war on crime vs the war on rugs - portland state university€¦ · jamein p. cunningham the war on...

Portland State University

Jamein P. Cunningham

Department of Economics

Portland State University

March 3rd, 2017

THE WAR ON CRIME VS THE WAR ON DRUGS

AN OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANT

PROGRAMS TO FIGHT CRIME

Economics Department Seminar

• The War on Crime vs The War on Drugs

“Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: The Introduction of the War on

Crime” w/ Sayak Khatua

“The Impact of Federal Law Enforcement Grants on Drug Arrests and Incarceration

Rates: Evidence from the Edward Byrne Program” w/ Robynn Cox

Outline

The War on Crime vs The War on DrugsJamein P. Cunningham

• Questions to be addressed:

Do National Crime Programs Change Local Government or Policing

Behavior?

How Effective are Nation Crime Programs at Reducing Crime or meeting

their stated goals?

Are there intended or unintended results related to race?


Outline

The War on Crime vs The War on Drugs

• The results indicate that:

National Crime Programs

National Program w/o enforcement mechanisms are not likely to influence size of

the police force as well as crime and arrests rates.

National Crime Programs that focused on narcotic control increased arrests related

to drug trafficking.─ 107 percent increase in white arrests for drug sales

─ 44 percent increase in black arrests for drug sales

Preview of Results

Jamein P. Cunningham The War on Crime vs The War on Drugs

OVERVIEW


Overview

• The 1960’s was a decade of radical changes in the political and economic structure of the United

States.

War on Poverty, War on Crime, Expansion of Health Care for Poor and Elderly, Desegregation, Civil Rights

Act, Voting Rights Act, Fair Housing, many more….

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995


Overview

• The 1960’s was a decade of radical changes in the political and economic structure of the United

States.

War on Poverty, War on Crime, Expansion of Health Care for Poor and Elderly, Desegregation, Civil Rights

Act, Voting Rights Act, Fair Housing, many more….

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

WOP

Established


Overview

• Reported crime started to rise dramatically in mid 1960’s

Large Cohort of Juvenile between the age of 15 and 21

Exposure to lead

Civil Unrest and Riots

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

WOP

Established


Overview

• These reforms also occurred during the same time that crime rates, female household headship

rates, and divorce rates in the United States began to rise dramatically.

Reduction in State Mental Hospitals, Expansion of Public Assistance Programs, Black Migration and White

Flight, Urban Uprisings, Militarization of the Police

Incarcerates began to explode in the mid 1970s

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

WOP

Established


Overview

• New evidence suggest that mass incarceration was driven by policy changes not criminal

behavior (Raphael and Stoll, 2013).

War on drugs led to racial disparities within the criminal justice system (Benson and Rasmussen, 1996;

Blumenson and Nilsen, 1998).

Intergovernmental grants and other programs (e.g., asset forfeiture programs) (Alexander, 2010; Cox, 2015)

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

WOP

Established


Overview

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)

• Established under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968 under Title 1.

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

LEAA

Established

WOP

Established


- LEAA


Overview


1. Allocated block grants to state and local law enforcement agents

Rising Crime

Riots and Unlawful Protest

Organized Crime

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

LEAA

Established

WOP

Established


- LEAA


Overview


2. Grants provided aid in training, equipment, hiring new police officers

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

LEAA

Established

WOP

Established


- LEAA


Overview


2. Grants provided aid in training, equipment, hiring new police officers

• Although in existence until 1982, LEAA did not administer any grants after 1980.

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

LEAA

Established

WOP

Established

LEAA Ended


- LEAA


• Initially LEAA grants were touted as the center piece on the War on Crime but support

of the program quickly began to wane.

• Public Criticism of LEAA (Horrock, 1975; Varon, 1975; “U.S. Anticrime”, 1976;

“Floundering”, 1977 ; Diegelman, 1982)

The lack of leadership,

Mission

Bureaucratic red tape

Simplistic

• LEAA criticized for inappropriate usage of Funds.

Little evidence that funds were used to increase the number of officers (“Crime Program”, 1972).

Funds were often unaccounted (Halloran, 1971; Varon, 1975; C.H., 1976; Diegelman, 1982).


- Literature Review: LEAAOverview


Overview

• By the 1980s the War on Crime was supplanted by the War on Drugs.

Violence surrounding the crack epidemic created bi-partisan agreement for a federal intervention (Kerr, 1986;

D’Amato, 1986).

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

LEAA

Established

WOP

Established

LEAA Ended


- Byrne


Overview


Violence surrounding the crack epidemic created bi-partisan agreement for a federal intervention (Kerr, 1986;

D’Amato, 1986).

The State and Local Assistance for Narcotics Control Program of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 financially

supported the War on Drugs.

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

LEAA

Established

WOP

Established

LEAA Ended

Narcotics

Control Program

Grants


- Byrne


Overview


The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 renamed the grant program the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local

Law Enforcement Assistance Program.

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

LEAA

Established

WOP

Established

LEAA Ended

Narcotics

Control Program

Grants

Renamed The

Edward Byrne

Memorial LEAP


- Byrne


Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance

Program (Byrne)

Established by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and initially operated

as the State and Local Assistance for Narcotics Control Program.

1. To allocated block grants to state and local law enforcement agencies for drug

related offenses – focusing on:

Apprehension

Prosecution

Detention and rehabilitation

2. Grants provided aid in training, equipment, hiring new police officers.

Multijurisdictional drug task force units

Grants had to be match by local municipalities (3 to 1).


- ByrneOverview


• Byrne grants went to local municipalities for variety of areas to influence law

enforcement effectiveness but approximately half of all funds were used to establish

multijurisdictional drug task forces (MJDTF) between 1989 and 1993 (Dunworth et

al., 1996d).

• MJDTF were created to deal with drug trafficking that often involved multiple

jurisdictions.

Byrne grants through MJDTF have been championed as effective in improving communication

between law enforcement agencies (McGarrell and Schlegel, 1993; Jefferies et al, 1998).

By 1991, there existed 904 MJDTF which were responsible for over 250,000 arrests made in that

year (Blumenson and Nilsen, 1998).

• Despite the MJDTF covering 83 percent of the population, there is little evidence that

the Byrne grants influenced drug arrest (Smith et al., 2000; Mazerolle, 2007).


- Literature Review: ByrneOverview


Why Study Intergovernmental Grant Programs dedicated to

Crime Prevention?

• Quasi-Experimental Research Design can estimate an elasticity of police

on crime

Estimates in crime literature suffers from simultaneity bias

• Gain Greater Understanding of Federal Funding on Local Police Initiatives

COPS program has shown to decrease crime in the 1990?

• Riots, Riot Prevention, and Community Policing Strategies have become a

topic of interest and have create tension in urban communities.


Research Questions…


What is the Impact of the Intergovernmental Crime Prevention

Grant Programs?

More Specifically

Impact of police on crime and arrest

How effective was the “War on Crime” and the “War on Drugs”?

How effective are these federal grant programs in enhancing local or community

policing?

Research Design

• Use variation in the timing & location of grants

Difference in Difference using event-study framework

─ Before and After design for description of pre-trends and dynamic response for cities that receive

grants


Research Questions…


The Event Study Research Design

Visual/statistical evaluation of pre-treatment trends (falsification test)

Describe dynamic, likely non-linear evolution of effects, reflecting set up costs, changes in

use, and changes in composition of population

Estimates of 𝜋 and 𝛿 will be unbiased even in the presence of pre-existing and permanent

difference between cities that receive grants and those that do not

Eliminates potential downward bias from averaging outcomes in newly funded location with

those from more established locations

Uncovers estimates of the elasticity of police on crime


𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡,𝑠(𝑖) + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡′ 𝛽 +

𝜏=1

𝑝

𝜋−𝜏 𝐷𝑖1 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑖∗ = −𝜏 +

𝜏=1

𝑞

𝛿𝜏 𝐷𝑖1 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑖∗ = 𝜏 + 휀𝑖,𝑡

- Empirical StrategyMethodology


: City (i) fixed effects

: State-by-Year fixed effects

X: Annual city level covariates from census linearly interpolated between

census years


𝜏=1

𝑝

𝜋−𝜏 𝐷𝑖1 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑖∗ = −𝜏 +

𝜏=1

𝑞





Di1(): Dummies for 𝜏 years before & after grant is received (Ti*)

Year the grant was issued is omitted: 1(t-Ti* = 0)

: Pre-effects

Change in average difference in treated city outcomes 𝜏 years before establishment relative to

the untreated cities

: Post-effects

Change in the average difference in treated city outcomes 𝜏 years after establishment relative

to the untreated cities



𝜏=1

𝑝

𝜋−𝜏 𝐷𝑖1 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑖∗ = −𝜏 +

𝜏=1

𝑞




Data on Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

Grants

• Federal Outlays files

The date the grant was issued

Geographical Codes

Size of the Grants

• Focus on grants made from 1968 to 1975


- DataMethodology


Data on Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law

Enforcement Assistance Program Grants

• Consolidated Federal Funds Report Files

The date the grant was issued

Geographical Codes

Size of the Grants

• Focus on grants made from 1986 to 2004


- DataMethodology


Data on Reported Crime by City

• The Uniform Crime Reporting: Offenses Known and Clearance by Arrest (UCR),

provides information on offenses submitted by law enforcement agencies to the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

• The Uniform Crime Reporting: Arrests by Age, Sex, and Race provide

information on arrest rates by offense for law enforcement agencies starting in

1980.

• The data compiled for the UCR is submitted voluntarily by city, county, and state

enforcement agencies.


- DataMethodology


• LEAA analysis will focus on crime rates

Sample Restrictions – Population greater than 25,000

• Byrne analysis will focus on crime and arrest rates by race

Sample Restrictions – Population greater than 50,000

• Technical notes

Weighted by population

Standard errors clustered by city


- DataMethodology


LEAA GRANTS


LEAA Grants


All Cities LEAA Cities

Non-LEAA

Cities

T-Test of

Difference

A. 1960 City Characteristics

(N=609) (N=431) (N=178)

Means

Population 120,708 150,112 49,512 <0.01

Population per square mile 5,230 5,157 5,407 0.508

Median Income 6,180 6,008 6,599 <0.01

Proportion of residents

with 12 years of education 46.0 45.8 46.4 0.557

nonwhite 9.8 11.1 6.7 <0.01

male between 15-24 years of age 6.8 6.9 6.3 <0.01

male between 25-39 years of age 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.995



All Cities LEAA Cities

Non-LEAA

Cities

T-Test of

Difference

B. 1960 Offenses Known and Reported

(N=609) (N=431) (N=178)

Violent Crimes per 100,000 residents

Murder 7 8 5 <0.01

Rape 6 7 5 <0.05

Robbery 39 43 28 <0.01

Assault 179 188 138 <0.10

Property Crimes per 100,000 residents

Burglary 557 585 490 <0.01

Larcerny 1,550 1,631 1,349 <0.01

Motor Vehicle Theft 219 231 187 <0.01

Total Crimes per 100,000 residents 2,403 2,539 2,062 <0.01

Sworn Police per 1,000 residents 140 143 133 <0.05

Growth from 1960 to 1965

Total Crimes per 100,000 residents 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.386

Sworn Police per 1,000 residents 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.667

LEAA Grants



• Our identification strategy relies on pre-existing trends in crime

rates being exogenous from the date of the first grant.

• There is no statistically significant relationship between crime rates

and the date of the first grant.

LEAA Grants



y = 0.0003x - 0.3278

-1.5

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

Chan

ge

in t

he

Cri

me

Rat

e

1960 -

1965

Year of First Grant

Pre-Trend Relationship Between Date of LEAA Grant and Crime Rates

LEAA Grants


Preliminary Results: LEAA


Event Study Results – Police per 1,000

-0.06

-0.04

-0.02

0

0.02

0.04

0.06

-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8

Model 1: C & Y Model 2: C & SxY Model 3: C & SxY & Covariates





-0.06

-0.04

-0.02

0

0.02

0.04

0.06

-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8


Pre-treatment Effects

Statistically Indistinguishable

from 0





-0.06

-0.04

-0.02

0

0.02

0.04

0.06

-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8






-0.06

-0.04

-0.02

0

0.02

0.04

0.06

-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8


Post-treatment Effects Statistically Indistinguishable from 0





-0.06

-0.04

-0.02

0

0.02

0.04

0.06

-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8

Model 3: C & SxY & Covariates




-0.08

-0.06

-0.04

-0.02

0

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.1

0.12

0.14

-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8


Event Study Results –Total Crime per 100,000




Event Study Results –Violent Crime per 100,000

-0.15

-0.1

-0.05

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8

Model 2: Treated Only Sample




Event Study Results –Arrests per 100,000

-0.2

-0.15

-0.1

-0.05

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8

Model 2: Treated Only Sample


• No Evidence that LEAA increased the number of police, reduced

crime, or even increased arrests.

Program lack mechanism to ensure proper utilization of funds.

• Police – Community interactions could have served as a local

mechanism for oversight.

Neighborhood Legal Service Program often filed lawsuits against local

police departments.

Funding could have been used to meet the demands of poverty

lawyers.






Event Study Results – Treatment Interacted w/ Legal Services

(1) (2) (3)

LSP & LEAA DV: Police

Years -4 to -1 -0.0246* -0.0142 -0.0136

[0.0132] [0.00883] [0.00894]

Years 1 to 3 0.00522 0.00545 0.00437

[0.0104] [0.00905] [0.00908]

Years 4 to 6 3.27e-05 0.00501 0.00342

[0.0200] [0.0142] [0.0144]

Years 7 to 9 0.0117 0.00118 -0.00277

[0.0193] [0.0154] [0.0158]

Observations 15,386 15,386 15,386

R-squared 0.834 0.888 0.892

Number of Cities 609 609 609





(1) (2) (3)

LSP & LEAA DV: Total Crime

Years -4 to -1 0.0105 -0.0183 -0.0145

[0.0335] [0.0143] [0.0140]

Years 1 to 3 -0.00628 -0.00882 -0.0148

[0.0140] [0.0106] [0.0105]

Years 4 to 6 -0.0154 -0.0266 -0.0415*

[0.0251] [0.0225] [0.0228]

Years 7 to 9 -0.0275 -0.0125 -0.0359

[0.0297] [0.0335] [0.0338]

Observations 15,386 15,386 15,386

R-squared 0.834 0.888 0.892






(1) (2) (3)

LSP & LEAA DV: Violent Crime

Years -4 to -1 0.0651 0.0184 0.0247

[0.0761] [0.0473] [0.0427]

Years 1 to 3 -0.0203 -0.0110 -0.0179

[0.0251] [0.0211] [0.0186]

Years 4 to 6 -0.125*** -0.0881*** -0.0953***

[0.0401] [0.0295] [0.0306]

Years 7 to 9 -0.153*** -0.102** -0.113**

[0.0528] [0.0441] [0.0472]

Observations 15,386 15,386 15,386

R-squared 0.834 0.888 0.892






(1) (2) (3)

LSP & LEAA DV: Arrests

Years -4 to -1 0.0642 0.0394 0.0432

[0.0399] [0.0391] [0.0366]

Years 1 to 3 -0.00447 -0.00733 -0.0157

[0.0235] [0.0295] [0.0235]

Years 4 to 6 -0.0767** -0.0692* -0.0847***

[0.0298] [0.0362] [0.0263]

Years 7 to 9 -0.111*** -0.0978** -0.116***

[0.0402] [0.0464] [0.0349]

Observations 15,386 15,386 15,386

R-squared 0.834 0.888 0.892



BYRNE GRANTS


Byrne Grants


All Cities

Received Grant

between 1987-2000 Control Group

T-Test of

Difference

( N =407 ) ( N = 199 ) ( N = 208 )

A. Average Characteristics 1980

Population 107,514 164,725 52,778 <0.01

Population Per Square Mile 416 425 407 0.668

Median Age 30 29 30 <0.01

Median Income 17,416 15,891 18,875 <0.01

Percent of the Population

with 12 or more years of education 69.7 68.0 71.3 <0.01

with female head of households 16.3 18.6 14.1 <0.01

Black 11.2 16.6 6.0 <0.01


All Cities

Received Grant

between 1987-

2000 Control Group

T-Test of

Difference

( N =407 ) ( N = 199 ) ( N = 208 )

B. Average Characteristics 1980-1985

Crime Rates (per 1,000 Residents)

Total Crime 77.7 87.8 67.9 <0.01

Personnel

Sworn Police (per 1,000 Residents) 1.7 1.9 1.6 <0.01

Drug Arrest Rates (per 1,000 Residents)

Total 3.5 3.9 3.2 <0.01

Sales 0.7 0.8 0.6 <0.01

Possession 2.9 3.1 2.7 <0.10

Drug Arrest Rates by Race

Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) 9.7 7.7 11.7 <0.05

White (per 1,000 White Residents) 3.5 3.6 3.4 0.425

Drug Sales Arrest Rates by Race

Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) 2.0 1.8 2.3 0.169

White (per 1,000 White Residents) 0.6 0.7 0.6 <0.01

Drug Possession Arrest Rates by Race

Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) 7.6 5.9 9.2 <0.05

White (per 1,000 White Residents) 2.9 2.9 2.9 0.823

Byrne Grants


• Our identification strategy relies on pre-existing trends in crime

rates being exogenous from the date of the first grant.

• There is no statistically significant relationship between crime rates

and the date of the first grant.

Byrne Grants



Pre-Trend Relationship Between Date of First Byrne Grant and Crime Rates

y = 0.0001x - 0.3278

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Chan

ge

in t

he

Cri

me

Rat

e

1980 -

1985

Year of First Grant

Byrne Grants



Results: Byrne


-0.08

-0.06

-0.04

-0.02

0

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.1

0.12

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5



• Using model 3 estimates, sworn per 1,000 residents increase by 2.4 (.0399/1.6719)

percent three years after treatment. Four and five years after treatment, the size of law

enforcement is steadily growing.

• The results are consistent with the grant utilization for additional personnel to conduct

wide-spread apprehension of persons in violation of local and state substance abuse

laws (U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1987).


Results: Byrne



Event Study Results – Arrests per 1,000

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5


Results: Byrne



(1) (2) (3) (4)

Dependent Variable Per 1,000 Residents

Violent Crime Total Crime

Treated Only Treated Only

Years -5 to -1 -0.233 -0.177 -1.588 -2.382*

[0.339] [0.508] [1.296] [1.234]

Years 1 to 2 0.0449 -0.00585 0.799 0.993

[0.340] [0.431] [0.866] [1.091]

Years 3 to 4 0.258 0.359 0.354 2.051

[0.513] [0.699] [1.577] [1.874]

Years 5 to 6 -0.476 -0.362 -0.650 1.587

[0.713] [1.028] [1.906] [2.375]

Observations 11,633 5,698 11,786 5,741

R-squared 0.298 0.527 0.705 0.767

Number of Cities 407 199 407 199

Results: Byrne


• Possible explanations for the insignificant post-treatment effects

Additional funding, it only represents a small fraction of total expenditures on public safety.

Also possible that Byrne grants had spillover implications for nearby untreated cities through the

establishment of multi-jurisdictional drug task forces.

― These multi-jurisdictional drug task forces could increase drug arrest in both treated and nearby untreated cities

and the full sample specifications would under estimate the effect of the Byrne Grant Program.

• Both the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 outlined the

grant purposes which included additional personnel, equipment, training, technical

assistance, and information for the more widespread apprehension, prosecution, and

rehabilitation of person who violate crime and drugs laws (Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub.L

100-690, 1988).

Disparities in incarceration by race stems from aggressive policing strategies in high crime areas where

narcotic trafficking occurs outdoors; creating the opportunity for wide-spread apprehension for drug

offenses (Johnson et al., 1977).

― Possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects.


Results: Byrne



(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Dependent Variable Drug Possession Arrest Per 1,000 Residents

Total Arrests White Arrests Black Arrests

Treated

Only

Treated

Only

Treated

Only

Years -5 to -1 -0.232 -0.219 -0.0677 0.0362 -0.645 -0.749

[0.226] [0.228] [0.203] [0.224] [0.669] [0.681]

Years 1 to 2 -0.0634 -0.0779 -0.0692 0.0346 -0.537 -0.838

[0.247] [0.289] [0.238] [0.244] [0.788] [0.861]

Years 3 to 4 -0.254 -0.0818 0.0305 0.179 -1.264 -1.408

[0.323] [0.363] [0.320] [0.325] [1.026] [1.164]

Years 5 to 6 -0.429 -0.0513 0.0167 0.307 -2.087 -1.756

[0.376] [0.438] [0.396] [0.397] [1.400] [1.558]

Observations 11,732 5,709 11,400 5,544 11,400 5,544

R-squared 0.531 0.627 0.430 0.523 0.279 0.511

Number of Cities 407 199 407 199 407 199

Results: Byrne



(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Dependent Variable Drug Sales Arrest Per 1,000 Residents

Total Arrests White Arrests Black Arrests


Treated

Only

Years -5 to -1 -0.102 -0.102 -0.112 -0.122 -0.0216 0.227

[0.137] [0.166] [0.126] [0.162] [0.336] [0.429]

Years 1 to 2 0.416*** 0.416*** 0.136 0.178 1.161 1.148

[0.141] [0.150] [0.120] [0.111] [0.773] [0.703]

Years 3 to 4 0.455*** 0.543*** 0.317* 0.383** 0.130 0.0902

[0.170] [0.185] [0.166] [0.172] [0.505] [0.455]

Years 5 to 6 0.329* 0.505** 0.527** 0.642** -0.0818 0.0294

[0.184] [0.219] [0.211] [0.261] [0.536] [0.545]

Observations 9,868 5,023 9,524 4,853 9,524 4,853

R-squared 0.584 0.661 0.412 0.488 0.319 0.483

Number of Cities 407 199 407 199 407 199

Results: Byrne


• The joint treatment effect in year 1 and 2 indicates a 43 (0.416/0.956) percent increase in

drug sales arrest after the first grant is received.

• Arrest for drug sales increase by 9 percent 3 to 4 years after treatment.

The cumulative post-treatment effect implies a 126 (1.2/0.956) percent increase in drug sales arrests 6

years after the first Byrne grant.

• The post-treatment effects differ dramatically by race.

According to column 3, the cumulative post-treatment effect implies a 107 (0.98/0.916) percent increase

in drug sales arrests for whites compared to a 44 (1.643/3.708) percent increase in drug sales arrest for

blacks in column 5.

Evidence that funds were utilized in communities that may have been under policed. However, the

policy still could have exacerbated racial disparities in incarceration due to historically high arrest rates

for blacks.


Results: Byrne



(1) (2) (3) (4)

Dependent Variable Violent Crime Arrest

White Arrests Black Arrests


Years -5 to -1 -0.218 -0.352 -0.0723 -0.596

[0.152] [0.226] [0.671] [0.751]

Years 1 to 2 0.240* 0.328* 0.175 0.182

[0.139] [0.174] [0.530] [0.644]

Years 3 to 4 0.345** 0.614** -0.0489 0.0717

[0.169] [0.246] [0.750] [0.886]

Years 5 to 6 0.482** 0.841*** -1.130 -0.675

[0.210] [0.321] [0.977] [1.130]

Observations 11,554 5,626 11,554 5,626

R-squared 0.526 0.592 0.276 0.555

Number of Cities 407 199 407 199

Results: Byrne


(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

Per 1,000 White Residents Per 1,000 Black Residents

Treated

Only Treated Only

Treated

Only

A: Drug Possession

Byrne Grants per Capita 0.705 0.679 0.478 0.0121 0.0202 -0.125 1.959* 1.487 1.326

(in 2000 dollars) [0.433] [0.434] [0.463] [0.370] [0.367] [0.429] [1.057] [1.122] [1.218]

Covariates X X X X X X

R-squared 0.515 0.526 0.625 0.416 0.426 0.521 0.243 0.274 0.508

B: Drug Sales Arrest

Byrne Grants per Capita 0.424*** 0.405*** 0.252** 0.220 0.217 0.140 1.008** 0.808* 0.572

(in 2000 dollars) [0.157] [0.152] [0.114] [0.185] [0.180] [0.173] [0.452] [0.427] [0.470]

Covariates X X X X X X

R-squared 0.572 0.579 0.655 0.395 0.401 0.474 0.275 0.317 0.481

Number of Cities 407 407 199 407 407 199 407 407 199

Results: Byrne

• LEAA had minimum influence on crime and arrest rates.

• Some evidence that enforcement mechanism resulted in lower crime rates but evidence

is weak.

• The implementation of the Byrne Program resulted in an

An increase in police hiring,

An increase in drug arrests,

An increase in white drug arrests

However, an increase in black/white relative arrest rates that seems to be driven by an increase in the

black/white relative drug arrest rates.

• The Byrne Program provide evidence that funds were utilized in communities that may

have been under policed. However, the policy still could have exacerbated racial

disparities in mass incarceration.

• Although great racial disparities still exist with mass incarceration – the current policy

debate is related to police use of force.


Summary


THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME


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