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Historical Legacies, Nationalist Mobilization, and Political Outcomes in Russia and Serbia: AWeberian ViewAuthor(s): Veljko VujačićSource: Theory and Society, Vol. 25, No. 6 (Dec., 1996), pp. 763-801Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/657828

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Historical

legacies,

nationalist

mobilization,

and

political

outcomes

in Russia and Serbia:

A

Weberian

view

VELJKO

VUJACIC

Oberlin

College

The

community

of

political

destiny,

i.e.,

above

all,

of common

struggle

of life and

death,

has

given

rise

to

groups

with

joint

memories

which

often

have

had a

deeper impact

than the ties of

merely

cul-

tural, linguistic, or ethnic community. It is this

community

of

memories

which,

as we shall

see,

constitutes the

ultimately

decisive element

of

national

consciousness.

Max

Weber'

The

closing

months

of 1991

witnessed the

disintegration

of two

multi-

national

Communist

federal states with a

comparable

history

of

indig-

enous revolutions and similar, if not entirely equivalent, policies on

nationalities.

Both

in

the Soviet

Union

and

in

Yugoslavia,

the

collapse

of

the state was

largely

caused

by

the

increasingly

vocal demands

for

autonomy, sovereignty,

or

outright

independence

on the

part

of

repub-

lics

opposed

to the

federal

center,

and

the

inability

of the

latter

to con-

tain

the

process

of

disintegration.

In

both

cases,

the

long-term

causes

of

disintegration

can be

attributed

to

the unintended

consequences

of

Communist

policy

on

nationalities

that contributed

to

the

process

of

nation-building, especially among

the

peripheral

nations

with a hit-

herto

weak

or

not

fully

developed

national

consciousness.2

The

deceptive similarity

of

outcomes in

the

two

cases, however,

hides

an

important

anomaly.

The

remarkable

victory

of the

Russian

demo-

cratic

movement

in

August

1991

against

the coalition

of

empire-

savers, 3

embodied

in

coercive

state

institutions,

conservative

party

structures,

and

the

military-industrial

complex, strongly

contrasts with

the

success of

the

equivalent

Communist-nationalist coalition

in

Serbia

in

mobilizing

the grievances of Serbian minorities in Croatia and

Bosnia,

and

rallying

officers

of

the

Yugoslav

army

for

the cause of state

preservation.

Theory

and

Society

25:

763-801,

1996.

? 1996

Kluwer

Academic

Publishers.

Printed in

the

Netherlands.



764

To

be

sure,

neither the

triumph

of

Russian

democracy,

tainted

by

numerous problems since 1991, nor the perpetuation of an authoritar-

ian

Serbian

regime

is

a conclusive

development.

The

relative

success

of

Vladimir

Zhirinovsky

as

well as

the

revived

Russian Communist

Party

in

the December 1993 and 1995 elections

points

to the

presence

of

a

possibly

restorationist

and,

at least

partially, imperialist

con-

stituency

in

the Russian heartland.

Nor

can the

possibility

be excluded

that

a

change

of

regime

will

occur

in

Serbia,

bringing

the defeated

democratic

opposition

into

power.

Nevertheless,

the difference

in

outcomes is

sufficiently

striking

to

require

explanation.

The

peaceful disintegration

of the Soviet

state,

for-

mally

dissolved

with

the

support

of

Russian

president

Boris Yeltsin

in

December

1991,

can

be seen as

a decisive watershed

making

the Rus-

sian

outcome

qualitatively

different from its Serbian

counterpart.

Whereas

the Serbian

regime

never

formally recognized

the existence

of

the Croatian

and Bosnian

states within

the administrative

republican

boundaries drawn

by

the Communist

regime

after the

war,

Russia's

recognition

of

Ukraine,

Belorus,

and Kazakhstan

within

pre-existing

boundaries

has

effectively

turned

the borders between

Soviet

republics

into

those of

internationally recognized

states.

Consequently,

while

the

Yugoslav

conflict

could

be

interpreted,

at

least

partially

and

in

its

ori-

gins

as a

civil

war,

any

attempt

by

a

prospective

restorationist

Russian

regime

to assume

a

more

aggressive

stance

in

defense

of its co-nation-

als

in

the

so-called

near

abroad

will

inevitably

assume

the

character

of international

aggression.

The

element

of

legal

and

political

discontinuity

between the

Soviet

Union

and

a

hypothetical

Russian

restorationist

state is

likely

to

prove

to

be

one

of the

decisive

constraining

factors

facing

the

com-

munist-nationalist

coalition,

even

if

it succeeds

in

coming

to

power.

In

addition,

any

new

development

that

would make

the Russian

case

qualitatively

more

similar

to its Serbian

counterpart,

would

have to

take

place

within

the

context

of a

formally

democratic

regime.

Consequent-

ly,

the institutional continuity enjoyed by Milosevic's ruling Socialist

Party

as

well as

the

army

and

federal

government

institutions

in

Serbia

would

be

lacking

in the

Russian

case. Such

considerations

are

impor-

tant

enough

to

justify

the

choice

of

1991 as

an end

point

for the

pur-

poses

of

comparative

analysis.4

My

main

goal

in this

article,

therefore,

is to isolate

some

of

the

causes

for the

different

reactions

of

the

dominant

nations

-

Russians

and



765

Serbs

-

to the

disintegration

of the

larger

state.

Although

I

primarily

concentrate on the reasons for the emergence of different kinds of

homeland

politics

in

the two

nations,

I

also

emphasize

the

signifi-

cance of the historical role of

diaspora

communities

in

explaining

dif-

ferent

patterns

of nationalist

mobilization.5

The

comparative

analysis-

that follows is

informed

by

Max

Weber's

writings

on

the

nation,

nationalism,

and

imperialism.

I

argue

that

the

overlap

between nationalist and

imperialist

constituencies charac-

teristic of

dominant

nations

in

multinational states makes

Weber's

ideas

particularly appropriate

in

explaining

the

defensive

political

coalitions

that

emerged

in

Russia and Serbia

during

the

mid-1980s.

Consequently,

a related aim

in

this article is to revive an

interest

in

Max

Weber's discussion

of

nations and nationalism.

Max

Weber on

nations,

nationalism,

and

imperialism

Max Weber's discussion

of

nations,

nationalism,

and

imperialism

has

not been

consistently applied

in

empirical explanations

of

nationalist

mobilization. Nor have his

scattered remarks on

the

topic

in

Economy

and

Society

exerted the

kind

of

theoretical

influence

of

his

short

essay

on

Class,

Status,

and

Party

that has

dominated our

thinking

about

social

stratification

throughout

the

post-war

period.6

Instead,

essays

and books on

Weber as

a

political

thinker

and

an

ideologist

of

German

Machtpolitik

outnumber

by

far

those studies

that

attempt

to

apply

his

ideas on nationalism to

empirical

explanation.

Raymond

Aron,

Wolf-

gang

Mommsen,

and

David Beetham

have

particularly

contributed to

the latter.7

More

recently,

and

along

the same

lines,

Roman

Szporluk

has

suggested

that Weber

should be

considered

the

foremost

ideologist

of

nationalism of

the

contemporary

epoch.8

Weber's

theoretical ideas

on

nations and

nationalism,

however,

are

not

only

interesting

in

themselves,

but are

particularly

appropriate

for an

analysis of the two cases at hand. As will become clear, one reason for

this

lies

in

the

specific position

occupied by

nations

that

find them-

selves in a

central,

if

not

necessarily

dominant

position

in

multi-

national

states.

According

to

Weber,9

the

concepts

of

ethnic

group

and

national

cannot

be

unambiguously

defined in

terms

of some

empirical

trait

shared

by

their

members.

Objective

markers

of

social

differentiation such

as



766

language,

religion,

common

descent,

and even

physically

observable

differences can all serve as a basis for status differentiation along ethnic

as

well as

national lines.

However,

if

the

subjective

belief

in

common

descent

is

necessary

for

the

constitution

of ethnic

groups

as

status

groups, '

the same is not

necessarily

true

of

nations. Even if

ethnic

self-

identification

frequently

serves as

a basis of

national

identity

as

well,

the

latter

varies with historical

circumstances,

which

are often

highly

contingent.

Thus,

the

absence of common

descent, language,

or

religion

did not

prevent

the

emergence

of

a distinct sense of

Swiss

nationhood. On the

other

hand,

the

presence

of common

descent does not

automatically

lead to

a

sense

of

nationhood,

as is the

case with

German-speaking

Alsatians

who,

on

the

whole,

feel a

greater allegiance

to

France than to

Germany.

In

the

case

of

Alsatians,

the elements of

shared culture and

the

prestige

of

French civilization

override the

significance

of

linguistic

community.

Even more

importantly, according

to

Weber,

shared

his-

torical

experience

or common

political

destiny ;namely

the Alsatians'

identification

of

France

with a

revolutionary

regime

that

abolished

odious

feudal

privileges helps

explain

their

national

allegiance.

Ob-

viously,

the ethnic

and

linguistic affinity

of

Serbs

and Croats

did

little

to

obliterate the

significance

of

religious

and

national differences between

them.

In this

case,

neither

common

descent

nor

the existence

of

a

shared

linguistic

community

is

enough

to foster

a

feeling

of

national

solidarity;1'

instead,

religion

has served as a marker of

status

differen-

tiation

along

national

lines,

a

differentiation,

however,

which

is

primar-

ily

political

in character.'2

Weber's first

idea,

therefore,

is that a sense

of

national

solidarity

is,

more

often than

not,

based

on

particular

historical

experiences.

These

historical

experiences

are

first and

foremost

political

in

nature. Natu-

rally,

such

political

experiences

are

subject

to

interpretation

and

change

over

time, and,

moreover,

the

interpretations

vary

across national

po-

litical

spectrums

at

any given

point

in time

as

well. For this

reason,

nationalism is always inthe making,' a field of contested and contest-

able

possibilities,

constantly

remade

by ideologists

and

politicians.

Nevertheless,

there

is

one

simple

test

of

the

strength

of

subjective

feel-

ings

of national

solidarity

on the basis

of

historical

experiences

that

is

especially

relevant

for

the

discussion

of

the

two

cases

at hand.

This

is

the

willingness

of

the

members

of one national

group

to

serve in

the

army

of a

state

largely

dominated

by

members

of

another.

Weber

him-



767

self noted the relevance

of

this

criterion,

when

he contrasted the

strik-

ing identification of immigrant Germans with the United States to the

unreadiness

of

diaspora

Serbs

from

Austro-Hungary

to serve the

larger

imperial

interest.

Apparently,

Germans

in

the United

States

had

come

to feel as

part

of

the American nation

and

were

willing

to

serve,

how-

ever

reluctantly,

in an

army

that

confronted their

ethnic

brethren

from

Germany;

in

contrast,

the

solidarity

of

diaspora

Serbs

with

Serbs

from Serbia was

stronger

than

their

identification with the

empire.13

A corresponding contemporary example of great relevance for our two

cases can

serve

as another

illustration

of

the same

observation.

The

surprising

ease with

which

ethnic Russian

army

officers

swore

alle-

giance

to

the

Ukrainian

army strongly

contrasts

with the behavior of

the

majority

of Serbian

officers

in

Croatia and

Bosnia,

almost none

of

whom endorsed

the new

states. Once

again,

the

reasons

for this

minority

stance

are to be

found

in

historical

experience:

given

the

legacy

of the

Second World War

and the

extreme

nationalizing

thrust

of

the Croatian

regime,

a Serbian

officer had

no

reason to believe that

his

presence

in

the

ranks

of

the

Croatian

army

was

in

the least

accept-

able,

let alone

desirable.14

Moreover,

for

reasons

I

elaborate

later,

the

solidarity

of the

Serbian

officer from

Croatia with Serbs

from

Ser-

bia,

as well as his

allegiance

to the

Yugoslav

state

was

stronger

than

any

feeling

of

attachment to

Croatia.

Both

the

historical

experience

and the

contemporary

situation

were,

however,

different

for

a

Russian officer

serving

in

Ukraine.

Neither for

historical,

nor

contextual

reasons,

did a

Russian officer need to feel

threatened

by

the

prospect

of an

independent

Ukrainian

state

at the

moment of

separation.

Under

these

conditions,

economic

and social

considerations

predominated

at

the

expense

of

national

solidarity

with

the

external

national

homeland,

Russia.15

These

examples

should

suffice to

illustrate

the

usefulness of

Weber's

idea

of

the

significance

of

historical

and

political

experiences

in

accounting

for

feelings

of national

solidarity.

They

also lead us to

Weber's

second

relevant

observation,

the

idea

that national

solidarity

is

always

a

manifestation of

a

pattern

of

interaction

with

other

groups (I

would

add that

this is

especially

the

case when

these

groups

are

per-

ceived as

historical

or

potential

enemies).

For

this

reason

national

identity

is

always

partially

negative

n

character.



768

Indeed,

as

Weber

writes,

the

concept

of the nation

nd

the sense

of

nationalitys highlyambiguous:t alwaysrefersto a specific entiment

of

solidarity

n

the face

of other

groups.

As

such,

Weber

added,

the

concept

of the nation

belongs

o

the

sphere

of

values

and is

closely

tied to

feelings

of

prestige. '6

Furthermore,

his

specific

sentiment

manifests

tself

in

attempts

o

form

a common state.As

states are

politi-

cal

communities

defined

by

their

monopoly

of

legitimate

violence

over

given

territories,

national

(as

opposed

to ethnic or

racial)

conflicts

almost

always

ake the

form

of

struggles

over

territory.

But the

concepts

of nation

nd state

n

Weber's

hought,

as David

Beetham

has

lucidly pointed

out,

do not

operate

on

the

same

plane

of

sociological

reality.

Whereas the existence

of

a nation

s

predicated

upon

feelings

of cultural

solidarity

hat

are reinforced

by

common

his-

torical

and

political

experiences,

he state

is anassociation

developed

consciously

for

specific

purposes.

Consequently,

the

nation s

a

community

of

affective

ies,

i.e.,

a

Gemeinschaft;

he

state,

n

contrast,

s

a

political

association,

a

Gesellschaft.17

t was the

fusion

of the

two

sociological

realitiesof cultural

solidarity

and

political

associationthat

gave

birth

to the

modern

nation-state.

Under

modern

conditions,

thought

Weber,

he

striving

or

political power

on

the

basis

of

a

shared

culture was

central

to the

notion of the

nation.'8

It

was

precisely

this

pretension

to

political

power

that

gave

the

status of national

commu-

nities

to such

relatively

small

anguage

groups

such

as

the

Hungar-

ians,

Greeks,

or

Czechs.19

But the communal-affective, ational-cultural oundation of the

modern

state

also accounted

for the

superiority

of

modem nation-

states

to

traditional

mpires

n the

face

of

adversity:

What

then

is the

realpolitisch

significance

of

Kultur?

...

The

war

has

power-

fully

increased

the

prestige

of the state:

'The

state,

not the

nation,'

runs

the

cry.

Is this

right?

Consider

the

fundamental

difficulty

confronting

Austrian

officers,

which

stems

from

the fact

that

the

officer has

only

some

fifty

Ger-

man

words

of command

in common

with

his men.

How

will he

get

on

with

his company in the trenches? What will he do when something unforeseen

happens,

that

is

not covered

by

this

vocabulary?

What

in the event

of

a

defeat?

Take a

look

further

east at

the

Russian

army,

the

largest

in the

world;

two

million

men taken

captive

speak

louder

than

any

words that the state

can

certainly

achieve

a

great

deal,

but

that it

does not have

the

power

to

compel

the

free

allegiance

of

the

individual....20

Weber's

distinction

between

the

mobilization

capacity

of

imperial

states

and

that

of the

modern

nation-state

s

of

particular

elevance

or



769

an

understanding

f

the differencebetween

the

two

cases

analyzed

n

this article. To anticipatethe argument,the existence of a Serbian

nation-state

prior

to

the

formation

of

the

larger

multinational

state

strongly

contrasts

with

the fusion of

national and

imperial

identities

under

both

the

Tsarist

Russian

and,

in a

different

way,

the

Soviet

regime.

The

greater

mobilization

power

of

contemporary

Serbian

nationalism

n

comparison

to

its

Russian

counterpart

s

partially

ex-

plicable

n

termsof this

key

difference

n

historical

egacies.

It would not

be

too

difficultto

demonstrate hat Weber'sdefinitionof

the nation as a

cultural

community

of

shared memories

and

a

common

political

destiny, striving

or

prestige

and

territorial

political power,

could

serve us well in

interpreting

national conflicts

within select

historical

contexts

and,

perhaps,

as a source

of further

hypotheses

about the

like-

lihood of such

conflicts

elsewhere.

Thus,

the

differentialdistribution

f

prestige

and

power

between

Serbs

and Albanians

has served as the

basis

of

ethnic

and

national

conflict in

the

Yugoslavregion

of

Kosovo.

On both

sides,

painful

historical

memories,

dating

at

least to

the end of

thenineteenth

century,

werereinforced

by

a constant

process

of status-

reversal

and

conflict

over a

shared

erritory.

This

never-ending ycle

of

status-reversal

an

be

briefly

summarized

s

follows:Moslem

(not

Catholic

or

Orthodox)

Albanianswere the

privi-

leged

group

under

the

Ottoman

empire

(at

least relative

to Orthodox

Serbs);

Serbs

came

out

on

top

after

the

Balkan

wars

(1912-1913)

and the

formationof

Yugoslavia

1918);

the

status/powerrelationship

changedin World WarTwo when Kosovo became a partof greater

Albania

under

Italian

sponsorship;

n

1945,

the Serbs

took

over,

albeit under

the

auspices

of

communist

Yugoslavia

and

in

the

name

of

brotherhood

and

unity ;

after

Kosovo

became a

fully

autonomous

region (1974),

high

Albanian

birth

rates

and

the

gradual

Albanianiza-

tion of

the

party

once

more

raised

the

painful

specter

of

status-

reversal

(for

Serbs);

with

the

advent

of

Milosevi6

to

power,

Serbs

emerged

as

the

dominant

tatus

group

for

the

third

ime

in

this

century.

In

each

of

these

cases,

the

process

of

status-reversal

was

accompanied

by

a

revivalof

unpleasant

memories

as well

as

actual

nstancesof

per-

secution

that

further

reinforced

hem.

At

the same

time,

all the

markers

of

status-differentiation

long

ethnic or

national lines were

present,

including

physically

observable

differences. The

superimposition

of

physical,

religious,

and

linguistic

markers of

status

differentiation,

accompanied

by

a

constant

process

of

status/power

reversal,

which



770

revived

negative

historical

memories,

cemented

the

solidarity

of

each

group as a community of political destiny.

Although

this

necessarily

brief

analysis

of

some

of

the

main reasons

for

the

protracted

conflict

between Serbs and

Albanians

in

Kosovo

goes

well

beyond

Weber's

own

exposition,

it

is

not

only

consistent with his

definition

of

the

nation,

but also

logically

derivative from his frame-

work.

Undoubtedly,

other conflicts

in

the

post-Yugoslav

or

post-Soviet

space

could be

analyzed

with the same

considerations

in

mind.2

These

preliminary

observations,

of

course,

do

not exhaust Weber's

view on the

nation.

Nationalism

-

a

political

claim based on

feelings

of

prestige

and

cultural

solidarity

felt

by

members of a

nation

-

has

a

differential

appeal

among

social strata. Since the idea of the nation

is

based

on

considerations

about the

uniqueness

of

national culture and

prestige,

it

is

only

natural

that

the

Kulturtrager

will

play

a

special

role

in

the formation

of

nationalist

ideologies.22

The

important

role of

the

Ser-

bian

Academy

of

Sciences

and the Russian Union

of

Writers,

of the

writer Dobrica Cosic

in

Serbia and

the world-renowned mathematician

Igor

Shafarevich

in

Russia

in the formation

of

nationalist

world

views,

should come as

no

surprise

in

this context: all

the more so because

in

this

part

of

the

world the

intellectual,

the

writer,

and

the

poet

appeared

as the true conscience

of

the

nation

in

the absence

of

strong

indig-

enous

bourgeois

classes.23

But if nationalist

ideologies

are

largely

the

work

of

intellectuals,

nation-

alism has a far broader

appeal.

When it comes to

feelings

of

prestige,

ethnic

honor,

writes

Weber,

appears

to

be

the

only

form

of

status

superiority

available

to the

masses

at

large

(Weber

adds:

under

modern

conditions ):

The

sense

of ethnic

honor

is

a

specific

honor

of

the

masses,

for

it is

acces-

sible

to

anybody

who

belongs

to the

subjectively

believed

community

of

descent.

The

poor

white

trash,

i.e.,

the

propertyless

and,

in the absence

of

job opportunities, very

often destitute

white inhabitants of the

southern

states

of the United

States

of America

in the

period

of

slavery,

were

the

actual

bearers

of racial

antipathy,

which

was

quite foreign

to the

planters.

This was

so because

the

social

honor

of

the

poor

whites was

dependent

on

the social

declassement

of

the

Negroes.24

A

few

examples

from

the

Yugoslav

civil war

can serve

to

illustrate

the

usefulness

of

Weber's

observation.

One

glance

at the

backward

moun-

tainous

areas

of the Serbian

Krajina

in

Croatia,

or

the

rocky

landscape



771

of Croatian

Herzegovina

can

help

us

understand

why

national

war

can

be such an attractive prospect in these regions: for the absence of eco-

nomic

opportunities

and

the

traditionally

low

peacetime

status

of

poor

villagers

makes the belief in

the

superior

Croatian

or Serbian

way

of

life one

of

the few

available sources of

prestige

in

which

everyone

can

partake.25

Not

surprisingly,

it is from

these

desolate,

ethnically

intermixed

areas,

with

strong

rural

traditions

and

historical memories that

the

fiercest

Serbian and Croatian volunteers in the Yugoslav war have been recruit-

ed.26

Herzegovina

offers

a classic

case of

the

superimposition

of

con-

flicts:

negative

historical

experiences

(inter-ethnic

warfare and

exter-

mination

in

World War

Two)

contribute

to the sense

of

ethnic threat

(fear

of a

repetition),

which,

in

the

absence

of

any compensatory

mechanism

(economic

prosperity,

prestige)

turn the

' nation

nto

a

unique

source

of

pride

and

status.27

The

feeling

of

ressentiment

caused

by

low

peacetime

status also

expresses

itself

in

a

revengeful

attitude

towards urban

dwellers,

and in

some

cases,

the

city

as a

symbol

of

modernity

as

well.28

The

importance

of

prestige

considerations,

however,

is

not limited to

these

regions

of

Yugoslavia

alone:

many

poor

urbanites,

some

of

them

ordinary

criminals,

for

example,

have

become

national heroes

in

the

current

Yugoslav

war.

Proud to

be a

Serb,

Croat,

or

Moslem,

as it

goes,

regardless

of

social status. It

is

for

such

reasons

that nationalism

is

a

democratic

force,

able to

cut

across

class lines too

easily,

regardless

of more mundane

considerations.

War,

and

especially

one

fought

in

the

name of

the

nation,

is

profoundly

democratic in

this

sense: it can do

wonders

for

one's

status,

especially

since it

inverts

traditional,

peace-

time

social

hierarchies.29

This

observation can

be

independently

confirmed

in

the

Russian

case

as well.

It is

enough

to

take

a look

at the

shock-troops

of

Vice-Presi-

dent

Rutskoi

during

the

October

1993

crisis,

the

people

who

so

des-

perately stormed the Moscow City Hall and the main television tower,

and later

attempted

to

resist

President

Yeltsin's

paratroopers,

defending

the

Constitution.

The

social

base

of

this

right-wing

coalition

consist-

ed of

young

male

volunteers from

the

Transnistrian

diaspora,

declasse

policemen

and

officers,

fascists

recruited

from

working-class

toughs,

neo-Stalinist

pensioners,

and the

lumpen-proletariat.3

As

for

the

intel-

lectuals,

they preferred

to

write

about it in

right-wing

dailies

and week-

lies,

or

at

best

watch

it

all

from

inside the

parliament

building

under



772

siege.

With

little

to

lose and

much

to

gain,

these volunteers

were not

driven by their love for Vice-President Rutskoi, but rather by their

belief

in

the

superior

Soviet

or

Russian

way

of

life:

battle on

the field

of

honor is

how

Aleksandr

Barkashov,

the leader

of

the

Russian

National

Unity, openly

fascist,

paramilitary group

called

it,

after

many

of

his

men lost their

lives

in

the

Russian White House.31

But

such

intellectuals,

peasants,

and threatened

ethnic

diasporas

alone

do not

produce

national

conflicts

or wars. When it comes

to the raison

d'etat,

as

Weber

reminds

us,

it is

military officers,

civil

servants,

and

politicians

whose sinecures and

prestige depend

on the

perpetuation

of

state

power:

Feudal

lords,

like modern

officers

or

bureaucrats,

are

the natural

and

pri-

mary exponents

of this

desire for

power-oriented

prestige

for

one's own

political

structure.

Power to their

political

community

means

power

for

themselves,

as

well

as the

prestige

based on this

power....

The

prestige

of

power

means

in

practice

the

glory

of

power

over other

communities;

it

means

the

expansion

of

power,

though

not

always by

way

of

incorporation

or

subjection.

The

big political

communities

are

the

natural

exponents

of such

pretensions

to

prestige.3

Naturally,

Weber's

observation

first

and

foremost

applies

to

great

power

nationalism

and

is,

for

this

reason,

particularly

appropriate

in

the

Russian

case.

Nevertheless,

in

both the

Russian

and

Serbian

con-

texts,

army

officers

and other

representatives

of

coercive

state

institu-

tions

(police,

secret

services),

and the

remnants

of

Party

and

federal

nomenklatura structures have formed the core of imperial or statist

as

opposed

to

purely

nationalist

constituencies.

The most

typical

example

of such

an

imperial

constituency

was

the

Soiuz

(Union)

group

of

deputies

in the

former

Soviet

parliament.

Led

by

several

army

officers

of

mixed

ethnic

background

and

from

the

peripheral

republics

(Baltic

states,

Moldova,

Kazakhstan),

Soiuz

placed

the

preservation

of

the Soviet

Union

as a

great

power

above the

cause

of all national

par-

ticularisms,

including

the

more

isolationist

or ethnic

brands

of

Rus-

sian nationalism.33

Finally,

as

far

as

broader

social

strata

without

a

vested

interest

in

nationalism

are

concerned,

Weber's

pessimistic

conclusion

about

the

ease

with

which

they

can

be

mobilized

for

imperialist

goals

unfor-

tunately rings

true

in view

of the

frightening

example

of

the

Yugoslav

war:



773

Experience

shows that

the

pacifist

interests of

petty bourgeois

and

proletar-

ian strata

very

often

and

very easily

fail. This

is

partly

because

of

the

easier

accessibility

of

all

unorganized

masses

to emotional influences

and

partly

because

of the definite notion

(which

they

entertain)

of some

unexpected

opportunity

somehow

arising through

war.... The

masses as

such,

at least

in

their

subjective

conception

and in

the extreme

case

have

nothing

to lose

but

their

lives.

The

valuation

and

effect

of this

danger stongly

fluctuates

in

their

own

minds. On the

whole,

it can be

easily

reduced to zero

through

emotional

influence.34

The

remarkable

frivolity

with

which

masses

of

Serbs and

Croats

have

rushed

to

meaningless

(or

alternatively

meaningful )

deaths

is

more

readily

understood

when

the

relentless war

propaganda campaigns

car-

ried out

by

the

state-owned

media

in

the two

republics

are taken

into

account.

However,

the

attractiveness of

war

booty

(the

widespread

practice

of the

acquisition

of

goods

from

the homes of

refugees)

as

well as

the

status

considerations

mentioned

above

should also be taken

into

account in

explaining

the

availability

of

masses for

nationalist

mobilization.

With this

Weberian

framework in

mind,

let

me now

return to the

main

empirical question:

why

was a

nationalist

authoritarian

regime

able

take

power

in

Serbia,

surviving

the

downfall of

Communism,

the

disintegra-

tion of

the

state,

and

the

pressure

of

the

whole

international commu-

nity?

Why

was

this

regime

so

successful in

mobilizing

the

grievances

of

Serbian

minorities in

Croatia

and

Bosnia?

What,

in

contrast,

explains

the

ascendance

of

a

generally

pro-Western

and

democratic

regime

in

Russia and the

peaceful

disintegration

of the Soviet state

roughly

along

the

borders of

former

republics?

Imperial

versus

dominant

nation: A

comparison

of

historical

legacies

in

Russia

and

Serbia

It is

imperative,

however,

first

to

consider

some

of

the

important

simi-

larities in the relative positions of Russians and Serbs with respect to

other

nations

within

the

larger

Soviet

and

Yugoslav

contexts. In

multi-

national

contexts,

dominant

nations

occupy

a

unique

position,

form-

ing

the

founding

block of

the

larger

state. In

both

the

Soviet

and

Yugo-

slav

cases,

the

political

center

of

the

federal

state

coincided

with the

traditional

seat of

authority

of

the

dominant

national

group.

Whether

in

terms of

numbers,

military

power,

or

historical

prestige,

Russians

and

Serbs

occupied

a

special

position

vis-h-vis

other

nations in

the



774

polity, including

those

who

could

hardly

be

considered

peripheral

n

a meaningful sense.35

Historically,

both Russians

and

Serbs have

played

a

special

role in

the

process

of

unification,

achieved

either

in

the context of liberation wars

(Serbia),

or

centuries-long

military conquest

(Russia).

This heroic

tradition is

reflected in what

could

be

called the

special

social

psychol-

ogy

of dominant nations: their sense

of

historical

mission,

the em-

phasis

on

military

valor

and their

special

role in

the

state-building

process,

as

well as in

any

situation

of

grave

state

crisis,

for

example

the

Second World

War. As the Soviet-Russian communist anthem

puts

it:

The indestructible

union

of free

republics

was

united

forever

by

Great

Rus. Not

accidentally,

at the

turn of

the

century,

the

role

of

Serbia

in

Yugoslav

unification

was

compared

to

that of

Piedmont

in

Italy,

or

Prussia

in

Germany,

however

inappropriate

the

analogy might

seem

from our

vantage

point.3'

The

unique

position

of

state-building peoples

in

multinational

contexts

makes

for their

strong

attachment

to

the state and

a

willingness

to

adopt

a state-wide

identity.

Although

this

state-wide

identity partially

overlaps

with the narrower

national

self-identification

of

the

dominant

group,

it

is not

just

a

simple

extension

of the

latter,

nor is

it coterminous

with

it

(Yugoslav-Serbian;

Soviet-Russian;

Spanish-Castillian).37

Typi-

cally,

the

willingness

of dominant

national

groups

to

identify

with

the

larger

state

is

accompanied

by

a

rejection

of

narrower

particularist

goals

and

aspirations.

This assimilation

or even dissolution

of

the

dominant national

group

into a state-wide identity is not perceived as a

threat,

because

the

larger

state satisfies

the more

limited nationalist

goal

of

ethnic

or

cultural

unification.

Thus

all Serbs could

have

been united

either

in

a

greater

Serbia,

or

in

Yugoslavia.

But

once

united

in

Yugoslavia,

they

identified

with the

larger

state,

often

suppressing

their

narrower

nationalism.35

It

comes as no

surprise

that

the

identifi-

cation

of Serbs

with

Yugoslavia,

and Russians

with

the

empire

or the

Soviet

Union,

was

much

stronger

than

among

the other

nationalities.

What

this

leads

to

is a

simple,

but

highly

relevant

observation.

In

multi-

national

contexts,

dominant

nations

have

no

reason to

develop

a

par-

ticullarist

political

nationalism

of

their

own. Both in the Soviet

Union

and

Yugoslavia,

Russian

and

Serbian

nationalism

developed

largely

as

a reaction

to

peripheral

nationalist

movements

threatening

the

larger

state.

Once

the

superior

status

of the dominant national

group

comes

into

question,

the

stage

is set

for the

reemergence

of

particularist

claims.



775

Initially,

these

particularist

claims take the

form

of

defensive

postures,

and reflect a disappointment with the ingratitude of smaller national-

ities

or the ineffectiveness

of the

larger

state

in

containing

secessionist

claims.

An

interesting

illustration

of

this

defensive

stance

characteristic

of

dominant nations

under threat is the

speech

of the

well-known

writer Valentin

Rasputin

to

the First

Congress

of

People's Deputies

in

1989:

Russophobia

is

spreading

in

the

Baltics,

in

Georgia,

and is

making

its

way

into other

republics

as

well

....

Anti-Soviet

slogans

are

accompanied

by

anti-

Russian ones:.... Perhaps Russia should leave the Union, if you accuse her

for all

your

difficulties,

if

its

poor

level

of

development

and

awkwardness

make

your

progressive aspirations

more

difficult to achieve?

Maybe

that

would be

better?

By

the

way,

this

would

help

us solve a lot of

our

problems

in

the

present

as

well as

the

future.39

There is a

striking

parallel

between

Rasputin's

and Shafarevich's ressen-

tinzen

toward the

nationalism

of

peripheral

nationalities,

and

their

condemnation of

Russophobia

and the

underlying

mood

expressed

in the

following

excerpt

from the Memorandum of the Serbian Acad-

emy

of

Sciences,

the

key

document

of

a

reemerging

Serbian

particu-

larism

in

the

1980s:

It is first

and

foremost

a

question

of

the Serbian

people

and its state. The

nation

which had

achieved

statehood

after a

prolonged

and

bloody struggle,

had

created a

parliamentary

democracy

on

its

own,

and which

in

the

last

two

wars

lost 2.5

million

compatriots,

is

the

only

one which has been

deprived

of

its own

state

by a

party

apparat

committee after

four decades

in

the

new

Yugoslavia. A worse historical defeat in peacetime can hardly be imagined.4'

Not

surprisingly,

the

authors

of

the

Memorandum

used the

equiva-

lent

term

Serbophobia

to

describe

the

attitude of

peripheral

national-

ities

toward the

Serbian

nation,

condemned

secessionist

trends,

and

argued

for

the

recentralization of

the

weakened

Yugoslav

state. Much

like

Rasputin

and

some

of

their

other

Russian

counterparts,

however,

they

left

open

the

possibility

of

Serbian

secession from

Yugoslavia

unless these conditions were met, naturally within the historical bor-

ders of

the

nation.

Under

conditions

of

increasing

ethnic

polarization,

however,

these ini-

tially

defensive

stances

are

replaced

with

more

aggressive postures.

When

the

legitimacy

crisis of

the

state

and

the sense of

ethnic

threat

reach

a

peak,

the

political

space

is

open

for the

emergence

of

new

types

of

coalitions

that

span

the

traditional

left-right spectrum.

Conserva-



776

tive

party

officials at first

eager

to defend

Communist

orthodoxy

find

a

substitute class enemy in peripheral national groups dismembering the

larger

state,

an

ideological

development

that leads to a

gradual

en-

dorsement of

what

are more

typically

seen as

right-wing

values such

as extreme

nationalism,

imperialism

(statism),

and

anti-Semitism

(in

the Russian

case).41

Army

and state

security

officers threatened

by

reforms,

peripheral

nationalisms,

loss

of

territory,

and

prestige jump

to

the

defense of

state

borders

or

super-power

status.

They

are

joined by

nationalist intellectuals

of

the dominant nation

opposed

to state

disintegration

on

completely

different

grounds, i.e., particularist

na-

tionalism.

It

is

this

overlap

of

imperial

(statist)

and nationalist

constitu-

encies

among

dominant

nations

in

multinational

states that makes

Weber's framework

particularly

useful

for

explaining

the

types

of

po-

litical coalitions that

emerged

in

Russia and Serbia

(it

is

impossible

to

imagine

the same

constellation

of

forces

in

Croatia

or

Ukraine,

for

example).42

There are a

number

of

other

important

similarities

between Russians

and Serbs

in

terms

of historical

experience,

a historical

affinity

that,

incidentally, helps explain

Russia's reluctance to

support

any

form of

military

intervention

against

Serbia,

regardless

of the

regime

in

power.

The

most

important

ones are Christian

Orthodoxy,

their

struggle

on the

same

side

in both the

First and

Second World

Wars or

the earlier

com-

mon

struggle

against

the

Ottoman

Turks,

Tsarist

attempts

to

enlist the

support

of Balkan

nationalism

for the

larger

imperial

cause,

the ideas

of Pan-Slavism.

Most

importantly,

in

the

present

context,

the

growing

perception

among

Russian

political

elites that the disintegration of

Yugoslavia

was

just

a

small-scale

testing ground

for the

dissolution

of

the

Soviet Union

and

perhaps

Russia

as

well,

all under the

auspices

of

the

new world

order. 43

But

the

differences

between

the two

cases

are

of

equal,

if not

greater

importance.

The most

significant

one

has to

do

with

the

divergent paths

of state

and

nation-building

in Russia and

Serbia.

Russia was first formed as an empire, a multinational civilization of its

own.

Moreover,

unlike

many

other

empires,

the

Russian

one

was

geographically

contiguous,

with the

consequence

that there

was

no

clear

distinction

between

the

metropole

and

the

periphery.

The

overlap

between

the

frontiers

of the

Russian

nation

with state

borders,

the

colonization

of vast

expanses

and the

accompanying

subordination

of

local

populations,

made

for a

strong

identification

of

Russians

with

the

empire,

but

also

for

a weaker

sense

of ethnic

or national

particu-

larism.44



777

To

be

sure,

a

strong

sense of

Russian

cultural

separateness,

of the

spe-

cificityof Russiancivilizationandits institutions,was evidentthrough-

out the nineteenth

century,

its most

characteristic

expression

being

Slavophilism

n

its

many

varietiesand

transformations. ut

the

defense

of one's

own

traditionsand

mores,

andthe

resistance o the

adoption

of

foreign

models,

is

different from

positing

the

question

in

purely

ethnic

erms.

Here,

the

absence of

the

Russian

question

offers

a

most

striking

ontrast o

East-European

nationalisms ike the Polish

or

Serbian

ones,

which

crystallized

n

opposition

to

imperial

domination,

and

sought

to

incorporate

the

fragmented

ethnic elements under

the

roof of

the

emerging

nation-state.The

sense of

Russianness'

there-

fore,

might

have been

imperial

r

cultural ut was

not

sharply

defined n

ethnicterms.45

As Roman

Szporluk

has

written:

As

a

result

of

this

reversal

of

stages

-

the

formation

of an

empire

before the

completion

of

nation-building

-

the

Russians

themselves have

never

been

quite

sure

what

is

Russia

and

what is

not

Russia even

if

it is

under Russian

rule.46

Whilethe

argument

can

easily

be

pushed

to

an

unacceptable

extreme,

it serves to

illustrate

he

crucial

difference

marking

off

Russiannation-

alism from

its

East-European

and,

in

this

case,

Serbian

counterparts:

because ethnic

Russians

were

already

incorporated

nto the

imperial

state,

ideological

Russian

nationalism

lacked

the

necessary

external

impetus

that would

have

inevitably

pushed

it in

an ethnic

direction.

Characteristically,

nlike

the

Serbian

national dea

with its

limited

aim of

marking

he

bordersof

a

prospective

greater

erbia,

he much

morecelebrated Russiandea was

imperial

anduniversalist lmost

by

definition.47

The

relative

ease

with

which

many

non-Russians

became

Russian

by

assimilating

nto

Russian

culture

was

in

line

with these

developments.

Even if

the

possibility

of

cultural

assimilation

was

differentially

distri-

buted

among

the

different

nationalities

for

many,

assimilation o

cul-

tural

Russianness

was

predicated

upon

conversion o

Orthodoxy),

uch

acculturationwas widespread n the empire,reinforcinga non-ethnic

definition

of

Russianness.48

At

different

times,

linguistic

assimilation

served

a

similar

purpose,

despite

the

fact

that the

distinction

between

Russians

russkie)

and

Russian-speakers

russkoiazychnie)

till

enables us

to

differentiate

between

ethnic

and

linguistic-cultural

ussianness.49

However,

the

sociologically

decisive

point

is

that

the

distinction is

not

necessarily



778

perceived

as

a

practically

relevant one

by many

Russians.

As

frequently

as not, the subjective belief in common descent is a less important

criterion of

membership

than

participation

in

the

linguistically

and

cul-

turally

defined national

community.

Strikingly,

even

some

contemporary

extreme

right-wing

nationalist

parties

shy away

from

defining

Russian

in

an ethnic

sense,

despite

their

explicit

ideological

commitment

to

defending

ethnic Russians

(russkie)

in

the near-abroad.

Thus,

for Russkii

Natsionalnyi

Sobor,

an

extreme right-wing organization

led

by

former KGB

major-general

Aleksandr

Sterligov:

Russian

is

neither

a

racial,

nor a

genetic,

but

rather

a cultural-historical

notion.

Russians

are all those

who

accept

and defend

Russian

values,

the

uniqueness

and

distinctive

character

of Russian statehood

as a union

of

many peoples,

in which the 82% of ethnic

Russians

play

a

cementing

role.5

In

this

view,

Russians

obviously play

the first

violin,

but

Russia

is not

for Russians

alone.

The

nation-building

process

in

imperial

Russia was

further

hindered

by

internal

developments.

The

patrimonial

features

of

the old

order,

manifested

in

the wide

gulf

separating

state

and

society

and even

the

intelligentsia

from

the

people,

inhibited

the

process

of

nation-building

in

the

Russian

case.

The

partial

extension

of

citizenship

in the short

period

between

the revolutions

of 1905 and

1917 could

not

fully

compensate

for these

trends.51

As Hans

Rogger

has

written,

the

troubled

relationship

between

ideological

Russian

nationalism

and

the Tsarist

state

was

the

single

most

important

differentiating

mark

of

the Russian

experience:

The dilemma

of

nineteenth-century

Russian

nationalism,

so

defined,

consists

in

this,

that

it could

only

with

difficulty,

if

at

all,

view

the

tsarist

state as

the

embodiment

of

the

national

purpose,

as

the

necessary

instrument

and

expression

of

national

goals

and

values,

while the

state,

for its

part,

looked

upon

every expression

of

nationalism

with

fear and

suspicion.52

Consequently,

the

kind

of

positive

identification

of national

Kultur

with

the state, which Weber posited as the necessary precondition for the

emergence

of the

modern

nation-state,

was

lacking

in the Russian

case.

Paradoxically,

the

process

of

nation-building

was hindered

further

by

the

communist

party-state,

which resurrected

the former

empire

in

a

completely

new

form.

Despite

Lenin's

warnings against

great

Russian

chauvinism,

Russians

again

became

the dominant

nation within

the

empire,

but at

the

staggering

cost

of

losing

many

historical

attributes



779

of

their

identity.

The

suppression

of

Orthodoxy

and

Russian

traditions

under the Soviet regime, not to speak of the devastating legacy of col-

lectivization,

was a

process

as brutal

as

the

persecution

of some

periph-

eral nationalities.

The

most

important

long-term

consequences

of the traumatic

legacy

of

Stalinism, however,

became

apparent

only

with the advent

of

glasnost

and

political

liberalization,

when

it

transpired

that

authentic

(as

op-

posed

to

officially

sponsored)

national

memory

was much

better

repre-

sented

by

the

society

for the

commemoration

of

the

victims

of

Stalin-

ism

(Memorial)

than

by

the

anti-Semitic

chauvinists

of

Memory

(Pamiat').s3

Insofar as the

Russian nation indeed

represented

a

com-

munity

of

shared

memories, therefore,

these

memories

had as much

or

more to

do

with

the

experience

of

political

victimization

at

the hands

of

a totalitarian state

as

with the

officially sponsored pride

in

the historic

achievements

of the

Soviet Union

as

a

great

power.

The

political

significance

of

this

legacy,

however,

was

obscured

for the

longest

time

by

the

incorporation

of

select elements

of

traditional

Rus-

sian nationalism into the

dominant

ideology

of

the

party-state,

a

devel-

opment

that led

observers to

speak

of

Soviet-Russian nationalism

as

the

main

legitimating

formula

of the

Soviet

regime.54

In

fact,

Stalin's

famous dictum

( national

in

form,

socialist

in

content )

applied

to Rus-

sians

as

well

as

others,

despite

the

great

tyrant's

instrumental use

of

nationalist

symbols

and

his

elevation

of the

Russian national

form

above

the

forms of

smaller

nationalities.

Nevertheless,

the

merger

of

Soviet and select Russian national themes in official

ideology per-

formed its function:

by

coopting

elements of

traditional

right-wing

nationalism into the

dominant

world-view,

it hindered the

development

of anti-Soviet

Russian

nationalism

until the

process

of

liberalization

opened

the

political

space

for

the

emergence

of

alternative

ideologies

and,

ultimately,

the

velvet

divorce of

democratic

Russia from

the

Soviet

state.

This Soviet-Russian ideological merger had its institutional counter-

part

in

the

absence of

RSFSR-wide

political

and

cultural

organizations,

from

a

separate

communist

party

to

the

Academy

of

Sciences

and the

media.

The

absence of

national

institutions

graphically

underscored

the

Russians'

dual role in

the

Soviet

Union: at

the same

time

a

domi-

nant

nation

and

one,

in

contrast to

others,

deprived

of its own

venues for

national

expression.

As a

result,

the Russian

Socialist Fed-

erated

Soviet

Republic

was

somewhat of a

residual

category,

a kind of



780

Russian nation-state

by

default.

Moved

by

such

considerations,

self-

professedRussiannationalistsikeSolzhenitsynargued ordismantling

the

empire

in

direct

opposition

to communist

and

right-wing

imperi-

alists

rom

Soiuz

and

other

organizations

of the Soviet-Russian

left-

right

oalition.55

The historical

egacy

was

very

different

n

Serbia.

Historically queezed

between

Austro-Hungary

and Ottoman

Turkey,

Serbs

developed

a

strong

national

consciousness

through

a

long process

of

struggle

with

the

surrounding mpires.

As the Serbian

state

graduallyexpanded

to

incorporate

more

and

more co-nationals

n

its

fold,

the

Serbian

nation-

al

question

ook

ever

sharper

orms.

As Ivo Lederer

has written:

The

elemental act

that

all

throughout

he

nineteenth

entury

he

frontiers

of

the

Serbian tate

did not

coincide

with the boundaries

of the

Serbian

nation

lent

a

galvanic

quality

o the

very

notion of Serbian

nationality

while,

politi-

cally

and

ideologically,

very

Serbian

national

program

perforce

looked

to

changes

n

the

international

tatus

quo.56

Moreover,

the better educated Serbian

diaspora

from the

Habsburg

lands

played

a

special

role

in

the

process

of

national

cultural

revival.57

Later,

at

the

turn

of the

century,

these

Habsburg

Serbs

were instru-

mental

in

forging

anti-imperial

coalitions,

reemerging

as

key propo-

nents

of

the

idea of

Yugoslav

unification.

Finally,

during

World War

Two,

Western

erbs

(from

Croatia

especially,

but

also

from Bosnia

and

Herzegovina)

participated

n

masse

in Tito's

partisan

movement,

playing

an

important

ole

in the

reintegration

f

Yugoslavia

n

the

after-

math of a devastatingcivil war.58Howeverdifferenttheir role might

have

been

at different

times,

diaspora

erbs

continued

to

exert an

influence

in Serbian

and

Yugoslav

politics

disproportionate

o their

numbers.

t

should

be

stressed

that

this

special

role

of the

diaspora

n

the

internal

process

of

Serbian

and

Yugoslav

nation and

state

building

has

no

counterpart

n

the

Russian

case,

and

goes

a

long

way

in

explain-

ing

the

strong

eeling

of

solidarity

between

Serbs

from

Serbia

and their

co-nationals

n Croatia

and

Bosnia.

This outward

and

expansionist

process

of

nation-building

was

accompanied

by

internal

developments

that

favored

the

nation-state

form

in

Serbia

itself.

By

the

turn

of

the

century,

Serbia

emerged

as

a

constitutional

monarchy

with

vibrant

political

parties

that

largely

suc-

ceeded

in

extending

a

sense

of

political

participation

if

not full

citi-

zenship)

to the

peasantry,

despite

illiteracy

and

backwardness

n

the

countryside.59

he

peasants'

sense

of nationhood

was

further

ortified



781

in

the

Balkan wars

of

1912-1913,

as well as the

First

World

War,

which

affected practically every Serbian family and contributed to the sense

of

martyrdom

at

the

hands

of

empires.

Most

importantly,

the

costly

road to

independence

fortified

the nation as a

community

of

shared

memories and a common

political destiny, making

the

cult of

strong

statehood

one of the

defining

elements of Serbian

political

culture.60

However different

in

character

and

outcome,

the

historical

experiences

of

persecution

in

World War Two

further reinforced these

political-

cultural

elements. As two

Western

anthropologists

wrote

in the

conclu-

sion of

an

in-depth study

of a

Serbian

village:

To be a

Serb is

implicitly

to

be

Orthodox,

explicitly

to

celebrate

the slava and

importantly

to

associate oneself with

a heroic tradition of

struggle.

Here

the

covert

linking

of the

Partisan

struggle against

the Germans with earlier

struggles against

the Turks and

later as a

nation-state

against

the

Austrians

and the

Germans

is

of

great

significance.6'

From

the

comparative

point

of

view of

this

study,

the most

important

consequence

of this

legacy

was

that,

in

marked contrast to

Russians,

Serbs

saw

themselves

as

the

ethnic

victims of

alien

empires

and some of

their

proximate

neighbors

as

well,

not

the

political

victims

of

an over-

bearing

state.

For

all these

reasons,

the

merger

of

Serbianism

and

Yugoslavism

was

never

as

great

as

in

the

case of

imperial

or

Russian

and

or

Russian and

Soviet

identities. Even

if

there

was room

for

the

confusion

of

greater

Serbianism and

Yugoslavism

in the inter-war state, the creation of

Yugoslavia

was not

achieved

at the

cost of

blurring

Serbian

national

consciousness.

However,

the link

between

greater

Serbianism and

Yugoslavism

was

decisively

severed

only

in

communist

Yugoslavia.

In

sharp

contrast to

the

official

sponsorship

of

Soviet-Russian nation-

alism,

in

communist

Yugoslavia

Serbo-Yugoslavism

was not to

be,

and

no

toasts were

ever

raised to

the

special

historic role

played by

the

leading Serbian nation. 62 The existence of Serbian institutions in

addition to

federal ones in

post-war

Yugoslavia,

however,

was not

only

a

manifestation of

the

recognition

of

Serbian

particularism

on

the

part

of

the

Communist

regime,

but also

a

sign

that

in

the new

Yugoslavia,

Serbs

would not

be

allowed to

play

the

imperial

glue

role

accorded

to

Russians

in

the

Soviet

Union.

Once

the

prospect

of

Yugoslav

disinte-

gration

had

become

a

reality,

therefore,

Serbs could

fall back on

their

own

strong

sense of

national

identity,

mobilizing

their

energies

for

the

defense

of

greater

Serbian

borders.



782

Explaining

nationalistmobilization

n

Russia and Serbia

The main

argument

made

in

the

preceding

wo sections can

be summa-

rized as follows. As dominant

nations

n

multinational

communist

party-states

with a

comparable

history

of

indigenous

revolutionsand

similar

policies

on

nationalities,

Russians and

Serbs

occupied

struc-

turally

similar,

although

not

equivalent positions.

In

both

cases,

the

prospect

of

state

disintegration

riggered

he

emergence

of

left-right,

statist-nationalist

olitical

coalitions

made

up

of orthodox

party

cadres,

armyofficers,officials fromfederalpartyand statestructures,nation-

alist intellectuals

of the dominant

nation,

and

segments

of

diaspora

populations

threatened

by

the

prospect

of state

disintegration

along

republican

ines.

But the

existence

of

structurally quivalent

lites striv-

ing

to mobilize

for the

cause

of state

preservation

or,

alternatively,

he

narrower nationalist

project

of

incorporating

the

diaspora

into an

enlarged

state

of the

dominant

nation,

was

accompanied

by

the

differ-

ential

availability

f

the

masses

or

statist-nationalist

mobilization

n

the

two cases.63

This differential

availability

f

the

masses

for nationalist

mobilization

has to

be understood

against

he

background

f

long-term

actors,

most

importantly,

he different

historical

egacies

of

state,

and

nation-build-

ing

in

Russia and

Serbia.

These

legacies,

and

the

corresponding

politi-

cal

experiences

and

historical

memories,

were different

n

at least

four

important

espects:

1)

The conflation

of

empire,

state,

and

nation-building

n the Russian

case

blurred

the

boundaries

of

ethnic

Russianness.

The

Russians'

imperial

elf-identification

was

reinforced

by linguistic

and

cultural

definitions

of

Russianness

nd

the

absence

of a

diasporaquestion.

In

contrast,

Serbian

state

and

nation-building

ccurred

n the context

of

opposition

to

imperial

domination

and

with the

goal

of

incorporating

the ethnic

diaspora

nto

the

emerging

nation-state.

The

very

existence

of this

state

prior

to

Yugoslav

unification

ortified

a sense of

Serbian

nationality.

On the ideological evel,the most importantcontrast s the

one

between

the

national

Serbian

dea

and

the universalist

Russian

idea.

2)

The internal

dynamic

of

state-society

relations

was

very

different

n

the two

cases.

The

patrimonial

eatures

of theold

order,

partially

esur-

rected

by

Stalin

n

the

context

of a

totalitarian

tate,

made

for an

at

best

ambivalent

and,

at

worst,

a

negative

dentification

of Russianswith

the



783

state.64

n

contrast,

Serbs

dentified

withboth

the Serbianand

Yugoslav

states n a manifestlypositivemanner.

3)

Different historical

experiences

made

for

very

different

collective

memories

n

the Russian

and Serbian

cases.

The shared

collective

memory

of

most Serbs was one

of

victimization

at the hands

of

em-

pires.

This

memory

was

reinforced

by

the

experience

of ethnic

victimi-

zation

in

World War Two.

In

contrast,

Russians

were the creators

of

empire.

Insofar as a

sense

of

victimization

was involved

in

Russian

nationalself-identification,t was related to the legacyof an overbear-

ing

autocratic

tate,

reinforced

by

the

Stalinist

experience.

Consequent-

ly,

the

subjective

experience

of

victimization

was

political,

not ethnic

in

character.65

4)

The

institutional

arrangements

f

communist federalism

reflected

these differences.

While the

communist

policy

on

nationalities

had

similareffects

insofar

as

most

peripheral

nationalities

were

concerned,

the

treatmentof the

dominant

nation was very different n the two

cases.

In

marked

contrast

to the

Soviet

case,

there was

no

overlap

between

Serbian

and

Yugoslav

nstitutions.

The

existence of

Serbian

cultural

and

political

institutions

not

only

fostered

the

separation

of

Serbian

and

Yugoslav

identities,

but also

created

the

structural

reconditions

or

nationalist

as

opposed

to

pure-

ly statist)

political

mobilization.

Whereas the

Russian

equivalents

of

Milo'sevicwere

hard

pressed

to

create

an

RSFSR-wide

communist

party

in

a

late

effort

to

mobilize

against

the

reformist

coalition

spon-

sored

by

Gorbachev,

the

Serbian

party

leader

had

at his

disposal

a

ready-made

republican

apparatus,

rom

party

and

government

nstitu-

tions to

the

republican

media.

National

self-identifications,

olitical

experiences,

historical

memories,

and

institutional

egacies

create the

long-term

social-structural

and

political-cultural

reconditions

or

different

ypes

of

nationalist

mobili-

zation. Individual nstancesof nationalist

mobilization,

however,

can

only

be

explained

with

reference to

contextual

factors

that

favor the

selective

eactivation

f

elements of

these

historical

and

political-cul-

tural

egacies

on

the

part

of

elites

and

leaders.

It is

not too

difficult

to

demonstrate

that the

contextual

factors

that

favored

nationalist

mobilization

n

the

Serbian

case

largely

fall

under

the

familiar

heading

of

unintended

consequences

of

social

action

n



784

this

case,

of

the

asymmetrical application

of

the

federal

principle.

Alone among the Yugoslav republics, Serbia contained two autono-

mous

provinces,

Kosovo and

Vojvodina.

Although

formally

a

part

of

Serbia,

the autonomous

provinces practically gained

the status

of fed-

eral

republics

after the

adoption

of

the 1974 constitution.66

The

prospect

of the confederalization

of

the

republic

of Serbia

was

an

object

of criticism

by

Serbian

intellectuals

already

in

the

early

1970s.

As of

the

mid-1970s,

the

question

of

the status of autonomous

provinces was repeatedly on the agenda of the Serbian party organiza-

tion.

Prior to Milosevic's advent

to

power

in

1987,

however,

Serbian

elites were

manifestly

unsuccessful

in

reintegrating (not incorporating)

the

autonomous

provinces

into Serbia within

the

ideological

frame-

work of the Titoist

policy

on nationalities.

By

the

early-1980s,

national

conflict

in

the

southern

province

of

Kosovo

assumed

critical

proportions,

with Albanian

riots and

demands

for full

republican

status

threatening

not

only

the

fragile

inter-ethnic

balance

of the

weakened

federal

system,

but the

integrity

of the

Yugo-

slav state

as

well. This

political

threat was

accompanied

by

a

perceived

ethno-demographic

threat,

caused

by

high

Albanian birth

rates

and

Serbian

immigration

from

the

region.

While

the

process

of

Serbian

immigration

from

Kosovo

began

already

in

the

1960s,

the

cumulative

effects of

demographic

change

were

felt

only

by

the mid-1980s

when

the

proportion

of Serbs

and

Montenegrins

fell to little

more than 10

percent

of

the

region's

total

population.68

The

institutionally

weak

Yugoslav

federal

state

was unable

to halt

Ser-

bian

immigration:

instead,

it

indiscriminately

persecuted

the

'Albanian

irredenta

with

the

help

of

the federal

army.

Simultaneously,

the

federal

state

failed

to

address

the

grievances

of

local

Serbs,

who found

them-

selves

under the

jurisdiction

of the

province's

Albanianized

party

organization

(one

more

instance

of the

historically

traumatic

cycle

of

status-reversal).69

To

make

matters

worse,

the

myth

of Kosovo

occupied

a

special

sym-

bolic

place

in traditional

Serbian

national

mythology.70

During

the

1980s,

the

prospect

of

losing

Kosovo

and

the

weakened

position

of

the

republic

of

Serbia

in the

larger

federation

provoked

a

dramatic

revival

of

Serbian

particularism,

culminating

in

the

already

mentioned

Memorandum

of the

Serbian

Academy

of Sciences

(1986).

Initially,

this document

was

treated

as an

ideologically

unacceptable

manifesta-



785

tion of

greater

Serbian

chauvinism

and

anti-communism,

and

was

sharply attacked by the Serbian party leadership.

With the

ascent

of

Slobodan

Milosevic

to

leadership

in

1987,

this

ideo-

logical configuration

began

to

change.71

Not

accidentally,

Milosevic

made his

first

populist

breakthrough

among

the Kosovo

Serbs,

by-

passing

local

officialdom.

By

mid-1988,

Milosevic

positioned

himself

as the leader

of

a

guided

grass-roots

national movement in

which

Kosovo Serb

activists

occupied

the

most

prominent

role. This

move-

ment

culminated

in

mass

rallies

that forced the resignations of the

treasonable

(from

the

nationalist

point

of

view)

as well

as

politically

corrupt

elites of

Vojvodina

and

Montenegro (October

1988,

January

1989).

The

Serbian

leader's

appeals,

however,

also

had a

strong

social

com-

ponent.

Milosevi6's

emphasis

on

social

justice

and

promises

of

eco-

nomic

reform in

the

context of

frustrated

expectations

and the

political

corruption

of

communist

officialdom

brought

him

the

support

of

broad

social

strata,

from

workers

to

intellectuals. In

a

striking parallel

to the

early

Yeltsin,

Milosevi6

was

perceived

as

an

honest

communist of the

people ;

he

like

Yeltsin,

fought

the

bureaucrats,

referring

to the mass

rallies as an

element

in

a

broader

anti-bureaucratic

revolution.

But

unlike

Yeltsin's

anti-corruption

drive in

Moscow,

Milosevi6's

social

appeals

were

increasingly

subordinated

to

nationalist

goals.

Thus,

Ser-

bia's

developmental

lag

was

not

explained

by

the

weakness

of

its own

economy,

but

by

exploitation

on

the

part

of

richer

republics,

Slovenia

and Croatia.72

Moreover,

unlike

Yeltsin,

Milosevi6

never

experienced

a

political

trans-

formation.

The

increasingly

divided

and

quasi-confederal

Yugoslav

League

of

Communists

had

no

strength

to

remove

Milosevi6

from

the

heights

of

power

for

violating

party

norms

(his

endorsement

of

spon-

taneous

mass

activity,

and

his

subversion

of

the

internationalist

spirit

of

the

Yugoslav

revolution).

In

the

absence of

a

Yugoslav

equivalent

of

Gorbachev, Milosevi6 remained in the party and, in

spite

of his reform-

ist

rhetoric,

never

tied

the

fate of

Serbia

to

anti-communism

or

West-

ern-style

market

reforms.

The

Serbs'

growing

obsession

with

historical

and

ethnic

grievances

was

deliberately

fostered

by

the

republican

media.

At

the

same

time,

the

attempts

of

the

newly

formed

opposition

parties

to

provide

an

alterna-

tive

to

Milosevi6's

populist

revolution

were

treated

as

instances of



787

troika

and

glasnost

quickly

led to the rise of

potentially

threatening

peripheral nationalist movements, both the ethos of Gorbachev's

reform

program

and

the

revival

of

public

debate about the

Stalinist

legacy delegitimized

the use

of

military

force

in

containing

them.

In

fact,

almost

every attempt

to use

military

orce

against

he

recalcitrant

republics

on

the

part

of

the

empire-savers,

evived

he

traumatic

ym-

bolic

legacy

of

the totalitarian tate

terrorizing

ts

own

citizenry

Tbilisi,

April

1989;

Vilnius,

January

1991,

etc.).

This

legacy

was

brought

nto

focus

by

the

increasingly

iberal

media

that,

to the

regret

of

conserva-

tives like YegorLigachev, ell into the handsof the archenemyof Rus-

sian

nationalists,

Aleksandr

Yakovlev.77

The

widespread

perception

of

Russians

as

occupiers

nd

colonists,

associated

with

the

imposition

of

Stalinist

error

and communist

rule

in

the

republics,

contributed

o an

intense

sense

of

shame

among impor-

tant sections

of

the

Russian

intelligentsia

who

formed the

core of

democratic

coalitions,

and

strengthened

anti-imperial

eelings.

Con-

sequently,

n

sharpopposition

to the

Yugoslavpoliticaldynamic,

as of

mid-1989,

Russian

democrats

embraced the cause

of

the

republics,

creating

a

broad

coalition

with

peripheral

nationalists

against

the

oppressive

Soviet center and

its

ideological

superstructure imperial

chauvinism.

The

suppression

of

authentic

Russian

cultural

raditions,

he devasta-

tion

of

the

countryside

and

ecological

catastrophies

n

the Russian

heartland,

and the

experience

of a

recent and

meaningless mperialistwar

(Afghanistan)

were

further

proofs

of

Russia'svictimization

by

the

Soviet

center,

and

developments

hat

could

hardly

be

blamed

on

exter-

nal

ethnic

enemies.

Finally,

he

growing

perception

that the

empireput

a

heavy

burden on

the

Russian

economy, by

syphoning

off

Russia's

natural

resourcesto

the

republics

also

favored

the

emergence

of

a new

Russian

isolationism.

Not

accidentally,

s of

1990,

the

theme

of

Russia's

exploitation

by

the

imperialenter appears n

many

of Yeltsin's

peeches.78

ndirectcon-

trast to

Milosevic,

who

channeled

social

discontent

nto

national con-

flict,

Yeltsin

tied the

solution of

the

economic

problem,

.e.,

the

social

question,

to

Russia's

ndependence

from

the

Soviet

center and

its his-

toric

reconciliation

with

newly

independent

republics.

Yeltsin's

per-

sonal

political

trauma

(exclusion

from

the

Politburo)

ed

him

to em-

brace

Western

alues,

and

position

himself

as

the

populist

leader of

an

intelligentsia-led

emocratic

coalition.The

fusion

of

liberal-univer-



788

salist,

social,

and national

goals

and

appeals

proved

to be a most

explosive populist mix, undermining the belated attempts of Rus-

sian communists to form a

counter-reformist coalition based

on a

Milosevic-type

combination of

orthodox communism and extreme

nationalism.

The

demoralization

and lack of internal coherence of coercive state

structures

was most evident

during

the dramatic

August

1991

coup.

The

image

of

complete

political

impotence,

best illustrated

by

the

Brezhnevite iconography of the coup, graphically underscored the

political senility

of the communist ancien

regime.

In

addition,

the

prospect

of

shooting

at the

first

freely

elected President

of Russia had

a

great impact,

especially

on some

military

and

KGB officers.79

The dissolution of the

Soviet state

in

December 1991

formally

ratified

this

state of affairs

but,

at the

same

time,

also

created

structurally

a

completely

novel

situation.

Without

the

protection

of

the

over-arching

Soviet

center,

25

million ethnic

Russians

(and

11 million Russian-

speakers )

have

found themselves

in

the

position

of minorities

in

newly

independent

states. The

intrinsically unpleasant

experience

of status-

reversal

is not

rendered

easier

by

the

gradual

nationalization

of the

newly independent

states,

that are

primarily

seen

as nation-states

of

and

for the dominant

(titular)

nation.

Critically,

however,

Russian

minorities

in

the

truly important

republics

with

compact

areas

of Russian settlement

-

Ukraine

and

Kazakhstan

-

did not

experience

a sense

of

ethnic

threat

at the

time of

separation.

Here,

the

contrast

between

the

heavily

Russified Ukrainian

nation and

the

remarkably

strong

resistance

of

Croats

to

Serbianization

under

Yugoslav

auspices

both

in inter-war

and

post-war

Yugoslavia,

as well as

the different

experiences

of World War

Two

in

the

two

cases,

offer

a

clue

for

explaining

the

relative

docility

of Russian

minorities

in

Ukraine.8

Only

in western Ukraine

does

the

dynamic

of

Russian-

Ukrainian

relations

approach

the

Serb-Croat

experience;

however,

the

absence of compact Russian settlement in western Ukraine, i.e., the

geographical

separation

of the two

ethnic

groups,

inhibits

conflict.

Despite

the

periodic

setbacks

in Russian-Ukrainian

relations

in

the

presence

of

highly

symbolic

and

divisive

issues

such

as the status

of

Sevastopol,

Crimea,

and the

Black

Sea

Feet,

the continued

migration

of

ethnic

Russians

into Ukraine

is a

process

that demonstrates

the

absence

of

strong grassroots

Russian

hostility

toward

the

Ukrainian



789

state.81

However,

the

regional

polarization

of the

vote

in

Ukraine

along

linguistic, and potentially national lines, raises the question of whether

this

relatively friendly grassroots

reality

will

prevail

in the

long

run.82

Certainly,

the ultimate

outcome will

depend

as much

on the

constel-

lation

of

political

forces

in

Russia

itself,

in

which

the distortions

of

the

reform

process

and the

decline

in

great power

status have

affected

the

material

and ideal interests of

large,

traditionally state-dependent

con-

stituencies,

from

pensioners

to

security

and

military

officers,

different

groups

of

industrial

workers,

collective

farmers,

and

the

formerly

state-

subsidized

intelligentsia.

Far from

being

socially, politically,

or

nation-

ally

neutral,

marketization

has

raised anew

a whole set of

questions

about the

viability

of

Russian

democracy

and the

relation

of

Russia

to

the

West,

adding

credibility

to

the

anti-liberal,

extreme

left-right

ideological

concoctions of

orthodox

communists and

right-wing

na-

tionalists.83

On the

other

hand,

the

war

in

Chechnia

has

made clear the

costs

of

adventurous national

projects.

Despite

the

Russians'

manifest lack

of

enthusiasm for

Chechens,

perceived

as

mafia

ringleaders

in

the

big

Russian

cities,

the

application

of

indiscriminate force has

revived the

traumatic

memory

of

the

oppressive

state,

provoking

the

resistance of

Russian

public

opinion.84

Ironically,

the

ultimate lesson of

Chechnia

might

be

lost on the

Russian

electorate for

the

simple

reason

that,

in

this

instance,

state

oppression

was

associated

with the

democratic

regime.

Moved

by

these

and

other,

more

important

social

and eco-

nomic considerations, the voters

might

decide that communists and

nationalists

will

make

the

state

into

a

better

instrument of

economic

policy

and the

national

purpose,

thus

making

the

Russian

outcome

closer to

its

Serbian

counterpart.

Conclusion

In the preceding analysis, I'attempt to demonstrate the usefulness of

some of

Weber's

key

theoretical

ideas on

nations,

nationalism,

and

imperialism

by

way

of

a

comparative

examination

of

contemporary

Russian

and

Serbian

nationalism.

More

specifically,

I

try

to show

how

long-term

historical

and

institutional

legacies,

shared

memories,

and

defining

political

experiences,

played

themselves

out

in

the

contem-

porary

period,

influencing

the

different

availability

of

mass

constituen-

cies

in

Russia

and

Serbia for

nationalist

mobilization

under

the

auspices

of

new

empire-savingcoalitions.



790

But

political

outcomes

are never

wholly pre-determined

as historical

legacies are subject to different cultural interpretations and political

contest.

To

put

it

simply,

nationalism

is made and remade

by politicians

and

ideologists;

and there

is no need to

gloss

over the

frequently

bloody

and

unpredictable

consequences

of

their

struggles

with

unduly

abstract

sociological

generalizations.

Instead,

we

should

theorize

our

narratives,

while

giving

contingency

its

place.

I

suggest

that the

presence

of a

highly symbolic

issue

(such

as

the

World

War

Two

experiences

of Serbs

in

Croatia,

the

mythology

of

Kosovo,

Sevastopol

or the

mythology

of

the

Russian

fleet),

which touches

on the

core

historical

mythology

of one

nation,

but

is contested

by

another

on different

grounds

(demographic,

ethnic,

or for reasons

of historical

justice,

for

example)

increases

the

likelihood

of

national

conflicts.

Once

highly

symbolic

issues

are

involved,

national

conflicts

quickly

assume

the

form

of

struggles

over

ultimate values

not

subject

to

com-

promise

and

conflict-regulation.

However,

as the

Russian

case demon-

strates,

other

symbolic

legacies

(the experience

of

Stalinism) might

be

powerful

enough

to

override

nationalism.

I

also

suggest

in

this

article

a few

simple

ways

in which

we can

interpret,

and

possibly,

test

the

likelihood

of the

emergency

of national

conflicts:

the

significance

of

prestige

considerations,

the

absence

of

compensa-

tory

mechanisms

such

as

economic

prosperity,

the

egalitarian

character

of nationalist

appeals,

the

dynamic

of

status-reversal,

and the

theory

of

the

superimposition

of conflicts.

To understand

the exclusivist

over-

tones of much of

contemporary

nationalism in the former Soviet Union

and

Eastern

Europe,

however,

it would

also

be

necessary

to

pay

more

attention

to

the

political-cultural

and

social-structural

legacy

of

Com-

munist

rule.

The

prevalence

of

uncompromising

stances

among

politi-

cal

leaders,

the

absence

of

mechanisms

of

conflict-regulation,

the

hos-

tility

to

proceduralism

and

legal

mechanisms

as

a

means

of

resolving

the

emerging

national

questions,

and

the

appeal

of

the new

nation-

alism

to

state-dependent

and

traditionalist

strata are

among

the

most

important elements of this legacy.

Acknowledgments

The

first

version

of this

article

was

presented

to the conference

on

National

Minorities,

Nationalizing

States,

and External

National

Homelands

in

the

New

Europe,

Bellagio,

Italy,

August

22-26,

1994.

I



791

want

to

thank all

conference

participants,

but

especially Dominique

Arel, Mark Beissinger, Rogers Brubaker, Victoria Koroteyeva, David

Laitin,

Alexander

Motyl,

and Nikolai

Rudensky,

for their

helpful

com-

ments

and criticisms.

I

would also

like to

thank

my

colleagues

Audrey

Helfant

Budding,

Tomasz

Grabowski,

Jeremy King,

and

Jeff

Manza,

for

helping

me

clarify

several

critical

points

in the text.

During

the

last

stages

of

rewriting,

Andrew

Arato

of the New

School,

Leon

Kojen

of

Belgrade

University,

and David Woodruff of

MIT,

provided

invaluable

advice.

Special

thanks

are

due to the members

of

my

dissertation

com-

mittee,

Victoria

Bonnell,

Ken

Jowitt,

and Neil

Smelser,

all

of

whom

suf-

fered

through

various versions

of

the

argument

presented

in

this

article.

Finally,

I

thank

the

Academy

Scholars'

Program

of

Harvard

Univer-

sity's

Center

for

International Affairs for

providing

me with

the

time

and resources

necessary

to

complete

this

article,

and the

reviewers

and

Editors of

Theory

and

Society

for

useful

criticisms

and

suggestions.

Notes

1. Max

Weber,

Economy

and

Society

(Berkeley,

Los

Angeles,

and

London:

University

of

California

Press,

1978),

Vol.

2,

903.

2.

I

have

analyzed

the

long-term

disruptive

effects

of

communist

nationality policy

in

the

Soviet

Union and

Yugoslavia together

with

Victor

Zaslavsky

in

our

The causes

of

disintegration

in

the Soviet

Union

and

Yugoslavia,

Telos 88

(Summer,

1991):

120-140.

See

also Victor

Zaslavsky,

Nationalism

and

democratic

transition in

postcommunist

societies,

in

Stephen

R.

Graubard,

editor,

Exit

from

Communism

(New

Brunswick and London:

Transaction

Publishers,

1993),

97-123.

For a

very

lucid

theoretical

exposition

of

the pervasive institutionalization of multinationality

in

the

Soviet

case,

its

impact

on

state

breakdown,

and

the

new

national

questions

in

the

post-Soviet

space,

see

Rogers

Brubaker,

Nationhood and

the

national

question

in

the

Soviet

Union and

post-Soviet

Eurasia: An

institutionalist

account,

Theory

and

Society

23

(1994):

47-78.

For the

ideological justification

and

content of

these

policies

under the

Soviet

regime

during

the

1920s and

1930s,

see

Yurii

Slezkine,

The

USSR

as a

communal

apartment,

or how

a

socialist state

promoted

ethnic

particularism,

Slavic

Review

53 2

(Summer,

1994):

414-453.

For an

alternative

view

that sees

the

disintegration

of

the Soviet

Union

through

the

prism

of

imperial

collapse,

see

Alexander

Motyl,

From

imperial

decay

to

imperial

collapse:

The fall

of the Soviet empire in comparative perspective, in David Good, editor, Nation-

alism

and

Empire

(New

York;

St.

Martin's

Press,

1992),

15-44.

Although my

gen-

eral

approach

to

Soviet

disintegration

is

closer to

the

views

of

Zaslavsky,

Brubaker,

and

Slezkine,

the

analysis

of

Russians

as

an

imperial

nation in

this

article

incor-

porates

some of

the

insights

of

the

empire

perspective

as

well.

3.

For the

empire-savers

see

Roman

Szporluk,

Dilemmas

of

Russian

nationalism,

Problems

of

Communism,

July-August

(1989):

15-35.

4.

Or,

to

use

another

analogy,

although

the

overthrow of

the

Tsarist

regime

in

1917

and

the

disintegration

of

the

imperial

state did

not mark

the end of

Russia's

historic

imperial

role,

the

Soviet

state

was

more

than

just

a

continuation

of the

old

empire



793

12. This claim

appears

controversial

in

light

of the

present

war

in Croatia

and Bosnia

in

which

religious

divisions

appear

to be more

than

mere markers

of status

dif-

ferentiation

along

ethnic

or

national

lines.

At least

one

prominent

Serbian

and

Yugoslav

historian,

Milorad

Ekmecic,

has seen

religious

divisions as the

main

obstacle

to the historical

integration

of

different

Yugloslav

communities on

the

basis of

language.

See

his monumental

work,

Stvaranje

Jugoslavije:

1790-1918

(Beograd: Prosveta,

2

Vols.,

1988).

Other

scholars,

however,

have

stressed the

his-

torical

absence

of

confessional

and

religious

wars

on

Yugoslav

territory

prior

to

the

emergence

of

the modern

Serb and

Croat

national

ideas.

See,

for

example,

Ivo

Banac,

The National

Question

in

Yugoslavia

(Ithaca

and

London:

Cornell

Univer-

sity

Press,

1984),

which

sees the

development

of

Serb

and

Croat

national

ideologies

as decisive for shaping the Yugoslav national question. Although not underesti-

mating

the

significance

of

religion

or

ideology,

in

line with

Weber's

framework,

I

look at

the

decisive

historical and

political

experiences

that

have

shaped

the

current

animosities

between Serbs

and

Croats.

13.

Weber,

Economy

and

Society,

Vol.

2,

924-925.

The

contrast

becomes

even

more

striking

once it is

recalled that

many

Serbs in

the

Austro-Hungarian

empire

were

professional

soldiers

in

the

so-called

Military

Frontier,

i.e.,

the

border

zone

sepa-

rating

the

Habsburg

domains from

the

Ottoman

empire.

But even

this

experience

of

serving

the

empire

was not

enough

to

contain

the

attractiveness

of

unification

with

Serbia

once the

Serbian

idea

emerged

in

the

nineteenth-century

age

of

nation-

alism. This process reached critical momentum after the advent of the parliamen-

tary

monarchy

in

Serbia

under the

auspices

of

the

Karadjordjevi6

dynasty

(1903).

14.

Here

I

follow

Rogers

Brubaker's

terminology,

in

which

nationalizing

state

serves

to

denote a

set of

stances

and

perceptions

shaping

the

political

choices

of

the

elites of

prospective

nation-states

striving

to

create a

state for

the

nation

by

promoting

the

language,

culture,

demographic

position,

economic

flourishing,

or

political

hegemony

of

the

nominally

state-bearing

nation.

As

Brubaker

demon-

strates

himself,

the

Croatian

elite

under

Tudjman

fits

the

description

only

too

well.

See

Brubaker,

National

minorities,

nationalizing

states,

114.

It

should be

stressed

that,

in

contrast to

Croatia,

some

Serbian

officers

did

remain in

the

newly

formed

Bosnian army, a fact which underscores the somewhat

greater

attractiveness of

Bosnian

multinationalism

as

opposed

to

Croatian

ethnocentrism.

Nevertheless,

even

in

the

Bosnian

case

the

proportion

of

such

Serbian

officers

is

small

enough

to

warrant the

contrast.

15.

This,

of

course,

is

not

meant to

imply

that

the

situation

might

not

change.

Even

at

the

moment of

friendly

separation,

Russian

officers

from

the

Black

Sea

fleet

accepted

Ukraine

only

on

condition

that

the

fleet

be

governed

by

a

joint

strategic

command.

Here a

highly

symbolic

national

issue,

the

mythology

of

the

Russian

fleet,

was

of

decisive

importance.

The

significance

of

symbolic

issues

in

nationalist

mobilization

is

explored

throughout

this

article.

16. Weber,

Economy

and

Society,

Vol.

2,

922.

17.

Beetham,

Max

Weber

and

German

Politics,

128-129.

The

interpretation

is

Beet-

ham's.

It

should

be

pointed

out

that

Weber

shied

away

from

Tonnies'

terminology,

developing

the

concepts

of

communal

(Vergemeinschaftung)

and

associative

(Vergesellschaftung)

social

relationships.

See

Weber,

Economy

and

Society,

Vol.

1,

40-43,

as

well

as

the

introduction

by

Roth,

cii-ciii.

Weber,

did,

however,

consider

the

nation

a

community

of

affective

ties,

ibid.,

41.

18.

This

idea

is

very

close

to

Ernest

Gellner's

much

quoted

definition

of

the

nation in

his

Nations

and

Nationalism

(Ithaca,

and

London:

Cornell

University

Press,

1983).



794

19.

Weber,

Economy

and

Society,

Vol.

I,

398. On the other

hand,

Weber

noted that

there were

national

communities,

such as the Swiss

one,

whose

very

existence

was

predicated

on the renunciation of

political power.

On the

whole,

however,

Weber

was inclined

to treat such cases as

exceptional,

at least as

far as

modern

nations

are

concerned.

20.

Quoted

in

Beetham,

Max Weberand German

Politics,

129.

21. Both the

present

Croatian and Bosnian conflicts could

be

analyzed

from

the

point

of view

of sudden and dramatic status-reversals

that evoked

painful

historical

memories

among

members

of

the

national

group

that

found

itself on

the

losing

side

of the

equation

(Serbs). Structurally,

the

most dramatic

example

of status-

reversal

in

the Soviet case

is

offered

by

25 million

ethnic

Russians

who have

found

themselves in the position of minorities in newly independent states. See Brubaker,

Nationhood

and

the national

question....

But the

historical

experiences

of

Rus-

sian

minorities

vis-a-vis the titular

nations

vary

from

case to

case,

as do

contextual

factors.

The contrast

between Moldova

and Ukraine

is

telling

in

this

respect.

There-

fore,

it is

not

only

the

mechanism of

status-reversal,

but

also the

historical

and

present

content

of ethnic interaction

which

helps

explain

variation.

22.

Weber,

Economy

and

Society,

Vol.

2,

925-926.

23.

See

Igor

Shafarevich,

Est'

li u Rossii budushchee

(Moskva:

Sovetskii

pisatel',

1991)

and

Dobrica

(osic,

Promene

(Novi

Sad:

Dnevnik,

1992)

for

the

views

of these

key

ideologists

of

Russian

and

Serbian

nationalism.

24. Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. I, 391. Whether Weber's empirical assertion is

true

in

this case

is debatable.

Nevertheless,

as

I

try

to

show,

it

is

highly

suggestive.

25.

A

good

impression

of

the

importance

of

nationalism

as

a source

of

ultimate

mean-

ing

and

prestige

considerations

among

Serbian

peasants

or small-town

residents

in

the

rocky

Dalmatian

hinterland

can be

gathered

from

Misha

Glenny,

The

Fall

of

Yugoslavia:

The

Third

Balkan

War

(Harmondsworth,

England:

Penguin

Books,

1992).

This

is

one of

the few

recent

books on

Yugoslavia

sensitive

to

the

native's

point

of

view

and

written

with an

appreciation

of

complex

regional

differences.

26.

Understandably,

data

on the

social and

regional

structure

of volunteer

units

are

not

readily

available.

Nevertheless,

to take

just

one

example,

there

is

enough

circumst-

antial evidence to suggest the over-representation of Herzegovina Croats, (relative

to

Croats

from

Dalmatia,

Istria

or even

Slavonia)

in

volunteer

units.

Thus,

many

Herzegovina

Croats

participated

in the defense

of

Vukovar

(Slavonia),

a

town

far

removed

from

their

native

region,

both

physically

and

culturally.

Not

surprisingly,

the

influence

of

the

Herzegovina

lobby

in internal

Croatian

politics

has

grown

almost

in direct

proportion

to the

intensity

of

military

conflicts.

For

such

reasons,

a

sociological

history

of

the

war

in

Croatia

and

Bosnia

written

from

the

point

of

view

of

the

micro-foundations

of violent ethnic

conflict

would

be

of

great

value.

For

a

highly

imaginative

and

suggestive

analysis along

these

lines

in other

contexts

see

David

Laitin,

National

revivals

and

violence,

Archives

Europeenes

de

Sociologie

XXVI 1 (1995): 3-44. It could be shown quite easily that some of the main factors

which

Laitin

identifies

as

the

necessary

micro-conditions

of

violent

ethnic conflict,

are

also

present

in

the

case

of

Krajina,

Herzegovina,

and

much

of

Bosnia

as

well

(for

example,

the

density

of

rural

networks,

exemplified

in

the

high

salience

of

the

extended

family

in these

parts

of

Yugoslavia).

However,

these

rural

networks

are

not

only

the

source

of

the

canon

fodder

of

nationalism

(guerilla

fighters),

but

also

the

repositories

of collective

memory.

For this

reason,

I

argue

that

a

full

explanation

necessitates

attention

to

macro-social

processes

and decisive

historical

experiences

as

well.



795

27.

The classic formulation of the

theory

of

the

superimposition

of

conflict

is,

of

course,

Ralf

Dahrendorf,

Class

and Class

Conflict

in Industrial

Society (Stanford,

California: Stanford

University

Press,

1959).

The

implications

of

sociological

con-

flict

theory

for

ethnicity

are

explored

and

elaborated with

great

erudition

in

Donald

Horowitz,

Ethnic

Groups

in

Conflict.

28. The

relentless

bombing

of

Sarajevo

by

the

Serbian

army,

the

leveling

of

Mostar

by

the

Croatian

army,

or the

persistent

destruction

of

cultural

monuments

(in Sarajevo,

Dubrovnik,

Mostar)

is a

testimony

to the

importance

of

anti-urbanism

as a

strong

cultural

component

in

the

Yugoslav

war.

Although

the

destruction

of cities

has

had

its

instrumental-rational

(purely

military)

dimension

as

well,

the

destruction

of

monuments

testifies to the

significance

of

affective and

symbolic

(value-rational)

considerations in nationalist social action. Neither the bombing of the national

library

in

Sarajevo

by

the

Serbian

army,

nor

the

leveling

of

the old

bridge

in

Mostar

by

Croatian

forces

was

motivated

by

military

considerations

alone.

In

contrast,

it

is

the desire

to

eliminate all traces of

an

enemy

group's

culture

(in

this case

that of

the

Bosnian

Moslems),

that

explains

such

behavior. In

both of

these

cases,

however,

there is

considerable evidence to

the

effect

that the

bombardments

were

carried out

by

army

officers

who had

little

appreciation

of

the

cultural

significance

of

old

manuscripts

or

the

uniqueness

of

sixteenth-century

bridges.

It is

instructive

to

remember

that the

hostility

towards

the

city

as

such

was

also a

significant

com-

ponent

in

extreme

right-wing

ideologies

(fascism

in

some

of its

varieties),

and

some

extreme left movements as well (Pol Pot). The relationship among prestige consid-

erations,

ressentiment,

and

nationalism

is,

of

course,

the

main

theme of

Liah

Green-

feld's

Nationalism.

The

connections

among

all these

elements

and

tyrannical

forms

of

government

is the

subject

of

Daniel

Chirot's

Modern

Tyrants

(New

York:

The

Free

Press, Macmillan,

1994).

29.

For

the

democratic

implications

of

modern

warfare,

see

Raymond Aron,

The

Cen-

tury

of

Total

War

Garden

City,

N.Y:

Doubleday,

1954).

30.

Although

I do

not

have

precise

information

about

the

social

origin

of these

volun-

teers,

there

are

suggestive

eye-witness

accounts

that

project

a

roughly

similar

pic-

ture.

See,

for

example,

the

contribution

of journalist

Veronika

Kutsyllo,

who

was

present in the White House throughout the siege, Zapiski iz belogo doma

(Moskva:

Kommersant',

1993).

For

the

participation

of

Transnistrian

Russians

and

Russian-

speakers

see

Charles

King,

Moldovan

identity,

Slavic

Review

532

(Summer,

1994):

345-369.

For

the

extreme

left

and

extreme

right

political

mentality

of

the

defenders,

see

the

collection

of

leaflets, Listovki

belogo

doma

(Moskva:

Memorial,

1993).

31.

Aleksandr

Barkashov,

Pole

chesti,

in

the

right-wing

weekly

Zavtra

1

(January,

1994).

For

other

reactions

on the

Russian

right

to

the

October

events

in

the

same

spirit

see

My

i

vremia

48

(November

1,

1993).

32.

Weber,

Economy

and

Society,

Vol.

2,

911.

33. It is for this reason that among the leaders of Soiuz

one

could find

Viktor

Alksnis

(a

half-Latvian),

Yevgenii

Kogan

(a

Russian

Jew),

Nikolai

Petrushenko

(a

Russian-

Ukrainian

from

Kazakhstan),

a

female

delegate

from

Chechnia

(Sazhi

Umalatova),

as

well

as

pure

Russians,

such

as

Yurii

Blokhin

(Moldova).

The

difficulty

in

pre-

serving

the

loyalty

of

such

an

ethnically

mixed

group

of

officers in

Yugoslavia

points

to a

crucial

difference

between

the

two

cases,

despite

important

exceptions

(such

as

the

Slovene

Stane

Brovet

who

remained

Admiral

of

the

Yugoslav

fleet

even

after

the

outbreak

of

the

war,

and

some

other

highly

ranked

officers).

The

increasing

identification

of

the

Yugoslav

army

with

Milosevic's

Serbocentric

regime

in

the

last



796

years

of

Yugoslavia's

existence was one of the

decisive factors

deterring

hitherto

loyal

officers of

non-Serbian, and especially Slovene and Croat

ethnic

background,

from

forming

what could

have

been a

more

purely

state-centered

coalition.

34.

Weber,

Economy

and

Society,

Vol.

2,

921.

35.

I

have

in

mind

Ukrainians and

Croats

respectively.

It should

be

pointed

out,

how-

ever,

that in

comparison

to

Russians,

Serbs

were

at best an

incomplete

hegemon

in

terms of numbers. The last reliable

Yugoslav

census

(1981) registered

that self-

declared

Serbs

constituted

only

36.3%

of

the

total

population.

Even

if

one

assumes

that

most

Montenegrins (2.6%)

consider themselves close

to Serbs

in

national

terms,

and

that

there was a

significant

number

of Serbs

among

self-declared

Yugo-

slavs

(5.4%),

that would

bring

the relative

proportion

of

Serbs

to little

more

than

40% of the total. In contrast, ethnic Russians constituted about 52% of the popula-

tion at about

the same time

(1980), although

the

proportion

declined

during

the

next decade.

36. For

a series of

speculative,

but

highly suggestive comparisons

between

Yugoslavia

and Czechoslovakia

on

the one

hand,

and late unifiers

such

as

Germany

and

Italy

on

the

other,

see A.

J. P.

Taylor,

The

Habsburg Monarchy:

1809-1918)

(Chicago

and

London:

The

University

of

Chicago

Press:

1976),

252-261.

37.

In the Russian

empire,

this

distinction

was

captured

by

two

adjectives

denoting

a

territorial

(rossiiskii)

as

opposed

to an ethnic

(russkii)

identification.

Hence,

Ros-

siiskaia

imperiia (a

term

introduced

under

Peter

the

Great),

but russkii

narod

(the

Russian people in an ethnic sense). The distinction is lost in translation.

38.

This does

not mean that there

were no instances of

the

advocacy

of narrower

Ser-

bian

and Russian

national interests

in

Yugoslavia

and

the

Soviet Union

on the

level of

political

and intellectual

elites.

Naturally,

both

in Russia

and

Serbia,

cultural

elites

continued

to

reproduce

a

largely

national

culture.

Yet,

to

take

just

one

example

from

Yugoslavia's

more

liberal

environment,

unlike

Croats

or

Albanians,

Serbs

did

not

develop

a mass nationalist

movement

until

the

rise of

Milosevic

to

power.

It

could be shown

without

great

difficulty

that even

the

earlier

mani-

festations

of

ideological

or

political

Serbian

particularism

on the

elite

level

were

largely

a reaction

to the decentralization

of the state

(late

1960s),

the

rise

of

poten-

tially threatening nationalist movements (Croatia in 1971; Kosovo after 1981), or

the

growing

demands

on

peripheral

nationalists

(Slovenia

in the

1980s).

This

would

seem

to bear

out the

point

that

assertions

of dominant

nation

particularism

are

largely

reactive

n

character.

39.

For

Rasputin's

speech

see Sovetskaia

Rossiia

131

(June

7,

1989).

40. Memorandum

SANU,

Duga (June,

1989,

special

edition),

38-39.

This

unfinished

document

originally

appeared

in

September

1986

and was

circulated

privately

in

Belgrade.

41.

Anti-semitism

was,

of

course,

a

long-standing

component

of

both official

as

well

as

grassroots

right-wing

nationalism

in Tsarist

Russia.

Revived

during

Stalin's

notorious

anti-cosmopolitan

campaign,

it became a standard,

although

subsidiary

component

of

official

ideology

during

Brezhnev's

long

tenure

( anti-Zionism ).

It

is

not

surprising,

therefore,

that

anti-Semitism

was a

part

of the

world-view

of select

members

of

the conservative

party

elite.

Yet,

the

appearance

of

explicitly

anti-

Semitic

tracts

such as

Shafarevich's

Russophobia

on

the

pages

of

literary

journals

like Nash

sovremennik

can be dated

to

the second

half of 1989.

42.

I

explore

the

emergence

of

these

new

coalitions

in

my

dissertation,

Communism

and Nationalism

in Russia

and

Serbia, University

of California

at

Berkeley,

1995.

For the

development

of the new

Russian

ideology

during

the

early years

of

pere-



797

stroika

see Yitzhak

Brudny,

The heralds

of

opposition

to

perestroika,

oviet

Economy

5

2

(1989):

162-200.

43.

See,

for

example,

Ruslan

Khasbulatov,

Vozmozhna

i

Balkanizatsiia

Rossii?,

Rossiiskaia

azeta

(May

27,

1993).

Such

analogies

were

regularly

made in the Rus-

sian

nationalist

press during

he

last few

years,

but it

is

interesting

o note that even

a

moderate ike Khasbulatov ame to the

same conclusion.

44.

See Richard

Pipes,

Russia

under

the Old

Regime

(New

York:

Charles

Scribner's,

1974)

for the blurredboundaries

among empire,

state,

and

nation

in the

Russian

case. See also Marc

Raeff,

Patterns f

Russian

mperial

policy

toward

he

nation-

alities,

n

Edward Alworth et

al.,

Soviet

Nationality

Problems

(New

York and

London:

Columbia

University

Press,

1971),

22-43.

45. Foran interestingdiscussionof the distinctionbetween ethnic Volksnation) nd

cultural

otions of

nationhood

(Kulturnation)

n

the Germanhistorical

context,

see

Reiner

Lepsius,

Nationund

Nationalismus n

Deutschland,

n

his

Interessen,

Ideen,

und

Institutionen

Westdeutscher

Verlag,

1990),

232-246.

I

would like to

thank one of

the

anonymous

reviewers or

addressing

my

attentionto

this refer-

ence,

whichhas

helped

me

clarify

my

views on

this

problem.

46.

Roman

Szporluk,

TheUkraine

and

Russia,

n

Robert

Conquest,

editor,

The Last

Empire Stanford,

California:

Hoover

Institution,

1986),

151-183.

For

the

citation,

see

157. The

statement,

however,

deserves

some

qualification.

Neither

Central

Asia

(with

the

exception

of northern

Kazakhstan),

or

the

Baltic

states evoke

the

same

kindof emotionalresponseamongRussiansas do UkraineandBelorus.

47.

It is

important

o

remember

hat

the more

universalist

Yugoslav

dea

was born

in

Croatia,

not

Serbia,

and

held

greater

attraction

or

Croats

andSerbs n

the

Austro-

Hungarian

mpire

thanfor

Serbs

in Serbia

proper.

Prior

to

unification,

Serbs

in

Serbiawere

taught

Serbianism

ot

Yugoslavism,

hich

helps explain

why

Ser-

bian

political

elites could

see

Yugoslavia

as an extension

f Serbia

during

the

inter-war

period.

See Charles

Jelavich,

South

Slav

Nationalisms:

Textbooks

and

YugoslavUnification

n

1918

(Columbus,

Ohio:Ohio

State

University

Press,

1990).

For

the

universalist,

as well

as

messianic

implications

of the

Russian

dea

see

Nicholas

Berdiaev,

The

Russian dea

(Boston:

Beacon

Press,

1962).

48. Significantexceptions were, and remained,Jews, who ironically, requentlyex-

hibited a

manifest

desireto assimilate.

For

imperial

policy

on

the

Jewish

question

see

Hans

Rogger,

Jewish

Policies and

Right-Wing

Politics

in

Imperial

Russia

(Berke-

ley

and Los

Angeles:

University

of

California

Press,

1986).

Forthe

Soviet

period,

see

Benjamin

Pinkus,

The

Jews

of

the Soviet

Union

(Cambridge:

Cambridge

Univer-

sity

Press,

1988).

49.

The

1989

census

registered

11.2 million

linguistic

Russians

r

Russian-speakers

outside of

the

RSFSR,

mostly

in

Ukraine,

Kazakhstan,

nd

Belarus.

See

Nikolai

Rudensky,

Russian

minorities n the

newly

independent

states

n

Roman

Szpor-

luk, editor,

National

Identity

and

Ethnicity

in Russia

and the

New

States

of

Eurasia

(Armonkand London:M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 58-78, for the breakdownof ethnic

Russianand

Russian-speaking

minorities

by republic.

See

also

Hugh

Seton-Watson,

Russian

nationalism

n historical

perspective

n

Robert

Conquest,

The

Last

Em-

pire,

14-30,

for

the

view that

linguistic

Russification

did not

necessarilyhelp

the

cause

of ethnic

Russiannationalism.

50.

Sovetskaia

Rossiia,

82

(June

20,

1992).

51.

See

Richard

Pipes,

Russiaunder he Old

Regime,

or

the

patrimonial

eaturesof

the

Tsarist

regime.

In

his

sequel,

The RussianRevolution

New

York:

Random

House,

1990),

Pipes

argues

that

the

legacy

of

imperialpatrimonialism

was a

key

factor



799

63. To

my

knowlege,

the first

clear formulation

of the

concepts

of elite

and mass

avail-

ability

in the context

of social movement

mobilization

can be found

in the

unjustly

neglected

book

by

William

Kornhauser,

The Politics

of

Mass

Society (Glencoe,

Illi-

nois: The

Free

Press,

1959).

64.

For the Russian

image

of the state as a

bleak,

elemental force

that holds the land

in

its

grasp

and the

resurrection of this

image

as

a

consequence

of

Stalin's return

to

autocratic

motifs,

see Robert

Tucker,

The

image

of dual

Russia,

in his

The

Soviet

Political Mind

(New

York

and London:

W. W.

Norton,

1971),

121-143. For a

cri-

tique

of

the

application

of the

concept

of

patrimonialism

in

the context of

Soviet

communism,

see Stefan

Breuer,

Soviet

communism and

Weberian

sociology,

Journal

of

Historical

Sociology

53

(September,

1992):

267-290.

While

I

agree

with

Breuer's general point, I believe that it is not inappropriate to speak of certain

patrimonial

features of Soviet

political

culture,

especially

in

the

context of

Stalin's

rule.

65.

It

is

characteristic that

the sense of

victimization

of the

nation at

the hands of

the

state is a

leitmotif

in

the

works of

the most

celebrated

ideological

Russian

nation-

alist,

Aleksandr

Solzhenitsyn,

most

clearly

in

his

recent

book,

The

Russian

Ques-

tion

(New

York:

Farrar,

Straus,

and

Giroux,

1995).

66.

For

the

growing

national

tensions

in

the

Yugoslav

federation

during

the

1980s,

see

Sabrina

P.

Ramet,

Nationalism

and

Federalism

in

Yugoslavia:

1962-1991

(Bloom-

ington

and

Indianapolis:

Indiana

University

Press,

1992).

For

the

asymmetrical

application of the federal principle in the Serbian case, see Kosta Cavoski, Ustavni

polozaj

Srbije,

in

his

Revolucionarni

makijavelizam (Beograd:

Rad,

1989),

318-

343. It

could be

objected

that a

similar

asymmetry

can

be

observed in

the

case of

the

RSFSR

and

its

autonomous

republics.

That,

however,

would entail

missing

the

central

point

of

this

essay,

i.e.,

that

the RSFSR

was

never

conceived as a

genuine

federal

unit,

much

less a

Russian

national

homeland.

67.

For

the

attempts

of

Milosevi6's

predecessor,

Ivan

Stambolic,

in

this

respect,

see

his

collection of

speeches

from

the

1980s,

Rasprave

o

SR

Srbiji

(Zagreb:

Globus,

1988).

68.

See

Michel

Roux,

Les

Albanais en

Yougoslavie.

Minorite

nationale,

territoire et

developpement (Paris, 1992: La Maison des Sciences de l'Homme), 379-395, for

an

ethnically

neutral

estimate

of

Serbian

immigration

from

Kosovo

in

the

1961-

1987

period.

69.

For

the

growing

number of

Albanian

political

prisoners

in

the

1980s,

see

Kosovo:

dresiti

ili

seci

(Independent

Commission

Report,

Beograd:

Chronos,

1990).

For

the

gradual

'Albanianization

of

the

local

party organization,

see

Lenard

J.

Cohen,

The

Socialist

Pyramid:

Elites

and

Power

in

Yugoslavia

(Oakville

and New

York:

Mosaic

Press,

1989),

354-366.

70.

The

battle of

Kosovo

(1389)

marked

the

beginning

of

the

fall of

the medieval

Serb-

ian

kingdom

to

the

invading

Ottomans.

It

was

turned

into

a

myth

of

Christian

martyrdom at the hands of Moslem aliens

through

cycles

of

epic

poems

which

were

passed

on

orally

from

generation

to

generation.

The idea of

reconquering

Kosovo

was a

strong

motivating

factor in

nineteenth-century

Serbian

nationalism,

but

the

reconquista

took

place

only

in

the

First

Balkan

War

of

1912.

The

Kosovo

myth

was

resuscitated in

the

1980s in

many

books

and

publications,

for

example,

in

Kosovo i

Metohija

u

srpskoj

istoriji

(Beograd:

Srpska

knjizevna

zadruga, 1989).

71.

Milosevic's

rise

to

power

is

well

covered in

Slavoljub Djuki6,

Izmedju

slave i

ana-

teme:

Politicka

biografija

Slobodana

Milosevica

(Beograd:

Filip

Visnjic,

1994).

72.

Compare

Ralf

Dahrendorf,

Society

and

Democracy

in

Germany

(New

York

and



800

London:

W.

W.

Norton

&

Company,1967),

3,

in the

context

of

the

German's

his-

torical obsession with

the

national,

t the

expense

of the social

question:

As

t

happens,

national

questions,

n

contrast

o social

questions,

nvariably

end to

be

questions

posed

to

others rather

han to oneself.

Moreover,

while social

questions

generally

call for

answers for which the

questioners

hemselves are

responsible,

responsibility

or

national

questions

can

easily

be shirked

or

rationalized.

73. In a certain

sense,

this

dilemmawas not unlike

that

of the

many

European

social-

democratic

and

socialist

parties

on

the eve of WorldWar

One.

For the

connection

betweenthe ethnic

conception

of

the nation

(Volksnation)

nd the

tendency

o treat

political

opposition

as treasonable

n

the

German

historical

context,

see

M. Reiner

Lepsius,

Nation

und

Nationalismusn

Deutschland,

35-238.

74. For the combatethos as the definingfeatureof communistparties,see Philip

Selznick,

The

OrganizationalWeapon

Glencoe,

Illinois:The

Free

Press,

1960)

and

Ken

Jowitt,

The New

WorldDisorder

(Berkeley

and

Los

Angeles:

University

of

California

Press,

1992),

1-50.

75.

A

good

analysis

of the

combat

spirit

of Milosevic's

peeches

can be

found in

Kosta

tavoski,

Slobodan

protiv

lobode

(Beograd:Dosije,

1991).

76. For

the

relative

over-representation

f Serbs

n

the

officer

corps

and

Croatian

party

structures,

ee

Cohen,

TheSocialist

Pyramid

128,

419.

Although

I do

not havedata

on the exact

proportion

of

Serbs

from

Croatia

as opposed

to

Serbs

from

Serbia)

n

the officer

corps,

Serbian

officers from

Krajina

played

a

special

role

in the

high

commandandYugoslavpoliticsas a whole.Thus,NikolaLjubicic, he retiredcom-

mander

n chief of the

Yugoslav

army,

was instrumental

n

bringing

Milosevi6

to

power

in

Serbia,

and

Veljko

Kadijevic

and

Blagoje

Adzi6

commanded

the

army

during

he

first

stages

of

the war

n

Croatia.

77.

Yegor

Ligachev,

nside

Gorbachev's

Kremlin

New

York:Pantheon

Books,

1993).

78.

Yeltsin's

and

Gorbachev's)

most

important

peeches

from the

perestroika

period

are

collected

in

Gorbachev-Yeltsin:

500 dnei

politicheskogo

protivostoiania

(Moskva:

Terra,

1992).

The

theme

of

the Stalinist

egacy

and Russia's

victimization

by

the Soviet

center

also

runs

through

Yeltsin's

memoirs,

The

Struggle

or

Russia

(New

York:

Random

House,

1994).

79. See Victoria Bonnell, GregoryFreidin,and Ann Cooper, editor, Russia at the

Barricades:

Eyewitness

Accounts

of

the

August

1991

Coup

(Armonk,

New

York:

M.

E.

Sharpe,

1994)

and

John

Dunlop,

The

Rise

of

Russia

and

the

Fall

of

the

Soviet

Empire Princeton:

Princeton

University

Press,

1993)

for two

analyses

of some

of

the causes

of the failure

of coercive

state

institutions

during

he dramatic

days

of

August,

1991.

80. For

Russocentrism

s

an

element

in

Ukrainian

political

culture,

see

Orest

Sub-

telny,

Russocentrism,

egionalism

nd

the

political

culture

of

Ukraine,

n

Vladi-

mir

Tismaneanu,

editor,

Political Culture

and Civil

Society

in

the New States

of

Eurasia

Armonk,

New York:

M.

E.

Sharpe,

1995),

189-208.

81. For

survey

datathat demonstrateherelativelyriendlygrassroots thnicreality, ee

Evgenii

Golovakha,

Natalia

Panina,

and

Nikolai

Churilov,

Russians

n

Ukraine,

n

Vladimir

Shlapentokh,

Munir

Sendich,

and

Emil

Payin,

The

New

Russian

Diaspora

(Armonk,

New York:

M.

E.

Sharpe,

1994),

59-72.

This,

naturally,

oes not

mean

that

hostility

could

not be

mobilized

by

both

Russian and Ukrainian

political

entrepreneurs.

82.

For an

excellent

discussion

of

linguistic

divisions

and

their

contribution

o the

re-

gional,

East-West

polarization

of

the

vote

in

Ukraine,

see

Dominique

Arel,

The

temptation

f

the

nationalizing

tate,

n

Tismaneanu,

Political

Culture,

157-189.



801

83.

Although

the

ideological

transformation f the

current eader of Russiancommu-

nists,

Gennadii

Ziuganov,

roma

believer

n

class

struggle

nto a defenderof Russian

national interests

began

prior

to

August

1991,

his recent

rejection

of

Western

evolutionism n

the name

of

Spenglerian

houghts,

s

telling.

See his latest books

Derzhava

(Moskva:

Informpechat',

994)

and Za

gorizontom

(Moskva:

Inform-

pechat',

1995)

for the

peculiar

mixture

of

left and

right

alues and ideals

that

informsmuchof

communist-nationalist

hinking

n

Russia.

84.

It is

indicative that Yeltsin's

popularityrating

dropped

dramatically

n

both

in-

stances

in

which he had

applied military

force

against

civilians

(parliament

October

1993;

Chechnia December

1994).

vujacic, veljko (1996) historical legacies, nationalist mobilization, and political outcomes in...

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