Wang Ming

LENIN,LENINISM

ANDTHE CH\NESEREVOLUTION

Novosti Press Agency Publishing House,Mo~co""" 1970

T he grea t army of world communism and allprogressive and peace -loving .mankind are ce~e­brating the centenary of the bir th of great L en in .T he Chinese Communists and th e Chinese peopl e,who arc in a tra gic situation and live in an atmos­phere of terror, wholeheartedly and in eve ry pos­sible way take part in all worl d eve nts connectedwith the celebration of this histor ical dat e-thecentenary of the bir th of the great ma n. In sodoing they regard great Lenin as th eir fa vouri teleader and teac her ; th ey consider all-conqueringLeninism as thei r only ideo logy and banner andthe Lenini st CPSU and the glorious Soviet peo­ple as the ir dear cider bro thers , the ir true andreliabl e friends.

Len in, a brill iant thinker , great revo lut iona ryand loyal continuer of the cause of Marx andEngels , had always regarded the Chinese peoplewith a feeling of internati onali st sympathy . Evenat the time whe n the revol utio nary-democraticprogramme of Sun Yat-sen was mad e public andat the time of the 1911-12 revo lution in ChinaLen in pointed out that the great Chinese peopl e is"capable not only of lamenting its age- long sla -

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very and dreaming of uberty a nu eq~a! lly ...I~u( ofligh ting the age-lo ng oppressor s of China. .

At the same time Lenin foresa w that the all ia n­ce of th e Chinese peasa nt ry w ith the libera l bou r­zco isic would be di sastr ous for th e former andfhat hetra ya l by the liberal bourgeoisie of th ecause of th e revoluti on was inevitabl e. H e wr oteabout thi s in his a rti cle Regenerated Ch ina: " C hi­na's freedom was won by an a ll ia nce of peasa ntde mocr at s and th e lib e ra l bourge oisie . \ Vhctherth e peasants, who a re not led by a proletarian pal:­ty, wi ll be able to retain their de mocratic J?(~S I ­

tions agai nst th e liberal s, who are on ly waitin gfor an opportunity to shift to the r ight, wi ll heseen in the near future. " 2

Lenin also foresaw that a pr olet a ri an par tywould inevitably be or gan ized that wo uld leadthe pe asantry and di rect the Chinese revolution .In h is article Democrucy and Nu rodi sm ill ChinaL enin wrote with g rea t insight: " . . .The Chines eproletur ia t wi ll increase as the n umber of Shang ­ha is increases . It wi ll probably form some kind ofChinese Social-Democratic labour party which,while criticizing the petty-bourgeois utopias andreactionary views of Sun Yat-sen , will certain lytake care to singl e out, defend and develop therevolutionary-democratic core of his politi ca l andagrarian programme." 3 Thus it is clear that L eninregarded an all iance be tween th e pe asan tr y a ndthe prolet a ri at-under th e leadership of th e pro-

I L en in . Coli . l OOt k.< . Vol. IS. p . 164 .2 tua., p . 401.

:1 Ibid.. p. !G9.

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retarr at represen ted by Its Marxist party-as th emain force of the Chinese revolution and th e ch iefguarantee of its victory.

After the v ictory of th e G reat O ctober Soc ia listRevolution L enin, as head of government of th eworld's firs t soc ia list st ate, immediately stre tche dout a hand to the much-suffe ri ng Chinese peopl e.lIe declared all un equa l treaties concl ude d by th etsaris t g-overnment with C hina a nnulled and thereturn tu China of a ll Russian conce ssions and mi ­litary indemniti es. H e sent a pl en ipotenti a r y re­presenta tive of the RSFSR to China thereby recog­niz ing the C hinese Rep ubl ic, whereas the we ste rnim per ialist powers a t the time on ly sent envoysto China, since the y regardcd China as a se mi-co­luny, a second- class sta te.

Thus Lenin laid the foundations of friendshipbetween the two g rea t na tions. H owever , hi s con­cern for the Chinese people was not limited tothis. As a g rea t Marxist- internationalis t Leninrealized more clearly th an any ho dy el se th a t forth e lib era tion of the Chi nese peopl e fr om th e op­pression of foreig-n im perialists and local fe udalmi li tari st s and for the incl usio n of China in themainstream of the world process of socialist revo­lutions, i.c. , for ens uring a non -capi tal ist path ofdevelopment in China, it was necessary, firs t andforelllOs~ , to re nder th e Chinese wo rking peop lea ll possibl e assistance in organ izing its Marx ist,Bolsh ev ik, Communist party. T hus Lenin, afterth e form ati on of th e Co mmunist Jnternat ionalwhi~h. he headed . sen t Com int ern. representat ive sto China more th an once to esta hlish con tac t bothwith its advance d in tell ectual s, who se ch ief

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sp okesman was .the well -known Profess.or Li Tao­Chao and with its advanced worke rs, Il1 orde~ topass on 'to th em th e th eor y . and ta ct ics of Marxismand Bolshevism, the exp erience of th e Ru ssian re-volution.

As a result there appeared in 1920 the firstcomm unis t gT~UpS in Peking, Shanghai , Hupei ,Shantung, Hunan, Kwang(;holl and other Chinesecities. The First Congress of th e CPC ~v~s. c? n­vened in Shanghai in July 1921 on the 1 11l t l a tl ~ eof Lenin and thanks to th e great efforts and ~h­rect participation of a Com intern repre~entatlve

sen t by him. The Con &"re ss was held despI.te oppo­sition by Chen Tu-hsiu who, together with someothers considered the formati on of th e CPC tobe im;"ature and did not take par t in th e Co n-gress. . . , .

Thus Lenin actually initia ted th e crea tion ofthe Communist Party of Chin a.

The Second Congress o f the Cf'C (1922) adop­ted a decision on th e entry of the C.om~umstParty of China int? the Co min tern. At Its I' ?l~rthCongress the Comll1tern, ,by a for~al deCISIOn,accepted the CPC as its Chmese section . T h us th eCPC be came a component part of th~ world 7~m­munist mo vem ent under th e ideologIcal , .P? h hcaland organizational leadershi p of the Leninist Co-

mintcrn. I .It was Lenin who personally la id th e t leore~ l -

cal and tactical foundations of th e COI~lIn UDl s tParty of China and 0'£ th e C hinese re~oluhon.

The L eninist Co mi ntern sen t the Secon d COI~­g ress of th e CPC a di reeti v~ saying th a t th e. an~ l­imperiali st nation al - revolutIOna ry st ruggle 1Il se -

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uri -colonial China was of great ' sign ificance andthat th e CPC sho uld take a mo st active part inthis strugg le ill o rder tu sec ure thc lead ing ro leof the proletariat in it.

T o develop the ant i-imperialist and ant i-mili­tarist revolutionary mo vement L en in h el ped theyoung Communist Party of China create it sin gl eant i-impcrial ist na tional front whi ch include d SunYat-sen 's Kuomintang, a nd turn the Ku omintanginto a revolution ary bl oc comprising the wo rki ngclass, th e peasan try, the petty bour geuisie and th enational bourgeoisie . Thus th e Ku omin tang cameto include a new and truly cons istent revolutiona­ry forc e made up of Co mmunists and was able torevive its revolutionary act ivi ty . A s fo r th e Com­munist Party uf Ch in a, it had in th e Ku ornintangan ally which more or less represented the mas­ses and acquired through th e alliance a certainterritorial base for develo pi ng a legal , mass- scal erevolutionary movem en t.

It was the anti -imperi alist , na tional , unitedfront , set up wi th L enin's ass istance, consi sting ofth e Kuomintang headed by th e great re volutiona­ry-democrat Sun Yat-sen and th e Communist Par­ty of Ch ina that was th e political basis of th egreat 1925-27 Chinese revo lution.

Tn its directive to th e Third Congress of th eepc (1923) th e L eninist Comin tcrn pointed ou tth e urgent need to involve the peasant masses inthe Ch inese re vol ution a nd recommended tha t th eepc exert every effor t to develop the pe asan lmovem ent and sec ure th e leading ro le of th e pro­letariat in it. The di rective no ted: "The pe asantquestion h ecorn cs the centra l questi on of all pol it -

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ics. T o avoid this main issue und crwhat ever pre ­text is to fai l to understand th e entire. significanceof the social and economic basis of China , for thisis the only basis on wh~ch it. is po.ssi? le to wage avictorious struggle against Impe l: l a li s l~ al?~ Co!~­sistent ly to eliminate fel!dal su:v!val~ in China.

It is thus clear that m Lenin s view the mostimportant strategic and tactical prercqui ites Forthe CPC in semi-colonia l and semi-feudal Chi naconsisted in creating a sing le an ti -j mperia li t n~­tional-l iberation fr ont, in developing the anti ­Feud al peasant ag rarian revolution and in se~ur i ngproletarian hegemony in these revoluti onarymovements .

The hegemony of the proletariat in the anti-im­perialist and agrarian revolu tion , as tau ght byLenin, was the main internal condition for andguarantee of not only the victory of the bour ­geois -democratic revolution but its conversion in toa socia list revolution. The Soviet Union's com­prehensive assistance to the Chinese revolutionand the experience of the All -Union CommunistParty of Bolsheviks in revolution and socialistconstruction whi ch the Communist Party of Chinaand the Chinese peopl e drew on were the mainexternal conditions for and gua ra ntee of the vic­tory of the Chinese revolution through all the sta­ges of its development and socia list const ructionin China .

After Lenin's death the Leninist Comi nte rnand th e Central Committee of Lenin's Partv, theAll -Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: fur­ther developed Lenin 's teaching- on the nati onal­libera tion revelution s of the colonial and semi ·

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coloni al l-lclJj.Jlo ill lllc c pllch of itnperialiom anelproletarian rev olutions in gen era l and the Chi­nese revolu tion in particula r, th us rendering theCommunist Part y of China invaluable assistanc ein matters of the or y and tactics.

T he Chinese Communists an d the Chinesepeople ha ve for decad es been waging a heroicand selfless fi ght for the triumph of Le ninism inChina, for the victory of Leninist theory andtactics in their nati onal and socia l lib er a tionstruggle , Fighting in exceptionally ha rd under­gr ound condi tions, in the grim circumstances thataccompany revolutionary and nat ional -liberationwars , hundreds of th ousands of Chinese Com­munists and YCLers, together with millions ofrevoluti onary workers, peasan ts, int ell ectuals an dstudents, with Len in's name in their hearts, an dunder the banner of. Leninism exerted eve ry effort,man!' glVlOg their .lIves for achieving victo ry overthe in ternal exploiters an d oppressors and int er-national imperiali sm. .

At the same tim e the Chi nese Com munis tswith Leninist in ternati onal ists in the front ranksfough t-an d are fighting today-under the ban­ner of Lenin ism a bitter, comp lex an d sel/lcssstr llgl{Je agamst ant i-Leninist, nat ionalist, " left"and, righ t opportunist, bourg eoi s and pett y bour ­geois clements, def ending Marxism in the inte­rests of the revol ution .

U nde r ,the gu i d anc~ of the Cornintcrn an d aid edby the CPS U, the COlJ!munist Party of Chinahead ed by Leninist intern ationali sts ove rcam e theright -opportuni st defea tist line of Chen T u- hsiuan d the T rotskyite-Ch en Tu-hsiu liquidator

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In his a rt icle He/JOTl on a Suroe» of the Pea­sant Mouement in H unan Proui nce (Hsien tsienPingluug ma ga zine, No . :1 , 1927) Ma o ~se-tunghad high prai se for peasants' spontaneity butmade no mention of th e fact that the peasant mo ­vement had been organized by th e local bodiesof the Communist Party of China, or of the needfor establishing unity between the peasantry andthe proletari at with th e prole taria t assuming theguid ing ro le . What is more, Mao said nothi~gabout th e need to arm workers and peasants 111

order to conduct an ag rarian revolution un derth e directi on of Communists. All this had beenrepeatedly demanded of the Communist Party ofChina by the Cominte rn . The que stion of whowa s for and who was against th e Cornintern'sdirect ions on th ese matters was a sub ject of se­ri ous controversy in th ose years within th e lea­der ship and am ong party cadres .. Thus Mao T se-tung wa s an und isguised anti ­Leninist and a follower of Chen Tu-hsiu on thebasic qu estio ns of theory and tactics in th e firstperiod of th e Chinese revolution when an anti­imperialist united national front wa s being form­ed and an agrarian revolution was bein g laun­ched . But since he did not occupy a leadi ng postin th e Party at that time his utterances were re ­gar?ed as a mere echo of Chen Tu-hsiu's oppor ­tunism , which was being severely criticized bythe Party . Mao ,Tsc-tung's positions were al sorej ected, but Mao fail ed to lea rn a lesson andcorrect his erroneous views.

In the second period or the Chinese revol uti on,the peri od of agrarian revolution and preparation

groups in th e 20's, the " lef t" opportuni st. adven­tu rist semi-T rotsky ite lin e of Li L i-san and th eTrotskyit e-Ch en Tu-h siu , counte r-revolu tiona rygroup of Lo Chang -ling in th e 30's.

But th e most diffi cult , complex an d pr otracte dstruggle by th e Comm unist s, L eninist inte rn atio­nali sts ha s been that aga inst the an ti-L eninist,an ti -social ist, pan -Ch inese-nat ionali st and bour­geois care erist ideas and act iv ity of Mao T se­tung.

Back in July 1923 Mao T sc-tung wrote an ar­ticle entitled Th e COll!l in Peking and T raders ,publ ish ed in the magazine H sia ngtao (organ ofthe Communist P arty of China Cent ra l Commit­tee, N o. 31/32), in whi ch he prai sed th e Chinesebourgeoisie as th e ba sic and guiding force in theChinese revolution . H e wrote : "T his revolu tion isa task for the ent ire people. The entire peopl e ofthe country - tra de rs, workers, peasants, students,tea chers and office employees-all must ca rr y outa part of the revolu tionar y work. Yet , becau se ofhistorica l necessity and th e demands of the cur ­rent situation, the work to be undertaken bv tr a ­ders is most urgen t and important compared tothe work to be don e by th e rest of the cit izens."Mao continued: "T he grea ter th e cohes ion amongth e. tr aders , th e g r~ate r th eir in lluence, the st rong­er IS th e force acting as th e leader of the entirecountry , th e soone r will th e revolut ion tri ump h!"(It was becau se or the simila rity of his ideas withth e ri gh t oppor tunism of Chen ' Tu-hsiu th a t MaoTse- tung was elected memb er of the Cent ra l Com­mitt ee a t th e Third Congress of the CommunistPart y of China on the prop osal or Chen T u-hsiu .)

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for setting up an anti -Japanese, un ited na tion alfr ont (in 1930), when th e " left" adv cntur ist LiLi-san's line took th e upper hand in the CPCleadership, Mao T sc -tung became it s ardent sup ­porter and twice made Red Army troops, des piteunfavourable conditions, stor m th e big provinc ia ltown of Changsha. (It was becau se of th is thatMao Tsc-tung, on the prop osal of Li Li-san waselected member of the Centra l Committee Pol i­tical Bureau at the 3rd plenary meeting of theCl'C Central Committee). The Pa r ty overcameL i Li-san's putschist line and critic ized M ao Tse­tl!ng's mistakes. Bu t he ag-ain failed to correctv iews,

Tn 1931 Mao T se-tung began to prop agandizehi s theory to the effect that "the presen t Sovietmovement in China is a purely peasant move­ment," fr om whi ch foll owed his assertion thatthere was no possibility [or the Chinese revolu­tion to develop along th e non-capital ist path butthat there existed the possibility of th e develop ­me nt of "peasant capitalism."

I criticized thi s theo ry of M ao's in early 19.~2in th e book For Furth er Bolsheuizat ion of th eChinese Communist Party, th ough Mao T se­tung's name was not mentioned there (see th eabove-mentioned book put out in Chinese by th ePublishing Association of Foreign Workers inth e USSR (2nd edition), Moscow, 1934, pp. 125­182 , or Chich/an?', she edition. Y anan . 19·10.pp . 10R-1l 5) .

O ver est imati on of th e role of the bou rge ois iein the Chinese revolution, underestima tion of th erevolutoinary role of the prole ta ria t and rejection

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of .thc proleta riat as the hegemonic class in theChinese revolut ion, placin g the peasantry aboveth~ wor~ll1g class and deni al of th e need forUnIOn o f th<; pro!dal"!a t a n d the p easantry witht~e proletariat a.ss.lI ~lllng the leading ro le, rej ec­h on of .the posslblltty 01 th e Chinese revolutionde veloping along a non -capitalist, i.e, socialistroad-all th ese .a re th e sources as well as com..ponent 'parts of the anti-Leninist, anti -socia listideological concepts. of Mao T se-tung.. , In hIS wo:k 011. Nei« Dem ocratism , whic h MaoI se- t lll?K l11l ns el~ ca lle d his " fi rs t fun damentaltheoretical work,' he revised a ll ba sic th eoret icalam.l ta cti cal Le,:,inist theses with regard to theChinese revolut ion, H e contin ued to maintainthat tl~ere exist~d. in China no possibility of~aunc!lI~g a sOC1al~s t revol~lti?n an~ est ablishinga socia list state with a soc~ ails t policy, economyand cult ur e but tha t there It was possibl e to car­ry out a "ne\~ democratic" revolution a nd se t upunde~' th e guidance of th e bourgeoisie " or" pro­leta.nat a "new democr atic republic," i.e. , bour ­geois-democra tic republi c with a new dem ocraticpolicy, econo my and culture. T his Mao's work ismer~ly a . conti.nl;lation ~nd .fu.rth~r developmentof his anti-Leninist, anti -sociali st Ideological con ­cept~ comb~ned with Trotskyism and Chen Tu­h~lulsm which took shape in th e 20's-30's (seehi s booklet On N ew Dem ocrat ism published inCh in ese by 'I'seh jang she, Yana n, 1944 or MaoT se-tungs' one -vo lume sele cted works in Chinesepublished by Tungpei shutien, 1948 , pp . 233-273).

In hi s report and con cludi ng speech at the 2ndplenary meet in g of th e cpe Central Co mmitt ee

(7th convocation) held in March 19-1 9, Mao Tsc­tung declar ed that it was impossible to carry outsocialist revolu tion and socialist construction a f­tel' the victory of the bourgeois-democra tic revo ­lu tion (the full tex t oJ the report and the conclu­ding speec h have not yet been published ; the so­calle d Mao T sc- tungs re port at the above-men­tioned 2nd plenum published twice in the 60's isfalsifi ed). In hi s articl e On Democratic Dictator­shill o f the Peopl e ( 1949) Mao T ee-tung sa id th atit was impossibl e to estab lish the di ctatorship ofth e prol eta ria t bu t that it was only possible toestablish a "democra tic di ctatorsh ip of the peo­ple" as a " combined dicta tor ship of the workingclass, the peasantry, petty bourgeoisie and na­tional bourgeoisie ." Hi s pronouncements after thefailure of the "big leap" and th e " people' s com­munes" on th e impossibili ty of building socialismin China for decades and even centuries, his " fa­therly conce rn and solicitude" for the Ch inese na­tional bourgeoisie- all this is further develop­ment and concrete applica tion by Mao Tse-tungof his ant i-Le ninist, anti-socia list "new democrat­ism" , i.e., "Mao T se-tungisrn," as he himself ca l­led it after the notor ious "style-streamlining cam-paign " in th e 40 ·s. ,

It foll ows that Mao Ts c- tung s nco-democrat­ism, or Mao T se-tungism, is in essence noth ingbut the th eory and programme of the Chinese na ­tional bourgeoisie as opposed to the theory andp r ogramm e of the Chinese working cla ss in theChinese revolution.

It is these ant i-Le ninist and anti -sociali st ideo ­logical concepts, togeth er with those noti ons wh ich

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Mao T sc-tung drew from feuda l mon archism,anarchism. Trotskyis m ant! mililar ism tha t aret he basic ideologica l and theoret ical causes of hispoliti cal downfa ll. T hcy ha ve manifested them ­selves tluuughout ti ll: yca r:l be~i ll\\i nh £n)\n th<:t ime wh en Mao T sc-t ung waged a perfidiousstrugglc ag ainst Leni n and Leninism, the Comin­tern and the worl d comm unist an d worke rs' mo­vement , th e CPSU and the Sov iet Union , th eCommuni st Party and working people of China ,to the time when he openly betrayed M ar xism­Leninism and d isplayed attit udes of rabid anti­communism and insolent anti -Sovietism, and sho w­ed wehcment hatr ed for th e Chinese peo ple andthe entire progressive and peace-l oving mankind .

Taking advanta ge of cer ta in internal and in ­tern ational factors and staging numerous conspi­racies and intrigues, Mao T se- tung managed loseize poli tical power in th e Party after th e enla r­ged session of the Pol itbureau of th e CC CPCheld in Ts uni at the beginning of 1985. Betweenthe Gth plenary meeting of th e Central Commit­tee of the 6t h convocation (October-November1938) and the Seventh Congress of the CPC (Ap­ril -May 19-1 5) Mao not on ly usur ped the supre ­me power in th e Party but also establishe d a sortof personal military d ictators hip in it. Conse.q l.!~n­tly the st ruggle against hi ~ id eas .a~d activitiesin the Party became increasingly difficul t. At va­rious stages of the Chinese revolut ion ChineseCommunists , true to Leninism and th e principleof proletarian internationalism, fo ught tirelesslyand selflessly ag ainst Mao Tse- tung 's anti -Lenin­ist, anti-socialist and anti-popula r ideas and poli-

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cies, for the victo ry of a Leninist policy. I t maybe stated that histori c successes were achie ved inthi s str uggle .

The th ird period of the Chinese rev olu tion wasmarked by the setting up of a united nationa lanti- japanese front which was to mobilize thepeople of Chi na for armed resistance to J apaneseaggressors, and lay the ground for victor y of thebourgeois-democratic revolution. At that timeMao Tse-tung was opposed to the policy of aun ited anti-japanese fron t ; he called for the crea­tion of a n "an ti-Chiang- Kai -shek front in allian­ce with Japan and Wang Ching-wei," whic h Maohi msel f termed a "policy of nationa l treason ,"and whose aim was to provoke j apanese impe ­rialism to unle ash war agains t the Soviet Union .Mao 's sugg estion wa s completely defeated, andthe P?li cy of establ ishing an anti-japanese natio­na l fron t and waging a national -revolu tiona rywar aga inst J apanese aggression in close alliancewi t~l ~he Sovi~t U nion triumphed. T he SovietUn WIn entry into the war with J ap an in accor­dan ce with its al iied comm itments and the So­viet A rmy's rout of the picked Kwantung Armyof J apan were a decisive contribu tion to the Chi­nese people 's libera tion from brutal J apan ese oc­cupation ; furthermore , they cre ated favourablecon~iti o!l ~ for the Communist P~rty and the peo­ple ur Ch ina to achl .eve victory in the comtng re­vol u f. iori a ry war agamst the counter-revolutionarylo rces headed by Chiang Kai-shek and bac ked byUS imper ial ists.

In th,e fourth period of the Chinese revo lution­tha t ot the victory of th e bourgeois-d emocratic

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. I tion and its develoI)ment into a socia list1 evo u I • d ' 1 .revolution-Mao Tse-tung wa s defea te m lI S

ca ll for the forming of a coa lition govern~lcn lwhich would incl ude the Kuommlan g, the Com­mun ist Part y and other parties and groups ~[t~rthe victory over the Japan~se. aggressor.~ . I hispolitical line was bas~d on hi s Ide.a that coop:,~I at ion in war determines coope ra tron af ter war(stated in his re port On a Coalition Gov,emmel~tdel iver ed at the Seventh Cf'C Congr ess 111 April1945). .

Subsequent events confirmed ~l~e co rre~~nessof the policy based on the pr opmntH:m th at con­trad ictions d uring the wa r are dIffer en t. fro~nthose after the war, and therefore cooperatIon. inwar does not mean that there mus t be cooperationafter war." That was a policy aimed at preparingthe Party and people fo r a new revolutionar y ci­vil war against the US-backed an ti-na tional, an ­ti-popular and counter- revo lutiona ry Chiang Kai ­shek regime, for complet ing the bourgeois-demo­cra tic revo lution an d promoting its developmentinto a socia list revolut ion (outlined in my re­por t On th e Present Situat ion and th e 'Tasks ofth e Party de livered at the ge neral meetin g ofParty cad res, conve ned by the Party Committeeat the ce CPC on D ecember 25, 1945).

Led by the Communist Party and supported bythe people of Ch ina, the her oic nat ional -libera­tion army of China defea ted the multi -million­strong army of Chiang Kai-shek, Li Ts ung-jcn,Yan H si- shan g and other militarists, whi ch theUnited Sta tes had armed with mod ern rnilit arvequipment. The national -liberation army was ;;hfe

Ii

to score that v ictory , firstl y, becau se the SovietUni on 's victo ry ove r l l itlerite German v and mi­litarist Japan in the Second W or ld \ Va'r had cre­a ted an ex tremely favour able situa tion inside th ecountry, and secondly, because the CC CPSU andthe Soviet Government had rende red China tre­mendous military and technical assistance, sup­plying- it with modern armaments whi ch the he­ro ic Sov iet Army seized from the million-stronzK

h

wa ntung Army of Japan in August 1945, andplacing at its disposal Northea st China, an eco­no.micall y and industri all y advanced area. But forthi s a ll- round , selfless , int ernati on ali st assistanceon the part of the migh ty Soviet U nion, th e Chi­nese revolution would not ha ve succeeded in1949.

In the fifth period of the Chinese revolution­t ~lat of socialist revolution and socia lis t construe­tlOn:-Ma.o Tsc-tung followed a polic y which heo~I.~lJ~ed III hI S report to th e 2nd plenum of the~.C C~C of the 7th convocat ion in March 19491.1,1 •~lllCh he ,as ~ erted th at. it wa s impossible h;call Y, out. soc ialis t revolution and socia list con­stru,ct lOn in CI~ina a fter th e victo ry of the bo ur­g-eols-de!l1.ocra tl.c revo luti on becau se of the exis­tence . of impe rialism, th e incompletene ss of theagrarian ~evol~tion, the inadequ ate devel opmentof ~apltalJsm III .91it,la and th e participa tion ofnatIOnal. bourgeoisie III th e rev olution . A lthoughthat polt~y tnumphed and for four years wa s ad­hered to 111 Pa rty and state affairs, it was ultima­t~l ~ overco~l1e by a . Lenini st, Comintern policy.S,Llch a I~ olJ cy was indeed desired by th e wholeConununist Party and the people of China; the

III

po licy confirms the possib ility for 11 ;11 <1 to takea non -capi talist pa th of develo pment and th e pos­sibility of th e transformation of the Chinese bour ­geois-de mocratic revolut ion int o a socia list revo ­lu tion du e to its ant i-i mperialist nature, the he­gcmony of the proletaria t in th e revo lution andthe assistance of the Soviet Union.

T hat policy , whic h is outl ine d chiefly in mywork T he Soviets in China as a Sp ecial Form ofDem ocratic Dictatorship of th e Proletariat andthe Peasant ry (magazine Communist Int ernatio­nal, No . 3 1, 1934, pp. 22-33), and which was ap­pr oved at the time by the Comintern leadershipand the A ll-Union Com munist Party (Bolshe ­viks ), a policy which I defended and which MaoT se- tung opposed at the above-mentioned 2ndplen um of the Centr a l Committee, tr iumphed firstat the 4th plenum of the ee Cl'C of th e ith con­vocation in J anuary 1954, th en at the All- ChinaParty Conference in Mar ch of the same year, andfinally at the Eighth cpe Cong ress in October195G.

T he def~at ~f th e right~opp,ortunjst, and pla in­ly Trotskyite-Cheri T u-hsiung ist policy of surren­der advocated by Mao Tse-tung on the basic is­sues of the Chinese revolut ion mad e the " ideasof Mao T se- tung" synony mous wit h Trotskyismand Chen Tu-hsiungism in the eyes of the Partyand people. That is why Mao Tse-t ung was com­p.eIl.ed to acceJ?t not only the Part y poli cy of so­cia list re volution and socialist construct ion bu talso the proposal s conce rni ng introduction ofchanges in the contents of the " Main P rincipl es"of the CPC Ru les adop ted by the Seventh Con-

III

Kress. Inste ad of accep ring " the ideas of MaoTse-tung as guidance for all activities" of theepc, the new Rules adopted a t the Sth Congressst ipulated that " the Communist Party of China isguided in its activities by Marxi sm-Leninism."That was really a gr eat victory over anti-Marx­ist and anti -Le ninist Maoism.

The CPS U Central Committee, the Soviet Go­vernment and the Soviet people rendered theChinese Communist Party, the Chi nese Govern­merit an d people tremendous economic, scientific­techno logical and cultural-e ducat iona l assistancefor socialist const ruction in China. As a resu lt,an indu strial base was built in China with in ashort period of time, wh ich ensured the furtherall -round development of the national economy.nu ~ for the ad;,ent ur!s t "big le~p" an d "peo­ple s comm un es, but for the unbn dled slanderous~arnl?aign against the Soviet Union which ma del.ts fur ther ass istance to China impossible, butf~H' the so-~alled "cult ura l revolution," the situa­tlO!l 111 China today would be entirely different.W ith the ~uvict Union's all-round and selflessass istance, In .close and mu tuall y advantageouscoopera tion ~.l th the world socialist community,tn the conditions of . the mod ern-d ay scient ificand technical revolutio n, an d as a result of thecre at ive en.deavo ur of millions of workers pea­sal~ts and mtell cctua ls, the People's Republic ofC:~ll?a could ~ave been by now a flourishi ng so­cia list industria l power with an advanced agri­culture, science an d culture. The Chinese peo lecould have been living and working in secu~ecultured and peacef ul con rli tions ; they would not

zn

ha ve been doom ed to cons b n t int imi (btion fromMao T se-tung and Lin Piao with their shameless,insolent and inh uma n slogans, such as "do notfear poverty ," "do not fear privat ion," "do not

f " " ffear death ," " prepa re or war, prepare orhunger ," etc.

T hus hi stor ical event s h ave clearly provedthat du r ing th e th ree stages of the Chinese revo­lution (anti-imperialist nation al -li beration revo ­luti on an ti -f eudal bourgeois democratic revolu­tion , 'anti-c ap ita lis t socialist revolution) MaoTsc-t ung committed either "!e.ft" . or righ t, orcomb ined "lef t" and right revisionist and oppor­tun ist mistakes and that ultimately it wa s th eL eninist theory , L enin ist tactics and the L enin­ist poli cy that triumphed. Bu t this does not meanth at by first usurping mili tary, th en party andthen state power, M ao T st- tung had not at diff e­rent times done gr ea t harm to the cause of th eChinese revolution and the international cornm­uni st , working-class and nation al -liberat ion mo­vement. On th e contrary, fact s irrefutably showthat whe never Mao T se- tung took the upp erhand in milit a ry, party and state affa irs he inva­riably inflicted-and still inflicts -serious da­mage to ou r common cause both insid e and out ­side China.

For example. after the con ference in TsuniMao T se- tung by his adventurist, schisma tic andharmful policy reduced the 270-tho usa nd-stro ngChinese Red Army to 45,000 thu s causi ng- greatdamage 10 the cau se of the Communist Partyand the people of China .

In the fi rst half of the 1940s, under the pr etex t

2t

of the so- ca lled " campaign to rectify the style ofP art y work," Mao did immense ideologica l, pu­litical and organizat ional harm to the Comm un­ist Pa~ty of China by dest ro yin g a nd to rlLu';ngtens uf tho usands uf P arty workers and revolut ­ionary you th organizations. 1t has become obvi­ous today that the anti -communist , treacherouscampaign was a dress-rehearsa l of the "cult uralrcvolut ion ."

By pursuing his " three red ba nners" poli cy inth e late '50s and ea rly '60s Mao brought thecause of socia list construct ion in China and hereconomy to the brink of disaster, and the livingcond itions of the Chinese peo ple-to un believa­bly low sta ndards, to destitut ion. He thereby dis ­cre d ited the ideas of socialism in the eyes of thewo rld public.

By his ant i-Le ninist, anti-Soviet, sch ismatican d subve rs ive ac tivity he has, since the ea rly'60s, done g rea t harm to the world socialistcommunity, th e world comm unist and labourmovement a nd the an ti- imperia list struggle ofthe peo ples of Asia, Afr ica an d Latin America,pa rt icula rly to the nation al -li bera tion struggleof the Vietnamese and A rab peoples. He therebyrenders the US an d other imperialists a greatserv ice while ignoring th e vi tal interests of theCommunist Party of China and the Chinese pe­ople.

Ami what unbel ievab le ca lamit ies, what mis­fort unes , unprecedented in Chinese history, hehas brought to the Communi st Par ty of Chinaand th e Chinese people ; what grea t harm anddamage he is causing to th e socia list countries,

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the Communist and W orker s' Part ies and th ejust cau se of all peoples fighting against imperia­lism. colonialism and neocoloni ali sm, for free­dom, p rog-res s and p e a ce , b y h is c rim cs in thecourse of th e " cultural revolution" in Ch ina!

I t is nut sur prising that today " the thought ofMao T se-tung," as well as Mao personally, havebecom e to th e Chinese people and working peo ­ple throughout the wor ld a symbol of err ors andun tru th , a symbo l of calamities and misfor tunes,a symbo l of barbarism and savagery, a symbolof obscurantism and coun ter -revolution.

In order to impo se his mad ideas and policyon the people of China and other countries, topreser ve his rea ctionary, despotic military regi­me, and tu ena ble his successors to inherit hisimp erial th rone, he has for a number of yearsconcentra ted his attention and effort on twoprincipal task s: first , to brainwash the ChineseComm uni sts and people so as to replace the ideasof Leninism wi th Mao ism; second, tu brainwashthe Ch inese Communists and people so as to neu­tra lize the in fluence of the CPSU and the So­viet sla te an d destroy the feelings of friendshipcherished by th e Chinese people for t he Commun­ists and peoples of the US SR by pr omoting' anti-Sovieti sm and an ti -commun ism. '

T o achi eve his ends Ma o Tse-t unz ha s fordecades launched one campaign aft~r anothe rand used. either bloody or " peaceful" terror ista!l~ dece ~tful m~th()d s and pol icies aga inst the~'/lln ese Comm unists a nd peop le. However , lifeItself shows that he has never been ab le norwill he be abl e, to achieve his aims full y.' The

chief evidence of this is the "c ult ura l rcvulutionwhi ch is ac tua lly nothing bu t a c~u ntcr- rCV l '~ lI­

t ion ary coup agains t th e COmllll!l1Ist P ar ty a~dpeople of Chi na, as we ll as ~gamst the Sov! etUnion and th e worl d communist movement. 1 heca mpaign is being cond ucted under suc h slog­aus as: "T he th ou gh t of Mao T ee-tung is in dan­ger"; "T he th ought of Mao T se- tun g is beingprevented from sp reading among the present g~­

neration" : " Moder n rev is ionism (t he referenee I S

to Leninism] must be up rooted " ; " Soviet agen tsmust be el iminated" (that is. advocates of prole­tari an inte rna tionalis m).

Another ev iden ce of M ao's failure to ac h ievehi s ai ms fully is the foll ow ing fact . Althou gh inth e initial peri od of the " cult ura l revolution"M ao T sc-tun g and hi s group succeeded in defeat ­in g the Corn m u n is t Party, the Y oung Comm u n­ist League and th e trade union s of China a ndin persecuting a nd destroyin g physica lly mill ionsupon mi llions of Communists and YCLers . wo rk­ers, peasan ts, in tellectual s, for the ir loyalty toM arxi sm -L en in ism and for their in terna tionali stfe elings tow ards th e Soviet Union: a lthough th eMaois ts have brought th e ant i- Sov iet psychosisto a poin t where armed provocations on the So­vie t border were staged , they conti nue to com­pl ai n that n either afte r a second nor thi rd , fourth.fif th , etc. "cul tural revolut ion " wi ll th ev be ableto atta in their ends fo r decades or even' centuriesto come, T h is is hor ne out by the decisions ofth e 9th CPC Congress and the activity of MaoT se- tung and h is g roup after the Con gress,

In the first pl ace , whil e con tinuing the " cultu r -

24

a l revolution" under the slogans of " s t~uggle ,"" cr it icism" and " re-ed uca tion ," of " fightl~,g re -

" fi I ' S ' t . " and figh t-visionism ," Ig ltlng . nvre sp ies, .ing the class ene my," th ey resort to mass repres­sions and kill ings of Co mmunists , Y CL ers, andurdinary working people under the pretext oflighting " cr im inal elemen ts." T~ey l~ot on ly car­ry out purges in every cn tcrpn s.e, 111 every of­fice, in every people's commun e, III eve lY e.duca­tional establishment and in every Family .ll'~ anattempt to track do wn, hound and a nnihila teCo mmuni sts, YCLcrs, advanced wo rkers, pe asants.intellect ual s and studen ts, th ey are al so pers ecut­ing hun gweip ings and tsaofa ns, purging revolu­tionary committees , and th e command I?ersonn:lof the N a tional-L ibera tion A rmy of China, It IS

no secret, of course th at th e hungweipings, th etsaofa ns, and Army units arc the three mainstaysof the Mao regime .

In the second place, Mao and his group a returnin g the ir anti- Soviet ca mpaig n, not only inpropagand a but in th eir en tire sta te and publicwork , in to frenzied preparation for war againstth e Soviet Union. T h is shows be yond any doub tth a t Mao's anti-S ovie tism is nationali st in formand an ti-commun ist in con ten t.

But Mao Tse-tung and h is gro up shall neveratta in th eir a ims, The Chinese Co mmu ni sts andpeopl e arc firml y convinced, both in th eor y andpractice, that L eninism is the ir com bat bannerin th e strugg le against, and victory over, a ll in ­te rn a l and ex tern a l enemies. that it is the ir com­ba t ba n n e r in th e building uf socia lism and com­mun ism . Alliance and friendsh ip with th e So -

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viet COl1l mun ists and peopl e are a necessary con­dition for and a reliable gua ra n tee of v ictoryover all en emi es in the struggle for a free a ndha ppy life.

T herefore it was with a fe eling of p rofoundsa tisfaction that the Chinese Communists a ndpeople learned about the sta teme n t made byL. T. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSUCen t ra l Committee, at th e Internation al Confe­rence of Co mmunist and W orkers' Par ties heldin J unc 1969 in M oscow. Com ra de Brezhnevsa id th en:

"\ Ve arc cons cious of th e fact tha t the basicinterests of the Sov ie t and Chinese pe oples coin ­cide. W e have always done and will contin ue todo everything possibl e to keep alive th e fri endlyfeelings which the Soviet peop le have for th efraternal Chi nese people, and we arc cer ta inthat the Chinese peopl e, too , have the sa mefee li ngs towards th e Soviet Union an d the othersoc ia list countries ."

T he Chinese Co mmu nist s and people regardth is j ust and res ponsi ble statement by L. I. Brezh­nev as an expression of since re friendship no ton ly on the par t of the Soviet Communists a ndpeople , but of the Chinese Communists andpeople as well.

They are confident that the tragedy and mis­for tune caused by th e " though t" of Ma o Tse­tung , by his activity are a tempora ry, trans ien tph enomen on , as well as M ao himself and his" though t."

They a re confiden t tha t the def ea t of MaoT se-hmg is inevitabl e just as the defeat of a ny

:.IG

traito r to revolu tion and to Marxism-Leni nismis an implicable law of histo ry.

They are confide n t th a t the time is no t fa roff wh en L eninism and th e cause of soc ia lis mwill again triumph on Chinese so il.

Thev a re confident th at th e time is not fa roff wh~n f riendshi p , concord and coo pe ration be ­tween the Soviet U nion and socia list China willt riumph .

They arc convi nce d th a t th e time is not far 0 [[when the Chi ne se Communists and people willag-a in march sho ulder to shoulde r with the Com­munists and peopl es of all countries in their just ,rev olution ary struggle for the triumph of thegoreat ideas of M arxism -Len inism th roughou t theworld!

April 18, 1970