Ukraine’s Future Ascension into the

European Union

Travis Clark

Introduction:

For centuries, Ukraine has existed at the border between the East and the

West. The young nation declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991

and for the first time in centuries has existed as an independent political entity. The

country has existed briefly throughout the hallmarks of European history, beginning

its existence with the formation of Kievan Rus until its destruction by the Mongol

Hordes. Centuries later, Austria-Hungary, Poland, the Commonwealth, and Russia

would claim Ukrainian lands, subjugating and suppressing the nation in the name of

Empires. Now in the post-Soviet era, Ukraine has finally achieved independence

after millennia of foreign ownership, only to be torn between the Kremlin in the

East and Brussels in the West. Ukraine has found anything but economic stability in

the past twenty-five years, racked by systematic corruption, the worst in Europe,

and political turmoil, the nation’s living standards have fallen far below the average

European. Yet the Ukrainian people have shown a strong intolerance to any injustice

threatening their newborn republic. Beginning in 2004, pro-Russian candidate

Victor Yanukovych was determined to have won the 2004 presidential election, yet

his election was plagued by mass protests over allegations of wide spread fraud,

voter intimidation, and corruption among election officials. Outraged, the Ukrainian

people took to the streets in what became known as the Orange Revolution. As

millions peacefully took to the streets, a run-off election was held and Yanukovych

was defeated decidedly. Following the Orange Revolution little changed both in

terms of government corruption or economic growth. In 2010 Victor Yanukovych

returns to the presidential office following a successful campaign, promising closer

ties to Russia and winning over the Eastern and majority Russian population

centers, particularly in Donbass, Ukraine’s industrial base. Victor Yanukovych,

despite winning in a landslide, must still appeal to western-oriented ethnic

Ukrainians in the center and western sections of the country. Yanukovych begins

negotiating a European Free Trade Agreement, widely viewed as the first step in

European integration, while negotiating outside the public view for economic

integration with Russia. The deadline in November 2013 comes and passes for

Yanukovych to sign the European trade agreement, sparking mass student protests

that would quickly grow into the nationwide Euromaiden Revolution, named for the

central square in Kiev (Maiden) in which the revolution began and was based. Over

the following months, Yanukovych lost control over most of the Western section of

the country, with the nation’s most prosperous city of Lviv declaring independence.

Crimea had been annexed by Russia, Russian separatists were operating in the

Donbass, and Kiev had become a warzone. Finally, in February of 2014, Ukraine’s

parliament ousted Yanukovych only after he had fled from the country. Snap

elections were held in the following months, leading to the election of a pro-western

government and the signing of the European Free Trade Agreement.

This paper will seek to address how the Ukrainian populace feels regarding

Ukraine’s further integration into Europe, the West, and eventually the European

Union. The EU has a very rigorous and clearly defined set of criteria for a nation to

advance in ascension talks; requiring a host of news laws that the more conservative

Russian sections of the country may find intolerable. As Ukraine attempts to find its

footing as it treads into European society, I conducted research in the capital city of

Kiev to gain a greater understanding concerning the sentiments on the future of the

nation. The research presented was conducted by questionnaires presented to any

denizen willing to participate. The questionnaires were presented only in Russian,

but should not confound the results as the ethnic Ukrainians populace is considered

fluent in the language. Additionally, ethnic Russians were present in smaller

numbers in the Kiev than in their total composite of the country and due to the

ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, their results may be skewed or

underrepresented in the data.

Brief Historical Summary:

To understand their current political and ethnic climate in Ukraine it is

necessary to discuss the historical background of the Ukrainian state. Beginning

around 880 A.D. the city-state of Kiev was founded by the Rus people emigrating

from Scandinavia. Kiev quickly grew into a regional power, assimilating the local

Slavic tribes and forming the basic national identities of modern Ukrainians and

Russians. Kievan Rus would quickly grow to expand to encompass much of the

modern territory that encompasses modern Ukraine and European Russian.

Vladimir the Great (980-1015) signified Kievan Rus’ golden age and converted the

pseudo-empire to Byzantine Christianity. Upon his death, Kievan Rus fragmented

into several principalities, greatly decentralizing power and weakening Kiev. Finally,

the Mongol Invasions of the 13th century saw the total destruction of Kievan Rus.

The principalities of European Russian would become vassals of the Mongol Empire,

where as the historic Ukrainian territories came under European occupation. The

fall of Kievan Rus marked the beginning of a sharp divide between the Rus people.

In the east (Russia), the identity of Russian and the Russian language evolved, while

in the west the cultures retained much of the Rus’ former idenitity, eventually

molding into the modern Ukrainian language and culture. An important distinction

to note during this time period, however, is that the territories of Crimea, the

Donbass, and land along the Black Sea were never settled or controlled by Kiev. This

land would only come to be conquered by the Russian Empire nearly a thousand

years after Kievan Rus’ formation.3

The following centuries came with nothing but foreign domination over

Ukrainian lands. After the collapse of Kievan Rus, the western Rus territories

consolidated into a nation-state known as Galicia-Volhynia. The lifespan of this

country lasted a mere eighty-seven years (1253-1340) before being invaded by both

Poland and Lithuania. This last portion of Galicia-Volhynia would fall to Lithuania in

1366, marking the end of self-Ukrainian rule until Ukraine’s reemergence as a

sovereign state under the USSR. Ukrainian territories would remain under

Poland/the Commonwealth’s control until the 1700s as the Russian and Ottoman

Empires began competing for Ukrainian lands. By 1783, the formal annexation of

Crimea by Russia, Ukrainian lands had fallen entirely under Russian control with

small portions having been seceded to the Austrian Empire. Upon the annexation of

Crimea, Russia began the colonization of “New Russia,” or the formally Muslim

territories in Crimea, the Donbass, and the southern territories in modern Ukraine.

Thus the ethnic divide brewing in modern Ukraine traces its origins back nearly

three hundred years to Russian colonization attempts of former Muslim Tatar

lands.3

Ukrainian lands existed in relative peace throughout the next few centuries

until WW1 brought about the destruction of the Russian Empire and created a brief

Ukrainian nation-state. However, the Ukrainian Republic lasted less than four years

(1917-1921) before being reabsorbed by Russia (USSR) or portioned into Poland

and Belarus. Ukraine would finally be granted an official state under the USSR but

could flex very little political or ethnic free will. Excluding the brief Republic that

existed from 1917 to 1921, Ukraine had existed under foreign domination for over

four hundred years until its declaration of independence form the Soviet Union in

1990. Ukraine has long existed as a stateless people, marked by division and foreign

invasion. Russian colonization attempts further destabilized the country as a

modern Ukraine seeks to govern itself for the first time in centuries.3

European Integration and Law:

Following the Euromaiden Revolution, Ukraine’s government has firmly

expressed their interest into European ascension and EU law adoption. The

adoption of European law is perhaps the most crucial step concerning Ukraine’s

reorientation towards the West. The adoption of European law is a long and

complex set of procedures that is bound to produce pushback from the populace of

Ukraine. The aim of this research project is to assess to the level of pushback or

favoritism the populace of Ukraine currently feels towards the laws that concern

western integration. The process of integration is complex and usually spans years,

if not decades. However, the process of European integration can generally

summarized into three basic steps.

1. Candidate for Membership – The European Union has identified a

country that has expressed interest into joining the bloc, but formal negotiations

may or not have officially begun. Examples of this include the ratification of the free

trade agreement between the European Union and Ukraine, as well as the opening

of visa free travel between Ukraine and Union members. All EU governments must

agree in the form of a vote in the European Union Council to begin the formal

negotiations step as outlined in step 2.

2. Accession Criteria – The stage begins with formal membership

negotiations and the implementation of EU law by the target country. This step of

the process is the most arduous and often can span over a decade. The laws the

target country must adopt include a variety of a criterion, including judicial,

economic, and administrative reforms, as well as meeting certain sociological

standards the European Union finds acceptable. For example, Ukraine hosted its

first LGBT rally in 2016, the first in over seven years, due to EU law calling for equal

treatment of disenfranchised and marginalized groups.

3. Ascension – The final stage of the process, the target country and the EU

conclude their formal negotiations and the target country is formally invited to

become a member. It is also important to note that the various states of the Western

Balkans follow a different set of ascension criteria and may or may not be subjected

to current process concerning Ukraine.

The European Union has classified the following countries as in the process

of joining as displayed in Table 1.

Table 1:

Country Name Official Status

Montenegro The country was declared an official

candidate country in 2008 and began the

formal ascension process in late 2011.

The country is currently still in the

process of adopting European Law.

Additionally, Montenegro joined NATO

in 2016, increasing its relations with the

west and European Union in general.

Turkey In 1997 the European Council declared

Turkey eligible to begin the ascension

process. However, the political situation

in Turkey has deteriorated over the past

two decades and the ascension process

has stalled. The majority of EU states,

most notably France, are actively

blocking Turkish ascension talks due the

increasingly anti-democratic legislation

and actions of Turkey’s head of state.

Turkey is still classified as belonging to

the ascension process.

Serbia In 2012 Serbia was granted official

candidate status and in 2013 Serbia

began official membership association

negations. Serbia’s progress, despite

adopting EU appropriate legislation, is

currently being stalled by several EU

governments over Serbia’s relationship

with the Russian government. Serbia’s

government is still discussing ascension

negations.

Iceland Iceland has requested not to be formally

listed as a candidate country following

the 2009 financial crisis and legal issues

concerning international fishing rights.

Ukraine Ukraine has ratified the European Free

Trade Agreement and begun ascension

talks but has not been listed as an official

candidate country. The EU has officially

recognized their potential, however.

Currently, Ukraine is classified alongside a Georgia and Moldova that have

had official recognition by the EU Council to begin the ascension talks. An important

distinction of all three recognized states includes ongoing international disputes

with Russia. In Ukraine, Russian rebels are currently contesting the sovereignty of

the Donbass region and the international community is disputing the legal

ownership of Crimea. In Georgia, Russia has been accused of “creeping annexation,”

walling of significant portions of the country in breakaway republics known as

South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In Moldova, the political situation is kept tense by the

Russian minority in the breakaway region known as Transnistria.3

Ukraine, in addition to Georgia and Moldova, is in a tense domestic and

international political situation concerning their relationship with Russia and the

European Union. Russia works to ensure neither country can make significant

progress with ascension talks without ethnic tensions confounding the process and

working to unnerve EU Council states.3

Literature Review

Several studies have been conducted studying the changes in Eastern

European mindsets concerning the process of “Europeanization” after the fall of the

Iron Curtain and Soviet Union. The term Europeanization has come to fall under

many different meanings in modern political terms, but at its core refers to, “diverse

changes in core domestic institutions of politics and for governance, undertaken in

the process for adaption for European Integration. By implication therefore

Europeanization implies a degree of internalization of European policy and values

paradigms at the domestic level (Kataryna). Europeanization, therefore, has become

the main foreign policy effort by the European Union at large and by individual EU

states. The policy of Europeanization has governed the European continent and

surrounding countries since the break up of the Soviet Union, most notably in

countries such as Morocco or Turkey, whom technically lie outside of Europe’s

boundaries, but have had domestic policy adaptions in accordance to the European

Union. As a result, the European Union’s process of Europeanization has largely

come as a result of the post-communist political and economic transformation

process that has been equated with the preparation for membership.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine’s leaders have not made it a secret

about their intentions of integration into the European Union. However, Ukraine has

repeatedly and systemically failed to adopt the necessary domestic policy changes

necessary to be considered for integration or even fit the vague definition of

“Europeanization.” Despite Ukraine’s tumultuous economic times during the 1990s,

the country has managed to achieve economic growth over the early parts of the

twenty first century. Yet a fundamental flaw in Kiev’s logic concerning European

Integration has concerned the matter that economic growth does not equal

Europeanization, has stated by Kataryna, “Ukraine’s political leaders have

sometimes acted as if they could achieve integration by declaration, or simply by

joining and participating in international organizational clubs rather than by

undertaking concrete structural changes.” Ukraine followed a similar path of that of

Russia following the collapse of the USSR, in that a select few ruling elites

maintained de facto control over the country. Specific to Ukraine, the Communist

Party still maintained a large portion of control following the collapse of Ukrainian

Soviet State, not losing its majority in Ukraine’s governing body until 1998. Many

reasons affected this slow transition of power and suppression of democratic

reforms, including the threat of a red scare and true communists recapturing

control over the state, Crimean separatists and other border disputes, and the

desperate attempt to build the concrete notion of a Ukrainian national identity by

the executive branch. Ukraine’s transition of power was flawed largely in part due

its true lack of national identity, in addition to the concentration of power in the

hands of a few post-communist elites, and severely delayed the formation of

democratic institutions that formed more rapidly in other post-communist states.

Czechia, for example, had a strong sense of national identity, national past, and

history of democratic institutions, allowing for the country to peacefully separate

from Slovakia and sail through the process of Europeanization. Following the 2002

Ukrainian parliament elections, displayed below, which saw the left lose its hold on

parliament by pro-reform parties, the post-communist elites still maintained control

over the executive and continued to suppress the process of Europeanization.

Historically, Ukraine’s population has remained steeply divided between the

counterbalance between Russia and the rest of Europe. Following the collapse of the

USSR in 1991, roughly 1/3 of Ukraine’s population was in favor of Europeanization,

mostly centered in the Western territories of the country, and 1/3 strongly favored

integration with Russia and the CIS, favored largely in the south and east. However,

surveys of this type can be misleading as Ukrainians, when given the option,

overwhelmingly support the idea of both strengthening ties with the European

Union and Russia. Yet in Ukrainian society there still exists a blind ambivalence as to

what the benefits of Europeanization are or what the process of European ascension

may entail, as stated, “According to a 2003 survey, 93 percent of those surveyed

assume that entering the EU would be useful for Ukraine, but only half of them were

able to explain what the benefit might be (Kataryna). This survey moves to indicate

that general idea of Europeanization as being the correct path forward for the

Ukrainian state, but the actual process of domestic policy changes are lost on the

general population. So while a supermajority of the population may favor the idea of

European integration, the populace is widely unaware of the necessary policy

changes that will need to be implemented to move their country towards the

European Union.

In stark contrast to the other post-communist states following the collapse of

the USSR, the Ukrainian state also followed a different path in terms of government

rhetoric. After 1991, states such as Serbia and Slovakia saw their presidencies

center around the call for ethno-nationalism and the return to European civilization.

The presidential figures were not promoting EU integration, but rather the return to

their pre-communist way of life. The process of Europeanization was largely

conducted through their legislative branches, rather than direct promotion by heads

of state. In Ukraine, the exact opposite occurred. The presidents of the 1990s and

early 2000s promoted the idea of the “return to European civilization” and rejected

ethno-cultural homogenization. While this may have been necessary for Ukraine to

remain united as a country instead of splintering along ethnic lines, another

significant factor included Ukraine’s balancing act between the European Union and

Russia. Other post communist states were capable of fully capable of adopting pro-

EU policy through their legislative branches, meanwhile the Ukrainian legislature

was torn between western-oriented Ukrainians and Russia-oriented Russians.

Excluding Belarus, Ukraine was forced to navigate through a unique dynamic of

executive Europeanization rhetoric, while the legislative and representative branch

of the Ukrainian government maneuvered through appealing to all ethnic groups

that resided within the fragile country. As the 21st century progressed, the country

gradually adopted more pro-EU mindsets, but Ukraine’s significant delay following

the collapse of the USSR in the process of Europeanization still plagues the countries

economy and foreign relations today.

In terms of past surveys and research polls conducted on public opinion

concerning Ukraine’s future, the division directly follows the ethnic divisions in the

country. In 2003 it was found that 58% of the public supported integration with the

EU while 16% opposed and 26% remained undecided. The native language of any

specific individual is a strong indicator towards their sentiments of

Europeanization, such as that only 47% of Russophones approve of European

integration, while 26% disapprove. Ukrainian speakers, however, large centered in

the west of the country, approve of Europeanization by over 75% with only 9% of

respondents not being in favor. Given the sharp divides within the country before

the Euromaiden Revolution, the Ukrainian state chose a balancing act between the

two opposing viewpoints of European integration. Ukraine has signed numerous

economic agreements with Russia, including becoming solely dependent on Russia

for gas imports, as well as becoming a member of the Commonwealth of

Independent States. Additionally, Ukraine pursued pro-European legislation only to

the point of satisfying European demands at a bare minimal, including the European

Free Trade Association agreement that eventually kicked off the Euromaiden

Revolution in 2013.

The literature review moves to reinstate the belief of a vast difference in

public opinion concerning Ukraine’s foreign policy divided along ethnic lines.

However, a closer look demonstrates that for the majority of Ukraine’s post-soviet

history has included a populace that has overwhelmingly wished to pursue a future

that included both the European Union and Russian Federation. These sentiments

were further propagated by the Ukrainian state, which sought to grow too close to

neither for fear of losing their grip on power, namely through various forms of

corruption they employed. Yet this review fails to account for more recent changes

in Ukrainian society, including the increased awareness of systematic corruption of

the Ukrainian state and the perception of freedom that the idea of Europeanization

propagates. Ultimately, Ukrainians of either ethnic group wish to better their lives

and obtain a higher standard of living, a prospect that the old model of governance

could not produce and lead to civil unrest and changes in public opinion. After the

Ukrainian government failed to pass the European Free Trade Agreement in 2013,

public opinion has largely switched from maintaining the EU/Russian balancing act

towards a greater likening to the process of Europeanization.

Methodology

The research presented in this paper was conducted in the format of survey

presented in the Russian language. The survey consisted of ten questions

concerning EU policy, domestic governance, and Russian sentiments ranked from 1

(lowest) to 10 (highest) in terms of personal conviction towards any given question.

In addition to these questions, several other questions were included that allowed

the survey participants to indicate various aspects on the current state of their

country. Survey participants were asked to indicate their age and self-described

ethnicity in an effort to understand the differences between ethnic and age

demographics. The surveys were distributed through the academic network at the

NovaMova Institute in Kiev, Ukraine as well through associates of a selected host

family. It should be strongly noted that Ukrainian political activism is not on par

with the standards presented in other western countries; political sentiments

following the revolution are tense and the majority of Ukrainians are not open to the

idea of sharing political opinions. In addition, the state of Ukraine is currently at war

with Russian backed separatists in the Donbass region with a travel warning in

place for foreigners in the country. Traveling outside of the capital or in the

eastern/Russian direction was strongly discouraged. Thus the survey was

distributed only among associates of the NovaMova Institute as these participants

were the only individuals comfortable with sharing political sentiments. A sample

survey has been attached to the end of this report.

Results and Discussion

Graph 1

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5

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Question1: Is Ukraine a European Country?

1: Strong Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree

Number of Responses

Graph 1 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 1 on the survey: Is Ukraine a European Country?

The lower the value the more each participant disagreed with the stated question. Standard deviation bars are included.

The data collected as a result of the survey has displayed a microcosm of

ideas surrounding the political sentiments of the general populace surrounding Kiev

and central Ukraine. Beginning with the first question, displayed in Graph 1: Is

Ukraine a European country, the responses were largely positive and in congruence

with general Ukrainian sentiments following the Euromaiden Revolution. However,

given Ukraine’s geographic positioning and the country’s status as the largest

European country not split between two continents, the results were slightly

surprising. Responses range from 5 (neutral) to 10 (strongly agree) to form a bell

curve with the majority of answers lying between these two points. This may be a

reflection of the Ukrainian sentiment to remain balanced between two great states:

the European Union and Russia. Russians sentiments towards their country are not

always reflected as being European but a distinct cultural identity simply

considered as Russian. While Ukrainians still overwhelmingly identify as European,

their past and current geopolitical setting may lead them to identify less as

“Europeans” and more of a bridge between the European continent and the Russian

federation.

Graph 2

1 2 3 4 5 60

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5

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Question 2: Is Russia an Ally?

1 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree

Number of Responses

Graph 2 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 2 on the survey: Is Russia an Ally? The lower the

value the more each participant disagreed with the stated question. Standard deviation bars are included.

Question 2 addressed the topic of Russia as an ally to Ukraine as displayed in

Graph 2. Non-surprisingly, the majority of responses were negative (strongly to

moderately disagreeing). However, sentiments were not as negative as anticipated,

given Russia’s active involvement in the seizure of Crimea and support for rebels in

Donbass. Again, this may be a historical reflection of the Ukrainian mindset of

bridging the gap between the east and west across the European continent.

Ukrainians certainly do not maintain positive views of Russia, at least at the

moment, but there remains an underlying sense of brotherhood and connectedness

that continues to permeate Ukrainian society.

Graph 3

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5

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Question 3: Is the European Union a Ally?

1 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree

Number of Responses

Graph 3 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 3 on the survey: Is the European Union an Ally? The

lower the value the more each participant disagreed with the stated question. Standard deviation bars are included.

The information obtained from the third survey question presents an

interesting set of data. The graph does not follow a bell curve (normal distribution)

concerning sentiments towards the European Union. It is possible the survey

participants felt the wording of the question including possible European

intervention in the Ukrainian state, in contrast to viewing the EU as purely a

strategic partner. Ukrainians as voting block typically favor less federal powers

allocated to the government than other states and thus view the encroachment of

pro EU legislation as strengthen the central presidential powers. Overall, however,

the sentiments are overwhelming positive, as only two survey responses fall into

the possible standard deviation range for a negative/neutral view of the European

Union.

Graph 4

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Question 4: I support NATO

1 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree

Number of Responses

Graph 5 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 4 on the survey: I Support NATO. The lower the

value the more each participant disagreed with the stated question. Standard deviation bars are included.

Underwhelming Ukrainian support for NATO was an anticipated result. As

with support for the EU becoming an ally, Ukrainians have a mixed, but overall

positive view of the military alliance. The negative summations about the military

alliance may stem from the older participants who may still recall the tensions

between the Warsaw Pact and NATO during the Cold War. Yet Ukraine is a country

at war whether the international culprit is recognized as Russia or simply Russian

backed rebels. The critical military advantage of NATO stems from the protective

ideology, “an attack on one is an attack on all.” NATO exists first and foremost to

protect its member states in times of war, namely the USSR and its successor state,

the Russian Federation. Ukraine is already struggling with the threat of Russian

aggression and may view NATO with lukewarm feelings due to the conflicting

nature of sharing an extensive border with Russia should a formal declaration of

war come from Moscow and the effects of dealing with Russian-backed rebels alone.

The data from the question lacks a normal distribution, displaying a mixed bag of

polar feelings towards fierce support for NATO and neutral passiveness to the

military alliance.

Graph 5

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Question 5: Ukraine Should Become a Member of NATO

1 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree

Number of Responses

Graph 5 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 5 on the survey: Ukraine Should Become a Member

of NATO. The lower the value the more each participant disagreed with the stated question. Standard deviation bars are

included.

In direct contrast to the previous survey question, the sentiments among

Ukrainians that express interest in joining NATO follows a normal distribution. The

data suggests that while public opinion on supporting the alliance is mixed,

becoming a military member has different implications, at least in the public

perception. NATO’s perceived vision is protection among on client states, including

the call to war if any such member were to be attacked. Ukrainians already have a

pessimistic view on warfare, given their current history of Crimea and the ongoing

conflict in Donbass. Joining a staunchly western military alliance is implicated more

in the perception of future military conflicts Ukraine maybe called into, verses the

immediate benefit of joining NATO. Ukrainians perceive the alliance as a means to

protect the nation from outside threats, namely Russia, but are wary off future

military engagements the country may be obliged to participate in. Additionally,

there is the ever looming threat of direct warfare with Russia and many Ukrainians

are wary of a full on military engagement with Russia. A stated goal of the Russian

Federation is to prevent the spread of NATO and the option of Ukraine joining may

lead to further conflict in the future for the Ukrainian state, despite the benefits of

western-oriented military integration.

Graph 6

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Question 6: I Support Changes the EU Wants in Ukraine

1 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree

Number of Responses

Graph 6 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 6 on the survey: I support changes the EU wants in

Ukraine. The lower the value the more each participant disagreed with the stated question. Standard deviation bars are

included.

The concern of foreign intervention in Ukraine is strong given the current

military conflict and divided populace. To continue with Europeanization, the

Ukrainian state is required to continue implementing reforms of different measures,

including judicial and social reforms targeting Ukraine’s lackluster human rights

record. In addition, Ukrainians as a people are naturally wary of strong, centralized

government establishing the rule of law, a potential major turn of considering the

majority of these edicts originate from Brussels in the foreign but democratically

elected European Council. The mixed sentiments expressed in the data, largely

centered on low enthusiasm (both positive and negative) for EU legislation

integration is justifiably slow. After all, Ukraine has struggled for centuries to obtain

independence from foreign bodies and the concept of a foreign European capital

dictating policy changes in the Ukrainian state may produce a hesitant populace.

The data obtained from this survey question does not follow a standard distribution

and displays the complex and mixed sentiments felt by the post Euromaiden

revolution population. Indeed, the hard fought battle for westernization and

democracy has shifted in the support for European intervention in Ukrainian

governance in comparison to pre-revolution public opinion polls and this survey.

Consequently, while enthusiasm is low for foreign policy intervention in Ukraine,

certain policy edicts are more attractive than others to the general populace.

Graph 7

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Question 7: It Would Be Better to Allow Donbass to Join Russia in

Return for Faster EU Integration

1 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree

Number of Responses

Graph 7 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 7 on the survey: It would be better to allow

Donbass to join Russia in return for faster EU integration. The lower the value the more each participant disagreed with the

stated question. Standard deviation bars are included.

The current situation in the Donbass region of Ukraine has produced an

interesting flux among public opinion in the Ukrainian populace. Donbass, which

constitutes the oblasts of Luhansk and Donetsk, is among Ukraine’s most developed

regions and responsible for much of the coal and power production for the state of

Ukraine. The region is also overwhelmingly Russian. As of April 2017, more than

10,000 and civilians have died in the conflict. While Ukrainians value their

territorial integrity, it is important to stress the main focus of the stated survey

question: European integration. Ukrainians are more likely to secede rebel territory

if the immediate outlook for the rest of the country is guaranteed. Living standards

and conditions have failed to improve following the revolution, although policy

initiatives are beginning to take place. Ukrainians, overall, appear willing to sacrifice

a war torn section of the country if it is understood the rest of the nation will

benefit, namely through Europeanization.

Graph 8

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Question 8: Foreigners are Better at Eliminating Corruption

1 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree

Number of Responses

Graph 8 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 8 on the survey: Foreigners are better at

eliminating corruption. The lower the value the more each participant disagreed with the stated question. Standard deviation

bars are included.

The concept of foreign intervention in Ukraine is held with suspicion.

Ukrainians as a populace are overall very suspicious of strong governments and the

concept of foreign government intervention is even more undesirable among the

public. However, Ukrainians overwhelming feel corruption is the main threat to

their country and should be the main focus of any government in Kiev. Ukraine is

ranked among the most corrupt nations globally and is considered the most corrupt

on the European continent. Other European nations, namely Romania, have

benefited tremendously from EU sponsored anti-corruption measures, as seen in

the level of economic growth and perception of government between Romania and

Bulgaria; two states that entered the EU at the same time but pursued the fight on

corruption at different extremes. Ukrainians, according to the survey, are at least

somewhat willing to allow EU intervention in their fight against corruption. The

hindrance that the level of corruption among Ukrainian officials has inflicted among

the prosperity of the nation has warranted a change in Ukrainian public opinion, at

least among this specific policy area.

Question 9

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Question 9: Ukraine Should Split Between Russians and Ukrainians

1 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree

Number ofResponses

Graph 9 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 5 on the survey: Ukraine should split between

Russians and Ukrainians. The lower the value the more each participant disagreed with the stated question. Standard

deviation bars are included.

The responses to Question 9 portray the alarming sense of division among

the Ukrainian public. The majority of respondents either had a neutral or positive

view corresponding to the division and subsequent dissolvent of the Ukrainian state

among ethnic lines. However, in correspondence to Question 7 in correspondence to

the seceding of Donbass, the two questions may have been too similar in focus.

Ukraine’s Russian populations are largely concentrated in the south and in the east,

yet the division isn’t concrete in terms of separation. There is a blend of both ethnic

groups concentrated in any given territory, excluding the Donbass, which is

overwhelmingly Russian. Therefore, the participants of this survey may have

viewed the secession of Donbass as the separation of ethnic groups, as other

Russian dominant territories share fairer pro-EU views and support of the modern

Ukrainian state.

Question 10

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100

1

2

3

4

5

6

Questtion 10: Europe is too Liberal for Me

1 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree

Number ofResponses

Graph 10 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 10 on the survey: Europe is too liberal for me. The

lower the value the more each participant disagreed with the stated question. Standard deviation bars are included.

Finally, for the actual process of Europeanization to occur the Ukrainian

populace must support the measures. Ukraine is largely considered to be one of the

most socially conservative countries in Europe and the agenda of the European

Union has the potential to trigger a culture clash between these two societies.

However, while the participants of this survey had a wide range of responses and

sentiments, mostly associated with age, Ukrainians are willing to tolerate social

changes within their country even if the populace as a whole is not supportive of the

measure. As an example, Ukraine hosted its first gay pride parade in several years in

Kiev of June 2016. Despite the bombardments of violent threats the parade was held

without issues and no reported violence to the participants or spectators. The

parade and the subsequent tolerance of the government was entirely driven by the

promise of EU funds for the betterment of Ukraine as a whole, even at the sacrifice

of a long standing social taboo in Ukraine. While Ukrainians may view the European

Union as a liberal society interfering with their social viewpoints, the potential

quality of life improvements from EU policy initiatives are worth the social changes

to Ukrainian society.

Conclusion

The process of state building and legislative reform for the Ukrainian

government will almost certainly continue the country on its path towards EU

ascension. The Euromaiden revolution effects still ring loudly in the ears of

Ukrainian voters who desire a freer and more prosperous nation for their

countrymen. Even as Russia is funds separatist movements in the far east,

Ukrainians still cling to the notion of brotherhood with their Slavic brothers and

western sisters. Ukraine for the longest time has been a nation of uncertainty:

uncertain of its borders, uncertain of its sovereignty, and uncertain of its

governments; but finally the will to have a democratic say in the process of

government has permeated the mass populace. The research collected from

Ukrainians living in Kiev confirms the EU-orientated goals, but not a path of total

westernization. While Ukrainians undoubtedly view themselves as western and

European in the geographic sense, the revolution does not signify a significant

cultural shift in the Ukrainian population. Ukrainians still overwhelmingly view

themselves as the bridge between the east and the west; a connect between Europe

and Russia and beyond. Ukrainians still maintain their conservative view of the

world, despite their support for liberal EU legislation affecting their domestic policy

making process. The entire purpose of the revolution was to bring about prosperity

to the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian state, regardless of Russian, Ukrainian, or

Tartar ethnicity and an end to corruption. Ukrainians view western institutions,

such as NATO, not with a particular passion to uphold but as a means guarantee the

safety and future prosperity of their state.

Ukraine undoubtedly has a great deal of legislative reform to continue

implanting to reach EU levels of prosperity and freedom. As the current government

continues to falter in the single digits of public approval, Ukrainians separate from

the elite will have to take up the challenge of reforming their corrupt state. EU

reforms continue to capture the public’s interest and will continue to propel Ukraine

strongly into the sphere of EU and western influence. In the future, as Poroshenko’s

government transitions out power, further research analyzing the election results of

elected officials is crucial to understand the future state of Ukrainian affairs. The

Ukrainian government must become detached from the elite to eliminate corruption

and join the ranks of Western Europe, otherwise their nation will falter and become

more vulnerable to foreign intervention. Future research targeting the mindset of

new Ukrainian politicians and the public’s opinion will provide an effective roadmap

for Ukraine’s navigation into the European Union.

References

1. European Union. Europea.eu European Union, n.d. Web. 30 Apr. 2017.

2. Hrushevs’kyi, Mykhaylo. “History of Ukraine.” History of Ukraine. Toronto

Ukrainian Geneaology Group, n.d. Web. 03 May 2017.

3. Joyce, Stephanie. “Frozen Conflicts and Disputed Borders Create Uncertainty In

Russia’s Shadow.” NPR, 13 Mar. 2017. Web. 03 May 2017.

Literature Review

Wolczuk, Kataryna. “Integration Without Europeanisation: Ukraine and Its Policy

Towards the European Union.” By Kataryna Wolczuk :: SSRN. University of

Birmingham, 26 Oct. 2013. Web. 30 Apr. 2017.