused or confounded, are linked in hiswork to the rift between natural ar-rangement and photographic design, orbetween formal sobriety and intellec-tual playfulness; or, finally, betweenwhat is potentially representable andwhat is actually recorded and promisedby a photograph. Even as he departedfrom his early abstract experiments toportray the peculiar nature of MexicoCity and its outlying regions —whereextraordinary encounters often emergefrom workaday phenomena— ÁlvarezBravo returned repeatedly to thestudy of spatial relationships and puri-fied form. Resorting often to personaleffects, a negative image of a rolledmattress, Colchón, 1927 (Mattress),was first exhibited as a set of lightboxes with a positive companion piece,a common practice for the photogra-pher in his abstract compositions. ButÁlvarez Bravo strove to retain the pro-gressive content of abstracted forms,perhaps in keeping with the concernsof his friend and associate TinaModotti. Over and over he addressesthe metropolis as a monument of mod-ern life and industry, in images thatpass as purely formal studies.An implausible architecture and

social progress are suggested in a pho-tograph of steel hardware tools, Ins-trumental, 1931 (Tools). Some of Ál-varez Bravo’s images from the 1930s

are more resolvedly symbolic or literaryin meaning. There is an uncertaintythat intensifies the power of thesepictures insofar as it remains unclearto what degree staging or reenactmentwas involved between photographerand subject. Death, dreams, solitudeand the unconscious were among thethemes explored also by the group ofMexicanwriters known as LosContem-poráneos (The Contemporaries). Likethe poetry of this movement, ÁlvarezBravo’s photographs often emanatefrom an interior landscape of desire,haunted by images of statues and mir-rors as emblems of the body (Ángelesen camión, 1930 [Angels in Truck]), orfrom an intellect in which insomnia andlonging are suspended in time (Escalade escalas, 1931 [Scale of Scales]).If rarely shown producing either in

the domestic or public realm, womenare often portrayed as symbols of anidea, feeling or effect. In a visit to thecourtyard of the building where hespent his early childhood, Álvarez Bra-vo chanced upon an adolescent immers-ed in her reverie, El ensueño, 1931(Reverie). The sunlight caressing herright shoulder intensifies the pausecaptured by the camera. Here, day-dreaming is symbolized as that inter-val between sleep and memory, beit personal or collective. The picturecaptures the pace of the everyday andthe often invisible but no less dra-matic interludes that confound it. Ina related image, from the penumbraof a room, a sitter’s face is half-illumi-nated as she gazes into a looking glasswhile combing her long tresses Re-trato de lo eterno, 1935 (Portrait of theEternal). Dreams and the unconsciouswere explored by many artists andwriters inMexico. But the picture com-plicates Freud’s model for femininity

* Research fellow at Dartmouth College. He haspublished widely on Latin American visual cul-ture and the language arts.

All photographs are reproduced by permission ofColette Urbajtel de Álvarez Bravo.

as the passive desire to be desired. Theeternal portrait of a figure locked intoher mirror image is arrested by view-ers, male or female, and by the inter-pretive process of the viewing.Devoid of metaphor, however, there

is another important strain in ÁlvarezBravo’s photography that is almost doc-umentary in its concern for workingconditions in Mexico. In one image,Obrero en huelga asesinado, 1934 (Strik-ing Worker, Murdered), the artist ren-ders the viewer mute as the cameracaptures the harrowing reality of a vio-lent death. Taking film footage (withSergei Eisenstein) in the Isthmus ofTehuantepec, and in search of whathe thought were fireworks from near-by festivities, Álvarez Bravo discoveredthat the noises were gunshots fired ata sugar-mill strike and that someonehad been murdered. Álvarez Bravo tookthis image very close to the corpse,and low to the ground, rendering thearm of the murdered worker as if inmuralist foreshortening.From the perspective of a passer-

by looking up from a city sidewalk,another image —a central one in hiswork Parábola Óptica, 1931 (OpticalParable)— shows an optician’s shopwith an oval hanging sign, but thepicture is reversed. It contains inflec-

tions of Eugène Atget’s images of Parisstorefronts made during the first de-cade of the twentieth century. Withreferences to the human eye, the “par-able” tells about the unreliability oflooking, about visual afterthoughts orchange in viewpoint and, therefore,about the nature of photographyitself. As inOptical Parable, where helinks scientific optics to photographicpractice, Álvarez Bravo also relatespathology to corporeal soundness, andthe observable body to the phantomanatomy beneath the skin (HospitalJuárez, 1935 [JuárezHospital]).Anothercommon motif in Álvarez Bravo’s pho-tographs, tree trunks and other natu-ral debris become surrogates of thehuman body, as in this unsettling formdiscovered by the photographer in aclearing beside a cornfield. Choppedaway at the base, side and head, thesolitary stump transforms the land-scape into a kind of otherworldly placesuffused with the “secret terror offoreboding” Diego Rivera claimed thephotographer’s images inspire.His work is an extended medita-

tion on the nature of looking and themedium of photographic reproductionitself. Lyric restraint and collectiveimpulses are joined in idiosyncratic do-cuments that engage the difference

36

Tools, 1931�

An implausible architectureand social progress are suggested

in a photograph of steelhardware tools.

37

between Mexico’s social realities andthe often nameless transit or long du-ration of the otherwise uncelebrated.His sensibility is surprisingly contem-porary in that his pictures allow fatu-ous and poignant qualities to coexistin an image. His pictures comment,too, on the disjunction between realfigures and their renderings. ÁlvarezBravo has stated, “I believe everythingis portrayable, depending on how yousee it. Everything has social content.”Even in hismore recent work, an image-environment of Coyoacán, En un pe-queño espacio, 1997 (In a Small Space),

the viewer is asked to choose betweenat least two possible interpretations.As he stresses the photographer’s rolein the decision between what an imageportrays and what it can mean as per itstitle, Álvarez Bravo invites the observerto ponder theworld as it is—but perhapsmore importantly, as it could be.

NOTE

* This article is based on fragments of the bookby the same author In Focus: Manuel ÁlvarezBravo, published by the J. Paul Getty Mu-seum, Los Angeles, 2001.

38

Mannekins Laughing, 1930.�

Extraordinary encountersoften emerge from

workaday phenomena.

39

�Reverie, 1931.

The sunlight caressingher right shoulder intensifies

the pause capturedby the camera.

41

� Juárez Hospital, 1935.

The artist renders the viewermute as the camera

captures the harrowing realityof a violent death.

� Striking Worker, Murdered, 1934.

42

Good Name, Sleeping, 1938-1939�

Women are oftenportrayed as symbols ofan idea, feeling or effect.

45

�In a Small Space, 1997.

His pictures comment, too,on the disjunction

between real figures andtheir renderings.

46

� Portrait of the Eternal, 1935.

The eternal portraitof a figure locked into

her mirror image is arrestedby viewers.

47

Optical Parable, 1931 �

The “parable” tells aboutthe unreliability

of looking, about visualafterthoughts.

� And It Moaned at Night, 1945.

Álvarez Bravo invites theobserver to ponder the world

as it is —but perhaps moreimportantly, as it could be.

Globalization and the forma-tion of regional blocs haveimposed the need for Mex-

ican diplomacy to develop new practic-es in order to lead the country towardthe center of the world dynamic. Thisgoal is embodied in the national dev-elopment plans of the last two admin-istrations as well in their respectivereports.Mexico’s geopolitical situation has

been altered by international transfor-mations that demanded a more active,specialized strategy to try to fulfill themain interest of our foreign policy:strengthening national sovereignty andpromoting the country’s economic andsocial development through insertingitself better in today’s world. In thatsense, contacts with all the regions ofthe globemounted and political and eco-nomic exchanges intensified through

an aggressive strategy of signing in-ternational instruments, outstandingamong which are accords on education,science and technology and, of course,free trade. But the task has merelybeen outlined and therefore remainsunfinished.The diversification and intensifica-

tion of external links with a greaternumber of countries and regions re-quired the design, implementation andfollow-up of a series of actions aimedat reaffirming Mexico’s presence inEurope, Latin America, the Caribbeanand the Pacific Basin countries, as wellas in the institutions and groups thatpromote economic and social devel-opment both in developed and devel-oping nations.1

THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSIFICATION

On the threshold of the twenty-firstcentury, Mexico’s foreign policy has

gone through significant changes inits design, leadership and implemen-tation. These modifications have oc-curred parallel to the profound andvaried transformations of the structureand dynamic of the international system.The end of bipolarism, the processesof political and economic integration,the growing advance of economic glob-alization and the importance of thedebate about democracy, human rights,the environment, etc., have changed thepriorities on the agenda.While the doc-trine, principles and objectives of foreignpolicy have remained firm, it is alsotrue that the speed of world events hasforced it to be increasingly pragmatic.On the other hand, economic reor-

ientation and political changes insidethe country have also had an impacton the new dynamic of Mexico’s for-eign policy. In this context, over the lastdecade the strategy to diversify Mex-ico’s relations with the world has be-come a priority;2 this consists of seek-

49

E C O N O M Y

Mexico, Modern DiplomacyAnd the European Union

Alejandro Chanona*

* Professor at the UNAM School of Politicaland Social Sciences.

Over the last decade the strategy to diversifyMexico’s relations with the world has become a priority;

this consists of seeking more solid links with different groupsof countries through formal institutional mechanisms.


ingmore solid linkswith different groupsof countries through formal institu-tional mechanisms that attempt to cre-ate conditions of certainty and legalsecurity in the relationship with Mex-ico for the world’s leading investingpowers and, of course, with the mostdynamic markets.

THE EUROPEAN UNION

AND DIVERSIFICATION

TheEuropeanUnion (E.U.) as a region-al regimen has tended to regroup themost influential nations of Europe in

the post-Cold War period. The E.U.is the world’s foremost trading powerand largest market. Its 15 countries arehome to 375 million inhabitants; itsjoint gross domestic product is U.S.$8.3trillion, equivalent to that of the UnitedStates. In addition, the E.U. concen-trates about one fifth of the world’strade.

The EvolutionOf Mexico-E.U. Relations

Since the 1975 signing of the first im-portant trade agreement betweenMex-

ico and the then-European EconomicCommunity, relations between the twohave intensified in the political spherebut diminished in the economic sphere.Today, the E.U. has great weight

and political and economic influencein the dynamics of international rela-tions; it is also Mexico’s second tradingpartner (6.5 percent) and second sourceof foreign investment (20.3 percent).3

This means that the potential for ourcountry and the world’s main tradingbloc complementing each other takeson special significance.This is the reason for Mexico’s stra-

tegy of deepening and broadening outlinks of all kinds mainly with the E.U.,without disregarding its relations withthe new states that have emerged inCentral Europe and the Balkans, attimes wrapped up in overcoming theirown internal problems.On May 2, 1995, Mexico and the

European Union announced the deci-sion to broaden and deepen their bilat-eral relations creating a new frame-work that would make it possible tobolster political dialogue, establish afree trade area and intensify coopera-tion with the aim of contributing inthe long term to the promotion of thefundamental values of respect for hu-man rights, the rule of law, democra-cy and security. In this same vein, onDecember 8, 1997, another of themost significant steps in the strength-ening of bilateral relations betweenMexico and the E.U. was taken: thenegotiations for the E.U.-Mexico Eco-nomic Partnership, Political Coordina-tion and Cooperation Agreement, alsoknown as the “Global Accord,” began.This instrument, which entered intoforce very recently, pulls together in asingle text political, trade and cooper-ation issues, making it the most com-

50

While the doctrine, principles and objectivesof foreign policy have remained firm, it is alsotrue that the speed of world events has forced

it to be increasingly pragmatic.

Economy

plete and ambitious one Mexico hasever signed and the only one of thistype that the E.U. has negotiated witha non-European nation.4 Also signedwere the “Interim Accord on Tradeand Matters Related to Trade” and ajoint declaration, which ratifies themandate to negotiate a free trade zone.The process leading up to these sign-ings began in 1998 and culminatedsuccessfully November 24, 1999.

NegotiatingThe Free Trade Agreement

The signing of the “Global Accord”was the step that preceded the sign-ing of the Mexico-European UnionFree Trade Agreement (Mexico-E.U.FTA) in March 2000 by then-Presi-dent Ernesto Zedillo in Lisbon, givingMexican products access to a 375-million-person market.With this agreement, the Mexican

economy is expected to benefit fromthe high potential for European in-vestment as well as from its advancedtechnology. At the same time, theEuropean Union benefits by being ableto compete in equal conditions withthe countries withwhichMexico alreadyhas free trade agreements. This willallow the E.U. to recover and extendits presence in the Mexican market,which, despite its continuing to beMex-ico’s second trade partner, in the lastdecade had dropped 43 percent, sink-ing from 11.4 percent of all of Mex-ico’s foreign trade in 1990 to 6.6 per-cent in 2001 (see graphs 1 and 2).The European Union is also our

second source of foreign direct invest-ment (FDI), with 20.2 percent of thetotal (U.S.$74 billion) that enteredthe country between 1994 and June

2001 (see graph 3). In June 2001, the5,066 companies with European cap-ital made up 23 percent of the 22,002firms inMexicowith FDI,withU.S.$15.1million in investment.The results of the negotiations were

approved March 20, 2000 by Mexico’sSenate —together with the “GlobalAgreement”— and by the EuropeanCouncil ofMinisters ofMember States;and July 1, 2000, the part of the FreeTrade Agreement with the EuropeanUnion corresponding to goods enteredinto effect.Finally, in his last European tour

from May 14 to 18, 2002, PresidentZedillo inaugurated a program to ac-celerate tariff reduction between Mex-ico and the European Union whichincluded trade for U.S.$1.7 billion.

Firm commitments for almost U.S.$300million in investments from Spain wereachieved and high expectations cen-tered on European firms’ investing inMexican telecommunications, electri-city and petrochemicals. However, thisis still subject to the arrival at consen-suses among the different branches ofgovernment to create the legislativeframework that would allow it.

THE NORTH AMERICAN

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

As a result of Mexico’s decades-longstrategy abroad, and after signing sev-eral different trade instruments withthe United States, relations with ourneighbor to the north are constantly

51

With the Mexico-E.U. FTA the Mexican economyis expected to benefit from the high potential

for European investment as well as fromits advanced technology.


improving. The profound changes thatMexico has been undergoing have givenour bilateral economic relations greateraffinity than ever before in history.Through new trade instruments likethe framework agreements of the1980s, as well as others regarding invest-ment, tourism, agricultural cooperation,etc., the first steps were taken towarda new course for relations between ourtwo countries. However, these instru-ments still excluded some basic tradeissues like the application of tariffs orthe abuses of legislation about unfairtrade practices, and retained their pro-tectionist approaches. These matterswere overcome.The North American Free Trade

Agreement, negotiated from 1990 onwith the United States and Canada,came into effect in 1994 with the fol-lowing explicit aims:

a) Promoting better and more secureaccess for Mexican products to theUnited States;

b) Reducing the vulnerability of Mex-ico’s exports vis-à-vis unilateral anddiscretionary measures;

c) AllowingMexico to deepen the struc-tural change of its economy, strength-ening domestic industry through asolid export sector and with morecompetitiveness; and

d) Contributing to the creation of moreproductive jobs and increasing thewell-being of the population.

MAIN RESULTSOF THE NEGOTIATIONS

NAFTA, in addition to establishing a pro-gram to reduce tariffs among its mem-bers, includes stipulations about elimi-

nating non-tariff barriers; states specificrules of origin for products from theregion; opens up a significant portion ofgovernment purchasing to its mem-bers; has a specific chapter that setsbilateral commitments between Mex-ico and the United States and betweenMexico and Canada about agriculturalproducts that include domestic sup-ports and subsidies to exports; and con-tains a special program to lower tariffsfor auto products with a rule of originof an average 60 percent.With regard to energy, Mexico has

been released from the application ofthe disciplines agreed on by the othersigners; for textile products, it has beenstipulated that the treaty will prevailover the Multi-fiber Accord and otherinternational conventions on the issue.NAFTA also includes norms about safe-guards and unfair trade practices and

52

Economy

a chapter about trade in services, whichdeals not only in general principles butinvolves specific areas like financial ser-vices, insurance, land transportationand telecommunications, among others.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The differences between NAFTA andthe Mexico-E.U. FTA are not to befound in the instruments negotiatedsince both are mechanisms dealing withsimilar issues and with norms that fallwithin the framework of the WorldTrade Organization. What marks thedifferences between these two treatiesare the circumstances and premisesthat gave rise to their negotiation andthe expectations about the results.

When negotiations began with theUnited States and Canada, 72.4 per-cent of all of Mexico’s trade was withthe United States. When the processbegan with the European Union in1998, Mexico’s total trade with it wasonly 6.4 percent (and this percentageis a matter of greater concern if weconsider that at the end of 2001, Mex-ico’s trade worldwide had tripled vis-à-vis the beginning of the 1990s, andhad reached U.S.$326 billion).For these reasons, we can conclude

that while NAFTA was negotiated inthe light of the need to create a nor-mative, formal framework for alreadyexisting trade flows with the UnitedStates, Mexico-E.U. FTA was signedbased on the premise of diversifyingthe prevailing concentration of Mex-

ico’s trade flows and attracting in-vestment from the world’s largestmarket.

NOTES

1 Andrés Rozental, La política exterior deMéxico en la era de la modernización (MexicoCity: FCE, 1993), p. 55.

2 Poder Ejecutivo Federal, Plan Nacional deDesarrollo, 1995-2000 (Mexico City: PoderEjecutivo Federal, 1995), p. 12.

3 “La diversificación de las relaciones, prioridadde la política exterior,” Enlace mexicano,March-April 2000, (Mexico City), p. 1.

4 Ibid, p. 2.

53

Main Accords in the Mexico-E.U.Free Trade Agreement


54

I. MARKET ACCESS

• Gradual, reciprocal elimination of import tariffs.• The asymmetry between Mexico and the EuropeanUnion is recognized through differentiated timelimits for tariff elimination.

• Europe will eliminate tariffs in 2003, Mexico in2007.

• Preferential access for Mexican exports in the gen-eral system of preferences.

• Establishment of a 10-year, linear elimination oftariffs for agricultural and agro-industrial products,import quotas and a waiting list for products pro-tected by the European Union.

• 95 percent of Mexico’s agricultural exports to theEuropean Union will have preferential access.

• Quantitative restrictions and prohibitions (importor export permits) will be eliminated, but the rightto adopt measures needed to protect human, ani-mal or vegetable life and health and public mo-rality will be preserved.

II. RULES OF ORIGIN

• Rules of origin were negotiated guaranteeing thatthe benefits from the agreement remain in theregion.

• Among the most important rules of origin arethose for textiles, transportation, auto parts, elec-trical appliances, footwear and plastics.

III. TECHNICAL NORMS

• It was agreed that the right to adopt and applynorms will be preserved as long as they do notbecome unnecessary obstacles to trade.

• A special committee will be created to foster coop-eration in information exchange about systems ofnormalization and the solution of problems of ac-cess related to technical norms.

IV. SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY NORMS

• A specialized sub-committee will be formed and willmeet yearly to exchange information, identify andfacilitate the solutions of problems of access, promoteequivalent norms in Mexico and the European Unionand foster the recognition of areas free of disease.

V. SAFEGUARDS

• Safeguards can be adopted for a maximum ofthree years to provide temporary relief to a sec-tor that might face serious damage or the threat ofdamage due to substantial increases in imports.

• In all cases, the application of a safeguard willrequire compensation. If an agreement cannot bereached about the amount of the compensation, ameasure with equivalent effects can be adopted tocompensate for the damage to trade.

VI. INVESTMENT AND RELATED PAYMENTS

• The current opening will be consolidated innational legislation.

• For Mexico, this will not imply additional openingto FDI in any sector.

• International commitments with regard to invest-ment will be reiterated.

• The right to adopt safeguards because of problemsrelated to exchange rate, monetary or balance ofpayment policies will be preserved.

Economy

55

• A mechanism will be instituted to promote recip-rocal investment through information exchangefor identifying business and corresponding legisla-tive opportunities.

• The commitment to reciprocally promote invest-ment and design ways to carry out joint invest-ments will be established.

VII. TRADE IN SERVICES

• Mexican service providers will have access to theE.U. service market without restrictions on the num-ber of operations or providers and will enjoy na-tional treatment and most-favored-nation status.

• The current degree of economic opening stipulat-ed in national laws will be consolidated to guaran-tee that none of the countries pass more restrictivelegislation.

VIII. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

• Mexican exporters of goods and services to theE.U.’s 10,000 public sector institutions and compa-nies that make more than U.S.$400 million in pur-chases a year will be given better access than otherE.U. trade partners; in addition, they will enjoy na-tional treatment.

• The aforementioned measure will include purchas-ing by Mexican federal government institutionsand companies as well as the entities of the centralgovernments and para-state companies of themember states and the executive body of the E.U.

• This measure will be applied on acquisitions ofgoods and services including those for construc-tion, whose value exceeds certain amounts.

• Mexico will have a transitional reserve for sevenyears for purchases by PEMEX, the Federal ElectricityCommission, non-energy sector construction andthe acquisition of non-patent medicines.

• These measures will not enter into force until theE.U. presents detailed, disaggregated statistics forthe purchases of at least 150 public companies.

IX. COMPETITION

• To guarantee an environment conducive to entre-preneurial activity, competition will be promotedand monopolistic practices combatted.

• A working group will be established to promotetechnical cooperation and information exchange;to coordinate general studies on the matter as wellas specific consultations; and to consider issueslinked to the relationship between policies and thelaws of competition and trade, to avoid the appli-cation of restrictive trade measures.

X. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

• According to respective legislations, obligationswill be established about the acquisition, conser-vation and exercise of intellectual property rights.

• A special consulting committee will be establishedto deal with issues and disagreements in mattersof intellectual property, while the right to resort tothe dispute settlement mechanism established inthe agreement will be preserved.

• The rights and obligations established in signedinternational treaties and conventions are con-firmed.

XI. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

• A consultation and dispute settlement mechanism isestablished with clear, expedite procedures.

• Priority will be given to conciliation for settling dis-putes.

• The right to appeal to the World Trade Organi-zation’s dispute settlement mechanism is pre-served.

• Arbitral procedures will be agile and transparent.• In case of non-compliance, equivalent agreed-upon benefits may be temporarily suspended untilsuch time as the decision of the arbitral panel iscarried out.

56

It was 10 years ago, inAugust 1992,that the North American FreeTrade Agreement (NAFTA) negotia-

tions concluded after a final push dur-ing a marathon session at the WatergateHotel.

At the time, some commentators inMexico feared that the trade agree-ment would be a “sellout” of Mexico(much as Canadian critics did, whentheir country negotiated its free tradeagreement with the U.S.), especiallyregarding the sacrosanct oil sector, andthat it would wipe out vast segmentsof Mexican industry. U.S. critics, mostnotably Ross Perot, expected to hear a“giant sucking sound” as thousands ofU.S. jobs moved south of the border.

NAFTA supporters in both the U.S.and Mexico expected a significant num-ber of jobs to be created in both coun-tries andmore generally envisaged NAFTA

as the driving force of North Americaneconomic dynamism, whichwould allowthe three countries to become morecompetitive in world trade.

Ten years after NAFTA’s signing, andalmost eight years after its coming intoforce, it is fair to say that, not surpris-

ingly, it has turned out to be neither adisaster nor a panacea. By some yard-sticks, it has performed very well, andby others it has fallen short of expec-tations; what actually happened couldbe likened to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’sfamous dog that did not bark. And,some of its greatest challenges are stillto come.

SOME SUCCESSES

Two recent Mexican books provide anassessment of NAFTA. ¿Socios naturales?(Natural Partners?), edited by ITAM

scholars, and Para evaluar al TLCAN,edited by CIDE-ITESM scholars, both con-clude that, overall, NAFTA has been asuccess.1

Looking at “the big picture” presentsNAFTA in the best light. Take trade flows,for instance. From 1993 to 2000, bilat-eral trade between Mexico and the U.S.went from U.S.$85 billion to U.S.$263

billion, an increase of 209 percent. Mex-ico is now the U.S.’s second tradingpartner, surpassed only by Canada. Ifthe latest available projections are cor-rect, Mexico should become the U.S.’smain trade partner during the currentdecade.

Thanks in large measure to the im-pressive growth in Mexico’s trade withthe U.S. since the onset of NAFTA, it isnow, by far, Latin America’s main ex-porter. In fact, for the last several yearsMexico’s exports have exceeded thoseof all other Latin American countriescombined. As graph 1 shows, in 2000,Mexico’s exports easily surpassed thoseof the other threemain exporters in LatinAmerica: Argentina, Chile and Brazil.

The situation regarding foreign di-rect investment (FDI) is akin to that oftrade. The total FDI received by Mex-ico from 1994 to 2000 was U.S.$466billion, which translates into an annu-al inflow of U.S.$7.8 billion, whereasannual inflows from 1989 to 1993 wereonly U.S.$2.9 billion. The U.S. hasaccounted for 64 percent of total FDI

flows since the NAFTA entered into effect.Turning from trade and investment

flows to institutional questions, NAFTA

has also chalked up some noteworthysuccesses. It represents an institution-alization of economic relations amongcountries whose economies had becomeincreasingly intertwined and where

Ten Years of NAFTAA Mexican Perspective

Antonio Ortiz Mena*

* Researcher and lecturer in internationalpolitical economy at the InternationalStudies Division of the Center forEconomic Research and Teaching (CIDE)(www.cide.edu).

Large increasesin trade and investment flows

have translatedinto a greater reliance on

the U.S. economy.

Economy

57

the large partner always had the upperhand over the smaller ones when solvingdisputes unilaterally. NAFTA has bredcertainty and facilitated the impres-sive growth in trade and investmentmentioned above.

A key element in providing certain-ty has been thedispute settlementmech-anisms. For instance, between 1994and 2001, 79 disputes arose regardingthe politically volatile issues of dump-ing and subsidies, and arbitral panelsset up under NAFTA rules have solvedthe great majority of these cases effec-tively and fairly. All other Latin Amer-ican countries would be more thanpleased to have access to this disputesettlement mechanism, but so far Mex-ico is the only Latin American countryto have this privilege.

NAFTA has also meant that wide-ranging economic policy swings, whichhad been prevalent in Mexico andproved devastating (one need only recallthe 1982 bank nationalization), have

been greatly curtailed. After the De-cember 1994 peso devaluation strongpressure was brought to turn back fromtrade liberalization, but the costs ofdoing so under NAFTA would have beenvery high. Instead, the devaluation,coupled with privileged access to abooming U.S. market, allowed Mexicoto turn back from the brink in a rela-tively short time.

Most critics now take NAFTA forgranted, and talk about improving itor modifying it, instead of ditching italtogether. Jorge G. Castañeda, Mex-ico’s current foreign minister, andAdol-fo Aguilar Zínser, Mexico’s represen-tative in the United Nations SecurityCouncil, were two of NAFTA’s most vo-ciferous opponents and during itsnegotiations testified before the U.S.Congress, advising against its approval.Now they no longer question its fun-damental principles.

NAFTA is thus a central element inMexico’s economic policy. The coun-

try has greatly benefited from privi-leged access to the world’s largest mar-ket. It has also helped to attain somecontinuity in economic policy, which isa prerequisite for sustained economicgrowth and poverty reduction.

SHORTCOMINGS

The obverse sides of some NAFTA suc-cesses are also its shortcomings. Thelarge increases in trade and investmentflows have also translated into a greaterreliance on the U.S. economy. Somecommentators see nothing new in this.The usual retort is that Mexican tradehas been closely linked to the U.S.market for decades; in the early 1980sapproximately 70 percent of Mexico’stotal trade was with its northern neigh-bor, and NAFTA merely increased it to80 percent. This view misses a majortransformation: even during the oilboom in the late 1970s and early 1980s,


58

only slightly over 20 percent of theMexican economy depended on trade,whereas the figure is now close to 70percent (see graph 2).

Mexican and Canadian trade in-creased by 199 percent from 1993 to2000 (just shy of the 209 percent in-crease in Mexico-U.S. trade), but giventhe extremely low levels of trade be-tween Mexico and Canada when NAFTA

entered into effect, this figure is some-what misleading. In fact, 95 percentof Mexico’s North American trade in2000 was with the U.S. The fact thatonly 5 percent of its North Americantrade was with Canada cannot be fullyaccounted for by the fact that Cana-da’s economy is smaller than that ofthe U.S., nor by geographical consid-erations. What this also shows is thatNAFTA is really comprised of two strongbilateral relations (Canada and Mex-ico with the U.S.) rather than a trulyNorth American one. Mexico now hasone of the world’s most open econo-mies, and the vast majority of its tradeis with theU.S.As theU.S. goes so doesMexico, as became all too painfullyevident since the latter entered into arecession in 2001.

NAFTA did not wipe out many Mex-ican industries, as had been feared.The fact of the matter is that thebrunt of trade liberalization was feltduring the 1980s, before NAFTA wasnegotiated. During that decade Mexi-co undertook a series of far-reachingeconomic policy reforms as part of ma-croeconomic stabilization and structur-al reform efforts, and trade liberaliza-tion played a major part.

What is the case is that the benefitsof NAFTA have not been shared equal-ly. The Mexican Southeast is one ofthe country’s poorest regions, and it hasseen few —-if any— benefits from

NAFTA. In fact, those regions may behard hit as the liberalization of cornimports from the U.S. proceeds apaceuntil full liberalization of trade in corntakes place 15 years after NAFTA’s enter-ing into force.

Severe regional disparities are cou-pled with scant possibilities of partic-ipation for small and medium enter-prises (SMEs). SMEs account for lessthan 7 percent of Mexico’s exports,

while large companies contribute about50 percent. The rest of exports areaccounted for bymaquiladoras (in-bondprocessing plants), and of the late itseems that they are more footloose thanpreviously thought. Many of the plantsthat were in Mexico have moved toCentral America and other places andmay not return even after a resumptionof growth in the U.S. economy and amore competitive Mexican exchangerate, which has appreciated consider-ably since 2000.

We thus see some islands of pros-perity amidst vast regions that have notprospered and are not connected tothe north. How much these regions(and SMEs) can prosper through in-creased economic interaction with theU.S. (and hopefully also Canada) isopen to question. Given that Mexicomay soon become the U.S.’s main tradepartner, it is not clear how much tradecan continue to grow.

There are also some institutionalshortcomings. Just as dispute settle-ment for subsidies and dumping issueshas worked quite well, disputes in otherareas have not been addressed effec-tively. Mexico-U.S. disputes over sugarand trucking have festered for years,and the de facto situation is comingperilously close to the bad old days ofunilateral solutions.

NAFTA is of course not a develop-ment strategy: it is merely a very im-portant economic policy instrumentthat, coupled with a myriad of othermeasures, may contribute to the reduc-tion of poverty in Mexico via sustainedhigh rates of economic growth. Mex-ico’s developmental problems are notthe result of NAFTA, but neither canNAFTA alleviate them. The danger nowis that, given that poverty has not de-creased notably and income concen-tration seems to be growing, somegroups become desperate and pressfor radical economic policy changes,doing away with some very positiveaspects derived from trade liberaliza-tion in general, and NAFTA in particu-lar. Significant challenges still lie aheadif Mexico is to make the most of theopportunities NAFTA offers.

THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

NAFTA is facing challenges from withinand from without.2 External develop-ments, such as the establishment ofthe World Trade Organization (WTO)and the launching of a new round ofmultilateral trade negotiations in No-vember 2001, mean that NAFTA has tokeep abreast of multilateral develop-ments if it is to remain relevant. Whatis more, the Free Trade Area of theAmericas (FTAA) negotiations, slated for

Ten years after NAFTA’ssigning, it is fair to say that

it has turned outto be neither a disaster

nor a panacea.

Economy

59

completion by 2004, will also pose achallenge for NAFTA members, and es-pecially for Mexico. The country can-not continue to rely on its privilegedand exclusive access to the U.S. mar-ket as the main source of economicgrowth. Once those privileges start toerode, it will face stiff competition inthat market.

Another challenge for all three coun-tries, especially salient after the terror-ist attacks of September 11, is how tokeep fully open borders for legal flowsof goods and capital, while closing themoff for all illegal flows. Minor adjust-ments in this regard will not suffice,and the interaction between econom-ic and security needs will have to beaddressed head-on, lest focusing on onetranslates into detrimental effects uponthe other.

Internally, Mexico needs to ensurethat the benefits from free trade areshared more fairly. This means it will

have to implement a series of policiesaimed at “making openness work.”3

The Mexican economy must be madeless vulnerable to external shocks, forinstance, by seriously striving to di-versify trade relations and avoid sucha high degree of reliance upon theU.S. economy and by providing fora safety net for workers that are dis-placed by foreign competition, so theycan adapt to new circumstances insteadof merely trying to survive and push-ing for the erection of new trade bar-riers, which will hurt everyone in thelong term.

Achieving all this will not be easy.These measures include, among manyothers, a resumption of financing forSMEs, radical deregulation and simpli-fications aimed at fostering new busi-nesses and bolstering the social securi-ty and educational systems. If thesemeasures are not carried out, in the longterm Mexico will bear only the costs of

free trade without the many potentialbenefits it can yield.

NOTES

1 Beatriz Leycegui and Rafael Fernández deCastro, eds., ¿Socios Naturales? Cinco añosdel Tratado de Libre Comercio de América delNorte (Mexico City: ITAM-Miguel Ángel Po-rrúa, 2000) and Arturo Borja, comp., Paraevaluar al TLCAN (México City: ITESM-MiguelÁngel Porrúa, 2001). The ITAM and CIDE aretwo of the most prestigious in economics the-ory and analysis in Mexico. [Editor’s Note.]

2 Academics from the three North Americancountries address these issues in Edward J.Chambers and Peter H. Smith, eds., NAFTA inthe New Millennium (Edmonton and LaJolla: University of Alberta Press and Centerfor U.S.-Mexican Studies, 2002).

3 This expression is borrowed from DaniRodrik, The New Global Economy and Dev-eloping Countries: Making Openness Work(Washington, D.C.: Overseas DevelopmentCouncil, 1999).

Mexico Town is the first shop-ping center dedicated to pro-moting Mexican culture ever

built in the United States. It is in Lyn-wood, near Los Angeles, which has thelargest number of Mexican residents ofany city in the country. Nine out of 10Lynwood inhabitants are of Mexican

origin, the vast majority born in Mex-ico. Arturo Reyes and Luis Valenzuela,both of Mexican origin, and DonaldShea, of Korean descent, decided totake advantage of this niche in a bur-geoning market, Latino consumers, toset up the most important ethnic de-velopment project in the Los Angelesmetropolitan area.1

Mexico Town is just one exampleof the dynamism of the Hispanic mar-ket. In the United States today, His-panics are the largest ethnic minority,numbering 35.3 million,2 23.6 million

of whom are of Mexican descent. Thiscommunity constitutes a powerful con-sumer market with about U.S.452.4billion in purchasing power annually,3

an amount almost comparable to thesize of the entire Mexican economy.

Hispanics, particularly Mexican-Americans and Mexicans, have main-tained their cultural patterns, customs,traditions and language. These are allkept alive by continual migration tothe United States and give this popu-lation specific characteristics, needs andconsumption habits of its own that

61

U N I T E D S T A T E S A F F A I R S

The Hispanic Market in TheWestern United States

Erika González*Esther González**

* Research coordinator for the Funda-ción de Solidaridad Mexicano-Ameri-cana, A.C. (Mexican-American SolidarityFoundation).

** Technical assistant director of the Mex-ican-American Solidarity Foundation.

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spur phenomena like Mexico Town.At this shopping center, Latino buy-ers, especially Mexicans, will not onlynow have a place to acquire productsmade in their country of origin, but alsothe chance to be in direct contact withcolors, textures and sounds that willmake them feel at home.

To deepen our understanding of thisnatural market niche for our country,the Mexican-American Solidarity Foun-dation has decided to develop the Stu-dies on the Hispanic Market in theUnited States Series in the nation’s fourregions: West, Northeast, Midwest andSouth. This article presents some of thedemographic and economic characteris-tics found in the study on the West.

DEMOGRAPHICS

The region is comprised of 13 states:Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, NewMexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington andWyoming. It has the largest numberof Hispanics of all the regions of theUnited States. According to the 2000census, of the 35.3 million Hispanicsin the U.S., 43.5 percent, or 15.3 mil-lion, live in this region.4

Hispanics make up 24.3 percent ofthe total population of the region, theonly one of the four where Hispanicsare more numerous than the nationalratio of 12.5 percent. Although thereare Hispanics in all 13 states, the vast

majority live in California (10.9 million),Arizona (1.3 million), New Mexico(765,000), Colorado (735,000) andWashington (441,000). The other eightstates combined only have a 1.1 mil-lion Latino population.5

It is not necessarily the case that inthose states where there is the greatestnumber of Hispanics, they representproportionally the largest percentagecompared to the total population. Forexample, almost half the inhabitantsof New Mexico (42.1 percent) are ofLatino origin, while in California, theyrepresent only 32.4 percent of the pop-ulation.6

To have a clear idea of Hispanics’dynamic development and growing im-

62

TABLE 1HISPANIC AND MEXICAN POPULATION IN THE WEST (2000)

TOTAL HISPANIC POPULATION MEXICAN POPULATION % OF MEXICANS

STATE POPULATION NUMBER % NUMBER % IN HISPANIC

POPULATION

California 33,871,648 10,966,556 32.4 8,455,926 25.0 77.1

Arizona 5,130,632 1,295,617 25.3 1,065,578 20.8 82.2

New Mexico 1,819,046 765,386 42.1 330,049 18.1 43.1

Colorado 4,301,261 735,601 17.1 450,760 10.5 61.3

Washington 5,894,121 441,509 7.5 329,934 5.6 74.7

Nevada 1,998,257 393,970 19.7 285,764 14.3 72.5

Oregon 3,421,399 275,314 8.0 214,662 6.3 78.0

Utah 2,233,169 201,559 9.0 136,416 6.1 67.7

Idaho 1,293,953 101,690 7.9 79,324 6.1 78.0

Hawaii 1,211,537 87,699 7.2 19,820 1.6 22.6

Wyoming 493,782 31,669 6.4 19,963 4.0 63.0

Alaska 626,932 25,852 4.1 13,334 2.1 51.6

Montana 902,195 18,081 2.0 11,735 1.3 64.9

Western Region 63,197,932 15,340,503 24.3 11,413,265 18.1 74.4

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000, “Table DP-1. Profile of General Demographics Characteristics: 2000”. (The author consulted thesame table for each state.)

Uni ted States Af fa i rs

portance in the region, it is worth look-ing back 10 years. According to censusdata, 50 percent of the total popula-tion growth in the region is attributableto Latinos. In the last decade (1990-2000), in 12 of the 13 western states,the Hispanic population grew at a sig-nificantly higher rate that the overallpopulation. The highest growth rateswere found in the states where the La-tino community is not very large, suchasOregon,Utah andWashington, whichdoubled their number of Hispanicresidents. In Nevada, they tripled innumber. In Idaho, Arizona and Colo-rado, the Latino population grew morethan 50 percent, while six states hadgrowth rates of under 50 percent. It isinteresting to note that two of the lat-ter, California and New Mexico, arestates that have traditionally concen-trated Hispanics. This short overviewof the states shows us how Latinos arerelocating and emigrating to areas wherethey did not previously live in signifi-cant numbers.

Hispanics are a diverse group madeup of people from different nations.However, Mexicans are by far thelargest group on a regional and nation-al level.7 This means that there is apotential market niche for Mexican orMexican-origin businesspersons. Of the20.6 million people that the censusclassifies as Mexicans, 55.3 percent,or 11.4 million, live in the West. Thetotal Hispanic population in the regionis distributed as follows:

• 74.4 percent of Mexican origin• 1.6 percent Puerto Rican• 23.3 percent “other Hispanics”8

• 0.7 percent Cuban.

Clearly, Mexicans make up the vastmajority. They are concentrated main-

ly in California, where three out of everyfour, or 74.1 percent, live. This is whythere are cities like Lynwood, where90 percent of the inhabitants are ofMexican origin (see table 1 and graph1).9 Compared to the entire Hispanicpopulation, Mexicans make up 82.2percent inArizona, 78 percent in Idahoand Montana and 77.1 percent in Cal-ifornia.

These indicators allow us to locatethe states where the diversity of theHispanic population is a significantfactor for marketing, particularly whendealing with the Mexican population,one of the most loyal to products fromits country of origin.

SOME ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF

THE HISPANIC COMMUNITY

The demographics of the Hispanicpopulation in the West are not enoughto determine the importance of themarket. We also have to discuss someeconomic indicators: income, buying

power and number of businesses, whichincreased significantly in number inthe last 10 years. Most analysts thinkthat one of the factors that led to thistrendwas the expansion of theU.S. econ-omy after the 1990-1991 recession.

The positive trend of these indica-tors clearly illustrated that Latinos makeup a consumer market with growinginfluence in the U.S. economy, des-pite constituting only 12.5 percent ofthe U.S. population and that, as a group,together with Afro-Americans, they oc-cupy the country’s lowest socio-econom-ic levels.

Generally speaking, in the 1990searnings among the Hispanic popula-tion increased consistently. U.S. Cen-sus Bureau estimates put the meanannual income for Hispanic householdsat U.S.$33,447, a historic high for thatoffice’s records.10 Hispanics’ incomeis higher than that of Afro-Americans,although considerably lower than thatof Anglos or the population of Asianorigin. The mean income of Hispan-ic households in the West was 1.11

63


percent higher than the mean nation-wide.

Increased earnings and consequent-ly greater purchasing power has turnedthe Hispanic community into a focalpoint for Anglo-American companiessuch as Macy’s, AT&T and AOL TimeWarner, just to mention a few of thosethat are already forcefully penetratingthe U.S. Latino market with theirgoods and services through publicityand products designed especially forthe sector.11

There are different estimates of La-tino buying power. Nevertheless, inthi article we are using the Universityof Georgia Selig Center for EconomicGrowth study, which put the His-panic community’s 2001 purchasingpower at U.S.$452.4 billion.12 Thisfigure is 118 percent higher than theone for 1990, compared to a 67.9 per-cent growth in the non-Hispanic pop-ulation’s buying power for the someperiod.

Regionally, Latinos’ purchasing powerincreased by 111 percent in the lastdecade, soaring from U.S.$89 billionto U.S.$188 billion, only 8 percentbelow the national estimate. In the 10states nationwide in which the Hispan-ic community has the greatest buyingpower:

• California is in first place, withU.S.$137.6 billion;

• Arizona, Colorado and New Mex-ico are in seventh, eighth and ninthplace.

And, in the ten states nationwidein which their purchasing power grewthe most:

• Nevada is in second place (with272.5 percent growth);

• Utah is in eighth place (198.7percent)

• Oregon is in ninth place (193.7percent).

Overall, California concentrates 73.3percent of total purchasing power forthis community, followed in descend-ing order by Arizona, Colorado, NewMexico, Washington, Nevada and Ore-gon (see graph 2).

One of the reasons for the rise inthe Hispanic community’s purchasingpower has been the considerable in-crease in the number of Hispanic busi-nessmen who create jobs and producegoods and services. According to thelast economic census done in 1997,13

the United States had 1.2 million His-panic-owned businesses, 5.8 percentof all businesses in the U.S. economy.14

The West has four of the 10 statesnationwide with the largest number ofHispanic firms. California is once againthe leader with 28.8 percent and Ari-zona, New Mexico and Colorado arein seventh, eighth and ninth placerespectively. If we compare the per-centage of Hispanic businesses to thetotal number of businesses in thesestates, we find that New Mexico is thestate with the most Latino companiesproportionally speaking (21.5 percent),although California concentrates 74.4percent of all the region’s Hispanicbusinesses.

If we look at the distribution of His-panic businesses in the West by coun-try of origin, the largest group is thatof those owned by Mexicans, Mex-ican-Americans and Chicanos,15 whichtogether represent 54.9 percent of theLatino firms in the region (see graph 3).In California, this group represents 57percent of the Hispanic companiesand their sales come to 57.6 percentof the Latino sales volume statewide.

Despite California’s regional lead-ership, other states have registered anincrease in the number of companiesowned by Mexicans and their sales:

64

Uni ted States Af fa i rs

• in Arizona, they represent 67.5percent of firms and 80.4 per-cent of sales of all Hispanic com-panies;

• in Wyoming, Washington, Neva-da, Oregon, Idaho and Alaska,they represent over 40 percent;

• in Montana, they represent 74percent of sales of Hispanic firms.

Clearly, California is a consolidat-ed market in terms of the number ofHispanic and Mexican companies andtheir sales. Nevertheless, other mar-kets are growing rapidly and are attrac-tive to Mexican investors interestedin linking up with these firms to dobusiness.

METROPOLITAN AREAS WITH THE

LARGEST HISPANIC POPULATION

To get a better idea of more specificconsumer markets, it is useful to lookbriefly at the metropolitan areas withthe largest Hispanic population in theWest, those with 100,000 or moreaccording to the Census Bureau.16 Itis important to point out that we con-sider metropolitan areas specific mar-kets given that the economic censusitself defines a metropolitan statisti-cal area (MSA) as an economic and so-cial unit composed of at least 50,000inhabitants.

The West includes 18 of the 38 met-ropolitan areas with the largest His-panic populations in the United States.Of the West’s 15.3 million Hispanicconsumers, 13 million, or 85 percent,live in these metropolitan areas. These18 areas are distributed as follows: 11in California; 2 in Arizona; 2 in NewMexico; 1 in Nevada; 1 in Washing-ton; 1 in Oregon and 1 in Colorado.

Outstanding among all these is theLos Angeles-Riverside-Orange Countiesarea which contains not only the larg-est Hispanic market in the West, butin the entire United States, with 6.5million Latinos, 5 million of whom areof Mexican origin. Other metropoli-tan areas where Latinos represent 40percent or more of the population areFresno, California; Albuquerque, NewMexico; Salinas, California; and Vi-salia-Tulare-Porterville, California.

It should be mentioned that a larg-er number of Hispanics does not nec-essarily correlate with a larger num-ber of Latino-owned businesses. Thisis only the case for the Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange, San Francisco andModesto, California metropolitanareas. This trend is not repeated inthe remaining areas. The most illus-trative case is Phoenix, Arizona, whichhas the lowest number of Hispanic-owned businesses in the West’s 18metropolitan areas despite having thethird largest Latino population.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The figures presented in this articleshow some demographic and econom-ic characteristics that illustrate thedynamism of the Hispanic market inthe western United States. However,in recent years, it is Anglo firms thathave begun to penetrate it, not primar-ily Latin American and particularlyMexican businessmen. In that sense,Mexico Town is a tangible example,among many others, that shows thebusiness opportunities that the Hispan-ic community offers in this region.

In terms of market importance bystate, California is at the head of thelist of indicators in terms of the num-ber of consumers, buying power andLatino-owned businesses. Neverthe-less, in other states the indicatorshave grown enough to make thempotential market niches; this is thecase of Arizona, Colorado, New Mex-ico, Nevada, Oregon, Washington andUtah.

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66

In coming issues of Voices of Mex-ico, we will examine the Hispanic mar-ket in the other three regions of theUnited States: the South, Northeastand Midwest.17

NOTES

1 Dante Parma, “Bienvenidos a Mexico Town,”Cambio (March 31-April 6, 2002) MexicoCity, pp. 9-18.

2 Betsy Guzmán, The Hispanic Population. Cen-sus 2000 Brief (Washington, D.C.: U.S. CensusBureau and U.S. Department of Commerce,Economics and Statistics Administration, athttp://www.census.gov, May 2001).

3 Jeffrey M. Humphreys, “Buying Power at theBeginning of a New Century: Projections for2000 and 2001,” Georgia Business and Eco-nomic Conditions, published by Terry Collegeof Business athttp://www.selig.uga.edu/forecast/GBEC/GBEC,consulted October 2001.

4 Guzmán, op. cit.

5 U.S. Census Bureau, “Table DP-1. Profile ofGeneral Characteristics for Alaska: 2000,” athttp://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/dp1/2kh06.pdf, consulted August 2001. Note: Thesame source was consulted for Arizona, Cal-ifornia, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washing-ton and Wyoming.

6 Ibid.

7 By “Mexicans” we mean the population of Mex-ican origin living in the United States, includ-ing both Mexican-Americans and Mexicans.

8 In this category, the 2000 census includespersons of Central and South American andSpanish origin.

9 Parma, op. cit.

10 Carmen De Navas-Walt, Robert W. Clevelandand Marc O. Roemer, “Money Income in theUnited States: 2000,” Current PopulationReport. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-ment Printing Office, 2001), pp. 60-213, athttp://www. census.gov, consulted in Octo-ber 2001.

11 See Pedro Pulgar, “Dólares latinos,” La Opi-nión, 11 December 2001.

12 Humphreys, op. cit.13 The next economic census will be taken in

2003.

14 The census figures are derived from the Surveyof Minority-Owned Business Enterprises,which does not include agricultural businesses.

15 The Census uses the category: “Mexican,Mexican-American and Chicano business-es” when referring to Mexican-origin relatedcompanies.

16 U.S. Census Bureau, “45 MetropolitanAreas with Large Numbers of Selected Ra-cial Groups and of Hispanic Origin Popu-lation: 1997,” Section 1: Population, Statisti-cal Abstract of the United States, 1999 athttp://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/99statab/sec01.pdf, consulted in October 2001.

17 If any reader wants more information aboutthe four geographic regions, he or she can con-sult the Studies on the Hispanic Market in theUnited States Series on sale at the Funda-ción Solidaridad Mexicano-Americana, A.C.(Mexican-American Solidarity Foundation).

Oil is the lifeblood of any mod-ern state, and Canada is noexception. It is limited in quan-

tity and, once taken, can never be putback. The same, of course, is true ofother fossil fuels such as natural gasand coal. However, the fuels that drivemost industrial economies today aregasoline or diesel. Coal usage is mini-mal at best; and, while natural gas canbe used as fuel for heating and cooking,as well as the making of certain productsin its dry form, modern society is depen-dent on and, in some cases, built around,the extraction and production of oil.1

As oil is such an important resourceand source of wealth, great conflicts

have arisen over controlling it. In theCanadian case, Westerners, particular-ly Albertans, still brood over the Na-tional Energy Program (NEP) 15 yearsafter it ended, and they continue toguard crude like a mother protectingher child. Oil has made the provinceof Alberta, in particular, rich, and as aresult has made other Canadian pro-vinces envious.

BACKGROUND

In the Canadian federation the divisionof powers is clearly set out in Sections91 and 92 of the original ConstitutionAct of 1867. Section 91 gave the fed-eral government certain powers, and

Section 92 gave the provincial govern-ments another set. While these pow-ers were designated solely for the ju-risdiction they are included under, ofcourse some practical overlaps occur(for example, the creation of criminallaw is a federal jurisdiction, but its en-forcement is provincial).

However, four areas of concurrent orshared jurisdiction are explicitly spelledout in the Constitution.2 The one weare concerned with in this article isSection 92A: Non-Renewable NaturalResources, Forestry Resources andElec-trical Energy. Essentially, what this saysis that the provinces own and can makedecisions as to the exploration and ex-traction of natural resources, includingoil. Additionally, according to Section

67

C A N A D I A N I S S U E S

Oil, the State and NAFTAIs Canadian Oil Up for Grabs?

Aaron Roth*

* Ph.D student at the University ofAlberta.

Andrew

Winning

/Reu

ters


92A(4), the provinces can collect moniesfrom resource developers and extrac-tors by any mode or system they deemfit. This is the only jurisdiction of theConstitution in which provinces canraise monies by any mode or system oftaxation.

Federal jurisdictional concurrencycomes into this section with regard toexports. Essentially Canada’s parliamentcan make laws about the inter-provin-cial trade of natural resources. In ad-dition, under Section 91(2) the feder-al government is responsible for “TheRegulation of Trade and Commerce.”3

This includes, as we will see, the exportof resources, including oil. In short, theprovinces own and extract the resourceand, if it is to be exported, the federalgovernment is responsible.

Despite this jurisdictional division,there have been agreements betweenprovinces and extra-Canadian territo-ries about the trade of products. Thesetrade agreements are worked out eitherthrough special relationships or multi-sectoral partnerships, trans-boundarypartnerships, or economic memorandaof understanding.4 In these relation-ships, agreements on trade, joint reg-ulation or joint concerns over specificfields are dealt with. Provinces likeAl-berta have now established trade agree-ments through economic memorandaof understanding on items such as agri-cultural and food products with Kang-won, South Korea for example, althoughit is admitted that “trade between Al-berta and Kangwon is still limited andindirect.”5 Due to the “unofficial” na-ture of these agreements, they are notenforceable by law but are mutual un-derstandings, the political equivalentof a handshake.

It is the economic memoranda ofunderstanding that we will be discuss-

ing, particularly the possibility of di-rect provincial “unofficial” tradingarrangements with the United Statesabout oil, thereby skirting the federalgovernment’s constitutional role in es-tablishing formal trading arrangements.This raises some additional questionswe will be looking at, for instance:How would these types of relationsstrain federal-provincial relations? Andto what degree can or will NAFTA havean effect on either prohibiting or ex-panding these types of informal agree-ments? The hypothesis that we will

explore in this article is that in the com-ing years, “unofficial” agreements ofthe type suggested above on oil trad-ing and exports may become a reality.This would result in the increasing ex-clusion of the federal government fromits role in the export of oil. Further, inthis case, NAFTA may hinder the fed-eral government, not help it. As a re-sult, relations between the provincesand Ottawa may be strained.

Only one province —Alberta— willbe looked at in this article becauseAlberta is by far Canada’s largest oilproducer.

THE EXISTING PROCESS

The existing process for extraction ofand exporting oil is, as mentioned, a

responsibility shared by both levels ofgovernment. On a provincial level, theAlberta Energy and Utilities Board(EUB) is responsible for issuing permitsto companies who wish to extract oil.It is important to know that much ofAlberta’s reserves are located on gov-ernment land.6 According to an offi-cial I spoke to at the Department ofInternational and IntergovernmentalRelations (IIR), in such cases, in orderto drill on government land for re-sources, a company must sign an agree-ment with the province for land lease.To obtain the lease however, the ex-tractor must participate in an auctionof the land rights. This process createsa free market option for lease and insome cases the sale of the land.7

At this point the operator (compa-ny) must make an application to theEUB for drilling or the establishmentof an energy project.8 Once the appli-cation has all the “i’s dotted and the t’scrossed,” the board approves or deniesthe company permission to extract theresource.9 If conflicts arise with arearesidents or other land owners, theEUB holds a hearing and makes a de-cision.10

Essentially, once a permit is grant-ed or denied, the process ends. Ac-cording to the EUB official, from theirpoint of view as soon as the oil leavesthe ground they have no restrictions.11

Transportation within the provincecan go one of two ways: “pipelineswithin the provinces are regulated byprovincial authorities…Transport ofcrude oil by truck where no gatheringpipelines exist is subject to provincial[transportation] legislation.”12 In es-sence once it is out of the ground, withthe exception of pipeline and road safe-ty of transport trucks, the province’sinvolvement is at an end. If the oil is

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Oil has made the provinceof Alberta rich and,

as a result,has made other Canadian

provinces envious.

Canadian Issues

destined outside the province, inter-provincial trade agreements apply.However, if the oil is destined outsidethe country, the National Energy Board(NEB) steps in.

Before we address NEB involve-ment in exports, there is one vital areaof provincial jurisdiction left to dis-cuss: that is, of course, how the pro-vince collects the oil royalties fromthe company. Royalties from oil com-panies are given “in kind” to the pro-vince. Officials from both the IIR andthe Department of Energy proper stat-ed that the province receives a per-centage of the profits from oil sold.13

Marketers determine the amounts ofoil sold, by pipelines for example, andthen the province receives a portionof the profits thereof.14

As mentioned, the export of oil —orany other resource for that matter—comes under the jurisdiction of thefederal government. The FederalDepartment of Natural Resources hasthe mandate in this case, exercisedthrough the National Energy Board.

In discussions with a member ofthe National Energy board, the pro-cess was described quite clearly. Inessence, an operator would apply fornot just an export license or permit butalso an import license or permit fromthe NEB.15 The application would thenbe analyzed by the NEB and sent tothe full board or a 2-member panel forconsideration.16 In evaluating the ap-plication, one of the main tests for de-termining if oil can be exported is thatof “sufficient surplus.” Essentially thistest involves the condition that therebe sufficient surplus oil to meet Ca-nadian needs. If the NEB conditionsare met then a permit or license canbe issued (although licenses requirea hearing before they are granted).

CHALLENGES TO FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

Several reasons exist —some morelikely than others— for the provincesor perhaps even extra-Canadian sourcesto wish to leave the federal govern-ment out of the oil export equation.One simplistic, and perhaps insignifi-cant, reason was mentioned above.The provinces, especially oil-rich Al-berta, see the resources as theirs. In-deed, it can be truthfully said thatthey are theirs. The experience of the

National Energy Program (NEP) inthe early 1980’s left a bitter taste inAl-bertans’ mouths with regard to thefederal government’s role in energy pol-icy. According to Archer et al., “[t]heNEP was designed to control the in-crease in oil prices; to provide greateroil tax revenues for the federal govern-ment; to Canadianize ownership ofthe oil industry; and to shift explora-tion from provincial lands to ‘CanadaLands’ in the North and offshore.”17

The analogy of the parent-child re-lationship between the province, itspeople and the oil resources of Alber-ta may have been exaggerated, but notby much. It may perhaps be betteranalogized by a person’s relationshipwith his or her bank account. The reac-tion to the prime minister’s summer2001 comments was evidence enough

that this sentiment has not died out.The suggestion was made the day aftera federal caucus meeting in Edmon-ton that Alberta’s neighbors were jeal-ous of the province’s wealth, and thatperhaps Alberta should “share.”Albertans’ response was spectacular: ahue and cry rang throughout theprovince that a second NEP was onthe way. At the time I was an assis-tant in the Leader of the OfficialOpposition of Alberta’s office inLethbridge, and it will not be easy toforget that the phone rang off the hookwith concerns from Albertans railingagainst the prime minister for even dar-ing to speculate where our oil revenuesshould be going. The point is thatAlbertans generally guard their oiland the revenues from it very jealous-ly and want no intrusion by the feder-al government in the area.

The second reason the provincesmight wish to sell directly to the UnitedStates without intervention by the fed-eral government has two parts. Thefirst deals with the United States’ in-creasing need for oil to fuel its gargan-tuan industrial and societal needs.Any businessperson will tell you thatif there is a market demand to be filled,you can make money by filling it. Ifthe United States has a thirst for“black gold,” those who can fulfill thedesire can also get rich. Since Alber-ta’s oil revenues are a percentage of theprofits of the oil sold, it seems logicalto this writer that the more oil soldmeans more profits for the provincialcoffers, and thus the province itselfhas a vested interest in satisfying thedemand. This may be a rather crudemodel (no pun intended), perhaps sim-plistic in the sense that it is also logi-cal to conserve and save oil reservesover the long term; however to some

69

The export of oil—or any other resource forthat matter— comes under

the jurisdiction of the federalgovernment.


politicians and companies, this may bea potential avenue to explore. Indeed,Duquette argues that “the provincesinvariably favor maximum resource ex-traction in the shortest possible timeand on the largest possible scale, with-out particular concern for the nation-ality of the interests to whom theseresources are conceded.”18 In thatevent, federal control over oil exportsmay become a nuisance.

Thirdly, some scholars have specu-lated that NAFTA could assist the pro-vinces and companies in the export ofoil to the United States. Robert McRaeargues that the federal governmentcould be constrained in terms of itsrole. “The North American Free TradeAgreement…makes it difficult for thefederal government to regulate the Ca-nadian energy industry under nation-alistic principles, such as forcing Ca-nadian energy prices to be lower thanthose in the United States, and/or towithhold supplies from the US mar-ket.”19 Further, the IEA’s documentstates that NAFTA “ensure[s] that thatenergy trade will be based on marketprinciples and subject to fewer traderestrictions.”20 It could be inferred thatNAFTA is possibly a tool to be usedagainst federal government interven-tion in oil exports.

Finally, Gilles Paquet discusses theincreasing powerlessness of states,their institutions and their increasinginability to deal with the demands of“sub-national” groups. He argues thatwhat he calls the “Gulliver Effect” isweakening these institutions. “Thejoint impact of information dominance,accelerated change, and of a more dis-tributed governance has made the so-cio-economy both more volatile andmore malleable. But it has also putimmense strain on the ‘national insti-

tutions.’ ”21 Further he states that, “Thenation state, when confronted withthe global adjustment processes and thedemands of sub-national groups, is notunlike Gulliver: unable to deal effec-tively either with the dwarfs of Lilliputor the giants of Brobdingnag.”22

The long and the short of it is that“globalization” and “glocalization” areaffecting institutions’ ability to workin the arenas they were intended to.Decentralization is the order of theday, as is the clearing of traditional bar-riers to the outside world. Now, of

course, Paquet is speaking here withregard to the evolution of the infor-mation age, but his statements couldhave the ring of applicability to otherareas, including federal government in-stitutions involved in trade.

FINDINGS

Despite all the challenges Canada’sfederal government faces when it comesto regulating international oil trade, itmust be concluded that the hypothe-sis of this article is essentially disproved.As we shall see, the likelihood of theprovinces going it alone in the inter-national community in terms of oilexports and skirting federal authorityto issue licenses or permits for theseexports is very minimal, indeed, prac-

tically non-existent.One of the questions asked direct-

ly to an official at the Department ofInternational and IntergovernmentalRelations dealt with the possibility ofusing economic memoranda of under-standing (MOUs) in a manner suggest-ed in the hypothesis. The answer wassimply that it is theoretically possiblethat such an agreement could besigned, however the possibility is ex-tremely remote.23 In her opinion, theprovince was primarily concernedwith the extraction of the resources.24

Further, the only real role for MOUs inthe field being discussed would be inthe form of research efforts with indi-vidual provinces or states, and how, forexample, the resources could be ex-tracted more easily and efficiently.25

The response when the same ques-tion was asked of the member of theNational Energy Board was abundant-ly clear: the provinces have no author-ity to work out agreements with othercountries without the federal govern-ment.26 Leaving constitutionality aside,the National Energy Board Act furtherclarifies the answer. It states that“except as otherwise authorized by orunder the regulations, no person shallexport or import any oil or gas exceptunder and in accordance with a li-cense issued.”27 By act of parliament,the NEB is the authority that grantspermits for the export and import of oiland gas. Indeed, a company which actedunder a hypothetical MOU agreementbetween the Province of Alberta and aforeign territory would face several bar-riers to its success.

The first is of course a deterrentwhich comes with any law. Accordingto the National Energy Board Act, any-one found guilty of contravening theexport and import division of the act

70

NAFTA makes it difficultfor the federal governmentto regulate the Canadianenergy industry undernationalistic principles.

Canadian Issues

can be fined, imprisoned, or both.28

Secondly, and more surprisingly, in thecase of pipelines especially, my discus-sions with the member of the NationalEnergy Board showed that two otherdeterrents can arise for failure to pos-sess NEB approval for oil exports to theU.S. The first is that marketers in theUnited States can halt construction orthe flow of oil in pipelines from Cana-da into the United States without NEB

permits or licenses. Secondly, a compa-ny exporting oil without NEB approvalcan be sued by its competitors for unfairtrading practices.29 As we can see, en-forcement and deterrent measures arein place. However one of the mainquestions and points in the hypothesiswas that NAFTA could change the scopeand ability of the federal powers, andperhaps even prevent provincial pow-ers from operating effectively.

While it is the case, as mentioned byMcRae, that governments cannot im-pose non-market price levels for oil orwithhold exports just because they feellike it, NAFTA still allows the federal gov-ernment to perform its role. Accordingto the member of the National EnergyBoard interviewed, NAFTA does not im-pose restraints on the NEB. NAFTA’s onlyeffect is that the board can never refusean export license, unless there is an orderby the governor general in council show-ing that the “surplus for Canadian’sneeds” test has not been met, or thatthe granting of such a license wouldnot be in the public interest.30 In supportof this answer, the text of NAFTA itselfstates that “The Parties confirm their fullrespect for their Constitutions.”31 InCanada’s case, this means that the fed-eral government’s constitutional and le-gal role in issuing permits and licensesfor oil exports is not annulled.

With respect to NAFTA curtailing

the Alberta provincial government’srole as owner and regulator of oil ex-traction, what is good for the goose isgood for the gander. In other words,the provinces’ constitutional role isalso intact. Officials from the AlbertaEnergy and Utilities Board stated thatNAFTA has had no real effect on therules and regulations of oil extraction.32

As officials from the Department ofInternational and IntergovernmentalAffairs stated, NAFTA focuses on ex-ports, not on extraction. There are, ofcourse, obligations about treatment

of companies involved in the oil busi-ness in Alberta; however that is theextent of NAFTA’s influence over theprovince’s control of resources.33

CONCLUSIONS

According to the member of the Na-tional Energy Board interviewed, sinceits founding in 1952, the NEB has neverhad to deal with a province trying toskirt the federal jurisdiction over oilexports abroad.34 Indeed, after speak-ing with officials at the Departments ofEnergy, International and Governmen-tal Affairs and the EUB, I have con-cluded that there is currently no desireto try. NAFTA has maintained the feder-al government’s role in authorizing oilexports, however it has also reduced its

power to pursue nationalistic endeav-ors or withhold oil exports. The NEB

must now demonstrate that an exportlicense should not be granted becauseit will leave Canada in a shortfall posi-tion in terms of its oil needs.

What does this all say about Ca-nadian federalism? Federalism, asRonald Watts states, involves “com-bining strong constituent units and astrong general government, each pos-sessing powers delegated to it by thepeople through a constitution.”35 Inessence it involves autonomous controlover certain aspects of society. Naturalresource ownership and export abroadprovide an example of the two levelssharing autonomy over a jurisdictionin a clear cut fashion that allows eachto exercise its rights without friction(by and large). Indeed, agreements suchas NAFTA may actually enhance thefederal principle in some respects, atleast where oil is concerned. The pro-vinces cannot willfully step on feder-al toes by facilitating the export of oilwithout federal approval. Neither canthe federal government impose pricerestrictions on oil which would affectcompanies and the province as a sec-ondary beneficiary of oil development. Itmight be fair to say that while the fed-eral government remains a part of NAFTA,National Energy Program 2 will neveroccur.A balance has been achieved; bothlevels seem content or at least accept-ing of the powers they have, somethingrarely seen or achieved in the largerscope of Canadian federalism.

NOTES

1 “Fossil Fuels,” Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia(Microsoft Corporation, 1993-1999).

2 Douglas Brown, David Cameron, PeterMeekison and Ronald Watts, “Federalism inCanada: Structures and Practices,” (paperpresented to the colloquium “The Road to

71

Because it focuseson exports, NAFTA has hadno real effect on the rules

and regulations ofoil extraction.


Federalism in Mexico,” San Juan del Río, Mex-ico, June 1996), p. 9.

3 Ibid., p. 404.4 http://www.iir.gov.ab.ca/iir/inter_rel/pages/twinning.htm Alberta Department of Inter-national and Intergovernmental Relations.

5 Ibid.6 Author’s discussion with officials at theDepartment of International and Intergovern-mental Relations, Government of Alberta (No-vember 16, 2001).

7 Ibid.8 Author’s discussion with officials at theAlberta Energy and Utilities Board (Novem-ber 16, 2001).

9 Ibid.10 Ibid.11 Ibid.12 International Energy Agency, The Role of IEA

Governments in Energy: 1996 Update (Paris:OECD/IEA, 1996), p. 100.

13 Author’s discussion with officials at theDepartment of International and Intergov-ernmental Relations and Department ofEnergy (November 16, 2001).

14 Author’s discussion with officials at theDepartment of Energy (November 16, 2001).

15 Author’s discussion with a member of theNational Energy Board (November 19, 2001).

16 Ibid.

17 Keith Archer, Roger Gibbins, Rainer Knopff,Leslie A. Pal, Parameters of Power: Canada’sPolitical Institutions (Scarborough: NelsonCanada, 1995), p. 120.

18 Michel Duquette, “Domestic and Interna-tional Factors Affecting Energy Trade,”Stephen J. Randall and Herman Konrad,NAFTA in Transition (Calgary: University ofCalgary Press, 1995), p. 297.

19 Robert McRae, “The Emergence of NorthAmerican Energy Trade Without Barriers,”Stephen J. Randall and Herman Konrad, op.cit., p. 91.

20 International Energy Agency, The Role of IEA

Governments in Energy: 1996 Update (Paris:OECD/IEA, 1996), p. 98.

21 Gilles Paquet, “Institutional Evolution in anInformation Age,” Thomas Courchene, Tech-nology, Information, and Public Policy (Kingston:John Deutsch Institute for the Study ofEconomic Policy, 1995), p. 207.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.26 Discussion with a Member at the National

Energy Board (November 19, 2001)

27 The National Energy Board Act, Part VI. Ex-ports and Imports, Division I, Oil and Gas, 116,http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/pubs/ nebactp6.htm

28 The National Energy Board Act, Part VI. Ex-ports and Imports, Division iv Offenses, Pun-ishment and Enforcement, 121, http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/pubs/ nebactp6.htm

29 Author’s discussion with a member of theNational Energy Board (November 19, 2001).

30 Ibid.

31 North American Free Trade Agreement,Chapter 6, Energy and Basic Petrochemicals,Article 601.01, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/chap6-e.asp

32 Author’s discussion with officials at theAlbertaEnergy andUtilities Board (November 16, 2001).

33 Author’s discussion with officials at theDepartment of International and Intergovern-mental Relations (November 16, 2001).

34 Author’s discussion with a member of the Na-tional Energy Board (November 19, 2001).

35 Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems

72

LANGUAGE AND TERRITORY

The Huaxtecs are related to the Mayawithout doubt. However, this groupbranched off from of the main macro-Mayan linguistic group about 3,500years ago, at that time located at Cu-chumatanes on the border of what arenow Guatemala and Mexico. That iswhere the Mayan languages diverge.Therefore, the material and ideolo-gical culture of the people we nowknow as Huaxtecs have nothing incommon with those of the Mayanculture that flowered in the first cen-turies of our era.Rather, all the data tends to indi-

cate that by the last centuries of thesecond millennium before Christ,the Huaxtecs had already reached thenorthern part of what is today the stateof Veracruz and the south of Tamauli-pas. For several centuries before theSpaniards arrived, they shared a vastterritory withNahua, Tepehua andOto-mí speakers, a territory that extendedthrough the north of what is todayPuebla, eastern Hidalgo, the southeastof San Luis Potosí, the south of Tamau-lipas and the north of Veracruz.The environmental mix of coast,

coastal plains and mountains variesthe climate from rainy tropical to

73

T H E S P L E N D O R O F M E X I C O

La Huaxteca in Time and SpaceLorenzo Ochoa*

* Researcher at the UNAM Institute for An-thropological Studies.� God of Death on the back of a sculpure from Ozuluama, Veracruz. Xalapa Anthopology Museum.

Javier

Hinojosa


semi-dry with temperatures rangingfrom 18 to 40 degrees Celsius. Agri-culture was just as important eco-nomically —the main crops were cot-ton, several types of chili peppers andcorn— as hunting and gathering. Theexploitation of other natural resourcesled to the creation of a network ofroads that linked the coast and thecoastal plain to the mountains andhighlands; salt was particularly impor-tant. Rivers, streams, lagoons and eventhe sea were very important for tradeof raw materials and luxury items thatspread throughout the extensive waternetwork, for communication and cul-tural exchange and because of the floraand fauna they offered the inhabitants.

THE HUAXTEC CULTUREIN THE POST-CLASSICAL PERIOD

Before the eighth century, Huaxtecculture was different from that of other

peoples of pre-HispanicMexico. In theeighth and ninth centuries, it beganto feel the influence of Mesoameri-can ideology and contribute to enrichthat of many peoples of that broaderarea. A century later, its integrationinto the Mesoamerican cultural spherewas clear. It is in this period thatimportant changes took place whichcan be seen in archaeological dataand later in historical sources. Thepresence of aspects of the culture fromcentral Veracruz and the Huaxtecaarea in the tenth to the twelfth cen-turies in El Tajín is clear. Very littlehas been researched about the rela-tions between the Huaxteca and cen-tral Veracruz in the eighth to the ninthcenturies, or the discovery of, for exam-ple, yokes and traces of central Vera-cruz iconography in the Huaxteca. Bythe tenth to twelfth centuries, theToltec presence, and later the Mexicapresence in the Huaxteca, as well asthe Huaxtec presence in central Mex-

74

The importanceof the Huaxteca for the

Mexicas can be seen both inideology and the economy.

� View of the gateway to the Hidalgo Mountains.�Quetzalcóatl priest on a stela from Castillo de Teayo, Veracruz.

LorenzoOchoa

LorenzoOchoa


ico, are clear, both in written tradi-tions or codices and in archaeologicalevidence.The story of the nude tohueyo, a

seller of chili peppers in the Tula mar-ket, with whom the daughter of Hué-mac, the Lord of Tula, fell in love, isonly a metaphor included in FriarBernardino de Sahagún’s book LaHistoria general de las cosas de NuevaEspaña (General History of the Thingsof New Spain) to emphasize the eco-nomic importance that the Huaxtecaarea had for the Toltecs and the rival-ry that existed because of the rela-tionship. The sixteenth-century Analesde Cuauhtitlán (Annals of Cuauhti-tlán) explains how the Ixcuinanme,1

the goddesses of the Huaxteca, intro-duced sacrifice by arrow shot in theCentral Highland through Tula. Ac-cording to Don Fernando de AlvaIxtlilxóchitl, when the Toltec capitalwas in ruins, Xólotl, “Lord of theChichimecs,” and his wife Tomiyauh,

“Lady of the Huaxtecs,” the foundersof the great Texcocan line, passed by.2

By the fifteenth century, the Mexi-cas had conquered different parts ofthe Huaxteca: Teayo, Tuxpan, Tzicóac,Temapache, Huejutla, Tamuín, Tempa-tal and Oxitipa, among others. The im-portance of the Huaxteca for the Me-xicas can be seen both in ideology andeconomy. Several Huaxtec deities,among them Tlazoltéotl and Mixcóatl,adopted by the Toltecs would in turnbe embraced by the Mexica and laterreturned to the Huaxteca with differ-ent characteristics. For the Mexicas,Tlazoltéotl was a goddess of carnal plea-sures and the devourer of filth, whilefor the Huaxtecs, under the genericname “Teem,” she was the goddessof women in childbirth who whiskedaway evil vapors. Mixcóatl, god ofthe hunt, was the namesake of theHuaxtecs, who considered themselves“the people of the deer” or “the peopledescendent of Mixcóatl.” Tenek, the

75

�The Otontepec Mountains in Citlaltépetl, Veracruz.Zacamixtle stela depicting the God of Death. Tancoco, Veracruz (drawing).�

The Huaxtecs, consideredthemselves “the peopleof the deer”, descendents

of Mixcóatl.

LorenzoOchoa

CésarFernánd

ez


76

first part of the term tenek bichim,meaning deer, is the name the Huax-tecs call themselves today.But these were not the only deities.

The god of death ruled the Tamzem-lab, or the underworld; for the Huax-tecs, this god is associated with eviland putrefaction. Mam, an importantgod of this culture, was depicted as astooped old man leaning on a caneused for planting; he is linked to thecult of fertility. Ehécatl, whose originalname in the Huaxtec language is un-known, was the god of the wind whowas originally represented as a cross-section of a conch shell, and later asa human body with a large beak. Incentral Mexico, written and pictorialsources depict him as a representa-tion of Quetzalcóatl, god of the wind,who is described or depicted in Huax-tecan clothing: a cone-shaped cap witha semicircular fan at the base of theneck, hook-shaped ear jewelry and anecklace in the shape of a cross-sectionof a conch shell or eheilacacózcatl.Like all theMesoamerican cultures,

their material goods were closely linkedto religion. The representation of theplanes of the universe have been foundin some pectoral made of shell, one ofthe most refined forms of aesthetic ex-pression of this culture. Some of theircustoms, known through chronicles,were depicted in murals and their maindeities have been sculpted with greatmajesty. According to Friar Bernardinode Sahagún, they were recognized asgreat artisans for their cotton weaving;this can be seen in the codex of the Reg-ister of Tributes. They also achievedgreat technical capacity in themanufac-ture of funeral ceramics, figurine mod-eling, bone carving and goldsmithing.Their architecture, sometimes mon-

umental, was very specific: public

structures often had curved lines or cir-cles or forms that included them, as wellas rectangular floors with rounded cor-ners as the foundations for temples likeTamtok in San Luis Potosí or Tabuco inVeracruz. The buildings had thin beamsto delimit stairways, and they used stuc-co as finishing that was then some-times decorated with murals, such asin Tamuín, in San Luis Potosí. Theyconstructed houses of considerable di-mensions on low platforms for the mostimportant lords. On occasion, they builtball courts, like in El Águila Zacamiztleand Tepetzintla, Veracruz.Artesian wellshave been found at some sites and forsecurity, they erected fortifications orwalled their cities, like in Yahualica,Hidalgo, or Metlaltoyuca, Puebla.The lay-out and distribution of the

political-religious centers do not seemto follow the norms of Mesoamericanurban organization, which generallyreproduced their understanding of thestructure of the cosmos, or Tehuayca-lal for the Huaxtecs. They understoodit to be organized in four parts: theeast or Elelquí, the west or Ozalquí,the north or Tzaylelquí and the southor Quahtalquí. This conception ledthem to an understanding of the chang-ing seasons and to register the pas-sage of time by a 365-day calendar(the tamub) and another, 260-day cal-endar (the tzobnalquí). They imaginedthe universe to be divided into threehorizontal planes: the celestial plane,the earthly plane and the underworld.These concepts are reproduced in someof their ceremonies to pray for rain.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

When the Spaniards came, the Huax-teca was organized in dominions des-

�Quetzalcóatl on a tablet from Castillo de Teayo,Veracruz. Xalapa Anthropology Museum.

� Scene of the cosmos on a shell pectoral.Tamaulipas. National Museum of Anthropologyand History.

LorenzoOchoa

Javier

Hinojosa


77

cribed as small independent provincesheaded up by a governor or lord calledtzalleinic in Huaxtec. Heir by pater-nal line to all the land, he would rentor distribute it to those who needed it,free peasants. The lord resided in themain center, called bichou, dividedinto neighborhoods called quachmal.The lord could be accompanied in thebichou by certain nobles —althoughthis was not always the case— like thedoctor or zitom; the wise man or huy-tom; and the zobnax, in charge of divina-tion and reading the calendar. Tradersand prominent artisans also residedthere, while the rest of the populationwas distributed over a relatively widearea. It is certain that there were twoclearly differentiated social classes:nobles and commoners. But it is alsopossible that there was a third class:slaves in the service of the lord to plowhis fields or serve in his home. Bothlords and commoners practiced polyg-yny, although it was limited by the ex-pense of supporting one or more wives.The tzalleinic supported the nobility, hisrelatives, some of whom lived in small-er hamlets called quamchalab, whereone of his close relatives ruled andmight be given the title ahjatic, mean-ing “master” or “lord of the area.” Evi-dence of this form of organization canbe gleaned from archaeological remains.

THE ECONOMY

The area’s political organization is areflection of its economic development,based mainly in agriculture, fishing,cotton weaving, goldsmithing, ceram-ics and trade in different raw materi-als. Agriculture was extensive. In theeighteenth century, Don Carlos de Ta-pia Zenteno wrote, “The men [had]

three and even four harvests a year,although cultivation did not benefitfrom any but the aid of the elements orinstruments other than rough stakes.”3

Until now there has been no evidenceof intensive agricultural techniques, butthey were outstanding producers ofcorn, cotton, beans, squash and a broadvariety of chili peppers. They caughtmany species —dry fish, shrimp andskate eggs— in the lagoons and riversthat they salted and sun dried. Theyused salt not only as a condiment, butalso for medicinal purposes. In the six-teenth century, RichardHakluyt empha-sized the importance the Huaxtecsgave it, writing,

� Cut shell pectoral showing Eheilacacoxcatl, the symbolof Ehécatl, the God of the Wind.

Casa

delaCu

ltura

SLP


78

In those countreys they take neither

golde nor silver for exchange of any thing,

but onely Salt, which they greatly es-

teeme, and use it for a principall med-

icine for certaine wormes which breed

in their lips and in their gummes.4

From the Huaxteca came honey,hens, fine feathers, ceramics, copperbells, carved shells, raw cotton, smallblankets called quachtli, used by theMexicas as coin, and beautifully em-broidered textiles that they distributedin local and regional markets. Theyused the rivers and lagoons as water-ways for this trade. On land they blazedreal trails and improvised paths. Sev-eral of those roads were kept up untilthe colonial period and, with somemodifications, were later even used tobuild new highways. The impact ofcolonization transformed the old order.The rhythm of commercial traffic

changed and the ideological struc-tures permeated by Western thoughtare still preserved in customs, fiestasand ceremonies.

NOTES

1 ”Ixcuinanme” is the plural of Ixcuina, one ofthe names of the goddess Tlazoltéotl, mothergoddess par excellence, who originated withthe Huaxtecs.

2 Fernando de Alva Ixtlilxóchitl, Obras históri-cas (Mexico City: UNAM, 1975).

3 Don Carlos de Tapia Zenteno, Paradigma Apo-logético y noticia de la lengua huasteca (Mex-ico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Filoló-gicas, 1985), p. 22.

4 Richard Hakluyt, The principal navigations,voyages, traffiques and discoveries of the EnglishNation, vol. 6 (London: n.p., 1927), p. 273.

Photographs on page 87 and the one on top ofpage 90, are reproduced by permission of the Xa-lapa Anthropology Museum. Photograph on page90 and the one on top of this page, reproduced bypermission of the National Institute of Anthopologyand History, Conaculta/INAH Mex.

� The Huaxtec Mountains, San Luis Potosí.

�Mam, God of Fertility with a planting stick.

Javier

Hinojosa

LorenzoOchoa

TheProto-Classical period (A.D.0-350) began in the first cen-tury of our era on the coasts of

what is now Veracruz. At that time, aculture inherited from the Late For-mative period was still prevalent. Theknown world had not changed a greatdeal; ceramic traditions were still prac-tically the same and the thick, blacksets of dishes were still used in cele-bration of local religious rites.

However, those same potters wouldsoon recreate the very early forms ofTeotihuacan ceramics.Although nomorethan crude imitations of the vesselsfrom Central Mexico, they could nothide a different, unprecedented originfrom the northern coast of the Gulf ofMexico. The Teotihuacan cultural stylewould permeate the arts of the firstelites of El Tajín, Cerro Grande andMorgadal Grande, located in the floodplains of the Cazones and TecolutlaRivers. In the mid-Proto-Classicalperiod, the transformations that tookplace in the Early Classical period,the Cacahuatal phase (A.D. 350-600)were about to manifest themselves,

79

El TajínFirst Approximations

Of a CivilizationArturo Pascual Soto*

* Researcher at the UNAM Institute forAesthetic Research.

All photos are printed courtesy of the UNAM Institu-te for Aesthetic Research (IIE) and by permission ofthe National Institute of Anthropology and History,Conaculta-INAH-MEX.

IIE/UNAM

Base for a cylindrical trivet cup.


transformations that would serve asthe basis for a vigorous regional cul-ture that preceded the El Tajín civi-lization’s greatest flowering by a cou-ple of centuries.Everything took time. Almost the

entire Proto-Classical period, the Te-colutla phase, had to go by before therewas a real integration of the ceramicforms that point to the participationof the Teotihuacan cultural sphere andwhose cultural model could have beendisseminated by the neighboring cityof El Pital. Perhaps the clearest andearliest of these changes was the aban-donment of several Formative periodsettlements. The kind of links thatexisted among them does not seem tobe known, giving first place to a dif-ferent group of small hamlets thatdeveloped on the tops of the hills atthe expense of the abandonment of theoldest settlements. The failure —ifit can be called that— of the Pre-Classical world could only have been

plotted in the nearby Nautla Riverbasin.El Pital, skirted by the waters of

the Nautla River, was the great me-tropolis of the Proto-Classical and hadcertainly not gone unnoticed by itsneighbors. During the second half ofthe Tecolutla phase a series of cultur-al elements were added to the newkind of settlements that show tracesof their antecedents in the Nautla Riv-er basin. All evidence seems to pointto an accentuated process of rearrange-ment of the populations as well asthe introduction of a new kind of pot-tery of Teotihuacan inspiration, madecertainly for the local elites. Thesewere manifestations of a complex pro-cess of assimilation and cultural defi-nition. Even though many details arestill not clear, it is not unlikely that ElPital had promoted the entire trans-formation. The Tlahuanapa Stream,one of the main tributaries of the Te-colutla River, had become a trade route

80

The Teotihuacancultural style would

permeate the arts of the firstelites of El Tajín.

Relief from the Pyramid of the Niches.

Gerardo

Vázquez/IIE


near the Cazones River, where El Ta-jín is located. On the stream traveledfloreros, cylindrical trivets with rectan-gular bases, and individual candle-holders, all of which were part of theTeotihuacan cultural sphere and inthe trading of which El Pital surelyparticipated. The stream ended upcarrying most of the region’s trade.The elites of the early El Tajín, CerroGrande and Morgadal Grande settle-ments not only must have based them-selves on the new economic status ofthe Proto-Classical, but also promot-ed the development of craftsmen in-spired in Teotihuacan and based ontheir own technological experience ofthe local pottery of the Late Forma-tive period.The taste for all things from Teoti-

huacan, for the cultural manifesta-tions of Central Mexico, would notindiscriminately change the form ofthe objects required by these very earlyelites. The creation of a new ceramic

repertory would be linked to the trans-formation of the elite’s ritual behavior.At that time (about A.D. 280), manythings were changing.1 The emphasisplaced on the reproduction of those ves-sels, very different from the oldest pot-tery traditions of the coastal plain, pointsto an elite that had opted for recreatinga cultural model of Teotihuacan extrac-tion that placed it on the threshold ofthe Teotihuacan “modernity.”It is not unlikely that the demo-

graphic readjustments of the Proto-Classical period were stimulated bythe incorporation of an as yet unprece-dented economic model that empha-sized long-distance trade and proba-bly emanated from the neighboringNautla basin. These new kinds of tradelinks that also included the distribu-tion of the obsidian from the far-awayPachuca, Altotonga and Zaragoza de-posits,2 may well have influenced thechange in the location of settlementsand the emergence of an elite based

81

JavierHinojosa

Gerardo

Vázquez/IIE

Tlaloc (detail) from Arroyo del Arco.

The elites of theEl Tajín region turned

the ball game into the verycenter of their rituals.


on control of trade. The increase in thepopulation that seems to characterizeMorgadal Grande in the Proto-Clas-sical and the Early Classical may wellbe explained by a new hierarchy amongthe settlements. On the Tlahuanapastream travelled the material goods ofother cultural models. On the eve ofthe Late Classical, the pottery includ-ed in trading activities may have beenmainly Teotihuacan in origin.The commercial dominance that

El Pital seems to have exercised overthe flood plains of the Tecolutla andCazones Rivers stimulated the devel-opment of a vigorous regional culturethat we now understand as the directpredecessor of the classical culture ofEl Tajín. The Morgadal Grande elites’rites and their material expressionended up by irreconcilably distancingthemselves from a cultural sub-stratainherited from the Late Formative. The“refined” culture of the elite must haveused different vehicles for expression,so different that only among them-selves, the early El Tajín and CerroGrande elites, could the image of theTeotihuacan Tláloc have found a place.The iconographic signs that served toexpress it can be found on the surfaceof a group of cups destined for theelite’s exclusive consumption and onthe stone of the oldest ball game courts,the most eloquent of the buildings des-tined for the exaltation of the politicalpower of these ancient rulers.Everything seems to indicate that

the elites of the El Tajín region, whoparticipated in the Teotihuacan cultur-al model during the Cacahuatal phase,turned the ball game into the verycenter of their rituals. By definition,rulers were considered players. Theirstone images emphasize their players’clothing that constituted the symbol

of the institution they represented.In fact, this association would last—although with changes in symbols—until the year A.D. 1100, when thelast reliefs were carved in El Tajín.These elites had chosen a cultural mod-el that separated them irremediablyfrom their origins and favored the un-precedented concentration of powerprobably based on the control of trade.The formalization of new trade routesfostered an entire strategy to controlroads, particularly at major river cross-ings, which could only with great dif-ficulty be forded anywhere else. Thesettlements grew rich and before themiddle of the Cacahuatal phase hadan administrative area in the highestpart of the ancient cities where —if Iam not mistaken— there were build-ings dedicated to the cult and thestone images of the elites themselves.Everything points to the idea that theproliferation of elites that dominatedonly a part of the trade routes led to acertain instability in the political def-inition of the territory. Borders had tobe set and reset periodically. However,they all recognized the same culturalmodel and a single artistic style, noneother than that of the classical El Ta-jín culture.

NOTES

1 The radiocarbon dating has been done in theBETA ANALYTIC, INC. laboratory in Miami,Florida, with the participation of Dr. DardenHood and Dr. David Miller.

2 The neutron activation studies of the obsidi-an deposits from which the archeologicalpieces fromMorgadal Grande originally camewere done by Dr. Dolores Tenorio and Mela-nia Jiménez with the participation of archae-ologist Ricardo Leonel Cruz Jiménez in thelaboratories of theNational Institute for NuclearResearch. They currently continue in theUniversity of Tokyo under the supervision ofDr. Motoyuki Matsuo and Dr. Akihito Kuno.

82

José

LuisCruz

Romero/

IIE

Individual candleholder from the Cacahuatal Phase.

The commercial dominanceof El Pital stimulatedthe development of a

vigorous regional culture thatwas the direct predecessor

of El Tajín.

Along with cacao, amaranth, chili peppersand tomatoes, vanilla is considered oneof Mexico’s main contributions to the

world. Its delicious flavor and delicate aromaare obtained from the mature fruit of an orchidknown as vanilla, caxixinath (“hidden flower” inTotonac) or tlilxochitl (“black flower” in Nahuatl).Its scientific name is Vanilla planifoliaAndrewsex Jackson.Just like today, in pre-Columbian Mexico,

vanilla’s flavor and aroma were appreciated andvalued. However, in contrast with our time, itwas reserved for a select few, restricted to thenobility. They drank a beverage of vanilla mixed

with chocolate, which was the way Hernán Cor-tés first tasted it, during an audience with Moc-tezuma.Throughout history, vanilla gathering and pro-

duction have been associated with a few townsin Mexico’s southeast and more generally withthe Totonac culture, located in the Papantla, Ve-racruz area. Totonac documents testify to thefact that they gathered vanilla fruit in theirtropical forests and offered it as tribute to theAztecs. In these forests, vanilla grew on vinesthat climbed the trees seeking sunlight. Oncethe orchid vine reached the tops of their hoststhey began to produce flowers and green fruitin spring. The young fruit, which looked like abean pod or green bean, hung from the top ofthe trees, watery and without scent or flavor. But,

83

History and Ecology of VanillaMariana Hernández Apolinar*

* Biologist and research assistant at the SpecializedEcology Laboratory at the UNAM School of Science.

Mar

iana

Her

nánd

ez


when they ripened in winter, they took on theircharacteristic flavor and smell: they turned avery dark brown, almost black, and some openedto form a kind of fan that looked like a flower.The ripe fruit was offered as tribute.We know that the vanilla harvest was not very

large; all the more reason why it was consid-ered rare and precious. One of the reasons forthe paucity of the crop was that the flowers de-pended for their fertilization on the abundanceof metallic green bees, known scientifically asEuglosa viridissima. Another reason that hasbeen cited as a cause of low vanilla productionhas been the fruit’s lack of nectar and fragrance,the function of which is to attract pollinatinginsects.Some controversy exists about the moment

when vanilla began to be cultivated in our coun-try. Some authors think it began among theTotonacs before the arrival of the Spaniards,while others say that it started in the mid-eighteenth or even the early nineteenth centu-ry. Regardless of the date, we know that today’straditional cultivation method is almost identi-cal to that used in the past in the tropical for-est: the orchid spreads through stakes or piecesof stem planted at the base of a tree or host.Once the plant takes root, it begins to grow andcreep up the host; when it is over three meterslong, the vanilla begins to produce flowers andfruit. In communities where traditional formsof planting continue to be used (for example,Papantla, Veracruz; Sierra Norte de Puebla andChinantla Baja, Oaxaca), trees under five metershigh are chosen as hosts, while the taller onesare used for the shade the crop needs.After the conquest, because of the enthusi-

asm for the spice in Europe, several attemptswere made to extend production to other partsof the world. Based on the Totonac experience,it was introduced into Java, Réunion, Mauritiusand Madagascar, where the plants developedwell, but when the orchids flowered, fruit pro-duction was nil or almost nil. This was due to theabsence of pollinating insects, a serious limita-tion for expansion of cultivation. Thus, for more

than two centuries, Mexico was the world’s onlysupplier of vanilla, bringing the country con-siderable profit. In the mid-nineteenth centu-ry it was discovered that vanilla flowers couldbe fertilized manually. This made it possible toproduce the fruit on plantations outside its nat-ural area (southeastern Mexico and CentralAmerica) and led to intensive vanilla cultivationin different tropical regions, making its produc-tion intensely commercial.Manual pollination is a common practice on

all the world’s vanilla plantations now, thoughit is the activity that consumes the most time,money and effort. This is because the flowers

84

Mig

uelÁ

ngel

Soto

Mig

uelÁ

ngel

Soto

Manual pollination is a common practice all around the world.

Young, unripe vanilla plants.


do not all open at the same time. For each racemewith two to 25 buds, usually only one floweropens a day and lives only six hours. This iswhy pollination is carried out during morninghours; in a productive vanillery more than 500flowers may be pollinated in one day. In the Pa-pantla region, manual pollination is known as“the marriage of the vanilla” and is carried outmainly by women and children.Today, vanilla is one of the most profitable

products of the humid tropics; this is why pro-ducers pollinate the largest possible number offlowers per plant, to get large harvests. However,this practice has negative consequences, par-

ticularly in plants with a large number of racemes(over 20). A plant can be weakened if it is heav-ily laden with fruit and can lose much of thefruit formed. In addition, the following year aweak plant will yield a low number of flowersand fruit, or none at all; and some of the orchidscan even die or develop diseases. To avoid thesenegative results, indigenous Totonac plantersrecommend pollinating five flowers per racemeand maintaining the same number of fruits.However, growers increase or decrease the num-ber they recommend according to their experi-ence and the plant’s vitality.With the permanent aim of achieving high

productivity, vanilla cultivation techniques havechanged over time to adapt to the area wherethe vanilleries have been planted. Unfortunate-ly, the most successful experiences have beenin areas outside the species’ place of origin. Thismeans that current vanilla production is con-centrated in countries where it was artificiallyintroduced, like Indonesia, Réunion, the Co-moros Islands and, above all, the Malagasy Re-public, which has been the world’s leadingproducer of vanilla for the last five decades, withan output of 1,000 tons a year. Mexico has beenleft behind with its 12 to 30 tons a year becausea large part of cultivation is done with tradition-al systems, with, unfortunately, low productivity.However, if we take into account the rapid de-forestation of the Mexican tropics, this agro-forestry system has the advantage of preservingthe fauna and a large number of species of theoriginal vegetation.A recent development has shown another

advantage of Mexico’s vanilleries: their geneticvariation. This means that although the plantslook similar, they are actually different, like thedifference between a father and his children.When this difference is very small, the plantsare genetically very similar or identical: this is thecase of the twins or clones that share the samegenetic information, making them less resistentto disease. Mexico’s vanilleries have greater ge-netic variety than those of other countries, whichmeans that the latter suffer from low resistance

85

When the fruit is ripe and almost black in color, it yields its characteristic flavor and smell.

Mig

uelÁ

ngel

Soto

Rica

rdo

Gar

ibay

Manual pollination is carried out during morning hours.


to disease and that all the plants in the vanilleryare in the same precarious situation. Therefore,if a plant is infected with a certain disease, suchas the fungus that causes the root to rot (Fusa-rium batatatis, vanillae variety), it is very likelythat all the orchids will be infected, thus turn-ing it into blight that will destroy the crop (thishas happened, for example, in Madagascar),while the outcome would not necessarily be thesame in our country.One advantage of genetic variety is that it

makes it possible to select strong vanilla plants,both on plantations and in their natural envi-ronment, that could be laden with a high num-ber of fruits or with fruit resistent to drought

and disease, among other things, which wouldbolster vanilla production in Mexico.Finally, Mexico’s vanilla production does not

seem very encouraging, but there are severaloptions for improving it, among them: 1) con-tinuing with traditional cultivation, and, with afew modifications, supporting it so the crop canbe introduced into the alternative market oforganic products; 2) supporting the transforma-tion and establishment of modern cultivationtechniques; and 3) creating genetic improve-ment programs.Vanilla production is a good option for Mex-

ico, particularly if we take into account that theworld’s yearly production covers only 50 per-cent of demand for natural vanilla. We shouldtake advantage of this opportunity.

FURTHER READING

Correll, Donovan, “Vanilla, Its History, Cultivation andImportance,” Lloydia no. 7 (1944), pp. 236-264.

Davis, Elmo, “Vanilla planifoliaAndr. Family Orchidaceae”(internal document) Gilroy Foods, Inc., a subsidiary ofMcCormick & Company, 1988.

Gordillo, Marcos, “El cultivo de la vainilla en la repúblicamexicana: su estimación actual y su futuro. Una reco-pilación didáctica basada en metodologías novedosasaplicadas al diagnóstico analítico-sistémico de la viabi-lidad del agro para Vanilla planifolia Andrews” (master’sthesis in biology, Facultad de Ciencias, UNAM, 1988).

Hernández Apolinar, Mariana, and Francisco Múgica,“Estudio de la vegetación secundaria utilizada para elcultivo de la vainilla en el municipio de Usila, Oaxaca”(technical report, Programa de Aprovechamiento deRecursos Naturales, UNAM, 1995).

Hernández Apolinar, Mariana, “Crecimiento y reproduc-ción de la Vanilla planifolia (orchidaceae) en Usila,Oaxaca” (master’s thesis in ecology and environmentalsciences, Facultad de Ciencias, UNAM, 1997).

Mallory, L.D. and W.P. Cochran, Jr., “Mexican vanilla pro-duction and trade,” Forestry Agriculture no. 5 (1942),pp. 469-488.

Soto, Miguel Ángel, “Filogeografía y recursos genéticos delas vainillas en México” (technical report to Conabio,J-101, 1999).

86

Today, vanilla production is concentrated in countries where it was artificially introduced.

Mar

iana

Her

nánd

ez

All museums have somethingthat makes them unique. TheXalapa Anthropology Museum

is no exception: it is the only largearchaeology museum in Mexico notmanaged by the National Institute ofAnthropology and History (INAH), theinstitution that possesses most of Mex-ico’s archaeological riches; it is locat-

ed outside of Mexico City; and it ismanaged by a university, the VeracruzUniversity. It is a university archaeo-logical museum in the provinces withcollections of inestimable value placedin an outstanding setting.

BRIEF HISTORY

Anthropological and archaeologicalstudies on the Gulf of Mexico coasthave gone through three stages. Duringthe first, from the early eighteenth cen-

87

M U S E U M S

Science and Art at the XalapaAnthropology Museum

Rubén B. Morante López*

* Director of the Xalapa AnthropologyMuseum.Photos reproduced by permission of the XalapaAnthopology Museum.

LeticiaArriaga


tury to the beginning of the twenti-eth, similarly to the study of archae-ology nationwide, they concentratedon scientific inquiry mixed with a ro-mantic vision of the past. In the sec-ond stage, from 1936 to 1970, once theprofession of anthropologist had beenconsolidated in Mexico, regional workdeveloped, like that in Oaxaca andMi-choacan, followed by Xalapa, Guada-lajara and San Luis Potosí. The thirdstage began when the federal govern-ment began decentralizing nationallyin the early 1970s, including the de-centralization of the National Instituteof Anthropology and History (INAH).This policy came to Veracruz in

1979, but had contradictory effectsbecause our cultural and archaeolog-ical patrimony had already been de-centralized and administered by theVeracruz University for three decades.The establishment of the INAH’s Re-gional Center actually centralized thepatrimony again.The story begins in the 1930s under

the influence of the ideas currentunder President Lázaro Cárdenas, afterthe Mexican Revolution. These ideasincluded changing the vision of indi-genous people from that of objects tobe exhibited and seeking through ar-chaeology a sincere—though ephemer-al— valuing of the dignity of indige-nous people as a first step toward themuch-longed-for social justice whichwould lead to emphasizing the gloriesof the past. The founders of anthropol-ogy in Veracruz, Gonzalo Aguirre Bel-trán and José Luis Melgarejo Vivanco,worked under the influence of theseideas.In 1942, the Veracruz government

Office of Indigenous Affairs began totransfer its collection of archaeologi-cal pieces to the city of Xalapa, exhi-

88

The museum’s collectionswere gathered over decades of archaeological research

between 1951 and 1973.

Cihuateo. Figures like this represent women who died in childbirth.

LeticiaArriaga

Museums

biting them in the General Offices ofEducation headquarters starting in1943. The following year the VeracruzUniversity was founded. The domi-nant archaeological ideas of the timewere concretized in a museum, inau-gurated in the early 1940s, which theVeracruz government said had the aimof “strengthening the nationality,” andbeing “luminous like Veracruz and joyfullike its people.”In 1957, Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán,

dean of Veracruz University, came toan agreement with the INAH to make itpossible to “carry out archaeologicalexploration and create the museum’sarchaeology section.”In 1986, after operating almost

three decades, the Veracruz Univer-sity inaugurated its new site for theAnthropology Museum, built on sixhectares of land with 16,000 squaremeters of construction for the exhibi-tion of about 2,500 pieces of differ-ent sizes, some of which weigh morethan 20 tons. The rest of the almost30,000 objects in the collection areproperly stored in three air-conditionedwarehouses.

A SPACE WORTHY OF

OUR CULTURAL PATRIMONY

The museum’s collections were gath-ered over decades of archaeologicalresearch between 1951 and 1973. Theyhave been augmented by donationsfrom individuals, among them severalentire collections received in the firsthalf of the 1980s. Iker Larrauri andFernando Gamboa stand out amongthe many gifted museographers whoparticipated in creating the museum.The works of pre-Hispanic art weredistributed in a vestibule, six rooms,

89

Fernando Gamboa stands out amongthe many gifted museographers who participated in

creating the museum.

Ritual palm, part of a symbolic group of objects linked to the ball game.

JavierHinojosa


90

18 galleries and three patios or pergo-las that lead to four hectares of gardens,where visitors can admire everythingfrom tropical plants to those that growin milder climes.In addition to warehouses, the area

of restricted access includes 15 cubi-cles for researchers from Veracruz Uni-versity and other Mexican and foreigninstitutions who are working on pro-jects related to the museum’s collec-tion. Other activities are the preser-vation of the museum’s patrimony andresearch to update and attractively pre-sent information for the public throughthe temporary and permanent exhibits.

For all this work, themuseumhas ware-houses and a computer center, as wellas rooms used for liaison with othermuseums and institutions. All theseareas operate with volunteers from dif-ferent institutions, mainly archaeolo-gists, visual artists, restorers, historiansand architects.Perhaps one of the museum’s most

significant features is the collection ofOlmec works that are the most repre-sentative examples of the artistic splen-dor of the southern part of Veracruzstate during the Early Pre-Classi-cal Period (1200-900 B.C.). From thissame culture, the museum also exhibits

The museum exhibits about 2,500 pieces of different size and weight.

LeticiaArriaga

Perhaps one ofthe museum’s mostsignificant features

is its collectionof Olmec works.

Museums

91

masks and figurines encrusted withsemi-precious stones. This is perhapsthe world’s most important collectionof Olmec monumental art. Suffice it tomention the famous Lord of the LimeTrees, or the seven oldest and mostaesthetically perfect colossal heads.Recently, the collection has been sup-plemented with the sculpture TheTwins of Azuzul.The cultures of central Veracruz

flourished during the early and mid-dle Classical Period (A.D. 300-650); themuseum has a rich stock of muralsfrom the Las Higueras area, excellent-ly fashioned clay figures, as well as

the best collection of the so-called“smiling figures.” Also of note are thelife-sized terra-cotta sculptures fromEl Zapotal representing women whodied in childbirth, or cihuateos. Lastly,in this part of the museum, we can seebeautiful stone sculptures, both reliefsfrom El Tajín and full-bodied piecesthat are part of a symbolic group ofobjects linked to the ritual ball game:yokes, palms, votive axes, protectivemitts and padlocks.From the Post-Classical (A.D. 950-

1521), the museum has an abundantcollection of sculptures from the Huax-teca region in the far northern part

The museum’s nearly30,000-piece collectionis stored in threeair-conditioned warehouses.

The pieces are displayed in an outstanding setting.

LeticiaArriaga

JavierHinojosa


of the state, among them the CornStone, the Tlazolteotl and the Lord ofOzuluama, the representation of oneof the dead crossing into the under-world. The Huaxtecs were incompa-rable potters and expertly worked shelland metals like copper and gold. Themuseum exhibits some of the mostbeautiful, representative works fromthe Huaxteca this region of Mexico.Other sections of the museum ex-

hibit objects from the Post-Classicalperiod from sites in central Veracruz likeCempoala, Quiahuixtlan and Quauh-tochco. And, lastly, we must not for-get to go through the thematic sec-tions of the museum organized to showstones, jewelry, instruments, itemsrelated to the ball game, bones andcodices.

In the last four years, the museumhas curated and organized almost 20local exhibitions and participated inothers presented in Finland, Canada,France, Spain, Portugal, Mexico City,Monterrey, Macao, the United Statesand the People’s Republic of China.The gardens, the building, the col-

lection and the harmonious whole inthe temperate climate of the city ofXalapa make of the museum a placeworthy of a visit both by local touristsand those from far away. None of themwill regret it.

INFORMATION

Av. Jalapa y Acueducto s/n

Xalapa, Ver.

Open Tuesday to Sunday

From 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

92

The Olmecs’ monumental art is well represented. Left: one of the seven oldest colossal heads; right: the Lord of the Lime Trees.

JavierHinojosa

The museum exhibitssome of the most beautiful,

representative works from thesoutheast region of Mexico.

INTRODUCTION

Human papillomavirus (HPV) infectionis associated with cervical cancer. Papil-lomaviruses can cause diseases, fromwarts and condylomas, to lesions whichcan progress to malignant neoplasias.Cervical cancer is a serious problem indeveloping countries because the dis-ease is usually not detected early. InMex-ico, several campaigns have been imple-mented since 1975 to detect the earlystages of HPV infections inwomen.How-ever, these campaigns have not beenvery successful, as indicated by the in-creasing number of patients with cervi-cal cancer. In 1992 alone, 4,348 womendied from cervical cancer, and this num-ber has increased to a 5,000 average inrecent years.Many factors are associated with the

development of cervical cancer: socio-economic status, being over 45 years ofage, multiple sexual partners, early sex-ual activity, first pregnancy at an earlyage, multiple pregnancies and smoking.Usually human papillomavirus in-

fects and replicates in epithilium cells,like the ones covering the vagina. Theseviruses produce proteins, including theE2 protein, that functions as a regula-tor for the production of two papillo-mavirus proteins, E6 and E7. After in-

93

S C I E N C E A N D T E C H N O L O G Y

Strategies for DevelopingA Cervical Cancer Vaccine

Ricardo Rosales*

* Researcher at the Institute for Biome-dical Research (IIB), UNAM.

Allpho

tographs

arereprod

uced

courtesy

oftheInstitute

ofBiom

edicalRe

search

Ricardo Rosales working with mice.

Cervical cancer is a seriousproblem in developing countriesbecause the disease is usually

not detected early.


fection with the virus —for example,a year or two later— the E2 proteinis destroyed, thus allowing E6 and E7to reproduce in great quantities. Pro-teins E6 and E7 are responsible forchanging a normal cell to a cancerousone. Thus, the E6 and E7 proteins areresponsible for creating a canceroustumor in a patient who has been in-fected with papillomavirus.Because cervical cancer is a seri-

ous health problem, many approacheshave been tried in an effort to devel-op a successful therapy. Surgery, radi-ation therapy and chemotherapy have,of course been used to reduce papillo-mas andcancerous tumors.Unfortunate-ly, these methods only work efficientlyduring the first stages of tumor devel-opment. In later stages, it becomes verydifficult to treat cervical tumors be-cause of their size and the side effectsthat anti-cancer drugs may have.Because cervical cancer has a close

correlation to HPV infection, it is thoughtthat inducing a protective stage against

papillomaviruses would help in pre-venting cervical tumors.Based on this idea, different strate-

gies aimed at controlling papillomavi-rus have been tried.Viral vectors (viruses used to man-

ufacture vaccines), like, for example,the vaccinia virus, have been used forthe design and manufacture of boththerapeutic and preventive vaccinesagainst cervical cancer. Using geneticengineering techniques, it has beenpossible to introduce genes into thevaccinia virus capable of producing pro-teins that have specific effects againstother viruses or cancerous cells. Na-turally, these proteins are recognizedby the patient’s immune system, whichgenerates antibodies and specific cellscapable of destroying viruses or tumorcells that contain the virus. The mainstrategy is making the vaccinia virus

capable of producing proteins recog-nizable by the immune system andthat generate a protective immunolo-gical response against viruses or can-cer cells.Another novel approach to control-

ling HPV infection and cervical canceris based on the properties of the E2protein of papillomavirus. This proteinis capable of arresting cell growth andstopping cell proliferation by induc-ing apoptosis (or cell death) of humancancer cells. The E2 protein is alsocapable of inducing tumor regression

and decreasing the number of newpapilloma foci formed in animals im-munized with the recombinant E2protein (a protein that has been ge-netically modified to fulfill other pur-poses). Thus, the delivery of the E2protein directly into HPV tumor cellsshould help arrest tumor growth. Oneof the most efficient ways to deliver aprotein into cells is to place the E2 geneinto vaccinia virus vectors (Poxvirusfamily).Inserting an antigen in a vaccinia

virus (poxvirus) increases the amountof these molecules in the infected cell,thus stimulating the immune systemmore efficiently. The purpose of usingdifferent antigens expressed in vac-cinia virus is to try to enhance the im-mune response against these specificantigens. For these reasons it is thoughtthat recombinant vaccinia viruses are

excellent candidates for new types ofvaccines as therapeutic agents. Inaddition, the vaccinia virus has beenused to vaccinate millions of peopleworldwide in the campaign to eradi-cate smallpox.An attenuated vaccinia virus known

as Modified Vaccinia Ankara (MVA),has been developed and tested as asafe smallpox vaccine. This virus wasfound to be virulent for normal or im-muno-suppressed animals and with-out side effects in 120,000 humansinoculated for the first time. One thing

94

A) Tumor before treatment; B) Quadriceps’ musclearea after treatment with MVA E2.

In Mexico, several campaignshave been implemented since 1975 to detectthe early stages of HPV infections in women.However, they have not been very successful.

Sc ience and Technology

that makes the MVA very safe is thatviral expression and recombinantmechanisms are impaired in this virus.This MVA vaccinia virus has otheradvantages. It is an excellent vectorfor expressing foreign genes, such asthe Escherichia coli Lac Z or the pageT7 polymerase in infected cells, and,moreover, MVA is capable of infectingmost, if not all, the human cell linestested up to now. Based on these char-acteristics, the use of vaccinia virusvectors is the most successful strate-gy for vaccine development today.Also, several other vaccines using theMVA virus against HIV, melanomas,measles, influenza, para-influenza, den-gue virus, herpes virus and malariahave been successfully tested in ani-mal models.In our laboratory, we have tested

the recombinant virus MVA E2 against

HPV tumors. This recombinant MVA

E2 virus contains the E2 gene of pap-illomavirus. When MVA E2 was in-jected directly into human HPV tu-mors in nude mice (mice withoutimmune systems), tumor growth wasarrested. In addition, when rabbitscarrying the VX2 transplantable cot-tontail rabbit papillomavirus carci-noma were treated with the MVA E2recombinant virus, their tumors stop-ped growing, and in 80 percent of theanimals complete tumor regressionwas observed. These rabbits remained

tumor-free for more than a year. Theyalso presented specific antibodies thatwere capable of stimulating macro-

phages for efficiently killing tumorcells in vitro. In addition, passivetransfer of these antibodies to newtumor-bearing rabbits resulted in tu-mor-growth arrest. This data stronglysuggests that the MVA E2 recombi-nant virus is a promising anti-papil-loma therapeutic agent. The findingsdescribed above work, and togetherwith others, underscore the safetyand effectiveness of using the MVA E2recombinant vaccinia virus againstcervical cancer, thus warranting fur-ther studies to investigate the thera-

peutic potential of MVA E2 in cervicalcancer patients.A phase I clinical trial designed to

test the safety of the MVA E2 recom-binant virus was performed in 200female patients having only papillo-mavirus infection but no lesions. TheMVA E2 recombinant virus did not causeside effects in the patients, except ina few who experienced only a smallincrease in body temperature after ap-plication of the second dose.No HPV DNA was detected in 50 per-

cent of the patients treated with MVA

E2 (using the hybrid capture method)after treatment. In contrast, in a par-allel group only 20 percent of patientstreated with cryosurgery did not haveHPV DNA. A follow-up of MVA E2-treat-ed-patients over a period of four yearsshowed no recurrence of HPV infectionin 35 percent of all patients as deter-mined by colposcopy and Papanicolautests. This showed that treatment withMVA E2 can eliminate the papilloma-virus present in infected patients andalso prevent new HPV infection.

95

Ricardo Rosales at his microscope.

In our laboratory, we have testedthe recombinant virus MVA E2 against HPV tumors.When it was injected directly into human HPV

tumors in nude mice, tumor growth was arrested.

98

P O L I T I C S

Surviving several administrations,budget cuts, innumerable crisesof the publishing industry, a dearth

of readers, disastrous distribution andthe other evils that plague the bookspublished by cultural institutions, theFondo Editorial Tierra Adentro (InlandPublishing Fund) had its tenth anni-versary in 2000. The fund is part of aneditorial program of the same namewhose aim is to disseminate the workof young writers and artists as well asthe most important cultural and artis-

tic products and activities in differentregions of Mexico. The program’s otherprojects are a bi-monthly magazine ofthe same name,2 a weekly radio showand the co-organization of the Edmun-do Valadés Contest to Support Inde-pendent Magazines and the Elías Nan-dino National Young People’s PoetryPrize.

The publishing house was createdin 1990 as an addition to the dissemina-tion that the magazine had been doingup until then, when it began its secondperiod. It publishes anthologies by genreand individually and collectively writ-

ten books to make new voices knownand stimulate literary creation. Thebooks have also been vehicles for dis-seminating the work of young visualartists, which appears on their covers,giving them a defined, distinctive image.In addition to having beautiful coverdesigns, they are carefully edited.

The publishing house’s catalogueboasts more than 200 titles in differentgenres: poetry, short stories, novels, playsand essays.

Poetry is the collection’s most favoredgenre for a very simple reason: almostno publishing house that survives based

L I T E R A T U R E

Writers of TierraAdentro PublishersTwoMexicanWomenNovelists

of the 1990s1

Graciela Martínez Zalce*

*Researcher at CISAN.

Li tera ture

99

only on its sales will risk publishingbooks of poetry today, so competitionamong poets, both men and women,is very stiff.3 Tierra Adentro could ded-icate itself exclusively to poetry giventhe number of manuscripts received.

Second comes narrative: more short-story writers than novelists are printedbecause it is easier to get a manuscriptof a novel accepted at a commercialhouse. In addition, younger authorsproduce more collections of short sto-ries than novels.

Tierra Adentro tries not to publishmiscellaneous collections of essays be-cause that could lead to its books beinggroups of articles published previous-ly elsewhere. Its view is that mono-graphic essays are more interesting forthe reader and have a more lastingeffect. The origin of the author stud-ied is not important: there are essaysabout Ermilo Abreu Gómez, MalcolmLowry, Efraín Huerta, Bruno Traven,Inés Arredondo and others. Several ofthese are prize-winning essays.

The playwrights are the smallestgroup for a logical reason: their workis produced to be performed and rarelyto be published as a book.

Basically, the collection is made upof young men and women authors. Theeditors have made an effort to estab-lish a balance between those from Mex-ico City and from the rest of the country.Many are fellowship recipients from na-tional and state funds to promote youngartists; the winners of regional prizeslike the Juan Rulfo prize for a firstnovel, the San Luis Potosí short storyprize or Tabasco’s Enriqueta Ochoa deTorreón and Josefina Vicens prizes; ornational prizes like the one for narrativegiven by theNational FineArts Institute.

In the last five years, since TierraAdentro has been a sponsor of the Elías

Nandino Poetry Prize, in addition to itsconsisting of a sum of money, it guar-antees publication of the book, whichis printed in less than amonth so it canbeawarded together with the prize money.This has created greater expectationsand every time the prize is to be given,about 200 collections of poetry com-pete for it.4

Former Tierra Adentro editor JuanDomingoArgüelles says that in recentyears the number of manuscripts re-ceived from women has increased. Hethinks that this is linked to the fad ofwomen’s literature which he says, re-gardless of theme and quality, has beena springboard for young women writ-ers to make their work known. I do notcompletely agree with him. I think thatascribing greater participation of womento a fad and not to a broadening out ofpossibilities is, even if involuntarily, toa certain point pejorative.

Let’s look at the figures. In all, Tie-rraAdentro has published 205 volumes:

• in 1990, it published six books,none by a woman;

• in 1991, there were 20 books, sixby women (two books of poetry,

two of short stories and two ofessays);

• in 1992, of 26 books, only threewere by women (two books of poet-ry, one of essays);

• in 1993, of 33 books, seven wereby women (six of poetry, one ofshort stories);

• in 1994, of 16 books, only twowere by women writers (both ofshort stories), although an antho-logy of children’s literature wasalso published, compiled by Sil-via Molina;

• in 1995, the number of booksdropped to seven, only one by awoman poet;

• in 1996, production increased to22 books, five by women in dif-ferent genres (two of poetry, oneof essays, one of short stories andone of plays);

• in 1997, of the 24 books published,again five were by women writers(two books of poetry, three of shortstories) and Thelma Nava editeda poetry anthology;

• in 1998, the number of volumespublished went up to 30, of which


nine were by women (one of plays,one of short stories and six ofpoetry);

• in 1999, although the number ofbooks published dropped to 19,eight were by women (three ofshort stories, two of poetry, two ofplays and one novel).

Some of the books by women, saysArgüelles, are among the best and mostinteresting that Tierra Adentro hasever published.

It is not a question of a fad, then,but of the authors’ maturity, as can beseen when reviewing the titles. Of themany books of short stories, some arenoticeably the product of a workshop;most of them are fresh, but the desireto surprise the reader subtracts fromtheir effectiveness. Nevertheless, sev-eral are of high quality, like Prefiero losfunerales (I Prefer Funerals) (no. 120,1996) by Yucatan-born Carolina Luna.Humor is an outstanding characteris-tic of this book and in the long story,we encounter an homage to her fellowYucatecan, Juan García Ponce. Otherbooks include the collection by Eliza-beth Vivero,Con los ojos perdidos (Witha Lost Look) (no. 197, 1999), andAle-jandra Camposeco, El bilé y otras enso-ñaciones (Lipstick and Other Fancies)(no. 198, 1999), undoubtedly two ofthe most interesting examples of thework of the youngest women writers inMexico.Among the collections of poet-ry, one exceptional book is La más mía

(The Most Mine) (no. 173, 1998) byCristina Rivera Garza, an intense narra-tive poem about the relations betweenmothers and daughters, illness and theimpossibility of expressing love.

And in the whole series, two rarities:the only two novels by women writers.In this issue of Voices of Mexico, weoffer a fragment of each of them.

* * *

Una manera de morir (A Way of Dying)by Vizania Amezcua is like a sympho-ny. Written in first person like an auto-biography, like in any self-respectingpostmodern game the protagonist haswritten a novel called Una manera demorir and on the cover is a referenceto the mystery that the narrator tries toreveal: the statue of a young girl witha wrinkled neck and her head thrownback in pleasure, called The Tongue.

Covering 1951 to the end of the cen-tury, with a tone of nostalgia that in-vades the novel like the rain in the citywhere it is set, the text is a recountingof the memory of the protagonist thatin every chapter moves back and forththrough her past and present.

Antonia, the narrator, near death,remembers the details of her life in agrey city of the provinces, her vocationas a writer almost lost in the cataloguecards of a library, the details of herrelationship with Vicente, the only manin her life, the only spiritual and phys-ical love, the game in which they bor-rowed the names of the sculptor andsculptress J.W. Fiske and Eva Roy, thelong and apparently fruitless wait.

* * *

When you are a reader by vocation,you spend your life in search of that

desirable object that absorbs us in itsrectangular black and white space thatis awindow to other spaces open and fullof shades of color. This seems to havehappened to Susana Pagano with JuanRulfo’s Pedro Páramo. Of course, eventhe least knowledgeable reader of Mex-ican literature could now ask, “Andwho did it not happen to?” But Paga-no’s case is special. In her, the reader’s en-thusiasm became an intertextual gameso that, in turn, her readers could un-wind it.

Y si yo fuera Susana San Juan...(And If I Were Susana San Juan...) isa feminine genealogy. In contrast withSusana San Juan, who lives with herfather and grieves for her husband,physically —not spiritually— at theside of Pedro Páramo, Susana, the nar-rator, lives with her mother, who wasabandoned by her father, and her madgrandmother.

NOTES

1 A version of this article appeared for the firsttime in Ana Rosa Domenella, comp., Terri-torio de leonas. Cartografía de narradoras me-xicanas de los noventa (Mexico City: UAM-JuanPablos, 2000).

2 The magazine includes literature, graphics,painting, photography and articles aboutmusic, dance, theater, architecture, regionalhistory, culture and folk art. It was created in1974 and its main objective is the projectionof young creators throughout the country. It isnow in its second period.

3 Interview with Juan Domingo Argüelles, chiefeditor of the magazine and the publishinghouse until 2001, 20 January 2000.

4 Tierra Adentro receives between 60 and 70manuscripts a year, of which 30 are pub-lished, budget allowing. The manuscripts arefirst reviewed inside the program and thensent to panels of judges organized by genre.

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101

And If IWere Susana San Juan...(Fragment*)

Susana Pagano

It’s no accident that Susana San Juan and Ihave the same name; I myself was the ins-piration for the character. Nor is it a coin-

cidence that his name is Juan. He came to myhouse one day dragging those melancholic eyesbehind him like a soul in Purgatory dragging itssins. “I brought you a present,” he said. He lefta hardback book on the dining room table, a bookthat was unopened, a new one. He knows I likenew books; old books are full of odors from apast that has nothing to do with me. Juan’s giftwas like a penetration into my own reality, aninfiltration into the raw ingredients of my fleshand my soul. He left without a word, leavingme alone with his creation and my memories,memories that I was not yet aware of. I read thenovel for the first time in a state of somethinglike hypnosis, where the person holding thebook in her hands was not me but her, SusanaSan Juan. A Susana San Juan in ecstasy as she

read her reflection in me, Susana, the characterwhose power over the man who idolizes her goesfar beyond limits, frontiers and material goods.A power she does not know she possesses.

I wept more than my eyes would allow and Ipossessed it. I made each word, each characterand each situation mine. Juan only looked at mewith a smile every time I reread his book. He did-n’t say a word; he just observed me and strokedmy hair. Susana San Juan, melancholic and ob-sessed with memories, could only be me: the re-flection of myself in the mirror of a printed book.

* * *

Ask the living, because the dead no longer res-pond, they become deaf fools; ask the livingSusana, even if they don’t answer you either, butnever ask the dead; they’re idiots, with their paleblue stares that only those who love the cold


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have, with their mouths stretched by iron rodsto simulate a smile, a smile they never wore whenthey were alive.

You were born in a town in the Bajio region;then you came here, to the capital, where every-one rushes around, and nobody has time tostop and look at your wood-coloured eyes. Butno one ever told you why you ended up in a worldhalf in ruins, empty of souls and plagued withnoisy people.

Ask them to tell you who your grandmotheris, that octogenarian relic whose eyes observeyou afraid to ask who you are and what you’redoing in her house eating her chocolates. Sittingin the same armchair smoking a long, reekingpipe, that’s how you remember her ever sinceyou were a child. She doesn’t appear in yourparents’ wedding photos; somebody said shespent a quarter of a century in a lunatic asylum,where your grandfather sent her to be lockedup. But you’ve no idea why; you never ask toomany questions; maybe you’re not really inter-ested in finding out too much and you don’tbelieve your grandfather could have been so

bad.After all, he bought you sweets and watchedthe cartoons with you.

Ask them how your mother and father met,when their first kiss was and if they ever lovedeach other. But, above all, ask why you wereborn and who said you’d be happy in your lifeand with them.

* * *

You’re burning me up Juan; you’re draping mewith your flames, and there’s nothing I can doto stop it. Do you really think I’m so insensitive?It’s hurting me and killing me, can’t you see?You were here watching me; you didn’t say any-thing but the silent words that came out of youreyes. Then you left and I felt angry; I felt angrybecause you’d left like you always do, withoutsaying a word. But you’re still here; I can still feelyour eyes watching me, and I can still touchyour smell as it floats through the air. You can’tget away from me, even if you leave me every day.I kept your essence but you stole mine, and that’swhy I’m just half of myself. I’ve got you but Ihaven’t got myself.

That’s why I spent a whole week in bed. Theseven nights with fever seemed never-ending,with cold sweats all over my body and my throatso dry I could hardly breathe. I thought of Su-sana San Juan a lot. It’s a shame you couldn’tcome to pay me a visit, I’d have felt better if I’donly seen you…

My mother is a strange woman too, she neverstops telling me I’m in the way and I’m nothingbut a nuisance in her life. I think she says thosethings because I’m not married. But when I’mill she never leaves my side. Maybe that’swhy I fall ill so often. SometimesI tell her to go away, to leavemealone, but she never does.She spent the entire weekin a rocking chair that creaksand reminds me of horrorfilms. She told me things orreadme the newspaper every day.Then I asked her to read me your

Li tera ture

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novel out loud, very loud so I could hear itproperly and not miss a thing. She didn’t minddoing it, but she didn’t understand a word. Shethought it was funny that Susana San Juan wascalled Susana like me, but she didn’t like thecharacter. She said she was crazy, but I don’tagree….

All my mother remembers about my grand-mother was when she got told off for eatingchocolates behind other people’s backs. She wasseven when a strange man and a strange womandressed in white arrived. That’s why my moth-er has never dressed in white, not even the dayshe got married.

They were the ones who took my grand-mother away. I was a little girl when she cameback home, a small pile of rags and a gaze morein the past than in the present.

“She wasn’t really crazy, but your grandfatherhated her and that was the only way he could getrid of her and have all the lovers he wanted.”

“My grandfather was a good man, he boughtme sweets and took me to the park.”

“He loved you. I don’t know why.”“I loved him too. He was a good man.”“You’ve always been stupid, Susana.”“Uncle Jaime says my grandmother banged

her head against the wall and wet her pants. Ithink she really must have been crazy.”

“Don’t be crude, Susana.”“And she got drunk just about every day. What

does delirium tremens mean?”“Jaime just talks rubbish. He’s stupid.”“Yes, everyone’s stupid. Am I stupid, too,

Mother?”My temperature went down instead of up. I

wanted to stay ill so that I could sleep foreverlike Susana San Juan and so that my motherwould be there telling me stories and reading yourbook and your stories to me. But I felt bettereach day. All I wanted was to keep on dreamingof you and my grandfather and the characteryou created, the character that’s really me.

The last night I was ill my grandmother en-tered the room. I felt the smell of her pipe wedgedinto my nose. I hate the smell of her pipe be-

cause it remindsme ofmy grandfather.My grand-father smoked a pipe too, and my grandfather’sdead.

“Are you sick again, Susana?”“Yes.”“Temperature?”“Yes, can’t you see?”“You need a man, Susana.”“I’ve already got one, grandmother. His name’s

Juan.”“He’ll leave you for another. They all leave

for another, or others.” I was enveloped in thesmell of her pipe and then a vacuum. I felt calmerand thought that I should have smashed theclay sun over her head.

The next day my temperature was back tonormal.

Translation: Michael Charles Smith

NOTE

* Fragments taken from Susana Pagano’s novel Si yo fueraSusana San Juan... (Mexico City: Conaculta/Fondo Edi-torial Tierra Adentro, 1998).

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Iwon’t die. Not yet. I’m still missing somepieces, indications of what happened. I won’tdie. Nobody can die when she has slices

missing out of her past, or rather, out of a partof her past that’s spotty and that she’s trying topiece back together. I won’t die. If I’m writingthese notes it’s to figure out what happened. Oneday... but I’m getting ahead of myself. Now I’mhere, watching the rain fall. I’m looking at thewoman I was. Right now I’m getting ready to tellthe story, and I say any story usually begins witha situation or actions that unleash a series ofother events, repercussions that become the bodyof the story itself. Now I’m not in the middle ofanything that’s particularly surprising, movingor noteworthy; I’m not carrying out any kind ofheroic, desperate or extravagant activity. I’m limit-ing myself to observing, from an armchair fromwhich lately I’ve been watching the days go by,a small statue that’s before me.

It’s set on a tall cube made specially to betopped with the statue to show it off likefor an exhibit. The figure that I’m observ-ing is of a woman’s nude body, lying onits side and arched as though an invisi-ble lover was making love to her at thevery moment in which the artist decid-ed to sculpt her.

There are two unusual details aboutthe statue, though: first, despite thewoman’s smooth young skin, her neckis noticeably wrinkled, and the other isthat in contrast to the name that you mightexpect it to have —the name of a womanor something like that— the statue is enti-tled The Tongue.

So many details to talk about a small statueis, of course, not happenstance. This sculpted,dark-skinned figure has a history that sums upthe totality of my own. Or the inverse: my entirehistory is concretized in the appearance of thatimage, its meaning and in the day that Vicentegave it to me, making it, unfortunately, the giftI would have preferred never to have received atall, despite the value it has now —and not onlyfor me.

I say I won’t die. Not yet. And the rain isfalling here.

NOTE

* Fragment taken from Vizania Amezcua’s novel, Una mane-ra de morir, published by Conaculta/ Fondo EditorialTierra Adentro, Mexico City, 1999, pp. 13-14.

AWay of Dying(Fragment*)

Vizania Amezcua

PhotographerMariana Yampolsky was bornin the United States, but lived inMexico,a country she liked somuch that shemade

it her own. She took out Mexican citizenshipregardless of the fact that she was leaving behind“a FirstWorld country”, as someone told her whenshe made her application. Her traveling lensjourneyed throughout Mexico tirelessly to portrayit with the depth of an eye that knew how to see.Yampolsky was born in 1925 in Chicago and

lived there until 1945 when she graduated in artsand humanities from the University of Chica-go. That same year she traveled to Mexico,which would capture her heart. She first decid-ed to reside here and then to take out Mexicancitizenship, which she was awarded in 1954.She studied at the La Esmeralda School of Paint-ing, Sculpture and Engraving and became partof the movement that founded the PopularGraphics Workshop, where she worked withartists like Alfredo Zalce, Pablo O’Higgins and

Leopoldo Méndez, among others. Yampolskyworked as an engraver and organized collectiveexhibitions of the workshop’s production in dif-ferent countries until 1958.But sketching and engraving, in which she

worked for the first few years of her profession-al career, would give way to photography. Thecamera that she initially carried with her as aback-up in her sketching outings soon becamethe basic tool with which she would captureimages of locales, towns, indigenous groups, folkart, dances, ceremonies, architecture and any-thing else she came across that stirred her emo-tions. Because Yampolsky accepted herself asan emotional photographer, something whichnever turned her into a banal artist. She said, “Idon’t arrange anything or expect anything. I usemy camera as an extension of my heart and notof logic.”1 In an interview months before herdeath, she said, “When a photograph is takenwith knowledge of the facts, it clarifies things;

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I N M E M O R I A M

Mariana Yampolsky’sProfound Mexico

Anto

nio

Nav

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VEPh

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it makes a gift to us of emotions....The eye thatknows how to see is more than all the profoundfeelings evoked by seeing certain things. A pho-tographer can be in love with trees or can pho-tograph things made by hand or by children, andhe is not necessarily a romantic. All these thingsare important, but you have to differentiate be-tween a banal photograph and one that searches,inquires or even reinvents.”2 Emotion and rigor-ousness were always the two maxims of hercamera.In 1948 she made her first inroads into pho-

tography with the images in the book Lo efíme-ro y lo eterno del arte popular mexicano (TheEphemeral and the Eternal inMexican FolkArt),to be followed by many others. From then on,she would roam through the country on what-ever means of transportation was available, bus,car, bicycle and even on foot, to photographmainly indigenous and rural Mexico. Her pic-tures of fields of magueys, indigenous faces andfolk ways often led her to be classified as aphotographer of indigenous peoples, somethingshe accepted as part of her love for this coun-try and its people.In 1950, she collaborated in editing the film

Memories of aMexican, and a year later, with otherartists, she founded the Salon of Mexican Vi-sual Arts. In 1960, she had her first one-womanshow, the first of many exhibitions of photo-graphs and engravings that traveled the worldover. Works of hers are part of the collectionsat the Modern Art Museums of New York, SanFrancisco and Mexico City, The Portrait GalleryinWashington, D.C., the SanDiego PhotographyMuseum and the Saint PetersburgArt Museum,to mention just a few.To her colleagues, students and friends, Ma-

riana Yampolsky was generous and warm andhad a great sense of humor; she chaffed at in-justice and liked to fight for justice. A concernfor fame and public recognition did not keepher awake at night, since they are ephemeral,though she did admit that “in the heart of heartsof any artist is a disproportionate desire to berecognized.”3

One of Yampolsky’s concerns was that herwork remain in Mexico after her death. “Theywant all my work in the United States, but I’mvery clear on this point: I’m Mexican and mywork stays here.”4 To that end, she gave her morethan 60,000-negative archive to one of herbest friends, photographer Alicia Ahumada, tokeep until a Mexican institution could be foundto preserve them and give them the dissemina-tion they deserve. One possibility is the Pachu-ca Photo Archives, in the city where Ahumadalives, as the most appropriate place for the col-lection, but the members of the Mariana Yam-polsky Cultural Foundation, formed precisely toprotect her legacy, say that it is too soon to makea decision. First, they say, the archives should beclassified since there are many unknown worksin it and the copyright should be protected.During her lifetime, Yampolsky received many

different prizes and distinctions; she was aneditor, professor and contributor to several na-tional dailies. When she died last May, she wasworking on an inventory of her own work andleft an unfinished book she was preparing forthe National Ecology Institute.Photographers speak through images. More

than 14 publications —like Tlacotalpan, La raízy el camino (The Root and the Road), Lo efímeroy lo eterno (The Ephemeral and the Eternal),Mazahua,Haciendas Poblanas (The Haciendas ofPuebla) and two English-language books pub-lished in the 1990s, The Edge of Time: Photo-graphs of Mexico by Mariana Yampolsky and TheTraditional Architecture of Mexico— testify towhat was in Mariana Yampolsky’s heart. Mexicowas fortunate in having had a woman who knewhow to portray it with love and elegance and wholeft a legacy of thousands of images to illustrateits memory.

Elsie MontielEditor

NOTES

1 Reforma (Mexico City), 4 May 2002.2 La Jornada (Mexico City), 8 May 2002.3 Reforma (Mexico City), 4 May 2002.4 Ibid.

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La pintura mural prehispánica en MéxicoÁrea maya, vol. II, tomos III y IV,(Pre-Hispanic Mural Painting in MexicoMaya Area, vol. 2, Books 3 and 4)UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones EstéticasMexico City, 2001, Book 3, 336 pp.; Book 4, 262 pp.

These books are the continuation of the review andstudy of Mayan paintings through the pre-Hispanic

Mural Painting in Mexico Project, headed by Beatriz de laFuente since 1990.Among the different arts of the pre-Hispanic peoples,

mural painting was an important means of communication.Their buildings were covered with stucco and usually paint-ed hematite red. Scenes covered different parts of thebuildings but most of the time were found in the interiors.The Mayan culture, just like the other Mesoamerican cul-tures, used this form of expression to transmit its conceptsof the universe and the power of the dynasties and gods.The historic content and the manufacture of the murals

themselves is so important that the project aims to registerthis universe of color through photography and computersgiven that, because of its fragility, it is in permanent dangerof being lost. Another aim of the project is to study themwith multi-disciplinary focuses.These two books contain 26 articles by researchers who

have analyzed the meanings of the scenes depicted fromthe different perspectives and methodologies of each of thedisciplines; the common object is a commitment to recoverfrom the images everything that can render more knowledgeabout the Mayas.The studies were done during different periods of field

work in archaeological sites in Campeche, Yucatán, Quin-tana Roo and Chiapas. Each of the researchers gatheredthe data he or she needed to carry out his/her work, took pho-tographs, observed each image, scrutinized the surroundings,measured the paintings and the buildings, took astronomi-cal measurements and acquired samples of pigments forchemical analysis.

107

Reviews


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The articles describe in detail the results of these stud-ies, both by members of the project and by specialists fromother institutions invited to participate.In Book 3, then, Jorge Angulo, in his article “Conceptos

generales y aspectos controversiales sobre la cultura maya”(General Concepts and Controversial Matters RegardingMayan Culture), gives an overview of the cultural, economicand natural milieu of the Maya, their cultivation techniques,settlements and architecture, using examples from themurals.Ricardo Bueno, in his “Arqueología de la región Río Bec,Xpuhil, Campeche” (Archaeology of the Rio Bec, Xpuhil,Campeche Region), presents a complete study of the emer-gence of the cities in the Bec River region, with emphasis onthe architecture. Lorraine A. Williams-Beck, in “La arqui-tectura cromática del horizonte clásico en la región de losChenes, Campeche” (ChromaticArchitecture of the ClassicalHorizon in the Chenes, Campeche Region), refers to sculp-ture and painting at Chenes-style sites in the northern part

of the state of Campeche. Rubén Maldonado, in “Los ma-yas del norte de la península de Yucatán” (The Mayas of theNorthern Yucatán Peninsula), uses an archaeological focusto analyze different aspects of the development of thenorthern area and its pictorial remains. Sonia Lombardoidentifies “Los estilos en la pintura mural maya” (Styles inMayan Mural Painting) that structure this amorphous uni-verse of color. Diana Magaloni, in “Materiales y técnicas dela pintura mural maya” (Materials and Techniques of MayanMural Painting), makes a thorough, interesting study of thepigments and the use of lime by the Mayas in their murals.In “El patrimonio arqueológico de Campeche: estudio delas pinturas murales de Ichmac, Xuelén y Chelemi” (Cam-peche’s Archaeological Patrimony: A Study of the Murals ofIchmac, Xuelén and Chelemi), using chemistry and physics,Tatiana Falcón suggests solutions to a very urgent problem:the dramatic deterioration of three murals. José FranciscoVillaseñor presents “Reflexiones en torno al espacio com-

positivo en la pintura mural maya” (Reflections on the SpaceUsed for Composition in Mayan Mural Painting), lookingat paintings at the Tulum site. María de Lourdes NavarijoOrnelas develops a unique study about the birds depictedin the murals by doing research into Yucatán Peninsulaecosystems in her article “Las aves en el mundo maya pre-hispánico” (Birds in the pre-Hispanic Mayan World). MaríaElena Ruiz Gallut, Jesús Galindo and Daniel Flores authoredarchaeo-astronomical studies, jointly and individually dev-eloping different work that looks at the Mayan cosmic viewof architecture and painting. In seven articles that dealwith the murals of Chichén Itzá, Mayapán, Tulum, Tancah,Xelhá, Rancho Ina, Xuelén and Palenque, they explore theheavens.In Book 4, the articles deal with other themes. Alfonso

Arellano Hernández, in “Textos y contextos: epigrafía y pin-tura mural” (Texts and Contexts: Epigraphy and Mural Paint-ing), translates dates and important events related to thegoverning authorities and gods from the painted inscriptions.Leticia Staines Cicero analyzes the images painted on vaultcovers found in different sites of the Yucatán Peninsula. Thebook contains several monographs dealing with archaeo-logical data, the architecture and studies of importantmurals: “La pintura mural en Yaxchilán, Chiapas” (MuralPainting in Yaxchilán, Chiapas) by Roberto García Moll;“La cromatía de Toniná, Chiapas” (The Chromatics of To-niná, Chiapas) by Maricela Ayala; “Los murales de la tumbadel Templo XX Sub de Palenque” (The Murals of Palenque’sSub 20 Temple) by Merle Green Robertson; “La pinturamural prehispánica en Ek’Balam, Yucatán” (Pre-HispanicMural Painting in Ek’Balam, Yucatán) by Leticia Vargasand Víctor Castillo; “La pintura mural de Mayapán” (TheMural Painting of Mayapán) by Alfredo Barrera Rubio andCarlos Peraza; “Cuentas y avatares: un calendario de Venusen Chacchoben, Quintana Roo” (Accounts and the Unfore-seen: A Venus Calendar at Chacchoben, Quintana Roo) byMaría Eugenia Romero, Jesús Mora-Echeverría and DanielFlores; “La pintura mural en Rancho Ina, Quintana Roo”(Mural Painting in Rancho Ina, Quintana Roo) by Luis Al-berto Martos; and “La pintura mural de Xcaret, QuintanaRoo” (Mural Painting at Xcaret, Quintana Roo) by MaríaJosé Con. At the back of this book there is a bibliographyof all existing publications about Mayan mural painting.Each article is illustrated with color photographs, most

taken by Ernesto Peñaloza and Javier Hinojosa, sketches,some by Arturo Reséndiz, and artist’s renderings by José

The historic content and the manufactureof the murals themselves is so important

that the project aims to registerthis universe of color through photography

and computers given that it isin permanent danger of being lost.

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Francisco Villaseñor, as well as some digital work by RicardoAlvarado. A large part of the photographic material is partof the project’s archives, which consist of more than 16,000photographs in different formats, the registry to date of pre-Hispanic mural painting.These two books, 3 and 4, come after Books 1 and 2,

dealing with Bonampak. This volume will conclude withBook 5, Catalogue, currently at press, which includes theregistry of the murals still preserved at more than 130 archae-

ological sites in the Maya area. Volume 1 is dedicated toTeotihuacán. Books 3 and 4 were published with the sup-port of the UNAM’s General Office of Academic PersonnelAffairs, the National Council of Science and Technologyand the state governments of Campeche, Chiapas andQuintana Roo.

Leticia Staines CiceroInstitute for Aesthetic Research

Territorio de leonas. Cartografía de narradorasmexicanas en los noventa(Land of Lionesses. Cartography of Mexican WomenWriters in the 1990s)Ana Rosa Domenella, comp.Casa Juan Pablos Centro Cultural/UAM-IztapalapaMexico City, 2001, 382 pp.

The Diana Morán-Coyoacán Literary Theory and Criti-cism Workshop, which has dedicated several collec-

tive books to the literary production of Mexican and LatinAmerican women writers, now publishes a new collection ofliterary criticism under the title Territorio de leonas. Cartogra-fía de narradoras mexicanas en los noventa (Land of Lionesses.Cartography of Mexican Women Writers in the 1990s).The epigraph that opens the book makes it clear that,

“There are lions here,” was a warning of fifteenth-centurycartographers about unexplored territories. The title of thebook implies, then, “Beware!” The subtitle is more reassur-ing, informing us that the essays are a map of what the writ-ers published in the final decade of the last century.The book’s name inevitably brings to mind a fragment of

the poem “A Gloria” (To Gloria) that Salvador Díaz Mirónpublished in El Diario del Hogar (The Home Daily) in 1884:

Reconcile yourself, woman! We have comeTo this overwhelming vale of tears,You, as the dove for the nest,And I, as the lion for the wars!1

The poet’s perspective is undoubtedly male, but women’spoint of view was not very different, as can be seen in theclassic Antología de Poetisas Mexicanas (Anthology of Mex-ican Poetesses) compiled by José María Vigil in 1893, pub-lished by the National Autonomous University of Mexicoin a facsimile edition in 1977. Here, for example, in a poemcalled “A mi hija” (To My Daughter), Mrs. Mateana Mur-guía de Aveleyra resorts to images like the following:

Bright butterfly of a thousand colorsThat lives in the cavern of my loves...


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Your sweet accent always reaches my earLike the tender sigh of the gentle windLike the cooing of a warbling turtle-dove.2

A better known author, Josefa Murilla, begins her poem“A EmmaHernández” (To EmmaHernández) with the lines,“You are the swallow that takes flight/through the floweredfield when the sky is/clear and blue.”3

Birds and butterflies are the recurring images nineteenth-century women poets use in the anthology. So, when theauthors of the Diana Morán-Coyoacán Workshop thinkabout the writers they have analyzed, implicitly looking atthemselves as lionesses, they make the change in sensibil-ity from the end of the nineteenth century to the end of thetwentieth very clear. The advance of women’s awarenesstoward independence is tangible.Our guide through these unknown territories is Ana

Rosa Domenella, the collection’s editor. She quotes the

collective’s declaration of principles, in the words of HélèneCixous: “Women must write themselves, write about womenand make women write.” Domenella introduces the book’scontents, pointing to the changes in Latin American litera-ture in the 1980s. While literary production was headed upby white male writers from what Ángel Rama called “thelettered city,” the 1980s saw extensive production of polit-ical novels, and women writers were emerging as protago-nists. Other groups, like homosexuals and ethnic minori-ties, marginalized from the dominant culture and the hallsof power also began to make their work known.The editor explains women’s writing in the light of the

end-of-century atmosphere defined by postmodernism, theunfolding of technology and “lite” literature. She commentson the work of some of the authors not included in the vol-ume and summarizes the history of the group of scholarswho wrote the essays.

Thirteen authors wrote the book’s 26 essays: in alpha-betical order, they are Enid Álvarez, Blanca L. Ansoleaga,María de la Luz Becerra Zamora, Maricruz Castro Ricalde,Laura Cázares H., Ana Rosa Domenella, Luzelena Gutié-rrez de Velasco, Graciela Martínez-Zalce, Nora Pasternac,Gloria Prado G., Berenice Romano Hurtado, Ute Seydel andLuz Elena Zamudio Rodríguez.This is not a compilation of articles written willy-nilly,

but a book conceived as collective from its inception: the re-searchers shared the whole process of producing the book;they met regularly, discussed the topics, came to agreementson theoretical perspectives, refined thinking and reviewedfinal drafts. This means that within the context of differentstudies, common threads of thought can be discerned in thearticles: an interest in exploring women’s writing, a free assi-milation of the tenets of feminist literary criticism, trans-lated into the search for the marks of gender on each work,as well as those of so-called cultural studies.After the introduction, the book is divided into five parts

organized by the dates of birth of the authors analyzed, eachcoordinated by one of the scholars.The first part includes essays on two writers born in the

Roaring Twenties, Elena Garro and Carmen Rosenweig,who wrote, respectively, the short novel Inés and Volanteo(Leafletting).The second part deals with authors born in the arid 1930s.

The book of short stories Alta costura (Haute Couture), byBeatriz Espejo; the novel Apariciones (Apparitions), by MargoGlantz; Fuimos es mucha gente (“We Were” Is Too ManyPeople), by María Luisa Mendoza; the novel La noche delas hormigas (The Night of the Ants), by Aline Petterson,are all analyzed. Three essays deal with important works byAngelina Muñiz-Huberman: Castillos en la tierra (Castlesin the Earth), El mercader de Tudela (The Merchant ofTudela) and Las confidentes (The Confidants). The sectioncloses with a comparison of autobiographical works by Petter-son and Espejo.Writers who came into the world in the 1940s —Brian-

da Domecq, Ángeles Mastretta, María Luisa Puga andSilviaMolina— occupy the following section. It offers a studyon La insólita historia de la Santa de Cábora (The UnusualStory of the Saint of Cábora) by Domecq, and another onMal de amores (Lovers’ Malaise) by Mastretta. The sectioncloses with an essay comparing Puga’s Inventar ciudades(Inventing Cities) with Molina’s El amor que me juraste (TheLove You Swore to Me).

Common threads of thoughtcan be discerned in the articles:

an interest in exploring women’s writingand a free assimilation of the tenets

of feminist literary criticism.

Reviews

111

Longer, with seven essays, suggesting more literary pro-duction by women, the fourth group includes five writersand a cinematographer born in the 1950s. Three of SabinaBerman’s novels are analyzed (La bobe [Granny],Un grano dearroz [A Grain of Rice] and Amante de lo ajeno [The Crook],and two of Carmen Boullosa’s (Duerme [Go to Sleep] andCielos de la tierra [Heavens of the Earth]). Other articleslook at Mónica Lavín’s Cambio de vías (Change of Track)and Beatriz Novaro’s Cecilia todavía (Still Cecilia), as wellas Beatriz and María Novaro’s script of the film Lola. Thesection closes with a study of Paloma Villegas’s La luz obli-cua (The Slanting Light).The last section deals with authors born in the 1960s

and 1970s. It includes articles about the novels La corte delos ilusos (The Court of the Deluded), by Rosa Beltrán;Unamanera de morir (A Way of Dying), by Vizania Amezcua; Ysi yo fuera Susana San Juan... (And If I Were Susana SanJuan...) by Susana Pagano; and Púrpura (Purple) by Ana

García Bergua. Others deal with the books of stories El ima-ginador (The Imaginer), also by Ana García Bergua; Cuentospara ciclistas y jinetes (Stories for Cyclists and Horsemen)by Adriana González Mateos; Técnicamente humanos, In-venciones enfermas (Technically Human, Sick Inventions)by Cecilia Eudave; and Antología de miradas (Anthology ofGlances) by Berenice Romano.Seen as a whole, the number and variety of topics dealt

with by the authors is enormously rich: they range from thematerial reality of bodies and detectable geographical areasto worlds of fantasy; from history to magic; from the bound-less font of autobiography to the labyrinths of writing. Theytouch on birth, identity, memory and death in a kaleido-scope that reinvents itself again and again.The essayists are interested in presenting, describing and

understanding each text, looking into the intertextualities,describing legacies and establishing thematic or generation-

al parameters. Almost all the essays —and to a lesser extentthe introduction— display a kind of renunciation of placinga qualitative value on the texts analyzed or situating themin a hierarchy of comparison. Perhaps this renunciation isdue to the fact that established literary criticism has almostalways been highly ideological. This desire to identify withthe texts, to understand themmore than to judge them, allowsus to speak in terms of anti-authoritarian criticism. I think,however, that later on, it will be necessary to develop crite-ria for evaluating and refining certain value judgments thathave barely been sketched here, and judging the place of thedifferent writers in the overall scheme of Mexican literature,perhaps trying to resituate them.

Lands of Lionesses is a contribution to the study of con-temporary Mexican literature. Today, we can learn some-thing about what women and men writers published in the1990s, and even in the 1980s, through newspaper articles,particularly reviews, essays in specialized journals and uni-versity theses, but there are still no systematic, panoramicstudies. The usefulness, then, of a book like this is clear, sinceit offers a mosaic of articles about over 20 writers, rangingfrom the well-established to others who are more or lessmarginal, providing an overview.The essayists’ empathy with the texts they analyze and

the studies’ anti-authoritarianism imply the intent to com-municate with the novelists and short story writers them-selves. I think that the whole makes it possible to appreciatethe recurring themes —as well as those left out— in thewriting of women in the 1990s and will be of great interestto the writers producing today. It also opens up a dialogue,of course, with readers, both specialists and everyone inter-ested in literature written by women, as well as in the devel-opment of end-of-century Mexican narrative in general.

Edith NegrínUNAM Institute of Philological Research

NOTES

1 Salvador Díaz Mirón, “A Gloria,” Poesía Completa, Manuel Sol, ed.(Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica), p. 314.

2 José Ma. Vigil, ed., Poetisas mexicanas, siglos XVI, XVII, XVIII y XIX facsimi-le edition (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México,1977), pp. 137-138.

3 José Ma. Vigil, op. cit., p. 191.

This is not a compilationof articles written willy-nilly,

but a book conceived as collectivefrom its inception: the researchers

shared the whole process.

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