walsh, catherine. the ecuadorian political irruption

8/14/2019 Walsh, Catherine. the Ecuadorian Political Irruption

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DOCUMENT

The Ecuadorian Political Irruption

Uprisings, Coups, Rebellions, and Democracy

Catherine E. Walsh

In this article I present and analyzethe events that resulted in the overthrow of Ecuadorian president Jamil

Mahuad in January 2000 and offer a brief discussion of what has tran-

spired since Gustavo Noboa assumed the presidency. My intent is to actively

involve the reader in living the crucial moments that emerged day by

day during the week of 15 January and to illuminate the complexity of

Ecuadors political, economic, and social crisis, as well as the increasing po-litical force of the indigenous movement. By offering various ways to read

what happened in the so-called coup, I hope to reveal the different motives

and interests behind the indigenous, military, and government roles in the

events of 21 January and make clear the present result: a strengthening of

the neoliberal agenda and the consolidation of business and elite sectors

within the government institution.

Lived and Televised EventsSaturday, 15 January. The peoples uprising announced by the Confed-

eration of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) begins. The

government employs a thirty-five-thousand-member police force and sanc-

tions the use of violence in order to ensure, on the one hand, that the main

roadways remain open and, on the other, that the indigenous people cannot

reach Quitothe nations capital and the designated meeting site. There is

N e p a n t l a : V i e w s f r o m S o u t h 2.1

Copyright 2001 by Duke University Press

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no sign of the indigenous people on that day, and everything seems to be

under control.

16 January, at daybreak. A labor union leader and two leaders of

the social movements are arrested, forcibly taken from their homes by men

wearing hoods. Despite the fact that no one is able to explain this arrestat the time of the event, the press later reports that the armed forces have

agreed to permit the indigenous march on Quito on the condition that the

labor unions, thesocialmovements, andtheDemocratic Popular Movement

(MPD)a political party with Maoist tendenciesnot be involved.

Monday, 17 January. The indigenous people begin to arrive in

Quito, at first by the major highways, some in buses, some in rented trucks,

others on foot, and in small groups so as not to arouse suspicion. Police

control and militarization on the roads are strengthened. People are forced

outofthebuses;trucksandsuppliesareconfiscated.Manyofthecompaeros

indgenas choose to walk; women, men, and children dodge the police and

the armed forces, taking secondary roads or mountain footpaths in the

darkness of the night, or, when there is an opportunity, hiding under fruits

and vegetables in the back of produce trucks on the way to market. Upon

arrival in Quito, they scatter to small neighborhoods so as to be able to move

unsuspectedtowardtheirfinal destination:theParquedelArbolito,situated

behind the Casa de Cultura (House of Culture), a place that, both in name

and function, ironically singularizes, homogenizes, and folkloricizes the

millennial cultural diversity of the nation. On Tuesday, the press reports

that five thousand indigenous people have arrived. Less than twenty-four

hours later, this number has more than doubled.

Meanwhile, despite strong militarization, the indigenous people

haveblockedthemainroadsinmostoftheprovinces.Apparently,thearmed

forces are giving their implicit support to the indigenous peoplehow else

could the indigenous people take over roads and come by the thousands

from the countryside to Quito?

In the principal cities and county seats, there are demonstrations

andmarchesthatcontinuallygrowinstrength.AndinQuito,sinceMonday,

17 January, thePeoples Popular Parliament forNational Salvation hasbeen

in session, presided over by Monsignor Alberto Luna Tobar.1 This Popular

Parliament intends to build a new political authority, an alternative to the

national Congress and a participatory space in which the people can discusssocial, economic, and political problems and collectively make proposals

without having to go through the bureaucratic mechanisms of the electoral

and political party structure.2 Its development began several weeks before,


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Walsh . The Ecuadorian Political Irruption

firstatthelocalandthenattheprovinciallevel,withsessionsintwentyofthe

twenty-two provinces that elaborated proposals and elected representatives

for the national parliament in Quito. But while these parliaments goal was

to build a representive base from all popular sectors, their success varied

greatly from region to region.3

The week begins in Quito with armed policemen on every street

corner. A heavy tension can be felt in the air, worsened by tear gas, the

result of student protests and small confrontations between the indigenous

people and the police. The streets surrounding the Parque del Arbolito

and the Casa de Cultura are cordoned off, marking the makeshift campsite

and territorial space of the indigenous arrivals. From their cars, homes, and

offices, the white-mestizo city inhabitants wonder whats going to happen.

But there is also uncertainty among indigenous organizations, social move-

ments, and allied groups not directly part of CONAIEs inner leadership.

Unlike the July 1999 protests against the governments handling of

the economic crisis, which actively engaged a number of social movements

and sectors of civil society, this time there was a visible level of skepticism

and apathy, particularly in Quito. This skepticism and apathy was largely

attributable to President Mahuads televised speech on 9 Januarythe eve

of announced strikes and the indigenous uprisingin which he announced

the plan to dollarize the economy. According to Mahuad, this plan offered

the only possibility of pulling the country out of the deepest economic cri-

sis in its history and the greatest monetary devaluation in Latin America

(348 percent between August 1998 and January 2000, and an additional 33

percent in the first weeks of 2000).4 More of a political strategy than an eco-

nomic one, Mahuads announcement reflected thebuilding of a new alliance

between right-wing parties and powerful business people and bankers de-

signed to directly benefit the oligarchy and to unite the dominant classes.

Yet for the general public, this new alliance building was far from evi-

dent. Despite the real poverty rate of 80 percent, the situation of bankrupt

banks, lost funds, and frozen bank accounts, a lack of currency, general-

ized corruption, and the probable inability of the Mahuad government to

implement dollarization, most read a new level of leadership in Mahuads

words, placed hope in dollarization as the way to save the economy and the

nation, and assumed that the government was somehow strengthened. All

this had a somewhat calming effect, contributing both to a demobilizationof the social sectors that were about to unite forces in the strike and the

national uprising and to an overall lack of interest, particularly among the

middle class, in joining the indigenous-led protests.


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Also contributing to apathy and making mobilization more diffi-

cult wastheradicalness of CONAIEs andthePeoples Popular Parliaments

demands for the overthrow of the three state powersthe national Con-

gress, the Supreme Court, and the government. While polls indicated that

a wide range of the population shared the opinion that these institutionswere both inefficient and corrupt, most saw the institutional overthrow as

overly idealistic, radical, and not presenting concrete alternatives.

But in addition to the hope generated by dollarization and the con-

cern over the radical character of the demands, there was another element

that affected the possibilities of adherence: a specific kind of self-isolation by

the indigenous people in relation to other sectors of society, including social

movements, labor organizations, and unions. While in cities like Cuenca

popular sectors were strongly represented, both the occupation of Quito

and the leadership of the national Popular Parliament were overwhelm-

ingly controlled by CONAIE, to the exclusion of other indigenous and

nonindigenous organizations.

With the national palace and the historical city center surrounded

by barbed wire, tanks, bomb-release gear, military personnel, and police

cordons, the indigenousnacionalidades andpueblosterms of identification

now used by the Ecuadorian indigenous movement in order to highlight

millennial cultural differences, the relationship between identity and ter-

ritoriality, and collective and legal rightsbegin to protest and march. In

the first days of the week, there are few confrontations with the police, and

the marches are largely ignored, barely reaching the status of brief news

reports.

However, with the passing days, the rebellious actions increase

in intensity, take shape, and begin to get local, national, and international

attention. On Tuesday, 19 January, a peoples march stretches for thirty city

blocks with an estimated ten thousand, mainly indigenous participants, but

also with representatives of social and labor movements, and sympathetic

members of civil society. Rumors circulate about planned strategies and

what might follow, but the secrecy of the inner indigenous leadership keeps

most people in the dark as to what will transpire until the final hours of

Friday, 21 January.

On the afternoon of Thursday, 20 January, thousands of natives

surround the streets around the national Congress, the Supreme Court,and the comptrollers office. The employees of Congress and of the various

institutions and offices in these areas find themselves sequestered. The


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armed forces and the police try in vain to rescue them. The employees are

forced to spend the night in their offices or in the street.

At daybreak on Friday, 21 January, an impressive military pres-

ence surrounds the Congress. Confrontations between the military and

the indigenous people intensify; tear gas permeates the air, and sticks andstones clutter the street. Suddenly, the confrontations diminish, and the

military operations noticeably change. The uniformed forces unexpectedly

step aside and allow the indigenous protestors to enter the Congress. Buses

of young troops arrive to support the indigenous occupation.

A flash on the radio at 10:15 a.m. Screams of fear, amazement,

and disbelief from the public: the indigenous people have occupied the

Congress with the help of the military. In short order the buildings of the

Supreme Court andof thecomptrollers office arealso occupied.(According

to indigenous leaders, the plan was to occupy the Congress on the previous

night but the military delayed its support until Friday.)

The indigenous leaders and military officials start to make joint

pronouncements in the media. They announce a newly formed Govern-

ment of National Salvation established by the Popular Parliament, whose

members are Antonio Vargas, president of CONAIE, Colonel Lucio

Gutirrez from the armed forces, and Carlos Solrzano, former president

of the Supreme Court and vice president of the Popular Parliament.5

Vargas is the first to speak:

The Ecuadorian people have triumphed. This time we wont

disappoint you like the traditional political parties have. This

time we will be with the people. We, the junta of the Govern-

ment of National Salvation, are the slaves of the Ecuadorian

people, we are neither authorities, nor chiefs. . . . The Ecuado-

rian peoples union with the military forces is one more Latin

American experience. But with the difference that, in this case,

we have been able to carry out a revolution without bloodshed.

Wewillworkfromanethicsbasedonamaquilla,amashua,amal-

lulla; that, from now on, will be the slogan for all the authorities

in the Ecuadorian state. That is to say, no lying, no stealing, and

no idleness.

Gutirrez speaks second, directly addressing the need to end cor-

ruption:


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Today, we begin a struggle. A tenacious, implacable, and pacific

junta that will work against a new form of slavery in order to

throw off the chains that bind us to the most gruesome cor-

ruption. We are here to overthrow this ignominious model,

to change the structures of the state, and to strengthen demo-

cratic institutions. We are acting peacefully in order to recover

and salvage the self-respect, the pride, and the honesty of the

Ecuadorian people, we are here in order to avoid government-

sponsored corruption and impunity. . . . We received this land

in better shape from our forebears and we must pass it on

healthy to our sons and daughters.

Unlike their counterparts in other Latin American countries, the

Ecuadorian armed forces have never had a reputation for violence or strong

repression. Neither are they known to be progressives or allies of social

movements, and even less to be allies of the indigenous organizations, even

though a relationship has existed for a number of years between the indige-

nous people and the armed forces in the Amazonian region. In recent years,

however, an increasing identification with the popular sectors struggle has

developed among some troops and officials. Despite the recent history of

these developments, the majority still wonders about the real significance

of this new position and alliance.

Lines of barbed wire and a strong smell of tear gas still surround

Congress. Truckloads of young members of the armed forces greet the peo-

ple as they pass by. Indigenous women, men, and children from a variety of

provinces, each with their distinctive dress, congregate in front of Congress

along with university and high-school students and representatives of the

social movements and organizationsa kaleidoscope of faces and colors

that represents the cultural diversity of Ecuadorian society.

The doors of Congress are open, something that normally never

happens. The same diversity can be seen inside, including many young

members of the armed forces with conspicuous uniforms over which thay

have draped huipalasthe indigenous movements multicolored flag. Ev-

eryone, indigenous or otherwise, is known as compaero. There is a strong

smell ofpalo santo, a kind of wood that is burned for spiritual purification,

and in the center of the Congress stands a table with herbs and other instru-ments for the shamans or yachags. Indigenous leaders along with delegates

of the Popular Parliament are seated at the presidents desk and at those of


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other members of Congress. Representatives of the social movements and

unions and some members of the press all circulate freely.

The elite and political partydriven institution of Congress is thus

turned into a house of the people with the announcement of the instal-

lation of the Popular and Patriotic Parliament. The Junta for Salvationmoves to the inner offices of the congressional president. This is a historic

moment; it would seem that a democracy is being built. However, many of

those present cannot stop worrying: How will this end, and what will the

end result be, given the historic racism, exclusion, and lack of social justice

in a country where a few families have always ruled over the majority?

In offices and homes, all eyes are glued to TV screens. According

to polls, 94 percent of the population followed the events either on TV or on

the radio. Very few people actually came out to show their support. After

all, this was an indigenous-military revolution. A televised rebellion.

Around midday on Friday, 21 January, General Carlos Mendoza,

chief of the armed forces, publicly demands President Mahuads resigna-

tion. Colonel Fausto Cobo, director of the military academy, appears along-

side Colonel Gutirrez, along with a good number of young officers. There

are rumors of wide military support. In the provinces, protestors backed by

the military begin to occupy government buildings.

Several hours later, reporters announce that President Mahuad has

fled the presidential palace, hidden in an ambulance headed to the air base.

The presidential palace is protected by heavily armed police and special

forces with orders to fire against anyone trying to invade it. The television

cameras focus on the machine guns, on the uniformed men occupying the

roofs and balconies of the palace, and on the surrounding buildings. The

revolutionary show continues, and the plot thickens.

Meanwhile, Vice President Gustavo Noboa leaves his native port

city of Guayaquil and heads for Quito in an armed-forces plane. A military

commando receives him at the airport and takes him to a Quito apartment,

where he remains, in direct and constant communication with the military

high command, until the early hours of Saturday.

A massive march of thousands leaves Congress and heads to the

presidential palace. In the first line are members of the Junta for Salvation,

the indigenous leadership, and Paco Moncayo and Ren Yandunboth

former generals and legislators of the Democratic Left. A confrontationis expected when the marchers arrive at the barricades and the military

cordons.


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Television reporters speak of a possible massacre. Between images

of the military cordon and the approaching protesters, the channels trans-

mit live interviews with right-wing legislators and leaders. Along with

markedly racist comments about the indigenous people, and accusations

that the rebellious colonels are traitors, these legislators and leaders issuean appeal to save democracy, the motherland, and the constitution and

to work against a minority movement that doesnt represent the nations

interests.

Former presidents also have their say in the matter. The most

important intervention is that of ex-president Osvaldo Hurtado, still a

respected political figure. Obviously upset, and calling the events of 21

January the perpetration of a coup, Hurtado declares himself to be in

favor of President Mahuad and calls on Ecuadorian society to defend the

constitutionhe is the first to use this symbolic referent. He calls for a

pro-Mahuad march to be held on Monday, 24 January. Meanwhile, in the

northern, mostly elite sector of the city, a huge protest on behalf of the

upper and middle classes takes shapeknown to some as the march of the

turned-off cellular phones. Some actually carry weapons. TheTV cameras

jump between both scenesthe palace with the indigenous people and the

popular social sectors, and the elite marchers chanting, We are not indios!

What is not known at the time is that while the junta and the

protesters are marching, the military high command is already inside the

presidential palace, meeting and consulting by telephone with Vice Presi-

dent Noboa, with congressional president Juan Jos Pons, with the leader of

the right-wing Social Christian Party, Jaime Nebot, and with former pres-

ident and then mayor of Guayaquil Len Febres Codero. In this meeting

the decision is made to replace Colonel Gutirrez in the junta with General

Mendoza, chief of the joint high command and acting minister of defense.

The high command has apparently decided to take power. Its goals are to

ensure the overthrow of President Mahuad and then to gain control overthe

division building within the armed forces. In a document elaborated by the

Council of Generals and Admirals, and circulated on Friday at 10:30 p.m.,

the armed forces assume power, asking for international understanding

due to the political, economic, and moral splitting of the groups the people

had democratically put in charge of managing the nation, and declaring

that due to this, we are assuming full powers from today onward until wereestablish order and peace. . . . During our stay in power, we will promote

a restructuring and purge of the state in order to build a solid base that can

respond to the peoples mandate.


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The television cameras focus on the moment of the juntas arrival

at the plaza in front of the presidential palace. The heavily armed special po-

lice are perched on the building tops, and the military barricades maintain

their positions. But to everyones surprise, after a few moments discussion,

the police forces make way, first for a few representatives to pass, and thenfor the masses. People fill the Plaza of Independencea name that could

have been chosen especially for this moment. The triumvirate composed

of Vargas, Gutirrez, and Solrzano enters the palace, accompanied by

colonels and by several indigenous leaders. From the terrace of the palace,

they salute the people with triumphant gestures. Juxtaposed with these im-

ages, the main television channels increase their interviews with members

of the Right, now also combined with telephone interviews with brigade

commanders who denounce the insurgent colonels.6

While the thousands of protesters and the millions of TV viewers

are waiting for news, the military high command is in a tense meeting be-

hind closed doors with indigenous leaders, generals, and a group of colonels

that includes Gutirrez. Meanwhile, Vice President Noboa speaks out on

televisioninfavorofthemaintenanceofthedemocraticsystem:Iaskthat

the indigenous people rid themselves of attitudes that can contribute to the

rupture of the democratic system and to a fratricidal confrontation among

Ecuadorians. Many foreign governments and international organizations

declare their opposition to the coup, and the United States threatens to

cut all financial aid. According to later reports, such as James Petrass 29

February article in Madrids El mundo, President Clinton ordered the U.S.

ambassador in Quito to pressure the conservative generals to take action. It

thus seems that the United States, in effect, intervened through the military

to bring down the junta.

The TV channels display the results of a poll conducted by

CEDATOS: 71 percent of the population is in favor of the indigenous peo-

ples movement; 74 percent support their occupation of the Congress; Var-

gas is backed by 34 percent of the population, and Gutirrez and Solrzano

have 26 percent and 21 percent of national support, respectively. Yet while

they strongly supported the indigenous people, 79 percent of Ecuadorians

supported the maintenance of constitutional order.

In the meeting going on inside, the generals finally present the

changes in the cast: Mendoza will replace Gutirrez. The argument is thatno general could possibly receive orders from a colonel. The indigenous

people refuse this. The negotiations are opened. Representatives of the in-

digenous people come up with a counteroffer that includes both Gutirrez


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and Mendoza. The generals reject it, once again arguing in favor of the

importance of military rank and giving their word that they will work

together and respect the indigenous movements great trust of Gutirrez.

Vargas and the other leaders finally accept. At 11:40 p.m., the triumvirate

of General Carlos Mendoza, Antonio Vargas, and Carlos Solrzano is an-nounced. They take an oath, sing the national anthem, and together say a

prayer. Following that, the new presidents go to a planning session. Sud-

denly, Mendoza disappears. The military men who had filled the halls and

terraces until then are also missing. From that moment on, we realized

that the move had been a betrayal, comments one of the indigenous leaders

present at the time.

At 2:50 a.m., General Mendoza presents his resignation, claiming

that, from the start, his intention, and that of the military high command,

has been to avoid the rupture of the armed forces, to avoid bloodshed in the

plaza, and to back constitutionality. He refers to himself as a scapegoat,

self-sacrificed in order to save the country.

Ecuador awakes with a new president, Gustavo Noboa, sworn in

not in the presidential palace but in the ministry of defense. The press de-

clares that the dictatorial perpetrators of the coup have been overthrown,

control over the armed forces has been regained, the indigenous people

have returned to the countryside, peace has been restored, democracy and

the constitution have been saved, and Gutirrez, the insurgent colonel,

has been jailed. On that same Saturday, Congress installs itself in session in

the building of the Central Bank in Guayaquil. The same legislators criti-

cized for their corruption in the days before shout political pronouncements

against the indios and military traitors, thank the democratic process for

saving Congress and replacing Mahuad with the former vice president,

Noboa. They denounce the perpetrators of the coup and the legislators

involved, calling for punishment and trials.7 Meanwhile, Vladimiro Al-

varez, minister of government under Mahuad, announces to the press that

he will probably write a book titled Tras de los ponchos [Behind the ponchos].

Early this same day, Antonio Vargas gives a speech before repre-

sentativesof the indigenous peoples andnationalities still present, first in the

Congress building and then in the Parque del Arbolito. Mendozas betrayal

is spoken of as a deception of the masses. Vargas also speaks of the successes

of the peoples uprising: overthrowing President Mahuad, creating nationalawareness of the inefficiency and corruption of the three state powers, and

showing the country and the rest of the world the mobilizing and political

strength of the indigenous people.


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On Monday, the attorney general announces that those involved in

the coup will be tried in court.

The Indigenous People and the Military:

A Relationship of Temporary Convenience

One of the most surprising aspects of 21 January, from the occupation

of Congress until the failed coup, was the apparent alliance established

between the indigenous movement and the armed forces, an alliance un-

precedented in Latin America.Although theindigenous uprisingsin March

and July 1999 showed a clearly different use of strategies and alliances from

the uprisings of the past, no one expected an insurrection within the armed

forces themselves or an alliance of these insurgent forces with the indige-

nous movement. As such, the events of the week of 15 January forever

changed the stage and the imaginary of indigenous uprisings.

During the 1990s, the indigenous uprisings in Ecuador were pri-

marily directed at obtaining indigenous rights, recovering territory, and

other ethnic demands, although opposition to the hegemonic power of the

stateandtotheperpetuationofcolonial/neocolonialconditionsundergirded

these demands. The protests of March and July 1999, led by the indigenous

movement in alliance with various social and labor groups, including trans-

portation workers, were aimed instead at the escalating economic crisis and

its impact on the majority of civil society. The support and participation

of various sectors were great, particularly in July, when the mobilizations

virtually paralyzed the nation. As a result, the government agreed to ne-

gotiations. But unlike in the past, these demands negotiated by indigenous

leaders with the government, including freezing the prices for fuel and bot-

tled gas, and the unfreezing of bank funds, reflected the needs and interests

of a majority of Ecuadorians and not just those of the indigenous sector.

The result was that the indigenous movement managed not only to gain

new recognition and support from the society at large but also to make clear

to both the national society and the government their role as one of the most

important political actors in the present situation.

And it is in its increasingly strong and central opposition to the

policies, politics, and corruption of the government and, most recently, to

the resulting economic crisis that the indigenous movement in Ecuador has

become a recognized and important force in political and social arenas, theonly group speaking out for the need to change the model of the state and to

create alternate spaces of popular power. It is because of its emergent force


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and unique ability to mobilize sectors of the population that the armed

forces saw the usefulness of an alliance.

The Military High Command and the Movement

of the Insurgent Colonels

Since the insurrection of 21 January more and more information has been

released in the press regarding the participation of the military in the failed

coup, most of it attempting to cover up the strong divisions within the

armed forces themselves, as well as the involvement of the higher ranks in

overthrowing the president.

According to former officials of the Mahuad government, there

were two central players in the occupation of power and the manipulation

of the indigenous people: Generals Carlos Mendoza and Telmo Sandoval.

Mendoza and Sandoval are part of a military group known as warriors.

Both received training at the School of the Americas in Panama and had

experience commanding battalions during the border clashes with Peru.

Mendoza was the minister of defense at the time of the uprising and was

also the chief of the joint high command; Sandoval was chief of the land

forces. (With Mendozas resignation, Sandoval ended up at the head of the

joint high command.)

It seems that high commands interest in a presidential change

began in 1999, especially after the July protests and in response to the

governments inability to pull the country out of its crisis. Some generals

met with various sectors, including leaders of CONAIE. But while the

indigenous movement spoke of the need for an entirely different state

model, the military leaderships main interest was to overthrow Mahuad.

According to Sandoval, the joint high command prepared an eval-

uation of the crisis in which they emphasized five points: (1) the economic

crisis and its effect on the military institution; (2) the relationship between

the government and Fernando Aspiazu, president of the bankrupt Bank of

Progress; (3) the lack of concrete actions against corruption; (4) the agree-

ments with former president Abdal Bucarams party and Bucarams pos-

sible return to the country from exile in Panama; and (5) the flawed rela-

tionship between high command and Minister of Defense Jos Gallardo.

The first and last points in this list made the conflict personal.

Mahuads executive decree cutting the state budget, including 60 per-cent of the armed forces funds, was interpreted as an insinuated accu-

sation of corruption. Subsequently, relations between the armed forces and


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the government worsened. Another point of contention was the relation-

ship between high command and Mendoza and Sandoval. In December,

Minister of Defense Gallardo recommended that the president cut off

the heads of Mendoza and Sandoval, due to their lack of support for the

government and to the suspicion that they were involved in a conspiracy.Meanwhile, Mendoza andSandoval pressured Mahuad to remove Gallardo

from his position as minister of defense, which Mahuad finally did at the

beginning of January. Mendoza was then named minister in charge.

With the level of support for Mahuad as low as 6 percent in the

first week of January, high command presented the president with a few

possible scenarios, including the convenience of immediate rectifications

intended to avoid general chaos, as well as his resignation, in order to make

way for the succession. At this meeting, the parties discussed the possibility

of an autogolpe,8 a fujimorazo, in Mendozas words, equivalent to a civil

dictatorship with the support of the armed forces. According to Mendoza,

Mahuad, Gallardothe minister of defenseand Minister of External

Affairs Benjamn Ortiz were the ones who came up with this plan. On the

following day, 8 January, military installations in Quito were filled with

tanks and troops. But on 9 January, Mahuad announced the dollarization

and thus muffled calls for his resignation.

In the armed forces themselves, increasing discontent and a spirit

of division reigned. This was due not only to the political crisis, but also

to the economic deterioration within the institution and its impact on the

troops and middle management. A group of young officersthe uniform-

clad intellectualsuneasy with high commands lack of action regarding

the crisis and convinced of the need to act urgently and radically, began

to get organized. The four colonels at the head of the movement of the

insurgent colonelsLucio Gutirrez, aide-de-camp to former presidents

Bucaram and Alarcn, Fausto Cobo, director of the Academy of War,

Gustavo Lalama, director of the School for the Improvement of the Army,

and Jorge Brito, deputy director of Army Operationswere recognized

and respected leaders, always at the head of their classes. All four were from

the ground forces, and all four were familiar with poverty and indigenous

realities. They shared a distinct vision for the country in which social justice

and ending corruption were central. The indigenous peoples call for a

different state model and alternative means of participation and powermade sense to many of these military men.

Not satisfied with the management of the country, and convinced

of the depth of the crisis and the urgent need for action, the colonels began


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to analyze the situation several months before the coup, together with a

group of almost two hundred young officers from the Polytechnical School

of the Army. In these meetings, they asked the joint high command to form

a military-civilian junta and to arrest the president and the vice president.

Gutirrez was the main protagonist, sending a letter to high commandthat questioned Minister of Defense Gallardo, requested that he be ousted,

and urged his superiors to take action against the growing corruption and

the governments inactivity. According to Mendoza, it was the need for

immediate action that justified Colonel Lucio Gutirrezs desire to seize

power in order to overcome the national crisis. Soon after, according to

some sources, CONAIE got in touch with Gutirrez, and together they

started to plan means of both express and tacit support.

What kind of relationship existed between the young colonels

and high command? In a meeting of the Council of Generals and the

joint high command on Friday, 21 January, at midday, high command

maintained that it never received any specific and appropriate information

regarding the magnitude of the colonels movement, nor did it know how

the colonels had managed to get so intensely involved with the indigenous

people. However, Minister Gallardo claimed that he had spoken to the

generals about the movement that was emerging among the lower-ranking

officers. The colonels also maintained that they had had meetings with high

command.

It is clear that there were strong differences between the colonels

and the generals in their ideas, tactics, and motivations for rapprochement

with the indigenous movement. According to Gutirrez and the other

colonels, they themselves were part of a new military generation that, due

toitsexperienceinthewaragainstPeruanditsparticipationindevelopment

projects in the indigenous communities, was able to relate more directly to

national reality, to poverty, and to the real needs of the majority. Without

directlygoingagainsttheirsuperiors,theywantedtoapplypressuretobring

about the changes that would allow the construction of an alternative state

model, changes that, in a way, coincided with the indigenous proposals.

According to press reports, the officers under Gutirrezs mandate

met with high command on 19 January and asked Minister of Defense

Carlos Mendoza to take control of the government through a coup dtat,

warning that if this did not take place, they would rebel.Although Mendoza himself has notmentionedthis meeting, many

sources have shown that both Mendoza and Sandoval played important

roles in the colonels proposals. According to former Minister of Defense


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Gallardo, it was Sandoval who gave the order for the military men who

were defending the Congress to withdraw and allow the indigenous people

to enter the Parliament.

The Military-Indigenous Alliance

In the months preceding the uprising, the military held a number of meet-

ings with indigenous groups primarily related to concerns of community

development. However, it seems that this was not the only topic of conver-

sation. Reports suggest that in these meetings, members of high command,

including Mendoza andSandoval, spoke out against the government, blam-

ing it for the economic and political crisis, citing the entrenched corruption,

including that between the government and the banking system. Allegedly,

they argued for the need to overthrow the president.

These meetings were not, however, the first example of contact be-

tween the military and the indigenous people. A historical relationship has

existed for some time between the armed forces and the indigenous sector

in the rural areas, particularly within the Amazonian region. There, the

military gave its support to the 1992 march of the OPIP (Organization of

Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza),9 fought alongside Shuar and Quichua war-

riors in the war against Peru, and, during the border conflict, developed a

daily relationshipwith indigenous communities.Butwhile bothindigenous

and military leaders admit contact, particularly in the area of community

development, precise information about the relationship remains vague,

classified according to the Ministry of Defense.

What is clear, however, is that in the months preceding the coup,

this relationship began to take on a different character. For example, in the

November1999CongressofCONAIE,heldinacommunityoftheTsachila

nationality, the military provided overall logistic support, including the

entire sound system. Some indigenous leaders maintain that there were no

political meetings with the military during the Congress. Others say that,

despite the fact that many protested the militarys presence, it was during

the Congress that serious discussions with high command began regarding

the ways to promote a change of government.

This relationship took shape during the crucial week in January.

According to Salvador Quishpe, then president of Ecuarunari (the indige-

nous organization representing the highland region), a meeting took placebetween military and indigenous leaders on 19 January, specifically with

the generals Mendoza and Sandoval. The indigenous leaders demanded in

this meeting that the generals concretize and confirm their support in the


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planned overthrow of Mahuad. However, the generals reportedly played

their cards close to their chests, not engaging themselves completely. It was

on this very same day that the colonels and other midlevel officers began to

appear in the public mobilizations.

There are many different versions as to the nature of the contactestablished between CONAIE and the young officers, and as to when it

took place. Some say that it was during the CONAIE Congress that the

indigenous leaders came into direct contact with Colonel Lucio Gutirrez

and other young officers critical of the political class, corruption, and the

management of the nation. Others say that the support was granted at the

last minute.

What we can be sure of is that the military and the indigenous

people had been discussing Mahuads overthrow for a while and that high

commandwasalsoinvolved.Thestrategy,itappears,wasfortheindigenous

movement to mobilize forcesa strategy only it could accomplish in the

current political climateand build a process of progressive revolt. The

military, in turn, agreed to lend its support once the mobilization was

successful. And this is in fact what happened.

The problem is determining up to what point this alliance between

the indigenous movement and the armed forces existed before the events,

and to what point they shared a fixed plan. At the end of December in

the assemblies of Ecuarunari, indigenous leaders announced that they had

been in discussions with a progressive nationalist group of the armed

forces about withdrawing their support from the three powers of the state.

However, the indigenous leaders say that there was never a definite adher-

ence among the military. But it seems the events took a turn when Mendoza

replaced Jos Gallardo as minister of defense.

Forthe indigenous peoples, as forthe military, mutual support was

necessary in order to succeed objectively and ensure nonviolence. Without

the militarys support, the occupation of the legislative palace or of any

other state installationwould have been impossible. Conversely, without the

mobilizing capacity of theindigenous people, it would have been impossible

for the military to oust Mahuad and take power. It would seem that there

was for both parties a relationship of temporary convenience, even if, as we

have seen, the terms of this relationship are still unclear, as is the attitude

behind Mendozas betrayal near the end.In the days that followed the events, the indigenous movement

defended the independent character of its struggle, and the military tried

to reconstruct its institutional image. Meanwhile, the new government


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changed its staff completely, including many representatives of the business

sector, the coastal elite, and the right-wing Social Christian Party. The only

thing that seems to have changed is that the neoliberal agenda has been

strengthened.

What reflections can be offered, then, to the outside world regard-ing these events?

Of Coups and Rebellions:

Ways to Read What Happened

One way of critically reading and analyzing the events and the facts dis-

cussed here is to start from the perspective of the interests of the different

actors who were deeply involved, and from their imagined constructions

of what happened. In the section that follows, the military and political

coup and the rebellion of the people are presented as juxtaposed con-

structions that provide two different ways of explaining and analyzing the

events of the evening of 21 January and the early morning hours of the

twenty-second.

Coup, Betrayal, and Constitutionality: The Military and

the Politicians Constructs, Acts, and Slogans

Coup and betrayal are the words most often used by politicians and by the

press to describe the events of 21 January. The symbolic referent of consti-

tutionality is invoked as a justification for the betrayal and for the coups

failure. But in addition to being mere words, coup, betrayal, democracy, and

constitutionality (the latter two often used interchangeably) are also discur-

sive, symbolic, and strategic constructions that allow and even privilege

specific readings and interests. In the use that the military and the politi-

cians made of them, these constructions served to propel and justify the

actions perpetrated.

What is of interest here is to offer different ways of reading the

coup, the betrayal, and the use ofconstitutionality in two possible interpreta-

tions of what happened: the militarys rise to power and the constitutional

succession as a right-wing autogolpe or self-coup.

As previously mentioned, in Ecuadorian political life, the military

has traditionally had a presence and power different from the rest of Latin

America. Unlike other countries, in which the armed forces are associatedwith repression, in Ecuador they have more of a civic and nationalistic

image. The presence of two progressive former generals, allied with social

movements, as legislators in Congress breaks the mold of what is usual


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in politics in the region, and within the institution of the armed forces.10

Perhaps the most unusual aspect of the Ecuadorian armed forces with

respect to its continental counterparts is their degree of intervention in the

downfall of two presidents in less than five years; that is to say, their role in

constitutionally helping to carry out two coup dtats.In the case of Bucaram, it was the people and the social movements

rather than the armed forces that created the possibility and conditions for a

coup. Nonetheless, the military played an important role in the negotiations

that allowed then president of Congress Fabin Alarcn to come to power.

In Mahuads case, the military intervention was much more direct. Other

countries in the region also provide evidence of modifications in military

participationfor example, the fujimorazo in Peru and chavismo in

Venezuela, both of which afford very different strategies from the more

traditional kind of intervention carried out in Argentina in 1978. Still,

there are elements that make the Ecuadorian case distinct. One is the very

limited use of violence in both coups.11 Others include the alliance between

the indigenous movement and the military, the insurrection within the

armed forces themselves, and the presence of members of the armed forces

in an indigenous uprising and in the Popular Parliaments.

WithoutoverlookingthefactthattheEcuadorianarmedforcesare

still a powerful, closed, and conservative organization, the military, specif-

ically the high command, has shown in these two interventions an ability

to use civil sectors of society to create the impression of popular power, and

to allow this power to be strengthened in order to reach certain common

goals. This doesnt mean that the indigenous people were simply used and

manipulated. Rather, it means that the military is able to employ a multi-

faceted tactical strategy that operates by means of popular mobilization and

power.

The military facilitated access to the legislative palace for the in-

digenous leaders and the leaders of social movements, it publicly demanded

Mahuads resignation, and it did not initially act against the junta formed

by Vargas, Gutirrez, and Solrzano. In this way, it clearly contributed to

the creation of an image of popular powera televised image of which it,

too, was part. However, due to the presence of an indio in the junta, and the

complete lack of support for Solrzano, the military knew that that power

was not going to have sufficient backing to be successful.What took place subsequently can be read in two ways. One is

based on the aforementioned document issued by the Council of Generals

in which they explain the need to assume power. The reading, then, is that


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there was a strategic plan in which the armed forces would end up taking

over the government in order to reestablish peace and order, to confront

corruption, to rebuild a nationalism weakened by the peace accords with

Peru,12 and to ensure the transition to a more convenient mode of power. In

this scenario, Mendoza became a central player within the junta, along withVargas and Solrzano, reestablishing the hierarchy that placed generals

above colonels. But the plan was not for this junta to actually assume the

governance of the nation but rather for the military to step in and take

control as a more stable and publicly acceptable option. In this reading, the

coup starts when Mendoza and the high command enter the triumvirate.

Mendoza did not act alone but rather on behalf of decisions of the joint high

command. Embedded is the joint high commands interest in power and in

taking a more active role in the countrys political life. The obvious referent

is the Venezuelan military man and president, Hugo Chvez.

However, various problems arose in this scenario that finally led

to a more direct and decisive form of actionthe transfer of power within

a few hours to Noboa, without looking like a dictatorship. These problems

included the image of a divided armed forces with a fissured chain of com-

mand and rejection by the international community, embodied specifically

in the United Statess threat to cut all external aid and to freeze investments,

a threat supposedly presented to Mendoza in person in the hours leading

up to the betrayal by officials of the U.S. embassy.

The reading thus suggests a premeditated military coup. In the

discourse of high command, however, the coup was the work of others

idealistic colonels, the indigenous people, and the social movements. The

betrayal, in this discourse, serves as a construction as well; on the one hand,

it is portrayed as a personal sacrifice to save the patria (homeland), and,

on the other, as an act justified by the need to maintain democracy and

constitutionality. This latter use is nothing more than an appropriation

of the discourse pronounced by the right-wing politicians condemning the

military coup, turned around to suit the militarys immediate purposes.

A second possible reading points to an autogolpe, orchestrated by

politicians, powerful businessmen, and the military, in which Vice Presi-

dent Noboa replaces Mahuad, establishing a newpresidentwith more social

support and thus better able to implement current policies. This second sce-

nario, which in fact describes the present situation of the country, not onlystrengthens the policies and political tenets of the neoliberal government

but also better situates the business and elite sectors within the govern-

ment institution. The coups authors are not the armed forces themselves.


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Rather, they are the powerful elite politicians and businessmen of the coun-

try who negotiated an alliance with the military power. Using the defense of

democracy and constitutionality as their slogan, they constructed an imag-

inary of the coup as the hijacking of the country by rebellious indigenous

peoplea politicized minority, influenced by revolutionaries and by dog-matic members of the Left. A CONAIE leader appropriately described this

imaginary as a manifestation of the hacienda mentality.

But within this reading there is also a military factor in the con-

struction of the coup. In contrast to the first reading, in which the military

institution is behind Mahuads overthrow, here the construction absolves

the high command. Blame is instead placed on the insurrectionist colonels,

portrayed, much like the indigenous people, as a minority influenced by the

Left and with little support. Thebetrayal in this case is perceived within the

coup itself. That is to say, the perpetrators of the coup and their collabora-

tors have betrayed thepatria and therefore must be jailed.13 The irony is not

only that Mendoza remained free but that a month later, on 25 February,

he was decorated by President Noboa for his professional excellence and

his military contributions.

The fact that Noboa was brought to Quito on the evening of 21

January in a military plane, kept safe by the military, and sworn in as

president in the ministry of defense, along with Noboas recent decora-

tion of General Mendoza, seem to support the hypothesis of the autogolpe,

although Noboa himself has referred to this theory as crazy. Other re-

cent events corroborate the possibility. For example, one of Noboas first

acts was the elimination of the Ministry of Environment and the appoint-

ment of Roberto Pea Durini, a wealthy leader in the deforestation of

Ecuadorthe most extensive in all of South Americaand the former

president of the Association of Industrial Timber Workers, as minister of

external trade.14 Similarly, he appointed Eduardo Tern, a man with huge

stakes in the mining industry, as minister of energy and mines, and Pedro

Pinto, president of the Chamber of Industries, as vice president. All of these

appointments helped strengthen and consolidate the neoliberal projecta

project intended to cater to the interests of big business, which include the

exploitation of natural resources and agricultural exportation, along with

the capitalization of currency necessary to implement dollarization. In May

and June, other cabinet posts were changed, and each time the new ap-pointments included conservative politicians allied with business and the

coastal oligarchy.15 This consolidatation of power has included changes in

the military as well. In May, Noboa accepted the resignation of the military


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high command, including Sandoval, appointing a group of markedly more

conservative officers in an effort to restore the unity of the armed forces and

strengthen his control of them. Given all of these actions, the theory of an

autogolpe certainly does not seem crazy.

The Popular Rebellion

A different way of analyzing these events is from the perspective of rebel-

lion. This is the word and construction used by the indigenous movement

to describe and give meaning to the events. Unlike coup, rebellion doesnt

necessarily imply the desire to take power. Rather, it presupposes specific

collective actions against an unjust authority. The indigenous peoples goal

was not to seize power, but to confront the reality of hunger, misery, un-

employment, and exclusion, all propelled by rampant corruption in the

government, in Congress, in the judicial sector, and by economic and social

policies that benefit the business class and its elite, right-wing political allies.

As Ricardo Ulcuango, vice president of CONAIE, explains, the

people revolted against this reality and sought alternatives by way of the

Peoples Parliaments: In no way were we the perpetrators of the coup. The

real protagonists were the president, the government, Congress, and the

judicial sector, all of whom permanently violated the constitution and the

Ecuadorian people, stealing the peoples money and putting it in the hands

of the bankers, letting some of the most corrupt people operate unfettered,

and putting the countrys sovereignty in the hands of the United States.

Always supported and protected throughout by the words democracy and

constitution.

The possibility of forming a junta as a space of alternative power

that would allow for the construction of a different state model, guaran-

teeing real participation and greater control for the people, was first heard

in the Peoples Parliamentone of the sites of the rebellion. The goal was

to find a model that would channel more funds to social areas, reactivate

productivity in communities, along with agricultural businesses, and set a

newpolicytolowertherateofexchange,givingcontroltotheCentralBank.

In addition, it was to modernize public institutions and capitalize public-

sector companies, seek private funding for new projects, design a policy for

employment through a productive reactivation, and establish transparent

bi- and multilateral agreements. The problem with this, as Carlos ViteriGualinga pointed out in the 6 February 2000 edition of El hoy, was that

a Junta for Salvation composed of only three names was contrary to the


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criteria for the composition of participatory and representative power un-

derstood by indigenous people and implied by the thesis of plurinationality.

The other problem is that the implications of being a state had

never been thought through very deeply within the indigenous movement.

This is the case even for the proposals for a plurinational state, first pre-sentedinthe1990uprisingandarguedoutduringtheConstituentAssembly

in 1998.16 Rather, these proposals were oriented toward the possibility of

building new decentralized, local political structures. Since 1993, the main

focus of CONAIEs political project has been local restructuring, that is,

the development of indigenous-run governments at the community level

as well as sectional and municipal governments that include indigenous

mayors. This is why there was no plan or preparation for the rise to power

that the circumstances required.

The consequences for Vargass and CONAIEs being part of a

government junta are ones that, according to Ulcuango, were also not

thoroughly thought through at the moment. As he notes, there was an

immediate need to fill the position abandoned by Mahuad and to assume

the responsibility that the people, through the Popular Parliament, had

bestowed on Vargas. This responsibility involved the opportunity to build

somethingthatdoesnotexistinEcuador:arealandparticipatorydemocracy

and a new and different vision of power conceived of from the point of view

of social movements.

The problems resulted from the quick improvisation of a junta

and from the insufficient creation and consolidation of an alternative and

viable popular government. Viteri Gualinga clearly expressed this inEl hoy

on 30 January 2000: The construction of alternative power is something

more than a mobilization. It requires a clear and forceful stating of the

goals, as well as social agreements without exclusions. These aspects must

be tackled with the seriousness and the vision of the sacred rituals of our

people.

Various sources maintain that there was no clear strategy for as-

suming power before 21 January but that rather the strategy was built and

improvisedinthecourseofeventsthatfollowedthetakingoverofCongress,

first in terms of the juntas formation, and then in terms of the movement

toward the presidential palace. The main protagonists were the indigenous

people, along with some of the representatives of the social movements and,to a lesser extent, the young military men unsatisfied with high command,

state policies, and corruption. In no way did the generals of high command

join the rebellion. From the start, they had different interests.


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Also, unlike the uprising of July 1999, the Quito rebellion did

not reach a high degree of social articulation. As discussed previously, the

reasons for this are many; among them the hope generated by dollarization,

the manipulation by the press, the decision to exclude party organizations

such as the Patriotic Front and the MPD (which unites many labor unionsand social movements), and the (apparently intentional) exclusion of many

nonindigenous sectors by CONAIE. Enrique Ayala Mora referred to this

final factor, in a 28 January 2000 editorial column in El comercio, as a

kind of vanguard isolationist attitude, and an attempt to monopolize the

representation of the country, without seeking wider social alliances that

would strengthen a popular opposition. In its organization, planning, and

execution, this rebellion was not that of a collective group of citizens; it was

that of the indigenous people.17

The clearly differentiated space between therebellion and thecoup

begins to break down upon arrival at the presidential palace and with the

initiation of negotiations. Here the revolt loses its rebellious and insurrec-

tional character, along with its legitimacy and its credibility in the eyes of

Ecuadorian society. From that point on, the military and the politicians be-

come manipulative. According to the indigenous reading, the replacement

of Gutirrez by Mendoza and his resignation three hours later were cen-

tral moments in the Rights game, one in which the principal players were

the same corrupt politicians and big businessmen, guided by the plans of

transnational companies, the neoliberal project, and, in Ulcuangos words,

the U.S. Empire. Ultimately, this is the same reading that I presented

above. But the rebellion remains distinct, symbolically and in practice, from

the coupthe coups goal was to manipulate and crush the rebellion. But

while the coup has ended, the rebellion is only just beginning.

CONAIE maintains a clear stance regarding the ongoing nature

of the rebellion, not only nationally but also when it comes to the shared

reality of the marginalized sectors of Latin America:

The indigenous problem is not just a matter for ministries, of-

fices, or government policies, it is a problem for the state, and

this is why the indigenous people of Ecuador rebelled, and this

is why they will keep rebelling. Other indigenous people, peas-

ants, and poor people of Latin America are faced with the samecircumstances we confront in Ecuadorracism, marginaliza-

tion, exclusion, corruption, and neoliberal economic policies.


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This is why we have to globalize struggles and actions, be wit-

nesses, watching over the processes and supporting each other

in the event of repression. (Ricardo Ulcuango, personal com-

munication)

For the indigenous movement, the rebellion was an act of sover-

eignty that strengthened the pride and identity of the indigenous peoples. It

also offered newstrategies forpoliticalaction.18 Nevertheless,thecomments

made by indigenous leaders in the months following the rebellion point to

some of the lessons learned: the problem of assuming power, the importance

of having concrete plans and strategies and of sharing these plans and

strategies among the entire leadership, not just a few members, and the

need for a wide-ranging base of support and of the participation of all

social sectors. These lessons point to three central problems that up until

now have constituted an obstacle to the consolidation of a wide-based and

pluricultural opposition.

Racism, Democracy, and the Question of Interculturality:

Final Thoughts

Despite recent constitutional reforms that define Ecuador as pluricultural

and multiethnic, that commit the state to promoting interculturality, and

that recognize the collective rights of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian

peoples, Ecuador is, in practice, an extremely racist country. Many white-

mestizos consider the indigenous people to be inferior, ignorant, and less

than trustworthy. They are thought to be confined to the rural sphere,

limited to agricultural and manual work, and with a merely folkloric value.

A growing participation by indigenous leaders in politics, including elected

office, has helped change perceptions, open up a space for the recognition of

specific rights, and build a realization that many of the indigenous demands

reflect the needs of much of society. Still, the majority of mestizos continue

to speak with disdain about the indigenous element and to reject their

own roots, identifying with white northern countries rather than with the

the cultural hybridity and ethnic diversity of the nation. Moreover, racism

is bred and ingrained in public and social institutions of society and in the

press. Though not everyone articulates it consciously, it permeates daily life.

In moments of social crisis, intercultural conflicts intensify, andracism practiced against dominated groups takes on a form of concrete

and/or symbolic violence. Fear of the Other is an important element in

these conflicts and in racism itself. This fear increases when this Other


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is part of an organized collectivity. Pablo Dvalos (2000) makes reference

to this fear in a recent article about the indigenous movement: Society

expresses fear when faced with the emergence of a social and political actor

that had been looked down upon and toward whom power had always

been indifferent.The clear emergence of this actor and the fear it provoked are

obvious in the most recent events. By exhibiting a kind of collective power

and control as they did in the rebellion, the indigenous peoples confronted

the exclusion, marginalization, and racism that they face daily, as well as

the realization of these attitudes in social and economic policies. And the

fear brought about by the emergence of this power has become increas-

ingly evident, especially in the discourse and pronouncements of members

of the oligarchy and the Right, in which they try to marginalize, isolate,

and exclude the indigenous peoples from national questions and blame

them for the countrys lack of stability. The attempt on the lives of Vargas,

Ulcuango, and Quispe in February shows the depth of ethnic and political

terror.

In response to the events of 21 January, the Right made a series

of statements on TV and in the press that contributed to an image of the

indigenous peoples as unruly and deceitful. Thieves of democracy, they

were called; disrespectful toward their bosses and toward the political

institutions and the constitution. How could an indio possibly govern us?

asked one of the politicians. They must be influenced by foreigners and by

members of the radical Left, said another politician, because they would not

be able to plan these kinds of strategies or to assume power on their own.

Very few people, however, complained that way about General Mendoza

and Colonel Gutirrez. Patent and obvious racism is here a weapon, disdain

intended to awaken latent attitudes and feelings, provoke ethnicseparation,

and legitimize existing power relations.

Despite the fact that more than 70 percent of Ecuadorians were

in favor of the indigenous peoples occupation of the Congress, very few

were at ease with Antonio Vargass presence in the triumvirate. Even if

the arguments against Vargas did not have a racist tone, the main refer-

ent projected by the media was that of a politicized indio; they insisted on

the ethnic, radical, and fearful referent associated with CONAIE and the

indigenous movement. It is these kinds of attitudes, combined with institu-tionalized racism, that have fenced in the indigenous movement, giving

it little option but to practice, at times, an exclusionary ethnocentrism.


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Ever since the introduction of proposals for a plurinational state

in the 1990s and since the enshrining of collective rights in the 1998 con-

stitution, a process of recuperation of ancestral identities has been initiated

within the framework ofpueblos andnacionalidades, peoples and national-

ities. The goal is to make clear the plurinational, and not just pluricultural,character of Ecuadorian society. In this process, CODENPE (the Council of

Development of the Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador, a state institution

formed in 1998, associated with the presidents office and governed by the

indigenous nationalities themselves) and some factions within CONAIE

have taken separatist and exclusionary positions with regard to nonindige-

nous sectors and organizations that group indigenous people, peasants, and

Afro-Ecuadorians. These ethnic-identity and political processes have also

contributed to a distancing from Pachakutik, a mainly indigenous political

movement with a wide-ranging and diverse cultural base. While there was

hope in the months immediately preceding the rebellion that the bonds be-

tween CONAIE and other mainly indigenous organizations, including the

Ecuadorian Federation of Evangelical Indigenous People (FEINE)19 and

the National Federation of Campesinos, Indigenous People, and Blacks

(FENOCIN), could be recuperated and strengthened, the divisions have

recently deepened, in part because CONAIEs leadership continues to act

without consultating other national, regional, and local organizations.20

Ethnocentrism did play a decisive role in the rebellion. CONAIEs

decision not to join other sectors strikes and to organize its own strategies,

resulting in the occupation of Quito, incited and marked a division from

the start. While some social movements representatives did participate in

the mobilizations, the movements themselves, the labor unions, and other

sectors affected by government policies and corruption did not participate.

In great part, this was because CONAIE created a vanguard isolationist

attitude, which in the long runweakened thepossibilities of reallybuilding

spaces and sites for alternative powerpossibilities that did exist because

of the depth of the crisis and the mobilizing strength of the indigenous

people. By not contributing to the formation of a wide-ranging, popular

opposition, strategically and concretely representative, CONAIE and the

indigenous movement missed their opportunity to accomplish more than

just the replacement of the old president by a new, politically similar one.

But it is also important to analyze how the media took advantageof the mainly indigenous character of the uprising to feed specific anti-

indigenous attitudes. For example,even if the level of violence was very low,

the media focused repeatedly on isolated incidents of indigenous violence


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perpetrated on white-mestizosforexample, an indigenous person pulling

onawhite-mestizomanstieandmakinghimdanceasifthisweretypical

behavior.

Ethnic, social, and political divisions in Ecuadorian society, to-

gether with the institutional and personal racism of dominant sectors ofsociety, still limit the possibility of alliances and changes leading to the con-

struction of a real, representative, participative, just, and plural democracy,

not the democracy of partisan hegemony. As Alain Touraine (1998, 90)

notes,

Democracy is no longer the goal for those who want to free

themselves, but it also cannot be reduced to respecting the rules

of the political game. It is a live force of construction of a world

as vast and as differentiated as can be, a world that is able

to conjugate past and present times, affinities and differences,

above all, a world that is able to re-create the space and the

political mediations that can allow us to stop the breaking up

of a world shaken by the whirl of capital and images, which

makes those who feel like losers in the global market become

entrenched within obsessive and aggressive identities.

In Ecuador, the problem of interculturality is one of the greatest

challengestobuildingthiskindofdemocracy.Ifsomethinghasbeenlearned

from the recent political irruption, it is precisely this: the need for dialogue,

communication, and understanding among all the sectors of opposition to

the neoliberal project, to the concentrationist model, to ingrained corrup-

tion, to injustice and inequality; a dialogue that helps strengthen popular

opposition and the formation of feasible, sustainable alternatives represen-

tative of the social and cultural diversity that is Ecuador.21 Only then can

we lay the foundations for a true democracy.

Translated by

Isis Sadek

Notes

This essay is based on newspaper articles, editorial columns, and investigative reports

that appeared from mid-January to June 2000 in Ecuadors El hoy and El

comercio. It is also based on interviews and informal discussions with some of


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the indigenous leaders and individuals involved in the events. I am thankful

to Enrique Ayala Mora, Roque Espinosa, Robert Andolina, Eulalia Flor, and

Juan Aulestia for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.

1. The election of Monsignor Alberto Luna Tobar as president of the Popular Parlia-

mentofQuitoandtheparticipationandleadershipofprogressivepriestsinthe

provincial and local parliaments are significant elements in that they reflect

the resurgence of divisions between religious sectors that identify with the

popular struggles and those that identify with the conservative ecclesiastical

hierarchy.

2. The parliaments are part of a recent tradition of struggle that includes the Assemblies

of the People in February 1997, the Peoples Constituent Assembly in October

1997 (an alternative space to the Constituent Assembly for constitutional

reform), as well as the failed experiment of the Peoples Congress in 1999

(Unda and Barrera 2000).

3. The two most extreme cases in terms of participation were those of Cuenca, where

there wasa considerablepresence ofsocialand popular sectors,andGuayaquil,

where participation was limited by the exclusion of major unions, such as the

UNE (National Union of Educators) and the FUT (Unified Federation of

Workers), as well as the exclusion of political organizations such as the MPD.

4. Despite promises that dollarization would virtually end inflation, in June 2000 infla-

tion on the dollar was reported to be at over 100 percent. The social impact of

this figure is made clear when considered in relation to salaries and basic food

needs. The minimum monthly wage in May for a family of 5 with 1.6 persons

employed was $116. (For individuals working in the informal economy, this

amount is calculated to be significantly lower.) The minimum monthly food

cost for this same family was calculated in May to be $260; for families in

extreme poverty the minimum monthly food cost was $112.

5. FranciscoHuerta,anallyofthesocialmovements,wasalsoacandidateforSolrzanos

position.ThefactthatHuertawasnamedministerofgovernmentbyGustavo

Noboa after he assumed the presidency raises interesting questions about

Huerta himself and about the interests and strategies of the new government.

Due to a dispute over the dialogues between the indigenous movement and

the Noboa government, Huerta resigned his post in late April.

6. There is no question that there was manipulation by the media in airing only the

telephone calls of those who spoke against the uprising. However, it is im-

portant to know why many of the commanders who started out supportingthe colonels actions ended up speaking against them. In an agreement es-

tablished by Gutirrez, Colonel Fausto Cobo was to assume the head of the

joint high command. This placed him in a position superior to that of all the


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brigade chiefs, ignoring the traditional hierarchy based on rank and seniority.

For the brigade commanders, the idea that a lower ranking officer would be

over them was enough to prompt immediate opposition.

7. The majority of Ecuadorians, unlike Congress, did not wish for the perpetrators of

the coup to be punished.

8. An autogolpe is a coup organized by the government itself to allow it to take extra

powers. Trans.

9. The OPIP march managed to bring about the legal recognition and the collective

titling of twelve million hectares of land.

10. The election in May of one of these former generals, Paco Moncayo, as mayor of

Quito breaks this mold even further.

11. Unlike in other countries, violence and repression have been minimal in Ecuador.

There are, however, reasons to believe that this situation may change, given

the empowerment of the Right following the recent coup. Evidence of this

is the attempt on the lives of three indigenous leadersAntonio Vargas,

Ricardo Ulcuango, and Salvador Quishpeon 9 February by individuals in

two unmarked cars.

12. The border wars between Ecuador and Peru since 1941 have served an important

role in helping to organize and strengthen an Ecuadorian national iden-

tity, uniting Ecuadorians against Peruvian expansionism and the Peruvian

other. For the military, these wars have been a source not only of subsis-

tence but also of civil support of the armed forces, patriotism, and nationalism.

President Mahuads signing of peace accords with Peru broke this legacy of

nationalistic unification and struggle and, according to many military leaders

and politicians, made evident to the world a weakened nation.

13. In the two months following the so-called coup, seventeen colonels were jailed, more

than two hundred younger officers put under investigation, and a large part

of Quitos military school shipped to the Amazonia. Arrest warrants were

also issued for many leaders and collaborators although none was taken in.

In public opinion polls, 70 percent of society was against trying the colonels;

CONAIE, the Coordinator of Social Movements, and many other social or-

ganizations called for amnesty. The governments position was initially firm

in opposing amnesty. For example, in a February march on behalf of the

colonels wives, children, and other supporters, police forces carried out a

strong repression, throwing tear gas bombs and asphyxiating many children.

However, with increasing evidence that the holding of the colonels was caus-ing further division within the military and serving as a point of contention

with social movements and civil society, the government changed its position,

also calling for amnesty. This was finally granted by Congress on 31 May.


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Since then, all of the colonels directly involved have resigned their posts and

left the military. Yet the tension within the military still continues: in June

the armed forces arrested 76 officials from the War Academy and sanctioned

another 204 soldiers for their participation in the events of 21 January.

14. As president of AIMA, Pea Durini spoke against protective legislation to save

the nations forests, arguing that lumbering must instead be seen from an

economic perspective. With the power he now has as a minister, this position

will most likely become official.

15. The regional distinctions in Ecuador between the coastal city of Guayaquil and the

highland city of Quito have historically functioned as points of tension and

conflict within the political process and governance structure. Demands for

autonomy by the oligarchy of the coast reached a peak in January, the same

weekend as the so-called coup, when a referendum election showed the great

majority of residents of the province of Guayas calling for autonomy from

Quito. Thefactthat a majority of thenations economic interest is based on the

coast, that Noboa is from Guayaquil, and that a majority of his appointments

represent the coastal elite is no coincidence.

16. The indigenous movements proposal for a plurinational state argues for a demo-

cratic, decentralized, pragmatic, and redistributive model that recognizes

and respects the cultural pluralism of the country, including the presence

and rights of diverse nacionalidades and pueblos, promotes solidarity and hu-

man development in harmony with the environment, and affords a structure

of governance based on autonomy, participation, sustainability, equity, and

diversity.

17. Following the occupation of Congress, a number of communiqus were reportedly

received from neighborhood groups, organizations, and labor unions, includ-

ing the transportation union, in which they all joined the rebellion. However,

these communiqus were later proven to be false. From this we can suppose

that some individual or group wanted to create an impression of sufficient

wide-ranging support for the overthrow of Mahuad and for the occupation

of the presidency.

18. In a recent article, Charles Hale (1997) similarly refers to an emergent tendency

in Latin America, particularly exemplified in Chiapas, of a new model for

doing politics.

19. FEINE maintains that it now represents 60 percent of the indigenous population in

the country. In contrast to its primarily religious stance of the past, FEINEhas recently assumed a more visible role in the political arena, arguing for a

greater political participation of evangelical indigenous people, demanding

dialogues with the Noboa government, and entering into actions against


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government policy, including the governments reratification of the executive

secretary of CODENPE.

20. While there are a number of examples that point to this division, two are particu-

larly clear. One was the taking over by FEINE and FENOCIN in April 2000

of CODENPE, the state institution for indigenous development controlled

principally by elements allied with CONAIE. FEINE and FENOCIN called

for a restructuring of the institution and the replacement of its executive sec-

retary. The second example was the national strike on 15 and 16 June 2000

in opposition to economic policies and the continuously worsening crisis.

While FEINE and FENOCIN joined forces in the strike with other social

and labor movement sectors, CONAIE decided not to participate. This de-

cision not only had a great effect on the force of the strike, which because

of CONAIEs lack of adherence was barely felt, but more importantly, made

evident CONAIEs desire to appear as the central actor of the opposition

and the only actor with negotiating power in relation to the government. In

this latter regard, according to FENOCIN, CONAIE made an agreement

with the government in the days preceding the strike to not participate if

the government agreed to give CONAIE total control of CODENPE and

PRODEPINE, its technical arm financed by the World Bank and FIDA and

with a more than $50 million budget. Recent actions to oust the director of

PRODEPINE and restructure the organization suggest that this agreement

did occur.

21. The rebellion not only opened a new space to think about proposals regarding the

creation of truly democratic structures but also helped stimulate the vote for

change in the May local elections, tr

walsh, catherine. the ecuadorian political irruption

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