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To What Extent Would War Affect the Quality of a State’s Bureaucracy?

Linda Wu

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Abstract

This paper discusses the relationship between war and the state bureaucracy. Unlike

existing literatures, which only focus on how war would help build up state, this paper

examines the extent to which war might affect the quality of a state’s bureaucracy through

quantitative analysis. The paper concludes that states that engage in lower-intensity wars will

have higher quality bureaucracies, whereas those that fight war outside their own territories

will have higher quality bureaucracies. In other words, states should avoid costly wars in

order to improve their quality of bureaucracy. This paper not only provides a quantitative

basis for researches on this topic, but also allows states to predict the change of their quality

of bureaucracy during wartime and arrange policies accordingly. Finally, this paper might

deter some states from engaging in costly wars.

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Introduction

The topic of “war making and state building” has been widely discussed among scholars.

Political scientists contend that war making facilitated state building in the early-modern

European context. They claim that, in order to win wars, states would first prepare capital

resources through domestic tax extractions, which would require the establishment of

bureaucracies. Whether war-making has facilitated the expansion of government

bureaucracies outside of the European context, however, is yet unclear. To date, research has

only focused on the establishment of the state, rather than the quality of its bureaucracy, an

essential aspect of political development.

This paper aims to address this gap and explain the extent to which war might affect the

quality of a state’s bureaucracy through quantitative analysis. It draws from global data on

interstate armed conflicts and bureaucratic issues from 1984 to 2008. A logistics regression

analysis of bureaucratic quality was conducted using two independent variables—the

intensity of war and location where the war takes place.

The paper concludes that states that engage in higher-intensity wars will have lower

quality bureaucracies, whereas those that fight war within their own territories will have

lower quality bureaucracies. These findings suggest that the assumption “war made the state

and the state made war” does not apply outside of the early-modern European context. This

study can be seen as a quantitative foundation for researches on this topic. It can also assist

when forecasting changes in the quality of a state’s bureaucracy during wars and creating

policies accordingly. Ultimately, this study might serve as a deterrent to some states when

deciding whether to engage in costly wars.

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Literature Review

Charles Tilly’s famous quote “war made the state and the state made war” links the

emergence of states to warfare. It suggests that, prior to a war, a state might establish an

effective administrative apparatus, in other words, its bureaucracy, in order to engage in more

effective resource extraction, which would then increase its capacity and, ultimately, ensure

its success in war. Fierce debate over whether this famous quote can be applied beyond the

European context has occurred in the past several decades. Some scholars contend that the

relationship between war and state-building outside of Europe is roughly the same, and,

therefore, imply that wars can help build states elsewhere also. Others, however, extending

war-making ideology to the developing world, claim that the war-making/state-building

connection is either too Eurocentric or outdated. They claim that there is a dramatic

difference between the contemporary international context and that of early-modern Europe.

States no longer build their institutional capacities by engaging in wars but, rather, by

receiving outside resources from international financial institutions and wealthy foreign

states. Since both camps in the state-building debate only focus on the establishment of the

state prior to wars, little is known about the precise mechanism by which wars can change the

quality of states’ bureaucracy.

Many empirical studies have shown that, in the European context, the activity of war-

making is a vital element in state-building (Andreski 1954; Finer 1975; Tilly 1975, 1992;

Downing 1990; Porter 1994). Taylor and Botea summarize the process of state-building as:

“war extraction repression state formation” (2008, 29). They argue that the

preparation for war requires powerholders to engage in activities that are also conductive to

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state-building. Among these, the effective extraction of resources needed for war-making is

the most important. These resources, Samuel Finer notes, are territory, men, materials, and

money (Finer 1975, 96). They later enable the ruler to coerce and repress both internal and

external opponents. In order to extract resources from those “who [are] reluctant to surrender

them without strong pressure or compensation,” the creation of bureaucracies and systematic

taxation is necessary (Tilly 1992, 14-15). In other words, effective extraction demands an

administrative apparatus, which, in turn, leads to the development of state institutions.

Scholars, such as Michael Desch (1996) and Joel Migdal (1988), who insist that war

contributes to state-building similarly outside of Europe, contend that the general absence of

external war in the developing world explains weak states, noting that the few strong states

outside of the developed world (for example, South Korea and Israel) are strong precisely

because of their past warfare (Desch 1996; Migdal 1988; Herbst 2000; Centeno 1997; Lustick

1997). Jeffrey Herbst (2000), after studying the formation of states in sub-Saharan Africa,

concludes that the absence of inter-state violence explains why African states are so weak. He

claims that African rulers face high costs in any territorial expansion due to low levels of

population density, highly variable environmental conditions, and considerable geographic

barriers. Central governments have not been able to project power over the periphery, and

therefore, political elites are unlikely to send administrators and armed forces from urban

centers into rural hinterlands to raise taxes and keep recruiting soldiers, as European political

elites have. As a result, limited African states have developed their state capacity. Centeno

qualifies Charles Tilly’s famous quote by asserting that “limited wars made limited states,

and limited states made limited war” (Centeno 2003, 28) in relation to war-making and state-

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building in Latin America. Because of their underdeveloped administrative capacity, the

internal splits within the ruling classes and European control, colonial Latin American states

rarely fought against each other. The pattern of limited wars hindered the growth of

centralized, efficient political institutions and prevented the formation of mass armies in that

region. With respect to the Middle East, Ian Lustick (1997) also argues that the efforts of

powerful and consolidated European states to thwart “state-building wars” prevented the

emergence of great powers with the potential for territorial expansion. Therefore, these states

never experienced significant warfare, which could have allowed the development of strong

central governments, as well as different bureaucratic institutions.

Unlike political scientists who agree that “war made the state and the state made war,”

some scholars argue that wars fail to make states in the contemporary world (Reno 1998;

Leander 2004). They highlight the dramatic difference between the contemporary

international context and that of early-modern Europe. Politically, the world has witnessed

the predominance of “external” elements of state formation today rather than the “internal”

dimensions present in the early-modern Europe (Tilly 1992; Ayoob 1995; Bates 2001;

Sorenson 2001; Leander 2004). That is, international forces play a more vital role in state

formation today than in early-modern Europe. Strong international norms, created in the

context of decolonization and strengthened during the Cold War, value existing sovereignties

and reject forcible changes of borders and the expansion of territorial control (Sorenson 2001;

Jackson 1990). As a result, the countries in the contemporary no longer carry out large-scale

wars, which lead to the expansion of the winners and the shrinking, or even disappearance, of

the losers. Furthermore, the radical difference between the contemporary international

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economic system and that of early-modern Europe also makes it difficult for contemporary

wars to positively affect state-building. In Europe, since war-making required strong capital

support (Tilly 1992, 172), states had to set up institutional apparatuses for domestic

extraction. For developing countries today, however, access to capital, supplied by

international financial institutions and wealthy states, matters more than domestic capital

(Leander 2004). Even when developing states pursue domestic extraction, they, being the

periphery states according to the dependency theory, are unlikely to obtain enough resources

for the preparation of wars (Sorenson 2001, 348).

Scholars in the contemporary world remain at odds about the effects of war on state-

building. On the one hand, some political scientists claim that the lack of warfare leads to the

underdevelopment of strong central governments. On the other, several political scientists

argue that, nowadays, the change in the international political and economic context has

changed the process of state formation. Nevertheless, all these arguments only focus on the

establishment of the state in preparation for wars, rather than the change of states’

bureaucratic quality as a result of the war. In other words, the bureaucracies created during

wars can be the basis for either efficient and beneficial bureaucracies or inefficient and

corrupt ones afterwards.

Theory and Methods

This study aims to explain the extent to which war might affect the quality of a state’s

bureaucracy. As the review above demonstrates, scholarly research on war and state-building

only focuses on the establishment of the state, rather than the quality of its bureaucracy, an

essential aspect of political development. Better quality of bureaucracy promotes better

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bureaucratic effectiveness and accountability, which ultimately leads to improved public

service delivery.

Therefore, in this section, I provide a theoretical framework that attempts to contribute a

quantitative explanation for a phenomenon that has not been studied often. I explore two

main hypotheses in the following section.

H1: Higher intensity of a war leads to better quality of bureaucracy, whereas low

intensity of war will either not affect the bureaucratic quality or worsen it.

First, I hypothesize that interstate war involvement, particularly in wars with higher

intensity (more battle-deaths) would positively increase the quality of a state’s bureaucracy; I

expect to find this relationship in both developing and developed states. Wars that are fought

with higher intensity would normally lead to greater internal destruction requiring leaders to

mobilize internal revenues to rebuild. This process would not only help the development of

infrastructure, but also promote the reorganization of the state bureaucracy. Meanwhile,

citizens would pay more attention to the rebuilding process so that the government would

need to increase its bureaucratic transparency and efficiency.

H2: States that fight war in their own territories will have better quality of

bureaucracy. If not, the quality will either worsen or remain unchanged. 

Secondly, I hypothesize that the location of war has an impact on states’ bureaucratic

quality. When an interstate war takes place domestically, the state needs to pay more

attention to the destructive effects of the war on its infrastructures. Citizens would also

demand greater security assurances from the state. Furthermore, the post-war reconstruction

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process would urge states to develop a more effective bureaucracy. Citizens would also focus

more on the distribution of public goods and prevent massive bureaucratic corruption.

Below is the formula I will be using to test these hypotheses:

the quality of bureaucracy (icrg_qog) = β0 + β1 * intensity of the war (bdbest)

+ β2 *location of the war (location)

The variables of interest for this study are described in the chart below.

Figure 1. Relationship: war and the bureaucratic quality

High Low

IV 1 Intensity  Better  worse/unchanged

IV 2 Location Better  worse/unchanged

The first independent variable (IV1) is the intensity of wars (bdbest). Some political

scientists argue that the absence of intense wars explains African countries’ lack of strong

bureaucratic institutions. In order to test this theory, I include the intensity of wars into this

study. The indicator for IV1 is the number of battle deaths. Since I was unable to acquire data

on war-related deaths, I use the most reliable aggregated numbers for all battle-related

incidents as the indicator of the intensity of war (see Data Sources below). The target for the

attacks is either military forces or party representatives, though substantial collateral damage

in civilians’ deaths also occurs at the same time. All fatalities – military as well as civilian –

incurred in such situations are counted as battle-related deaths. The limitation of this indicator

is that battle-related deaths exclude indirect deaths due to disease and starvation, criminality,

or attacks deliberately directed against civilians only.

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The second independent variable (IV2)—a dummy variable—is the location of the war

(location). The dependent variable (DV) is the quality of the bureaucracy (icrg_qog). This

variable includes bureaucratic corruption, law and order, as well as quality of bureaucratic

institutions. Finally, I controlled other variables, like regime type and economic background,

since they are fixed within each country.

Definitions of variables

1. War

In this study, I draw elements from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)’s

definition of armed conflicts and define war as a contested incompatibility that concerns

government and/or territory over which the use of armed force between states has resulted in

at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year. The separate elements of this definition,

according to UCDP, can be seen below:

“a) Incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory. The

incompatibility must concern government and/or territory and it refers to the stated

generally incompatible positions of the parties. An incompatibility that concerns

government refers to the type of political system, the replacement of the central

government or the change of the composition of the current government. An

incompatibility that concerns territory refers to the status of a territory, for example,

the change of the state in control of a certain territory (interstate conflict).

(b) Use of armed force. This refers to the use of arms by the military forces of

the parties resulting in at least 25 deaths in a year. Arms are defined as any material

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means of combat, for example, manufactured weapons as well as sticks, stones, fire,

water, and so on.

(c) State. A state is an internationally recognized sovereign government

controlling a specified territory or an internationally non-recognized government

controlling a specific territory which is not disputed by an internationally recognized

sovereign government, which previously controlled the same territory.”

2. Intensity

The intensity of war is indicated by the number of battle-deaths (ranging from 0 to

82500) that result directly from violence inflicted through the use of armed force by one state

on another during contested combat.

3. Location

Dummy variable. Self-evident, the name of the territory over which the conflict is

fought.

4. Quality of Bureaucracy

The mean value of the ICRG variables “corruption”, “Law and Order” and “Bureaucratic

Quality”, scaled 0 to 1. Higher values indicate higher quality of bureaucracy. According to

QoG:

“Corruption (originally 6 points): an assessment of corruption within the political

system. Law and order (originally 6 points): assessed separately, with each sub-

component comprising zero to three points. The Law sub-component is an assessment of

the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the order sub-component is an

assessment of popular observance of the law. Bureaucracy Quality (originally 4 points):

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the assessment of institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy. Therefore, high

points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to

govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services.” (no

page)

Data sources

I developed my own data set through information from three existing data sets. The

first one is the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, which contains battle deaths (number of

soldiers and civilians killed in combat) in state-based armed conflicts for the period 1946–

2008. The second dataset is the UCDP Battle-related Deaths Dataset, a project developed by

the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Department of Peace and Conflict

Research, Uppsala University. It contains a dyad-year dataset with information on the number

of battle-related deaths in the conflicts from 1989-2018 that appear in the UCDP/PRIO

Armed Conflict Dataset. The third data set is the QoG Standard TS dataset, which includes

data on bureaucratic issues from 1946 to 2018.

One limitation of my data set is that it only contains 357 observations, since there

were no data information on bureaucratic issues being recorded before 1980s and the number

of interstate conflicts are limited after 1980s. I use logistic linear regression model in order to

determine the extent to which involvement in interstate warfare influences the quality of state

bureaucracy. 

Results and Analysis

In the study, I use logistic regression modeling instead of a simple linear regression when

determining the relationship between interstate warfare and the quality of state bureaucracy. 

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Linear regression modeling in this case does not allow a clear interpretation of the data

because, as Figure 2 demonstrates, the indicator for the dependent variable (icrg_qog) ranges

from 0 to 1, while the indicator for the independent variable (bdbest) ranges from 0 to 82500.

In other words, even though the results show that the independent variable (bdbest) is

statistically significant, its coefficient is too small (-0.00000). With logistics regression, on

the other hand, we can make the quality of bureaucracy (icrg_qog) into two categorical

variables, which allow us to efficiently assess whether or not the intensity of war is associated

with the quality of bureaucracy.

Logistics modeling can also help predict the possible changes of quality of bureaucracy

in future warfare. According to Figure 3 and Figure 4, the data on the quality of bureaucracy

has normal distribution and the mean score is around 0.5. Therefore, I code the scores below

0.5 to 0 and the scores above 0.5 to 1. In this case, the formula for the relationship between

the independent variables and the dependent variable will be: icrg_qog = e^ (β0 + β1 * bdbest

+ β2 * location).

Figure 2. Linear Regression Results

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The results can be seen in the first model in Figure 7. With respect to the interpretation,

when a war has 0 battle deaths and does not take place in domestic territory, the quality of the

state bureaucracy is e^1.148. In addition, both of the independent variables show a

statistically significant negative correlation with the quality of bureaucracy (DV) because of

their negative coefficients as well as the star signs. That is, with each battle death, the quality

of state bureaucracy would add e^ (-0. 00002855). If war were to take place in one’s own

territory (location=1), the state’s quality of bureaucracy would add by e^ (-1.328). The

negative coefficients indicate that as intensity of war decreases or location is not domestic,

the quality of a bureaucracy improves. Conversely, the quality of a bureaucracy decreases

with each additional battle death and when the war takes place in domestic territory.

Figure 3. Descriptive statistics on the quality of a state’s bureaucracy (icrg.qog), the

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dependent variable

Min 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Maximum NA’s

0.0417 0.3935 0.5255 0.5495 0.6944 1.000 346

Figure 4. Histogram: The Quality of State Bureaucracy

Because the coefficient for independent variable 1 (bdbest) was still too small for a

comprehensive interpretation and the data were bifurcated (see Figures 5 and 6), I improved

the model by using the scaling formula: (bdbest - x̅)/sd to standardize the variable.

Figure 5. Descriptive statistics on intensity of war (bdbest), independent variable 1 (bdbest)

Min 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Maximum NA’s

62.5 951.0 7928.0 10350.6 17602.5 82500.0 3527

Figure 6. Histogram: Intensity of war

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Figure 7. Logistics Regression Results

Model 2 in figure 7 captures the results of the final logistics regression analysis, with 357

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observations in total. The coefficient for the intercept predicts that a state’s quality of

bureaucracy will be e^0.853 when the number of battle deaths is at the mean value (10350.6)

and the war does not take place on its own territory.

The intensity of interstate warfare significantly and negatively correlates with the quality

of a participant state’s bureaucracy. The estimated coefficient is significant, because its p-

value is 0.0111, which is smaller than alpha, even when it takes the value of 0.05. In addition,

as a rough rule of thumb, in statistical analysis, when the absolute value of a variable’s Z-

value is larger than 2.0, the variable is significant. In this case, the absolute value of the Z-

value (2.539) confirmed that the intensity of war is related to the quality of a participant

state’s bureaucracy. The coefficient for this variable (-0.407) shows a negative correlation

between the intensity of war and the quality of bureaucracy. It also predicts that a state’s

quality of bureaucracy will add e^ (-0.407) with each increase in standard deviation (14250.6)

of battle deaths above the mean value of the battle deaths (10350.6) and vice versa. This

finding rejects the expectation that higher intensity of war would prompt a more effective

(and less corrupted) bureaucracy. In other words, when the number of battle deaths increases,

the mean score for corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality decreases.

The location of warfare also correlates significantly with the quality of participant state’s

bureaucracy, because its p value is 8.20e-08, which is smaller than the alpha even when it

takes the value of 0.001. Moreover, the absolute value of the Z-value being 5.363 also proved

its statistical significance. The estimated coefficient for this variable is -1.328, suggesting a

negative correlation. It also predicts that if a state engages in a war on its own territory

(location=1), the quality of its bureaucracy will add e^ (-1.328). This finding also rejects my

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expectation that state’s bureaucracy would improve when an interstate war takes place

domestically. So, engaging in warfare in one’s own territory will lead to lower mean score for

corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality.

These two phenomena are not unusual. First, higher intensity of the war leads to higher

damage of the state economy as well as higher level of domestic unease. People's sense of

personal security tends to drop and their experiences with crime and law enforcement are not

ideal, therefore states will have a lower ICRG “law and order” score. Furthermore, when

transiting from war to peace, a state offers opportunities to drastically remake and rebuild its

institutions because of the malfunction of existing institutions. The existing institutions

receive a lower ICRG “bureaucratic quality” score. A post-conflict state often receives an

influx of funds for reconstruction from the international community (Lindberg, Orjuela 2014:

728). On the one hand, outside assistance is essential for domestic reconstruction, while, on

the other hand, it can undermine the state capacity. For states engaging in conflicts with

higher intensity, their reconstruction process requires more time and funds. The involvement

of a large amount of time and money contains a high risk of corruption and rent seeking in

various stages. Higher corruption rates will result in a lower ICRG “bureaucratic corruption”

score. The effects of corruption are amplified by the large influx of resources meant for

reconstruction to societies with weak accountability structures (Cheng, Zaum 2015).

Similarly, when states fight wars on their own territories, citizens’ sense of personal

security as well as their confidence towards the government will drop, therefore states will

have a lower ICRG “law and order” score. Moreover, citizens would not be able to fully

focus on the state rebuilding process after going through a war, so that number of corruptions

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would increase in this period due to lack of checks from the citizens, which leads to a lower

ICRG “bureaucratic corruption” score.

Conclusions

I began my research with the famous “war made the state and the state made war” quote

from Charles Tilly and posed the question to what extent would war affect a state’s

bureaucracy. After building up my own dataset based on three existing datasets, I used a

logistic regression model to test the correlations between my two independent variables—the

intensity of war and the location of war—and the dependent variable, the quality of state

bureaucracy. My two original hypotheses were rejected. That is, neither higher intensity of

wars nor having a war in one’s territory improve the quality of a state’s bureaucracy.

However, the intensity of war is negatively correlated with the quality of a state’s

bureaucracy at a statistically significant level. In other words, when the number of battle

deaths increases, the mean score for corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality

decreases. In addition, the location of wars is also negatively correlated with the quality of a

state’s bureaucracy at a statistically significant level. Having a war in one’s territory will

result in lower mean score for corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality.

These results show that the notion that we should “give war a chance” (Luttwak 1999) to

create strong states is misleading. The quote “war made the state and the state made war”

does not apply to the contemporary world as it did to the early-modern European context.

This study can be viewed as a quantitative foundation for researches on this topic and leaves

space for future qualitative analyses as well as studies focus on specific regions or country

cases on similar topics. In addition, this study can assist when forecasting changes in the

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quality of a state’s bureaucracy during wars and creating policies accordingly. Ultimately, this

study might serve as a deterrent to some states when deciding whether to engage in costly

wars.

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