volatility presentation - u.s. department of the treasury volatility presentation . asset price...
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1
Volatility Presentation
Asset price volatility has declined over the past two years both in the United States and globally. At the same time, forward-looking measures of market uncertainty across a range of fixed income, equity, and foreign exchange markets have also declined. What are the Committee’s views on these developments and the factors that have contributed to the current environment of low volatility globally?
2
Current state of volatility
Monthly count of Bloomberg articles that contain the phrase “low volatility”. ? Theirs, unclear, mine, relentless comments
3
Current state of volatility
Credit Suisse Interest Rate Volatility Estimate: yield curve weighted index of normalized implied volatility on a rolling series of constant at-the-money one-month expiry swaptions weighted across benchmark maturities 2yr, 5yr, 10yr and 30yr. ? Theirs, unclear, mine, relentless comments
4
Factors contributing to low volatility
1. Actions by the Fed and ECB have significantly clipped the left tail risk, in terms of both economic outcomes and market outcomes (QE I)
2. As interest rates approached the zero lower bound, rate vol is lower by construction which leads to maturity extensions, lower term premia and declining volatility across other asset classes through a lower and more certain discount rate (QE II)
3. Suppression of yield and vol induces investors to take on more risk (QE III). The market clings to perception of certainty regarding outcomes, despite the Fed shifting commitment modes from time or level-based to data dependent. This stage of policy should eventually lead to increased uncertainty and risk.
? Theirs, unclear, mine, relentless comments
Cross asset volatility through progression of central bank policy
0
50
100
150
200
250
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Jan-
09
May
-09
Sep-
09
Jan-
10
May
-10
Sep-
10
Jan-
11
May
-11
Sep-
11
Jan-
12
May
-12
Sep-
12
Jan-
13
May
-13
Sep-
13
Jan-
14
May
-14
3m10
y bp
vol
VIX
and
FX lo
g vo
l
VIX index EUR/USD 3mth vol 3m10y vol (RHS)
QE I QE II and Operation Twist QE III
5
Short term price volatility versus long term economic uncertainty
Realized volatility is extremely low, which leads to lower implied volatility in a self-reinforcing loop.
-10%
10%
30%
50%
70%
Jul-1
0
Oct
-10
Jan-
11
Apr-
11
Jul-1
1
Oct
-11
Jan-
12
Apr-
12
Jul-1
2
Oct
-12
Jan-
13
Apr-
13
Jul-1
3
Oct
-13
Jan-
14
Apr-
14
Jul-1
4
Implied and Realized Vols in Equities
VIX Index SPX 1mth realized vol
0
5
10
15
20Implied and Realized Vols in FX
EUR/USD 1mth implied EUR/USD 1mth realized vol
0
50
100
150
200Implied and Realized Vols in 10yr Rate (bpvol)
1m10y implied vol 1m10y realized vol
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Jul-1
0
Oct
-10
Jan-
11Ap
r-11
Jul-1
1
Oct
-11
Jan-
12
Apr-
12
Jul-1
2
Oct
-12
Jan-
13Ap
r-13
Jul-1
3
Oct
-13
Jan-
14Ap
r-14
Jul-1
4
IG Implied & Realized Vol
IG CDX 3mth implied vol IG CDX 3mth realized vol
6
Short term price volatility versus long term economic uncertainty
Dispersion among Wall Street analyst forecasts for GDP is falling – VIX level on right hand scale – Standard deviation of US GDP forecasts provided to database on left hand scale
7
Short term price volatility versus long term economic uncertainty
The Global financial Stress Index (GFSI) measures • Risk as indicated by cross-asset measures of volatility, solvency and liquidity • Hedging demand implied by equity and currency option skew • Investor risk appetite gauged by trading volumes and flows into equities and high yield bonds
and out of money markets 33 out of 39 indicators point to vol being too low.
8
Short term price volatility versus long term economic uncertainty
Realized volatility follows the business cycle – high around recessions, falling with recovery, bottoming out mid to late cycle before turning up again
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Jan-
37
Jan-
43
Jan-
49
Jan-
55
Jan-
61
Jan-
67
Jan-
73
Jan-
79
Jan-
85
Jan-
91
Jan-
97
Jan-
03
Jan-
09
Jan-
15
Recession S&P 500 Realized Vol (12m ma, rhs)
1m vol
3m vol
1987 Crash WorldCom Bankruptcy US
Down-grade
Asian Crisis
* Realized vol is the annualized standard deviation of daily log changes in S&P 500 over a 1m window
9
Supply / demand factors in the options markets
Tail hedgers have decreased as evidenced by
• Falling prices of downside puts on the S&P
• Shrinking fund size of VIX ETF
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
S&P 500 3m 90% Put Price (%)
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
Jan-
09Ap
r-09
Jul-0
9O
ct-0
9Ja
n-10
Apr-
10Ju
l-10
Oct
-10
Jan-
11Ap
r-11
Jul-1
1O
ct-1
1Ja
n-12
Apr-
12Ju
l-12
Oct
-12
Jan-
13Ap
r-13
Jul-1
3O
ct-1
3Ja
n-14
Apr-
14
USD
mill
ions
VIX ETF VXXTotal Fund Size USD millions
10
Supply / demand factors in the options markets
Convexity hedging by mortgage accounts has gone down significantly after the crisis because of lower issuance and the Fed’s QE purchases. QE mortgage purchases remove both duration and convexity from the market, making it one of the most powerful policy tools.
MBS Issuance
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Jun-
09Se
p-09
Dec-
09M
ar-1
0Ju
n-10
Sep-
10De
c-10
Mar
-11
Jun-
11Se
p-11
Dec-
11M
ar-1
2Ju
n-12
Sep-
12De
c-12
Mar
-13
Jun-
13Se
p-13
Dec-
13M
ar-1
4Ju
n-14
Fed MBS holdings % outstanding
11
Supply / demand factors in the options markets
QE mortgage purchases remove both duration and convexity from the market, making it one of the most powerful policy tools.
Duration effect of QE
Convexity effect of QE
-
50
100
150
200
250
Oct
-09
Jan-
10
Apr-
10
Jul-1
0
Oct
-10
Jan-
11
Apr-
11
Jul-1
1
Oct
-11
Jan-
12
Apr-
12
Jul-1
2
Oct
-12
Jan-
13
Apr-
13
Jul-1
3
Oct
-13
Jan-
14
Apr-
14
Jul-1
4
Estim
ated
Dol
lar a
mou
nt o
f DV0
1 ad
ded
in a
10
0bps
sello
ff (in
MM
$)
Impact of convexity on Fed DV01 Impact of convexity on Index DV01
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0
50
100
150
200
250
Oct
-09
Jan-
10
Apr-
10
Jul-1
0
Oct
-10
Jan-
11
Apr-
11
Jul-1
1
Oct
-11
Jan-
12
Apr-
12
Jul-1
2
Oct
-12
Jan-
13
Apr-
13
Jul-1
3
Oct
-13
Jan-
14
Apr-
14
Jul-1
4
Ratio
Fed
/Ind
ex (i
n %
)
Dolla
r am
ount
of D
V01
(in M
M$)
Ratio of DV01 Fed DV01 (in $MM)
12
Market complacency and excessive risk taking
Interest rate volatility can be viewed as a proxy for the corporate bond market and the interest rate at which people and companies borrow money. Shown below is 1y10y interest rate vol with 5yr spreads of the credit default index of investment grade on the left and high yield on the left.
60
80
100
120
140
160
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
1y10
y bp
vol
HY C
DX
HY CDX 5yr spread bps (LHS) 1y10y bpvol (RHS)
60
80
100
120
140
160
40
90
140
190
240
290
1y10
y bp
vol
IG C
DX
IG CDX 5yr spread bps (LHS) 1y10y bpvol (RHS)
13
Market complacency and excessive risk taking
Days with a 10% or greater correction in the S&P Days in which SPX is at least 10% lower than the peak of the prior 6 months
0200400600800
100012001400160018002000
Jun-
84
Jun-
86
Jun-
88
Jun-
90
Jun-
92
Jun-
94
Jun-
96
Jun-
98
Jun-
00
Jun-
02
Jun-
04
Jun-
06
Jun-
08
Jun-
10
Jun-
12
Jun-
14
0
1
Days of 10% Correction SPX
Note the lack of 10% corrections during the past hiking cycles in 2004 and 1994
14
Market complacency and excessive risk taking
Against environment of low vol and low returns, the only way to achieve the same return targets is to take on more risk - Ballooning AUM invested in hedge funds, now $2.7 trillion - VAR-based risk management frameworks and risk-parity investment models in which volatility
is an input that determines the amount of risk to take
2,801
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Q1
2014
Q2
2014
AUM
USD
bill
ions
Hedge fund AUM
15
Market complacency and excessive risk taking
Mostly unchanged target for investment returns from the pension community. Latest data from November 2013 shows the median target shifted to just under 8% in 2012, despite the yield on Moody’s AA index having fallen to 4.2%.
3.03.54.04.55.05.56.06.57.07.58.0
Moody's Corporate AA Index
16
Financial market indicators of excessive risk taking
This represents the extra yield of owning pass-thru mortgage securities from the option value without embedded prepayment assumptions.
17
Financial market indicators of excessive risk taking
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Feb-
98
Feb-
99
Feb-
00
Feb-
01
Feb-
02
Feb-
03
Feb-
04
Feb-
05
Feb-
06
Feb-
07
Feb-
08
Feb-
09
Feb-
10
Feb-
11
Feb-
12
Feb-
13
Feb-
14
S&P 500 implied vol term slope (% of 1m vol, 1m ma)
3m minus 1m 6m minus 3m
Equity vol term structure has held up against complacency in the market place.
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
-5%
-3%
-1%
1%
3%
5%
7%
9%
11%
13%
15%
Aug-
09
Nov
-09
Feb-
10
May
-10
Aug-
10
Nov
-10
Feb-
11
May
-11
Aug-
11
Nov
-11
Feb-
12
May
-12
Aug-
12
Nov
-12
Feb-
13
May
-13
Aug-
13
Nov
-13
Feb-
14
May
-14
Aug-
14
FX implied vol term slope (% of 1m vol, 1m ma)
3m minus 1m 6m minus 3m
18
Financial market indicators of excessive risk taking
FX vol term structure is also near the steepest level in the last 5 years.
19
Financial market indicators of excessive risk taking
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
Jun-
96
Jun-
97
Jun-
98
Jun-
99
Jun-
00
Jun-
01
Jun-
02
Jun-
03
Jun-
04
Jun-
05
Jun-
06
Jun-
07
Jun-
08
Jun-
09
Jun-
10
Jun-
11
Jun-
12
Jun-
13
Jun-
14
10y bond implied vol term slope (% of 1m vol, 1m ma)
3m minus 1m 6m minus 3m
Rate vol term structure is off the highs despite the Fed being closer to tightening than at any other point in the last 5 years.
20
Equity volatility term structures
21
Interest rate volatility term structures
25
45
65
85
105
125
145
165
185
205
225Au
g-04
Feb-
05Se
p-05
Mar
-06
Oct
-06
Apr-
07N
ov-0
7Ju
n-08
Dec-
08Ju
l-09
Jan-
10Au
g-10
Feb-
11Se
p-11
Apr-
12O
ct-1
2M
ay-1
3N
ov-1
3Ju
n-14
Dec-
14Ju
l-15
Jan-
16Au
g-16
Mar
-17
Sep-
17Ap
r-18
bpvo
l
10yr rate vol term structures
2005 2006 2007 2008 20092010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Warning sign
22
Liquidity providers Less warehouses for risk = higher storage costs
23
Conclusions
Monetary policy and regulatory changes have contributed to the decline in volatility.
Less demand for volatility across asset classes naturally lowers the price for such insurance.
VAR-based analysis leads to self-reinforcing loops as low volatility causes models to recommend scaling up risk.
The term structure of volatility is a powerful indicator; flatter vol curves would suggest excessive complacency and presage increasing risk.
Volatility tends to rise mid-to-late stage of the business cycle as expansive endeavors increase through the system.
An unexpected increase in volatility might come from broad-based selling of assets wanting to de-risk in front of a turn in policy.
With liquidity providers having declined in number and capacity, the system is less able to deal with such episodes of higher volatility. Institutions which deliver absolute returns or provide liquidity to the system would be most at risk.
24
Reference
P6: Consensus Economics, UBS
P7: Bank of America Merrill Lynch
P8: Haver, Deutsche Bank
P11: Citibank
P14: HFR Global Hedge Fund Industry Report
P15: Public Fund Survey
P17: Deutsche Bank
P18: Deutsche Bank. FX vol is computed on the currencies that make up the Deutsche Bank Currency Volatility Index.
P19: Deutsche Bank