waltz the theory of international politics

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6Anarchic Structures andBalances of Power

Two tasks remain: f irst , to examine the characterist ics of ana rchy and theexpectations about outcomes associated with ana rchic rea lms; s econd, toexamine the ways in which expectations vary as the structure of an anarchic system changes through changes in the distribution of capabilities across nations.The second task, undertaken in Chapters 7, 8, and 9, requires comparing different international systems. The first, which I now turn t o, is best accomplished bydrawing some comparisons between behavior and outcomes in anarchic and hierarchic realms.

I1. VIOLENCE AT HOME AND ABROADThe state among s tates, i t is often said, conducts i ts a ffa irs in the broodingshadow of violence. Because some states may at any t ime use force, a ll s ta tesmust be prepared to do so-or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorousneighbors. Among s tates, the stateof nature is a s tate of war. This ismeant no t inthe sense that war constantly occurs bu t in the sense that, with each state decidingfor itself whether or not to use force, warmay at any time break out. Whether inthe family , the community, or the wor ld a t large, con tact without a t leastoccasional conflict is inconceivable; and the hope that in the absence of an agentto manage or to manipulate confl icting part ies the use of force wil l always beavoided cannot be realistically entertained. Among men as among states,anarchy, or the absence of government, is associated with the occurrence ofviolence.

The threat of violence and the recurrent use of force are said to distinguishinternational from national affai rs . But in the history of the world surely mostrulers have had to bear i n mind t ha t their subjects might use force to resist or

Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power 103

overthrow them. If the absence of government is associated wit h t he t hr ea t o fviolence, so also is i ts presence. A haphazard list of national tragedies illustratesthe point all too well. The most destruct ive wars of the hundred years followingthe defeat of Napoleon took place not among states bu t within them. Estimates ofdeaths in China's Taiping Rebellion, which began in 1851 and las ted 13 years,range as high as 20 mil l ion. In the American Civil War some 600 thousand peoplelos t their l ives . In more recent history, forced collectivization and Stalin's purgeseliminated five million Russians, and Hitler exterminated six mil lion Jews. Insome Latin American countries , coups d 'eta ts and rebellions have been normalfeatures of national l ife. Between 1948 and 1957, for example, 200 thousandColombians were killed in civil strife. In the middle 19705 most inhabitants of IdiAmin's Uganda must have fel t their l ives becoming nasty, brutish, and short,quite as in Thomas Hobbes's state of nature. If such cases constitute aberrations,t he y a re uncomfortably common one s. We easily lose sight of the fact thats truggles to achieve and maintain power, to establ ish order, and to contrive akind of justice within states, may be bloodier than wars among them.

If anarchy is identified with chaos, destruction, and death, then the distinction between anarchy and government does not tel l us much. Which is more precarious: the life of a state among states, or of a government in relation to its subjects? The answer varies with time and place. Among some states at some times,the actual or expected occurrence of violence is low. Within some states at sometimes, the actual or expected occurrence of violence is high. The use of force, orthe constant fear of i ts use, are no t sufficient grounds for distinguishing international from domestic affairs . If the possible and the actual use of force markboth national and in ternat ional orders, then no durable distinction between thetwo realms can be drawn in terms of t he use or t he nonuse of force . No humanorder is proof against violence.

To discover qualitative differences between internal and external affairs on emust look for a criterion other than the occurrence of violence. The distinctionbetween international and national realms of politics is not found in the use or thenonuse of force bu t in their different structures. But if the dangers of beingviolently attacked are greater , say, in taking an evening stroll through downtownDet ro it than they are in picnicking along the French and German border, whatpractical difference does the difference of s truc tu re make? Nationally asinternationally, contact generates conflict and a t times issues in violence. Th e difference between national and international politics lies not i n the use of force bu tin the different modes of organization for doing something about it. A government, ruling by some standard of legitimacy, arrogates to itself the r ight to useforce-that is, to apply a variety of sanctions to control the use of force by itssubjects . I f some use private force, others may appeal to the government. Agovernment has no monopoly on the use of force, as is all too evident. An effec-


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128 Chapter 6

tude was well expressed by Tro ts ky , who , when a sked wha t he would do asforeign minister, replied, "I will issue some revolutionary proclamations to thepeoples and then close up the joint" (quoted in Von Laue 1963, p. 235). In a competitive arena, however, one party may need the assistance of others. Refusal toplay the political game may risk one's own destruction. The pressures of competition were rapidly felt and reflected in the Soviet Union's diplomacy. Thus Lenin,sending foreign minister Chicherin to the Genoa Conference of 1922, bade himfarewell with this caution: "Avoid big words" (quoted in Moore 1950, p. 204).Chicherin, who personified the carefully tailored traditional diplomat rather thanthe simply uniformed revolutionary, was to refrain from inflammatory rhetoricf or t he sake of working deals. These he successfully completed with that otherpariah power and ideological enemy, Germany.

The close juxtaposition of states promotes their sameness through the disadvantages that arise from a f ai lu re t o conform to success fu l p ract ices . I t is this"sameness," an effect of the system, that is so often attributed to the acceptance ofso-called rules of state behavior. Chiliastic rulers occasionally come to power. Inpower, most of them quickly change their ways. They can refuse to do so , andyet hope to survive, only if they rule countries little affected by the competitionof states. The socialization of nonconformist states proceeds at a pac e that i s setby the extent of their involvement in the sys tem. And tha t is another testablestatement.

The theory leads to many expectations about behaviors and outcomes. Fromthe theory, one predicts that stateswill engage in balancing behavior, whether ornot balanced power is the end of theiracts. From the theory, one predictsa strongtendency toward balance in the system. The expectation is not tha t a balance,once achieved, will be maintained, bu t that a balance , once disrupted, will berestored in one wa y or another. Balances of power recurrently form. S ince thetheory depicts international politics as a competitive system, one predicts morespecifically that s ta tes wil l display characteristics common to competitors:namely, that they will imitate each other and become socialized to their system.In this chapter, I have suggested ways of making these propositions more specificand concreteso as to test them. In remaining chapters, as the theory is elaboratedand refined, additional testable propositions will appear.

7Structural Causes and

EconoDlic Effects

Chapter 6 compared national and international systems and showed how behavior and outcomes vary from one system to another. Chapter 7, 8, and 9 comparedifferent international systems and show how behav io r and outcomes vary insystems whose ordering principles endure bu t whose structures vary throughchanges in the distribution of capabilities across states. The question posed in thischapter is whether we should prefer larger or smaller numbers of great powers.Part I carries the theory further. Part II moves from theory to practice. *

I1. COUNTING POLES AND MEASURING POWERHow should we count poles, a nd how can we measure power? These questionsmust be answered in order to identify varia tions of structure. Almost everyoneagrees that at some time since the wa r the world was bipolar. Few seem to believethat i t remains so. For years Walter Lippmann wrote of the bipolar worldas beingperpetually i n t he process of rapidly passing away (e.g., 1950 and 1963). Manyothers now carry on the t radi tion he so firmly established. To reach the conclusion that bipolarity is passing, or 'past, requires some odd counting. The inclination to count infunny ways is rooted in the desire to arrive at a particular answer.Scholars feel a strong affection for the balance-of-power world of Metternich andBismarck, on which many of their theoretical notions rest. That was a world inwhich five or so great powers manipulated their neighbors and maneuvered foradvantage. Great powers were once defined according to their capabilities. Students of international politics now seem to look a t o ther conditions. The abilityor inability of states to solve problems is said to raise or lower their rankings. The*Some parts of this chapter and the next one were written as a study of interdependencefor the Department of State,whose views may differ from mine.

waltz the theory of international politics

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