war zone syria: russian and us interventions assessed · war zone syria: russian and us...
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War zone Syria: Russian and US interventions assessed
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During the past two years, operations by Russia and the United States in Syria have
intensified as Moscow and Washington have sought to bolster their allies in the region. Tim
Ripley assesses the progress of these rival operations
In October US-backed allies finally captured Raqqa, the ‘capital’ of the Islamic State, after a four-
month siege. A few weeks before Russian-supported Syrian troops broke the Jihadi group’s three-
year siege of the eastern city of Dayr al-Zawr. Islamic State fighters seemed to be in full retreat
across Syria.
Moscow and Washington have thus recently had good news to celebrate from Syria, yet only two
years before the situation was very different. Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s depleted armed
forces were in retreat across the country in the face of advances by the Islamic State and an
alliance of anti-government groups. At the same time the United States was struggling to find any
local allies in Syria that might be willing and capable to take the fight to the Islamic State militants.
Geopolitical context
The strategic objectives, tactics, and equipment employed by the Russians and the US-led
coalition in Syria during the past two years have been very different.
A Syrian Arab Army T-62 tank fires into the eastern city of Dayr al-Zawr during an operation against the Islamic State on 2 November. (AFP/Getty Images )
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information contained herein is from sources considered reliable but its accuracy and completeness are not warranted, nor are the
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For the United States the six-year-long war has proved to be one of its most challenging foreign
engagements since the end of the Cold War. In 2011 the then-US president, Barack Obama, along
with the British, French, and several Gulf Arab states, came out strongly in favour of the rebellion
against the Assad government. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) led an operation to
channel arms and other support to the rebels, while US-backed diplomatic and political
engagement was initiated to build up opposition political groups as an alternative government that
could eventually take over from Assad. In the aftermath of the 2013 crisis regarding the use of
chemical weapons by Assad’s forces, however, the United States and its allies recoiled from
directly attacking the Damascus government.
The rise of the Islamic State in 2014 and its offensive into Iraq that captured Mosul – and nearly
led to the fall of Baghdad – forced the United States to form a military coalition to defeat the Jihadi
group. Soon US-led coalition aircraft and special forces were mounting air strikes and raids into
Syria to hit Islamic State command and logistics infrastructure. As Iraqi government forces were
rebuilt in 2015 and began to strike back in 2016, the United States started to look for a local ally
that could take the fight to Islamic State sanctuaries in Syria. This created a dilemma for policy
makers in Washington, London, and Paris: they wanted to defeat the Islamic State, but at the
same time the Syrian civil war was still raging and many rebel groups they were supporting
showed little inclination to fight the Islamic State as well as Assad. In addition, the factions that
were most able or capable of taking on the Islamic State came with major political baggage. The
Syrian government army was still loyal to Assad, whom the United States and its allies wanted to
overthrow. Moreover, the Kurdish fighters of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) were anathema
to the Turkish government, which at the time was a major NATO ally, providing key air bases for
US aircraft that were conducting strikes on Islamic State territory. To take the fight to the Islamic
State in Syria would therefore come at a political cost for Washington.
For Moscow, intervention in Syria came with none of the political complications facing the
Americans. President Vladimir Putin viewed Assad as a long-established Russian ally and was not
going to allow Assad and his government fall victim to what Moscow dubbed “another US-
sponsored regime change operation”. The overthrowing of Libyan leader Moammar Ghadaffi in
2011, along with the ousting of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in 2014, added to Putin’s
resolve to back Russia’s “friend in need” in Damascus.
[Continued in full version…]
Local partners
The divergent and often contradictory political objectives of the United States and its major allies in
Syria meant that they struggled to find reliable local allies. The first USD350 million in ‘train and
equip’ funding for anti-Assad rebels ended in farce when it emerged in 2015 that only “four or five”
US-trained fighters had survived for more than a few days after they returned to Syria from
neighbouring countries.
In 2015 President Obama changed tack. While the CIA continued to help channel arms to rebel
groups fighting Assad in northwest and southern Syria, the US military was directed to expand
links with the Kurdish YPG in northern Syria and build up its forces so that they could launch an
offensive against the Islamic State capital, Raqqa. In a bid to assuage Turkish and other regional
political sensitivities, the United States created a political umbrella group dubbed the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF). This was pitched by Washington as containing both Kurdish and Arab
fighters, rather than being controlled solely by the YPG. Several hundred US special forces
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information contained herein is from sources considered reliable but its accuracy and completeness are not warranted, nor are the
opinions and analyses which are based upon it, and to the extent permitted by law, IHS shall not be liable for any errors or
omissions or any loss, damage or expense incurred by reliance on information or any statement contained herein.
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operatives were eventually sent to advise, train, and co-ordinate SDF units and during late 2016
the SDF’s revitalised forces began to advance across northern Syria.
Syrian Democratic Forces fighters on the eastern front line of Raqqa on 24 September as they battled with the support of US special forces to clear the last remaining Islamic State jihadists holed up in the city. (Bulent Kilic/AFP/Getty Images )
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However, the US military operation with the SDF was kept very separate from the CIA-led alliance
with the moderate rebels of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). This ultimately led to the SDF and FSA
facing off against each other in northwest Syria early this year in a standoff that had to be diffused
by the US advisors and sponsors of each group.
[Continued in full version…]
Force packaging
The US-led intervention in Syria eventually grew to involve several hundred personnel on the
ground, backed by air power operating from bases across the Middle East under the umbrella of
Combined Joint Task Force Operation ‘Inherent Resolve’ (CJTF OIR), headquartered in Kuwait.
The CJTF OIR special operations component led the mission in Syria and by early this year had
established a network of several bases across northern Syria, including a dirt airstrip north of
Raqqa capable of receiving Boeing C-17 Globemaster III and Lockheed Martin C-130J Hercules
transport aircraft and near that a forward arming and refuelling point that could accommodate
more than a dozen helicopters.
© 2017 IHS. No portion of this report may be reproduced, reused, or otherwise distributed in any form without prior written
consent, with the exception of any internal client distribution as may be permitted in the license agreement between client and IHS. Content reproduced or redistributed with IHS permission must display IHS legal notices and attributions of authorship. The
information contained herein is from sources considered reliable but its accuracy and completeness are not warranted, nor are the
opinions and analyses which are based upon it, and to the extent permitted by law, IHS shall not be liable for any errors or
omissions or any loss, damage or expense incurred by reliance on information or any statement contained herein.
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A US Air Force C-17 Globemaster III from the 816th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron sits on the ramp at Al Udeid Airbase, Qatar, before conducting combat airlift operations for US and coalition forces in Syria in support of Operation ‘Inherent Resolve’ on 27 October. (USAF/Tech Sergeant Gregory Brook )
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The core mission of the 900-strong US special operations task force in Syria was to provide
advisor teams to work with SDF militia groups, including acting as forward air controllers. Indirect
fire support was provided by a US Marine Corps (USMC) M777 155 mm howitzer battery and a US
Army High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) element deployed north of Raqqa.
© 2017 IHS. No portion of this report may be reproduced, reused, or otherwise distributed in any form without prior written
consent, with the exception of any internal client distribution as may be permitted in the license agreement between client and IHS. Content reproduced or redistributed with IHS permission must display IHS legal notices and attributions of authorship. The
information contained herein is from sources considered reliable but its accuracy and completeness are not warranted, nor are the
opinions and analyses which are based upon it, and to the extent permitted by law, IHS shall not be liable for any errors or
omissions or any loss, damage or expense incurred by reliance on information or any statement contained herein.
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US marines with the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit fire an M777 howitzer during a fire mission in northern Syria as part of Operation ‘Inherent Resolve’ on 24 March. (USMC/Corporal Zachery C Laning)
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Meanwhile, air power remained at the heart of the US intervention, both to provide surveillance
and to strike at Islamic State targets. The US Combined Air Operation Centre (CAOC) at Al Udeid
Airbase in Qatar was central to co-ordinating US and coalition air operations across Iraq and Syria.
Almost every aircraft type in the inventories of the US, British, and French forces have been
involved in operations over Syria since late 2014.
Parallel to the CJTF OIR-controlled element, US Central Command has been involved in providing
training to FSA-linked groups in southern Syria. The most prominent of these groups set up a base
at Al Tanf on the Syria-Jordan border. While CIA co-ordination and logistic elements were reported
to be operating in Jordan and Turkey to channel Raytheon BGM-71 TOW anti-tank missiles and
other arms to moderate rebel groups, US President Donald Trump ordered the mission to be
closed down in July.
A Russian Sukhoi Su-35 lands at Humaymim airbase in Latakia province, northwestern Syria, on 4 May 2016. The conflict in Syria, which erupted in 2011, quickly escalated into a multifaceted war that has killed more than 270,000 people and forced millions from their homes. (Vasily Maximov/AFP/Getty Images)
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To co-ordinate and control all its military operations in Syria, Russia set up a headquarters in
Damascus headed by an officer with the rank of colonel-general (equivalent to a Western four-star
officer) who controls a number of force elements. The largest and most prominent of these is the
Russian air group at Humaymim airbase, which operates fast jets including Sukhoi Su-30s and Su-
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information contained herein is from sources considered reliable but its accuracy and completeness are not warranted, nor are the
opinions and analyses which are based upon it, and to the extent permitted by law, IHS shall not be liable for any errors or
omissions or any loss, damage or expense incurred by reliance on information or any statement contained herein.
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35 fighters, Su-24 bombers, Su-34 multirole strike aircraft, and Su-25 ground attack aircraft. The
air group also boasts Forpost unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs – derived from the Israeli Searcher
2 platform), Tupolov Tu-214 multisensor surveillance aircraft, and Beriev A-50 airborne radar and
command aircraft.
A contingent of Russian attack helicopters, including Mil Mi-28s, Mi-24/35s, and Kamov Ka-52s, is
also based in Syria at a number of forward operating locations close to the various battlefronts. An
air operations centre has been set up at Humaymim air base to control all Russian air operations
in Syria, as well as to co-ordinate long-range cruise-missile strikes into the country. Following the
loss of an Su-24 bomber to a Turkish F-16 in November, Russia made its first deployment of S-
400 strategic air defence systems into Syria, although they have not yet been used in action.
Pantsyr-S1 point defence systems were also sent to Syria and have been seen in locations around
the country to counter any airborne threats.
Russian ground forces have played a major role in operations in Syria. The Spetsnaz, or Russian
special forces, have received considerable prominence for their work as forward air controllers and
battlefield advisors with Syrian troops. An artillery group equipped with 2S65 MSTA-B 152 mm
towed howitzers, BM-27 Uragan multiple rocket launchers, TOS-1A thermobaric-warhead rocket
launchers, and Urlan-10 hand-launched mini-UAVs has operated on several Syrian battlefields.
Shore-based Bastion anti-ship missiles were also deployed in the land-attack mode in 2016. KBM
9K720 Iskander theatre ballistic missiles were spotted at Humaymim airbase in early 2016 but no
reports have emerged of them being fired in anger.
[Continued in full version…]
Weapon system performance
On the US-coalition side there have been no major equipment surprises. The majority of aircraft
and air-delivered ordnance, artillery, and land-attack missiles employed in the Syrian campaign
had already been used extensively in recent campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.
© 2017 IHS. No portion of this report may be reproduced, reused, or otherwise distributed in any form without prior written
consent, with the exception of any internal client distribution as may be permitted in the license agreement between client and IHS. Content reproduced or redistributed with IHS permission must display IHS legal notices and attributions of authorship. The
information contained herein is from sources considered reliable but its accuracy and completeness are not warranted, nor are the
opinions and analyses which are based upon it, and to the extent permitted by law, IHS shall not be liable for any errors or
omissions or any loss, damage or expense incurred by reliance on information or any statement contained herein.
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Two F-22 Raptors fly above Syria in support of Operation ‘Inherent Resolve’ on 7 August. The presence of F-22s has given the US-led coalition a fifth-generation edge in the skies over Syria, although no confrontations with Russian aircraft in the region have occurred. (USAF/Staff Sergeant Trevor T McBride )
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The one notable debut was the first combat use of the Lockheed Martin F-22A Raptor fifth-
generation air-superiority aircraft. Raptors led the first coalition strike packages to enter Syrian air
space to attack Islamic State targets on 22 September 2014. US air commanders in the Middle
East decided to use F-22s to lead this and subsequent operations close to Syrian surface-to-air
missile (SAM) threats because of the uncertainty about how the Damascus government would
react to US incursions into its airspace. The deployment of Russian Su-30s, Su-34s, and Su-35s
to Syria in 2015 made the presence of the fifth-generation Raptors in theatre increasingly
important, just in case a stand-off developed with Moscow’s air power. US air commanders
reported that the F-22s performed well in the air-to-ground role and ensured that US aircraft
always had advantageous positions over Russian aircraft and SAMs, even though the two sides
never exchanged fire.
USAF CV-22B special operations Ospreys, along with USMC MV-22Bs, have been a vital component of US operations in Syria due to their combination of range and speed with a vertical landing capability. (IHS Markit/Patrick Allen)
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The other US aircraft that proved its worth in Syria was the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor due to the large
distances covered by US special forces in the north of the country. Turkish hostility to US co-
© 2017 IHS. No portion of this report may be reproduced, reused, or otherwise distributed in any form without prior written
consent, with the exception of any internal client distribution as may be permitted in the license agreement between client and IHS. Content reproduced or redistributed with IHS permission must display IHS legal notices and attributions of authorship. The
information contained herein is from sources considered reliable but its accuracy and completeness are not warranted, nor are the
opinions and analyses which are based upon it, and to the extent permitted by law, IHS shall not be liable for any errors or
omissions or any loss, damage or expense incurred by reliance on information or any statement contained herein.
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operation with the Kurds in northern Syria meant that during much of the early phase of the
operation US special forces missions had to be mounted out of Iraq and relied on V-22s to get
them to many Kurdish positions. The aircraft's vertical landing capability, combined with its range
and speed advantages over other rotary-wing assets, meant it was the ‘transport of choice’ for US
special forces operatives heading into Syria. The US Air Force special operations CV-22B and the
USMC MV-22B have both been operated extensively over Syria.
On the Russian side there have been more combat firsts, including the Novator Design Bureau
Kalibr ship- and submarine-launched cruise missiles; Raduga Design Bureau Kh-55 and Kh-101
air-launched cruise missiles; Tupolov Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers; Su-30, Su-34, and Su-
35 tactical fighters; Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters; Su-33 carrier-borne strike fighters, and the
Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier.
Although the deployment of big ‘double-digit’ Russian S-300 (SA-10 ‘Grumble’) and S-400 (SA-21
‘Growler’) SAM systems has attracted considerable attention, they have yet to be used in anger. In
August, however, the Russian military claimed that its Pantsyr-S1 air defence systems had shot
down 12 “hostile” UAVs in Syria.
In terms of ground systems Russian Gaz Tigr light armoured utility vehicles and Kamaz Typhoon
mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles have been deployed extensively in Syria. A
significant first for the Russian Army was the airlifting of a MARM road bridge and PMM-2M
amphibious bridging ferry sets to Syria to build a bridge across the Euphrates in September while
under attack from bombs dropped from Islamic State UAVs developed from commercial ‘hobby
drones’.
A still from Russian TV news footage broadcast on 25 September showing Russian military personnel on a MARM bridge they constructed across the Euphrates to enable Syrian troops to expand their bridgehead on the eastern side of the river near Dayr al-Zawr city. (RT)
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[Continued in full version…]
The power of precision
When comparing the performance of US and Russian hardware in Syria, the issue of precision
needs to be addressed. The US-led coalition places great emphasis on its precision-strike
operations, from manned aircraft as well as its General Atomics MQ-1/9 Predator/Reaper UAVs, to
reduce civilian casualties: an approach that has characterised US-led air operations throughout
the Syrian campaign.
© 2017 IHS. No portion of this report may be reproduced, reused, or otherwise distributed in any form without prior written
consent, with the exception of any internal client distribution as may be permitted in the license agreement between client and IHS. Content reproduced or redistributed with IHS permission must display IHS legal notices and attributions of authorship. The
information contained herein is from sources considered reliable but its accuracy and completeness are not warranted, nor are the
opinions and analyses which are based upon it, and to the extent permitted by law, IHS shall not be liable for any errors or
omissions or any loss, damage or expense incurred by reliance on information or any statement contained herein.
Page 9 of 10
The widespread employment of MQ-1s and MQ-9s to provide persistent 24/7 surveillance of
Islamic State territory has also allowed the US-led coalition to identify, track, and then strike at
high-value targets, including several individuals accused of being involved in terrorist attacks in
Western Europe.
Airbus Defence and Space imagery showing a Russian Forpost unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and its operations hangar installed at Humaymim Air Base in Syria. ()
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Although the Russians made repeated claims that they had also struck at Islamic State and other
rebel “leadership targets” in Syria, Russian aircraft do not appear to have made extensive use of
precision-guided munitions. Out of their workhorse strike jets – the Su-24, Su-25, and Su-34 – only
the Su-34s routinely seem to have employed precision-guided weapons, while the older Su-24s
and Su-25s have relied on ‘dumb’ bombs, albeit released by recently upgraded bombing
computers.
Western laser- or GPS-guided weapons routinely achieve a circular error of probability (CEP) of
within a couple of metres, whereas the bombing computers used on the latest variants of the Su-
24 and Su-25 have a CEP of 10–25 m, according to Russian aerospace sources. Bomb damage
assessment videos from Syria released by the Russian Ministry of Defence seem to confirm this.
While such a level of accuracy and destruction provides a useful capability against large buildings,
artillery positions, and soft-skinned vehicles in the open, it is more problematic when employed
against high-value targets, such as individual people or vehicles. There have also been
widespread reports of civilian casualties from Russian air attacks in Syria.
© 2017 IHS. No portion of this report may be reproduced, reused, or otherwise distributed in any form without prior written
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information contained herein is from sources considered reliable but its accuracy and completeness are not warranted, nor are the
opinions and analyses which are based upon it, and to the extent permitted by law, IHS shall not be liable for any errors or
omissions or any loss, damage or expense incurred by reliance on information or any statement contained herein.
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[Continued in full version…]
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