volunteering, pro-environmental attitudes and norms
TRANSCRIPT
V
Ma
b
c
d
a
ARRA
JDDHQQ
KEEPS
1
sioscbbitFuaeme
1d
The Journal of Socio-Economics 41 (2012) 455– 467
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
The Journal of Socio-Economics
j our nal ho me p age: www.elsev ier .com/ loc ate /soceco
olunteering, pro-environmental attitudes and norms
aría A. García-Valinasa,b,∗, Alison Macintyrec, Benno Torglerc,d
Oviedo Efficiency Group, Department of Economics, School of Economics and Business, University of Oviedo, Avda. del Cristo s/n, 33006, Oviedo, Asturias, SpainLERNA (Laboratoire d’Economie des Ressources NAturelles), FranceThe School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, QLD 4001, AustraliaCREMA – Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Gellertstrasse 18, CH-4052 Basel, Switzerland
r t i c l e i n f o
rticle history:eceived 8 March 2010eceived in revised form 23 June 2011ccepted 14 July 2011
EL classification:64732601
a b s t r a c t
In the spirit of previous work in the compliance literature (e.g., tax, littering), we investigate whether envi-ronmental social norms affect volunteering in environmental organizations. Using two ‘environmentalmorale’ variables as indirect measures, we analyze the impact of social norms on the incidence of unpaidwork in environmental organizations. In addition, we test whether violation of a specific environmen-tal norm initiates a conditional cooperation response. We explore a large individual data set covering 32countries from both Western and Eastern Europe, and extend the number of countries investigated to testthe robustness of the relationship at the macro level. Our results indicate a strong positive relationshipbetween the proxies for environmental social norms and volunteering in environmental organizations.The relationship persists despite our various robustness checks.
59
eywords:nvironmental participationnvironmental social normsro-environmental attitudesocial capital
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
. Introduction
In light of the popular debate regarding environmental con-ervation, climate change and externalities, we investigate severalnteresting elements of voluntary participation in environmentalrganizations. Volunteering in general is the foundation of civilociety, building cooperative behavior that not only decreases theosts of government operations designed to provide public goods,ut may solve social dilemmas and defuse the need for interventiony formal institutions. Environmental volunteering is particularly
mportant, since we all require (for our very survival) that a cer-ain minimum quality of the natural environment is maintained.rom a policy perspective, it is helpful to identify who contributesnpaid work to the provision of environmental amenity, and why,nd whether they respond to signals that others do not care for thenvironment (conditional cooperation). We suggest that environ-
ental attitudes and norms affect the incidence of volunteering innvironmental organizations, and that these norms may assist in
∗ Corresponding author at: University of Oviedo, Spain. Tel.: +34 985 10 48 78.E-mail address: [email protected] (M.A. García-Valinas).
053-5357/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.oi:10.1016/j.socec.2011.07.001
the unraveling of social dilemmas with respect to environmentalexternalities.
The idea that individuals’ environmental morale or attitudescould help to reduce environmental degradation or the problemsof free riding associated with public goods has been previouslysuggested by researchers such as Frey and Stutzer (2006). Turn-ing to social norms, attitudes and values to explain actions ismotivated by the importance of extending the standard homoeconomicus conceptualization of human behavior. It is necessaryto recognize and analyze such voluntary behavior that incurs agreater individual costs than the individual benefit received. Inaddition, the observed level of compliance with formal rules isfar greater than would be predicted under control and deterrencemodels. Previous literature on this paradox (Torgler, 2007; Torgleret al., 2009) covers situations such as tax compliance (despite thelow chance of being audited) and not littering (despite the lowprobability of getting caught and penalized). In many countries,the level of government control is too low to explain the highdegree of environmental compliance, and the economics of crime
approach does not explain various situations where a private costis incurred in order to provide a public good. In a meta-analysisexamining the link between attitudes and action in many differentsettings, Glasman and Albarracin (2006) found a strong relationship
4 al of S
besezi(mt
trsti6paaphbtatslswod
autdnttlemScvac
2o
tyutrtfs
Ts(
56 M.A. García-Valinas et al. / The Journ
etween attitudes and behavior under certain conditions. How-ver, there are relatively few studies exploring empirically whetheruch pro-environmental attitudes exert a positive effect on eithernvironmental behavior or involvement in environmental organi-ations (for an overview see Torgler et al., 2010). We are interestedn whether the presence of pro-environmental attitudes and normsor what may be termed ‘environmental motivation’ or ‘environ-
ental morale’) could be linked to behavior aimed at protectinghe environment.
We focus on individuals’ participation in voluntary environmen-al organizations because it is a cooperative behavior that mayesult in the provision of a public good that is ultimately neces-ary for survival by ensuring the efficacy of environmental policieshat require behavioral changes, or for making voluntary behav-oral changes that neutralize a social dilemma. As Handy (2001, p.48) pointed out, “much of the initial impetus towards change forrotecting environmental quality came from concerned individu-ls who have often come together and formed voluntary non-profitssociations to collectively address environmental concerns. Theirersistent lobbying and advocating for environmental protectionas changed public sentiment, thereby convincing government andusinesses to pay attention to their demands. . . many environmen-al non-profit organizations continue to play an important role indvocating a better environmental quality”. We are interested inhe conditions and mechanisms for this activism from a policy per-pective, because the adaptive capability of societies is stronglyinked to their ability to act collectively (Adger, 2003). Hence, thetrength of values, social norms and cooperation are importanthen dealing with new environmental scenarios, such as the threat
f climate change, or for coping with the impact of environmentalisasters, such as droughts or floods.
In order to explore the impact of pro-environmental attitudesnd norms on environmental behavior, we use both a large individ-al data set covering 32 European countries and a country data sethat includes information on 52 countries. As it is not possible toirectly quantify social norms, we work with indirect measures,amely, self-reported willingness to give income and pay taxeso protect the environment. This intrinsic motivation or attitudeowards the environment can shape behavior from the individualevel. We investigate the incidence of unpaid work in voluntarynvironmental organizations and its relationship to our environ-ental morale variables. The outline of the paper is as follows.
ection 2 of the paper first briefly discusses potential factors (psy-hological and socio-demographic) that influence environmentalolunteerism. Section 3 introduces the data set and the key vari-bles. The empirical findings are presented in Section 4 and someoncluding remarks are offered in Section 5.
. Determinants of environmental volunteerism: a briefverview
As discussed in the introduction, civil engagement in volun-ary organizations is gaining increased attention from researchers;et the causes of environmental participation are still relativelynknown. The benefit of participation in voluntary activities ishe creation of social output that would otherwise require paidesources (Freeman, 1997). Pretty and Ward (2001) showed that
he creation of active pro-environmental groups was significantor solving certain local environmental problems.1 The presence ofuch norms or environmental motivation influencing the willing-1 The authors analyzed some environmental organizations in rural communities.hey found an evolution from reactive-dependence groups (static and created exclu-ively in reaction to a threat or a crisis), towards awareness-interdependence groupsmore dynamic and interactive).
ocio-Economics 41 (2012) 455– 467
ness to protect the environment is especially useful in situationswhere a regulatory enforcement regime would be prohibitivelyexpensive to arrange. A desirable and positive side effect of volun-tary compliance is that it lowers the cost of government operationsaimed at ensuring public good provision (Slemrod, 2002).
A number of factors, such as socio-demographic characteristics,altruism, social norms, internalized norms and intrinsic motiva-tions are linked to cooperative behaviors (Frey and Stutzer, 2006).Experts from different fields, such as sociology, psychology and eco-nomics have analyzed this topic, each contributing to improvedexplanations of the phenomenon. However, to date only a fewstudies have analyzed the factors influencing participation in envi-ronmental organizations (Mohai, 1992; Thompson and Barton,1994; Barkan, 2004; Martinez and McMullin, 2004; Randle andDolnicar, 2006). Our study will contribute to this literature andinvestigate who is likely to participate and whose priorities andvalues are best promoted by voluntary work in environmental orga-nizations.
2.1. Socio-demographic factors
Volunteering is influenced by socio-demographic factors andthe ability to participate in networks, either by access to net-works or the costs and benefits of participation. It is importantto include these factors because they serve an important role ascontrol variables. Some of the more usual costs are the energyand time costs, and these depend on several socio-economicfeatures, like age, gender, marital status, education level orincome, which we include as control variables. For instance,previous studies have found that find women are more will-ing to comply with society’s rules (Mears et al., 2000; Torgler,2007; Torgler and Valev, 2007) and express a stronger prefer-ence for environmental conservation regardless of age, maritalstatus or whether they have had children (Zelezny et al., 2000).It is also often argued that traditional gender socialization influ-ences women through both overt and covert encouragements tobe cooperative and behave in a compassionate manner Henderson(1996).
A traditional economic approach would suggest that volun-teers are more likely to be individuals with low opportunity costsof time (Menchik and Weisbrod, 1987). In fact, family issues orfinancial and employment commitments act as competing com-mitments, at odds with participation in any voluntary capacity,including environmental organizations. The extent of competitionfor the attention and time of the individual has an effect on thedecision to volunteer (Martinez and McMullin, 2004; Cappellariet al., 2007). At the same time, there are several arguments as towhy wealthier citizens may have a higher demand for a clean envi-ronment. Income has been considered as an important variable inthe previous empirical literature (Whitehead, 1991; Witzke andUrfei, 2001; Bulte et al., 2005; Israel and Levinson, 2004; Hidanoet al., 2005). Usually, a positive relationship between income andwillingness to make voluntary contributions has been found. TheEnvironmental Kuznet’s Curve (EKC) proposes this relationship atthe country level, but it is refuted by Yandle (2004, p. 224) whostates that “Stories of human action lie hidden within the data”,and that EKCs are ‘statistical artifacts’; merely describing the pointsat which humans organize to conserve environmental assets. Pre-vious research has suggested arguments for the environment asa normal good, and as income increases, people might be willingto spend more on it (Bruneau and Ecchevaria, 2003). We suggest
that the concept of ‘spending’ more on the environment could beextended to include spending more time through voluntary contri-butions, and thus we pay particular attention to this variable in theempirical section.
al of S
2
icifBiitisCrftwRabinTsst
ivaImtlpeehuaLoe
2
umozpeio(c
t(ahr
1991 and again in 1999 through 2001, with an increasing numberof countries participating over time. The methodological approachis explained in detail in the European Values Survey (1999) sourcebook, which provides information on response rates, the stages of
3 He considered the average of the three following questions: (1) We worry toomuch about the future of the environment and not enough about prices and jobstoday; (2) People worry too much about human progress harming the environment;and (3) To protect the environment, America needs economic growth. Individualscan answer in a scale from 1 (=strongly agree) to 5 (=strongly disagree).
4 According to Dunlap et al. (2000), they modified the original NEP, obtaining a 15item scale. The items cover the following: (1) We are approaching the limit of thenumber of people the earth can support; (2) The earth has plenty of natural resourcesif we just learn to develop them; (3) The earth is like a spaceship with only limited
M.A. García-Valinas et al. / The Journ
.2. Psychological factors
In addition to socioeconomic issues, several studies on partic-pation in voluntary associations or incidence of environmentaloncerns have shown the importance of psychological character-stics and attitudes. Extraversion, solidarity and empathic concernor other people are relevant factors (Cappellari and Turati, 2004;ekkers, 2005). Martinez and McMullin (2004) found that know-
ng or meeting other people with similar interests or who werenvolved in the same activities was an important reason to par-icipate in environmental organizations. Solidarity incentives arenterpersonal rewards such as fellowship, friendship, prestige, andimilar positive outcomes from personal relationships (Rouse andlawson, 1992). Curtis and Van Nouhuys (1999) found that envi-onmental participants were motivated by task orientation, a desireor learning and for social interaction. Altruism is also a very impor-ant value that has been analyzed in several empirical studiesith respect to volunteering in general. According to Katz andosenberg (2005: 432), “altruistic individuals (defined as caringnd community minded) often express their altruistic tendenciesy participating in institutional and non-institutional volunteer-
ng”. Wymer (1998) found that people who actively participate inon-governmental organizations show more pro-social attitudes.o examine this relationship, Randle and Dolnicar (2006) used acale to measure the level of altruism, and found that volunteershowed moderate levels of altruism, but levels were higher thanhat of non-volunteers.
The psychological experience of individual and political efficacys another consideration (Barkan, 2004). It is important for indi-iduals to perceive that their personal environmental acts, and thections of their institutions can and will lead to a successful end.t is expected that higher levels of this kind of perceived efficacy
ay encourage people to participate more actively in environmen-al organizations. On the one hand, internal or personal efficacy isinked to beliefs about individual competence in influencing theolitical system to achieve environmental aims. In this respect,xperiences are quite significant, a hypothesis reinforced by sev-ral empirical studies (Martinez and McMullin, 2004). On the otherand, external political or government efficacy refers to individ-al perceptions about the level of public institutions’ responsibilitynd the response to citizens’ environmental demands. According toubell et al. (2006: 158), “citizen perceptions of the likely successf collective-action are driven in part by their trust in the policylites who are crucial shapers of policy outcomes”.
.3. Pro-environmental attitudes
Values and attitudes are extremely important variables innderstanding action in general. The higher the values or theore positive the attitude towards an activity, the higher the level
f participation or action. According to Lubell (2002: 437), ‘citi-ens with strong environmental values are more likely to receivesychological benefits from expressing their preferences throughnvironmental activism or enjoy the social benefits of participat-
ng with like-minded citizens’. Grendstad and Wollebaek (1998)btained a positive but moderate relationship between ecocentricas opposed to anthropocentric) values2 and environmental con-ern, however, they discovered a negative relationship between2 On the extreme end of environmental values, we find theories of ecocen-rism, which mean that environmental interests have priority over human interestsEckersley, 1992). Some statements such as ‘all ecological systems however smallnd insignificant have a right to exist’ or ‘each human being must increase his orer self-awareness so that she or he may feel at one with all living creatures’ areepresentative of that theory.
ocio-Economics 41 (2012) 455– 467 457
ecocentrism and two common correlates of environmental con-cern (age and education). Serret and Ferrara (2008) pointed outthe positive and significant impact of environmental attitudes onseveral households’ pro-environmental behaviors, such as recy-cling, water and energy savings or car use. Lubell (2002) found apositive relationship between environmental activism and a setof three questions about environmental attitudes.3 In this respect,one of the most well known scales is the NEP (New Environmen-tal Paradigm). It was proposed initially by Dunlap and Van Liere(1978), and was considered (both in its original structure andslightly modified) in several studies as a consistent explanatoryfactor of pro-environmental behaviors. Olli et al. (2001) showed apositive link between NEP4 in almost all the environmental behav-iors analyzed. In their study, ecological attitudes explained about25 percent of active environmental behaviors. In a study that testedwhether hypothetical willingness to pay was related to actual will-ingness to contribute, Brown et al. (1996) discovered that thewillingness to pay in a contingent valuation study was higher forthe environmentally active respondents. People with pre-existingattitudes and values, and those who had previously acted on theirpreferences tended to pay more for an environmental good. Theseresults are similar to those obtained by Kotchen and Reiling (2000),who found that pro-environmental attitudes are related to the like-lihood that a person would report a positive willingness to payfor environmental protection. Leaving aside the mechanisms bywhich people come to hold these attitudes, we draw the connectionbetween our variables and the concept of ‘environmental morale’,or ‘pro-environmental attitudes’.
3. Data
For the individual level analysis we use data provided by theEuropean Values Survey (EVS) 1999/2000, which is a European-wide investigation of socio-cultural and political change. Socialscientists are increasingly using survey data in areas of researchsuch as those dealing with social capital, corruption, happiness andtax compliance. These literatures explore the causes of attitudes(see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Brewer et al., 2002, 2004; Uslaner,2004; Chang and Chu, 2006; Torgler, 2008). The survey collectsdata on the basic values and beliefs of people throughout Europe.The EVS was first carried out from 1981 to 1983, then in 1990 to
room and resources; (4) Humans have the right to modify the natural environmentto suit their needs; (5) Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist;(6) Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature; (7) When humans interferewith nature it often produces disastrous consequences; (8) The balance of natureis strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations; (9) Thebalance of nature is very delicate and easily upset; (10) Human ingenuity will ensurethat we do not make the earth unliveable; (11) Despite our special abilities, humansare still subject to the laws of nature; (12) Humans will eventually learn enoughabout how nature works to be able to control it; (13) Humans are severely abusingthe environment; (14) The so-called ecological crisis facing humankind has beengreatly exaggerated; (15) If things continue on their present course, we will soonexperience a major ecological catastrophe. In order to obtain homogeneity, some ofthe previous questions are recoded in reverse (2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 14).
4 al of S
swapIaaitsa
vnahdt
abteb
v
v
(ttmc
crooiwatseshU
ii
58 M.A. García-Valinas et al. / The Journ
ampling procedures, the translation of the questionnaire, and fieldork, along with measures of coding consistency, reliability of data,
nd data checks. All country surveys are conducted by experiencedrofessional survey organizations, with the exception of Greece.
nterviews are face-to-face and those interviewed are adult citizensged 18 years and older. Tilburg University coordinates the projectnd provides the guidelines to guarantee the use of standardizednformation in the surveys and the national representativeness ofhe data. To avoid framing biases, the questions are asked in a pre-cribed order. The response rates vary from country to country withn average response rate of around 60 percent.
Because EVS poses an identical set of questions to individuals inarious European countries, the survey provides a unique opportu-ity to empirically examine our hypotheses. We are able to employ
large data set considering 32 representative national samples. EVSas been designed as a wide-ranging survey, thereby reducing theanger of framing effects when compared with many other surveyshat focus entirely on environmental questions.
In the country-level analysis we not only explore the EVS butlso the World Values Survey (WVS) using the same wave. EVS cane seen as a subpart of the WVS, although one should note thathe questions are not always fully identical. For example, in thempirical micro analysis we are also going to use data that has noteen collected in the WVS.
We use the following variable that measures involvement in aoluntary environmental organization, namely doing unpaid work:
Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organi-zations and activities and say which, if any, are you currentlydoing unpaid voluntary work for: conservation, the environ-ment, ecology, animal rights (1 = yes, 0 otherwise).
To ensure the robustness of results, we use two independentariables that measure environmental morale:
I would give part of my income if I were certain that the moneywould be used to prevent environmental pollution (0 = stronglydisagree, 3 = strongly agree)
I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money wereused to prevent environmental pollution (0 = strongly disagree,3 = strongly agree)
Although we are not conducting a contingent valuation studyCV), these two questions offer the chance to explore environmen-al motivation. Since the WVS does not include enough informationo build an environmental attitude scale similar to the NEP, we
aintain (based on the discussion in Section 2.3) that our variablesonstitute a good representation of pro-environmental attitudes.
However, the question is not free of problems and can beriticized in several ways. The statement is relatively vague: ‘envi-onmental pollution’ is not clearly specified, and neither is the levelf expected environmental improvement. Similarly, the proportionf income to be spent and the degree of tax increase are not clar-fied. Therefore the respondents are not aware of how much they
ould hypothetically have to contribute.5 The consequences of tax-tion are not mentioned and no information is provided regardinghe extent to which income tax, value added tax or other taxes areupposed to increase. Thus, it is not clear who will bear the high-st tax burden. Such unspecified questions regarding the payment
chemes will increase the variance in responses, but on the otherand, may influence the willingness to contribute (Witzke andrfei, 2001). Nevertheless, despite these possible shortcomings, an5 It has been shown that the preferences to protect the environment (regard-ng causes and consequences of environmental damages) depend on the level ofnformation included in the questionnaire (Bulte et al., 2005).
ocio-Economics 41 (2012) 455– 467
unspecified statement still helps to measure moral values and toreduce strategic behavior via influencing the quantity or qualityof environmental goods. Providing a more concrete scenario couldencourage respondents to intentionally indicate a false willingnessto contribute to ensure that the outcome of the study matches theirown preferences (Hidano et al., 2005). When neither specific goodsnor quantitative values are used, the attributes of the environmen-tal goods in question do not have to be thoroughly explained toensure that respondents understand the proposition and respondwith the appropriate willingness to sacrifice income and accept anincrease in taxes.6 Brown et al. (1996) also found that there arestriking similarities in the proportion of positive responses givenin an open-ended hypothetical contingent valuation study, anddichotomous questions between a higher or lower amount. Theseresults indicate that the salient issue for all respondents is whetheror not they are willing to pay, regardless of whether the questionis open ended and hypothetical, or of whether there is a definitevalue attached.
Surveys suffer from a common problem in that they can bebiased if they do not cover a representative share of the popula-tion. Therefore, a high response rate is essential. We work withwell-known data sets from surveys that have been conducted ona regular basis and across a large number of countries. The sur-veys are designed to ensure the representativeness of the data set,and by including the environmental question as only one part of alarger survey, framing biases might be less of a problem than theywould be in a more environmentally specific study. If the respon-dent takes the interviewer to be an environmental activist, theycould overstate the extent of their environmental morale, as theywould feel guilty if stating a low willingness to accept an increasein taxes (Witzke and Urfei, 2001).
Finally, there is the issue of whether an index is more appro-priate for measuring environmental values than a single question.Many studies that examine environmental attitudes typically mea-sure environmental values using a single item.7 The advantage of asingle question is that problems associated with the construction ofan index can be avoided (for example, an index could be designed tobest fit the theoretical arguments). Economists frequently employsingle attitudinal or value variables in various areas ranging fromcompliance to subjective well being (for overviews see Frey andStutzer, 2002; Torgler, 2007).
Our multivariate analysis includes a vector of control variables,which are explained in Appendix A. Previous research in environ-mental economics and social norms demonstrate the validity ofsuch socio-demographic factors and the importance of control-ling for regional differences (see Alm et al., 2006; Torgler andGarcia-Valinas, 2007; Torgler, 2007). The advantage of a multivari-ate analysis is that we are able to control for many factors, butthe disadvantage is that only a limited number of environmentalaspects can be investigated.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Analysis of individual data
We use a probit estimation and calculate the marginal effectsto measure the quantitative effect of a variable (as the equationis nonlinear). Marginal effects indicate the change in the proba-
bility of individuals exhibiting a specific level of environmentalparticipation when the independent variable increases by one unit.Weighted estimates are calculated using the weighting variable6 For a detailed discussion regarding possible survey biases see Carson andMitchell (1995).
7 For a review see, e.g., Zelezny et al. (2000).
M.A. García-Valinas et al. / The Journal of Socio-Economics 41 (2012) 455– 467 459
Table 1Determinants of voluntary unpaid work in environmental organizations.
Weighted probit
(1) (2)
Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg.
Pro-environmental attitudesWillingness to give income 0.233*** 10.45 0.009Willingness to increase taxes 0.162*** 7.89 0.007GenderFemale −0.100*** −2.79 −0.004 −0.085** −2.40 −0.004AgeAge 30–39 0.017 0.30 0.001 0.018 0.31 0.001Age 40–49 0.094 1.58 0.004 0.077 1.32 0.003Age 50–59 0.126* 1.96 0.005 0.127** 2.02 0.006Age 60–69 0.123 1.51 0.005 0.096 1.18 0.004Age 70+ 0.101 0.92 0.004 0.055 0.50 0.002Parental effectChild −0.106 −1.22 −0.004 −0.115 −1.35 −0.004Formal and informal educ.Education 0.019*** 7.13 0.001 0.020*** 7.40 0.001Political discussion 0.110*** 3.98 0.004 0.119*** 4.37 0.005Marital statusWidowed −0.023 −0.28 −0.001 −0.062 −0.74 −0.002Divorced −0.100 −1.50 −0.004 −0.091 −1.40 −0.003Separated 0.160 1.22 0.007 0.148 1.15 0.007Never married 0.139*** 2.92 0.006 0.138*** 2.95 0.006Employment statusPart-time employee 0.064 0.99 0.003 0.071 1.13 0.003Self-employed −0.036 −0.50 −0.001 −0.028 −0.39 −0.001Unemployed −0.114 −1.60 −0.004 −0.095 −1.35 −0.004At home −0.163** −2.13 −0.006 −0.137* −1.85 −0.005Student 0.073 1.02 0.003 0.119* 1.69 0.005Retired −0.310*** −3.79 −0.009 −0.310*** −3.82 −0.010Other 0.139 1.14 0.006 0.146 1.21 0.007RegionWestern Europe 0.092*** 2.69 0.004 0.069** 2.04 0.003
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.043Number of observations 36,086 36,052Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Notes: The reference group consists of Man, Age < 30, Not have children, Married, Full-time employee, Eastern Europe. Robust standard errors.* Statistical significance at the 10% level.
**
pna
taoistgsItiotv
tfgSmh
would form part of the process by which these attitudes and normsare perpetuated. However, the motivation to become involved inthe first place would possibly require a significant pre-existing
Statistical significance at the 5% level.*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
rovided by the EVS to ensure that the samples correspond to theational distribution. Furthermore, answers such as ‘don’t know’re eliminated in all estimations, as are any missing values.
Table 1 presents the first results. The two specifications indicatehat both environmental morale proxies are statistically significantnd report a positive sign. This is in line with the results of somef the previous studies discussed in Section 2.3. Researchers work-ng with contingent valuation have found a positive and stronglyignificant relationship between the willingness to pay for pro-ecting the environment and the belonging to an environmentalroup (Hanley and Craig, 1991; Brown et al., 1996). In our case, thetrongest effects are observable for the variable Willingness to Givencome. Specification [1] shows that an increase in the environmen-al morale scale by one unit raises the probability of participatingn an environmental organization by 1 percentage points. Thus,ur hypothesis cannot be rejected. A higher level of environmen-al social norms due to higher standards of morale is related tooluntary involvement in environmental organizations.
Looking at the control variables we find that there is a nega-ive correlation between environmental participation and beingemale. Thus, women are less likely to do unpaid work, which
oes against previous results on gender differences discussed inection 2.1. However, we could make the argument that womenight tend to be more active in community-based and neighbor-ood organizations addressing local environmental issues, while
men could tend to participate in formal environmental organiza-tions. In addition, women (particularly younger women) might berestricted with respect to their time available to participate in anyvoluntary organization, if they are more heavily involved in timeintensive household activities. Turning to our results on Age, weobserve that the group 50–59 returns the highest probability ofdoing unpaid work. Both education and political interest8 have asignificant and positive impact on environmental engagement, asdoes the ‘never married’ status. Contrary to what we might expect,a parental effect is not visible and it appears that only retired peopleare significantly less willing than the full time-employed individ-uals to be active in environmental organizations through unpaidwork. Finally, we observe that Western European citizens reporta higher incidence of environmental participation. However, theeffect is not statistically significant in all specifications.
Table 2 explores the potential endogeneity problems. Thereis good reason to argue that being involved in an environmen-tal organization enhances pro-environmental attitudes, indeed, it
8 Torgler et al. (2011) explores the role of political interest in environmentalparticipation in greater depth.
460 M.A. García-Valinas et al. / The Journal of Socio-Economics 41 (2012) 455– 467
Table 22SLS.
2SLS First stage reg. −6 −6
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Pro-environmental attitudesWillingness to give income 0.034*** 2.96Willingness to increase taxes 0.037*** 3.00GenderFemale −0.006*** −2.92 0.052*** 4.78 −0.005** −2.59 0.039*** 3.61AgeAge 30–39 0.002 0.56 −0.024 −1.38 0.001 0.36 −0.009 −0.52Age 40–49 0.006** 2.18 −0.047** −2.55 0.004 1.42 0.000 0.02Age 50–59 0.008** 2.56 −0.049** −2.41 0.007** 2.31 −0.018 −0.90Age 60–69 0.008** 2.00 −0.027 −1.06 0.006 1.58 −0.009 −0.38Age 70+ 0.009* 1.80 −0.104*** −3.54 0.005 1.06 −0.025 −0.88Parental effectChild −0.003 −1.02 −0.0005 −0.02 −0.004 −1.26 0.017 0.89Formal and informal educ.Education 0.001** 2.11 0.018*** 17.51 0.001* 1.90 0.017*** 16.82Political discussion 0.001 0.62 0.145*** 17.79 0.002 0.78 0.128*** 15.77Marital statusWidowed 0.003 0.98 −0.102*** −4.95 0.002 0.60 −0.079*** −3.90Divorced −0.002 −0.56 −0.075*** −3.71 −0.001 −0.34 −0.076*** −3.76Separated 0.008 1.05 −0.018 −0.46 0.009 1.12 −0.037 −0.92Never married 0.007*** 2.96 −0.018 −1.10 0.008*** 3.09 −0.033** −2.12Employment statusPart-time employee 0.002 0.46 0.048** 2.35 0.002 0.65 0.036* 1.77Self-employed −0.003 −0.87 0.061*** 2.83 −0.003 −0.65 0.029 1.31Unemployed −0.003 −0.79 −0.085*** −4.04 −0.002 −0.66 −0.070*** −3.41At home −0.004* −1.71 0.008 0.41 −0.003 −1.10 −0.021 −1.03Student 0.004 0.73 0.100*** 4.00 0.007 1.35 0.063 2.50Retired −0.008*** −2.98 −0.098*** −4.55 −0.008*** −3.11 −0.081 −4.01Other 0.005 0.78 −0.006 −0.14 0.004 0.63 0.023 0.55RegionWestern Europe 0.007*** 3.07 −0.155*** −14.82 0.005*** 2.67 −0.087*** −8.40
Instruments:Child qualities: Tolerance and respect for other people 0.111*** 9.69 0.096 8.57Unselfishness 0.131*** 12.00 0.131 11.94Test of excluded instruments 119.63*** 107.79Identification/IV relevance test: Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic 271.33*** 243.550Weak identification statistics: Anderson–Rubin test 17.13*** 16.900
Notes: The reference group consists of Man, Age < 30, Not have children, Married, Full-time employee, Eastern Europe.* Statistical significance at the 10% level.
**
iidcitthtRdcsoat1br
aT
Statistical significance at the 5% level.*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
nternalized pro-environmental stance. This suggests a strongernfluence than the identification generated by participation (for aiscussion on the difference between internalization and identifi-ation see Aronson, 1972). To address the endogeneity problemn this process, we will use an instrumental approach to checkhe robustness of the results. A suitable instrument must be con-emporaneously uncorrelated with the error term but must beighly correlated with membership in a voluntary environmen-al organization. Our instrument (Child Qualities: Tolerance andespect for Other People and Unselfishness9) satisfies these con-itions. It measures the individuals’ willingness to educate theirhildren on certain social norms that are conducive to fostering pro-ocial behavior. Tolerance and other related attitudes are featuresf affective education clearly linked to cooperation and interactionmong people which develop children’s abilities related to collec-ive behavior and consideration of others as well as self (Nixon et al.,
996). Thus, we would predict a statistically significant correlationetween our environmental morale variables and this variable. Thiselationship is confirmed when looking at the first stage regres-9 Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn. Which, ifny, do you consider to be especially important? (1 = mentioned, 0 = not mentioned).olerance and respect for other people; unselfishness.
sions in Table 2. We also conduct the Anderson’s likelihood-ratiotest. A failure to reject the null hypothesis would call the identifica-tion status of the estimated equation into question. Table 2 showsthat we can reject the null hypothesis that our specified instru-ment is redundant. In general, the results obtained in the two 2SLSestimations indicate that our previous findings on the key hypoth-esis remain robust. We observe a relatively robust relationship asspecified between environmental social norms and environmentalparticipation.
As discussed in Section 2.1, the opportunity cost of time is animportant consideration in the literature, yet there is evidence thatwealthier citizens may have a higher demand for a better environ-ment, and thus a stronger incentive to actively contribute to theenvironment by participating in a voluntary organization. In thenext table we extend the previous regression by including individ-uals’ economic situation with two dummy variables. It should benoted that the number of observations in Table 3 decreased aftercontrolling for individuals’ economic situation. The results indicatethat a higher level of economic status leads to a higher probabilityof doing unpaid voluntary work in environmental organizations.
Next, we explore whether the social context is relevant inunderstanding individuals’ participation in environmental orga-nizations. We are interested in whether individual behavior isinfluenced by the perception of how other people behave. In par-
M.A. García-Valinas et al. / The Journal of Socio-Economics 41 (2012) 455– 467 461
Table 3Income and unpaid work in environmental organizations.
Weighted probit
(13) (14)
Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg.
Pro-environmental attitudesWillingness to give income 0.231*** 8.06 0.010Willingness to increase taxes 0.153*** 5.77 0.007GenderFemale −0.158*** −3.04 −0.007 −0.144*** −2.80 −0.006AgeAge 30–39 0.011 0.14 0.000 0.009 0.11 0.000Age 40–49 0.006 0.06 0.000 −0.007 −0.08 0.000Age 50–59 0.099 1.09 0.004 0.088 0.99 0.004Age 60–69 0.040 0.36 0.002 0.016 0.15 0.001Age 70+ 0.052 0.35 0.002 0.012 0.08 0.001Parental effectChild −0.042 −0.35 −0.002 −0.039 −0.33 −0.002Formal and informal educ.Education 0.022*** 5.43 0.001 0.023*** 5.62 0.001Political discussion 0.064* 1.68 0.003 0.066* 1.78 0.003Economic situationUpper class 0.237*** 3.58 0.012 0.254*** 3.91 0.014Middle class 0.153*** 2.79 0.007 0.156*** 2.88 0.007Marital statusWidowed 0.029 0.25 0.001 −0.006 −0.05 0.000Divorced −0.077 −0.85 −0.003 −0.085 −0.94 −0.003Separated 0.082 0.45 0.004 0.075 0.42 0.004Never married 0.052 0.76 0.002 0.056 0.83 0.003Employment statusPart-time employee 0.038 0.40 0.002 0.062 0.69 0.003Self-employed −0.015 −0.16 −0.001 −0.010 −0.11 0.000Unemployed −0.071 −0.77 −0.003 −0.063 −0.69 −0.003At home −0.160 −1.62 −0.006 −0.141 −1.48 −0.006Student 0.002 0.02 0.000 0.024 0.23 0.001Retired −0.209* −1.90 −0.007 −0.203* −1.87 −0.007Other 0.224 1.42 0.012 0.222 1.42 0.012RegionWestern Europe 0.119** 2.32 0.005 0.087* 1.71 0.004
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.053Number of observations 18,862 18,887Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Notes: The reference group consists of Man, Age < 30, Lowest class, Not have children, Married, Full-time employee, Eastern Europe. Robust standard errors.* Statistical significance at the 10% level.
ttubd1wp2
rbvaiwFjtjowc
** Statistical significance at the 5% level.*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
icular, we will examine the relationship between perceptions ofhe prevalence of littering behavior in public places and an individ-al’s participation in environmental organizations. Despite litteringeing recognized as a major public health and safety hazard andiminishing the aesthetic appearance of public places (Ackerman,997), to our knowledge there are only a few empirical studieshich have compiled data and analyzed in detail the extent ofublic attitudes towards littering (see Torgler et al., forthcoming,009).
The conditional cooperation literature suggests that envi-onmental participation may be affected by non-environmentalehavior of others. If most people litter in a public place, other indi-iduals could feel less obliged to dispose of their own litter properlynd take less care with respect to the environment. For example,n a study by Fischbacher et al. (2001), 50 percent of the subjects
ere found to be conditionally cooperative. In a separate study,alk et al. (2003) create a laboratory situation in which each sub-ect is a member of two economically identical groups, where onlyhe group members differ. The study observes that the same sub-
ects contribute different amounts, depending on the behavior ofthers in the group. The study finds that contributions are largerhen group cooperation is higher. Torgler et al. (2009) observeonditional cooperation with respect to non-littering rules when
individuals perceived that throwing away litter in a public placeis common. However, it is unclear whether this also crowds-outthe incentive to be active in environmental organizations. We usethe following question to investigate the impact of conditionalcooperation: “According to you, how many of your compatriots dothe following: Throw away litter in a public place?” (4 = almost all,1 = almost none). The question represents a perception of others’behavior, which could provide cues to the standards expected forown behavior.
The results are presented in Table 4. We observe a positive cor-relation between perceived level of littering and environmentalparticipation when extending the specifications reported in Table 3.Thus, the results are contrary to the expectation of conditionalcooperation, as our results indicate that environmental participa-tion is not ‘crowded out’. We suggest that there are several possiblereasons for this effect.
It may be that environmental participation is used as a chan-nel for action when highly motivated and engaged individualssee that others are not pursuing environmental cooperation. Thus,
environmental participation may arise in situations when thereare ‘frictions,’ or in other words, when there is a need for collec-tive action to overcome failures. Rose (1998) suggests that a goodstock of social capital can replace deficient formal and informal
462 M.A. García-Valinas et al. / The Journal of Socio-Economics 41 (2012) 455– 467
Table 4Perceived level of compliance and environmental participation.
Weighted probit
−13 −14
Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg.
Pro-environmental attitudesWillingness to give income 0.227*** 7.55 0.009Willingness to increase taxes 0.148*** 5.39 0.006GenderFemale −0.186*** −3.42 −0.007 −0.178*** −3.29 −0.007AgeAge 30–39 0.021 0.25 0.001 0.019 0.23 0.001Age 40–49 −0.013 −0.14 0.000 −0.031 −0.34 −0.001Age 50–59 0.109 1.14 0.005 0.097 1.04 0.004Age 60–69 0.058 0.48 0.002 0.026 0.22 0.001Age 70+ −0.022 −0.13 −0.001 −0.060 −0.37 −0.002Parental effectChild −0.010 −0.08 0.000 −0.009 −0.08 0.000Formal and informal educ.Education 0.022*** 5.02 0.001 0.022*** 5.28 0.001Political discussion 0.307*** 4.37 0.015 0.329*** 4.74 0.018Economic situationUpper class 0.190*** 3.19 0.008 0.199*** 3.38 0.009Middle class 0.048 1.19 0.002 0.051 1.27 0.002Marital statusWidowed 0.061 0.51 0.003 0.035 0.29 0.001Divorced −0.104 −1.12 −0.004 −0.107 −1.15 −0.004Separated 0.063 0.32 0.003 0.066 0.34 0.003Never married 0.070 0.97 0.003 0.074 1.05 0.003Employment statusPart-time employee 0.005 0.05 0.000 0.043 0.43 0.002Self-employed −0.048 −0.48 −0.002 −0.041 −0.40 −0.002Unemployed −0.088 −0.88 −0.003 −0.076 −0.76 −0.003At home −0.182* −1.74 −0.006 −0.148 −1.45 −0.005Student −0.055 −0.49 −0.002 −0.033 −0.30 −0.001Retired −0.212* −1.85 −0.007 −0.203* −1.81 −0.007Other 0.257 1.58 0.013 0.257 1.60 0.014RegionWestern Europe 0.088 1.60 0.003 0.049 0.91 0.002Perceived complianceOthers throwing away litter 0.065*** 2.00 0.003 0.062* 1.93 0.003
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.059Number of observations 17,293 17,318Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Notes: The reference group consists of Man, Age < 30, Lowest class, Not have children, Married, Full-time employee, Eastern Europe. Robust standard errors. ** Statisticals
ipaiadesmehbtrfosI(ttc
ignificance at the 5% level.* Statistical significance at the 10% level.
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
nstitutions, enabling collective action and cooperation to solveroblems of the group. This argument is consistent with Bowlesnd Gintis’ (2002: F423) statement that “communities may makemportant contributions to governance where market contractsnd government fiats fail because the necessary information toesign and enforce beneficial exchanges and directives cannotffectively be used by judges, government officials, and other out-iders.” Similarly, internalized social norms and environmentalorale may also exert an influence stronger than or equal to the
ffect of conditional cooperation. It is possible that some peopleave intrinsic motivation to care for the environment, so will note affected by evidence of others’ misbehaving. It is also possiblehat people who participate in environmental organizations mayeject the identity that comes with littering as being a valid optionor them. Akerlof and Kranton (2010) have explored the economicsf several other identities (for example, gender and military) andhown that holding a certain identity can affect decision making.f a person’s “self-image is strongly associated with green values”
Blamey, 1998, p. 680), the cost of acting in a manner that is con-rary to their identity would outweigh any benefit obtained throughhe convenience of littering. Therefore, these individuals might notlass themselves as being subject to the same norms or liable tochange their behavior in the way observed by Torgler et al. (2009)on conditional cooperation.
4.2. Analysis of country data
In a next step we are going to explore whether the previousresults remain robust at the macro level. We therefore extend thenumber of countries to include those from the World Values Sur-vey (see Appendix A), and build averages out of the country values.However, we do not recode the original indirect measures of envi-ronmental social norms, which means that higher values are relatedto lower social norms for the first two variables (willingness to giveincome and willingness to increase taxes). In other words, we mea-sure the non-willingness to give income or increase taxes. We willuse a simple OLS regression using the latest 2000 data.
We report beta or standardized regression coefficients toreveal the relative importance of the variables employed. Toobtain robust standard errors in these estimations, we use the
Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of standard errors. We arealso providing the elasticity of y with respect to x equivalent to∂ log(y)/∂ log(x) evaluated at the multivariate point of means of thedata. As control variables we use a proxy for institutional quality,
al of Socio-Economics 41 (2012) 455– 467 463
tAianbpiptaalooeawitpfbcchwf
aVolrfilcs
Table 5Macro evidence.
Dep. variable Unpaid work
Pro-environmental attitudesNon-willingness to give income −0.236*
−1.84−2.657
Non-willingness to increase taxes −0.369***
−3.16−4.950
Political factorPolitical risk factor 0.228* 0.163
1.83 1.401.805 1.295
Further factorsGDP growth 0.155 0.112
1.05 0.820.297 0.214
Urbanization −0.422* −0.390*
−1.87 −1.91−1.799 −1.662
Population (age > 65) −0.107 −0.071−0.48 −0.32−0.343 −0.226
Regions Yes Yes
Prob > F 0.056 0.010R2 0.456 0.513# of observations 52 52
Notes: Robust standard errors. Beta/standardized coefficients reported. t-Values inbold and elasticities in italics. Regions: Dummies using the common differentiation(Europe, Latin America, North America, North Africa, Sub Saharan Africa, the Pacific,
T2
NC
M.A. García-Valinas et al. / The Journ
he growth rate, the level of urbanization and the population sizege > 65. Institutional quality has been measured using the Polit-
cal Risk Rating from the International Country Risk Guide. It isn index that measures government stability, internal and exter-al conflicts, corruption, law and order, democratic accountability,ureaucracy quality, ethnic and religious tensions, the military inolitics and the socioeconomic and investment conditions. Includ-
ng this variable indicates whether people are able to express theirreferences and engage in pro-environmental behaviors in the con-ext of better government; translating attitudes and behaviors intoction when holding institutional quality constant. Higher valuesre correlated with better institutions. We also control for theevel of economic development and urbanization. A higher levelf urbanization may provide a larger potential subject pool, butn the other hand it also increases the level of anonymity in soci-ty, which could produce higher transaction costs when forming
voluntary organization. We control for the age structure (in lineith the micro analysis), as it could be expected that the number of
ndividuals who are actively involved in environmental organiza-ions decreases as age increases. One possible reason is that oldereople will not live to enjoy the benefits of preserving resourcesor later years. However, it can be argued that as people age, theyecome more cautious, more risk averse and more conservative orompliant (Torgler, 2007), and they have more free time, so theorrelation can also be positive. In addition, older people mightave reached a stage in their lives where they are more concernedith the bequest motive, and want to preserve the environment
or future generations (Whitehead and Thompson, 2003).We do not investigate the effect of perceived level of littering
t the macro level as this question was only asked in the Europeanalues Survey. Table 5 presents the results. We again observe thatur indirect measures for environmental social norms are corre-ated with environmental participation, which is in line with theesults of the individual data analysis. The coefficients for the two
rst proxies are always statistically significant, reporting relativelyarge beta coefficients next to the political factors. Similarly, thealculated elasticities demonstrate that these two environmentalocial norm regressors are elastic, with a decrease in environmen-
able 6SLS focusing on unpaid work.
Dep. variable: unpaid work IV (2SLS) estimati
Pro-environmental attitudesNon-willingness to give income −0.187*
−1.73Non-willingness to increase taxes
Political factorPolitical risk factor 0.001
0.64
Further factorsGDP growth 0.001
0.30
Urbanization −0.001
−1.26
Population (age > 65) 0.001
0.29
Regions Yes
Instrument:Child qualities: tolerance
And respect for other people
Test of excluded instruments
Identification/IV relevance test: Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic 4.479**
Weak identification statistics: Anderson–Rubin test 3.71*
otes: t-values in italics. Regions: Dummies using the common differentiation (Europe, Laribbean and Australia).
* Statistical significance at the 10% level.** Statistical significance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
Asia, the Caribbean and Australia). **Statistical significance at the 5% level.* Statistical significance at the 10% level.
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
tal social norms having more than four times as large an effect onenvironmental participation. However, it should be noted that thecoefficient on the third proxy is not statistically significant.
Looking at the control variables we observe that there is a posi-tive relationship between institutional/governance quality proxiedby Political Risk Factor and participation in environmental organi-zations. With respect to the other variables we observe a negative
on First stage regression IV (2SLS) estimation First stage regression
−0.158**
−2.11
0.0003 0.0003 −0.0010.08 0.34 −0.38
−0.014 0.001 −0.019−1.00 0.22 −1.470.004 −0.001* 0.0041.36 −1.70 1.600.007 0.0005 0.0050.43 0.18 0.31Yes Yes Yes
−0.836* −0.990**
−1.92 −2.473.67* 6.09**
7.232***
3.71*
atin America, North America, North Africa, Sub Saharan Africa, the Pacific, Asia, the
4 al of S
rtvs
mTdaiitktp
5
afpwiPvvmiasapevlwcnnvrnsasbptst
gtAwdtcte
n
64 M.A. García-Valinas et al. / The Journ
elationship between urbanization and environmental participa-ion, yet the coefficient is only barely statistically significant. Theariables on economic growth and population structure are nottatistically significant.10
Table 6 explores the potential endogeneity problems at theacro level, in line with the micro-level analysis presented in
able 4. In this case we use also use a variable that measures theesirability of encouraging children to be tolerant and respectfuls an instrument, and report several diagnostic tests. The resultsndicate that we can reject the null hypothesis that our specifiednstrument is redundant. In general, the results obtained in thewo 2SLS estimations indicate that our previous findings on theey hypothesis remain robust. We observe a relatively robust rela-ionship between environmental social norms and environmentalarticipation.
. Conclusions
This paper investigates whether environmental social normsffect environmental behavior. We use two different proxiesor environmental social norms, namely the willingness to giveart of the own income to prevent environmental pollution, andhether the respondent would agree to an increase in taxes
f the extra money is used to prevent environmental pollution.ro-environmental behavior was proxied through the conduct ofoluntary unpaid work in environmental organizations. The moti-ation behind such a study is the observation that deterrenceodels fail to predict the relatively high level of compliance in var-
ous situations where a private cost is incurred in order to provide public good. Previous literature on this paradox covers situationsuch as tax compliance despite the low chance of being auditednd not littering despite the low probability of getting caught andenalized. This paper provides empirical support for the idea thatnvironmental values or morale are indeed related to individuals’oluntary involvement in environmental organizations. By using aarge micro-data set covering not less than 32 different countries
e are able to provide a comprehensive summary for every singleountry (almost 200 regressions). In addition, we check the robust-ess of the results using a macro approach, and here we extend theumber of countries by including data from the World Values Sur-ey. We have also explored potential endogeneity problems. Theesults show robust findings and therefore indicate that attitudi-al questions help to explain behavioral consequences. Conceptsuch as environmental motivation, pro-environmental attitudesnd environmental social norms are highly relevant to an under-tanding of why some people demonstrate a higher willingness toe involved in environmental protection. In addition, our resultsrovide another piece of empirical evidence for the propositionhat self reported attitudes are related to behavior, and that atated willingness to do something does represent the intentiono act.
The literature on reciprocity and conditional cooperation sug-ests that a critical mass of cooperative individuals is requiredo induce a positive dynamic process of conditional cooperation.
society that has many non-compliant individuals will exhibiteaker social norms. Policies should take into account such path-ependent processes within a society. The closer we are to thehreshold or tipping point, the easier it is to influence the dynamic
onditional cooperative processes. We have seen in our studyhat environmental participation may be present in situationsven when there are ‘frictions,’ or in other words, when there10 It should be noted that the impact of economic growth does not change wheneglecting the political institutions in the regressions.
ocio-Economics 41 (2012) 455– 467
is a need for collective action to overcome the failures within asociety or of governance. In such a situation, a certain strengthof social norms can complement or substitute the operations offormal institutions and enable collective action to solve prob-lems of the group. This may act as a catalyst for cooperationand may reduce (the speed) of the negative dynamic process incase there is a lack of conditional cooperation. It is also possi-ble that a critical mass of individuals could form strong identitiesas ‘environmentalists’, and hence is ‘immune’ to the conditionalcooperation response when faced with others’ deviation from anorm. Thus, from a policy perspective it is crucial to understandthe factors that strengthen environmental participation. Referringto social capital, Pretty and Smith (2004) state that it is importantthat international agencies, governments, and other organizationsaccept and understand that investment in strengthening socialnorms, social ties, social resource pays off. Thus, all efforts madeto characterize the kind of people who participate actively inenvironmental organizations will help assure the success of suchinvestments, by either choosing to ‘crowd in’ existing attitudes ordeveloping a moral suasion campaign to develop environmentalmorale.
These empirical findings are not only useful in the context ofenvironmental issues, but can also be applied to voluntary par-ticipation and provision of public goods more generally. Ostrom(2000, p. 154) claims that the (pre-Mancur Olson) idea of col-lective action arising organically from groups in order to solvetheir own dilemmas was “not entirely misguided”, and main-tains that institutional, cultural and biophysical contexts mayplay a role in determining which individuals join collective actiongroups. Ostrom also raises the uncomfortable point that pastpolicy may have placed an inappropriate emphasis on financialvalues for the environment. based on payoff structures appealingto the rational egoists could have been misdirected. In fact, thiscould have worked against the original intention of the policy,crowding out social norms that encourage cooperative behav-ior rather than encouraging collective action (Ostrom, 2000, p.154).
Moreover, as pro-social behavior is both voluntary and con-ditioned by observed norms of behavior in society, there existsa stronger chance to crowd in these behaviors than to persistin seeking the appropriate monetary value for the environmentbased on an individually stated willingness to incur private costsin order to supply a public good. In seeking policy implicationsfrom the current study, we could look to policies supporting for-mation of new community based organizations and partnershipswith existing organizations. If policies are aimed at crowding inexisting motivations and pro-social behaviors rather than at ‘therational egoist’, environmental quality may be ensured at lowertransaction and policing costs. Furthermore, supporting exist-ing environmental morale and pro-environmental morale wouldstrengthen the conviction of those who see themselves as environ-mentalists, augmenting the sense of personal efficacy (discussedin Section 2.2) that fosters further voluntary efforts, and holdingto their identity, even in the face of non-compliance from otherpeople.
The results of our analyses present an insight into voluntaryparticipation and whose preferences are being served by voluntaryprovision of a public environmental good. Considering the difficultyand expense involved in regulating to protect the environment (andthe political sensitivity of such actions), policymakers seeking themost effective ways to address the consequences of climate changeand ecological degradation could find efficient solutions throughcrowding-in these motivations. Finally, it should be noted that fur-
ther investigations are required to gain a better understanding ofwhat shapes individuals’ environmental motivation. This wouldprovide a better foundation to derive policy implications to pro-
al of Socio-Economics 41 (2012) 455– 467 465
mt
A
TD
Table A2Descriptive statistics micro analysis.
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
M.A. García-Valinas et al. / The Journ
ote, encourage and maintain a higher willingness to contributeo the environment.
ppendix A.
See Tables A1–A4.
able A1escription of control variables.
Variable Definitions
Micro analysisAge Age 30–39, Age 40–49, Age 50–59, Age
60–69, Age 70+ (Age <30 in the referencegroup)
Gender Woman (Man in the reference group)Parent effect Child (not having children in the reference
group)Formal and informal education Education:
What is the highest educational level thatyou have attained?1. No formal education2. Incomplete primary school3. Completed primary school4. Incomplete secondary school:technical/vocational type5. Complete secondary school:technical/vocational type6. Incomplete secondary:university-preparatory type7. Complete secondary:university-preparatory type8. Some university-level education,without degree9. University-level education, with degreePolitical discussion:When you get together with your friends,would you say you discuss politicalmatters?1. Never2. Occasionally3. Frequently
Marital status Widowed; Divorced; Separated; NeverMarried (Married in the reference group)
Economic situation People sometimes describe themselves asbelonging to the working class, the middleclass, or the upper or lower class. Wouldyou describe yourself as belonging to the:Upper class, Middle class (the rest,Working class and Lower class, in thereference group).
Employment status Part-time employee, Self-employed,Unemployed, At home, Student, Retired,Other (Full-time employed in the referencegroup).
Macro analysisPolitical risk factor ICRG index covering 12 factors
(government stability, socioeconomicconditions, investment profile, internalconflict, external conflict, corruption,military in politics, religious tension, lawand order, ethnic tensions, democraticaccountability, and bureaucracy). For adetailed description see:http://www.icrgonline.com/page.aspx?page=icrgmethods#Background of the ICRGRating System.
GDP growth GDP per capita growth (annual %). Source:World Development Indicators.
Urbanization Urban population (% of total). Source:World Development Indicators.
Population (age > 65) Population ages 65 and above (% of total).Source: World Development Indicators.
Others throwing away litter According to you, how many of yourcompatriots do the following: Throw awaylitter in a public place? (4 = almost all,1 = almost none).
Key variablesEnvironmental morality (income) 38,877 1.620 0.885 0 3Environmental morality (taxes) 38,834 1.412 0.877 0 3Working voluntary
environmental organization41,125 0.020 0.140 0 1
Control variablesAge 30–39 40,963 0.197 0.398 0 1Age 40–49 40,963 0.191 0.393 0 1Age 50–59 40,963 0.15 0.357 0 1Age 60–69 40,963 0.135 0.342 0 1Age 70+ 40,963 0.102 0.302 0 1Woman 41,114 0.54 0.498 0 1Children 41,125 0.077 0.266 0 1Education 39,840 18.712 5.125 5 74Political discussion 40,713 1.886 0.654 1 3Upper class 21,335 0.136 0.343 0 1Middle class 21,335 0.338 0.473 0 1Widowed 39,861 0.097 0.295 0 1Divorced 39,861 0.07 0.256 0 1Separated 39,861 0.016 0.124 0 1Never married 39,861 0.228 0.42 0 1Part-time employed 40,919 0.068 0.252 0 1Self-employed 40,919 0.052 0.222 0 1Unemployed 40,919 0.229 0.42 0 1At home 40,919 0.095 0.293 0 1Student 40,919 0.061 0.24 0 1Retired 40,919 0.073 0.261 0 1Other 40,919 0.018 0.131 0 1Others throwing away litter 37,437 2.710 0.777 1 4
Table A3Countries macro analysis.
Albania LithuaniaArgentina LuxembourgAustria MaltaBangladesh MexicoBelarus MoldovaBelgium NetherlandsBulgaria PeruCanada PhilippinesChile PolandChina PortugalCroatia RomaniaCzech Republic RussiaDenmark SingaporeEstonia SlovakiaFinland SloveniaFrance South AfricaGermany SpainGreece SwedenHungary TanzaniaIceland TurkeyIndia UgandaIreland UkraineItaly United KingdomJapan United StatesSouth Korea VietnamLatvia Zimbabwe
Table A4Descriptive statistics macro analysis.
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Unpaid work 58 0.039 0.051 0.002 0.277Non-willingness to give
income57 2.248 0.270 1.583 3.052
Non-willingness to increasetaxes
57 2.039 0.307 1.380 2.806
Political risk factor 140 66.383 13.970 31.083 95.250GDP growth 186 2.507 4.396 −16.580 18.940Urbanization 206 54.783 24.734 8.60 100Population (age > 65) 188 6.888 4.581 1.08 18.21Instrument:Child qualities: tolerance and
respect for other people68 0.705 0.0964 0.525 0.923
4 al of S
R
A
A
A
A
AB
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
C
C
D
D
EE
F
F
F
F
F
G
G
H
H
H
H
I
K
K
L
66 M.A. García-Valinas et al. / The Journ
eferences
ckerman, F., 1997. Why Do We Recycle? Markets, Values, and Public Policy. IslandPress, Washington, DC, xii, 210.
dger, W.N., 2003. Social capital, collective action and adaptation to climate change.Economic Geography 79, 387–404.
kerlof, G., Kranton, R.E., 2010. Identity Economics. Princeton University Press, NewJersey.
lm, J., Martinez—Vazquez, J., Torgler, B., 2006. Russian attitudes toward payingtaxes – before, during, and after the transition. International Journal of SocialEconomics 33, 832–857.
ronson, E., 1972. The Social Animal. W.H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco.arkan, S.E., 2004. Explaining public support for the environmental movement: a
civic voluntarism model. Social Science Quarterly 85 (4), 913–937.ekkers, R., 2005. Participation in voluntary associations: relations with resources,
personality, and political values. Political Psychology 26, 439–454.lamey, R., 1998. The activation of environmental norms: extending Schwartz’s
model. Environment and Behavior 30, 676.owles, S., Gintis, H., 2002. Social capital and community governance. Economic
Journal 112, F419–F436.rewer, P.R., Steenbergen, M.R., Marco, R., 2002. All against all: how beliefs about
human nature shape foreign policy opinions. Political Psychology 23, 39–58.rewer, P.R., Gross, K., Aday, S., Willnat, L., 2004. International trust and public
opinion about world affairs. American Journal of Political Science 48, 93–109.rown, T.C., Champ, P.A., Bishop, R.C., McCollum, D.W., 1996. Which response for-
mat reveals the truth about donations to a public good. Land Economics 72 (2),152–166.
runeau, J., Ecchevaria, C., 2003. Environmental Quality is a Normal Good. Depart-ment of Economics Working Paper 2003-5, University of Saskatchewan.
ulte, E., Gerking, S., List, J.A., De Zeeuw, A., 2005. The effect of varying the causesof environmental problems on stated WTP values: evidence from a field study.Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 49, 330–342.
appellari, L., Ghinetti, P., Turati, G., 2007. On Time and Money Donations. CESifoWorking Paper No. 2140.
appellari, L., Turati, G., 2004. Volunteer labour supply: the role of workers’ moti-vations. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 75 (4), 619–643.
arson, R.T., Mitchell, R.C., 1995. Sequencing and nesting in contingent valuationsurveys. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 28, 155–173.
hang, E.C.C., Chu, Y., 2006. Corruption and trust: exceptionalism in Asian democ-racies? Journal of Politics 68, 259–271.
urtis, A., Van Nouhuys, M., 1999. Landcare participation in Australia: the volunteerperspective. Sustainable Development 7 (2), 98–111.
unlap, R.E., Van Liere, K.D., 1978. The ‘New Environmental Paradigm’: a proposedmeasuring instrument and preliminary results. Journal of Environmental Edu-cation 9, 10–19.
unlap, R.E., Van Liere, K.D., Mertig, A.G., Jones, R.E., 2000. Measuring endorsementof the New Ecological Paradigm: A revised NEP scale. Journal of Social Issues 56(3), 425–442.
uropean Values, 1999. Questionnaire. Tilburg University, The Netherlands.ckersley, R., 1992. Environmentalism and Political Theory: Towards an ecocentric
approach. UCL Press, London.alk, A., Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., 2003. Living in Two Neighborhoods – Social
Interaction in the Lab. CESifo Working Paper No. 954, May 2003, Munich.ischbacher, U., Gächter, S., Fehr, E., 2001. Are people conditionally cooperative?
Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics Letters 71, 397–404.reeman, R.B., 1997. Working for nothing: the supply of volunteer labor. Journal of
Labor Economics 15, S140–S166.rey, B.S., Stutzer, A., 2002. Happiness and Economics. Princeton University Press,
Princeton.rey, B.S., Stutzer, A., 2006. Environmental Morale and Motivation, CREMA Working
Paper No. 2006-17, Basel.lasman, L.R., Albarracin, D., 2006. Forming attitudes that predict future behavior:
a meta-analysis of the attitude–behavior relation. Psychological Bulletin 132,778–822.
rendstad, G., Wollebaek, D., 1998. Greener still? An empirical examination of Eck-ersley’s ecocentric approach. Environment and Behavior 30, 653–675.
andy, F., 2001. Advocacy by environmental nonprofit organizations. An optimalstrategy for addressing environmental problems? International Journal of SocialEconomics 288, 648–666.
anley, N., Craig, S., 1991. Wilderness development decisions and the Krutilla–Fishermodel: the case of Scotland’s flow country. Ecological Economics 4 (2), 145–164.
enderson, K.A., 1996. One size doesn’t fit all: the meanings of women’s leisure.Journal of Leisure Research 3, 139–154.
idano, N., Kato, T., Aritomi, M., 2005. Benefits of participating in contingent valu-ation mail surveys and their effects on respondent behaviour: a panel analysis.Ecological Economics 52, 63–80.
srael, D., Levinson, A., 2004. Willingness to pay for environmental quality: testableempirical implications of the growth and environmental literature. Contribu-tions to Economic Analysis and Policy 3 (1), art. 2.
atz, E., Rosenberg, J., 2005. An economic interpretation of volunteering. EuropeanJournal of Political Economy 21, 429–443.
otchen, M.J., Reiling, S.D., 2000. Environmental attitudes, motivations, and con-tingent valuation of nonuse values: a case study involving endangered species.Ecological Economics 32 (1), 93–107.
ubell, M., 2002. Environmental activism as collective action. Environment andBehavior 34, 431–454.
ocio-Economics 41 (2012) 455– 467
Lubell, M., Vedlitz, A., Zahran, S., Alston, L.T., 2006. Collective action, environmentalactivism and air quality policy. Political Research Quarterly 591, 149–160.
Martinez, T.A., McMullin, S.L., 2004. Factors affecting decisions to volunteer in non-governmental organizations. Environment, Behaviour 36, 112–126.
Mears, D.P., Ploeger, M., Warr, M., 2000. Explaining the gender gap in delinquency:peer influence and moral evaluations of behavior. In: Crutchfield, R.D., Bridges,G.S., Weis, J.G., Kubrin, C. (Eds.), Crime Readings. Pine Forge Press, ThousandOaks, pp. 143–148.
Menchik, P.L., Weisbrod, B.A., 1987. Volunteer labour supply. Journal of Public Eco-nomics 32, 159–183.
Mohai, P., 1992. Men, women, and the environment: an examination of the gendergap in environmental concern and activism. Society and Natural Resources 5,1–19.
Nixon, J., Martín, J., McKeown, P., Ranson, S., 1996. Encouraging Learning: Towardsa Theory of the Learning School. Open University Press, Milton Keynes.
Olli, E., Grendstad, G., Wollebaek, D., 2001. Correlates of environmental behaviours.Bringing back social context. Environment and Behaviour 33, 181–208.
Ostrom, E., 2000. Collective action and the evolution of social norms. The Journal ofEconomic Perspectives 14, 137–158.
Pretty, J., Ward, H., 2001. Social capital and the environment. World Development29 (2), 209–227.
Pretty, J., Smith, D.J., 2004. The role of social capital in biodiversity management.Conservation Biology 18, 631–638.
Randle, M., Dolnicar, S., 2006. Environmental Volunteers: Are They Driven by Altru-ism and a Strong Feeling or Regional Identity? Working Paper n◦ 88, Faculty ofCommerce, University of Wollongong.
Rose, R., 1998. Getting things done in an anti-modern society: social capital networksin Russia. Social Capital Initiative Working Paper No. 6. World Bank, Washington,DC.
Rouse, S.B., Clawson, B., 1992. Motives and incentives of older adult volunteers.Journal of Extension 30, 1–6.
Slemrod, J., 2002. Trust in Public Finance. NBER Working Paper 9187. Cambridge,MA, September.
Serret, Y., Ferrara, I., 2008. Conclusions and Policy Implications. Special issue (n◦ 2)on Household Behavior and the Environment, OECD General Papers.
Thompson, S.C.G., Barton, M.A., 1994. Ecocentric and anthropocentric attitudestoward the environment. Journal of Environmental Psychology 14, 149–157.
Torgler, B., 2007. Tax Compliance and Tax Morale: A Theoretical and Empirical Anal-ysis. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.
Torgler, B., 2008. Trust in international organizations: an empirical investigationfocusing on the United Nations. Review of International Organizations 3, 65–93.
Torgler, B., Garcia-Valinas, M.A., 2007. The determinants of individuals’ attitudestowards preventing environmental damage. Ecological Economics 62, 536–552.
Torgler, B., García-Valinas, M.A., Macintyre, A., 2010. Participation in EnvironmentalOrganizations. Routledge.
Torgler, B., Garcia-Valinas, M.A., Macintyre, A., 2011. Participation in Environ-mental Organizations: An Empirical Analysis. Environment and DevelopmentEconomics, doi:10.1017/S1355770X11000106.
Torgler, B., Garcia-Valinas, M.A., Macintyre, A., 2012. Justifiability of littering: anempirical investigation. Environmental Values, forthcoming.
Torgler, B., Frey, B.S., Wilson, C., 2009. Environmental and pro-social norms: evi-dence on littering. Journal of Economic Analysis, Policy 9 (Iss. 1 (Topics)), Article18.
Torgler, B., Valev, N.T., 2007. Public attitudes toward corruption and tax evasion:investigating the role of gender over time. School of Economics and Finance Dis-cussion Papers and Working Papers Series 214, School of Economics and Finance,Queensland University of Technology.
Uslaner, E.M., 2004. Trust and corruption. In: Lambsdorf, Johann Graf, Taube, Markus,Schramm, Matthias (Eds.), Corruption and the New Institutional Economics.Routledge, London, pp. 76–92.
Whitehead, J.C., 1991. Environmental interest group behaviour and self-selectionbias in contingent valuation mail surveys. Growth and Change 22, 10–21.
Whitehead, J.C., Thompson, C.Y., 2003. Environmental preservation demand: altru-istic, bequest, and intrinsic motives. The American Journal of Economics andSociology 52 (1), 19–30.
Witzke, H.P., Urfei, G., 2001. Willingness to pay for environmental protection inGermany: coping with the regional dimension. Regional Studies 35, 207–214.
Wymer, W.W., 1998. Youth development volunteers: their motives, how they differfrom other volunteers and correlates of involvement intensity. InternationalJournal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing 3, 321–336.
Yandle, B., 2004. Environmental turning points, institutions, and the race to the top.The Independent Review 9 (2), 211–226.
Zelezny, L.C., Chua, P., Aldrich, C., 2000. Elaborating on gender differences in envi-ronmentalism. Journal of Social Issues 56, 443–457.
María García-Valinas is the Vice-Dean for InternationalRelations at the School of Economics and Business at theUniversity of Oviedo, Spain, and was recently a researcherat INRA-LERNA (Laboratoire d’Economie de RessourcesNaturelles, Toulouse School of Economics, France). Sinceobtaining her PhD in 2003, she has specialized in envi-ronmental economics. She has worked on (among other
topics) characterization of water demand, water sec-tor efficiency, and the use of alternative instruments inorder to control water consumption. She has recentlyco-authored a book on Participation in Environmental Orga-nizations, published by Routledge.
al of S
M.A. García-Valinas et al. / The JournAlison Macintyre is working towards her PhD onnational pride, national identity and public good prob-lems at Queensland University of Technology in Brisbane,Australia. She is also interested in environmental andbehavioral economics and has previously explored
the relationship between institutional quality, socialcapital and environmental outcomes. Alison recentlyco-authored a book on Participation in Environmental Orga-nizations and has collaborated on two contributed bookchapters on the topics of tax evasion and corruption.ocio-Economics 41 (2012) 455– 467 467
Benno Torgler is Professor of Applied Economics, atthe Queensland University of Technology, in Brisbane,Australia. His areas of research include behavioral andexperimental economics, non-market economics, illegalactivities (e.g., tax evasion, corruption, shadow economy,money laundering), sportometrics, public finance, andenvironmental economics. His work has been publishedextensively in leading journals and he has also publishednumerous book chapters and books including Tax com-pliance and tax morale: A theoretical and empirical analysis,
and Participation in Environmental Organizations. He is edi-tor of the Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, AssociateMember in the research group in Economics, Sport andIntangibles, ESIrg (Spain), and an Independent Advisor to the Institute of Local PublicFinance (Germany).