w. j. thompson, aristotle: philosophy and politics, theory and practice

8/12/2019 W. J. Thompson, Aristotle: Philosophy and Politics, Theory and Practice

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Aristotle: Philosophy and Politics Theory andPractice

by WalterJ Tlwmpson

I will examine here what has become a common and in manyrespects all too casual, interpretation of the relation in Aristotle sthought of two distinctions: on the one hand, that between theorytheoria) and practice praxis); on the other, that between philosophyand politics.

On the currently prevailing account, the two pairs are symmetrical:the distinction between theory and practice mirrors at the level ofactivities ofmind energeiai) that between philosophy and politics at thelevel of ways of life bioi). Theory and practice as activities are bifur-cated, and each is assigned to a distinctive way of life. On this account,the distinction between ways of life is the distinction between activitieswrit large. The philosophic life becomes the life of theory-the life inaccordance with, guided by or composed of theoretical activities-thepolitical life becomes the life of practice-the life in accordance with,guided by or composed of practical activities.1 The ambiguity in theseformulations is intentional, for as I have claimed above the interpreta-tion in question is a casual one. t of course makes a significantdifference which of these formulations one chooses but it is not uncom-mon for commentators to run them into one another, indifferentlyswitching from one to the next. Commentators are encouraged in theirimprecision by Aristotle s own treatment, for while he does indeed,throughout his practical writings, distinguish both theory and practiceas activities and philosophy and politics as ways of life and doesmoreover, loosely associate the pairs, he nowhere explores their relationin any systematic fashion. Now the absence of such an explicit thematictreatment may appear a deficiency in Aristotle s account, it may beconsidered an oversight on his part, but we should, at the outset at least,and in order that we not miss something that Aristotle intends therebyto show us, leave open the possibility that his silence on this matter is

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110 REASON IN HISTORYintended and that the absence of an explicit treatment of the twodistinctions is itself significant or revealing.The consequences of the common interpretation I have outlined aredistressing. The dichotomous reading of the distinctions between the-ory and practice, philosophy and politics, opens an unbridgeable riftbetween thought and action, between intellectual and moral virtue,2which undermines the integrity of Aristotle's ethical-political teachingas a whole, and threatens to leave us with the unhappy alternatives ofan unreflective political activism and a philosophic amoralism. Com-mentators are sent scrambling for a way to reconcile what appear to betwo divergent tendencies in Aristotle's thought: one which elevatespractice and its virtues to the central position in a good human life, andanother which denigrates practice in order to elevate theory and itsvirtues to that central position. There have been several interpretiveresponses to this dilemma. Some commentators attempt to dissolve thedilemma by writing off, on the basis of some interpretation of the wholeof Aristotle's ethical-political teaching, one or the other tendency asinconsistent with the whole. The choice of which tendency to mutedivides contemporary commentators into inclusive end and dominantend interpreters. Inclusive end interpreters reject, while dominantend interpreters accept, an intellectualist reading of Aristotle's teach-ing on the human good; the former deny, while the latter affirm, thatAristotle teaches the superiority of theoretical to practical activity, andtherefore, the superiority of the philosophic to the political way of life.3Other commentators allow the dilemma to stand, and maintain eitherthat Aristotle unintentionally forwarded two incompatible teachings,4that the duality of teachings represents a genuine duality of alterna-tives,5 or that the duality reflects a difference in the audience to whomthe respective teachings are addressed.Each of these responses, however, begins from the dichotomousinterpretation of theory and practice, philosophy and politics, sketchedabove. All read the distinction between activities and lives as a sym-metrical dichotomy. All suppose, therefore, that for Aristotle to affirmthe superiority of an activity is for him to enjoin its correspondingpursuit. All suppose, that is, that Aristotle intends his teaching on thenature and worth of each activity qu activity to be determinative ofaction in particular situations. This supposition, I will argue, is mis-taken, and arises from a misinterpretation of the distinctions betweenlives and activities.

At the root of the contemporary interpretive dilemmas, then, is aconfusion concerning the distinctions between theory and practice,philosophy and politics. f the existence of these distinctions is beyonddoubt, their meaning and relation remain highly problematic. What isrequired, therefore, is a careful reading of Aristotle's own differentiation


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ARISTOTLE: PHILOSOPHY AND PoLITICSof the pairs. I will attend to this task of technical or terminologicalclarification first.

Aristotle's method in political science (politike) is to begin with theappearances (ta phainomena), with what is first for or most apparentto us, and then to ascend, by way of dialectical clarification, to what isfirst in itself' or first by nature NE I, 4, 1095a31-b4).7 In fidelity to

Aristotle's own way of proceeding, we too should begin from the appear-ances.

Of the two pairs of distinctions, it is that between philosophy or thephilosopher and politics or the political mans that first comes to sightin Aristotle's account NE I, 5, 1095b14ff.). The difference or oppositionbetween lives seems more apparent, more immediate, than that be-tween activities. Indeed, I will later argue that it is the priority of thedifference between lives which structures Aristotle's presentation ofthedifference between activities. For the moment, however, let us noticethat according to Aristotle's own order of treatment, first for us is theappearance of a difference between lives, of contending ways oflife; whatis first in itself' t h e precise nature of that difference-remains un-clear.AtNE 1,5, Aristotle begins his inquiry into rival notions of happinessand the good. From the lives men lead, he argues, the prominentcandidates are three: the many and most vulgar hold [happiness andthe good to be] pleasure, and on account of this they love the life ofenjoyment (ton bion ton apolaustikon). Such a life, and such a concep-tion, Aristotle summarily dismisses as utterly slavish, as an existencefit for cattle. Only the fact, he says, that some men in high places favorsuch a life even gives it a hearing.9 Refined and practical men (hoicharientes kai praktikai), he continues, [hold happiness and the goodto be] honor (timen), for this is nearly the end of the politicallife. l0 Thisview Aristotle also criticizes as being too superficial. For honor seemsto rest more with the one who honors than the one who is honored, whilewe think happiness to be something that is one's own and self-sufficient.Moreover, it appears that those who pursue honor desire to be honoredonly by men of practical wisdom, who know them, and who honor themfor their excellence. There is an unrecognized tension in the lives ofthose who are considered refined and practical between the pursuit ofhonor on the one hand, and the pursuit of excellence on the other.ll Ontheir own account, or in their own self-understanding, however, it is thehonor which is primary. The life devoted to the pursuit of this-albeitqualified-honor they hold to be the politicallife. 2

The third candidate, the theoretical life ho theoretikos) is identified,but quickly dropped, with the promise of a later examination. Aristotleremains silent on the identity of its proponents, and their peculiar viewof happiness and the good. By his silence we are led to wonder whether


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112 REASON IN HISTORYthe character of this l ife-what distinguishes it from its rivals-isindeed apparent, is prominent in the manner Aristotle had earliersuggested. We wonder the more as he styles it the theoretical, ratherthan the philosophic life. Is the character of theory or theorizing, itsdifference from other sorts of activity or pursuit, in some sense elusive,hidden from public view?To this point Aristotle has said nothing explicit of the other of ourtwo pairs of distinctions, that between theory and practice. Indeed, thisdistinction will not be taken up thematically until NE VI. Still, we doreceive anticipations ofthis later treatment, in the form ofme hodo log -cal reflections on the nature of the inquiry carried out in NE and Pol.The end of this study, which Aristotle calls political science, is notknowledge griOsis) but action praxis) NE I, 2, 1094b11 and I, 3,1095a5). Thus, in his fullest statement: Since, then, the presentmatters are not for the sake of theory as the others are-for it is not inorder to know what virtue is that we are inquiring, but in order tobecome good, since without this [our inquiry] would be of no benefit-itis necessary for us to examine the things concerning actions, and howwe must act NE II, 2, 1103b26-31). A practical inquiry, then, is onenot only concerned with matters of action, but undertaken for the sakeof action itself. Moreover, while the subject matter of a theoreticalinquiry is as yet unclear, still we are told that it is pursued for its ownsake, for the sake of knowing itself.We are led by Aristotle's remarks on the differences between inquir-ies to wonder about the limits imposed on the present practical studyby the nature of its object and end. As for the former, we are told thatwe can expect only as much precision as the subject matter will admit;that because of the variability and contingency of action there cannotbe a science or art of action; that because actions are ultimate particu-lars we cannot rest content with generalities but must scrutinize theparticulars; and that our generalities about matters of action will be lesstrue the more comprehensive we attempt to make them NE I, 3,1094b12-27; 11,2, 1103b35-1104a11; II, 7, 1107a28-32). As for the latter,if political science is pursued for the sake of action, might it be the casethat the treatment of some problems will extend only so far as isnecessary to ensure right action?13 Might the inquiry as a whole bebounded by practical and pedagogical concerns? I will return to thisquestion in my conclusion, but we would do well to keep it in mind aswe proceed. Let us look next to Aristotle's explicit treatment of thedistinction between theory and practice.

Having treated extensively of the excellences ofcharacter in NE II VAristotle turns, in NE VI, to an examination of the excellences ofthought. 4 His account here is perhaps the most technical of all thediscussions in his political science, so we will attempt to follow it closely.Aristotle differentiates two sub-parts of what he has called the reason-having to logon echon) part of the soul: first, that by which we study(or theorize about-theorein) the beings whose principles cannot be


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ARISTOTLE: PHILOSOPHY ND PoLITICS 113other than they are, and second, that by which [we study the beingswhose principles] can be other than they are. The first part he termsthe scientific to epistemonikon), the second the calculative or accountingto logistikon) part. He then examines the work or function ergon) ofeach part, with a view to determining its proper excellence, that whichdisposes it to doing its work well.

There are, Aristotle maintains, two sorts of thought and truth hedianoia kai he aletheia): practical praktike) and theoretical (or rather,theoretical and not practical or productive ). The object of the formeris a thing-to-be-done (to prakton), and because it concerns action oracting, its work is said to be the attainment of truth in agreement withright desire. The object ofthe latter is a thing necessary and unchang-ing, or a thing under the aspect of its necessity and unchangeability,and its work is said to be the attainment of truth alone. Note that whilethe work of both parts is said to be truth, the truth of practical thoughtalone is somehow yoked with desire. This is so because the object ofpractical thought is a thing-to-be-done, an action which mayor may notcome to be, and the motive force (arche kinesis) of action is thought yokedwith desire, or what Aristotle calls forechoice prohairesis).15 Thoughtitself, Aristotle tells us, moves nothing, but [only that thought] whichis for the sake of [something] and practical. Because it is forechoicewhich puts us to act, and the origin of forechoice is desire and reasonfor the sake of something, doing well eupraxia) requires both theexcellences ofthought and those of character, the concord or agreementof reason logos) and desire orexis) NE VI, 1-2, 1138b35-1139b7).

f we turn back now, to apply this discussion to the relation betweenthe distinctions of theory and practice, philosophy and politics, we willsee the error in the common and casual interpretation. On that readingthe distinction between theory and practice amounted to a bifurcationofthought and action, and the philosophic life became the life of thought,the political life that of action. But according to NE VI, however, thedistinction between theory and practice is not a distinction betweenthought and action but between two kinds of thought, differentiated bytheir objects. Theoretical thought is about things that cannot be other-wise, things whose existence and intelligibility is unalterable by humanaction. Practical thought is about things that can be otherwise, thingswhose existence or intelligibility depends on human action. But accord-ing to this differentiation, to think about theorizing-to considerwhether one will, in some particular circumstance, engage in theoreticalthought-is to think not theoretically but practically. f heory itself isabout things that cannot be otherwise, then theory cannot be abouttheorizing, about the practice or pursuit of theory. In any particularsituation, whether, when, or in what manner one will theorize is not atheoretical but a practical question, a question of possible courses ofaction. f one does theorize it is because he has chosen theorizing ashere and now more to-be-done than any other practicable alternative.Moreover, unlike god or the gods, human beings are not simple and


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114 REASON IN HISTORYso cannot be in continuous activity. Natural human complexity entailsthat our activities are many, and both come to be and pass away. If asAristotle says, thought itself can move nothing, but only that thoughtwhich is for the sake of something and practical, then only practicalthought can bring theoretical thought into being. Theorizing, then,comes to be through that combination of thought yoked with desire thatAristotle calls forechoice. Considered as an activity in which one mayor may not engage in any particular circumstance, theorizing is apractice (see Pol VII, 3, 1325b16-21).16 And as a practice, it would seem,the determination of its exercise must fall to the judgment of practicalreason.

On Aristotle's account, then, the realm of practice is encompassingof all pursuits, of all human activities as chosen and performed, andtherefore, of the pursuit and performance of theory. However differenta practice theorizing may be, it is a practice all the same. 7 And, asAristotle says in concludingNE VI, though practical wisdom phronesis)is not authoritative kuria) over theoretical wisdom sophia), still it doessee to its coming to be NE VI, 13, 1145a6-11).18 If that is, practicalreason cannot construct the objects or the purpose of theory, cannotmake these to be other than they are, still practical reason does deter-mine the where, and when, and in what manner that theorizing comesto be. Considering activities not in themselves, in their nature asenergeiai, but as particular acts chosen and performed, practical reasonand its excellences are comprehensive (compare NE VI, 12, 1144al-9,and VI, 13, 1145a2-6).We have, therefore, no prima facie reason to suppose that thedetermination of action in the case of theorizing differs fundamentallyfrom that determination in the case of any other possible practice.Despite the fact that Aristotle clearly argues for the superiority oftheoryand wisdom qua activity and excellence NE VI, 12, 1144a2-6; X 71177a12-1177b26),19 he nowhere suggests that from this teaching onecan deduce a decision ru l e maximize theorizing t ha t would deter-mine action in any particular case. Furthermore, he does not do sobecause his teaching on the superiority of theory and its principalvirtue-that the excellent exercise of theory is most happiness-consti-tuting because it is most actual, that is, most continuous, most pleasant,most self-sufficient, most final, most leisured, etc.-is a teaching on thenature of human being or human capacities or on the nature of thehuman good. It is, in other words, a theoretical teaching, ' 'Humanbeing, however, does not act; particular human beings do, and they doso in situations that are irreducibly unique. The human good, more-over, is not properly something that can be done; only particular actionscan. If as Aristotle says, practice is concerned with ultimate particularactions, then a theoretical teaching on human nature and the humangood cannot be determinative of action; it cannot simply be enacted.Practically speaking, Aristotle will say that the end of action is doingwell eupraxia). Doing well is happiness eudaimonia) concretized,


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ARIsTOTLE: PHILOSOPHY ND PoUTICS 115rendered practical. The task of practical reason is to discern whichparticular action, of the many that might possibly be done, should bedone, is appropriate in and for the particular circumstances in whichone acts. Practical wisdom perceives and commands that particularaction which constitutes doing well in the here and now (see N I, 8,1098b20-22; II, 9 1109b20-23; VI, 2, 1139b3-4; VI, 4, 1140b7-8; VI, 8,1142a14-25; VI, 11, 1143a25-b25). A true account of human nature orthe human good will be useful, perhaps indispensable, in helping one tostructure one's life as a whole, to delimit one's broad entanglements,20or to sort out in particular situations the nature of the activities or goodsat stake, but it cannot replace practical wisdom's particular situationaljudgment of appropriateness.2

IIIMuch more can, and should, be said on this question, but I would like

to step back from these matters of technical or terminological clarifica-tion to address a subtler, but perhaps more fundamental, problem ofinterpretation. I will inquire no longer into the nature ofthe distinctionsbetween theory and practice, philosophy and politics, but into the causeor causes of the common appearance of those distinctions. On Aristotle'sview there should be reasons for this appearance, and knowing thesereasons should further our understanding of the distinctions them-selves.Let us first recall that Aristotle's procedure in political science is toset out from the appearances, to begin with what is first for us and toascend by way of dialectical clarification to what is fIrst in itself' orfirst by nature. In accordance with this method, Aristotle's owntreatment of the difference between activities and lives should be adialectical engagement ofthe first appearances of those distinctions. Asthe inquiry at hand is political science, the first appearances should bethose that come to sight from within political life. Indeed, I will arguethat the common interpretationof the distinctions is precisely their first,political appearance: the dichotomous reading of the distinctions be-tween theory and practice, philosophy and politics, is the appearance tothose who are called political or practical men of the differencebetween their own characteristic activity and way of life and the char-acteristic activity and way oflife ofthe philosopher. That contemporarycommentators have followed the political men in their readings is aproduct of their misunderstanding of the dialectical pedagogy of Aris-totle's political science.

Some initial evidence for this hypothesis can be found in the treat-ment of the wise at N VI, 7. Aristotle there defines wisdom asscientifIc knowledge episteme) and insight nous) concerning the thingsmost honorable by nature. On account ofthis, he continues, [people]say that Anaxagoras and Thales and such men are wise sop}wus) butnot practically wise phronimous), when they seem ignorant of the


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116 REASON IN HISTORYthings advantageous to themselves; and they say that they know thingsextraordinary, and wonderful, and difficult, and divine, but useless,because they do not seek the human goods ta anthropina agatha).Practical wisdom is concerned, however, with the human [goods], aboutwhich there can be deliberation NE VI, 7, 1141b6-9).22 Because theobjects of wisdom are things beyond the pale of common human concern,the pursuit of wisdom is taken not to belong to the realm of practice.The uselessness of wisdom is taken to entail not merely the impracti-cality, but the non-practicality of its pursuit. Anaxagoras is mentionedagain at NE X 8, where Aristotle is defending the view that happinessdoes not require many and great external goods, that one can do thethings in accordance with virtue with only moderate resources.Anaxagoras is here cited as one who did not seem to hold that the happyman was either rich or powerful, saying that he would not be surprisedif such a man were to appear strange to the many; for they judge byexternals, as these are all they perceive NE X 8, 1179al-16).23 Therich and powerful, then, and those who look up to the rich and powerful,greatly overestimate the necessity or worth of the external goods. Tothese, who judge by externals, any life which pursues such goods evenmoderately appears strange.24 Ifphilosophers seem to overvalue thingsuseless, they also undervalue the things commonly esteemed as trulyadvantageous.

The common views of happiness, Aristotle tells us, exaggerate thevalue of external goods. Ofthese views, that which is politically prepon-derant-the view of the most respectable-holds that the greatest of theexternal goods is honor time). Those in positions of regard aim aboveall at honor, and consider it the prize of excellence and noble deeds(NE IV, 3, 1123b17-21); and in politics, too, honor is the reward forcontribution to the common advantage NE VII, 13, 1163b3-8). Recallthat in NE I, in the initial examination of lives, the refined andpractical were said to take honor, or a qualified honor, to be the end ofhuman life.25 And because politics offers the most and the grandestopportunities for the pursuit of honor, they were said to devote them-selves to the polit ical life. t is this group of political men hoi politikoi),I will argue, who are Aristotle's principal interlocutors in his treatmentof our two pairs of distinctions. It is their conception of activities andlives which, because politically preponderant, is first for us. Theirperspective on the distinctions is the point from which Aristotle's dia-lectic embarks.

The clearest examJ>le of the dialectical engagement of this view isfound at Pol VI, 2-3. Here Aristotle presides over a debate betweenadvocates of a life of political commitment and one of withdrawal,between political activists and political quietists. There is, he tells us,a dispute among those who agree that the most choiceworthy life is theone accompanied by virtue, as to whether the political and practical lifeis choiceworthy or rather the [life] divorced from all external th ings-such as a sort oftheoretical [life]-which some say tines phasin is the


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ARISTOTLE: PHILOSOPHYAND PoLITICS 7only [life] of a philosopher. Who these some are remains unclear, forAristotle speaks not in his own name, but in that of the disputants. Weshould not assume, then, that this is his own casting of the alternatives,especially in light of the passage immediately following: It appears,Aristotle says, that these two lives are the ones chosen by thoseambitious with regard to virtue (hoi philotimotatoi pros areten), bothformerly and in the present; and the two I mean (legO) are the politicaland the philosophic (pol VII, 2, 1324a25-32). Speaking for himself,Aristotle distinguishes the political and the philosophic lives; he dropsthe equation of political and practical, philosophic and theoretical whichcharacterized the conception of the original contenders.As he continues, it becomes clear that Aristotle is working not withhis own understanding of the difference between lives and activities, butwith those of the respective advocates of a life of political withdrawaland political commitment. The former, he says, consider the life of afree man (ton tou eleutherou bion) to differ from that of a political man(tou politikou) and to be most choiceworthy of alL The latter, on thecontrary, maintain that the political life is best, for it is impossible forone who does nothing to do well, and doing well and happiness are thesame thing (Pol VII, 3, 1325a19-23). The political men, that is, hold thatthe active and political life is the only life for a real man (andros) (PolVII, 2, 1324a39-40).27 For them, that life alone which is busy with theaffairs of the polis is active. They reduce the realm of practice to thatof politics narrowly conceived.The withdrawal of those who prefer to be free men is a reactionagainst politics as practiced by the political men. For the many,Aristotle says, seem to think that political expertise (politike) is [thesame as] mastery (despotiken), and seek to exercise such rule, if notamong themselves, then toward their neighbors (Pol VII, 2, 1324b32-33). The origins of such a politics are found in the political men'sconception of the human good: a despotic politics, a politics of factionwithin and conquest without, is a politics centered on the pursuit ofhonor. As honor is a good scarce and essentiallycomparative, its pursuitis a zero-sum game: what honor accrues to one is both lost to andreduces the prominence of others. The pursuit of honor, then, whetherby individual or polis and the latter is often an occasion for the former,while the former is often put in the service of the latter-produces anunstable, agonistic politics. Aristotle's dialectical pedagogy throughouthis political science seems especially directed at correcting such a viewof the political-from the rejection of honor as the highest end of humanactivity NE I, 5), through the replacement of honor by friendship as thehighest of external goods NE VII, 7 IX, 9), to the account of regimepreservation through moderation of partisan claims (Pol V and theproposal for a non-imperialist foreign policy for the best regime (Pol VII,14). Aristotle appears concerned above all to moderate the politics ofhonor by redirecting the desire to excel toward those goods the pursuitof which does not entail mastery, because they are more perfectly


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ARISTOTLE: PHILOSOPHY AND PoUTICS 119in it a human being is most at work. Pol VII, then, looks back to NX 30

Both works, therefore, conclude with a peroration which commendsthe philosophic life as offering more of what one chooses political life for.Aristotle leads his auditors away from the politics of honor, from theconception of the happy life which is first for us, toward the pursuit ofthose goods which do not provoke rivalry because they are more perfectlyshareable. Along the way he subtly reveals to us his readers theerroneous public face of the philosophic life. In engaging and thencorrecting this appearance, Aristotle does a service both to those whowould be practical men and those who would be theorists. For nolonger can either take refuge in the dichotomous interpretation of theircharacteristic activities.

IVWe have seen that Aristotle's own account ofthe distinctions betweentheory and practice, philosophy and politics, is directed against the

dichotomous reading which currently prevails among commentators.The cause of these contemporary misreadings is a hermeneutic failure,a failure to appreciate the distinctive dialectical pedagogy of Aristotle'spolitical science. Commentators have failed to see that Aristotle'saccount is structured by the requirements of a dilalectical engagementwith those opinions that are first for us. 31 Because they have not begunfrom these appearances, commentators have been led-perhaps ironi-cally-to mistake for Aristotle's own view on the distinctions that of hisprimary dialectical interlocutors. The dichotomous interpretation oftheory and practice, philosophy and politics which interpreters read outof the texts is in fact the view of the class of political men who are theprimary target of Aristotle's dialectical pedagogy. The principal actionof Aristotle's own account lies in the dialectical engagement and trans-formation of this view, the education of the political men away from the'1ove of honor which motivates the reduction of the realm of practiceinto that of politics narrowly conceived. This pedagogical ascent, inforeclosing to the political man a reduced conception of practice, at thesame time forecloses to the philosopher a reduced conception of theoriz-ing. t is the great merit of Aristotle's pedagogy that it cuts both ways:in rejecting a dualistic account of theory and practice it precludes thekindred reductionisms of both an unreflective political activism and aphilosophic amoralism.

University ofNotre DameNotre Dame Indiana


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120 REASON IN HISTORY Notes

The author wishes to thank Fred R Dallmayr, Edward A Goerner, VBradley Lewis, David K O'Connor, John Roos, and Thomas W. Smith for helpfulcomments on an earlier draft. Research on this paper was supported by theEarhart Foundation and the Department of Government and InternationalStudies at the University of Notre Dame.

1 The interpretation outlined is of course an abstraction drawn from theparticular readings of many commentators. As representative examples of suchreadings, see John Ackrill, Aristotle on Eudaimonia, Essays on Aristotle'sEthics, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980),30-31; A W H. Adkins, Theoria Versus Praxis in the Nicomachean Ethics andthe Republic, Classical Philology 73 (1978): 298, 300-01, but see, 303; HarryV Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1952),30-32,122-23,150; Jaffa, Aristotle, History ofPolitical Philosophy, 1sted., eds. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1963),127; David Keyt, The Meaning ofBios in Aristotle's Ethics and Politics, AncientPhilosophy 9 (1989): 17-19; Richard Kraut, Aristotle on the uman Good(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 5-6, 16-17,20-22, 178-79, 187,215,250, but see 263; Carnes Lord, Aristotle, History ofPolitical Philosophy,3rd ed., eds. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago and London: Universityof Chicago Press, 1987), 123, 152-53; Aris tide Tessitore, Making the City Safefor Philosophy: Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10, American Political ScienceReview 84 (December 1990): 1257; Tessitore, Aristotle's Ambiguous Account ofthe Best Life, Polity 25 (Winter 1992): 201-09; Kathleen Wilkes, The GoodMan and the Good for Man, Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, 350-51.

The above readings share at least two common features: first, they failproperly to distinguish between activities and lives, applying indifferently toone what Aristotle will say of the other; second, they take practical, political andmoral on the one hand, and theoretical, philosophic, and intellectual on theother, to be synonymous in all contexts.2. The scare quotes intend to emphasize the fact that these are not properlyAristotelian terms, and indeed do not comfortably map onto Aristotle's owndistinction between excellences of character (ethikai aretai) and excellences ofthought (aretai dianoetikai). The term moral is especially misleading insofaras in its modern sense it connotes an autonomous, non-natural sphere of values,a notion utterly foreign to Aristotle.3. For the former, see Ackrill, Aristotle on Eudaimonia and MarthaNussbaum, The Fragility ofGoodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy andPhilosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986),373-77. For thelatter, see Adkins, Theoria Versus Praxis in the Nicomachean Ethics and theRepublic and W. F. R Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory, 2nd ed. (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1980). For an overview of the debate, see Keyt, intellectual-ism in Aristotle, Essays inAncient Greek Philosophy, vol. 2, eds. John P. Antonand Anthony Preus (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), and


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ARISTOTLE: PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS 121Timothy D. Roche, Ergon and Eudaimonia in Nicomachean Ethics I: Recon-sidering the Intellectualist Interpretation, Journal of he History ofPhilosophy26 (1988): 175-94.4. John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1975), 144-80; but compare Cooper, Contemplationand Happiness: A Reconsideration, Synthese 72 (1987): 187-216.5. Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good, 3-9,15-31.6. Tessitore, Making the City Safe for Philosophy, 1251-62.7. Translations of Aristotle will be my own, from the Oxford Classical Texteditions: Ethica Nicomachea, ed. 1 Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894),hereafter NE; and Politica, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957),hereafter Pol.

S. Political man is perhaps a cumbersome translation of the Greek poli-tilws, but the available alternatives, politician and statesman, are both tooone-sided in their connotations. A politikos is one devoted to ta politika, theaffairs of the polis, the business of political rule.9. The quickness of his dismissal would lead us to believe that Aristotleexpects his audience to share his judgment on this life. Or perhaps he intends,by branding it as slavish, to dissuade from its pursuit those who would otherwisefind such a life of seemingly unrestricted power attractive. The tyrant's life,after all, has never been without its partisans.10. Aristotle had earlier distinguished (NE I, 4, 1095a17-24) the views ofthe many (hoi polloi) from those of the wise (hoi sophoi) on the question, whatis happiness? The answer of the many had been some good visible andapparent, such as pleasure or wealth or honor. The answer of the wise was notmade clear, although Aristotle did make reference to the teaching of thePlatonists on the Good. t would appear that, though the refined and practicalare to be differentiated from the many and most vulgar who find happiness inthe life of pleasure, in contradistinction to the wise, the refined and practicalare still numbered among the many who find happiness in some visible andapparent good. See also NE IX, 8, 1168b15-21.11. This tension is most prominently displayed in the Aristotle's discussionof magnanimity ne megalopsychia) at NE IV, 3. The magnanimous man, saysAristotle, desires to be honored, yet somehow knows that no honor is worthy ofhis excellence. Thus, he is strangely inactive, waiting for some project worthyof his greatness to come along. Given Aristotle's emphatic identification ofhappiness with an activity, a being-at-work (energeia), rather than a meredisposition to activity hexis-see NE I 8, 1098b32-1099a7; X 6, 1176a32-b2),it is difficult not to read his characterization in Book IV as a subtle critique ofmagnanimity, and perhaps of the political simply, insofar as the goal of politicallife is taken to be honor.

12. t is important to emphasize that this is not Aristotle's own conceptionof the political, but his portrayal of those who are called refined and practicaland who devote themselves to the affairs of the polis. There is a tendency amongcommentators to collapse practical into political, to grant to the politicalpractitioner the practical excellences, and so to read Aristotle's commendationof excellent practical activity as a valorizat ion of politics. The danger in such a


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22 REASON IN HISTORYreading is that it threatens greatly to overestimate the virtue of those whodevote themselves to politics, and greatly to underestimate Aristotle's criticismof politics as practiced in most, if not all, actual the groundsprecisely of its deficiency as practice. When Aristotle allows the practical orpolitical men to speak in their own name, they reveal themselves above all asthose who pursue a quali fied honor.

The connection between excellence and honor lies in the fact that excellenceis a thing worthy ofpraise. It is a small step, however, from this true observationto the false inference that what is excellent is what is praised.On the love ofhonor philotimia) in general, seeNE,IV, 4, 1125bl-26, whereAristotle remarks that the virtue which hits the mean with respect to moderatehonors has no name, that is, is not publicly recognized. The pursuit of honor, itseems, tends naturally to the extremes. The reason for this is that honor is agood both scarce and comparative, so that its pursuit is a zero-sum game. Onthe political consequences olthe pursuit of honor, see NE IX, 8, 1168b15-21 andPol VII, 2-3.13. Consider, for example, the remarks which preface the soul divisionwhich concludes Book I: the student of politics must study the soul, but onlywith a view to his own purposes; a more precise treatment would be unneces-sary. Thus Aristotle remains silent on the question whether the two parts ofthe soul, the arational and the reason-having, are really distinct, or separableonly in thought, on the grounds that the answer makes no difference to thepresent problem NE I 8, l102a24-34).14. The division of soul which closes the first book NE I, 8, l102a27-l103alO), and which structures the presentation of books II-VI, does not corre-spond to the distinction between theory and practice. The parts of the soul arethere said to be two, an arational a logon) and a reason-having to logon echon).Three sub-parts are then distinguished: a nutritive part to phutikon)belongingto the arational, a desiring part to orektikon), which, because it somehowparticipates in reason by listening to, obeying, or harmonizing with it,belongs either to the arational or the rational, and a part having reason in anauthoritative way and in itself' which belongs to the rational. The division ofexcellences into those ofcharacter ethikai aretai) and those of hought dianoeti-kai aretai) corresponds not to the distinction between theory and practice, butto that between the desiring part which participates in reason and the rationalpart simply.15. For a defense of this awkward but literal translation, see LaurenceBerns, Spiritedness in Ethics and Politics: A Study in Aristotelian Psychology,Interpretation 12 (1984): 337.

16. In his commentary on this passage for Pol, Carnes Lord mutes the forceof Aristotle's identification of theorizing as a practice by omitting in his citationthe phrase, [f]or doing well is the end, and so this too [namely, theorizing] is asort of practice. Lord protests that to speak of practice as including the activityof theorizing is to use the term in a sense unacceptable to practical men. This,however, may just be Aristotle's point, that the practical men's conception ofpractice is unwarrantedly narrow. See Lord, Education and Culture in thePolitical Thought of Aristotle (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,


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ARISTOTLE: PHILOSOPHY ND PoUTICS 1231982), 187-88. Compare Pol VII, 14, 1333a24-26, where Aristotle speaks ofpractices (praxeis) of both theoretical and practical reason.

17. See Stephen G. Salkever, Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice inAristotelian Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990),100-01, 146-47; Stewart Umphrey, Why Polit ike Philosophia? Man and World17 (1984): 440; and Nicholas Lobkowicz, On the History of Theory and Prac-tice, in Political Theory and Practice: New Perspectives, ed. Terrence Ball(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 14-17.18. The full passage runs: But [practical wisdom] is not authoritative overwisdom or the better part, just as medicine [is not authoritative over] health.For it does not use (chretai) it, but looks to how it might come to be; it issuescommands for the sake of it, but not to it. Aristotle is attempting here to wardoff a possible misunderstanding of his teaching that practical wisdom is com-prehensive. The puzzle to which he is responding is stated at NE VI, 12,1143b33-35: In reference to these things it would seem strange if [practicalwisdom], being inferior to wisdom, were to be more authoritative than it. Forthe producer [of a thing] rules and commands concerning it. Aristotle's re-sponse, then attempts to ward off the false inference that practical wisdom,because it is authoritative over the coming to be of theoretical wisdom, can alsodictate or construct what that wisdom is to be. The objects of theory, we recall,cannot be other than they are, cannot be altered by human action.

19. This reading is commonly accepted among contemporary commentators:see Cooper, Reason and Human Good, 144-80; Nussbaum, Fragility ofGoodness,373-77; Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good,3-9, 15-31.20. In saying this we must recognize that there are limits to the control wecan exercise over our lives. Our part in determining that which befalls us isquite restricted; we can ourselves only imperfectly dictate the contexts of ourown action. I issue this caveat because many commentators equate rationalaction with the enactment of a predetermined (if revisable) life-plan. Viewingpractical rationality in this way underplays the extent to which it is responsiverather than stipulative. To do well on this view threatens to become successfullyforcing one's program on reality rather than appropriately meeting the require-ments of the particular circumstances in which one finds oneself, circumstancesover which one exercises some, but limited control.21. See Salkever, Finding the Mean, 146-48, 161.22. Several ancient sources relate that Anaxagoras, when prosecuted underDiopeithes' law on impiety for his astronomical teachings, was defended by noneother than Pericles, of whom Anaxagoras was said to be a close friend andadviser, and who is identified at NE VI, 5,1140b7-10 as among those who arethought to be practically wise because they study (theorein) the things good forthemselves and others. See Douglas M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical

thens (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978),200-01. Thales, while notori-ous for having fallen into a well while gazing at the heavens, is also said to haveused his knowledge of astronomy to earn a small fortune by monopolizing theolive presses before what he predicted to be a bumper crop. By this, saysAristotle, he showed those who reproached him for the uselessness of philosophythat his poverty was a consequence only of his not taking wealth seriously. See


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124 REASON IN HISTORYPol I, 11, 1259a5-21.23. See note 10 above.

24. t should be emphasized that the class of those who appear strangeincludes not only the philosopher, but anyone who attempts to do things inaccordance with virtue. Aristotle's criticism is directed not at those who devotethemselves to practice simply, but at those who think that in order to do noblethings it is necessary to be ruler over land and sea. See Pol VII, 2, 1324a35-1325a5.25. See notes 11-12 above. At both N I, 5, 1095b22-30 and VIII, 7,1159a22-27, those who pursue a qualified honor-who desire to be honored bypractically wise men, who know them, on account of their excellence-are saidto do so in order to be assured or persuaded of their own goodness. See note 26below.26. The other principal examples are these: first, the ascent from thecommon assumption, set down at N II 2 as the basis for the discussion of thevirtues of character, that virtuous action is action in accordance with rightreason (kata ton orthon logon), to the view articulated at N VI, 13, that virtueis not only in accordance with but accompanied by right reason (meta touorthou logou). While on the former conception virtuous activity need merelyconform to a right rule, on the latter the active exercise of practical wisdom isessential to doing well. The second example is the differentiation of continenceand incontinence from virtue and vice in Book VII, a differentiation which comesto sight only after the treatment of practical wisdom. On the basis of thisdistinction it appears that virtue is far rarer and virtuous action far moredifficult than had at first been supposed. Indeed, most human beings are,Aristotle now tells us, somewhere between perfect incontinence and perfectcontinence. The third example is the ascent from the opinion that honor is thegreatest of external goods to the defense of friendship inN VIII and IX as trulythe greatest. The kind of self-knowledge and self-love that the highest sort offriendship makes possible would seem to respond to the desire of those whopursue a qualified honor to be assured of their own goodness.27. On Aristotle's response to the politics of virility, see Salkever, Findingthe Mean, 178-203.28. See Mary P. Nichols, Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle sPolitics (Savage, MD: Rowman Littlefield, 1992), 128-30.29. We should bear in mind here that Aristotle directs his teaching inpolitical science particularly to those who are potential legislators. More gen-erally, however, and because most regimes do not adequately tend to suchmatters, it is offered to anyone who desires to make himself or those close tohim good. See N X 9, 1180a29-34.

30. f perhaps forward in the order of composition, the glance is stillbackward in the logic of exposition. On the chronology ofN and Pol, see P. A.Vander Waerdt, 'The Plan and Intention of Aristotle's Ethical and PoliticalWritings, Illinois Classical Studies 16 (1991): 231-53.31. The requirements of this dialectical engagement would then explain theabsence of an explicit thematic treatment of the relation of the two sets ofdistinctions.

w. j. thompson, aristotle: philosophy and politics, theory and practice

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