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W A Y S F O R W A R D I NRECRUITMENT OF LOW-SKILLED
M I G R A N T W O R K E R S
in the Asia-Arab States corridor
ILO White PaperDr Ray Jureidini
Regional Office for Arab States
Introduction
1
Copyright © International Labour Organization 2016 First published 2016 Publications of the International Labour Office enjoy copyright under Protocol 2 of the Universal Copyright Convention. Nevertheless, short excerpts from them may be reproduced without authorization, on condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation, application should be made to ILO Publications (Rights and Licensing), International Labour Office, CH-1211 Geneva 22, Switzerland, or by email: [email protected]. The International Labour Office welcomes such applications. Libraries, institutions and other users registered with reproduction rights organizations may make copies in accordance with the licences issued to them for this purpose. Visit www.ifrro.org to find the reproduction rights organization in your country. ILO Cataloguing in Publication Data Jureidini, Ray. Ways forward in recruitment of 'low-skilled' migrant workers in the Asia-Arab states corridor: ILO white paper / Ray Jureidini; International Labour Organization, ILO Regional Office for the Arab States. - Beirut: ILO, 2016. ISBN: 9789221312994; 9789221313007 (web pdf) International Labour Organization; ILO Regional Office for the Arab States. labour migration / recruitment / migrant worker / manual worker / Asian / international migration / private employment agency / trafficking in persons / unfair labour practices / workers’ rights / Arab countries 14.09.1 The designations employed in ILO publications, which are in conformity with United Nations practice, and the presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the International Labour Office concerning the legal status of any country, area or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers. The responsibility for opinions expressed in this paper rests solely with the author, and publication does not constitute an endorsement by the International Labour Office. Reference to names of firms and commercial products and processes does not imply their endorsement by the International Labour Office, and any failure to mention a particular firm, commercial product or process is not a sign of disapproval. ILO publications and digital products can be obtained through major booksellers and digital distribution platforms, or ordered directly from [email protected]. For more information, visit our website: www.ilo.org/publns or contact [email protected]. For ILO Regional Office for Arab States publications, contact: ILO Regional Office for Arab States P.O.Box 11-4088 Riad El Solh 1107-2150 Beirut – Lebanon
Publications are available on: www.ilo.org/arabstates
WaysforwardinrecruitmentoflowskilledmigrantworkersintheAsiaArabStatecorridor
2
Ways forward in recruitment of low-skilled migrant workers in the Asia-Arab States corridor ILO White Paper Dr Ray Jureidini
Regional Office for Arab States
In collaboration with the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
Introduction
3
CONTENTS
FOREWORD 4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 5
LISTOFFIGURES 5
LISTOFBOXESANDTABLES 5
INTRODUCTION 6
SECTION1:OVERVIEWOFRECRUITMENTCHALLENGESTOBEADDRESSED 8
SECTION2:WAYSFORWARDTOADDRESSRECRUITMENTCHALLENGES 144
SUMMARYOFRECOMMENDATIONS 355
CONCLUSION 377
ANNEXI: FEES,COSTSANDCHARGES 399
REFERENCES 422
WaysforwardinrecruitmentoflowskilledmigrantworkersintheAsiaArabStatecorridor
4
Foreword
AsthefirststepinacyclethatbringsmillionsofAsianmigrantworkerstotheArabStates
region,therecruitmentstagecandeterminewhetheraworkerhasapositivemigration
experience,withtheopportunitytoacquireskillsandremittances;oranexploitativeone,
characterizedbydebt,bondage,andlowearnings.Whilehigh-skilledmigrantworkerstendto
farewell,itisthewomenandmenmigrantsinmanuallabourwhoaremostvulnerableto
exploitativerecruitmentpractices.
PrivaterecruitmentagenciesintheinterconnectedregionsofAsiaandtheArabStateslieat
theheartoftherecruitmentprocess,actingasimportantandoftenpredominantlabour
marketmediatorsinaglobalizedprocessofrecruitinganddispatchingworkersacross
nationalborders.Whilesomeareethicalandlegallycompliantoperators,manyifnotmost,
intentionallystructureagreementswithemployerssothatlow-skilledworkersareforcedto
payhighchargesforrecruitment.Incontrast,recruitmentfeesandcostsofhigh-skilled
workerstendtobepaidforbyemployers.Inaddition,somerecruitmentagencies,employers
andlaboursupplyagenciesengageinillegalpracticessuchascontractsubstitution,where
the(low-skilled)migrantworkersareobligedtoacceptdifferentandworsecontract
conditionsonarrivalinthedestinationcountrytowhattheyhadbeenpromisedbefore
departure.
TheILOanditsconstituents–187memberStatesalongwithworkers’andemployers’
organizations–haveidentified‘fair’recruitmentascrucialinensuringfairmigration.
Subsequently,theILO’sGoverningBodydecidedin2016onthedevelopmentoffair
recruitmentprinciplesandguidelinesthroughaTripartiteTechnicalMeetingofExperts(in
September2016).Loweringmigrationcosts,includingthoseduringrecruitment,willalso
featureasoneofthethemesoftheGlobalForumonMigrationandDevelopmenttobeheldin
Dhaka,BangladeshinDecember2016.
Inter-regionally,thecountriesoftheGulfCooperationCouncil–whichhostmorethan15
millionmigrantworkers–andAsiancountriesoforigin,have“resolvedtoworktogetherto
preventandsanctionexploitativerecruitmentpracticesthatplaceworkersatgreatriskand
underminetheirfundamentalrights”(ThirdMinisterialMeetingoftheAbuDhabiDialogue,
November2014).Recruitmentwillfeatureprominentlyagainontheagendaoftheupcoming
FourthMinisterialMeeting(inJanuary2017),andintheILO’squadrennialAsiaandthe
PacificRegionalMeetinginIndonesia(December2016).Thecommitmentoftheinterrelated
ArabandAsianregionstotacklingflawedrecruitmentmeansthatthereisnowrealpotential
forradicalchange.
Withitscomprehensiveanalysisofcoreissuesintherecruitmentindustryandinnovative
solutions,thispaperonthe“Waysforwardintherecruitmentoflow-skilledmigrantworkers
intheAsia-ArabStatescorridor”comesatanopportunetime,andwehopewillhelpto
facilitatemeaningfulpolicydialogue,reform,andultimately,concretechangeinthelivesof
womenandmenmigrantworkers.
RubaJaradat TomokoNishimoto
AssistantDirector-GeneralandRegionalDirector AssistantDirector-GeneralandRegionalDirector
ILORegionalOfficeforArabStates ILORegionalOfficeforAsiaandthePacific
Introduction
5
Acknowledgements
ThisreportwasdevelopedbyDrRayJureidini.1
TheauthorisgratefultoHansvandeGlindandNilimBaruahfortheiroverallguidance,and
thanksarangeofILOcolleaguesfortheirsupport,withspecialthankstothefollowingfor
theircommentsandsuggestionsonpreviousdraftsofthispaper:HansvandeGlind,Eliza
MarksandSophiaKagan(RegionalOfficeforArabStates),RyzsardCholewinskiandMaria
Gallotti(MIGRANT),AlixNasri(FUNDAMENTALS),NilimBaruah,AnnaEngblom,Heike
Lautenschlager,ManuelImsonandMaxTunon(RegionalOfficeforAsiaandthePacific).
ThereportwasfundedwithsupportfromtheRegionalOfficeforArabStates,withagenerous
contributionfromtheSwissAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperationthroughtheFAIRWAY
project.
AfinalwordofthankstoRehamRachedandWadihaToumafortranslationassistanceforthe
Arabicversionofthereport.
Listoffigures
Figure1:Exampleoffraudulentrecruitmentflowofcharges 16
Figure2:Exampleoffairandcompliantrecruitmentflowofcosts 20
Listofboxesandtables
Box1:Nepal-Qatarcasestudyonrecruitmentchargesandcosts 22
Table1.Examplecostsforlow-skilledworkerrecruitmentperperson:
Nepal-Qatar
38
Table2.Examplecostsforlow-skilledworkerrecruitmentperperson:
Bangladesh-Qatar
39
WaysforwardinrecruitmentoflowskilledmigrantworkersintheAsiaArabStatecorridor
6
Introduction
Thelarge-scalemigrationofworkersfromAsiatotheArabStatesisincreasinglyfacilitatedby
aninterregionalnetworkofprivaterecruitmentagencies.aPrivaterecruitmentagencies,when
appropriatelyregulatedatbothoriginanddestination,playanimportantroleintheefficientand
equitablefunctioningoflabourmarkets.Howeverlow-skilledbmigrantworkerscinsectorssuch
asconstruction,agricultureandservices(includingdomesticwork)intheArabStatesareprone
to abuse by recruitment agencies, as well as placement agencies, employers andmanpower
outsourcingagencies.d
Fraudulent practices at the recruitment stage can leave low-skilled workers extremely
vulnerable. These practices might include debt bondage linked to payment by low-skilled
migrantworkersofexcessive recruitment fees, costsandchargeseanddeceptionabout the
natureandconditionsofwork,oftenleadingtodetrimentalcontractsubstitutionandhuman
traffickingforlabourexploitation.Acomplexandopaquewebofintermediariesincludingsub-
agentsandoutsourcingagentsfacilitatevisatradinganddriveuprecruitmentchargesforlow-
skilled migrant workers. Collusion between labour brokers at origin and destination can
perpetuatethesepractices, throughsuchmethodsaskickbackpayments.National lawsand
enforcementmechanismshaveproventobeinadequateinpreventingorrespondingtothese
crimes, and with the difficulties migrant workers face to access complaints mechanisms,
unscrupulousactorscancontinuetoprofit.
Practicessuchastheseareinbreachofinternationalstandardspertainingtohumanandlabour
rights,andhavebeenheavilycriticizedinternationally.Theexcessivepaymentsbylow-skilled
migrant workers and other recruitment related abuses significantly reduce the amount of
money that workers are able to spend at the destination country, or remit home. In the
constructionsector,fraudulentpracticesattheprojecttenderingstageandrelianceonlayers
of intermediaries mean that large corporate contractors are profiting from a lack of
transparencyintheirsupplychains.Thesepracticesalsoleadtodistortionsandinefficiencies
inlabourmarketmobilityandinefficientjobmatching.
Inresponsetothesechallenges,theInternationalLabourOrganizationhaslaunchedaglobal
“FairRecruitmentInitiative”tohelppreventhumantrafficking;protecttherightsofworkers,
a “Privaterecruitmentagency”isusedasamorespecifictermtodescribetheentitythatthisreportinmainlyconcerned
with.ThisisincontrasttotheILO’smoregenericuseof“labourrecruiter”,whichincludesbothprivateandpublicentities;
or“privateemploymentagency”,whichincludesmanpoweroutsourcingagencies.b Thedefinitionoflow-skilledworkersisbased“eitherontheskillsrequiredforthejobperformed,oraccordingtothe
educationalleveloftheworker…[namely]lessthanuppersecondary.”OECD(2008)ManagementofLowSkilledMigration,
InternationalMigrationOutlook,PartII,SOPEMI2008Edition:127.‘Low-income’(lessthanUS$549permonth)hasalso
beenusedtocharacterizethesamesegmentoftheGCCworkforce-seeGardner,Andrew,Pessoa,Silvia,Diop,Abdoulaye,
Al-Ghanim,Kaltham,LeTrung,KienandHarkness,Laura,“APortraitofLow-IncomeMigrantsinContemporaryQatar”,
JournalofArabianStudies3.1(June2013),pp.1–17:3.cThispaperusestheterm“migrantworker”inaccordancewiththeinternationaldefinitionintheUNMigrantWorkers
Convention(1990),as"apersonwhoistobeengaged,isengagedorhasbeenengagedinaremuneratedactivityinaState
ofwhichheorsheisnotanational”.ItisnonethelessimportanttonotethatanumberofArabStatesprefertousetheterm
“temporarycontractworker”or“expatriateworker”.d Thedistinctionismadeherebetween“recruitmentagencies”thatoperateandrecruitinorigincountriesand“placement
agencies”thatoperateandplacemigrantworkerswithemployersindestinationcountries.e Forthepurposesofthispaper,"fees"aredefinedaspaymentstoprivaterecruitmentandplacementagencies,andother
intermediariesfortheirservices."Costs"aretheactualcostsforrecruitmentprocessing,suchasdocumentation,workvisa
andcontractattestation,medicaltests,insurance,transportationfeesandtransportcosts."Charges"aretheamountsthat
migrantworkersarechargedforlabourrecruitmentthatcanvarywidely,butwhichcanincludefraudulentchargesfor
kickbackpayments.Inotherwords,“charges”areoftenfarmorethanthefeesandactualcostscombined.
Introduction
7
especiallymigrant workers, from abusive and fraudulent practices during the recruitment
process; and reduce the cost of labourmigration and enhance development outcomes for
migrantworkers and their families, aswell as for countries of origin anddestination. This
multi-stakeholder initiative is implemented in close collaboration with governments,
representative employers’ and workers’ organizations, the private sector and other key
partners. The initiative is embedded in the Fair Migration Agenda presented by the ILO
Director-General to the International Labour Conference in 2014 (and endorsed by that
Conference),whichincludesfairrecruitmentasoneofitsmainpillars.2Underthisinitiative,
ILOGuidelinesforFairRecruitmentarecurrentlybeingdevelopedfordiscussionwithaview
toadoptionatatripartitetechnicalmeetinginSeptember2016.Theseguidelinesareenvisaged
toincludeaclarificationthat‘fair’recruitmentmeans‘recruitmentcarriedoutwithinthelaw
and with respect for human rights, without discrimination and protecting workers from
abusivesituations’.f
WithintheAsia-ArabStatescorridor,theILORegionalOfficeforArabStates(ROAS)andthe
ILORegionalOffice for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP) have collaboratedwith constituents to
promote fairmigrationduringseveral forums.Thiswhitepaperserves to furtherstimulate
policydialogue for fairmigration in the interlinkedAsia-ArabStatesregion. Itoutlines– in
Section 1 - the main challenges to fair recruitment in the Asia-Arab States corridor, and
proposes concrete measures for reform (in Section 2). Reform will require harmonizing
legislation,accreditationandmonitoringbetweencountriesoforiginanddestination,aswell
as significant cooperation with the private sector for the review of business practices by
corporatecontractorsandemployersofdomesticworkers.
f Recruitmentisusuallythefirstactinestablishinganemploymentrelationship.TheILO’srecruitmentguidelinesarelikely
tocovertheselection,transport,placementintoemploymentandreturntothehomecountryofworkersifneeded.This
includesbothjobseekersandthosewhoestablishanemploymentrelationship.Thefullphaseoftherecruitmentprocess
includes:selection,transportation,placementintoemploymentandreturnifneededorwanted.Itdoesnotinclude
conditionsofworkandtreatmentofworkers,exceptastherecruitmentprocessmayinfluencethis.Recruitmentoccursin
threemainways:a)directrecruitmentofaworkerbyanemployer:b)recruitmentthroughlabourrecruiters,including
bothpublicemploymentservicesandprivateemploymentagentsofdifferentkinds,includingvariousintermediariesand
thoseoperatinginsideandoutsidethelaw;c)assignmentofworkersbyoutsourcemanpowersuppliers(private
employmentagencies)touserenterprisesastemporaryworkers.
Section1:Overviewofrecruitmentchallengestobeaddressed
8
SECTION1:Overviewofrecruitmentchallengestobeaddressed
1.Workerpaymentstorecruitmentagencies
The current practice of private recruitment agencies charging low-skilledmigrantworkers
amountsfarbeyondthemaximumallowablebyorigincountrygovernmentsgisattheheartof
fraudulent behaviour within the recruitment industry. While employers of higher-skilled
migrant workers normally cover recruitment costs, lower-skilled migrant workers in
construction, agriculture and services (including domestic work) pay agencies between
US$500to$5,000,orequivalenttobetween1to15monthsoftheirearningsabroad.3Thiscan
beseenasstatusorclassdiscrimination,baseduponskill-level,educationandtrainingandis
theexploitationofthevulnerability(anddesperation)ofthemuchlargersupplyofpoor,low
educated,low-skilledmigrantlabourfromAsiancountries.Thepracticeoflow-skilledworkers
paying for recruitment services has been the norm for decades, which has had a deep
intergenerational impact that will be discussed further below as a ‘culture’ of payment
expectations.Althoughnotaddressedhere,evidenceshowsthatlow-skilledworkersstillpay
when recruitment is through social and familial networks.4 Preliminary results from the
InternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM)(2016)studyofrecruitmentbetweenUnited
ArabEmirates(UAE)andNepal;andUAEandIndia(Kerala)suggestedincreasingpreference
by smaller companies to recruit through family and friends who act as ‘referees’ for the
candidates,butwhostillpaythemasintermediaries.5
It is important to understand why so much money is taken from migrant workers. First,
contractorsandsubcontractors“outsource”recruitmentcoststoprivaterecruitmentagencies
inorigincountriesasameanstocircumventlocallabourlawsthatprohibitworkerspaying
recruitment fees.6 Second, employing companies save money and increase their
competitiveness by not paying for recruitment costs. Third, private recruitment agencies
competeinternallyandinternationallytoobtainlaboursupplycontractsbyprovidingkickback
payments to employing company personnel and placement agencies in the destination
countries. The costs of this collusion between the private recruitment agencies, employing
companiesandplacementagenciesarepassedontolow-skilledworkers.Theremittancesthat
migrantworkers send home are thus partly offset by hundreds ofmillions of dollars from
worker payments being sent by private recruitment agents to employers and agents in
destinationcountriesaskickbackpaymentsforlaboursupplycontracts.AWorldBankstudy
in2011estimatedthatUS$17to$34millionperyearwastransferredfromNepaltoQatar(5
percentofrecordedremittancesfromQatartoNepal)inkickbackpaymentstoemployersand
placementagenciesinQatarusingtheinformalhawalasystemofmoneytransfer.7Thesame
observationshavebeendocumentedforIndia.8
Anumberofstudieshaveshownthatmigrantworkerstakeloansfrommoneylendersandtheir
recruitmentagenciesathighinterestrates(30to60percent),9sellfamilyassets,andusetheir
savingsinordertopaythechargesforrecruitment.10Workerpaymentsarealsoavitalelement
inthecontroloverthelow-skilledlabourforcethatcanfacilitateotherformsofexploitation,
suchaslonghourswithoutovertimepay,non-paymentofwagesorwageslessthanstipulated
inthecontract.Some,whoaretrappedinapositionof‘indebtedlabour’or‘debtbondage’,are
oftenforcedtoacceptlowerwagesandpoorerconditionsthantheyhadbeenpromised.11Wage
g Regulationsthatallowprivaterecruitmentagenciestochargeworkersbreachinternationallabourstandards,i.e.ILO
PrivateEmploymentAgenciesConvention,1997(No.181).
Section1:Overviewofrecruitmentchallengestobeaddressed
9
deductionsbyemployerstopayforrecruitmentcostsarealsoacommonandinvisibleformof
exploitation,particularlywithmigrantdomesticworkers.Thisvulnerabilityisexacerbatedby
a lack of adequate and safe complaints mechanisms, as well as the absence of workers’
organizationsandprobonolegalclinicstorepresentworkers.12
DespitelocallabourlawsinQatar,13theKingdomofSaudiArabia14andtheUAE15thatprohibit
charging fees toworkers,16 these lawshave sometimesbeen interpretedbyemployersand
recruitmentagenciesasaprohibitionof thedeductionofwages forrecruitment fees in the
destinationcountry.Thus, the feesare takenprior todeparture in theorigincountries.The
exception is the UAE, where the law includes the prohibition of accepting or demanding
paymentfromworkers“whetherbeforeorafterrecruitment”(Article18ofUAELabourLaw
No.8,1980). ILOConvention181(Article7)stipulatesclearly thatworkersshouldnotpay
recruitmentfeesorcosts-anywhere.17Itshouldbethecombinedresponsibilityofbothorigin
and destination country governments, agencies and employers to ensure this principle is
compliedwith.Someanalystsmakereferencetotheactualamountspaidas“excessivefees”.18
Somehavereferredtoworkerpaymentsasa‘bribe’forthejob,19butitismoreappropriateto
view it as ‘extortion’ that has become an acceptable institutionalizedbusiness norm in the
labourrecruitmentindustry.
Employersatdestinationareobligedtopaycertainrecruitmentcosts,suchastheworkvisa
andcostsassociatedwithobtainingtheresidencypermitandarethusseentobeoperating
within the law.Thekickbackpaymentsby recruitment agenciesmaybewholly orpartly a
reimbursementofthesecoststhatgototheemployingcompany,buttheyaremorelikelyto
justgointothepocketsofparticularindividuals.Further,whereemployerspayallrecruitment
feesandcostswithoutrequiringkickbackpaymentsorreimbursement,privaterecruitment
agenciescanstillchargeworkersbecauseworkersexpecttopay.Thus,theagencycanprofit
fromboththeemployerandthemigrantworker,takingfrombothsides.20
Thereisalsoacontrolfactor.Employersarewellawarethatiftheyarenotpayingrecruitment
costs, their employeesarepaying them.Theyarealsowell aware that their employeesare
trappedindebtandunabletoleaveiftheyareinpoorworkingorlivingconditions,orifthey
arereceivingasalarylessthantheywerepromised.21
Arecruitmentagencymaybeselectedontheassumptionthatnotonlywilltheworkerspay
highrecruitmentcharges,butalsothepaymentswillbesufficienttopayoffpersonnelatthe
employingcompany.22Themigrantworkersaregenerallynotgivenreceiptsfortheamounts
ofmoney theypayrecruitmentagencies,23so the transactionsareopaque,even though the
practiceiswell-knownbyallstakeholders.Workerpaymentsarealsousedbysomeprivate
recruitmentagenciestopayvariouslocalofficialsinoriginanddestinationcountriestoprocess
paperworkmorequicklyortopreventdeliberatedelays.24Thereislittleornooversightofsuch
fraudulent practices by origin or destination country governments. It is often accepted as
merelyafunctionof‘free’marketforcesofsupplyanddemandthatcannot,orshouldnot,be
interferedwith.
Indirect payments can also be made by colluding with employers to illegally deduct
recruitmentfeesandcostsfromworkers’wagesoveraperiodoftimethatcanlastforovera
yearorforthetermoftheemploymentcontract.Therehasbeenlittlegovernmentregulation
overthesepracticesbecausethemonitoringandinspectionofpay-slipsmaybebeyondthe
scope of destination country governments. Electronic bank transfers that automatically
10
reconcile payments with contracts and include overtime pay and deductions may be an
efficientmeansofsurveillance,butneedconsistentmonitoring.
AssumingthatthetotalnumberofforeignnationalsintheGCCworkforceisaround13million
and80percent25(around10million)are fromAsiancountrieswhereworkerspayprivate
recruitmentagencies;andassumingeachworkerpaysanaverageofUS$1,000overandabove
the actual costs,26 we can conclude that unauthorized cash transactions have potentially
amountedtoaroundUS$10billionoverthepastdecadeorso,andcontinuesonadailybasis.
Thus, fraudulent charges by private recruitment agencies feed a multi-billion dollar
recruitment industry, largelypaid forby its low-skilled foreignworkforce.27Recruitmentof
low-skilledmigrantworkersthustakeplacenotsolelyonthebasisofqualifications,skilland
experience,butalsoonthebasisofwhoiswillingandabletopay.Thisskewsthelabourmarket
in termsofproper skill-jobmatchingaswell as impactingon thedevelopmentpotentialof
migration.
2.Projecttendering–thebeginningoflabourdemand
Anyanalysisoftheproblemsinrecruitmentshouldbeginatthepointwherelabourdemandin
the destination countries begins. In the case of construction, this is when a
building/engineering project has been decided upon and a budget drawn up. Competitive
tenderingforcapitalprojects lacksadequatetransparencyinrelationto labourrecruitment
and recruitment costs, as these costs are only aggregated at the end of the commercial
evaluationphaseoftenders,wherethelowestbidismostlikelytobeawardedthecontract.
Cost-cuttingmeasures by tendering contractors often include non-payment of recruitment
costs,relyingonworkersthemselvestopaythosecostsinordertomaximizethecontractors’
competitiveness in the bidding process. The same applies to subcontractors that are a
fundamentalbutindirectpartofthetenderingprocess.Thefinancialandtimepressureson
contractorsandsubcontractorsaremajorfactorsinseekingsuchcost-cuttingmeasures.There
is a responsibility to maintain a transparent oversight of procurement and facilities
management departments in the awarding of building/engineering projects and any other
projects that call for competitive tenders. This responsibility extends from government to
governmentinstrumentalities,contractorsandsubcontractorsthroughoutthesupplychain.
Thepracticeofcontractorsandsubcontractorsnotpayingrecruitmentcostsisfacilitatedby
twofactors:first,thethousandsofprivaterecruitmentagenciesinorigincountriescompeting
withoneanotherforbusinessinsupplyinglabourtotheArabStates;andsecond,thealmost
infinitesupplyofpoorlypaidorunemployedworkersinAsiancountrieswhoarewillingor
forcedtopayfortheirrecruitment.
3.Manpoweroutsourcingagenciesh
Manpower,orlabouroutsourcingfirmsarethedirectemployersofmigrantworkersandact
asthirdpartyintermediariesbetweenorigincountryrecruitmentagenciesandcontractorsin
the destination country. They are responsible for recruitment, negotiation of employment
contracts, payment ofwages, housing, food and insurance. As an alternative to direct hire,
hSometimesreferredtoasa“laboursupplyagencies”,“manpowerlaboursuppliers”,“temporaryworkagencies”,“private
employmentagencies”,“staffingagencies”or“staffingcompanies.”SeeGordon,Jennifer(2015)GlobalLabourRecruitment
inaSupplyChainContext,ILO,Geneva.“Manpoweroutsourcingagency”isusedherebecauseitismorecommonlyused
andunderstoodinconstructionandotherindustrysectorsintheregion.
Section1:Overviewofrecruitmentchallengestobeaddressed
11
contractors in the construction industry use outsource labour suppliersmainly for ad hoc,
temporary and short-term needs, butmay also be engaged long term. Destination country
governments determine who is issued a license to operate. Some firms do not identify
themselves asmanpoweroutsource agencies, but register as contractorsor traders, obtain
visas(whichmayinclude‘freevisas’discussedbelow)and‘warehouse’themigrantworkersin
labourcampsorotheraccommodationsites,untiljobscanbefound.
Workersarethenhiredouttoothercompanies,typicallyinconstructionbutalsoinservices
suchascleaning(companiesandhouseholds)andsecurityguards.Themanpoweroutsource
firmchargescontractorsforthelabourhire,buttheformerpaysthewagesoftheworker.Thus,
workers from an outsource supplier are typically not included by contractors (or
subcontractors)inheadcountsbecausetheyarenotontheirpayrollbutemployedindirectly
fromathirdpartybroker.28Theprocesscanactasa‘corporateveil’wherethecontractordoes
notformallyacknowledgeoutsourcedworkersattheirworksitesnorcheckwhethertheymay
bevictimsoftraffickingorotherformsofexploitation,orlivinginsubstandardconditions.29
Thepracticeofoutsourcingisahigh-riskelementinglobalsupplychainsbecauseofthelackof
transparency.The involvementofmultiple intermediaries shouldbe viewedas a “red flag”
warranting investigation and monitoring. Reports of fraudulent practices by outsource
manpowersupplycompanies includewithholdingofpassports, lowwages,non-paymentof
wages,pooraccommodationandlackofwork,duringwhichtimeworkersmaynotgetpaid.30
4.Contractsubstitution
WhilecorrectivemeasuresarebeingundertakeninsomeGCCcountries,contractsubstitution
iscommon.Withthelackofcentralregulationanddocumentmonitoringfromrecruitmentto
arrivalinthedestinationcountry,itisveryeasyforcontractsubstitutiontotakeplace.Thisis
madepossiblebecauseworkersarenotinapositiontocomplainorrefuseacontractdueto
therecruitmentdebtstheyhaveincurred.Electronicregisteringandmonitoringofcontracts
andactualwagepaymentscanassistinovercomingthisproblemwithoutrequiringmigrant
workerstoinitiateaformalcomplaint,astheyareoftennotinapositiontodoso.IntheUAE
theletterofjoboffer,giventoworkersbeforedeparture,isnowtobesignedandfiledwiththe
UAEMinistryofHumanResourcesandEmiratizationpriortoissuingoftheworkpermit.The
UAEgovernmentadvisesworkersthatthesignedcontractmustmatchthejobofferandthisis
checkeduponarrival.Requiringemployerstopaywagesintobankaccountsoffersafurther
measure for oversight (for example, by reconciling paymentswith original contracts). The
extenttowhichtheArabStates’authoritiesareabletoperformelectronicauditsthatreveal
contract substitution is not yet clear. For example, there must be a mechanism whereby
migrantworkerscanreportirregularitiesintheirelectronicpaymentsthatdifferfromtheir
contracts.
5.Tradingof‘freevisas’
‘Freevisas’arenotfreeinthemonetarysense,butfreeofanemployerorjob.Thesponsor
named on the visa does not actually employ the worker. Sometimes, fake companies are
registeredsimplytoobtainandsellfreevisas.31ThisisapracticethatisillegalinmostArab
States,whichplacestheworkerinaprecariouslegalsituation.MostArabstateshavesoughtto
stopvisatradingandpenalisethoseinvolved.Fromtheperspectiveofrecruitment,thetrading
of‘freevisas’isamajorsourceofirregularity,mainlybysmallandmedium-sizedcompanies.
12
Although free visas are well known in the labour origin countries, the critical question is
whetherthemigrantworkerknowsthereisnoactualjobbeforedeparture.Irregularworkers
under these circumstances may or may not be victims of deception, fraud and possibly
trafficking.
Ithasbeenestimatedthatupto15percentoftheworkforceintheGCCstateshaveinthepast
enteredonfreevisas,amountingtohundredsofthousandsofirregularworkers.32Thescaleof
thisproblemisdifficulttoquantify,particularlywhenthereareregularcrackdownsthatresult
indeportationaswellasamnestiestoregularizepapersorallowirregularworkerstoreturn
home without penalties. These measures indicate a concern by destination countries to
addresstheproblem,butgreatertransparencyofthedataforanalysiswouldbewelcomed.33
Inthislocalundergroundlabourmarket,unscrupuloussponsorsnotonlyreceiveanincome
fromthesaleofthevisaitself,butthemigrantworkerhascontinuingvalueintheeventheor
sheobtainsemploymentbyfurtherchargingtheworkerforanoobjectioncertificate(NOC)to
change sponsors/employers, returnapassportor returnhome.Workers arewilling topay
thesecoststogettheworktheyneedandtoensureregularizationoftheirpapers.
6.Migrantdomesticworkers
MigrantdomesticworkersintheArabStatesworkascleaners,carersofchildrenandtheaged,
cooks,gardeners,housesecurityguards,driversandotherswhoareemployedtoworkina
household for thebenefitof theiremployer/sponsorandhis/her family.Withanestimated
totalof3.16millionmigrantdomesticworkersintheArabregionin2013,justoverhalf(50.6
percent;1.6million)arewomen.34Farmoreattentioninrecentyearshasbeengiventofemale
domesticworkers.Domesticworkers’ particular vulnerabilities and invisibility frompublic
viewhasresulted inanILOConventionfordomesticworkers.35However,mostArabStates
excludedomesticworkfromtheprotectionofthelabourlawanddomesticworkerregulation
fallsunderthemandateofinteriorministriesratherthanlabourministries.
Inthedomesticworksector,agencieshaveavestedfinancialinterestinpreventingworkers
from‘absconding’duringtheirprobationperiod,andmayencourageemployerpracticessuch
asdelayedpaymentofwagesandpassportconfiscation.
Most female migrant domestic workers in the Arab States are recruited from Indonesia,
Bangladesh,SriLanka,India,Nepal,thePhilippinesandEthiopia.Duetothemanycomplaints
and violations of domestic workers’ rights, some countries have issued bans against their
deploymenttoArabStates.36Mostofthesebanswereliftedafteroneortwoyearsandsome
almostimmediately.InthecaseofthePhilippines,forexample,theliftingofthebanoccurred
aftera‘householdreformpackage’wasintroducedthatincludedincreasesinagelimits,higher
wages,upgradedtrainingandnopaymentoffees.37Agelimitshavealsobeenlegislated,38and
SriLankabannedwomenwithchildrenbelowtheageoftwofromtravellingabroadforwork.39
Theageandchildlimitationshavefacedcriticismfromwomen’sorganizationsincludingUN
Womenasconstitutinggender,age,maritalandmaternitydiscrimination.40ArabStateshave
alsoenforcedrestrictionsonwomen’smigration.Forexamplein2011,theKingdomofSaudi
ArabiastoppedissuingvisasfordomesticworkersfromthePhilippinesandIndonesiabecause
theycouldnotagreeontermsofwagesandconditions.Agreementswereeventuallysigned
withthePhilippinesin2013andIndonesiain2014.41
Section1:Overviewofrecruitmentchallengestobeaddressed
13
Historically,suchbansandlimitationshavenotpreventedpeoplefrommigratingabroadfor
work.Workerswill find irregularmeans to leave, rendering themevenmorevulnerable to
humantraffickingandforcedlabour.ArecentILOstudyfoundthatNepalesewomensimply
travelled to IndiaorBangladeshandweredeployed fromthere.42Thosewhoareunderage
commonly obtain false birth certificates.43Womenmigrants are particularly vulnerable to
beingforcedintothesextrade.
Origincountrygovernmentshavedonemuchtotryandspecificallyaddresstherecruitmentof
migrantdomesticworkers,suchasrequiringtheworkerstohaveagenciesinbothoriginand
destination countries as third party points of contact. Most have also banned recruitment
agenciesfromchargingmigrantdomesticworkersalthoughsomearesurreptitiouslycharged
and others have wages withheld or deducted.44 Destination country governments such as
Jordan(2015)andKuwait(2015)havemadesome(limited)legislativeeffortstorecognizeand
improve the rights of migrant domestic workers, and domestic worker-specific bilateral
recruitment agreements have been developed. Bahrain’s labour law does cover domestic
workers ina limitednumberofarticles,coveringcontracts, termination,paymentofwages,
annual leave and individual labour disputes. It is sometimes argued that the cultural
constraints of gender-based attitudes and beliefs in Arab States make reform for migrant
domesticworkersdifficult.However,gender-basedexceptionalismcannotbeacceptableifitis
discriminatoryandcontrarytointernationalstandards.
While this section focussed on the key challenges experienced by migrant workers, the
followingsectionofferswaysforwardtoaddresssomeoftheseissues.
Section2:Waysforwardtoaddressrecruitmentchallenges
14
SECTION2:Waysforwardtoaddressrecruitmentchallenges
ILOConventionsrecognizethelegitimacyofprivaterecruitmentagencies,butalsonotethatit
isessentialtocarefullyregulatetheirestablishmentandoperationsandholdthemaccountable
fornon-complianceandcriminalactions.45This isnecessarynot justtopunishwrongdoing,
buttopreventabusesandprotectworkers.46Moreeffectivemeasuresarerequiredtoensure
adherence to the rule of law and effective enforcement as a deterrent against abuse by
recruiters.Changingthemindsetsofmigrantworkers,employersandrecruitmentagenciesto
compliant, fair and ethical recruitmentwhereworkers do not pay for their recruitment is
crucial.ThefundamentaltenetoftheILOPrivateEmploymentAgenciesConvention,1997(No.
181)isthat“…agenciesshallnotchargedirectlyorindirectly,inwholeorinpart,anyfeesor
coststoworkers.”47
Recruitmentlegislationandpracticesmustcomplywithinternationallabourstandards48and
must contain explicit provisions relating to the protection of migrant workers, such as
stipulationsonemploymentcontracts,aswellasdecentworkingandlivingconditions.49
TheUNGuidelinesonBusinessandHumanRightsmake it clear thatgovernmentshavean
obligationtoprotectagainsthumanrightsabusesbybusinessenterprisesintheirterritory.
TheGuidelinesspelloutthedutiesofgovernmentsandbusinessestoprotecthumanrights.
TheseGuidingPrinciplesaregroundedinrecognitionof:
(a) States’ existing obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights and
fundamentalfreedoms;
(b) the role of business enterprises as specialized organs of society performing
specializedfunctions,requiredtocomplywithallapplicablelawsandtorespecthuman
rights;and
(c) the need for rights and obligations to be matched to appropriate and effective
remedieswhenbreached.
TheseGuidingPrinciplesareintendedtoapplytoallStatesandtoallbusinessenterprises,both
transnationalandothers,regardlessoftheirsize,sector,location,ownershipandstructure.50
Recruitmentreformsmustalsobenefitmigrantdomesticworkersandtakeintoconsideration
thegenderdimensionsofemploymentandrecruitment.51Althoughtherehavebeenreports
andproposals toestablish special lawsor comprehensiveprovisions tograntprotection to
migrantdomesticworkers,nonehavebeenforthcoming,except for JordanandKuwait,and
coverageofdomesticworkersunderthelabourlawofBahrain.Theseareelaboratedbelow
(Part9).
Itisimportanttonotethatreferencesto‘migrationcostsformigrantworkers’,forexampleas
referredtointheWorldBankKNOMADstudyonrecruitmentcosts,52areoftenanaggregate
ofactual‘costs’(fixedcostsandvariablecosts,includingfeesforservices)andextra‘charges’
thatmigrantworkerspaytorecruitmentagencies,employersorofficials.Thus,migration
costsreferstoboththeregulatedcostofrecruitmentaswellas‘informalpayments’-referred
tobysomeeconomistsas‘leakage’.Assuch,thelargediscrepanciesbetweentheamounts
migrantworkerspayandtheregulatedcostsmaybeexplainedbyfraudulentkickback
Section2:Waysforwardtoaddressrecruitmentchallenges
15
paymentstoemployerpersonnel,placementagenciesoroutsourcingfirmsatdestination,as
wellasofficials.
Whatfollowsaresuggestedwaysforwardtoimprovemigrantworkerrecruitmentpractices:
1.Employer-onlypaymentstorecruitmentagencies
Labourorigincountrygovernmentsshouldrepeallegislationthatcurrentlyallowsrecruitment
agents to charge workers for recruitment. Destination country governments should set
recruitmentfeesandcostsandmandatethatnovisaswillbeissuedtoworkerswhoarerequired
topayanythingfortheirrecruitment.Theonusonestablishingaprohibitionofworkerpayments
doesnotjustapplytotheorigincountries,butalso(perhapsmoreimportantly)todestination
countries.Exploratoryresearchintoworkersnolongerpayingfeesandtheimpactonrecruitment
industrystakeholdersshouldbeconducted.
Therequirementofworkerpaymentstorecruitmentagencieshasbecomeentrenchedinthe
expectationsofpotentialandreturneemigrantworkerstoArabStates.Thereisacultureof
employing companies not paying for recruitment fees and charges53 to increase their
competitiveness,andacultureintheorigincountriesofworkersexpectingtopay-somuchso,
thatoffersofjobswithoutpaymentaremistrusted.54Onlywhenorigincountrygovernments
ban worker payments altogether, will the expectation by workers to pay for jobs change.
Officiallyallowingworkerstobechargedone,twoorthreemonth’ssalaryforservicefeeshas
ledtoasmuchastentimesthisamountbeingcharged,withnodemandforaccountabilityby
regulatorybodies.Ano-feepolicy is far easier to implementandmonitor thana ceilingon
fees.55
However,thecurrentstatusquoisperceivedasawinningsituationforallstakeholders.The
employingcompanyreducesitscostsbynotpayingrecruitmentfeesandothercosts,givingit
anadvantageinprojecttendering;employingcompanypersonnelgetpaidforissuinglabour
supplycontracts;theintermediaryrecruitmentandplacementagenciescanextortlargeprofits
fromworkersandemployingcompanies;andthemigrantworkerseespaymentasaguarantee
of,orinvestmentin,obtainingworkandanincomethatwillrepaytheinitialcostovertime.
Changingthiscultureisimperative:first,byrepealingregulationsinorigincountriesthatallow
recruitmentagentstochargeworkers;second,alarge-scaleeducationandawareness-raising
program informing prospective migrant workers paying agents for jobs in Arab States is
prohibited; and third, informing employers at destination that they are required to pay
recruitmentcostsandmustensurethattheirprospectiveemployeeshavenotpaidanything.It
is the employer that contracts for the services of the agency to recruit. The contractual
conditionsshouldspecifythatonlytheemployerpayfortheagency’sfeeforserviceandother
costs.
Importantly, education and awareness-raising programs must be introduced prior to
recruitment. Perhaps beingmade aware of how theirmoney is spent, not just on costs of
recruitment but on fraudulent activities, migrant workers may better understand reasons
behindthepolicyandbegintotrustno-costforworkersrecruitment.Forexample,in2016the
UAEdistributed a “welcomepamphlet”56 to all newworker airport arrivals inUAE. In this
pamphlet, the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization explained its new labour
16
regulations,includinganewministerialdecreeonterminationconditionsforemployersand
employees.57Itstatesclearly:
UAE lawrequiresyouremployer topay thecostsof your recruitmentanddeployment.
These include any fees paid to a private recruitment agency that is accredited by the
governmentofyourcountry,thecostsoftheissuanceofanentryvisaandtraveltothe
UAE,andthecostsofpostarrivalprocessingrequirementssuchasmedicaltestsintheUAE
andtheissuanceofyourresidencypermit.
ThepamphleturgesworkersinneedofhelptoattendanyLabourOffice,adding,“YourLabour
Officewillbothassistyouandprotectyou.”Thepromiseofprotectionisimportantasitcan
provide workers with the confidence to raise questions about their circumstances. Under
“ImportantThingsforYoutoKnow”itstates:
“YouremployermustpayforyourrecruitmentcostsandtraveltotheUAE.”
“Youremployermustpayforyourresidencypermit.”
“Keepthereceiptsforanythingyouareaskedtopayfor.”
“Keepacopyofyoursignedjoboffer.”
“Yourcontractmustmatchyourjoboffer.”
“Keepacopyofyoursignedcontractinasafeplace.”
“You have the right to leave your job at any time but be aware of your contractual
obligations.”
The UAE’s effort in establishing a program of education and support for arrivingmigrant
workers such as this is welcome progress. However, informing workers on arrival of the
employers’dutytopayrecruitmentcostsandtheneedforreceiptsisratherlate.Itwouldbe
more effective if it was distributed before recruitment, and if it was accompanied with
informationonremedies.58Oncerecruitmenthasbegunandworkersarecommitted,theyare
vulnerable and likely to followwhatever demands aremade on them. Prospectivemigrant
workersshouldnotmakeanypaymentstorecruitmentagencies.Inthosecaseswhereworkers
dopay,theyshouldbeinformedthatitisintheirintereststoaskforreceiptsforthefullamount
thattheypaidandthatit isagainstthelawnottoprovidethesereceipts.59Origincountries
shouldmandatethatallpaymentstorecruiters(whetherfromworkersoremployers)should
bemadethroughbanktransferalongthesamelinesasthewageprotectionsystemsintheGCC,
forproperauditing.
Thejointandseveralliabilityarrangementsmayovercomethisbyforcingrecruitmentagents
toreimbursetheworkerstheyhavereceivedmoneyfrom(seePart7below).Thedifficultyin
this,ashasbeenshowninthepast,istheburdenofproofofpayment,forreceiptsarerarely
givenfortheamountsthatworkerspay.60Ifanyreceiptisgiven,itwillonlyshowthemaximum
allowablebylaw.
Countriesoforiginarelosinghundredsofmillionsofdollarsthataretakenfromtheircitizens
(migrantworkers)andpaidtoagentsandemployerpersonnelinthedestinationcountries.If
onlyemployerspaidrecruitmentagenciestherewouldbeasubstantialfinancialgainfororigin
countriesinforeigncurrencyearnings.
Proponentsofrecruitmentreformthatadvocatezero-costformigrantworkersoftenreceive
responsesbyemployers, recruitmentagenciesandgovernmentofficials lamenting that it is
Section2:Waysforwardtoaddressrecruitmentchallenges
17
“toodifficult”toabolishthepractice.Ithasalsobeenarguedthata‘sudden’banningofworker
payments will drive the practice ‘underground’.61 However, given the current and past
practicesasdescribedinthispaper,theredoesnotseemtobeanyeasilyenforceablemaximum
recruitmentfeesmechanismforworkersbecausetheextrachargesarealreadyunderground
duetothelackofreceiptsandaccountability.
EmployersandauthoritiesinArabcountriesareimplicatedinthedebtandusurypracticesin
theorigincountries.Even if thedebt isbeing incurred in thecountryoforigin, ithasbeen
shown thatmuchof it is being siphoned awayonbribery and extortionby employers and
agentsindestinationcountries.62SuchpracticesarearguablycontrarytoIslamicfinanceethics
rulesagainstcharginginterest(riba)orusury.Thus,allowing,encouragingorturningablind
eye to the usurious debt thatworkers accrue can also be considered contrary to religious
obligations.More effective, of course, is the elimination of these recruitment payments by
workersaltogether,obviatingthedebt.63
Figure1.Exampleoffraudulentrecruitmentflowofcharges
Comparisonscanbemadefrommodelsofhigh-skilledworkerrecruitment,wherefeestendto
bepaidbyemployersandperhapsasmallfeeforthejobseekertoregisterwiththeagency.As
hasbeensuggested,multinationalagenciessuchasAdecco,ManpowerGroupandRandstad
Holdings(allthreewithofficesinArabStates)couldprovidelarge-scalerecruitmentservices
forlow-skilledworkers,64iftheycanbeassuredofcompliancewithfairsourcingfromAsiaand
otherorigincountries.Asdemand for low-skilled labourremains in theAsianregion, these
Lowskilledmigrantworkers
pre-departure charges
Sub-agent/s
Employer/
agencykickback
paymentsand
reimbursework
visa&residency
permit
Employer
accommodation
andexpensesin
origincountry
Advertising,
training,
medical,
orientation,
transport,etc.
Employerpays
allorpartof
recruitment
costs
Private
recruitment
agency
Wagedeductions
18
multinationalsmustrelyonexistingfairandethicalagenciesthatdonotusesub-agentsorthey
mustestablishtheirownlocaloffices.65
Banning worker payments will also require addressing the level of influence that private
recruitment associations may have over origin country governments. The Nepal-Qatar
agreementonfairandethicalrecruitmenthasnotbeensuccessfultodatebecauseofprivate
sector pressure (seeBox 1). Given they have superior bargaining power,66 theArab States
whichwanttoabidebytheprinciplethatworkersshouldnotpayanyrecruitmentfeesmust
make it clear toorigin countrygovernments, recruitmentagencyassociationsandagencies
themselvesthatitisnotacceptable.Itisrecommendedthatdestinationcountrygovernments
setrecruitmentfeesandcosts,andmandatethatnovisaswillbeissuedtoworkerswhoare
requiredtopayanythingfortheirrecruitment.Itshouldbespecifiedthatonlyemployersat
destinationaretopayallrecruitmentfeesandcosts.InthespecificcasesofQatar,UAEandthe
Kingdomof SaudiArabia, it shouldbemade clear that it isunlawful to chargeworkers for
recruitmentunderthecountries’ labourlegislation.Inthissense,theonusonestablishinga
prohibitionofworkerpaymentsdoesnotjustapplytotheorigincountries,butalso(perhaps
moreimportantly)todestinationcountries.
Establishinga“no-costforworkers”practicecanbeamultilateralprocessbetweentheArab
StatesandAsianorigincountries,whereonlyemployerspay.The fact thatorigincountries
allowworker paymentswhile destination countries do not is highly problematic. Bilateral
labouragreementstopromotefairmigration67canprovidespecificprovisionstoaddressthe
gaps and contradictions in legislation between origin and destination countries.68 Bilateral
agreements aredeemed tohavemore contractual traction thanMemorandaofUnderstand
(MOUs)becauseobjectivesandoutcomesaretypicallymonitoredandassessedandallowfor
more focused ongoing dialogue.69 Such agreements or MOUs should include appropriate
measures for fair and ethical recruitment, coordinating rights-based contracts with clear
terminationconditionsaswellasprocedurestopreventcontractsubstitution.70
Incaseswherethereisaplacementagencyiinthecountryofdestination,theamountreceived
inkickbacksbyemployersmaybereducedbecauseoftheextraintermediaryinvolved.Insuch
cases, theplacement agencywill receive thekickbackpayments from the countryof origin
recruitmentagencyandpassaproportionofthistotheemployingcompanypersonnel.For
example,fromarecentinterviewwithaplacementagencyinQatar,awrittenquotationwas
provided fromaBangladeshrecruitmentagentofferingakickbackpayment,perworker,of
$1,500for‘helpers’(labourers)and$1,800forelectriciansandplumbers,aswellasproviding
five-staraccommodation for theirvisit toDhaka.Thequotation stipulated that40per cent
wouldbepaidonprintoutofthevisaand60percentonarrivaloftheworkeratdestination.71
AnnexIprovidesestimationsoftheactualfeesandcostsandcomparesthesewiththecharges
thatmigrantworkersarerequiredtopaytorecruitmentagencies.
TheIOMhasundertakenresearchintothebusinesscoststhatagenciesseektorecover,such
as the costs of maintaining an office, international travel, including hospitality costs,
“entertainment”andbusinessclassairfaresforemployerrepresentatives.72Suchtransactions
arelikelytobeformsofbriberyandwillinvariablybebornebythemigrantworkers.Itmaybe
arguedthatitisnotmerelya“flawedbusinessmodel”,buta“fraudulentbusinessmodel”.A
iA‘recruitmentagency’isreferredtoastheintermediaryinthelaborsourcecountry,whilea‘placementagency’residesinthedestinationcountry.
Section2:Waysforwardtoaddressrecruitmentchallenges
19
moreobjectivemodelofaservicefeestructureforrecruitmentagentsneedstobedeveloped
inconjunctionwithemployerstoascertainwhattheyarewillingtopayandhowagentscan
recovertheircostswithareasonablemarginofprofit.Employersshouldbewaryofagentswho
quotelowservicefees,becausetheywillinvariablychargeworkerstobecompetitiveandto
maintaintheiroperations.Recruitmentagents,ontheotherhand,shouldnotaccepttopayfor
employerrepresentatives’travelandlivingexpensesrequestedtoundertakeskillstestingand
selectionofworkers in thecountryoforigin.Thus, it is incumbentuponallstakeholders in
destinationcountriestoidentifyandpreventcompanypersonnelandplacementagentsfrom
takingorreceivingkickbackpaymentsfromprivaterecruitmentagenciesinorigincountries.
Withincreasingdemandforfairandethicalrecruitmentwhichstipulatesthattheemployer
mustpayforallrecruitmentcosts,itisimportanttomakeclearthatonlyemployersaretopay
forrecruitment.
Asignificantexpansionofsystematicempiricalresearchisrequiredtogeneratemoreprecise
dataonthedifferencesbetween“fees”,“costs”and“charges”inthevariouscorridorsoflabour
migrationfromAsianorigincountriestoArabStates.Suchstudiesmustconductinterviews(or
audits) with a large range of recruitment agencies and check the veracity of their cost
quotationswithgovernmentministriesanddepartmentsoforigincountriesthatarededicated
toregulatingrecruitment.
2.Projecttenderingprocurementprocedures
Projecttendersshouldincludeaseparatedetailedtransparent‘LabourRecruitmentCostAnalysis’
withinthebiddingproposalthatdetailsvariableandfixedcostsofrecruitment,includinglabour
costsofsubcontractors.
Complyingwiththisrecommendationwouldensurethattheintentionoftenderersandtheir
subcontractorsistopayforallrecruitmentfeesandcostsrelatedtolabour,accommodation,
recruitment,andtraining.Labourcostdetailsmaybeanintermediarystepintroducedbetween
the technical and commercial evaluation phases, or alongwith the commercial evaluation.
Clearly,labourrecruitmentcostsshouldnotbecalculatedafteratenderhasbeenawarded.If
properlydocumentedandaudited,unfairrecruitmentcanbemoreeasilydetectedbeforethe
projectsareawarded.
InawhitepapertotheUSgovernment,FSIWorldwide73arguedforraisingthethresholdinthe
evaluationofcontracttenders.Usinga“lowestpricetechnicallyacceptable”(LPTA)policycan
missandpossiblyfacilitatetraffickingviolationsunlessthereisatransparentbreakdownof
recruitmentfeesandcostswithinthetenderwherean“auditabletrailshouldbecreatedand
inspected in relation to suchpayments.”The recruitmentagencies tobeusedmustalsobe
documentedwithinthetenderandshowntobelicensed,auditedandaccreditedasfair,ethical
andcompliantrecruitmentpracticesthatdonotchargefeesorcoststoworkers.Anycontractor
orsubcontractorindicatinginabidthattheywillconductthelabourrecruitmentthemselves
shouldcomeunderspecialscrutiny.FSInotesthat“inourexperiencesuchadeclarationisoften
used toescape the requirement tonameanunscrupulousorunlicensedrecruitmentagent.
Veryfewprimeorsub-contractorsholdlicensestorecruitinsourcecountriesandnearlyall
willrelyonagents.”74
Itmaybethatsomecontractorsdonotarrangesubcontractorsuntilmonthsafterthecontract
hasbeenawarded.Yetcontractorsmustpracticeduediligencewiththeirsubcontractorswho
20
shouldgo throughthesametenderevaluationprocedures including labourcostevaluation.
Typically,timeandfinancialpressuresbuildup,givingsubcontractorsmorebargainingpower
tocutcostsbyforcingworkerstopayrecruitmentfees,costsandotherchargesandthusthe
cycleoffraudulentpracticescontinues.
“Blockchain” technology75 that isused for transparency inproduct supply chainshasmuch
potentialasappliedtosubcontractingsupplychains inconstructionandother industriesto
ensure transparencyanddetect fraudulentactivity. Itmayofferasolution toovercomethe
problemsassociatedwithmultiplepartiesthatdonottrusteachother,suchasinfragmented
supplychains.76Theapplicationisincreasinglybeingtestedinlabourrecruitmentandhuman
resourcemanagementtoprovidesecuretraceabilityofcertificationandotherdata.77
Governments of Arab States should legislate tendering policy procedures that mandate
transparency inmigrant labour recruitment costs for both contractors and subcontractors.
Lowestbidsshouldbemorecarefullyscrutinizedtoascertainwhethercostreductionsareat
theexpenseofmigrantworkersbeingrecruited.
3.Fairandethicalrecruitmentincompliancewithlaws
Regional coordination is required between origin and destination country governments to
establishlicensingandaccreditationoffairandethicalrecruitmentagenciesinorigincountries
asexclusivelaboursupplierstoArabcountries.Thisshouldalsoapplytoplacementagenciesand
manpoweroutsourcingagenciesindestinationcountries.Multilateralcooperationisneededto
establish consistent lawsbetweenorigin anddestination countries in a harmonization of fair
recruitmentregulationandenforcement.
The idea of ‘ethical’ recruitment has come to be accepted as a method of reforming the
recruitmentindustry,particularlyprivaterecruitmentandplacementagencies.However,the
term‘ethical’isoftenconsideredtobevoluntaryandsubjective–whatisacceptablebusiness
practiceandwhatisnot.Inthissense,theethicalfocusisuponthepersoninsteadoftheprocess
andcanleadtomisguidedtrust.Therecommendationhereisontheneedforamulti-layered
systemicapproachtoaddressingproblemsinlabourrecruitment.Itisthereforeappropriate
for ethical recruitment to include ‘compliance’ with laws, regulations and contractual
obligations in the recruitment process. Indeed, compliance is contained within the ILO
definition of ‘fair recruitment’, namely: “recruitment carried out within the law and with
respect for human rights, without discrimination and protecting workers from abusive
situations”. The ILO’s FairRecruitment Initiative alsoprovides for other actions, including:
improvinglaws,policiesandenforcementtopromotefairrecruitment;promotingfairbusiness
practices; and empowering and protecting workers through social dialogue.78 Compliance
requires internal controls, checksandbalances, externalaudits, trainingandreportingasa
minimumforanycorporatecomplianceprogram.79
However,arecruitmentagencycanbe‘compliant’undernationallegislationthatmaynotbe
inlinewithinternationalstandardsandhencenotbe ‘fair/ethical’.Compliancesuggeststhe
existenceofasoundlegislativeframework,whichisnotthecaseinmanycountriesoforigin
and destination alike, particularly where national legislative frameworks and enforcement
mechanismsareweak.Therefore,multilateralcooperation isneededtoestablishconsistent
lawsbetweenoriginanddestinationcountriesinaharmonizationoffair/ethicalrecruitment
Section2:Waysforwardtoaddressrecruitmentchallenges
21
regulationandenforcement–withahigherbenchmark thancurrentlyexistsandscope for
continuousimprovement.
Fairandethicalrecruitmentincompliancewiththelawisthebestmeansbywhichrecruitment
atnochargetotheworkercanbetrusted.Anumberofagenciesdoexistthatarestrictlyethical
andcompliantintheirrecruitmentoflabourbynotchargingworkersandabidingbynational
laws and international conventions that pertain to labour rights of migrants. Large
multinational companies such Manpower, Adecco and Randstad and members of the
InternationalConfederationofPrivateEmploymentAgencies(CIETT)exist,but theymainly
serveworkersinhigherskilledsectors.SmallerexamplessuchasFSIWorldwide(specializing
insecuritypersonnel,butexpanding),thenewFairHiringInitiativeinthePhilippines,80and
theFairEmploymentAgencyfordomesticworkersinHongKongwereestablishedpreciselyto
offerfairandethicalrecruitmentservices.Morecommonisforrecruitmentagenciestoaccept
fairandethicalrecruitmentpracticesbasedondemandfromemployers.Thismeanstheymay
be ethical for business in one country, orwith one employer, but unethicalwhen it is not
specificallyrequiredordemandedofthem.Itisthereforeincumbentonemployerstoensure
theyaredealingonlywithfair,ethicalandcompliantrecruitmentagenciesandmonitortheir
activities.
Figure2.Exampleoffairandcompliantrecruitmentflowofcosts
To assist in this, thedevelopmentof an extensiveofficial accreditationprogram for ethical
recruitmentagenciescanbeestablished,eitheronacountry-by-countrybasis,orasastandard
model for all Arab countries. Fair and ethical recruitment agencies in origin countries
accreditedbythedestinationcountriescanbelistedastheexclusivelaboursupplierstoArab
States.Governmentauthoritiescaneitherconducttheseaccreditationprogramsthemselves,
or authorize credible and independent authorities to do so, but this should not be seen as
relieving origin countries of their obligations to regulate recruitment and protectworkers.
Lowskilled
migrantworkers
pre-departure
charges
Sub-agent/s
Privaterecruitment
agency
Employer/agency
kickbackpayments
and
reimbursement
Employer
accommodation
andexpensesin
origincountry
Advertising,
training,medical,
orientation,
transport,etc.
Employerpaysall
recruitmentcosts
22
Suchprogramswillofferanaccreditationframeworkforfairrecruitersthatrequirenofeesfor
workers,nopassportretention,transparencyinsupplychainsandacomplaintsandreferral
mechanismformigrantworkers. Ideally,suchprogramswillbebasedonILOguidelineson
howtoachievefairrecruitment.
In addition to an accreditation system, all recruitment agencies shouldmeet standards for
registration and licensing, with criteria that ensure fair recruitment and decent work at
destination.81Bangladesh, India, Indonesia,Nepal, thePhilippinesandSriLankaall require
private employment agencies to obtain a licence prior to sendingworkers abroad.82 ‘Good
character tests’83without relyingsolelyonpolice checks, aswell asprovisionofeducation,
trainingandexaminationonindustrystandardsandlabourlawshouldalsobeapartofthe
licensingprocedure.SomeArabStateshave takensteps to regulate theactivitiesofprivate
employment agencies with ministerial decrees in the UAE and Qatar requiring private
employmentagenciestoacquirealicenseinordertocarryouttheiroperations.84Thisiscritical
fortherecruitmentofmigrantdomesticworkers,whereacorrespondingplacementagencyin
thedestinationcountryisrequired.However,forthemajorityofworkers,itisimperativethat
both recruitment and placements agencies are licensed and accredited in both origin and
destinationcounties,toallowforbilateralmonitoring.
Origin country government accreditation85 of fair and ethical recruitment is likely to face
resistancefromexistingagencies,particularlyprivatesectoragencieswhoseprimaryincome
isderivedfrommigrantlabourrecruitmentandwhoarereliantupontheextraincomefrom
exorbitantworkerpayments(seeexperienceofNepaloutlinedinBox1below).Thus,relying
upon origin country governments to introduce or mandate zero-fee recruitment may be
difficultbecauseofthecollectiveinfluenceoftheindustry.Thishighlightstheimportantrole
ofgovernmentsofdestinationcountriesinthedeterminationoffairandethicalrecruitment
practices.
Destinationcountriesthroughanaccreditationandlicensingprocesscanmandatepreferred
fair and ethical labour suppliers in both origin and destination countries. For example, in
February2016,theBahrainLabourMarketRegulatoryAuthoritypubliclylisted120approved
manpower firms.However,such listsmust includeaccredited fairandethicalcompanies in
destinationcountrieswithlinksto(orbranchesof)fairandethicalagenciesinorigincountries.
Such arrangements can be determined by bilateral agreements after more rigorous
registrationandlicensingprocedures.
Associations of recruitment agencies are important in the dissemination of reform of the
industry.However,theyareofteninfluencedbytheirmembershipandbysub-agentstoresist
zero-feespolicy.Whileassociationsmaypubliclyindicatethattheyaretakingtheleadonfair
andethicalrecruitment,thereislittleevidencethatactionhasbeentaken.Ascanbeexpected,
thereislittleappetiteforzeroworkerfeerecruitmentbecauseitissolucrativeforsub-agents,
privaterecruitmentagenciesandtheirclientsindestinationcountries.
Section2:Waysforwardtoaddressrecruitmentchallenges
23
Box1:Nepal-Qatarcasestudyonrecruitmentchargesandcosts86
InNepal,on6July2015,aministerialdirectivewasissuedfora“free-visafree-ticket”
policy for seven destinations -Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates,
Kuwait,BahrainandOman;pursuanttowhich,workersgoingtothesecountrieswould
havethecostsoftheirvisaandticketcoveredbytherecruitmentagency.Theaverage
one-wayairticketfromKathmandutomostGCCstatesatthetimewasaroundUS$360
and thecostofaworkvisaaroundUS$80.Thedirective included theprovision that
workerscouldpayuptoamaximumofNR10,000(approx.US$100)asaservicefeein
theeventthattheemployerinthedestinationcountryrefusedtopaycommissiontothe
agencyaswellasNR8,000(approx.US$80)tocoverthecostofthewelfarefund,NR
1,000 (US$10) for the health check and NR 7,000 (US$70) for orientation/training-
relatedexpenses.
InFebruary2016,NepalAssociationofForeignEmploymentAgencies(NAFEA)issued
anultimatumthatagencieswillgoonstrikeiftheprovisionwasnotreviewed.Inthe
same month, police raided 18 recruitment agencies for overcharging, tax fraud,
documentfraudandadoptingillegalchannelsfordeploymentofmigrantworkers.87
Privaterecruitmentagencieswentonstrikefor17days.Thestrikeendedwitha31-
pointagreementwiththeNAFEAandtheGovernmentofNepal,includingthepossibility
ofincreasingtheservicefeetobechargedbytherecruitmentagency.Thegovernment
of Nepal established a joint 11-member panel to review the policy, including five
representativesofNAFEA.Thepanelvisitedthedestinationcountriesandfoundallbut
Malaysiawereinfavourofthefreevisafree-ticketpolicy.Thegovernmentarguedthat
the money sent by Nepalese recruitment agencies to ‘agents’ in the destination
countriesamountedtoaroundUS$400-500millionperyear.In2014-15aroundUS$113
millionwastransferredtobrokersinMalaysiaalone.
Itcouldbearguedthatincludinga“freevisa”intheNepalfree-visafree-ticketpolicyis
potentiallymisleading,becausetheemployerwillhavealreadypaidfortheworkvisa
beforeitsissue.Thereisnofinancialoutlaybytherecruitmentagencyfortheworkvisa,
so theyhavenoright toask themigrantworker forreimbursement. If theagency is
underinstructionsfromtheemployertohavetheworkerpayfortheworkvisa(i.e.to
reimbursetheemployer)itwillbeaclearviolationofthelawsinQatar,SaudiArabia
and UAE and the employer should be liable for prosecution. Indeed, given that
recruitment agencies in origin countries are given power of attorney to act on the
employer’s behalf, the legal liability rests with employers in destination countries
whereitisunlawfultochargeworkers.Thus,thepracticeofworkersbeingrequiredto
payforthevisabeforedeploymentmaybeperceivedasvisatrading.
Allowing some payment byworkers and the lack of effectivemonitoring hasmeant
recruitmentagents inNepal are still chargingworkersas theydidbefore theno-fee
policy.
Fairandethicalrecruitmentalsomeansavoidingtheuseofnetworksofsub-agentsbothinside
andoutsidethemaincitieswherethemajoragencieshavetheiroffices.Althoughillegalinmost
origincountries,88networksofsub-agents(dalals)arerelieduponagreatdeal,buttheymay
24
deceiveprospectiveworkersandchargethemfeesindependently.Thelargerthenumberof
intermediariesthemoretheworkercanbecharged.Thusdirectrecruitmentispreferable,but
sub-agentscanbebroughtintoalicensedrecruitmentagencyonaformalcontractualbasis,
payingthemasalary,pluscommission,thuslegalizingtheiractivities.89
Theconsequencesforunfairandunethicalpracticesarealsocritical.Giventhescaleoffinances
intherecruitmentindustry,iftheobjectiveistooutlawfraudulentpractices,thepenaltiesmust
besevereenoughtooutweighthefinancialbenefitsthatcanbegleanedbytheillicitmarketfor
low-skilledmigrantworker funds90. Financial penalties for non-fair and ethical practice by
contractorsandsubcontractorsmaynotalwaysproveeffectivebecausetheycanbeoffsetover
thelifeofthecontract,particularlyintheconstructionsector.Forexample,asthereareusually
hundredsofclausesinacontract,thereareoftenrequestsforvariationsthatarecompliedwith
butforextracostsandcharges.Forexample,betweenthebeginningandendofalargeproject,
thecostmayincreasefromUS$50milliontoUS$75millionbecauseofvariationrequests.Fines
can be offset in these extra charges. Thus, there is a need formore effective and credible
enforcement that includes confiscation of assets, suspending or revoking licences, public
blacklistingandbansonfuturetendering,particularlyifthebanisappliedinallArabStates.
4.Standardizedcontracts,contractsubstitutionandminimumwages
Establish standardized contracts for all Arab countries with measures against contract
substitution.
Legal reform in Arab countries should devise or improve standard contracts for migrant
workersindifferentsectors.91Compliancemeansnotonlycompliancewithlaws,butalsowith
the provisions contained in the standard contract. This is critical where there are
contradictionsinthelawsbetweenoriginanddestinationcountries.Therefore,thecontract
(backedbyeffectivecivilorcontract law)createsthestandardtowhichtheemployermust
comply92and the lawshould stipulate that in caseofdisputes, the languageversion that is
understoodbythemigrantworkerwillprevail.
TheQatarFoundation’s2014MandatoryStandardsforMigrantWorkerWelfarerequiresthat
contractorsmake explicit in their contractswith recruitment agencies, subcontractors and
their employees that “workers are not to pay any recruitment fees, costs or charges”. The
statement isalsorequiredonanyadvertising forpositionsavailable inorigincountries.By
establishingthisconditionwithinlegallybindingcontracts,allpartiescanbeheldaccountable
fornon-compliance.
A standardcontracthasbeen recentlydevelopedby theUAEwithextensivearticulationof
terminationconditions.93Alongwithnewlegislationthatconferslegalcontractualstatuson
theletterofofferbeforedeparture,theUAEinitiativeprovidesuniformityforbothoriginand
destinationcountriesthatmilitatesagainstillegalcontractsubstitution.Itisrecommendedthat
otherArab states and countries of originmake similar agreements regarding standardized
contractualarrangements.
Establishment of standardized minimum occupational wage levels, standardized across GCC
countriesandotherArabStates.
Section2:Waysforwardtoaddressrecruitmentchallenges
25
Differentwagelevelsdependentonamigrantworker’snationalitycanbecommon.Whilethe
governments of India and Nepal (and formerly the Philippines) provide guidelines for
minimumwagesaccordingtooccupationanddestinationcountry,discrepanciesaccordingto
nationality still exist. In Qatar, for example, the Indian embassy (2014) lists US$411 for a
labourer and US$460 for a steel fixer, while the Nepal embassy (2014) lists US$247 for a
labourerandUS$301 forasteel fixer.Thismaybeseenasa functionofcompetition in the
international labourmarket,but it results in theviolationof theprincipleof “equalpay for
equalwork”incountriesofdestination.Twopeopledoingthesamejob,buthavingdifferent
wagesbecauseoftheirnationality isdiscriminatory,breachesequityguidelinesandcreates
disaffectionintheworkplace.j
5.Government-initiatedregulationandoversightopportunities:central
clearinghousesande-recruitment
Establish‘centralclearinghouses’inGCCcountriesandotherArabStatesforimplementationand
oversightoffairandethicalrecruitment.
The logic of low-skilled workers paying large sums of money means that non-compliant
recruitmentagentsandemployingcompanypersonnelhaveafinancialinterestinmaximizing
the number of workers recruited. A central clearing house could be established in the
destinationcountriesforrecruitment,runbythegovernmentauthorities,wherepossiblein
conjunctionwithemployerandemployeeassociations.Thecentralclearinghousewouldbe
responsible for registering and monitoring entering and exiting migrant workers, and for
storing information/documentation regarding the workers’ qualifications, experience,
contracts, conditions of their recruitment and other data. This data could be accessed by
government, employers, workers and their representatives and would improve national
statistics on labour migration, allowing for more targeted labour inspection, among other
things. Workers who have completed their contracts, or been made redundant, can be
redirectedthroughtheclearinghousetootheremployers,withouthavingtoleavethecountry.
Utilising centralisation strategies such as this, may offer financial savings for further
recruitmentendeavours.Acentralclearinghousecanserveasapublicplacementagencyand
canofferdirectrecruitmentbyaccreditedemployers.
TheBahrain LabourMarket Regulatory Authority (BLMRA) is an example which could be
replicated. The BLMRA registers and monitors recruitment agencies and can investigate
fraudulentrecruitmentpractices.Theyarerequiredtoattesttothevalidityandauthenticityof
documentation forworkvisasandtoverify theexistenceofanemployerandworkplaceso
workersarenotleftstrandedandundocumented.Ablacklistismaintainedonemployersand
recruitment agencies that have committed offenses ormisledmigrantworkers in the past,
banningthemfromfuturehiring.Anexplanatorybrochureisprovidedtoallarrivingmigrant
workers intheirownlanguage,andaSIMcardwhichcanbeusedtoreportgrievancesand
violations.AllinformationconcerningtheirworkpermitistransferredtotheSIMcard.94
Onlinerecruitmentcanalsobeencouragedtominimizethenumberofintermediariesinvolved.
Themorethenumberofintermediaries,themorethereisariskoffraudulentpracticestothe
detrimentofall.95CountrieslikeBangladesh, forexample,havealreadystartedusingonline
jTheILODiscrimination(EmploymentandOccupation)Convention,1958(No.111),Article1definesdiscriminationas,any
distinction,exclusionorpreferencemadeonthebasisofrace,colour,sex,religion,politicalopinion,nationalextractionor
socialorigin,whichhastheeffectofnullifyingorimpairingequalityofopportunityortreatmentinemploymentoroccupation.
26
registration processes for their nationals seeking employment abroad. This government
processinvolvesregistrationbySMSaswellassmartcardscontainingbasicinformationsuch
aspassportnumber,dateofbirth,familyname,andcontactphonenumbersintheircountryof
origin.96
Afewotherexamplesinclude:
• EURES (theEuropean JobMobilityPortal) - aEuropean cooperationnetworkwhich
provides information aswell as labour recruitment andplacement services. It has a
portalnetworkof1,000EURESadvisorswhomaintaindailycontactwithemployees
andemployersacrossEurope.97
• NAKURI.COM,anonlinejobwebsiteinIndiawithadatabaseof41millionregistered
jobseekers’resumes;andNAKURIGULF.COMthatfocusesontheGCCstatesforArab,
EuropeanandSouthEastAsianjobseekers.98
• Ane-hiringsystemannouncedrecentlybetweentheKingdomofSaudiArabiaandSri
Lanka99 and a new e-portal formigrant domesticworkers in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia.100
• Bayt.com,anonlineapplication for candidates to find jobs in theGCC,alsooffersan
‘online labourmarket’ that allows for faster recruitment, greater transparency, and
simplicitywithbetterjob-candidatematching.101
In addition, although it has come under much critical scrutiny, the early guest worker
(gastarbeiter)programbetweenGermanyandTurkeyandothercountriesinthe1960sisan
exampleofbilateralagreementsfortheorderlyrecruitmentoftemporaryworkerstofilllabour
shortagesinGermanindustry.AjointGerman-TurkishEmploymentServiceofficeestablished
inIstanbuloperatedasaforeignbureaufortheGermanMinistryofLabour.Turkishauthorities
screenedapplicants,pre-selectedthecandidatesandarrangedinterviews.Germanemployers
paidthecostsofsearch,transportationandtraining.102Germanyalsohasashort-termseasonal
foreignworkersprogrambaseduponMOUswithlabourorigincountries(mainlyPolish),but
therehasbeencriticismofthequalityofsomeworkeraccommodationthatisprovided.103The
‘circular migration’ project run by Unió de Pagesos (UP) in Catalonia recruits seasonal
agriculturalworkersfromMorocco,ColombiaandEasternEurope,supportedbyagricultural
worker unions. Government employment agencies organize the reception, travel, job
placementandaccommodationofthemigrantworkers.104Inalegislatedarrangement,theUP
andtheFederationofFarmers(FPS)payallrecruitmentcostsatthebeginning,butlaterdeduct
from the worker’s wages the amount corresponding to half the cost of the international
travel.105
6.Government-to-governmentrecruitment
Destination country governments shoulddiversify arrangements through the increaseduse of
origincountrygovernmentrecruitmentagencieswheretheyexist.
Bilateral agreements andMOUs for government-to-government recruitment andplacement
aretobeencouragedbecausethereisevidencethatsuggestsfarfewerfraudulentactivities
andmuchlowercoststoworkerswhensuchagreementsareinplace.106Theseshouldinclude
harmonizingrecruitmentregulationandenforcementamongtherespectivecountriesoforigin
and destination. Bangladesh, India, the Philippines and Nepal have established bilateral
agreementswithArabstatesovertheyears.107 However,recentexamplesfromBangladesh
andNepalindicateprivaterecruitmentagenciesandtheirassociationsarewellorganizedand
Section2:Waysforwardtoaddressrecruitmentchallenges
27
canplacemuchpressureagainstexcluding them. Indeed ithasbeensuggested thatprivate
recruitmentagenciesandtheirassociationsarepowerfulandabletowithstandorigincountry
governmentlegalandpolicyframeworksregulatingrecruitmentfees.108Recruitmentbypublic
employment services such as the Bangladesh Overseas Employment and Services Limited
(BOESL)andtheSriLankaForeignEmploymentAgency(SLFEA)havenotbeenparticularly
activeandhaveoftenclashedwithprivateagencyassociations.109Oftenbilateralagreements
are made but the recruitment is conducted by private recruitment agencies110 that more
resembletradeagreementsthatdonotalwayscomplywithinternationallabourandhuman
rightsstandards.111Severalpromisingexamplesexist,includingKorea’sEmploymentPermit
System(EPS)-agovernment-to-governmentrecruitmentprogramfirst introducedin2004,
which brings workers from 15 countries to work in Korea’s small and medium-sized
businesses.112Amajorachievementisthereductionintheaveragecostpaidbyaworkerfrom
US$3,509 under the previous trainee system in 2002 to US$927 under the EPS system in
2011.113 The Government has also introduced standardized employment contracts for
employersandworkers.Whilenotamodelinallrespects,theEPSisabetterconceived,funded
andimplementedforeign-workerprogrammethanmostintheregion.114
AnotherexampleistheGermany-Philippinesbilateralagreementforhealthworkersinwhich
social dialogue plays an important role in implementation. Signed in March 2013, the
agreementfacilitatestheentryofFilipinonursestotheGermanhealthcaresystemthrougha
government-to-government hiring scheme with fair and ethical recruitment and a joint
committeeresponsible formonitoringandevaluating the implementationof theagreement
involvingtradeunions.115
Arabcountriesmaywish toapplygreatergovernment interventionsuchas theseexamples
suggest. By coordinating agreementswith governments of origin countries and employing
companies,muchistobegainedbyreducingthecostsofintermediarybrokerageandensuring
payment of fees and costs by employers,while enhancing the focus on skills, training and
productivityinthemigrantlabourworkforce.
7.Jointandseveralliabilityschemes
Establish joint and several liability schemes in both country of origin and destination for
recruitmentandplacementagenciesaswellascontractorandsubcontractoremployers.
Thelogicofjointliabilityarrangementsisthattheleadenterpriseatthetopofthesupplychain
decideshowtostructureitsoperationsforanygivenproject.Subcontractingdiffusescosts,risk
andlegalliabilitydownthesupplychain.However,leadcompaniesdomaintaincontrolofthe
workthatisoutsourcedwithauthoritytomonitorandcancelcontractsiftheworkisnotupto
standard, particularly in migrant labour recruitment practices. Because the lead company
profits from its subcontractors, they are liable for the standards, abuses and fraudulent
activitiesofthosesubcontractors,andhavethepowertocorrectthem.116Firing,banning,or
suspendingsubcontractorsintheconstructionindustrydoesoccur,117butitisdifficultbecause
oftimepressuretoreplacethem.Insuchcircumstances,contractorsandstateauthoritiesmust
workwiththemtobringthemintolineandfindmodelstocompensatemigrantworkersfor
damages thatmight includecontractors, recruitmentagencies, thestateorcombinationsof
stakeholders.
ThePhilippines,IndonesiaandEthiopiaaretheonlycountrieswherenationallegislationforces
recruitmentagencies tobe financially liable foranywagediscrepanciesbetweenwhatwas
28
promisedtothemigrantworkerandwhatwasactuallypaid,althoughfewmigrantworkers
have the confidence to bring a lawsuit against an agency.118 The Philippines law provides
administrative liability for the possible suspension or termination of the license of a
recruitmentagency,aswellascriminalliabilityofmanagersandotherstaffmembersofthe
recruitment agency. This system of “joint and solidary liability” holds that, because the
employer is beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine courts, responsibility lies with the
recruitment agency.119 In principle, this is to deter recruitment agencies fromdealingwith
unscrupulousemployers.120
Thesearrangementsarecriticalforbothworkerandemployerrecoursetocompensationfor
fraudulentrecruitmentandtreatment. In thePhilippines, forexample, licensedrecruitment
agenciesassumejointandsolidaryliabilitywiththeemployerforallclaimsandliabilitiesthat
mayariseinconnectionwiththeimplementationofthecontract,includingwagediscrepancies.
Underthejointandsolidaryresponsibilityclause,thejurisdictionissueisimmaterialasthe
recruitmentagency, ineffect,actsasco-employer.The limitationof the joint liabilityclause
concernsactscommittedbysubcontractorsorintermediariesthatarenotrecognizedbythe
recruitment agency or employer.121 The Philippines arrangement is powerful because
recruitersareheldliableincasesofexploitationatdestinationwheretheexploitercannotbe
charged.k
In the Netherlands, there is a combined legal and voluntary system of joint liability. All
contractorsare liable forviolationsof their subcontractors, includingrecruitmentpractices
wheremigrantworkersatdestinationcanseekcompensationinthecourtsforjointliability
claims. The certification and licensing of recruitment companies is voluntary but regular
governmentauditsdooftenresultinsuspensionsandpenalties.122
InCanada,anotherdestinationcountrytoconsider,agovernment-ledapproachtosupplychain
liability can be seen in theManitobaWorker Recruitment and Protection Act (WRAPA), a
licensing system for agencies recruiting migrant workers that provides for a proactive
enforcementmechanism.WRAPAbansrecruitersfromcharginganyfeestoforeignworkers
and prohibits employers from recovering recruitment fees from workers. Comprehensive
information on all facets of employers, employees and recruitment agents are required.
Employersare liable for recruitment feescharged toworkers if theemployerrecruited the
workerwithanunlicensedrecruiter.TheActalsoincludesspecificoffensesforemployerswho
utilizeunlicensedrecruiters.123
In theUnitedKingdom, the Gangmaster Licensing Authority (GLA) requires origin country
recruitmentagencies“toalsoapplyforalicensewiththeGLAandtocomplywithitstermsand
conditions. In otherwords, the GLA imposed an extra-territoriality aspect to the licensing
conditions.Thishasledtoanumberofcross-bordercontactsandinitiativeswithregulatory
authoritiesinthosecountries.”124
kForexample,inOctober2013,thePhilippinesOverseasEmploymentAdministration(POEA)cancelledthelicenseofa
recruitmentagencybecauseofcontractsubstitutioninthecaseofsevenFilipinawomendeployedtoSaudiArabiaasnurses.
Itemsinthefirstcontractsuchassalary,transportationallowance,foodallowance,andlodgingwereeitherreducedor
totallyomittedinthenewcontract.Theagencyhadalsotakenexcessiverecruitmentfeesfromtheworkersanddidnotissue
receiptsfortheamountspaid.Theseallviolatedthe2002POEARulesandRegulationsGoverningtheRecruitmentand
EmploymentofLand-basedOverseasWorkers.Theagencywassuspendedandorderedtorefundtheworkerstheexcess
chargestheyhadpaid.See“POEAcancelsrecruiter’slicenseforcontractsubstitution”,PressRelease,25October2013,at:
http://www.poea.gov.ph/news/2013/PROct2013AllSkills.pdf
Section2:Waysforwardtoaddressrecruitmentchallenges
29
IntheArabcountriesauthoritieshavealicensingprocedure,butthelawonlyreferstolicensed
recruitment agencies in the Arab States. By expanding the licensing region to recruitment
agenciesintheorigincountries.Arabcountriescouldencouragefairandethicalrecruitment
practicesandensurejointliability.
Although countries of destination often assume they have no jurisdiction over recruitment
practicesinlabourorigincountries,theycandemandthatfairandethicalrequirementsare
metthroughthe joint-liabilityapproach.125Theycan insist that thecontractofemployment
meetstheminimumstandards,complieswithtermsagreedupon,protectstheemployeeand
includes provisions on the ability to change employer. Joint-liability through bilateral
agreementsshouldalso focusoncombatingcontract substitutionandother inconsistencies
andthattheminimumstandardsareunderstoodbyemployersandrecruitersonbothsidesof
the migration corridor.126 Joint-liability practices rely heavily on inter-governmental
cooperation127andrequirecommitmentfromcountriesoforiginandcountriesofdestination
equally.Information-sharingprogramsbetweenthedestinationcountryandcountryoforigin
must support legal reform and joint-liability approaches.128 Addressing concerns by origin
countriesfortheirmarketcompetitivenessformigrantworkers,someexpertsargue,“ajoint
liabilityapproachhasanadvantageovereffortstocontrolrecruitmentbyanoriginnationon
itsown.Suchregimestakerecruitmentcostsoutofcompetition,whichshouldbetheidealfrom
theorigincountryperspective.Whentheemployeristheprincipletargetofenforcement,and
theliabilityattachestorecruitmentfromanycountry(asitshould)…itdoesnotmatterwhere
intheworldthatemployerlooksforworkers:allrecruiterswillhavetocomplywiththesame
baselinestandards.”129
Privaterecruitmentagenciesmaintainresponsibilityforworkersfromdeploymentuntilthe
endoftheprobationperiod(usually3months),foriftheemploymentrelationshipdoesnot
work out, agreements may require a replacement at the agency’s cost.130 Where larger
contractorssendpersonneltotheorigincountriestoconductskillstestingandselection,the
employer usually accepts the replacement responsibility. Increasingly, private recruitment
agenciesinsistonemployerpersonnelvisitingthecountryoforigintoconductskillstesting
andselectionofcandidatesinordertodelegatereplacementresponsibilitytotheemployer.131
Making leadcontractors liable forrecruitmentabuses intheirglobalsupplychainshasalso
beenafocusoflegislationintheUK(BriberyAct,ModernDaySlaveryAct),theEuropeanUnion
(NonFinancialDisclosureDirective),andtheUnitedStates(ForeignCorruptPracticesActand
the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act). International human and labour rights
organizations as well as non-governmental organization, and the media can also bring
violationstotheattentionofthepublicthatmotivateinternalandindependentreviewsand
assessments of supply chain violations. Gordon’s comprehensive study of supply chain
liabilitiesshowedmultipletypesofaction,suchashighmediaprofilecampaignsintheUnited
States by the grassroots basedNational Guestworker Alliance (NGA) targeting large brand
companiestorevealrecruitmentviolations.132Insomecases,voluntarycodesofconducthave
alsobeenestablishedbytheprivatesector,throughwhichmemberspledgethatneitherthey
northeirsubcontractorswillchargeworkersrecruitmentcosts(oneexampleistheCodeof
Conduct by the Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition - a nonprofit coalition of leading
electronicscompanies).133
Clientsofthestateandtheircontractorsmustensurefairandethicalrecruitmentandinsist
upon it for all subcontractors in the supply chain. Commercial requirements for proper
30
standardsoffairandethicalrecruitmentcanbemorepowerfulthanlegislationbecausethey
canbeestablishedaspre-requisitecontractualrequirementsfordoingbusiness.
8.Addressingmalpracticesthroughfreevisas,visatradingandmanpower
outsourcingagencies
Greater surveillance over the issuing of visas is required by Arab countries to minimize visa
tradingontheblackmarket.
Careful inspectionsofemployers thatmayhavebeenestablishedas tradingcompanies,but
whichtradeinvisasoractasmanpowersuppliers(withouttherequisite100percentlocal
nationalownership)needtobesteppedup.Workerswhoareplacedunwittinglyintoirregular
statuscanberegularizedifstateauthoritiesarewillingtoinquireintothecircumstancesof
their recruitment.134 Destination country governments should ensure due diligence in
ascertainingthereasonsforirregularmigrantworkers’presence,minimizecostlydetention
and deportation and maximize regularization of migrant workers who became irregular
beyond their control with willing employers.135 Wage protection systems mandating that
employers pay wages into bank accounts are one way to check that sponsors are in fact
employingandpayingtheworkersundertheirsponsorship.
Visa tradingarises in anumberofways. For example, companies awardeda contract for a
projectapplyfora“blockvisa”androutinelyapplyformuchlargernumbersofworkvisasthan
is actually required. In addition, visas provided are not always commensurate with the
application in terms of occupation and nationality. Thus visas are given toworkerswhose
actualjobisdifferentfromthatwhichisstatedonthevisa.136
Freevisasareworkvisaswherethereisasponsor,butnorealemployeronarrival,inpractice
enablingmigrantworkerstoforinstancemanageashoporworkforthemselves.Thesellingof
these visas (that may go through a number of intermediaries) is ultimately reliant upon
workersbeingchargedsufficientlytocoveralltheprofitsbeingmade.Greaterdiligenceneeds
to be undertaken by destination government authorities to verify the legitimacy of visa
applicationswithfollow-upthatthesponsoristheactualemployerorthatpropersecondment
arrangements have been granted official approval. Embassies of origin countries also are
requiredtocheckthebonafideofworkvisas,particularlyduringtheattestationprocedures.In
this sense authorities in both countries of origin and destination have responsibilities in
identifyingvisaabusesbeforetheyaremarketed.RegularcrackdownsinArabstatesthathave
resulted in prosecutions of company executives should also result in more stringent
procedureswithchecksandbalancestopreventfreevisasbeingissuedinthefirstinstance.137
The scale of this problem is difficult to quantify, particularly when there are regular
crackdowns that result in deportation as well as amnesties to regularize papers or allow
irregularworkers to returnhomewithoutpenalties.Thesemeasures indicatea concernby
destinationcountriestoaddresstheproblem,butgreatertransparencyofthedataforanalysis
would be welcomed.138 While regularization efforts are a positive step, it is critical that
irregularworkersunderthesecircumstancesarenotcriminalized,butratherdealtwithunder
civillaw.Forexample,aworkerapprehendedbecauseofan‘absconding’noticebythesponsor
shouldnotbeplacedintodetentionandpenalized.Rather,theauthoritiesneedtodetermine
whethertheyarevictimsofabuse,traffickingorunwittingrecipientsof‘freevisas’.139
Section2:Waysforwardtoaddressrecruitmentchallenges
31
Non-workvisasarealsoimplicatedinvisatrading,wherebusinessvisasandtouristvisasare
soldtomigrantworkersforentry.Applicationstoconverttheseintoworkvisasshouldraise
red flags and inquiry into the possibilities of visa trading. Again, if the culture ofmigrant
workerspayingforrecruitmentandthejobstheyareobtainingwerecurtailed,visatrading
willbelargelystopped.
As “third party” employers, greater due diligence by contractors and sub-contractors is
required,throughmeanssuchasinspectionsandinquiriesaboutthepersonneltheyusefrom
manpower outsourcing agencies in destination countries - and should be held legally
responsiblefornon-fairandunethicalpractices.Forexample,contractorsandsubcontractors
shouldrefusetodobusinesswithmanpoweroutsourcingagenciesthatdonotcomplywith
lawsonrecruitment,housingandfoodprovisions;orthosewhodonotagreetothelevelof
transparency required.Of course, criminal laws,particularlyanti-trafficking legislation that
includesexploitation through forcedorcompulsory labour, canbebrought tobearonboth
contractorsandmanpoweroutsourceagencies.140Inthissensethecorporateveilofmanpower
outsourceagenciesneedstobelifted.Governmentsshouldintroducestricterlicensingaswell
as monitoring and inspections of manpower outsource agencies. Manpower outsource
agenciesinturnneedtocarryoutduediligenceonorganizationsthathiremigrantworkers
fromthem.TheproposedILOfairrecruitmentguidelinesstatethat,“itisnecessarytoensure
thattheresponsibilitiesofthetemporaryemploymentagencyandoftheuserenterpriseare
clearlydefined,fortheprotectionoftheworkers,oftheemploymentagencyandoftheuser
enterprise.”
9.Migrantdomesticworkers
Arabcountriesshouldbeencouragedtobringmigrantdomesticworkersundertheprotectionof
theirlabourlaws.
MigrantdomesticworkersinArabstatesareexcludedfromtheprotectionofthelabourlawin
allcountriesexceptBahrain.141InSaudiArabia,aministerialdecision(310)of2013mandates
domesticworkers receiveninehoursof restperday,onedayperweekoff andonemonth
vacationaftertwoyearsofservice.KuwaitenactedaseparatelawfordomesticworkersinJune
2015thatincludesmigrantdomesticworkers’righttoonedayoffperweek,30daysannual
paid leave,amaximum12hourdaywithrestperiodsandanendofservicegratuityofone
monthperyearofservice.142Althoughtherearesignificantlimitationstothelegislation,asit
doesnotaffordfullrecognitionunderthelabourlaw,itisconsideredastepforward.143
Reasons for the exclusion of domesticworkers from labour laws and restrictions on their
freedomofmovementhavebeenthreefold.First,domesticworkersareconsideredtobeina
personalrelationshipwiththemembersofthehousehold,ratherthaninaformalemployee-
employerrelationship.Asecondandrelatedreasonisthatdomesticworkersareprivytothe
intimaterelationshipswithinthefamilyanditisimportanttothemthatsuchinformationis
not shared publicly or to other households. Third, because of the high costs in recruiting
migrantdomesticworkers,restrictionsareseenasameasurebyemployerstopreventthem
fromrunningawayandthusprotectingtheir‘investment’.144Itshouldbenoted,thattheILO’s
EmploymentRelationshipRecommendation,2006(No.198)suggeststhatstates“shouldtake
particular account in national policy to ensure effective protection to workers especially
affectedbytheuncertaintyastotheexistenceofanemploymentrelationship,includingwomen
workers,aswellasthemostvulnerableworkers…”(Article5).
32
The ILO has recommended that international cooperation for targeted awareness-raising
campaigns,especiallyforthosewhoaremostatriskofbecomingvictimsofforcedlabour,to
inform them, inter alia, about how to protect themselves against fraudulent or abusive
recruitmentandemploymentpractices.145NGOshavealsobeentakingstepstoimprovepre-
departure rights awareness, grievance mechanisms and communication channels.146
Recruitmentagreementsandcontractualrequirementsshouldguaranteepossessionanduse
ofamobilephonewithaSIMcardinBahrain.Pre-departureorientationprogramscaneducate
domesticworkersandempowerthemtousesuchfacilitiesthatmightalsoincludehotlinesand
humanrightsorganizationsthatareavailabletotheminthedestinationcountry.
Under the Philippines’ active governance of out-migration, it has introduced significant
regulationsfortheprotectionofoverseasFilipinoworkers,particularlydomesticworkers.It
serves as a good case study for origin countries. The Philippines Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) is the government agency responsible for processing workers'
contracts and conducting pre-deployment checks, as well as for licensing, regulating, and
monitoringprivaterecruitmentagencies.In1995,theMigrantWorkersandOverseasFilipinos
Act147waspassedtoprovidealegislativeframeworkforprotectingoverseasFilipinoworkers.
Among other provisions, it promised direct assistance to workers abroad (including legal
assistance), penalties for illegal recruiters, reintegration services and the establishment of
resourcecentresincountriesofdestination.
A specific requirement in thedeploymentofdomesticworkers from thePhilippines is that
recruitment agencies are not to charge them any fees and, since 2006, domestic worker
contractsmust be for aminimum of US$400.148 In reality, agencies in the Philippines can
secretlycharge,eveniftheemployersalsopayanditiscommonfordeductionstobetaken
fromwages.InLebanon,forexample,itiscommonthatthefirsttwoorthreemonth’swages
arenotpaid.149
Attemptsbyorigincountrygovernmentstoregulateandprotectmigrantdomesticworkersin
destinationcountriesareimportant.However,thereisnoempiricalevidencedemonstrating
what difference the establishment of blacklists of employers, recruitment and placement
agencieshasmade,particularlysincenoimpactassessmentshavebeenundertaken.Itremains
the‘luckofthedraw’whethermigrantdomesticworkersareplacedindecenthouseholdsthat
treatthemwell.Itmaybesuggestedthatrenewalofpermitsforemployersofdomesticworkers
be conditional on a visit to the premises and a confidential interview with the previous
domesticworker,whichcouldbeconductedattheairportbeforetheyreturnhome.Thereare
alsopossibilitieswithnewonlineinitiativeswhereemployersandmigrantdomesticworkers
can conduct mutual interviews and hiring on a website with no charge to the domestic
worker.150 Such arrangements, however,will have to be approvedby both destination and
origincountryauthoritieswherethelawrequirestheuseoflicensedrecruitmentagencies.
Thegreatestimpedimenttothemonitoringandprotectionofmigrantdomesticworkersisthat
theworktakesplaceinaprivatehousehold,outofthepurviewoflabourinspectionandother
enforcement and regulatory mechanisms. The isolated work and living environment and
emotionallychargedspaceofthefamilyhomeresultsinmuchoftheabuse,while‘freelance’
domesticworkers have greater independence and report less rights violations.151 Allowing
domesticworkers to liveoutsideof thehouseholdas freelanceworkerswhoorganize their
ownlivingarrangementswouldoffersignificantprospectsforareductioninexploitation,but
it is unlikely tomeetwith cultural acceptance inArab states.Manydomesticworkers also
preferlive-inarrangements,astheysavemoneyonaccommodation,traveltowork,clothing
Section2:Waysforwardtoaddressrecruitmentchallenges
33
andhouseholdexpensessuchasfood.TheILODomesticWorkersConvention,2011(No.189)
urgesMemberStatestoensurethatdomesticworkers:a)are freetoreachagreementwith
theiremployerorpotentialemployeronwhethertoresideinthehousehold;b)whoresidein
thehouseholdarenotobligedtoremaininthehouseholdorwithhouseholdmembersduring
periodsofdailyandweeklyrestorannualleave;andc)areentitledtokeepintheirpossession
theirtravelandidentitydocuments(Article9).l
Another alternative to live-in arrangementsmay bemore encouragement of labour supply
agenciesthatrecruitandhireoutcleaningservicesonanhourlyordailybasis,providedthat
these services are monitored. These could also include workers who have training and
qualificationsinchildcareandcareoftheelderlyanddisabled.Thisofcoursedoesnotcater
forfamiliesthatwantin-houseworkersandrequirethemtobereadilyoncall,eventhough
they should not be on call outsideworking hours. The ILO’s exploratorywork onmigrant
domesticworkerassociationsorcooperativesalsooffersalternativemeansbywhichdomestic
workers themselves can establish organizations that serve both their economic and social
interests.152
10.Crediblecomplaintsmechanisms
Establisheasy,simpleandsafeaccessformigrantworkerstoexpresstheirgrievancesandmake
formalcomplaintsthatarefollowedupwithoutfearofretribution.
Migrantworkershavehadlittleaccesstoeffectivecomplaintsmechanismsinbothinorigin
and destination countries. While telephone hotlines and online complaints facilities on
Ministrywebsiteshavebeenestablished, there is littleevidence thatmore thana fewhave
accessedtheseandnoknowledgeastowhatextenttheyhaveledtocomplaintsremedies.In
Qatar,theNationalHumanRightsCommitteehasestablishedcommunitydesksatitspremises
fordirectpersonal,telephoneandinternetaccessbuttherehasbeennoimpactassessmentto
date and no statistics on the number ofworker complaints that led to further actions and
compensationpaid.Governmentsneedtobemoretransparentwithdataoncomplaintsissues
toallowbetteranalysisandsuggestionsforremedies,andtodemonstratetheeffectivenessof
theirlawenforcement.
InthePhilippines,thePhilippinesOverseasEmploymentAdministration(POEA)hasmandated
that licensed private employment agencies that recruit domesticworkersmustmaintain a
Facebookaccountfortheirbusinesses.Theseaccountsserveasacommunicationplatformfor
domestic workers abroad with the hope of preventing ‘disputes’, official registration of
complaints,andrequiringemploymentagenciestofilereportstothePOEAonthestatusand
conditionoftheirdeployedworkers.153InFebruary2016,theMinistryofOverseasPakistanis
and Human Resource Development (MoOPHRD), developed an online complaint system
allowingmigrantworkersandoverseasPakistanistosubmitlegalcomplaintsincasesduring
recruitment or employment, accompanied by a tracking system that will enable the
complainant to track the status of their complaint.154 Recruitment complaints that are
registeredcouldalsobelinkedtoemployersorplacementagenciesatdestinationtokeepthem
informedofpossiblefraudulentactivitieswiththeircounterparts.
lThereisprovisionintheILODomesticWorkersConvention(189)(Article17)for“effectiveandaccessiblecomplaint
mechanisms…labourinspections…[where]conditionsunderwhichaccesstohouseholdpremisesmaybegranted,
havingduerespectforprivacy.…[and]…enforcementandpenaltieswithdueregardforthespecialcharacteristicsof
domesticwork”
34
Again,thekeytoanycomplaintsprovisionistheempowermentofmigrantworkerstomake
complaints-toprovidethemwiththeconfidencethattheycanmakeacomplaintwithoutfear
ofretribution.Thatlevelofempowermentshouldbedevelopedpriortodeparturewithclear
instructionson thekindsof problems theymay facewith their employers aswell as other
employees,supervisorsandmanagementalike.
11.Pre-departuremedicalscreeningandregularhealthassessmentsin
Arabstates
Countriesoforiginanddestinationshouldensureproperandmorecomprehensivepre-departure
medicalassessmentsandincludehealtheducationinpre-departureandpost-arrivalorientation
programs.
As amandatory requirement in labour recruitment, allmigrantworkers require amedical
screeningtestbeforetheycanbedeployed.Theyarealsoscreenedagainasapreconditionfor
theresidencypermitincountryofdestination.Examinationscanrequirelaboratorytestsfor
HIVandAIDS,HepatitisBandC,malaria,tuberculosis,druguseandpregnancy.Destination
countriesdogenerallynotacceptresultsfromtestsdoneinorigincountriesbecausethereare
stillpossibilitiesforcontagionandpregnancybetweenpre-departureresultsandarrival.Ithas
been suggested that, “because these mandatory procedures involve interactions with
governmententitiesand thepaymentof fees fordiscretionarydecisions, they representan
elevated risk of corrupt or improper payments.”155 Both origin and destination country
governmentsshouldtakemorecognizanceofinternationallawregardingthediscriminatory
natureofpracticessuchaspregnancytestsandothermedicalscreening,particularlyHIV.For
example, provisions in the ILO’s HIV and AIDS Recommendation, 2010 (No. 200) prohibit
mandatory HIV testing of migrant workers and their exclusion from migration “by the
countries of origin, of transit or of destination on the basis of their real or perceived HIV
status.”156
Summaryofrecommendations
35
SummaryofRecommendations
Issue Recommendations1 Employer-only
paymentsto
recruitment
agencies
Withinterregionalcoordination:
• Changethecultureofworkerpaymentsforrecruitment,instituting
employer-onlypaymentsforrecruitmentwithwide-rangingeducation
andawareness-raisingprograms.
• Labourorigincountrygovernmentsshouldrepeallegislationthat
currentlyallowsrecruitmentagentstochargeworkers.
• Destinationcountrygovernmentsshouldsetrecruitmentfeesandcosts
andmandatethatnovisaswillbeissuedtoworkerswhoarerequired
topayanythingfortheirrecruitment.Theonusonestablishinga
prohibitionofworkerpaymentsdoesnotjustapplytotheorigin
countries,butalso(perhapsmoreimportantly)todestinationcountries.
• Comprehensiveinstitutionalizationofrecruitmentcosttransparency.
• Identifyandpreventcompanypersonnelandplacementagentsfrom
takingorreceivingkickbackpayments.
• Introduceasignificantexpansionofsystematicempiricalresearchto
generatemoreprecisedataonthedifferencesbetween“fees”,“costs”
and“charges”inthevariouscorridorsoflabourmigrationfromAsian
origincountriestoArabStates.
• Conductexploratoryresearchintotheimpactonrecruitmentindustry
stakeholdersofworkersnolongerpayingfees,costsandothercharges.
2 Projecttendering
procurement
procedures
• Projecttendersshouldincludeaseparatedetailedandtransparent
‘LabourRecruitmentCostAnalysis’withinbiddingproposalsthatdetail
variableandfixedcostsofrecruitment,includinglabourcostsof
subcontractors.
• Lowestbidsshouldbemorecarefullyscrutinizedtoascertainwhether
costreductionsareattheexpenseofmigrantworkersbeingrecruited.
3 Fair,ethicaland
compliant
recruitment
• Multilateralcooperationtoestablishconsistentlawsbetweenorigin
anddestinationcountriesinaharmonizationoffairrecruitment
regulationandenforcement.
• Regionalcoordinationisrequiredbetweenoriginanddestination
countrygovernmentstoestablishlicensingandaccreditationoffairand
ethicalrecruitmentagenciesinorigincountriesasexclusivelabour
supplierstoArabcountries.Thisshouldalsoapplytoplacement
agenciesandmanpoweroutsourcingagenciesindestinationcountries.
• Avoidtheuseofunregulatedandunlicensedsub-agents.
• Employersmustensuretheyaredealingonlywithfair,ethicaland
compliantrecruitmentagenciesthatdonotchargeworkersand
monitortheiractivities.
4 Standardized
contracts,contract
• EstablishstandardizedcontractsforallArabcountrieswithmeasures
againstcontractsubstitution.
36
substitutionand
minimumwages
• Establishminimumoccupationalwagelevels,standardizedacrossArab
States.
5 E- Recruitment:
Centrallabour
clearinghouse
• EstablishcentralclearinghousesinArabcountriesforimplementation
andcontroloffairandethicalrecruitment.
• Encourageonlinerecruitmenttominimizethenumberof
intermediariesinvolved.
6 Government-to-
Government
• Destinationcountrygovernmentsshoulddiversifyarrangements
throughtheincreaseduseoforigincountrygovernmentrecruitment
agencieswheretheyexist.
7 Jointandseveral
liabilityschemes
• Establishjointandseveralliabilityschemesinbothcountryoforiginand
destinationforrecruitmentandplacementagenciesaswellas
contractorandsubcontractoremployers.
• Ensureleadcontractorsareliableforrecruitmentabusesintheirsupply
chains,includingmanpoweroutsourceagencies.
• Establishstringentandsubstantialfinancialandreputationalpenalties
fornon-compliancewithfairandethicalrecruitmentpractices.
8 Malpractices
throughfreevisas,
visatradingand
manpower
outsourceagencies
• GreatersurveillanceontheissuingofvisasbyArabstatestominimize
leakagetotheblackmarketof‘freevisas’andotherformsofvisa
trading.
• Greateroversightandauditingofmanpoweroutsourceagencies/firms
toensurefair,ethicalandcompliantrecruitment.
9 Migrantdomestic
workers
• Bringmigrantdomesticworkersundertheprotectionofthelabourlaw
intheArabStates.
• Explorenewfairandethicalonlinerecruitmentinitiatives.
10 Crediblecomplaints
mechanisms
• Establishaccessibleproceduresandimprovesupportservicesfor
migrantworkerstoexpresstheirgrievancesandmakeformal
complaintsthatarefollowedupwithoutfearofretribution.
11 Pre-departure
medicalscreening
andregularhealth
assessments
• Countriesoforiginanddestinationshouldensureproperandmore
comprehensivemedicalassessmentsandincludehealtheducationin
pre-departureandpost-arrivalorientationprograms.
• Countriesoforiginanddestinationshouldoperatehealthassessments
inlinewithILORecommendationNo.200.
12 ILOConventions • Countriesoforiginanddestinationshouldconsiderratificationof
relevantILOConventions,namelyalltheILOfundamentalConventions,
the2014ProtocoltotheForcedLabourConvention,Private
EmploymentAgenciesConvention(No.181),DomesticWorkers
Convention(No.189),MigrationforEmploymentConvention(No.97)
andMigrantWorkers(SupplementaryProvisions)Convention(No.143).
Waysforwardinrecruitmentof“lowskilled”migrantworkersintheAsiaArabStatecorridor
37
CONCLUSION
ThehistoryofAsian-Arabstateslabourrecruitmenthasoftenbeencharacterizedasa“blame
game”, where the destination country blames agents in the origin country for charging
workers; and vice versa; orwhereboth agents andgovernments in origin countriesblame
employersforbeingunwillingtopayrecruitmentcosts.Intherealityofamaturemarket,it
seemsclearthatthereiscollusionbetweenintermediariesinorigincountriesandemployers
andagenciesindestinationcountries.Knowingthatworkersareindebtfortherecruitment
charges, employers can be certain of their compliance until their debts have been paid, a
condition that is an indicator of forced labour. In an age of globalization andmultilateral
relations,hidingbehindargumentsthatthesovereigntyofnationstatescannotbeinterfered
withdoesnotseemconvincing.Turningablindeyetothefraudulentcircumstancesbywhich
workersarerecruitedshouldnolongerbeconsideredacceptable.
Further,asapartof this 'blamegame', it isoftensuggestedbyArabnationals that thereal
perpetratorsaretheforeignnationalswhomanagetheemployingcompanies.Afterall,they
areinapositiontoexploittheirownnationals.Thismaywellbetrue,butintheGCC,foreign
companiesarerequiredtobeatleast51%ownedbyaGCCnational.Theroleofthecontrolling
owner, or partner, is often considered to be a passive one that merely allows the foreign
company to operate legitimately, in what has been referred to as a rental (or rentier)
arrangement.157 But just as any landlord, it would seem incumbent upon the controlling
partnertotakeresponsibilityfortheactionsofthetenantcompany;namely,toensurethatthe
othershareholders,managementandpersonnelarenotbreakingthelaworviolatinghuman
andlabourrightsontheirbehalf,orintheirname,forultimatelyitisalsothereputationand
conscienceofArabnationalsandtheirnationsthatisatstake.
To assist reform-minded country of origin governments in resisting the lobbying power of
privaterecruitmentagencies,itisincumbentuponArabstatestoinsistthatastrictcondition
ofentryisthatmigrantworkershavenotpaidtherecruitmentagencyortheemployerforthe
position.Apart fromreputationaland fairandethicalgrounds, it is in the interestsofArab
countries toadopt thispositionbecauseof thecurrent inefficiencies.Forexample,asmuch
recruitmentisbasedupontheselectionoflow-skilledmigrantworkersonthebasisoftheir
willingnessandabilitytopaylargesumsofmoneythatcanbeusedaskickbackpaymentsto
employingcompanypersonnelandothers,thereisahighriskthattheyarelessthanproperly
qualifiedandwillnotbeasproductive.Thisincludesworkersinconstruction,agricultureas
wellasdomesticworkers.Becausemigrantworkerspaysomuch,mostrecruitmentagencies
aremotivatedtodeployhighvolume,ratherthanhighqualitylabour.Typically,thenumberof
workersonconstructionsitesintheArabStatesareabnormallyhigh,inordertocompensate
forlowproductivity.158
Itmaybeanticipatedthatpreventingworkerpaymentsmaymeanthattheprofileofcurrent
recruitswillchange,withemployersseekinghigherskilledworkersandreducingthesizeof
their labour force. Thismaymean reduced job opportunities for low-skilled, low educated
workersfromthepoorerregionsofdevelopingAsiancountries.Itmaybesuggestedthatpast
and current practices of sourcingworkers fromAsia for the construction industry in Arab
countries has been seriously inefficient and costly, at least partly because of the unethical
motivations for current and past decisions on migrant labour recruitment.159 There is a
momentum for reform and as they take place there will no doubt be unforeseen and
unintended consequences. There are always risks of fraudulent behaviour and threats to
38
vulnerable migrant workers, so it is important to develop concerted multilateral and
multidisciplinarymodelsthatcanprotectthem.160
Inthisregard,recentinitiativesbythePhilippinesoncertificationthroughnationaloccupation
skills standards as well as pre-employment, pre-departure and post-arrival orientation
modulespromisemoresystematic,comprehensiveinformationprogramsthatwillincreasethe
awarenessofmigrantworkeraccesstofairandethicalrecruitmentanddeployment.161Further
initiativesbytheUAEinestablishingvisaservicescentresincountriesoforiginadvancesfair
andethicalrecruitmenttoArabstates.WithfourcentrescompletedinSriLanka,Indonesia,
Kenya and Bangladesh, plans are underway for further such service provision centres
elsewhere.
Ithasbeenclearlyshownthatlawsinthedestinationcountrythatbanworkerpaymentsfor
recruitmentcostssimplydoesnotstopitfromhappeninginreality.Inthispaper,andinmany
reportsoverthelastfewyears,ithasbeensuggestedthatreformshouldoperateonanumber
oflevelsandarenastowardsfairandethicalrecruitmentpractices.Giventheirrelativewealth
andhumanitarianactivitiesinmanypartsoftheworld,itwouldbeconsistentforArabStates
totakethemoralandpracticalhighgroundwithanactiveinsistencethatintheinterestsof
dignity,adherencetotheruleoflaw,equityandjustice,low-skilledmigrantworkersentering
theArabStatesworkforcemustdo sowithoutpaying anything for their recruitment.They
shouldenterdebt-free,justasthemorehighlyskilledsectorsoftheexpatriateworkforcedo.
39
ANNEXI:Fees,costsandcharges
Therearebothfixedandvariablecostsinrecruitment,someofwhicharenegotiable,suchas
agencycommissions.
Table1.Examplecostsforlow-skilledworkerrecruitmentperperson:Nepal-Qatar
Nepal US$ Qatar US$
Variablecosts Variablecosts
Internaltravel,good,
accommodation
50-100 Airfare(oneway) 300-350
Sub-agent
Commission
75-100 Agencycommission 250-450
Total(average) 163 Total(average) 670
FixedCosts FixedCosts
Medicaltest 25 Workvisa 82
Orientation 10 Visaattestations 150
Welfarefund 10 Residencypermit 320
Lifeinsurance 20 Medicaltest 30
Airporttax 5 Healthinsurance
card
30
Advertising 10
Sub-Total 80 Sub-total 612
Combinedtotal 243 Combinedtotal 1,282
OverallTotal:US$1525
Source:placement/recruitmentagencyandemployerinQatar
Table 1 is based on information obtained from interviews with placement agencies and
employersinQatar.ItshowsanapproximationofactualcostsofrecruitmentbetweenNepal
andQatar.Airfarescanvaryinaccordancewithdistancefromdestinationandseason.Thetotal
estimatedrecruitmentcostisaroundUS$1,512fromrecruitmenttoactualemployment(not
justarrivalatdestination).Thisincludesthecoststheemployermustpaybytheendofthe
probation period (3months) for residency permit and ID,medical test, fingerprinting and
healthcard(insurance).Sub-agentandagencyfees(orcommission)inTable1areconservative
estimatesandcanbe farmorewidelyvariable than indicated,dependingon thecountryof
destination, the occupational category andwage level - whatever themarket will bear, or
whatever the migrant worker is willing to pay.162 Internal costs such as transport,
accommodationandfoodareincurredbyworkersfromouterregionsgoingtothecapitalcity
officeoftheagencyforinterviewsandpaperwork.Thesecostsaresometimespaidforbythe
candidate,sometimesbytherecruitmentagencyorsharedbetweenthem.Insomecases,the
employer may reimburse these costs if receipts are obtained. A recent IOM study found
NepaleseworkerswerepayingagentsbetweenUS$800-2,200.163This indicates thatnot all
costsarebeingpaidorreimbursedbychargestomigrantworkersandkickbackpaymentsare
notalwaysbeingmade.
A study by Verité International reported kickback payments for workers from Nepal and
MyanmarofbetweenUS$300-500perworker toemployersor theiragents.Employersand
theiragentsalsopaidbetweenUS$115-600perworkerinkickbackpaymentsto“arangeof
40
governmentofficialsinbothoriginanddestinationcountriestofraudulentlyapproveahostof
applicationsorfacilitatediscretionarydecisionsincluding,butnotlimitedto,foreignworker
quotas,demandsetattestations,visas,medicalcertificates,andworkpermits.”164
Itisimportanttonotethat“fixedcosts”inrealitycanbevariable,notonlyaccordingtocountry
oforigin,butalsoaccordingtorecruitmentagentquotationsincountriesoforigin.Forexample,
anotheragencyfromNepalquotedUS$45formedicalexpenses,US$35forlifeinsuranceand
US$15foradvertising.Inotherwords,recruitmentagenciescanmanipulatetheirquotations
(addingextraprofitmargins)forwhataresupposedtobefixedcostsintheirtendersforlabour
supplycontracts.Employerswhodonotrequireofficialreceiptsforthesecharges,ordonot
shoparoundforthelowestcosts,maybechargedmorethanactualcosts.Whereemployersare
notpaying,orbeingreimbursedbytheworkersalongwithkickbackpayments,thesemarginal
differenceswillbeoflittleornoconcern.
Bycomparison,Table2showsapproximationsofrecruitmentcostsfromBangladeshtoQatar.
Differencesincludehigherchargesforalmostallcategories.Significantlyhigherchargesarefor
themedicaltest,orientationseminarandadvertisingandtheadditionofcostsforgovernment
training,emigrationstamping,skillstestandadministration,whichwerenotincludedinthe
costsquotedforNepal.
Table 2. Example costs for low-skilled worker recruitment per person: Bangladesh-
Qatar
Bangladesh US$ Qatar US$
Variablecosts Variablecosts
InternalTravel,Food,
Accommodation
50-100 Airfare(oneway) 360-450
Sub-agent
Commission
75-100 Agencycommission 250-450
Total(average) 163 Total(average) 755
FixedCosts FixedCosts
Medicaltest 70 Workvisa 82
Orientation 25 Visaattestations 150
Welfarefund 10 Residencypermit 320
Lifeinsurance 13 Medicaltest 30
Administration 25 Healthinsurancecard 30
Governmenttraining 85
SkillsTest 35
Emigrationstamping 36
Advertising 108
Sub-Total 377 Sub-total 612
Combinedtotal 540 CombinedTotal 1,367
OverallTotal:US$1907
Source:placement/recruitmentagencyandemployerinQatar
AKNOMADstudycitesBangladeshiworkersgoingtoKuwaitpayingUS$3,136andUS$3,650,
anduptoUS$1,000perworkerinkickbackpayments,arguingthatthelackoftransparency
causesthesediscrepancies.165
Annex1:Fees,costsandcharges
41
Thus,intheabovescenario,thedifferencebetweenthecostsofUS$1,907(Table2)andcharges
ofUS$3,136beingpaidbyBangladeshiworkersisUS$1,229.Thisdifferencemaybeaccounted
for, or seen as an indicator, by the presence of kickback payments to employers and their
agentsindestinationcountries,toofficialsinorigincountries,andtotherecruitmentagency
(i.e.,extraprofit).
42
References
1RayJureidiniisaprofessorinmigration,ethicsandhumanrightsattheCenterforIslamicLegislationandEthics(CILE)in
theQatarFacultyofIslamicStudies,HamadBinKhalifaUniversity,Doha.2 ILO:ReportoftheILODirectorGeneraltotheInternationalLabourConference,Fairmigration:SettinganILOagenda(Geneva,InternationalLabourOffice,2014),paras.121-125
3Abella,Manolo,Martin,Philip&Yi,Soonhwa(2016draft)WhyareMigrationCostsHighforLow-SkilledWorkers?Evidence
fromMigrantSurveys.WorldBankKNOMADProgram.4Ibid.5IOM(2016)ResearchontheLabourRecruitmentIndustrybetweenUnitedArabEmirates,Kerala(India)andNepal,Interim
ReportfortheAbuDhabiDialogueSeniorOfficialsMeetinginDubai,11-12May2016,InternationalOrganizationfor
Migration.6ILO(2015)IssuePaper:FairRecruitmentforInternationalLabourMigrationBetweenAsiaandtheGulfCooperationCouncil
Countries,ILORegionalOfficeforAsiaandthePacific;ILORegionalOfficeforArabStates:4;EndoEsaku&Afram,Gabi
(2011),TheQatar-NepalRemittanceCorridor:EnhancingtheImpactandIntegrityofRemittanceFlowsbyReducing
InefficienciesintheMigrationProcess,WorldBank,Washington.7Esaku&Afram,aboven6.8Rajan,S.Irudaya,Varghese,V.J.&Jayakumar,M.S.(2011)DreamingMobilityandBuyingVulnerability:Overseas
RecruitmentPracticesinIndia,Routledge,NewDelhi.9Esaku&Afram,aboven6.10Toaddressthis,thegovernmentProbashiKallyanBank(Bangladesh)wasestablishedtoprovidecheaperloansfor
workerstopayrecruitmentfeesandpresumablytohandleremittances–from9%interest(November2014).Otherbanks
arealsoprovidingloansbutathigherinterestrates(14-15percent).11Farenblum,Bassina(forthcoming)GovernanceofMigrantWorkerRecruitment:ARights-BasedFrameworkforCountriesof
Origin.AsianJournalofInternationalLaw.Onprofitsfromforcedlabour,seealso,ILO(2014)ProfitsandPoverty:The
EconomicsofForcedLabour,Geneva,ILO12ILO(2011)LabourmigrationinSouthAsia:Areviewofissues,policiesandpractices,InternationalMigrationPaper108;ILO
(2015)ReportoftheDirectorGeneral,FairMigration:SettinganILOAgenda.13Article33:“Thepersonwhoislicensedtorecruitworkersfromabroadforothersshallbeprohibited…Toreceivefrom
theworkeranysumsrepresentingrecruitmentfeesorexpensesoranyothercosts.”QatarLabourLaw,2004.14Article40:“Anemployershallincurthefeespertainingtorecruitmentofnon-Saudiworkers,thefeesoftheresidence
permit(Iqama)andworkpermittogetherwiththeirrenewalandthefinesresultingfromtheirdelay,aswellasthefees
pertainingtochangeofprofession,exitandre-entryvisasandreturnticketstotheworker’shomecountryattheendof
therelationbetweenthetwoparties.”SaudiLabourLaw,2005.15Article18:“Itisnotpermissibleforanylicensedlabouragentorsuppliertodemandoracceptfromanyworkerwhether
beforeorafterhisrecruitment,anycommissionormaterialrewardinconsiderationforarrangingsuchrecruitment,nor
mayheobtainfromhimanyexpensesexceptasmaybedecidedorapprovedbytheMinistryofLabourandSocialAffairs.”
(author’semphasis)UAELabourLaw,No.8,1980.Norcananyvisafeebedeductedfromaworker’ssalary(Article60).16SaudiArabia’slabourlawonlystipulatesthatemployersshallpayrecruitmentfees,whileQatarandUAElabourlawsstate
specificallythatemployeesshouldnotpay.However,Sectiona,Article6oftheUAEMinisterialResolution52(1989)also
requires“Anundertakingfromtheemployertotheeffectthatheshallsponsorandberesponsiblefortherecruited
Labourer,thebearingofhisrecruitmentexpensesandhisemploymentinaccordancewiththeemploymentcontractina
waynotprejudicingtheprovisionoftheFederalLawNo(8)/1980referredtoherein.”LabourlawsinOman,Kuwaitand
Bahraindonotmentionrecruitmentfeesandwhoshouldpaythem.17InternationalLabourOrganization,PrivateEmploymentAgenciesConventionC181,1997/2000Article7.1.“Private
employmentagenciesshallnotchargedirectlyorindirectly,inwholeorinpart,anyfeesorcoststoworkers.”Part2of
Article7providesanexceptionclausethatisoftenusedtojustifyworkerpayments,butitshouldonlybewhenitis
deemedtobeintheinterestofworkersconcernedandafterconsultationwiththemostrepresentativeorganizationsof
employersandworkers.In2014theILOurgedmemberstatestotakepreventativemeasuressuchas:“promotionof
coordinatedeffortsbyrelevantgovernmentagencieswiththoseofotherStatestofacilitateregularandsafemigrationand
topreventtraffickinginpersons,includingcoordinatedeffortstoregulate,licenseandmonitorlabourrecruitersand
employmentagenciesandeliminatethechargingofrecruitmentfeestoworkerstopreventdebtbondageandotherforms
ofeconomiccoercion.”ILORecommendationNo.23onSupplementaryMeasuresfortheEffectiveSuppressionofForced
Labour,2014(Article4i;seealsoArticle8).18Martin,Philip(2016)BackgroundPaperonRecruitment,AbuDhabiDialogue,SeniorOfficialsMeeting,Dubai,11-12May19Abella,Manolo(2004)“Theroleofrecruitersininternationalmigration”inD.S.MasseyandJ.E.Taylor,(eds)International
Migration:ProspectsandPoliciesinaGlobalMarket.OxfordUniversityPress,London:201–211.20Jureidini,Ray(2014)MigrantLabourRecruitmenttoQatar,Bloomsbury/QatarFoundation,Doha,Qatar.21Ibid.22ILO(2015)IssuePaper:FairRecruitmentforInternationalLabourMigrationBetweenAsiaandtheGulfCooperationCouncil
Countries,ILORegionalOfficeforAsiaandthePacific;ILORegionalOfficeforArabStates.23Receiptsthataregivenwillonlybeforthelegalamounttheycancharge,notforwhatisactuallypaid.
Annex1:Fees,costsandcharges
43
24VeritéInternational(2016)AnExploratoryStudyontheRoleofCorruptioninInternationalMigration:2.
http://www.Verite-Report-Intl-Labour-Recruitment_0.pdf25Randeree,K.(2012).WorkforcenationalizationintheGulfCooperationCouncilStates,CentreforInternationalandRegional
Studies,Doha,GeorgetownUniversity.26Abella,Martin,&Yi,aboven3.27Apple’sSupplierResponsibility2009ProgressReportshowedthatthe“overcharge”ofrecruitmentfeespaidbyworkersat
sixofitssuppliersamountedtoUS$852,000.AppleendedupreimbursingUS$2.2milliontomigrantworkersto
compensatefortheovercharges,updateditsSupplierCodeofConductandissuedastandardforPreventionofInvoluntary
Labour.SeeUnitedNationsGlobalImpact(n.d.)HumanRightsandBusinessDilemmasForum,CaseStudieshttp://human-
rights.unglobalcompact.org/dilemmas/migrant-workers/28BSR(2008)InternationalLabourMigration:AResponsibleRoleforBusiness,October2008.
http://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR_LabourMigrationRoleforBusiness.pdf29Jureidini,aboven20.30AmnestyInternational(2016)TheUglySideoftheBeautifulGame:exploitationofmigrantworkersonaQatar2022World
CupVenue.AmnestyInternational,31March2016.31Shah,Nasra(2009).TheManagementofIrregularMigrationanditsConsequenceforDevelopment:GulfCooperationCouncil.
ILOAsianRegionalProgrammeonGovernanceofLabourMigrationWorkingPaperNo.1932Shah,Nasra&Al-Kazi,Lubna(2015)IrregularMigrationtoandwithinKuwait:EnablingandSustainingFactors,Gulf
ResearchMeeting,24-27August2015,CambridgeUniversity.33Shah,aboven31.ILOAsianRegionalProgrammeonGovernanceofLabourMigrationWorkingPaperNo.19;Kapiszewski,
Andrzej.(2001).Nationalsandexpatriates:PopulationandLabourDilemmasoftheGulfCooperationCouncilStates.Garnet
PublishingLimited,ReadingUK.34ILOGlobalEstimateofMigrantWorkers,December2015:18,Table2.9.35ILODomesticWorkerConvention,2011(No.189).Althoughtheconventionrecognisesthat,globally,thisisafemale-
dominatedoccupation,theconventiondoesprovideaframeworkofprotectionforbothmenandwomenindomestic
work,andspecificallyaddressesthechallengesfacedbymigrants.36SomeexamplesarethePhilippinesin2006,2008,2011,2014;Nepalin1998,2008,2010,2012;Bangladeshin1981;Sri
Lankain2013;Indonesiain2011,2014;andEthiopiain2013.37Nepalisalsolikelytoimposeasimilarrestrictiononwomen,bynotallowingwomenwithchildrenbelowtheageoftwo
yearstoleaveforwork.Also,startingfrom2017,Indonesiawillnotallowmigrationoflive-indomesticworkers.38Nepal,under30yearsofagein2012;SriLanka.21yearsincreasedto25yearsin2013;Bangladesh,35yearsin1997,
reducedto25yearsin2003.39Therecentlyamendedandendorsed“GuidelinesRegardingSendingDomesticWorkersonForeignEmployment,SriLanka,
2015”prohibitswomenwithchild(ren)belowtheageoftwofrommigratingforforeignemployment.40UNConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen(CEDAW)1979,General
Recommendation26;ILODiscrimination(EmploymentandOccupation)Convention,1958(No.111).41QatardidthesamewiththePhilippinesin2012,butnoagreementhassincebeensigned.SeeJones,Katherine(2015)
RecruitmentMonitoring&MigrantWelfareAssistance,InternationalOrganizationforMigration,Dhaka,DhakaHouse:40.42ILO(2015)NoEasyExit:MigrationBansAffectingWomenfromNepal,InternationalLabourOrganization,Geneva.
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_428686.pdf43ForasummaryofrestrictionsandoutcomesinColomboProcesscountries,see:InternationalOrganizationforMigration
(2015)RecruitmentMonitoring&MigrantWelfareAssistance:whatworks?p58.
https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/migrated_files/What-We-Do/docs/Recruitment-Monitoring-Book.pdf44Farenblum,aboven11.Jureidini,Ray(2015)“TheUseandAbuseofDomesticWorkers:casestudiesinLebanonand
Egypt”,inWenonaGiles,MaryRomeroandValeriePreston(eds)WhenCareWorkGoesGlobal:LocatingtheSocial
RelationsofDomesticWork,Ashgate.45Gordon,Jennifer(2015)GlobalLabourRecruitmentinaSupplyChainContext,ILO,Geneva,2015:746ILO(2014)RealizingaFairMigrationAgenda:LabourflowsbetweenAsiaandtheArabStates,Experts’Meeting.Background
paper.47ConventionNo.181,Art.7(1).48ThefollowingILOconventionsarespecificallyrelevanttorecruitmentissues:MigrationforEmploymentConvention,1949
(No.97)anditsrelatedRecommendationNo.86;MigrantWorkers(SupplementaryProvisions)Convention,1975(No.
143)andRecommendationNo.151;PrivateEmploymentAgenciesConvention,1997(No.181)andtherelated
RecommendationNo.188;DomesticWorkersConvention,2011(No.189)andtherelatedRecommendationNo.201;
ProtocolP029andRecommendationNo.203SupplementingILOConventiononForcedLabourNo.29;ILOMultilateral
FrameworkonLabourMigration;Non-bindingprinciplesandguidelinesforarights-basedapproachtolabourmigration
(2006).49ILO,aboven46.OfcoursethereareIslamicprinciplesthatrecognizetherightsofbothemployerandemployee.Islamic
ethicsandjurisprudenceisagainstforcedlabourandtheexploitationoflabouranddictatethatemployersmusthonour
contractualagreementsandpayemployeestheagreeduponwage,andwithoutdelay-seeMattar,Mohammed(2010)
CombattingTraffickinginPersonsinAccordancewiththePrinciplesofIslamicLaw,NewYork,UnitedNationsOfficeon
DrugsandCrime:23.50UnitedNationsGuidingPrinciplesonBusinessandHumanRights:Implementingthe“Protect,RespectandRemedy”
Framework,2011:151ILO,aboven6
44
52Abella,Martin,&Yi,aboven353SeeAbella,Martin,&Yi,aboven3;butalso,thereisnodefinitionofrecruitmentfeesininternationallyrecognizedlabour
andhumanrightsstandards.Althoughitistooall-encompassingforpracticalusageandanalysis,theUSSeniorPolicy
OperatingGrouptoCombatTraffickinginPersonsdraftdefinitionofrecruitmentfeesstates:“Recruitmentfeesinclude
butarenotlimitedtothefollowingfees,charges,orcosts:a)forsoliciting,identifying,considering,interviewing,referring,
retaining,transferring,selecting,orplacingpotentialemployees;b)forcoveringthecost,inwholeorinpart,of
advertising;c)forcertifyinglabourapplications;d)forprocessingpetitions;e)forvisasandanyfeethatfacilitatesan
employeeobtainingavisasuchasappointmentandapplicationfees;f)forgovernment-mandatedcostssuchasborder
crossingfees;g)forprocuringphotographsandidentitydocumentation,includinganynongovernmentalpassportfees;h)
feeschargedasaconditionofaccesstothejobopportunity,includingprocuringmedicalexaminationsandimmunizations
andobtainingbackground,referenceandsecurityclearancechecksandexaminations;andi)foranemployer’srecruiters,
agentsorattorneys,orothernotaryorlegalfees.2.Anyfee,charge,orcostmaybearecruitmentfeeregardlessofwhether
itisdeductedfromwages,paidbackinwageorbenefitconcessions,paidbackasakickback,bribeortribute,remittedin
connectionwithrecruitment,orcollectedbyanemployerorathirdparty,includingbutnotlimitedtoagents,recruiters,
staffingfirms(includingprivateemploymentandplacementfirms),subsidiaries/affiliatesoftheemployerandanyagent
oremployeeofsuchentities”.54Jureidini,aboven20.55Jones,Katherine(2015)RecruitmentMonitoring&MigrantWelfareAssistance,IOM,Dhaka,DhakaHouse:87.56ArrivingGuestWorkers,(n.d)UnitedArabEmiratesMinistryofHumanResourcesandEmiratisation.57SeeUAEMinisterialDecree765of2015,RulesandconditionsfortheTerminationofEmploymentRelations.58Thereisaneedtopreventrecruitmentabusesincountriesoforiginatthevillagelevelwhereinformalintermediariesare
oftenpartoftheintimatenetworkofprospectivemigrantworkers.See,forexample,theILOWorkinFreedomProgram
door-to-doorawarenessraisingprograminNepal.http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/multimedia/video/institutional-videos/WCMS_217690/lang--en/index.htm59Receiptswillalsoassistforworkerre-imbursementschemes.60Martin,Philip(2016)BackgroundPaperonRecruitment,AbuDhabiDialogue,SeniorOfficialsMeeting,Dubai,11-12May61Martin,Phillip(2013)HowtoReduceMigrantWorkerRecruitmentCosts,DanishInstituteforInternationalStudies,Policy
Brief,August,2013.62SeeWorkerpaymentstorecruitmentagenciesinSection1above.63SeeJureidini,Ray(forthcoming)“IslamicEthicsandMigrantLabourinQatar”inToseefAzidandNecmettinKızılkaya(eds)
IslamicEconomyandLabour/İslamİktisadıveEmek,London,Gower.64Martin,aboven60.65Curiously,in2012,Nepalbannedlicensedrecruitmentagenciesfromestablishingofficesinouterregionalareas,forcinga
greaterrelianceonsub-agents.However,Nepalallowssub-agentstoregistersothattheycanoperateinaformalmanner.
Thereisalsoanationalassociationofsub-agents,althoughveryfewsub-agentsareregistered.Nepaliscurrently
reviewingits2007ForeignEmploymentAct.Oneproposalallowsrecruitmentagenciestoestablishdistrictleveloffices,
andprohibitssub-agents,butitisnotclearwhetherthiswillbeadopted.66Jones,Katherine(2015)RecruitmentMonitoring&MigrantWelfareAssistance,InternationalOrganizationforMigration,
Dhaka,DhakaHouse:40.67ILOMigrationforEmploymentConventionNo.97callsforMemberStatestoadoptbilateralagreementswhenthereis
sufficientlylargemovementsofmigrantworkers.TheConventionassumesthattheagreementsshouldconformwith
internationallabourstandards(SeeArticle10).68Gordon,aboven45.69ILO,aboven2270Jones,aboven66:110.71SeealsoAbella,Martin,&Yi,aboven3.72IOM(2016)ResearchontheLabourRecruitmentIndustrybetweenUnitedArabEmirates,Kerala(India)andNepal,Interim
ReportforAbuDhabiDialogueSeniorOfficialsMeetingDubai,UAE,11-12May2016.73FSIWorldwideisafair/ethicalrecruiterthatdoesnotchargefeesorcoststoworkersandwithabusinessmodelthatowns
thewholerecruitmentchainfromthevillagelevelinthecountryoforigintotheplacementoftheworkerinthecountryof
destination.74FSI(2015)AddressingTraffickinginPersonsIssues,WhitepaperSubmissionRe:LogcapV,20thNovember2015:8.75Blockchainisadatabaseforstakeholderdistributionthatmaintainsacontinuouslygrowinglistofauthenticated
transactionrecordsencryptedagainsttampering,revisionandmisrepresentation.76Steiner,Jutta&Baker,Jessi(2016)Blockchain:thesolutionfortransparencyinproductsupplychains,ProjectProvenance
Ltd.77SIA(2016)Japan-RecruitTechnologiesandAscribeAnnouncePartnershiptoTestBlockchainTechnologyfortheHR
Industry,StaffingIndustryAnalysts,DailyNews.27April,2016.http://www2.staffingindustry.com/row/Editorial/Daily-
News/Japan-Recruit-Technologies-and-Ascribe-announce-partnership-to-test-blockchain-technology-for-the-HR-
industry-3772878SeeILOFairRecruitmentInitiative:http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/fair-recruitment/lang--en/index.htm79SamMcCahonofMcCahonLawOffices,Washington,-personalcommunication.80In2006,thePhilippinesAssociationforProfessionalisminOverseasEmployment(ASPROE)wasformedwiththe
requirementformembershipbeingthattheycouldnotchargeplacementfees,butithasveryfewmembers.81Gordon,2015:7-8.
Annex1:Fees,costsandcharges
45
82BeateAndrees,AlixNasri&PeterSwiniarski,RegulatingLabourRecruitmenttoPreventHumanTraffickingandtoFoster
FairMigration:Models,ChallengesandOpportunities,ILO,2015:66.83Forexample,anagentmaybedisqualifiedwheretheauthoritiesreasonablysuspectthatthepersonhasbeeninvolvedin
humansmuggling,trafficking,acrimeinvolvingtortureorslavery,oracrimethatisofseriousinternationalconcern,
whetherornottheyhavebeenconvictedofsuchanoffence.Backgroundcheckscanbeobtainedfrombusinessassociates,
formerclients,etc.84Andrees,Nasri&Swiniarski,aboven82.84ILO,aboven46.85Thisofcourseassumesamorerobustsystemofregistration,licensingandregulation,baseduponILOfairrecruitment
guidelinesthatshouldbeinplacefirstbeforeanysupplementaryaccreditationsystem.86Thefollowingsourcesweredrawnuponforthisboxedsection:OmAsthaRai(2015)“Zerocostmigration,really?”Nepal
Times,8April2015.http://www.nepalitimes.com/blogs/thebrief/2015/04/08/zero-cost-migration-really/;Sijapata,
Bandita,Bhattarai,AshimandPathak,Dinesh(2015)AnalysisofLabourMarketandMigrationTrendsinNepal,September
2015.GLZ,GmbH&InternationalLaborOrganization.
http://ceslam.org/mediastorage/files/Labor%20n%20migration_gizver%203.pdf;RoshanSedhai“Free-visa-free-ticket
policy:Recruitingagenciestellingtwistedtale?”KathmanduPost,14January2016.l;KathmanduPostReport(2016)
“Manpoweragenciesprotestagainst‘uninformedraids’”KathmanduPost,26February2016.http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2016-02-26/manpower-agencies-protest-against-uninformed-raids.html
87Someofthepointsincludedintheagreementincludethepossibilityofincreasingtheservicefeetobechargedbythe
recruitmentagency.The11-memberteamformed(whichincludes5representativesofNAFEA)isgiventheresponsibilityof
carryingouttheassessmentonthispossibility.TheotherpointincludedrepresentationofNAFEAinthetechnicalcommittee
formedtoreviewandamendtheForeignEmploymentAct,2007.88Gordon,Jennifer(2015)GlobalLabourRecruitmentinaSupplyChainContext,InternationalLabourOrganization,Geneva:
4689Ibid.90Ibid.91Andrees,Nasri&Swiniarski,aboven82:71.92Greaterclarityisrequiredonlegalremediesforbreachofcontractwherethelabourlawdoesnotapply,suchaswith
migrantdomesticworkers.InLebanon,forexample,contractlawhasnotbeeneffective.SeeJureidini,Ray&Moukarbel,
Nayla(2004)“FemaleSriLankanDomesticLabourinLebanon:Contractual,Slavery-likePracticesandConditions”in
JournalofEthnicandMigrationStudies,Volume30, No.4,July,2004,pp.581-607.93Theprovisions,however,needmoreclarification,particularlyregardingunilateralterminationbyanemployeewhere
thereisnoevidenceofabreachbytheemployer.94UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC)(2015)TheRoleofRecruitmentFeesandAbusiveandFraudulent
RecruitmentPracticesofRecruitmentAgenciesinTraffickinginPersons,UnitedNations,Vienna.
https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/2015/Recruitment_Fees_Report-Final-
22_June_2015_AG_Final.pdf95VeritéInternational,aboven24.96Jureidini,Ray(2014)MigrantLabourRecruitmenttoQatar,Bloomsbury/QatarFoundation,Doha,Qatar:127.97EURESwebsite.Available:https://ec.europa.eu/eures/public/eures-services98Infoedgewebsite.Available:http://www.infoedge.in/businesses-recruitment.asp99SifyNews(2016)“SriLanka,SaudiArabiainke-hiringsystemformigrantworkers”,SifyNews(22March2016)
http://www.sify.com/news/lanka-saudi-arabia-ink-e-hiring-system-for-migrant-workers-recruitment-news-
international-qdwsKpidchdgj.html100MohammedRasooldeen(2016)“OnlineportaltohelpSaudisponsor”,ArabNews,16May2016
http://www.arabnews.com/news/online-portal-help-saudi-sponsors-recruit-domestics#101Ataya,Rabea(2016)PotentialRoleofTechnologyonLabourRecruitmentIndustry,PresentationtoAbuDhabiDialogue
SeniorOfficialsMeeting,Dubai,11May2016.102Martin,Philip(2006)ManagingLabourMigration:TemporaryWorkerProgrammesforthe21stCentury,International
SymposiumonInternationalMigrationandDevelopment,UnitedNationsSecretariat,Turin,Italy,28-30June2006
http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/turin/Symposium_Turin_files/P07_Martin.pdf103“ExamplesofBestPractices,”inILOMultilateralFrameworkonLabourMigration:Non-bindingPrinciplesandGuidelines
ForaRights-BasedApproachtoLabourMigration,Geneva,2006:54.104http://www.uniopagesos.es/organitzacio/fundacio_02.asp;“ExamplesofBestPractices,”inILOMultilateralFramework
onLabourMigration:Non-bindingPrinciplesandGuidelinesForaRights-BasedApproachtoLabourMigration,Geneva,
2006:55.105IOM(2009)TemporaryandCircularLabourMigration:Experiences,ChallengesandOpportunities,International
OrganizationforMigration,SeriesofResearchintoMigration,No.2,December:22.106Jureidini,Ray(2014)MigrantLabourRecruitmenttoQatar,Bloomsbury/QatarFoundation,Doha,Qatar.107Foranoverviewofthesebilateralagreements,seeInternationalOrganizationforMigration(2015)Recruitment
Monitoring&MigrantWelfareAssistance:whatworks?p60-61.
https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/migrated_files/What-We-Do/docs/Recruitment-Monitoring-Book.pdf108IOM(2005)op.cit.:p74.109Wickramasekara,Piyasiri(2013)RegulationoftheRecruitmentProcessandReductionofMigrationCosts:Comparative
AnalysisofSouthAsia.Chapter3,inProceedingsoftheIntergovernmentalRegionalSeminaronPromotingCooperationfor
SafeMigrationandDecentWork,1-2July2013,Dhaka,BangladeshOctober.
46
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2478461
110AlthoughMOUssignedbythePhilippinescoverhiringofworkersundergovernment-to-governmentarrangementsand
donotinvolveprivaterecruitmentagencies.111Taran,Patrick(2015)Migration:TwentyFirstCenturyKeytoEconomicSuccessandSocialWell-Being,BriefingNoteforthe
133rdAssemblyoftheInter-ParliamentaryUnion,Geneva,18-21October2015.112Park,Young-bumandMyung-huiKim(2016)EmploymentPermitScheme:Korea’sTemporaryLow-skilledForeignWorkerProgram,HumanResourcesDevelopmentServiceofKorea,Seoul,Korea.113K.B.Kyung.UpdateontheEmploymentPermitSystem.Paperpresentedatthe“Effectiveimplementationofthe
EmploymentPermitSystem”,ILO/KoreaMulti-CountryDialogue,3rd-4thDecember2013,Bangkok,2014.114ILO.2015.RegionalguidelinesonthereturnandreintegrationofmigrantworkersparticipatingintheEmployment
PermitSystemoftheRepublicofKorea.Bangkok.Thailand,availableat:http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
asia/---ro-bangkok/---sro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_514915.pdf115SeePublicServicesInternational(PSI)websiteathttp://www.world-psi.org/en/psi-symposium-german-philippines-
bilateral-agreement-health-workers.116Gordon,2015:19117SeerecentactionsinQatar,forexample-http://www.sc.qa/en/news/statement-on-behalf-of-the-sc118ItmaybenotedthatthePhilippines’“jointandsolidaryliability”clausedoesnotapplytoanydirecthiringarrangement
orhiringthroughGovernment-to-Government.119SeeLabourCodeofthePhilippinesPresidentialDecreeNo.442,Article109,“SolidaryLiability”.120LawyersBeyondBorders(2011)“BuildingPartnershipsforJusticeforMigrantWorkers”ConferenceReport,23–25
November2011Bangkok,Thailand.121Gordon,2015:32.122Gordon,2015:27-28123BeateAndrees,AlixNasri&PeterSwiniarski:RegulatingLabourRecruitmenttoPreventHumanTraffickingandtoFoster
FairMigration:Models,ChallengesandOpportunities,ILO,2015:47-48.124Ibid.,p.79.125Gordon,2015:30;SeealsoAndrees,NasriandSwiniarski,aboven123.126Andrees,NasriandSwiniarski,aboven12.3127 ILO (2014) Realizing a Fair Migration Agenda: Labour Flows between Asia and Arab States: Summary Report of the
InterregionalExperts’Meeting,3-4December2014,Kathmandu:9.128Gordon,2015:48.129Gordon,2015:44130Underjointandseveralliability,thismaynotapplywithPhilippinerecruitmentagencieswhoareaskedtoassumefull
responsibilityforthelifeofthecontracttothereturnoftheworkeratthepointofhire.Philippinelawprohibits
probationaryperiodsformigrantworkersbutallowsprovisionsinthecontracton“justcauses”forterminationbythe
employerandemployee.131Jureidini,aboven20.132Gordon,2015:20-21.133EICCCodeofConduct,availableat:http://www.eiccoalition.org/media/docs/EICCCodeofConduct5_1_English.pdf134 Jureidini, Ray. (forthcoming) “IrregularMigration inQatar: The Role of Legislation, Policies and Practices” in Philippe
Fargues&NasraShah(eds)IrregularMigrationintheGCCStates,GulfResearchCouncil,CambridgeUniversityPress.135Statesshouldformulate“coherentpolicies,suchasemploymentandlabourmigrationpolicies,whichtakeintoaccount
therisksfacedbyspecificgroupsofmigrants,includingthoseinanirregularsituation,andaddresscircumstancesthat
couldresultinforcedlaboursituations.”ILORecommendationNo.203onSupplementaryMeasuresfortheEffective
SuppressionofForcedLabour,2014(Article4h).136ThisisacknowledgedintheUAEArrivingGuestWorkersPamphlet.Itasks,“Noworkuponarrival?…ReporttotheLabour
Office.”137Jureidini,aboven133.138Shah,aboven31;Kapiszewski,Andrzej.(2001).Nationalsandexpatriates:PopulationandLabourDilemmasoftheGulf
CooperationCouncilStates.GarnetPublishingLimited,ReadingUK.139Seeforexample:Crepeau,FrancoisReportoftheSpecialRapporteuronthehumanrightsofmigrants:MissiontoQatar.
UnitedNationsHumanRightsCouncil,Twenty-sixthsession,24April,2014,Geneva.140UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC)(2015)TheRoleofRecruitmentFeesandAbusiveandFraudulent
RecruitmentPracticesofRecruitmentAgenciesinTraffickinginPersons,UnitedNations,Vienna;BeateAndrees,AlixNasri
&PeterSwiniarski:RegulatingLabourRecruitmenttoPreventHumanTraffickingandtoFosterFairMigration:Models,
ChallengesandOpportunities,ILO,2015:82.141BahrainLabourLawNo.36,2012.DomesticworkersarecoveredbyArticles(6),(19),(20),(21),(37),(38),(40),(48),
(49),(58),(116),(183)and(185)andinPartsTwelveandThirteen.142KuwaitMinisterialDecreeNo.68,2015.143LabourlawNo.6of2011specifiesan8hourdayandanhourofrestevery5hours.Thedomesticworkerlawrequiresa
maximumof12houradaywithunspecified“hoursofrest”andonedayoffperweek.Insteadof15dayspaidsickleave,
employersofdomesticworkersarerequiredtoprovidemedicaltreatment.HumanRightsWatch(2015)Kuwait:NewLaw
aBreakthroughforDomesticWorkers,June30,2015.https://www.hrw.org;MigrantRights.Org(2015)AnotherLookat
Kuwait’sLawsforDomesticWorkers.http://www.migrant-rights.org/2015/08/another-look-at-kuwaits-new-laws-for-
domestic-workers/
Annex1:Fees,costsandcharges
47
144Jureidini,Ray(2004)“WomenMigrantDomesticWorkersinLebanon”inSimelEsim&MonicaSmith(eds)Genderand
MigrationinArabStates:TheCaseofDomesticWorkers,InternationalLabourOrganisation,RegionalOfficeforArabStates,
Beirut:63-84.145ILORecommendationNo.23onSupplementaryMeasuresfortheEffectiveSuppressionofForcedLabour,2014(Article
4b).146Asis,Maruja&Agunias,Dovelyn(2012)StrengtheningPre-DepartureOrientationProgrammesinIndonesia,Nepalandthe
Philippines,MigrationPolicyInstitute&InternationalOrganizationforMigration,IssueinBrief,No.5,September2012.147AlsoknownasRepublicAct,orRA8042148InSriLanka,recruitmentagenciesroutinelysolicitpotentialmigrantdomesticworkersbyofferinguptoUS$1,000asan
incentiveandrepaidbysalarydeductions.149Jureidini,Ray(2003)“TheFailureofStateProtection:HouseholdGuestWorkersinLebanon”["L'échecdelaprotectionde
l'Etat:lesdomestiquesétrangersauLiban"]intheEuropeanReviewofInternationalMigration[RevueEuropéennedes
MigrationsInternationales],2003,Volume19,Number3:95-127.150E.g.“HelperChoice”-https://www.helperchoice.com/151Jureidini,Ray(2015)“TheUseandAbuseofDomesticWorkers:casestudiesinLebanonandEgypt”,inWenonaGiles,
MaryRomeroandValeriePreston(eds)WhenCareWorkGoesGlobal:LocatingtheSocialRelationsofDomesticWork,
Ashgate.152ILO(215)Cooperatingoutofisolation:thecaseofmigrantdomesticworkersinKuwait,LebanonandJordan,ILOWorking
Paper,InternationalLabourOrganizationRegionalOfficeforArabStates,Beirut.153BeateAndrees,AlixNasri&PeterSwiniarski:RegulatingLabourRecruitmenttoPreventHumanTraffickingandtoFoster
FairMigration:Models,ChallengesandOpportunities,ILO,2015,p.68.154OnlinecomplaintsystemformigrantworkersandoverseasPakistanis,TVI,February13,2016.Available:
http://tvi.com.pk/online-complaint-system-for-migrant-workers-and-overseas-pakistanis/155VeritéInternationa,aboven24.156ILOHIVandAIDSRecommendation,2010(No.200).Seeparagraphs25,27and28.157Dito,Mohammed(2014)“Kafala:FoundationsofMigrantExclusioninGCCLabourMarkets”,inOmarAlShebabi,Adam
Hanieh,AbdulhadiKhalaf,TransitStates:LabourMigrationandCitizenshipintheGulf.PlutoPress.158Borgogna,Alessandro,Majdalani,Fadi&Bejjani,Marwan(2015)MasteringConstructionCostsandCapabilities:Layingthe
foundationsforsuccess,Strategy&,PWC,21December,2015.http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/reports/mastering-
construction-costs-capabilities159Ibid.160VeritéInternational(2016)AnExploratoryStudyontheRoleofCorruptioninInternationalMigration:1161SeeComprehensiveInformationandOrientationProgram,presentationtotheAbuDhabiDialogueSeniorOfficialsMeeting,
May11,2016,Dubai.162‘Fees’maybedistinguishedfromcostsandchargesasonlypertainingtotheservicecommissionfortherecruitment
agency(agencycommission).However,thereisnodefinitionofrecruitmentfeesininternationallyrecognizedlabourand
humanrightsstandards.163IOM(2016)ResearchontheLabourRecruitmentIndustrybetweenUnitedArabEmirates,Kerala(India)andNepal,Interim
ReportfortheAbuDhabiDialogueSeniorOfficialsMeetinginDubai,11-12May2016,InternationalOrganizationfor
Migration:5. 164VeritéInternational,aboven24.165Abella,Martin,&Yi,aboven3.
SUMMARY
Fraudulent practices at the recruitment stage can leave low-skilled workers extremely vulnerable. These practices might include debt bondage linked to payment by low-skilled migrant workers of excessive recruitment fees, costs and charges and deception about the nature and conditions of work, often leading to detrimental contract substitution and human trafficking for labour exploitation. A complex and opaque web of intermediaries including sub-agents and outsourcing agents facilitate visa trading and drive up recruitment charges for low-skilled migrant workers. Collusion between labour brokers at origin and destination can perpetuate these practices, through such methods as kickback payments.
Within the Asia-Arab States corridor, the ILO has collaborated with constituents to promote fair migration during several forums. This White Paper serves to further stimulate policy dialogue for fair migration in the interlinked Asia-Arab States region. It outlines the main challenges to fair recruitment in the Asia-Arab States corridor, and proposes concrete measures for reform. Reform will require harmonizing legislation, accreditation and monitoring between countries of origin and destination, as well as significant cooperation with the private sector for the review of business practices by corporate contractors and employers of domestic workers.
This report has been produced with the financial assistance of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
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