vver evolution and world references, licensing and post ... 3/1. vver 1200 - design and...
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THE STATE ATOMIC ENERGY CORPORATION ROSATOM
VVER evolution and world references,
licensing and Post-Fukusima safety technologies
SERGEY NOVOSELTSEV
JSC Rusatom Overseas
November, 2017
Accra
2
Content
Design approach and evolution
VVER-1200 overview
Main components of VVER-1200
VVER-1200 safety
Conclusions
DESIGN APPROACH
AND EVOLUTION
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information. 4
Design features expected from Gen III NPPs
* The IAEA safety target for future plants is 1x10-5. Calculated large release frequency (for radioactivity) is generally about ten times less than CDF.
a standardized design for
each type to expedite
licensing, reduce capital
cost and reduce
construction time;
a simpler and more rugged
design, making them easier
to operate and less
vulnerable to operational
upsets;
higher availability
and longer operating life -
typically
60 years
further
reduced
possibility
of core melt accidents*
1 2 3 4
substantial grace period, so
that following shutdown the
plant requires no active
intervention for (typically)
72 hours
resistance to serious
damage that would allow
radiological release from an
aircraft impact
higher burn-up to use fuel
more fully and efficiently
and reduce the amount of
waste
greater use of burnable
absorbers ('poisons') to
extend fuel life
5 6 7 8
WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION
INTERPRETS THIRD-GENERATION
REACTORS AS:
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information. 5
VVER-1200: Design evolution (1)
First VVER
since 196x
VVER-440
197x
• Leaktight
compartment
• Small LOCA
• Low leakage
containment
building
• Pipe 100 mm
break
• Limited release of
excess coolant at
high pressure
• Containment
• Primary circuit (Pipe
850 mm) break
• The use of safety
systems to
overcome design
basis accidents
• Double containment
• The use of means of
management of
design extension
conditions
• Passive heat removal
• Core catcher in case
of core meltdown
VVER-1000
198xVVER-1200
200x
VVER-1200 OVERVIEW
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information. 7
Advanced Technology: Rosatom Gen III+ VVER Design
Performance Indicators
VVER-1200 – FUSION OF TECHNOLOGICAL HERITAGE AND INNOVATIONS
First-of-a-class PWR Technology
Nominal Output* 1,200 MWe
Life cycle 60+
Efficiency 37%
Own power
consumption*≈ 7.5%
Availability > 0.9
Maneuverability 100-50-100
Turbine low Speed/high Speed
Maximum Fuel
burn-upup to 70 MW*day/kg U
Safety systems active + passive
Seismic loaddepends on the site and
customer’s request
ReferenceIn commercial operation
since Feb, 2017
* depends on particular project
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information.
NOVOVORONEZH
NPP II UNIT 1 Commercial Operation –
February, 2017
First VVER-1200 Project ImplementedNovovoronezh NPP II, Unit 1
NOVOVORONEZH II UNIT 1 CAN BE CALLED THE FIRST AND ONLY
GENERATION III+ NPP IN THE WORLD THAT IS ALREADY GENERATING
POWER.
VVER-1200 REACTOR TECHNOLOGY IS EMPLOYED AT THE UNIT –
A FIRST-OF-A-CLASS PWR TECHNOLOGY, COMPLIANT WITH POST-
FUKUSHIMA SAFETY REQUIREMENTS.
8
MORE TO GO:
Hanhikivi NPP (Finland)
Ostrovets NPP (Belarus)
Paks NPP (Hungary)
Leningrad NPP (Russia)
Ropoor (Bangladesh)
Al Dabaa (Egypt)
MAIN COMPONENTS
OF REACTOR BUILDING
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information. 10
VVER-1200: Reactor building Main Components
MAIN
COMPONENTS
OF REACTOR
BUILDING:
REACTOR
STEAM GENERATORS
MAIN CIRCULATING
PUMPS
1
2
3
1
2
2
3
3
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information. 11
VVER-1200: Reactor building Main ComponentsReactor Pressure Vessel
• LESS IMPURITIES in base metal and welds, LESS
NICKEL in welds, increased vessel diameter in
order to REDUCE NEUTRON IRRADIATION of the
vessel;
• according to extensive research the MATERIAL
MAINTAINS DUCTILITY at the lowest possible
temperatures after 60 years of operation at full
power;
• LOW MATERIAL EMBRITTLEMENT by neutron
irradiation can be confirmed by investigating
material samples placed in optimum way on vessel
wall.
1 – Control rod driving mechanism (CRDM)
2 – Reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head
3 – Reactor pressure vessel (RPV)
4 – Protective tubes unit , inlet and outlet nozzles
5 – Belt zone
6 – Reactor baffle
7 – Core
REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL
MATERIALS AND STRUCTURE:
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information. 12
VVER-1200: Reactor building Main ComponentsMain Circulating Pumps (MCP)
1. Primary circuit main circulating PUMPS
BEARINGS ARE WATER COOLED
and WATER LUBRICATED that
eliminates risk of oil fire inside the
reactor building.
2. Reactor cooling piping is designed in
compliance with the “LEAK BEFORE
BREAK” concept.
1
2
GCNA-1391
TWO SPECIAL DESIGN FEATURES
OF MCPS:
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information. 13
VVER-1200: Reactor building Main ComponentsSteam Generators
PGV-1000MK Performance
Capacity, MWt 800
Steam flow, t/h 1602
Inside diameter of steam generator vessel, m
4,2
Mass, t 330
• LARGER WATER INVENTORY
• Steam generators horizontal configuration
enables VVER to LOSE WATER SLOWER in
case of feed water supply failure
• LARGER STEAM EVAPORATION SURFACE
reduces steam velocity preventing tube
vibrations
• ENHANCED SEISMIC RESISTANCE
• EASY SG REPLACEMENT (no need to make a
hole in the containment wall)
• Material of the tubes: «08Х18Н10T» steel
(equiv. AISI 321) with ~10% Ni
• LONG SERVICE LIFE
VVER UTILIZES 4
HORIZONTAL STEAM
GENERATORS WITH
THE FOLLOWING
ADVANTAGES:
MAIN COMPONENTS
OF TURBINE BUILDING
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information. 15
VVER-1200: Turbine building Main Components
TURBINE TYPE:
• High-speed turbines - 3000 rpm
• Low-speed turbines -1500 rpm
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN:
• Russian referenced technologies
(Power Machines)
• Foreign solutions (GE-Alstom, Doosan,
Skoda Power, Siemens, etc.)
ROSATOM OFFERS A FLEXIBLE
AND TAILOR-MADE APPROACH
TO THE TURBINE SELECTION
AND ASSISTS PARTNER COUNTRIES
IN OPTING FOR THE MOST SUITABLE
SOLUTION ACCORDING TO THE
VARIOUS PARAMETERS:
VVER-1200 SAFETY
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information. 17
VVER-1200: Defence-in-Depth
CONTAINMENT
SYSTEM
Preventing fission
products release into
environment
PRIMARY CIRCUIT
Preventing fission
products release into
containment
FUEL ROD
Preventing fission
products release to
primary circuit
FUEL MATRIX
Preventing fission
products release
inside the fuel
cladding
DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH PRINCIPLE IS BASED ON USING PHYSICAL BARRIERS
TO PREVENT IONIZING RADIATION AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS LEAKS INTO THE
ENVIRONMENT, AND THE SYSTEM OF TECHNICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL MEASURES
ON BARRIERS MANAGEMENT
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information.
The main principle in the design of the
VVER-1200 PLANTS is:
18
VVER-1200: Safety Concept
THAT ALLOWS THE OPERATOR TO USE DIFFERENT SAFETY SYSTEMS
INDEPENDENTLY AND FLEXIBLY, DEPENDING ON THE ACCIDENT
SCENARIO
ALL FUNDAMENTAL
SAFETY FUNCTIONS
SHALL BE PROVIDED
BOTH WITH
ACTIVE
SYSTEMS that have reliable
AC power supply
PASSIVE
SYSTEMSthat do not need
electricity
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information.
CONTROL
OF REACTIVITY
• preventing uncontrolled
reactor power increase
• ensuring fast and safe
reactor shutdown if
required
19
Fundamental Safety Functions
1 2 3
PROVISION OF THE THREE FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS IS NECESSARY AND SUFFICENT TO ENSURE NUCLEAR SAFETY:
CONTAINMENT
OF RADIOACTIVE
MATERIALS
• preventing significant
radioactive releases
to the environment
REMOVAL OF DECAY
HEAT TO THE
ULTIMATE HEAT SINK
• cooling of shutdown
reactor
• cooling of spent nuclear
fuel
Ensuring fundamental safety functions
#1 CONTROL OF REACTIVITY
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information.
DESIGN DIVERSITY PRINCIPLE
21
Control of Reactivity
When control rods are dropped into the core the reactor will turn
IN SHUTDOWN STATE (without boron injection)
TO ENSURE
REACTIVITY
CONTROL VVER
UTILIZES
BORON INJECTION
SYSTEMS
(ACTIVE SAFETY
SYSTEM)
REACTOR CONTROL
AND PROTECTION
SYSTEM
(PASSIVE SAFETY
SYSTEM)
VVER-1200 REACTOR ENJOYS A UNIQUE SAFETY FEATURE IN
COMPARISON WITH OTHER PRESSURIZED WATER REACTORS:
Ensuring fundamental safety functions
#2 REMOVAL OF DECAY HEAT TO THE
ULTIMATE HEAT SINK
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information. 23
VVER-1200: removal of decay heat to the ultimate heat sink
• via the secondary circuit (water circulation can be established in a
closed loop: steam generators – steam lines – turbine by-pass –
capacitor – feedwater lines)
ACTIVE SYSTEMS (IN CASE OF DESIGN BASIS
CONDITIONS - DBC) REMOVE RESIDUAL HEAT AND TURN NPP INTO COLD SHUTDOWN MODE:
PASSIVE SYSTEMS (IN CASE OF DESIGN EXTENSION
CONDITIONS - DEC) REMOVE THE RESIDUAL HEAT FROM STEAM GENERATORS DIRECTLY
TO THE ATMOSPHERE.
• by removing heat directly from the primary circuit to the atmosphere
DESIGN DIVERSITY PRINCIPLE
Ensuring of fundamental safety functions
#3 CONFINEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE
MATERIALS
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information. 25
Confinement of Radioactive Materials
all physical phenomena that could occur in connection with core
meltdown and endanger the containment integrity are taken into
account, and
dedicated means and systems are provided to ensure containment
integrity.
.
systems that are completely independent and separated from the
systems that are intended to prevent a severe reactor core damage.
THE STRATEGY FOR PROTECTION OF VVER-1200
CONTAINMENT AFTER POTENTIAL REACTOR CORE
MELTDOWN ENSURES THAT
PROTECTION OF VVER-1200 CONTAINMENT
INTEGRITY IS BASED ON
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information. 26
VVER-1200: Double Containment
• INTERNAL CONTAINMENT – pre-
stressed reinforced concrete of 1.2
METERS thickness in cylindrical part
(1.1 METER in dome) with 6 MM internal
steel cladding.
• EXTERNAL CONTAINMENT – reinforced
concrete of 2.2 METERS thickness in
cylindrical part (0.8 METERS in dome).
• The gap between two walls (annulus) is
1.8 METERS and has filtering ventilation
to outside.
INTERNAL CONTAINMENT
EXTERNAL CONTAINMENT
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information. 27
VVER-1200: Core Catcher
• installed under the reactor vessel to PROTECT
CONTAINMENT FROM MELTDOWN IMPACTS (the
temperature of molten core exceeds 2000°C).
• RETAINS MOLTEN CORE AND SOLID
FRAGMENTS of the core and reactor vessel.
• COOLS AND SOLIDIFIES MOLTEN CORE due to
sacrificial material.
• FORMS A CRUST AT THE UPPER PART to
prevent radioactive leakage into the
environment.
CORE CATCHER
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information.
Fukushima Lessons Learnt
28
ALL VVER PLANTS IN OPERATION OR ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION
ARE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE LATEST SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
Long-term cooling of reactor core without power supply
Long-term decay heat removal independent of primary heat sink (natural or artificial water body, cooling tower, etc)
Maintaining reactor containment integrity after a potential
core meltdown accident
All technical means for management DEC should
be protected from the effects of accidents by
using mobile means stored in safe places.
Safety systems of a single unit of an
NPP must be independent from the
safety systems of another unit deployed
on the same site
The defense-in-depth concept and
the practical elimination of
accidents with early or large
release are fully applicable to the
spent fuel pool
CONCLUSIONS
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations to Rosatom and its affiliated companies. Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information. 30
Conclusions
1
2
3
5
4
The VVER type nuclear power plants have gone through a continuous
evolution during 50 years and have demonstrated their safety and
reliability in power generation.
The VVER-1200 plants have safety design features that take into
account the latest development of safety requirements and safety
technology.
All fundamental safety functions are ensured by multiple different
safety systems, both active and passive.
Such combination ensures both quick (due to active part) and reliable
(due to passive part) mitigation of any accidents that can occur.
The VVER designers have developed already before the Fukushima
Daiichi accident the NPP safety features that have been commonly
suggested to new nuclear power plants after the accident.
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