waf in scale
DESCRIPTION
Zeronighst 2014. Defensive Track. Few words about WAF integration and support.TRANSCRIPT
Prepared byPrepared by
WAF in scale
Alexey Sintsov
Principal Security Engineer
14.11.2014
Zeronights 0x04
22
Intro
© 2014 HERE | Security Monitoring System | SPC Engineering team
SPC
Engineering
Team Product team 1 Product team 2 Product team 3
AWS US
Product team 3
Data Center 1 Data Center 2
Attack Surface (Internet/WEB)
AWS EU. . .
- A lot of different teams
- Many different data centers (even AWS)
- Only few security engineers
- A lot of WEB attacks…
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What we want:
• We want to monitor WEB attacks, like IDS for WEB
• We won’t review all script-kiddie/bot scans, we want auto confirmation and correlation
• We want to be able to do fast ‘virtual’ fixes in critical situations
• We want SOC to be contacted when attack is confirmed (auto mode)
We want WAF, but in monitor mode (until blocking is needed)
Additional needs:
• We want to deploy and configure on all (if possible) FE - all products and DataCenters
• We want to control and update rules for those installations in “one way”
• We want to make it “transparent” to avoid dependency on them
• We do not want big performance impact on our services
Targets
© 2014 HERE | Security Monitoring System | SPC Engineering team
44
Mod Security
© 2014 HERE | Security Monitoring System | SPC Engineering team
• Detection Only mode
• Only SPC rules for less time CPU impact
Response based alerts:
1. Attack signature
2. Response Signature
• Parse response only if attack signature fired
• If response signature fired -> True Positive alert!
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Mod Security - simple example of rule:
© 2014 HERE | Security Monitoring System | SPC Engineering team
SecRule REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_URI|REQUEST_HEADERS "/+etc/+passwd“
"t:none,ctl:ResponseBodyAccess=On,msg:‘/etc/passwd request found…',
phase:2,pass,nolog,auditlog,id:'950002',setvar:TX.ATTACK_ZLO=1,
ctl:auditLogParts=+I,t:urlDecode,t:lowercase,severity:1“
…
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "root\:x\:0\:0" "id:'950015',ctl:auditLogParts=+E,
msg:'Content of /etc/passwd! (Rise incident to SOC)',phase:4,
allow,nolog,auditlog,t:lowercase,severity:0"
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Our Splunk app
© 2014 HERE | Security Monitoring System | SPC Engineering team
• Correlation, analyses (we can code that!)
• Search tool (incident analyses/analytics)
• Alerting
Mail to 24/7 SOC
Call to oncall Security Engineer (Wake up!)
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Design
© 2014 HERE | Security Monitoring System | SPC Engineering team
Splunk forwarder
Apache
- ModSecurity audit logs
- SPC Rules
Attacks
Splunk serverHERE servers
SPC Splunk app
Search tool
SPC Engineer
index-security
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THOR Integration
© 2014 HERE | Security Monitoring System | SPC Engineering team
THOR repo
HERE Rules
Apache
…
HERE server
Puppet agentyum install …
HERE Rules
Apache
Mod Security
Splunk forwarder
Configure all…
[1] http://www.netways.de/uploads/media/Pascal_Hahn_End_to_End_continuous_integration_of_deplayment-code_in_a_multi-tenant_puppet_setup.pdf
THOR:
• Puppet as a service
• Extensible & integration
• Standard & building blocks
1
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How it looks like for a product team
© 2014 HERE | Security Monitoring System | SPC Engineering team
• Ask for a new server with: Apache, MySQL, PHP (not real case, just example)
• Customer provides Puppet recipes of desired env. (Import MySQL schema, .htaccess rules,
PHP script deployment and etc) these two steps, THOR API and framework RPM
• After deployment – our hardened server with configured Splunk, Apache and ModSecurity
and customer’s application, configs.
• Customer’s tests (QA), including performance/stress
• If our ModSec provides not acceptable delay, than it will be found there
• Ready to go! (with some minimal Security by default!)
- Customer does not have to think about WAF, configuration of logs and monitoring
- If (s|)he adds new server, it will be automatically configured and will be under our monitoring
(in Splunk)
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Support
© 2014 HERE | Security Monitoring System | SPC Engineering team
• Build server for ModSecurity rules (into RPM)
• Automated unit tests for each rule
• Works as expected
• Not blocking normal requests
• No performance impact
• Version control via THOR API
=> If new rule needs to be distributed, new RPM with new version will be tested and built
(auto. mode).
Then it can be updated via THOR API to new version for specific service or for whole env.
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Summary
© 2014 HERE | Security Monitoring System | SPC Engineering team
• Maximum automation:
• Build new rules
• Test new rules
• Versioning
• Auto Deploy
• Auto alerting for REAL cases
• Easy to investigate (evil POST requests)
• Good coverage:
• All Apache (nginx) services – FE, WEB, RP, PVP
• No dependencies on many different teams
• Most common attacks and patterns – easy to do signatures, even for 0days
- If we do not use Apache/Nginx?
- If performance impact is too high for the service?
- If it is not a WEB attack (HeartBleed)?
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THE FIN
© 2014 HERE | Security Monitoring System | SPC Engineering team
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