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An Analysis of Ostrom’s Principles of Collective Action Institutions as Applied by the Coral Triangle Initiative By Julia Espy Undergraduate Honors Thesis University of Florida College of Agricultural and Life Sciences School of Natural Resources and the Environment April 2013

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Page 1: ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu · Web viewEmpirical examples of failed collective action institutions in Turkey, Sri Lanka, Nova Scotia and California can be found in Chapter 5 (Ostrom

An Analysis of Ostrom’s Principles of Collective Action Institutions

as Applied by the Coral Triangle Initiative

By

Julia Espy

Undergraduate Honors Thesis

University of Florida

College of Agricultural and Life Sciences

School of Natural Resources and the Environment

April 2013

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….……….3

Part I……..…………………………………………………….…….…………………....……….5

Ostrom’s Principles of Collective Action Institutions…………………………………….5

The Coral Triangle……………………………………………………………………….12

Comparison of Coral Triangle Initiative and Ostrom’s Principles.………..…………….13

Description of Study Areas and National Programs…………………………….……….17

Part II…………………………………………………………………………………………….22

Comparison of State of the Coral Triangle Reports and National Plans of Action..…….22

Other Management Issues in the State of the Coral Triangle Reports…………………..32

Findings and Discussion………………………………………………………………...……….38

Conclusions and Recommendations……………………………………………………………..43

Works Cited……………………………………………………………………………………...44

Figures………………………………………………………………………………..………….46

Figure 1: Map of the Coral Triangle………………………….………………………….46

Figure 2: Ostrom’s eight principles of collective action institutions…………………….47

Figure 3: 9 Guiding Principles of the CTI………………….…………………………....48

Figure 4: Flow chart of implementation, PNG Marine Program………………………...49

Figure 5: Indonesia comparison of Activities Completed vs. Intended vs. Total……….50

Figure 6: PNG comparison of Activities Completed vs. Intended vs. Total…………….51

Figure 7: Progress towards completion of CTI………………………………………..…52

Figure 8: Groups working to fund conservation programs in Indonesia………………...53

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INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF STUDY

My initial interest in Elinor Ostrom’s work developed upon reading her obituary, which

described her studies of collective action institutions and common pool resource management. At

the time, I was interning with Conservation International (CI) in their Global Marine department.

While I was not directly working on projects in the Coral Triangle, CI is very involved with the

area. It was first recognized that the natural resources in the area were largely of a shared nature,

therefore fitting the definition of common-pool resources. With the creation of the Coral Triangle

Initiative for managing those resources, the situation represented one to which Ostrom’s ideas

could be applied. The utilization of her principles of collective action institutions has been

studied in other locations around the world, though not in the Coral Triangle and mostly for

terrestrial areas and land-based resources. The Coral Triangle represented a new location, largely

dependent on marine resources, and a new management strategy that, at first glance, followed

many of her principles. By comparing her principles to the original plans under the Initiative and

then by assessing their actual utilization, the viability of these principles can be addressed. While

success or failure is not part of this discussion, there is much to be said with respect to how her

principles can also be applied to a marine-based common pool resource area and how they

possibly may not be applicable.

In this study, Ostrom’s alternative solution of collective action institutions will be

compared to those management practices the areas of the Coral Triangle plan to and have started

to implement. An expected finding is that many of her principles form the basis of the Regional

Plan of Action. It is also expected that this analysis will show that Papua New Guinea’s plans

depend more heavily on these collaborative action principles, while Indonesia relies more so on

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the classic models of government intervention. The plans’ effectiveness is difficult to determine

at this time due to the young nature of these initiatives, but the extent to which her principles are

being employed will be analyzed.

This paper is composed of two parts. In the first part, the management practices

developed and employed by the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI) will be compared with the

principles of collective action proposed and supported by Elinor Ostrom. Specifically, the CTI

Regional Plan of Action and the National Plan of Action (NPoA) will be examined for two

specific countries, Papua New Guinea and Indonesia in the Coral Triangle. These two locations

exemplify different management styles and will show how Ostrom’s theory of collective action

can be applied to varying extents. In part two, the State of the Coral Triangle Reports for both

countries, released three years after the start of the Coral Triangle Initiative, will be used to

assess progress along the original timeline set out in the NPoAs. The paper will then conclude

with a personal assessment of the extent to which Ostrom’s principles were effectively employed

and facilitated efforts to reach the Goals of the CTI, as well as areas where they were lacking.

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PART I

Ostrom’s Principles of Collective Action Institutions

In Governing the Commons, Political Scientist Elinor Ostrom challenges three main

theories regarding the management of common-pool resources (CPRs)1. One is the “tragedy of

the commons,” another is the prisoner’s dilemma game, and the last is the logic of collective

action. She supports that while all are accurate when their required conditions exist, generally

those types of perfectly controlled situations are not present and an alternative theory is more

applicable in the real world. CPRs, their issues and these theories will be explained in detail

below, following a brief background of Ostrom.

Ostrom’s greatest recognition was for receiving The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in

Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel in 2009 for “her analysis of economic

governance, especially the commons” (“Elinor Ostrom – Biographical”). She lived a modest life

growing up and encountered many obstacles in her scholarly and professional life due to her

gender. She obtained BA, MA and PhD degrees in Political Science at UCLA-the choice

partially due to the Economics department turning her away. Her initial research on collective

action did not begin by a direct purpose and she moved away from the topic to focus on police

industries across the United States. During this time she taught American Government at Indiana

University, her tenure lasting 15 years (“Elinor Ostrom – Biographical”). Eventually she returned

to the subject of the commons, with the goal of consolidating existing research that was

disconnected and scattered across disciplines and resources type. In 1990, she published

Governing the Commons – The Evolution of Institution for Collective Action, which was a

culmination of the empirical data she collected over years of study regarding the successes and

1 CPR is defined on page 4 of this paper as “a natural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use” (Ostrom 30).

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failures of CPR management. Her list of publications and contributions to other writings is

extensive and long. Her work is frequently cited in others’ examinations of natural resource

management as well. Toward the end of her life she established the Workshop in Political

Theory and Policy Analysis with her husband, Vincent Ostrom, as a research center to help

scholars located around the world ranging across various disciplines to work together and

enhance the results of research (“Elinor Ostrom – Biographical”). Throughout her life she served

on committees for various associations and societies, most notable the American Political

Science Association (“Elinor Ostrom Curriculum Vitae”). Ostrom died recently on June 12, 2012

at the age of 78.

In the following sections of part one of this paper, a CPR will be defined and the three

traditional models of natural resource management will be presented and discussed. Ostrom’s

arguments against these will then be described and her alternatives will be presented. Following

this background information, the Coral Triangle will be indentified and its resource management

problems presented. The Regional Plan of Action, developed through the CTI, will be described

and compared to Ostrom’s eight principles of collective action institutions. Two lower level

cases will show how her principles have been incorporated in different ways into the national

plans of Papua New Guinea and Indonesia. These plans are relatively new, so it will take further

measurement in the future to determine if one method is more successful than another. The two

areas will be compared with respect to the management style they chose. Finally, it will be

concluded that while Ostrom’s principles can be successfully incorporated into CPR

management plans, in different situations they are employed to different degrees.

Elinor Ostrom’s most famous work, Governing the Commons, outlines the issues

surrounding CPRs and their management, as well as the existing theories about them. Ostrom’s

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definition of a common-pool resource is “a natural or man-made resource system2 that is

sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from

obtaining benefits from its use” (Ostrom 30). The breadth of access to the resource does not

affect its status as a CPR. Common examples of CPRs include open pastures, fisheries, forests

and minerals. Management of these resources poses a problem since they are, as the name

suggests, common goods and therefore non-excludable, but rival3. The problem then lies in the

fact that while everyone has the right to use the resource, it is not possible for everyone to use it

freely and continuously into the future. There are three established models that describe how this

situation unfolds, if certain conditions are present. They are Garrett Hardin’s “tragedy of the

commons,” Dawes et al.’s “prisoner’s dilemma game” and Mancur Olson’s “logic of collective

action.”

Garrett Hardin presents the “tragedy of the commons” using the example of an open

pasture. Multiple herdsmen use this land to graze their cattle. Each individual herdsman wants to

maximize his personal benefit; therefore he wants to allow the maximum number of cattle to

feed on this land. Adding one additional animal creates a positive effect from the additional

proceeds the herdsman will receive from that additional healthy animal. The negative effect is

created by reducing the total amount of grass available for all the other cattle to graze upon. The

individual herdsman gains the entirety of the positive effect, but shares the negative effect

amongst all the other herdsmen. Therefore, the overall effect he feels is positive and it is in his

benefit to allow another animal to graze on the land. The dilemma lies in the fact that all the

herdsmen cannot keep adding animals limitlessly, for eventually the demand for the resource will

2 Ostrom makes a clear point to differentiate between a resource system (a fixed reserve) and the flow of resource units (the units being what are produced by the system to be used by people) (Ostrom 30).3 Non-excludable: no person can be prohibited from using the good; Rival: one person’s consumption of the good decreases the total amount available (Tietenberg)

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outpace the supply and the resource will run out (Hardin)4. This is Hardin’s determination of

what will occur in a CPR situation, without other intervention in the natural tendency of human

beings.

According to Ostrom, the prisoner’s dilemma game5 can be thought of as a more

formalized version of the “tragedy of the commons” (Ostrom 3). The study done by Dawes et al.

examined a CPR situation in which the subjects are all made fully aware of their surrounding

circumstances and the consequences of their choices, and also are not allowed to communicate

with others involved6. Each individual in the group is presented with a set of choices, with

varying respective outcomes, each choice also dependent also on the choices of the others. The

study found that if each individual made the choice that would personally benefit them the most,

regardless of the others’ choices, then the collective group would end up with a worse outcome.

If the individuals each chose a slightly less preferable, but more equitable outcome, then the

collective group outcome would be the greatest. This exhibits the “paradox that individually

rational strategies lead to collectively irrational outcomes” (Ostrom 5). Similar to Hardin’s

conclusion, this study deduces that human beings seem incapable of collectively managing a

resource without outside intervention.

Mancur Olson developed a third perspective on the issue of the commons in his book,

The Logic of Collective Action7. The main purpose of his book was to argue against group

theory8 and show that individuals within a group do not act in the best interest of the group solely

4 For further reading on The Tragedy of the Commons, read Hardin’s original article (Hardin).5 For further reading on the prisoner’s dilemma game, read the original report (Dawes)6 Note that the situation was a noncooperative one, meaning that in most cases communication is not allowed or possible, but in certain cases it could be. In these particular cases communication is considered irrelevant and/or any verbal agreements are considered nonbinding (Ostrom 4)7 Reference Olson’s book for further reading (Olson)8 “There is a traditional theory of group behavior that implicitly assumes that private groups and associations operate according to principles entirely different from those that govern the relationships among firms in the marketplace or between taxpayers and the state...” (Olson 16)

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for the reason that it would be in the best interest of the group. His most quoted argument is that

“unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special

device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational self-interested individuals will

not act to achieve their common or group interests. (Olson 1965, p. w. emphasis in original)”

(Ostrom 6). Here a third conclusion is made of the same nature-humans act in their own best

interest, with no regard for greater implications, without an outside incentive to do otherwise.

Ostrom concludes her brief discussion of these three models stating, “at the heart of each

of these models is the free-rider problem” (Ostrom 6). This occurs, as described above in

Hardin’s example, when a person is not forced to bear the full burden of their action and this

burden is shared among others. That person will get more immediate benefit by acting and will

do so in his or her own self-interest, even though the greater group is penalized. Ostrom goes on

to recognize the validity of the arguments made in the preceding three models, but contends that

these are very specific to the structure and circumstances outlined within the models. This is not

necessarily true to reality. In these models, participants are never able to affect or alter anything

regarding their surrounding circumstances, yet in the real world this is inaccurate (Ostrom 7).

She then goes on to make the point that historically policy makers have assumed that these strict

models are true to reality. They have acted in the belief that these represent only guide to

handling CPR problems, which leads to rigid government regulation, or a Leviathan force9. Here,

“proponents of centralized control want an external government agency to decide the specific…

strategy that central authority considers best for the situation” (Ostrom 9). This may be a

bureaucratically easier and more simplistic pathway to choose, but may not be the best choice in

the long run for managing resources effectively and sustainably. Ostrom then presents an

For further discussion refer to Olson’s section titled “C. The Traditional Theory of Groups”9 The Leviathan: “a coercive force outside their individual psyches” (Ostrom 9)

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alternative solution, which forms the basis for her research and the rest of the book. When

comparing her alternative theory to the previously described models, she indicates the most

important difference is that in her proposed solution, “participants themselves design their own

contracts” (Ostrom 17). This means that no external agent is defining the rules of management or

enforcement, but the people who will be actually following these rules are the ones who set

them. The advantage of this is best described in her authentic language:

“The self-interest of those who negotiated the contract will lead them to monitor each

other and to report observed infractions so that the contract is enforced. A Regulatory

agency, on the other hand, always needs to hire its own monitors. The regulatory agency

then faces the principal-agent problem of how to ensure its monitors do their own job”

(Ostrom 17).

It is generally accepted that humans are self-interested and it logical to utilize that natural

tendency in any solution. Human beings are going to pay attention to what is occurring around

them when their livelihoods are at risk of being impacted by others’ actions. To illustrate, a

person who directly depends on wild caught fish to make a living will be much more likely to

monitor survival of the fish than will someone who gets paid by an external group to monitor

that same species.

Ostrom concludes by clearly stating that this is not the only solution, there is no single

silver bullet. She simply is proposing an alternative idea that she has found to be effective in

many specific cases. She also notes that in her studies she has come across cases in which this

model of management did not work. She suggests that the reason for this difference is likely an

internal factor within those involved10 (Ostrom 21). The last point Ostrom makes in introducing

10 Empirical examples of failed collective action institutions in Turkey, Sri Lanka, Nova Scotia and California can be found in Chapter 5 (Ostrom 143).

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these issues is that the use of metaphorical models in reality is usually quite limited and they are

difficult to implement successfully. Actual situations and the actions of a human being do not

always follow the path set out in these models, so it is unrealistic to expect a policy based on

those models to work successfully. She states, “scientific knowledge is as much an

understanding of the diversity of situations for which a theory or its models are relevant as an

understanding of its limits” (Ostrom 24). This is a key perspective to keep in mind when

assessing strategies of natural resource management, specifically because these scientifically

based models should not be expected to fit flawlessly into a practical situation.

Later on in her book, Ostrom outlines eight specific attributes that identify successful

collective action institutions for managing CPRs in the long-term. They are listed in Figure 2,

Table 3.111 and form the framework for this analysis of the Coral Triangle. In short, the eight

principles are: clear boundaries, congruent rules, collective-choice arrangements, monitoring,

graduated sanctions, conflict-resolution, minimal recognition of rights to organize and nested

enterprises (Ostrom 90).

The Coral Triangle

The Coral Triangle12 is the “ region is located along the equator at the confluence of the

Western Pacific and Indian Oceans… covering all or part of the exclusive economic zones of six

countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands and

Timor-Leste” (CTI-CFF CTI Regional Plan of Action 5). This area is quite small relative to Earth

but contains largely disproportionate amounts of biodiversity, sources of food and critical natural

11 See Figure 2: Table 3.1 - Reproduced from text (Ostrom 90)12 See Figure 1: Map of the Coral Triangle

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habitats. The mangrove and coral habitats are essential to the inhabitants of these nations both in

terms of the coastal protection they provide and as a driver of important tourism revenue. They

are also critical habitats for tuna and other species of fish that provide food for locals and also

create revenue though food and product sales. The estimated value of these habitats is US $2.3

billion (CTI-CFF CTI RPoA 5). These areas are all in danger of decimation due to the global

trends of industrialization and expansion. In response to these threats, it was proposed by

President Yudhoyono of Indonesia that the six countries of the Coral Triangle should form a new

multinational initiative, later named the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI), to work together to

protect their precious shared natural resources (CTI-CFF CTI RPoA 6). Following his proposal, a

number of events were held to collaboratively organize a plan of action. The CTI Regional Plan

of Action (RPoA) is the product of these efforts.

Nine guiding principles13 were outlined for all countries to follow when creating and

implementing their own national plans. Furthermore, a four-level structure was outlined. The

first level solidifies the five Goals shared by all six nations: “(i) priority seascapes14; (ii)

ecosystem approach to managing fisheries and other marine resources; (iii) marine protected

areas15; (iv) climate change adaptation; and (v) threatened species” (CTI-CFF CTI RPoA 9). The

second level requires that timetables be set for Targets determined within the plan. The third

level defines that there will be regional Actions or Activities that all countries will adopt or

pursue. The fourth and final level consists of national Actions or Activities that are country-

13 See Figure 3: Section 2 of the RPoA, 9 Guiding Principles14 Seascapes: “Large, multiple-use marine areas, defined scientifically and strategically, in which government authorities, private organizations, and other stakeholders cooperate to conserve the diversity and abundance of marine life and to promote human well-being” (Atkinson et al. 2).15 Marine Protected Area (MPA): “Any area of intertidal or subtidal terrain, together with its overlying water and associated flora, fauna, historical and cultural features, which has been reserved by law or other effective means to protect part or all of the enclosed environment” (Kelleher xviii)

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specific (CTI-CFF CTI RPoA 9). All of the six countries use these five Goals as the basic

structure of their national plans. In the following discussion, Goal 4 was not a focus, as it dealt

with the broader environmental issue of climate change rather than a natural resource issue.

Comparison of Coral Triangle Initiative and Ostrom’s Principles

At this point, the comparison can be made as to how closely these CTI principles align

with those defined by Ostrom. It is clear that the CTI RPoA makes it a priority to include all

affected stakeholders in the processes outlined in the plan. The ideas of “capacity building”,

“collaboration” and “data & knowledge sharing” are littered throughout the document. Of

Ostrom’s eight principles, three are outlined extensively, two are intuitively present, and three

are only hinted at for future design and implementation.

The first three principles Ostrom lists appear frequently in the outlined Actions for Goals

1, 2, 3 and 5. The description of the plan for Goal 1, “priority seascapes”, begins with Target 1,

which is the process of delineating the seascapes – directly in line with Ostrom’s first principle,

“clearly defined boundaries” (CTI-CFF CTI RPoA 10). Another place this principle is employed

is under Goal 3, “MPAs”. The second Regional Action is to create a map of the MPA networks

to be designated. In the detail of the plan, it is stated that this is to be done in consultation with

local communities, other stakeholders and the government (CTI-CFF CTI RPoA 19). The idea of

consultation and consideration for the local communities and ecosystems already in place

appears somewhere in every Target plan. Details from Goal 1 and Goal 2 highlight this. In the

annotations explaining Target 1, it is stated that plans must “balance diverse societal objectives

by taking account of the knowledge and uncertainties of biotic, abiotic and human components

of ecosystems and their interactions…[and that] governance should ensure both human and

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ecosystem well-being and equity (CTI-CFF CTI RPoA 12).” In the annotations explaining Target

3, acquiring an understanding of the tuna’s life history and local importance is made a priority

before action is taken. Later, it is stated that in order “to make significant progress toward this

target, all of the major relevant stakeholder groups will need to be engaged…” (CTI-CFF CTI

RPoA 15). Ostrom’s third principle deals with the fact that it is close to impossible to implement

a management plan that has not taken into account local circumstances. It is clear from the first

part of highlighted sections above that the CTI directs countries to pay attention to the specifics

of localities. The capacity of the ecosystem to provide resources, the existing needs of the people

and the current stresses and trends must all be weighed together in order to create an effective

management plan. Similarly, the RPoA makes the point to recognize the different categories of

importance, both economic and cultural, of tuna to the coastal people and include those in the

analysis of future action. As would be expected, a crucial part of accommodating these factors

requires local input from all sectors. These groups must be included in the planning, execution

and future monitoring of these plans. Other plans for collaborative opportunities include national

and sub-national stakeholder forums regarding Goal 1,16 a CTI Forum on Tuna Governance,17

and a CTI Forum on Management of and International Trade in Coral Reef-Based Organisms18

regarding Goal 2 (CTI-CFF CTI RPoA 12; 16; 17). These are only a few of many examples that

illustrate how Ostrom’s first three principles have been incorporated into the RPoA.

16 The stated goal of these national and sub-national stakeholder forums is to “promote dialogue on sustainable fisheries management and EAFM (Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management)” (CTI-CFF CTI RPoA 12).17 The goal of the CTI Forum on Tuna Governance is to “serve as an informal dialogue and partnership mechanism to share information, advance the…work program…[and] promote practical solutions toward sustainable management of shared tuna stocks, including through public-private partnerships” (CTI-CFF CTI RPoA 16).18 The goal of the CTI Forum on Management of and International Trade in Coral Reef-Based Organisms is the same as the Forum on Tuna Governance, just with a focus on other reef-based organisms aside from tuna (CTI-CFF CTI RPoA 17).

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An interesting change in language is found in the section regarding Goal 5. While the

overarching themes are still present, the Targets and related Actions are more regionally strict in

their direction. Regional Actions 1 through 6 include distinctly region-wide conservation plans

for sharks, sea turtles, sea birds, marine mammals, reef fish and invertebrates and a protection

plan against invasive species. The last two Regional Actions focus on enhancing the ability of

the individual nations to implement these regional initiatives, rather than individualize their own.

This is likely due to the fact that these animals are not physically limited to habitats by legal

boundaries. Since it is hard to delineate boundaries for marine species’ territories by nation, it is

only reasonable to expect that the entire Coral Triangle will have to work together to share in the

responsibilities for preserving and protecting these species. As Ostrom’s first principle points

out, it is essential that boundaries be clearly defined for collective action institutions to perform

well. The smallest living environment that can be defined for these marine species is the entire

Coral Triangle itself, explaining why this Goal takes on a tone less concerned with each

individual nation.

Ostrom’s fourth, fifth and sixth principles mainly deal with issues of monitoring and

enforcement. Both topics are hinted at in the RPoA, but are not outlined in detail. It is noted in

multiple locations at the end of a Goal description that evaluations will have to be made

periodically and possibly upon those findings, adjustments would be made. The specifics of how

these evaluations will be completed are not outlined and it would be expected that this be due to

the infancy of this initiative. The most specific description of enforcement is found under Goal 2,

Regional Action 2, which identifies the objective of a Target as to “improve enforcement of

IUU19 fishing through greater collaboration” (CTI-CFF CTI RPoA 13). Here the specific types of

19 IUU: Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (CTI-CFF CTI RPoA 13)

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infractions are mentioned20, as well as some recommendations21 for how this monitoring should

be conducted. Despite these brief mentions, it is suggested that these plans would need further

overall development before effective monitoring and enforcement tactics could be advanced.

The last two principles Ostrom defines are not as explicitly mentioned as the previous

and are inferred from the structure of the plan. In application to the Coral Triangle, her seventh

principle would describe a situation in which individual countries were not prohibited from

defining their own action plans. This is the situation constructed by the CTI. It is inherent in the

composition of the RPoA that the individual nations will be able to construct their own national

plans without obstacles by higher authorities. Her eighth principle describes a situation in which

there are different levels of resource management. This is present as well, as there are plans for

multiple levels of committees. At the top will be the CTI Coordination Committee which “must

become a ‘large tent’ under which major stakeholder groups and related initiatives can combine

and coordinate their actions to achieve shared visions for communities, large-scale seascape,

entire countries, markets and the CTI Implementation Area as a whole” (CTI-CFF CTI RPoA

26). Following this statement plans for coordination at the regional, sub-regional and country

levels are explained. At the country level, National Coordination Committees take point on

national plans and are the main mediator between the Coral Triangle region and the individual

nation. Within each of these areas the committees communicate information and organize actions

among the various stakeholders. This structure fits the type that Ostrom describes in her eighth

principle, “nested enterprises”, which is specific to larger systems, such at the Coral Triangle.

20 Specific infractions include “IUU fishing as transnational organized crime”; “illegal, cross-border fishing by small-scale, large-scale and trans-boundary fishing” (CTI-CFF CTI RPoA 13).21 An example recommendation is “Encouragement of Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) in monitoring fishing activities of large-scale and transboundary fishing fleet” (CTI-CFF CTI RPoA 13).

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Description of Study Areas and National Programs

I have selected two of the six countries to focus on in more detail regarding their National

Plans of Action. Both Indonesia and Papua New Guinea used the RPoA as strong guidance in

forming their plans. While the overall compositions of the two plans are similar, the level of

emphasis on community involvement is greatly different. Indonesia’s National Plan of Action

(NPoA) is very similar in language to the RPoA. There is little extra information added. This

contrasts with Papua New Guinea’s, which begins the plan document with a long description of

the individual issues the country faces and the current situations the citizens find themselves in.

Throughout the entire document, the importance of participation by local communities in

management decisions and processes is expressed. The differences between the two will be

explored in some more detail in the next section.

Indonesia’s NPoA mirrors the RPoA structurally, although the specific plans are tailored

to the nation’s needs and abilities (CTI-CFF Indonesia 9). These plans were tied into the already

existing governmental regulations for these resources. One of the main themes throughout their

NPoA was consistency across national and local levels. While all stakeholders were included in

the development of strategies for achieving Goals, the direction came mostly from the top-down.

It is designated that the government agencies are to lead working groups that are focused on

maintaining consistency amongst themselves, as well as work with “other stakeholders including

international, national and local Non-Governmental Organizations, provincial and district

governments, universities and experts” (CTI-CFF Indonesia 10). It is important to note that there

is no mention of the public in this list. In the latter part of the NPoA, an Appendix of Indicative

Activities is found, where specific details of planned priority Activities are presented. Here is

where the emphasis on primary government policy is highlighted. Many of the intended

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“outputs” from Activities are simply government regulations to be implemented or studies to be

done to supplement those regulations. The inclusion of local people and intent to enhance their

ability to contribute and manage the resources they are in daily contact with is predominately

absent from the details of Goal 1. It is expected that mostly officials and action at higher levels

will handle the management of seascapes and their delineations22. There is some mention of

collaboration with locals in Action 2 under Target 1, Goal 2. Here, plans for training regarding

sustainable fishing practices are laid out (CITE 32). Throughout the detailed plans for this Goal

are the few direct references to local capacity building in Indonesia’s NPoA. Goal 3, regarding

MPAs, and Goal 5, regarding threatened species, are also place more emphasis on national

policy and broader terms of regulation. An interesting note about Goal 5 is that it is by far the

most clear about plans for monitoring and enforcement. Ostrom’s fourth principle emphasized

the need for active auditing of CPR conditions and accountability. Here we find within the

Detailed Activities that there are specific plans for “[a] monitoring and enforcement mechanism

involving trade associations,” “outreach on the enforcement of Government Regulation[s],” “[a]

wildlife crime unit,” and “enforce[ment of a] turtle by-catch reduction program” (CTI-CFF

Indonesia 50-52). Unlike in the RPoA, Indonesia has set out specific actions to be taken with

respect to enforcing these grand plans. This is one of the few differences between Indonesia’s

NPoA and the RPoA. Both documents are otherwise similar in style and language, which is not

surprising as it was stated distinctly that the NPoA mirrored the RPoA (CTI-CFF Indonesia 9).

The structure of the National Plan of Action (NPoA) for Papua New Guinea (PNG) strays

from the format of the RPoA and Indonesia’s NPoA. PNG includes more information regarding

the nation’s cultural and social situation and the programs already in existence. It is literally

22 See pages 27-31 in Indonesia’s NPoA. There is a focus on national policy and data collection across the entire nation, but little mention of local capacity building except for one “Detailed Activity” under Action 2.

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written in the National Constitution of Papua New Guinea that the country's “natural resources

and environment [are] to be conserved and used for the collective benefit for us all, and to be

replenished for future generations” (CTI-CFF Papua New Guinea 3). These themes of inclusivity

and sustainability at all levels are constantly found throughout this NPoA and are central values

of PNG. The community is mentioned with the government in a way that states or indicates a

partnership, rather than one serving or reporting to the other. The usage of the word

“partnership” comes for the stated purpose of the PNG Marine Program (CTI-CFF Papua 8).

This program and its purposes were in place prior to the creation of CTI and have only been

supplemented or enhanced since then. The importance of local community is obvious throughout

the NPoA, which is not surprising after learning that “over 90% of coastal and near shore

resources are under customary ownership,” meaning that locals use traditional knowledge when

managing these resources rather than new scientific data and studies (CTI-CFF Papua 9). It’s

explicitly stated that awareness of the impact of Marine Program actions be made a priority

among these communities. Another example of the emphasis on including locals in decision-

making can be found in the plans for program implementation. The Department of Environment

and Conservation (DEC) is assigned to take the lead in coordinating the program, but it is made

clear that the DEC must identify ways for stakeholders at all levels to participate (CTI-CFF

Papua 19). Multiple times in this section, concern for stakeholders is set as a priority, as well as

the importance of stakeholder participation in implementation is recognized-there is an entire

section describing how other stakeholders will be involved (CTI-CFF Papua 20). In the plan,

there is a graphic illustration of the “flow of implementation”, which shows the interconnectivity

of all stakeholders23. Following the lengthy description of PNG’s existing situation and

programs, the details of Activities planned in accordance with the Goals outlined in the RPoA

23 See Figure 4: Flow chart of implementation, PNG Marine Program

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are addressed. Here you find little derivation from the general plans and ideas of the RPoA.

Although as stated above, the emphasis lies more on connections with the local community

compared to the emphasis on government-led regulation in the Indonesian NPoA.

After reviewing the Regional Plan of Action and both National Plans of Action of

Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, it is can be concluded presently that Ostrom’s ideas regarding

collective action institutions are being applied. As Ostrom stated in her own work, her principles

are not strictly applicable, nor are they the only solution. The Coral Triangle, as well as both

nations have taken these ideas of managing at the collective level and applied them to their plans

in ways that fit their individual situations. Her eighth principle regarding nested enterprises is the

basis for structuring the CTI RPoA and also can be found in both NPoAs, although more

strongly in Indonesia’s. The first three principles regarding clear boundaries, well-fitting rules

and collective choice are referenced or inferred repeatedly in all three Plans of Action. The

principles regarding monitoring and enforcement are only lightly touched on, if at all, due to the

newness of the CTI and its corresponding plans. It will take further development of these plans

to determine the full extent to which Ostrom’s ideas in this area are actually implemented and the

level to which they are successful. There is an opportunity for further research and exploration in

measuring the success of these plans and the Coral Triangle Initiative. At this time, it can only be

concluded that Elinor Ostrom’s main principles regarding institutions of collective action are

being employed in the Coral Triangle Initiative’s Regional Plan of Action, as well as at a lower

level in the National Plans of Action for Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.

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PART II

Comparison of State of the Coral Triangle Reports and National Plans of Action

In part two of this paper, the State of the Coral Triangle Reports will be compared with

the National Plans of Action for Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. The State of the Coral

Triangle Reports (SCTR_ were released by each country in the Coral Triangle in 2012, three

years after the start of the Coral Triangle Initiative, containing an evaluation of their progress

towards completing the Goals of the CTI. To compare intended progress with actual progress,

the original timelines set for each Activity will be evaluated with what was reportedly

accomplished. Refer to Figures 5 and 6 for a bar chart representing this comparison. After

assessing progress for each individual country, the countries’ progress under each Goal will be

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compared to each other and areas where one country is exceeding the other or they are on par

with one another will be identified. Lastly, the final conclusions will be presented regarding

where Elinor Ostrom’s principles of collective action institutions are being effectively employed

or are lacking with respect to the implementation of the CTI.

Indonesia is one of the leaders in the Coral Triangle with respect to seascapes. In the past

few years since the creation of the Initiative, they have largely stayed on track with respect to

Goal 1, regarding seascapes, having at least started all Activities under this Goal. There are nine

seascape priority areas that have been designated, and plans for the creation of more are in the

works. They have been consistently developing priority seascapes each year since the start of the

Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI). These plans are continuously being addressed and finalized,

along with discussions regarding strategies for and sources of sustainable financing. Overall,

Target 1, dealing with delineation of seascapes, has been completed or is ongoing per the

original timeline. Target 2, focusing on sustainable management of seascapes, is also well

underway, with only the funding situation remaining unclear (Dirhamsyah et al 180-183).

Under Goal 2, Indonesia is mostly on track with Targets 1 and 2. Target 1 dealt with

regulatory frameworks to achieve Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management (EAFM),

drafts have been completed and baseline information compiled, but these policies have not been

finalized. Effective regulation of IUU fishing is being set up and there are plans to enact

community training and international cooperation between Indonesia and Australia. These

Activities are mostly on track with the original timeline. Target 2 addressed COASTFISH, or the

CTI Sustainable Coastal Fisheries and Poverty Reduction Initiative. All Activities under this

Target are underway per the National Plan of Action (NPoA), which provides that they will

continue to strengthen institutional capacity, develop cooperation between industry and

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government, as well as develop fishery product standards. The report indicates that the length of

time needed to complete these Activities will be longer than originally expected. Target 3,

dealing with sustainable management of tuna fisheries, is also underway with a Cold Chain

System24 developed and tagging programs established. Other Activities have yet to begin, but are

in sync with the original timeline. The final Target has seen the least progress, as there are at

least eight Activities to be completed under each of the three Actions needed to reach Target 4.

With respect to sustainable life-reef fish trading and reef-based ornamental fish trading,

Indonesia has developed a Database of Marine Ornamental Fish and is finalizing and

implementing a management plan for the Banggai cardinalfish25. There is still much to be done

to complete management, monitoring and evaluation plans as designated in the NPoA. These

were to have been commenced in 2012, but Indonesia is only in the early stages of preparing for

this type of comprehensive management (Dirhamsyah et al 183-187).

Indonesia is also doing quite well with Goal 3, Marine Protected Area (MPA)

management. This is similar to seascape management, so it is understandable that they would be

excelling under this Goal as well. Almost all Actions under this Goal have been initiated and are

well on their way to completion and on track with the original timeline. It is stated in the State of

the Coral Triangle Report (SCTR), “development of [a] national MPA system is in progress and

will [be] integrated into [a] regional and global network” (Dirhamsyah et al. 188). The

involvement of local communities and indigenous people is mandated in policy26, aiding in other

24 A cold chain system consists of refrigeration technology to ensure freshness and viability of the product, in this case tuna (Making a Good Catch).25 The Banggai cardinalfish is a popular aquarium fish and previous to this Initiative, their collection had been largely unregulated (Lunn). More information can be found in the cited article.26 Ministerial Decree No Per.02/MEN/2009 cites that MPA designation process should consult, discuss with and be agreed upon by local communities (Dirhamsyah et al. 189)

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capacity building plans. This policy is an example of the many27 that have been adopted that

enhance the ability of Indonesia as a whole to address MPA management effectively. Even

sustainable funding has been addressed, which is a problem that most other countries in the Coral

Triangle have yet to address. A Sustainable Financing Working Group has been created and has

begun work to establish a Trust Fund for Conservation. The general management plans for

MPAs have been developed and implemented, as well as annual monitoring of these areas.

Action 2, regarding trans-boundary protected areas, is the only one yet to be implemented, as it is

still under review by the central government. Looking forward, they are on track to create a

learning network for MPA management, further assessments for the effectiveness of their MPA

management programs and continue work on the Trust Fund for Conservation (Dirhamsyah et al

187-191).

Indonesia has begun to address climate change, the subject of Goal 4. About half of the

Activities that were schedule to begin by the date of the SCTR have actually seen progress.

While this is not substantial progress, it should be noted that the majority of Activities under

Goal 4 are much more long-term than Activities for other Goals. Target 1 is aimed to develop a

climate change adaptation plan. Most of the current research has been completed on coral reefs

and their threats. These records are growing and are quite in depth, so it would seem that

Indonesia is primed to begin the implementation processes. Also, public awareness programs and

training for local authorities on climate change preparedness are underway and ongoing. The

research to support Target 2, regarding Networked National Centers of Excellence on Climate

Change Adaptations, has also been ample which will help propel policy in the future. The stated

plans for the next three years do not include all Actions under this Goal, but it is clear some

progress is being made. Many of the Activities designated in the NPoA are long term or set to

27 Other policies in place are listed in Indonesia’s SCTR (Dirhamsyah et al. 189)

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begin in the future. In the NPoA, only about half of the Activities were planned to have been

commenced prior to the release of this SCTR. Of this half only a few have seen specific

progress, although the research being completed can be applied to multiple Actions under this

Goal (Dirhamsyah et al 191-193).

There are no specifics provided for Action updates for Goal 5, which addresses

conservation of threatened species. The title of the section is listed as “Implementation of Action

Plans for 2010-2012,” but through additional research it is believed that the dates are meant to be

2012-2015 to indicate future plans. One of the designated Actions is to determine species

protection status for the Napoleon Wrasse (Dirhamsyah et al 194). At the end of 2012, scientists

and conservationists were still pushing for more protection of the species. Special status has not

been designated past specific quotas for harvest, which have been lowered year after year with

continuously declining populations (Nurhayati). This leads me to conclude that formal protection

is a planned future endeavor. Additional research did not lead to a record of a specific turtle trade

facilitation Discussion Meeting, which is also listed. While essentially no progress has been

recorded in the SCTR, there are specified actions to be taken in the near future. It is reasonable to

assume these will be addressed, as Indonesia has set the foundation for action through its efforts

to complete other areas of its National Plan of Action effectively.

Papua New Guinea (PNG) is considerably behind Indonesia relative to their original plan

in developing seascapes under Goal 1. Only one of eight Activities under the first Target of

designating priority seascapes appears to have started; and that one has yet to be completed. All

of these Activities were planned to have begun in 2010 or 2011. Likewise, the second Target, of

sustainably managing resources within these seascapes, has seen no progress. For most of these

Activities, there is no status provided in the SCTR, which is likely because resources cannot be

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managed if the areas in which they reside are not defined. Here again Ostrom’s principle of

definite boundaries is applicable. One discrepancy found deals with Seascape Investment Plans.

In the overview paragraph, it is stated that “Seascape Investment Plans for priority seascapes are

completed, along with arrangements for sequencing investments in line with the PNG Vision

205028” (National CTI 35). PNG also lists each specific Activity under the Targets in a chart with

their current status, in which the Activities dealing with Investment Plans are marked as “not

started” or without a status. It is unclear as to why this discrepancy exists, so the choice was

made to follow the information listed in the chart, as it was the most detailed and in the same

format as other Goals (National CTI 35-37).

Goal 2 of the Marine Program dealt with Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management

(EAFM) and PNG has made more progress toward these Targets, but there are some that were

scheduled to be underway and have seen no progress. There are a few areas in which PNG is on

track and a few areas in which steps have been taken, but not as many as originally planned for

by this point in time. Target 1 has seen the least progress, with only two Activities commenced.

This is mostly due to the fact that assessment and strengthening of current legislation has yet to

take place, making implementing EAFM amendments difficult. Target 2 has seen the most

progress, with seven out of eight Activities underway as outlined in the National Plan of Action

(NPoA). Almost all of these dealt with efforts to improve community involvement in

management and are ongoing and on track with the original schedule. Targets 3 and 4 deal with

sustainable tuna stock and the live reef trade and have both experienced moderate progress. Most

of the Activities are ongoing or at least have been started – the ones that have not been deal with

28 PNG Vision 2050 is the National Strategic Plan whose mission states, “we will mobilize to create wealth through smart innovative ideas, quality services and equitable distribution of benefits for all citizens” (CTI-CFF Papua 11).

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conducting SWOT29 type analyses and building local capacity and knowledge. PNG recognizes

that the current policies are not directly aimed at EAFM and their programs are more ineffective

due to this fact. It is expected that several proposed amendments will be adopted in the near

future that will directly address and support EAFM Targets, which is a major theme throughout

Goal 2. With the passage of these directly relevant amendments, progress towards meeting

Targets will be facilitated and therefore speedier. With respect to training for local communities,

efforts have been largely supported by The Nature Conservancy. While there has been good

progress overall, there are specific holes in this training with respect to tuna and live reef

fisheries that should be addressed. PNG concludes their status assessment by defining the main

gaps in their EAFM efforts, which include a formally endorsed policy, specific provisions in

existing legislation, development of Fisheries and Ecosystem Management Plans modified from

traditional Fisheries Management Plans, and further training of EAFM for all involved in its

operations (National CTI 37-41).

Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are the subject of Goal 3. PNG’s SCTR states that there

currently are no MPAs within PNG territory. However, this overlooks the Maza Wildlife

Management Area. While not officially a MPA, it serves a similar purpose as a refuge for turtles

and dugong. It could benefit from a government endorsed protected area plan now, rather than

MPAs that still need to be designed. There are also plans to create Locally Managed Marine

Areas, which will become part of the MPA network when it is approved and operational, as is

the stated Target. So far, efforts to develop a national MPA system have been slow to get off the

ground. While initial plans have been developed and awareness has increased, implementation

all depends on support from all stakeholders and the government. As of the completion of the

SCTR, a discussion paper had been circulated leading to a draft Protected Area Policy. There are

29 SWOT analyses identify Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats

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plans to consult with stakeholders about this proposed plan, but no action has been taken. So

even though six of the twelve Activities have been commenced, Goal 3 has yet to see much

tangible progress past discussion and intent (National CTI 42-44).

The report on Goal 4 did not have specific updates with respect to individual Activities.

From the overall discussion though, it can be concluded that almost all Targets are underway

except for the last – the integration of climate resilience into PNG policy. The country seems to

be making an all-around effort to raise awareness of climate change and its impacts as well as to

develop coastal protection. This has been done through the Activities designated in the original

NPoA. These include vulnerability mapping, large mangrove planting projects30, development of

an early warning system, increased coral reef protection programs and provincial consultations to

educate people on climate change and issues specific to them. Even though it cannot be

specifically said how far along PNG is with respect to each Activity, it would seem that Goal 4

has seen the most progress (National CTI 44).

Goal 5 was not specifically addressed in the SCTR.

The observations from the individual SCTRs are largely in line with the Regional

SCTR’s assessment of effort allocated to completing each Goal under their NPoAs. In Figure 7,

the “relative level of allocation of effort” is shown for each country and each Goal with colors

corresponding to the “proportion of effort allocated per CTI Goal” (Alino 23). Indonesia is far

ahead of PNG in MPA development (Goal 3) and shows more progress as well in seascape

development (Goal 1). Indonesia is ahead in EAFM regulations (Goal 2), but only by one

quantitative category of effort. Both countries are then in the lowest categories of effort for both

climate change adaptation (Goal 4) and threatened species protection (Goal 5), but it is not

30 An example is the “Millions of Mangroves” project, which, as the name suggest, “aims to facilitate the planting of millions of mangrove trees” through workshops, supporting nurseries and distribution network of mangroves and seed stock (National CTI 44).

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discernable from this chart whether within that category one country has made further efforts

than the other. Though through this assessment, it seems that PNG has a bit of head start on

Indonesia for Goal 4.

It is not surprising that Indonesia would be far ahead of PNG in seascape and MPA

development. Prior to the CTI, seascapes and MPAs were already established or in the works in

Indonesia. Specifically, the Bird’s Head Seascape was designated in 2004 and is composed of

“10 multiple-use MPAs” (Conservation International). It is also stated in this description that the

Bird’s Head Seascape has a “strong focus on policy engagement with governmental institutions

at [all] levels,” as well as involvement by multiple NGO partners and local communities

(Conservation International). It is even stated that this is a model for other countries trying to

implement similar initiatives. Two other seascapes designated prior to the creation of the CTI are

the Karimunjawa and Sulu-Sulawesi Seascape (Atkinson). With existing programs such as this,

Indonesia was primed to meet the Targets of Goals 1 and 3 on track and with relative ease. The

PNG government did not have these types of formal seascape programs in place, making it more

difficult to develop seascapes on their own. The main existing MPA system in place was

researched organized and mainly managed by The Nature Conservancy (TNC). The Governor of

PNG has expressed his support of TNC initiatives in this area, but has largely relied on TNC to

carry out the related activities. This is the Kimbe Bay MPA network, which in 2007 was

proposed through identification of 15 Areas of Interest (Green). Additional research did not

result in any readily available information indicating that the PNG government had previously

organized seascapes or MPAs. There clear difference in the base that was set for seascape and

MPA development in each country. From the SCTRs, it can be assessed that Indonesia is well on

its way to achieving Goals 1 and 3, while PNG seems to be slow to get implementation programs

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off the ground. This assessment is well supported by the information above regarding the status

of seascapes and MPAs in each country prior to the inception of the CTI.

Both Indonesia and PNG have made clear progress towards reaching 3 of the 4 Targets

under Goal 2, although these Targets differ in exact content. Each country is lacking progress

toward different Targets though. Indonesia has been slow to fully develop and implement plans

to management live-reef fish trading. PNG has made progress implementing community level

management programs, specifically with sustainable tuna fishing and life-reef trading. On the

other hand, Indonesia has regulatory policies in the final stages of development or in place for

EAFM and IUU fishing, whereas, PNG has struggled with implementing and finalizing EAFM

friendly legislation. With respect to Goal 2, the two countries are having difficulties with the

areas that the other is making progress. Indonesia’s implementation tends to come from the top-

down, which could be why it has been slow to implement management at a lower level. PNG is

likely having difficulty getting legislation passed because it has typically operated with a bottom-

up structure relying on traditional knowledge and less formal regulation of resources.

Climate change is a topic that both countries have recognized as important and have

started overall efforts to addressing Goal 4. Only Indonesia outlines specific progress with

respect to individual Targets under the Goal, so it is hard to directly compare the amount of

tangible progress. From each country’s qualitative assessment of progress it can be observed that

progress is being made and that these actions will be played out over the long term. Both are

working to fortify current climate change research, develop forms of adaptation plans and

increase public awareness. Although this presents a slight contrast with the RSCTR, which found

that both countries were in the lowest category of effort allocated to addressing climate change.

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It can be inferred that both countries have recognized the importance of this Goal, but are slower

to implement its long-term Activities.

Neither country had recorded progress with respect to Goal 5. PNG fails to even address

specific future actions to be taken. Indonesia identifies a few specific Activities to be completed

in recent years to come. It is immediately unclear as to why specific progress has not been

recorded in this report and will require more research to determine this. The lack of specific

evidence is in line with the RSCTR’s finding that both countries have committed minimal effort

to this Goal.

Other Management Issues in the State of the Coral Triangle Reports

In addition to assessing their progress with respect to the original 5 Goals of their NPoAs,

both countries identified other management issues they were currently experiencing and

expected to continue in to the future. It is interesting to note that both countries identified the

same main three issues: capacity building, public awareness and sustainable financing.

Sustainable financing is by far the most significant management challenge facing both

Indonesia and PNG as they proceed to implement their NPoAs. “The fundamental outcome of

sustainable financing is to have a plan or strategy designed to have diversified income streams,

increased administrative efficient, cost-effective linkage between income and activities to

address key management challenges, good governance characteristics, and incentives for local

institutions for manage activities and budgets in a more cash-sustainable manner” (National CTI

44). Both countries discuss how the issue sustainable financing is caused by the free-rider

problem31, the root of the problem Ostrom’s collective action principles address. Both countries

31 The free-rider problem is the problem that arises from the “Tragedy of the Commons,” as discussed on page 5 of this paper

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note that sustainable financing is key to the success of program implementation and operation in

the future.

Indonesia has taken more tangible moves to address this issue, although very few steps

resulting in actual funding have been completed. Even though the government has been irregular

in its commitment to provide funds toward conservation and resource management activities,

they have passed legislation32 to establish a Trust Fund with the objective of conserving

biodiversity in Indonesia. With the enactment of this legislation came the development of the

Sustainable Financing Working Group, composed of 5 ministries and NGOs. It is charged with

analyzing the budget and potential availability of funds. At the time of the report, the most

current information provided by the SFWG was that there is a gap of 150 billion rupiah, which is

equivalent to $27.7 million, between available funds and funds needed to implement CTI

Activities, and that this gap would grow in the future without a proper sustainable financing plan

(Dirhamsyah 197). There are other groups working to estimate and fund conservation programs

in Indonesia, listed in Table 6.133. The product of most of these efforts has been estimations of

project costs. The only mechanisms currently in place and operating to provide funding are the

Bappenas Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund and debt-swaps with countries such as the US

and Germany.

PNG finds themselves even further behind in determining needs for or developing

methodologies for sustainable financing. It is stated bluntly that attempting to estimate the costs

of the 5 Goals of the NPoA is “unrealistic and impractical” (National CTI 45). There are no

budgets for existing MPA projects, nor has there been a strategy developed for public sector

conservation. This makes it very difficult to even begin to determine financing needs. PNG also

32 Government Regulation No 80/201133 Included as Figure 8 (Dirhamsyah et al. 198)

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addresses the fact that there are multiple objectives within the NPoA that are not SMART34 and

therefore are again difficult to attempt to finance. The only existing sources of funding are

donors and development partners, which are organized on a regional level, and the Coral

Triangle's political partners, the US and Australia. PNG also notes that the NPoA “does not

explore new internal sources of funding” (National CTI 47). The report does not provide

evidence that PNG is in any stage of planning for sustainable financing. It is clear that PNG

recognizes that this is a key need for the future sustainability of these programs, but does not

seem to be in the position to address this need at the current time.

There is also a need for further capacity building in both countries to support operation of

programs that have been implemented and are to be implemented in the future under the CTI.

Currently, the Coral Triangle Center (CTC), operated by The Nature Conservancy, completes the

majority of training. The CTC has developed training modules and implemented site-based

trainings. The development of the MPA Learning Network is in progress, which will aid in

coordination of trainings between the CT6 (the six countries of the Coral Triangle) and will

eventually be linked with the CTC. In PNG civil society organizations and provincial or local

level governments are the two main groups involved in implementing capacity building

programs. To date, civil society organizations are the only ones that have the required capacity to

carry out their responsibilities, but their training programs can potentially aid governments in

building capacity themselves. There have been two main workshops35 that have resulted in

tangible programs. In 2001 the Strengthening Conservation Capacity Project was initiated which

resulted in the creation of 8 training modules for capacity development and in 2010 the PNG

Learning and Training Network was created. Despite these initiatives, PNG still is lacking in

34 SMART goals are ones that are Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Timely35 Workshops were held in 2001 and 2010 (National CTI 62)

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leadership at all levels, especially with a high turnover rate in managers. One of the main

problems hindering PNG progress is the lack of available technical expertise. While there are

technical experts, they have been largely too busy to participate in conservation efforts. This

contributed to PNG being the last country to complete its SCTR. Indonesia is generally in the

same position as PNG, with multiple capacity building initiatives in the works, but still lacking

in capacity at all levels. In 2013, Indonesia is starting to develop a School for Marine Resource

Conservation and Management. The objective is to “enable 30% of [the] MPA system in

Indonesia to be managed under the leadership of qualified managers by 2015” – the idea being

that graduates of this school would be trained to successfully become these managers (Indonesia

National)36. The Indonesian government will be contributing about two-thirds of the funds

needed to complete this project on schedule and has requested the remaining funds be provided

by donors and partners. This is achievable especially with the existing partnerships and

cooperative relationships Indonesia maintains with other governments and NGOs. Looking

forward, Indonesia plans to align government strategic plans with capacity development needs

for marine resource conservation, as well as institutionalizing training strategies to ensure

continuation in the future (Dirhamsyah et al. 203). From each of their individual SCTRs, it seems

that both countries recognize capacity as a serious need and have made concrete efforts to

address this.

Public awareness was also named as key to the success of both countries efforts to fulfill

the CTI. The bulk of Indonesia’s effort to raise public awareness lies with the Coral Reef

Rehabilitation Management Project, also known as COREMAP. This project was implemented

in 1999 and is planned to continue through 2017. There are 3 areas of COREMAP that address

issues of public awareness. The first consists of activities that “support behavioral change for

36 See cited source for more information

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sustainable coral reef co-management through the provision of public awareness materials,

campaigns and advocacy at [all levels]” (Dirhamsyah et al. 210). Indonesia has actually been

able to assess the outreach of this program through the COREMAP II 2010 survey, which found

that “75% of project area residents are aware of the importance of coral reefs” (Dirhamsyah et al.

211). The current strategies are for the most part operating smoothly, but in the future Indonesia

notes that internet and mobile phones should be incorporated for information dissemination and

that there needs to be further outreach to political, religious, governmental and cultural leaders.

The second component deals with integrating coral reef conservation and sustainable use into

education. Education materials addressing these issues, including textbooks at all levels, have

been distributed and are in use. These efforts have been effective and Indonesia plans to continue

and expand the programs, hopefully with better coordination among government agencies to

ensure uniformity. The last component is effective communication of program “philosophy,

objectives, activities outputs and outcomes” to all those involved (Dirhamsyah et al. 212). This

has included standardizing messaging and PR protocols that Indonesia could use in the future for

other public awareness efforts. Other public awareness efforts besides those through COREMAP

have been conducted by local organizations and are much smaller in scale. Public awareness

through COREMAP is by far the largest in Indonesia regarding marine conservation.

PNG also has a large public awareness effort, although more concentrated at the local

effort. There are education programs, similar to those in Indonesia, which have developed marine

conservation resource materials. There are also media development programs that include both

print and electronic outreach materials. Outreach efforts frequently provide opportunities for

locals to participate in the marine management process, in that locals raise awareness of

additional issues that need to be addressed – these have ranged from the size of fishing nets, the

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need for alternative sources of income and the loss of trust or interest without regular awareness

programs. PNG has no specific statistics, but felt comfortable estimating that through direct

public awareness efforts, about 40% of the populations had been reached (National CTI 54). The

results PNG has seen have been positive – changes in attitude, more collaboration and the rising

inclusion of women. There are still many issues that much be address including lack of skills and

capacity, lack of funding, lack of coordination among stakeholders, lack of a tool to assess

awareness and lack of effective and standardized enforcement. All of these needs are identified

as areas to be addressed in the future by PNG. Both Indonesia and PNG are making deliberate

efforts to increase public awareness, although it seems Indonesia has access to more resources

and existing institutions, such as COREMAP, to be able do so.

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FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

After assessing the status of each country with respect to the timelines originally set out in

their respective National Plans of Action and then comparing the two countries’ results to one

another, another look was taken at Ostrom’s principles. As would be expected considering the

original comparison of the eight principles and the NPoAs, most of these had been applied. In

some areas it was found that according to the State of the Coral Triangle Reports, certain

principles had been employed to different extents than implied in the NPoAs. There were also

some key findings indicating where Ostrom’s principles may be lacking or not applicable to real

world natural resource management situations. The findings are as follows:

1. In the original comparison, it was stated, “it will take further development of these plans

to determine the full extent to which Ostrom’s ideas in this area are actually implemented

and the level to which they are successful” (Espy 18). This observation still stands, in

particular with regard to PNG. They are generally far behind Indonesia in the actual

implementation of any programs, as well as having no basis of internal sustainable

financing for these projects. It is very difficult to conclude overall how Ostrom’s

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principles are aiding or hindering their efforts to implement their NPoA. Indonesia has

made more tangible efforts that can be judged more effectively. That being said, both

countries NPoAs are still young and while some observations can be made, further time

to develop is still required to assess successes and failures.

2. In the original comparison, it was found that Ostrom’s first three principles were the most

apparent in the NPoAs. As they are implemented, this is largely proven to be true and

these principles seem to be aiding in the implementation process. Her first principle

regarding clear delineations of resource areas are proving to be essential to management

success. Indonesia has been able to designate multiple MPAs and seascapes each year

since the CTI began and implement or develop management strategies. PNG has been

largely unable to do the same. Consistent with Ostrom’s first principle; these countries’

experiences confirm that without designating unambiguous boundaries, it is very

difficulty to manage the resources within that area.

3. With respect to Ostrom’s second principle, again two specific cases of PNG’s difficulties

highlight the importance of the concept of appropriate rules. Quite frankly, PNG states

that some of the Goals or Targets set out in the NPoA are not SMART37 goals, most

important to Ostrom’s principle meaning that they are not attainable. By their own

evaluation, PNG does not currently have the needed capacity to meet the Targets set out

by the CTI. Second, in the discussion of Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management

and Goal 2, PNG points out that the existing legislation that can be applied to EAFM

does not directly address the approach, and therefore the current regulations will not

effectively enforce the EAFM policies or support EAFM Targets.

37 SMART goals are defined on page 34 of this paper

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4. Ostrom’s third principle emphasizes the importance of involving the local community in

management and decision-making when actions affect them and has been well supported

by both countries in practice. This concept was emphasized in PNG’s NPoA, and

continues to be as they proceed with implementation. While less notable in their NPoA,

Indonesia has made tangible efforts to increase community involvement in practice. In

particular, they passed legislation in 2009 around the time the CTI was approved, that

mandates the inclusion of locals in the MPA designation process. In PNG, public

outreach programs provide platforms for consultation with locals when implementing

conservation programs. Also, as previously mentioned, PNG is still largely dependent on

traditional forms of knowledge and management, which employ collective choice-type

arrangements.

5. Ostrom’s fourth, fifth and sixth principles were mostly hinted at or inferred in the NPoAs,

which is about the same depth to which they are employed in the SCTR. There is little

development in these processes that would provide for assessment of principles in action.

The fourth principle regarding monitoring is the most directly apparent in the language of

the SCTRs, but not more so than originally stated in the NPoA. The development for

these monitoring systems is in the works, but the actual results are limited or non-

existent. Specific plans for or measures regarding graduated sanctions, Ostrom’s fifth

principle, are even less evident. Ostrom’s sixth principle, dealing with conflict resolution

mechanisms, is not specifically outlined but there is some evidence for their existence in

PNG’s discussion of community outreach. As mentioned with respect to Ostrom’s third

principle, there are platforms for discussion of local issues within public awareness

programs. It is at this time that locals have the opportunity to raise problems they have

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with the CTI programs about which they are learning. An arena for conflict-resolution

can be envisioned here that would occur at minimal additional cost. The information

gained from locals can be gathered and returned to the decision-makers who can then

incorporate their concerns into program adjustments. While this was only pointed out in

PNG’s SCTR, this same type of interaction could be encouraged through Indonesia’s

public awareness efforts, if not already going on.

6. Ostrom’s seventh principle is much more strongly observed in PNG. The leadership is

supportive of local community efforts, as well as of efforts by NGOs. For example, the

Governor of the West New Britain Province pledged support of TNC for the Kimbe Bay

MPA project, including all stakeholders in that pledge as well (Kimbe Bay nature.org 5).

The intentional or unintentional reliance on local community activities moves PNG away

from Ostrom’s final principle regarding nested enterprises in that there aren’t many layers

and networks operating in PNG. There are plans to implement locally managed marine

areas as a part of a larger MPA network, but these plans have yet to come to fruition.

Indonesia’s situation is essentially opposite. There is already an MPA Network in place,

along with a coordinated learning network. On the other hand, Indonesia’s actions have

come from the top down and have relied much less on community involvement. While

the Indonesian government is not discouraging community-level organization, its

facilitation is not as great as in PNG.

7. One possible cause for the differences in progress seen between Indonesia and PNG

could be the extent to which they are utilizing collective-choice arrangements. As stated

above, PNG does so to a further extent than Indonesia. It is possible that this fact is

hindering PNG’s progress, in that the structure for legislation and large or national

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conservation projects does not exist as it does in Indonesia. In short, PNG is trying to

implement the NPoA from the bottom up while Indonesia does the opposite, working

from the top down. From this analysis, it seems possible that utilizing Ostrom’s

principles may operate the most smoothly and as intended at the smaller scale – when

dealing with local management, implementation and monitoring rather than coordinating

with a larger group like the Coral Triangle. It may be easier for Indonesia to employ

Ostrom’s principles in individual management efforts after they have set the stage for a

national project. Similarly, PNG may have difficulty doing so without the overarching

common national strategy in place. This could prove to be an area where Ostrom’s

principles are not applicable in the early stages of planning a nationwide initiative. This

analysis cannot prove this observation, although the finding is intriguing and could

benefit from further research.

8. Quite possibly the starkest finding was that the concept of sustainable financing is

nonexistent in Ostrom’s eight principles. Prior to assessing the implementation of the

CTI, it was not apparent that sustainable financing was a large point of concern – it was

only mentioned directly in a couple of the Targets or individual Activities as part of the

NPoAs. This contrasts with the huge emphasis placed on financing in both countries’

SCTR. Each country had a discussion of what sustainable financing was in general and

then as it applied to their individual situations. Both countries raised the point that

sustainable financing becomes an issue when the free-rider problem arises, the very root

of the problem Ostrom addresses with her theory of collective action. In addition, both

countries clearly state that sustainable financing is key to the success of conservation

efforts under the CTI. Through initial research there is not clear evidence of Ostrom

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addressing this important component of resource management through collective action

or why that is so. This raises another potential weakness in Ostrom’s principles as applied

to the Coral Triangle to be further investigated.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The eight findings above highlight that Elinor Ostrom’s principle can and are being

effectively employed in the Coral Triangle. While some are employed more directly than others,

all eight of her principles are utilized to some extent. The principles most strictly in use by the

Coral Triangle and proving to be valuable are the first (clearly defined boundaries) and third

(collective-choice arrangements). The fourth (monitoring), fifth (graduated sanctions) and sixth

(conflict-resolution mechanisms) principles are ones that show potential to aid in progress, but

cannot fully be assessed for actual effectiveness at this time due to their application to processes

not yet implemented under the CTI. The second (congruence between appropriation and

provision rules and local conditions) and eighth (nested enterprises) principles are not being fully

adhered to in PNG and underlines how its lack of use is detrimental to progress. On the other

hand, the seventh principle (minimal recognition of rights to organize) is not being fully adhered

to in Indonesia, but its lack of use is proving to potentially be beneficial. Lastly, Ostrom’s

principles seem to miss a crucial requirement for the success of collective action institutions,

which is sustainable financing. There are opportunities for future research in a few areas. First, a

longer-term analysis to determine success or failure of the Coral Triangle Initiative could be

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completed. Second, it is odd that only one of Ostrom’s principles seems to be disadvantageous to

progress in the Coral Triangle; an answer to why that is could be explored. Lastly, the

importance of sustainable financing on its own accord could be studied, as well as the reasoning

behind its apparent absence from Ostrom’s principles of collective action institutions.

WORKS CITED

Alino, Dr. Porfirio. Highlights of the Regional State of the Coral Triangle Report (RSCTR). 7 July 2012. Presentation.

Atkinson, S., et al. The Seascapes Guidebook: How to Select, Develop and Implement Seascapes. Arlington, VA, USA: Conservation International, 2011. Print.

Conservation International. Bird's Head Seascape. N.p.: Conservation International, n.d. Web. <http://www.conservation.org/Documents/field_demonstrations/CI_Field_Demonstration_Birds-Head_English.pdf>.

Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security (CTI-CFF). CTI Regional Plan of Action., 2009. Web. 2 July 2012.

---. CTI-CFF Regional Boundaries Map, 2011.

---. Indonesia National Plan of Actions., 2009. Web. 2 July 2012.

---. Papua New Guinea Marine Program on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and National Security: National Plan of Action 2010-2013., 2009. Print.

Dawes, Robyn M., Jeanne McTavish, and Harriet Shaklee. "Behavior, Communication, and Assumptions about Other People's Behavior in a Commons Dilemma Situation." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35.1 (1977): 1-11. Print.

Dirhamsyah Et Al. "Chapter 6: Plan of Action Initiatives and Future Plans." The State of the Coral Triangle in Indonesia: Coral Triangle Marine Resources: Their Status, Economies, and Management. N.p.: N.p., 2012. 180-215. Print.

"Elinor Ostrom - Biographical." Web. <http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/ostrom.html>.

"Elinor Ostrom Curriculum Vitae." June 19, 2012. Web. The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. <http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/people/lostromcv.htm>.

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Green, A., P. Lokani, S. Sheppard, J. Almany, S. Keu, J. Aitsi, J. Warku Karvon, R. Hamilton, and G. Lipsett-Moore. Scientific Design of a Resilient Network of Marine Protected Areas. Rep. no. 2/07. Kimbe Bay, West New Britain, Papua New Guinea: n.p., 2007. Print. TNC Pacific Island Countries.

Hardin, Garrett. "The Tragedy of the Commons." Science 162.3859 (1968): 1243-8. Web. 15 July 2012.

Indonesia National Secretariat of CTI-CFF Indonesia. Strengthening the Marine Capacity of Marine Protected Areas in Indonesia - School for Marine Resources Conservation and Management. N.p.: Indonesia National Secretariat of CTI-CFF Indonesia, n.d. Web. <http://www.coraltriangleinitiative.org/sites/default/files/resources/leaflet_Strengthening%20the%20Management%20Capacity%20of%20MPA_Final.pdf>.

Kelleher, G. Guidelines for Marine Protected Areas. Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK: IUCN Print.

Lunn, Kristin E., and Marie-Annick Moreau. "Conservation of Banggai Cardinalfish Populations in Sulawesi, Indonesia: An Integrated Research and Education Project." SPC Live Reef Fish Information Bulletin #10 (2002): 33-34. Print.

Making a Good Catch: Non-CFC Technologies in the Fishery Cold Chain. [Paris, France]: United Nations Environment Programme, Division of Technology, Industry and Economics, OzoneAction Programme, 2000. Print.

National CTI Coordinating Committee of Papua New Guinea. "POA Initiatives and Future Plans; Other Management Issues." State of the Coral Reefs of Papua New Guinea: Coral Triangle Marine Resources: Their Status, Economies, and Management. N.p.: n.p., 2012. 35-64. Print.

Nurhayati, Desy. "Scientists Urge Cessation of Napoleon Fish Trade." The Jakarta Post. N.p., 20 Nov. 2012. Web. 20 Mar. 2013.

Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Revised ed. United States of America: Harvard University Press, 1971. Print.

Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.

New York, NY: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1990. Print.

Tietenberg, Tom, and Lynne Lewis. "Chapter 4. Property Rights, Externalities, and

Environmental Problems." Environmental and Natural Resource Economics. 8th ed.

Addison Wesley, 2008. Print.

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FIGURES

Figure 1: Map of the Coral Triangle (CTI-CFF Regional Boundaries

Map)

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Figure 2: Table 3.1 – Ostrom’s eight principles of collective action

institutions (Ostrom 90)

Table 3.1 Design Principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions1. Clearly defined boundaries

Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself.

2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditionsAppropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labor, material, and/or money.

3. Collective-choice arrangements.Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules.

4. MonitoringMonitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behavior, are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.

5. Graduated sanctionsAppropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and the context of the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both.

6. Conflict-resolution mechanismsAppropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials.

7. Minimal recognition of rights to organizeThe rights of appropriators of devise their own institutions are not challenged by external government authorities

For CPRs that are parts of larger systems:8. Nested enterprises

Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.

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Figure 3: Section 2 of the RPoA, 9 Guiding Principles of the CTI

(CTI-CFF RPoA 8)

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Figure 4: Flow chart of implementation, PNG Marine Program

(CTI-CFF Papua 20)

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Figure 5: Indonesia comparison of Activities Completed vs. Activities Intended for Completion

vs. Total Number of Activities (Dirhamsyah et al.)

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Figure 6: Papua New Guinea comparison of Activities Completed vs. Activities Intended for

Completion vs. Total Number of Activities (CITE)

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Figure 7: Progress towards completion of CTI (Alino 23)

Notes:

The six countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Solomon

Islands, and Timor-Leste

Seascapes: see page 12, Goal 1

EAFM: Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management, Goal 2

MPA: Marine Protected Areas, Goal 3

CCA: Climate Change Adaptation, Goal 4

Threatened Species: Goal 5

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Figure 8: Groups working to estimate costs for and fund

conservation programs in Indonesia (Dirhamsyah 198)

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