projekter.aau.dk · web viewngos applying for a centralised grant covered by europeaid will have to...

THE EU AID SYSTEM

Allowing for NGO autonomy?– The case of DanChurchAid

_____________________________________________________Simon Holm

Supervisor: Associate Professor Paul Opoku-Mensah

Master Thesis - European StudiesAalborg University - April 2008

166.663 characters in total

i

Table of ContentCHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................1

1.1 THE INTERNATIONAL AID SYSTEM........................................................................................................21.2 PROBLEM FORMULATION.......................................................................................................................3

CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL APPROACHES............................................................................................4

2.1 RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY.........................................................................................................52.2 INSTITUTIONAL THEORY........................................................................................................................8

2.2.1 The Three Pillars of Institutions.....................................................................................................112.2.2 Institutional Isomorphism...............................................................................................................12

2.3 STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE......................................................................14

CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS......................................................................17

CHAPTER 4 THE EU’S RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD....................................................19

4.1 HISTORY OF RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD..............................................................................194.1.1 The Yaoundé Conventions...............................................................................................................204.1.2 The Lomé Conventions....................................................................................................................214.1.3 The Cotonou Agreement..................................................................................................................224.1.4 Relations with Asian and Latin American (ALA) States.................................................................24

4.2 FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES...........................................................................25

CHAPTER 5 THE EU’S RELATIONS WITH EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT NGOS........................28

5.1 THEMATIC PROGRAMME.......................................................................................................................295.2 FUNDING OF NGOS..............................................................................................................................31

5.2.1 EuropeAid Cooperation Office.......................................................................................................315.2.2 ECHO..............................................................................................................................................325.2.3 Objectives of co-financing of NGOs...............................................................................................345.2.4 Call for proposals (CfP) & Tender Opportunity.............................................................................395.2.5 Eligibility.........................................................................................................................................415.2.6 Procedure for awarding of grants...................................................................................................43

5.3 SUM UP.................................................................................................................................................44

CHAPTER 6 DANCHURCHAID (DCA)......................................................................................................46

6.1 CO-OPERATING WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS.........................................................486.2 DCA INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT...................................................................................................49

6.2.1 Project Cycle Management.............................................................................................................506.3 RELATIONS WITH THE EU....................................................................................................................556.4 SUM UP.................................................................................................................................................57

CHAPTER 7 ANALYSIS OF EU-DCA RELATIONS................................................................................58

7.1 DCA AS AN ACTOR IN THE EU AID SYSTEM.......................................................................................587.1.1 Degree of DCA dependency on the EU for resources.....................................................................597.1.2 EU-DCA – An Interdependent Relationship...................................................................................607.1.3 The EU Exerting Power over DCA.................................................................................................61

7.2 THE EU AID SYSTEM CAUSING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE...............................................................627.2.1 DCA’s Mission Statements..............................................................................................................637.2.2 Overall Objectives for DCA activities.............................................................................................647.2.3 DCA use of Project Management Tools..........................................................................................657.2.4 Strategic Responses of DCA............................................................................................................67

7.3 EU AID SYSTEM AND DCA AUTONOMY.............................................................................................68

CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION.........................................................................................................................70

CHAPTER 9 BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................................71

CHAPTER 10 ANNEXES................................................................................................................................

10.1 ANNEXE A1 INTERVIEW WITH POUL NIELSON........................................................................................

ii

10.2 ANNEXE A2 INTERVIEW WITH ALLAN DUELUND JENSEN, HEAD OF GLOBAL FUNDING UNIT, DANCHURCHAID (03.10.07)...................................................................................................................................10.3 ANNEXE A3 INTERVIEW WITH CARSTEN STRANDLOD, PROGRAMME OFFICER – GLOBAL FUNDING UNIT, DANCHURCHAID (04.10.07)........................................................................................................................10.4 ANNEXE A3 INTERVIEW WITH TROELS VICTOR DALGAARD, PROGRAMME OFFICER – GLOBAL FUNDING UNIT, DANCHURCHAID (04.10.07).........................................................................................................10.5 Annexe A5 Power Point Presentation of DCA GFU at LWF/Nordic Agencies Meeting.......................

Tables & IllustrationsTable 2.2.2-1 Three Pillars of Institutions..............................................................................................................14Table 5.2.3-1 Resources Distributed by Objectives................................................................................................34Table 6.2.1-1 The Quality Frame............................................................................................................................52

Illustration 4.1.4-1 EU Financial Instruments for External Assistance.................................................................26Illustration 5.2.6-1 Organisational Structure of DCA International Department..................................................49Illustration 6.2.1-1 Project Cycle Management......................................................................................................54

iii

Introduction

Chapter 1 Introduction

Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have become an integrated part of today’s society.

This is particularly true in the field of development and relief aid, where NGOs, both in the

Western world and in the third world, play an important role in delivering and distributing

aid. NGOs have also received tremendous attention from people in the celebrity sphere

wanting to use their fame and wealth to attract attention. Bill Gates setting up the Gates

Foundation to work for health care in Africa and India and former President Bill Clinton

encouraging people to give to charity (Clinton, 2007) as well as his work to fight HIV/AIDS

in the third world, can be seen as a few examples out of many.

Since the 1980s, which have been called the NGO decade, NGOs have had a central

role in the aid field. More and more of the world’s development aid have been distributed and

handed out by NGOs. According to The Economist (2000) there has been a trend among

many Western governments and international organisations to shift larger proportions of their

aid towards NGOs. An example of this can be seen in that “the proportion of the EU’s relief

aid channelled through NGOs [between 1990 and 1994] rose from 47% to 67%” (Economist,

2000). There can be several reasons for this, but generally NGOs are seen as more efficient

and cheaper than governments, and they provide the governments and international

organisations with the possibility of staying at “arm’s length” in cases they do not wish to get

directly involved in. Whatever the reason, it is a fact that NGOs today are a major player in

the field of development and relief aid and that huge sums of money pass through the NGOs

on their way to the intended recipients (Tvedt, 1998 & Economist, 2000).

One question that arises is: how does this situation affect NGOs as independent

organisations? The situation undoubtedly creates a complex relationship between NGOs on

the one side and governments and international organisations as donors on the other. It is a

relationship which to some degree has come to resemble the corporate market where NGOs

compete in seeking contracts for aid projects. This is not the case all through the spectrum but

in some areas it is (e.g. the EU). While many people in the general public sees NGOs “as

uniformly altruistic, idealistic and independent” (Economist, 2000) or autonomous good-

doers, others argue that the relationship have come to resemble one where the NGO are

contractors to governments or international organisations (Nielson, 2007-A1; 2 & Economist,

2000). Of course, the notion of NGOs as autonomous good-doers does not necessarily conflict

1

Introduction

with them being contractors, but it is a fact that contracts will often entail more demands and

a higher degree of control from the side of the paymaster.

1.1 The International Aid System

The question of donor-NGO relationship is one that has attracted attention among scholars.

One of these is Terje Tvedt who has done considerable work on the subject of how to perceive

NGOs in relation to donors. He ascribes much importance to the role of the donors in this

relationship. Tvedt writes among others that “the NGOs in donor countries which are

involved in development aid have to a large extent become actors on the scene because the

donor states have wanted them to do so” (Tvedt, 1998; 54). This is a recurrent statement in his

writings. He argues that we need to move away from “concepts such as “international aid

society” or an “international civil society system” (…) [as] they tend to disregard the power of

international and national donors in shaping and contextualising the work of the development

NGOs (…)” (Tvedt, 2007; 34). Instead he proposes a new approach, an approach which is

“truly” global and which incorporates all notions of NGOs.

This new approach, new system, will not only include development NGOs but also

donors. Tvedt describes this with the analogy of a river system consisting of both channels

(rivers) and reservoirs. The NGOs act as the channels while the donors are the reservoirs.

However, it is important to note that this system is not a one-way system. Power, influence

and legitimacy do not only flow in one direction. Just as some rivers can flow upstream, so

can the elements of this system (Tvedt, 2007; 39-40). Tvedt underlines that the system is

“more complex than a donor/receiver relationship for the transfer of funds from rich to poor

countries” (Tvedt, 2006; 681). Tvedt has labelled this system the International Aid System or

the DOSTANGO system, which is derived form DOnor STAte and NGO system. In order to

utilize the system it is important to note that “each actor within this system has different

resources and different amounts of resources, all of which are unevenly distributed. In order

to understand this system and its actors we therefore need to grasp both the “rules” of the

game and the disposition and resources of the individual actors” (Tvedt, 2007; 40).

The system distinguishes between actors inside and outside the system. It is in effect a

closed system. To be a ‘member’ of the system an organisation need to receive, use or

dispense donor money. This means that the membership is determined by the donor. “(…)

[T]he power of the donor, whether directly or indirectly, affects the organisations’

2

Introduction

accountability mechanisms, organisational formalities, reporting mechanisms and the

language they employ to justify their existence and policies” (Tvedt, 2006; 685).

1.2 Problem Formulation

It is on the basis of Tvedt’s International Aid System I now turn to look at the research field

of this paper. As one of the major contributors of development and relief aid the EU has a

great deal of interaction with numerous NGOs. There are several aspects of EU funding of

NGOs. Money is channelled to NGOs through various sources. All of this will be dealt with

in detail in Chapter 5 . For this paper I will build on Tvedt’s term of the International Aid

System to name my research field the EU Aid System. It incorporates the same elements as

Tvedt’s International Aid System, but is just limited to EU-NGO relations.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the EU Aid System affects the autonomy

of NGOs who are members of it. As the EU Aid System, compared to some state funding

systems, can be seen as somewhat strict in terms of organisational control and requirements to

NGOs receiving funding I wish to examine how this affects the member NGOs. This leads me

to my research question or problem formulation:

To what extent does the EU Aid System allow for NGO autonomy?

I will approach this question by using the Danish humanitarian NGO DanChurchAid (DCA)

as a case. I will analyse the relationship between the EU and DCA and DCA’s role in the EU

Aid System with the aim of exploring how this relationship affects DCA’s autonomy. I will

use my finding to shed light on how the EU Aid System affects humanitarian NGOs in

general. Being a case study it will of course have limitations in answering the problem

formulation on a general basis but the aim is that my findings will provide me with insights

into how the EU Aid System function and what the consequences are for NGOs operating

within. For the scale of this paper it is only possible to deal with the problem formulation as a

case study and as it is inevitable that this entails possible limitations.

3

Theoretical Approaches

Chapter 2 Theoretical Approaches

The aim of this chapter is to provide the theoretical framework necessary to investigate the

relationship between the EU and DCA and gain an understanding of how the EU Aid System

affects the autonomy of DCA. However, the question that arises from this is how to measure

organisational autonomy? As Poul Nielson (2007–A1; 3) argues, it is not nearly enough to

look at how large a percentage of the annual turnover of a NGO, which stems from donors.

This is also supported by Tvedt as he writes “there is no (…) one-to-one relationship between

financial dependence and autonomy” (Tvedt, 2007; 42). The character of the relationship

between the donor and receiver is of great importance as well. One has to look at what the

effect of the funding is. Does the donor exert power over the receiving organisation as a result

of the funding? How is the receiving organisation influenced by the donor as a result of the

funding? These questions lead me to look at how organisations change as a result to their

external environment. By looking into possible organisational changes of a NGO as a result

from external funding I hope to be able to analyse how the funding affects the autonomy of

the NGO.

To understand how organisations change and thereby be able to analyse on NGO

autonomy, I will employ two different theories which both provide an explanation for

organisation change. The two theories, Resource Dependence and Institutional Theory,

explain organisational change differently. However, for the scope of this paper they

compliment each other well. Resource Dependence approach organisational change from the

perspective of one organisation exerting power over another. Organisations will respond to

demands from or changes in their environment. Institutional Theory on the other hand

explains change as a result of institutional similarities in the environment. Organisations

change because of institutional rules, norms, and values or because it is taken for granted as

self-evident. In addition to Resource Dependence and Institutional Theory I also introduce

possible strategies for organisations to respond to change caused by their external

environment.

The EU Aid System is one comprised of both, organisations interacting with, and

thereby influencing, each other and institutional practices. This is why I by combining the two

theories will get a tool suitable for investigating the relationship between the EU and DCA.

By including the strategic responses to changes it will be possible to look at how DCA reacts

4


to processes, which affect it. All together this should enable me to get a clearer understanding

of how the EU Aid System affects DCA – it should enable me to see if, it compromises DCA

autonomy or if DCA is able to navigate the system in a way, which maintains organisational

independence.

2.1 Resource Dependence Theory

The notion of Resource Dependence Theory is that organisations are affected by and change

due to dependence on resources under external control. For organisations to maintain

themselves they rely on an inflow of resources. These resources can be of different character.

They can be of physical or monetary character; they can be in form of information or even

social legitimacy. As organisations are not self-sufficient they must interact with their

environment to secure the resources in question. The organisations become dependent on their

external environment, which because of this have some degree of influence on or control of

the organisational behaviour. If organisations are to survive they will therefore have to adjust

to the demands from the environment controlling the resource. The dependence of resources

give others power over the organisation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; 43).

The dependence of organisations on resources is determined by the importance and

availability of the resource. In addition the dependence is affected by the amount of

organisations controlling the resource. In order for an organisation to become dependent on a

resource it needs to be important to the organisation and it needs to be controlled by relatively

few organisations. Also, the scarcity of the resource influences the dependence. If the

resource is widely available “the power of any single [supplier] is correspondingly reduced”

(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; 52). In Pfeffer and Salancik’s words these three factors are:First, (…) the importance of the resource, the extent to which the organization requires it for continued operation and survival. [Second] the extent to which the interest group has discretion over the resource allocation and use. And, third, the extent to which there are few alternatives, or the extent of control over the resource by the interest group (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; 45-46).

Dependence on resources is not necessarily a problem for an organisation. The problem arises

if the supply of resources is not stable. The possibility of lack in resources assurance, for one

reason or another, for the organisation makes it vulnerable with respect to its survival

Therefore stability and certainty in resource supply is of vital interest to organisations. This

has accordingly to Pfeffer and Salancik (2003; 47) been “noted by many observers of

organizations.” Simultaneously as organisations seek to have stability and certainty in their

5


supply of resources they also wish to avoid being controlled by their environment. This

presents a dilemma for organisations. “On the one hand, future adaptation requires the ability

to change and the discretion to modify actions. On the other hand, the requirement for

certainty and stability necessitate the development of interorganizational structures of

coordinated behaviors – interorganizational organizations” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; 261).

Resource dependent organisations seeking stability and certainty will have to surrender some

of their autonomy to ensure this. As noted in Pfeffer and Salancik (2003; 262) it is a dilemma

between autonomy and certainty, which “is an important characteristic of organizational

actions taken with respect to the environment.” Organisations interacting in exchanging

resources of various kinds will therefore be dependent on each other, or interdependent.

Though one organisation is dependent on resources from another, the other organisation

is dependent on the one for the desired outcome of supplying the resources. According to

Pfeffer and Salancik (2003; 40) “interdependence exits whenever one actor does not entirely

control all of the conditions necessary for the achievement of an action or for obtaining the

outcome desired from the action.” They continue arguing that interdependence characterises

the relationship between actors creating outcomes and that almost all organisational outcomes

are based upon this relationship.

Pfeffer and Salancik (2003; 40-41) present two forms of interdependence, outcome

interdependence and behaviour interdependence. These are not mutually interdependent; they

might occur together but can just as well happen independently. Outcome interdependence is

characterised by “(…) outcomes achieved by A are interdependent with, or jointly determined

with, the outcome achieved by B [whereas in a situation] of behaviour independence,

activities themselves are dependent on the actions of another social actor” (Pfeffer &

Salancik, 2003; 41). An interdependent relationship between a NGO and a donor would

constitute behaviour interdependence. The donor is reliant on the NGO to achieve the desired

outcome of the funding while the NGO is reliant on the donor for funding to carry out

activities.

In an interdependent relationship between organisations, one organisation does not

necessarily have power over the other. For one organisation to have power over the other the

resource exchange relationship will have to be asymmetric. If the resource exchange is not of

equal importance to the organisation asymmetry will arise. One form of asymmetry can be the

size of the organisations. If the resource exchange constitute a smaller proportion for one

6


organisation compared to the other it will cause asymmetry as it will not have the same

importance for both organisations. To fully grasp if an interdependent relationship is

asymmetrical or not, all exchanges of resources will have to be taken into account.

Asymmetry in one resource exchange might be balanced by another resource exchange

(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; 53). This is summarised by Pfeffer and Salancik (2003; 53) into:

“the potential for one organization’s influencing another derives from its discretionary control

over resources needed by that other and the other’s dependence on the resource and lack of

countervailing resource or access to alternative sources.”

In case of an asymmetrical interdependent relationship one of the organisations will

then have the possibility to exert control over the other. Pfeffer and Salancik list eight

conditions which can facilitate control of another organisation. They label the controlling part

as the social actor. This can be an organisation, or it can be other groups or individuals which

comprise the organisation’s environment. These eight conditions are:1) The possession of some resources by the social actor.

2) The importance of the resource to the focal organization; its criticality for the organization’s activities and survival.

3) The inability of the focal organization to obtain the resource elsewhere.

4) The visibility of the behavior or activity being controlled.

5) The social actor’s discretion in the allocation, access, and use of the critical resource.

6) The focal organization’s discretion and capability to take the desired action.

7) The focal organization’s lack of control over the resource critical to the social actor.

8) The ability of the social actor to make its preferences known to the focal organization (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; 260).

These conditions are part of a dynamic sequence and they are alterable to the involved actors.

The focal organisation can try to limit the influence of the conditions or avoid them

altogether. At the same time the social actor can attempt to enhance the effect of the

conditions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; 260). In addition to these eight conditions Pfeffer and

Salancik also list ten conditions that affect organisational compliance with external control

attempts.1) The focal organization is aware of the demands.

2) The focal organization obtains some resources from the social actor making the demands.

3) The resource is a critical or important part of the focal organization’s operation.

7


4) The social actor controls the allocation, access, or use of the resource; alternative sources for the resource are not available to the focal organization.

5) The focal organization does not control the allocation, access, or use of other resources critical to the social actor’s operation and survival.

6) The actions or outputs of the focal organization are visible and can be assessed by the social actor to judge whether the actions comply with its demands.

7) The focal organization’s satisfactions of the social actor’s requests are not in conflict with the satisfaction of demands from other components of the environment with which it is interdependent.

8) The focal organization does not control the determination, formulation, or expression of the social actor’s demands.

9) The focal organization is capable of developing actions or outcomes that will satisfy the external demands.

10)The organization desires to survive (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; 44).

As above, these conditions are alterable and they do not all have to be met. But more

conditions met the greater extent of compliance by the focal organisation to external control.

While overlapping at times the two lists of conditions together paint a clearer picture of how

a, possibly asymmetrical, interdependent relationship between organisations dependent on

resources from each others is expressed.

Central to Resource Dependence Theory is that it is the management of the organisation

which responds to demands from or changes in the environment. It is the management which

has to react accordingly when faced with an interdependent relationship. What this reaction

can or should be will of course vary depending on the situation. I will turn to looking at

possible reactions at the end of this chapter by using Christine Oliver’s (1991) propose

strategic responses to dealing with change in the environment and situations of external

control.

2.2 Institutional Theory

Institutional Theory, or Institutionalism, is derived from the belief that institutions matter in

influencing political outcomes. Institutions are important as they are active in setting up a

context in which “actors can conduct a relatively higher proportion of positive sum bargains”

(Rosamond, 2000; 113-114). Institutional Theory deals with how the institutional

environment affects organisation behaviour. This is a not response “solely to market

pressures, but also to institutional pressures” (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; 1025).

8


Institutional Theory does not directly focus on organisational change but it elaborates on

similarity or isomorphism and stability of organisational arrangements (Greenwood &

Hinings, 1996; 1023).

Institutionalism is sometimes subdivided into three branches, Historical, Rational

Choice and Sociological Institutionalism. The paper will approach Institutionalism from the

sociological perspective in that it focuses on “the capacity of cultural and organizational

practices (institutions) to mould the preferences, interests and identities of actors (…)

(Rosamond, 2000; 114).

Before venturing into the details of Institutional Theory it is important to clarify what

constitutes an institution. However, it should first be noted that there can be varying

understandings of institutions depending on approach (e.g. Rational Choice, Historical

Institutionalism) (Rosamond, 2000). This paper will utilize the definition given by Scott

(2001). He lists five characteristics of institutions, which are presented below:1) Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience.

2) Institutions are composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meanings to social life.

3) Institutions are transmitted by various types of carriers, including symbolic systems, relational routines, and artefacts.

4) Institutions operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction, from the world system to localized interpersonal relationship.

5) Institutions by definition connote stability but are subject to change processes, both incremental and discontinuous (Scott, 2001; 48).

According to Scott (2001; 49) institutions encompass rules, norms, cultural beliefs as well as

associated behaviour and material resources. He continues by arguing that institutions have a

constraining character in that they can “impose restrictions by defining legal, moral, and

cultural boundaries settings off legitimacy from illegitimate activities. But it is essential to

recognize that institutions also support and empower activities and actors. Institutions provide

guidelines and resources for acting as well as prohibitions and constraints on action” (Scott,

2001; 50).

An organisation will be affected by its surrounding environment, a process which

Selznick has defined as institutionalisation. According to him the degree of institutionalisation

can vary but no organisation is completely free of it. Institutionalisation is a process in which

organisations, over time, become “infuse[d] with value beyond the technical requirements of

9


the task at hand” (Selznick, 1957; 17). The level of institutionalisation of an organisation

depends highly on the degree of “leeway there is for personal and group interaction. The more

precise an organization’s goals, and the more specialized and technical its operations, the less

opportunity will there be for social forces to affect its development” (Selznick, 1957; 16).

Hence, identifying possible institutionalised practices within an organisation will rely on

identifying the organisations ability to alter these practised if desired. As the organisation has

become infused with values from its surrounding environment the higher the ability of the

organisation to deviate from this the less institutionalised it is. Organisations will spend a

considerable amount of energy trying to work against institutionalisation as the process will

put constrain on the organisations behaviour. This will of course vary depending on how

much of a treat to the organisations identity it perceives the institutionalisation to be

(Selznick, 1957; 17). However, despite of organisations resistance institutionalisation of an

organisation can affect it to become more competent to perform a specific task, just as it can

become more incompetent.

The latest form of Institutionalism labelled New Institutionalism saw the light in the

beginning of the 1980s. In contrast to the “old” Institutionalism which revolved around

“issues of influence, coalitions, and competing values, (…) along with power and informal

structures (…) [New Institutionalism has] its emphasis on legitimacy, the embeddedness of

organizational fields, and the centrality of classification, routines, scripts, and schema “

(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; 1022). The focus on organisational fields brought along by

New Institutionalism is a focus on networks of organisations. When referring to

organisational fields in a context of NGOs this is very much what Tvedt has labelled the

International Aid System or DOSTANGO system as described in the Introduction.

Greenwood and Hinings (1996; 1023) build on writings of Scott to combine the old and

new Institutionalism into what they label Neo-Institutionalism. They do so by combining

multiple themes. In Scott’s words there is “convergent development among the approaches of

many analysts as they recognize the importance of meaning systems, symbolic elements,

regulatory processes, and governance systems” (Scott quoted in Greenwood & Hinings, 1996;

1023).

10


2.2.1 The Three Pillars of Institutions

In Scott (2001) New Institutionalism is divided into three pillars to represent different

theoretical views. The three pillars; the regulative, the normative and the cultural-cognitive

pillar influence organisations to conform in different ways. They each provide explanation for

institutionalisation of organisations.

The regulative pillar’s explanation for compliance is the use of coercion by actors. In

this view organisational behaviour is constrained and regulated by processes of “rule-setting,

monitoring, and sanctioning activities” (Scott, 2001; 52). Organisations will comply because

of use of authority by powerful actors, which sometimes may “impose their will on others,

based on the use of threat of sanctions. Or they may provide inducements to secure

compliance” (Scott, 2001; 53). In summing up Scott (2001; 54) describes the regulative pillar

as “a stable system of rules, either formal or informal, backed by surveillance and sanctioning

power” to which organisations will comply because it serves their interest.

The normative pillar places emphasis on compliance because of values and norms. It

focuses on “normative rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory

dimension into social life” (Scott, 2001; 54). Compliance because of values means

compliance as it is perceived as the preferred or the desirable to do, while compliance due to

norms is connected to a belief of what should be done. The normative pillar sets up objectives

or goals to be strived for as well as how these should be achieved (e.g. setting up a goal of

making a profit while specifying fair business practices) (Scott, 2001; 54-55). Specific values

and norms may vary from actor to actor. It is worth noting that while it may impose

constraints on behaviour the normative pillar may also be empowering. This can be seen in

that it “confer rights as well as responsibilities, privileges as well as duties, licenses as well as

mandates” (Scott, 2001; 55). Scott (2001; 53) notes that the regulative and normative pillars

can be mutually reinforcing.”

The third pillar, the cultural-cognitive pillar, works from perception of social reality. It

is based upon shared conceptions such as “symbols, words, signs, gestures [which] have their

effect by shaping the meanings we attribute to objects and activities” (Scott, 2001; 57).

Compliance happens as organisations see it as inconceivable not to – compliance is taken for

granted. Institutionalisation happens as organisations’ “internal interpretive processes are

shaped by external cultural frameworks” into an understanding of this is “the way we do these

things” (Scott, 2001; 57).

11


According to Scott (2001) legitimacy is important to organisations. “[They] require

more than material resources and technical information if they are to survive and thrive in

their social environments. They also need social acceptability and credibility” (Scott quoted in

Scott, 2001; 58). Scott (2001) uses a definition of legitimacy which states that it “is a

generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or

appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and

definitions” (Suchman quoted in Scott, 2001; 59). Scott (2001) argues that each of the pillars

provide different forms of legitimacy. In the institutional perspective legitimacy is “a

condition reflecting perceived consonance with relevant rules and laws, normative support, or

alignment with cultural-cognitive frameworks” (Scott, 2001; 59). This view is directly

opposed to how Resource Dependence Theory perceives legitimacy. Instead legitimacy is

“(…) treated simply as another kind of resource” (Scott, 2001; 59). But for New

Institutionalism legitimacy is central to institutionalisation and “the legitimacy of a given

organization is negatively affected by the number of different authorities sovereign over it and

by the diversity or inconsistence of their accounts of how it is to function” (Meyer & Scott

quoted in Scott, 2001; 60).

2.2.2 Institutional Isomorphism

Other authors who deal with organisational change are DiMaggio and Powell (1983) in

attempt to revise the classical image of the Iron Cage of bureaucratisation devised by Weber.

In their writing they explain how organisations change when interacting to become

increasingly similar, a process of isomorphism. Isomorphism happens to organisations within

the same organisational field because of actions by powerful external forces. This may lead

organisations to “change their goals or develop new practices” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;

148). The definition of isomorphism is that it “is a constraining process that forces one unit in

a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental condition”

(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 149). DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) writing focus primarily on

what is known as institutional isomorphism and only touch upon another type known as

competitive isomorphism. For the purpose of this paper I will deal solely with institutional

isomorphism. In the institutional isomorphism DiMaggio & Powell (1983) identify three

mechanisms of institutional isomorphism: coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism,

each a process through which organisational change occurs.

12


Coercive isomorphism happens because of “formal and informal pressures exerted on

organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural

expectations in the society within which organizations function” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;

150). The exerted pressure can be in form of force, persuasion or invitation to conform.

Central to coercive isomorphism is the presence of an actor with the ability to control a

system of contract law. DiMaggio & Powell underline this in saying that “the existence of a

common legal environment affects many aspects of an organization’s behaviour and

structure” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 150).

The second mechanism, mimetic process of isomorphism revolves around uncertainty

of organisations. This will drive organisations to imitate others organisations. The

organisation may see it as a solution to model itself on other organisations (DiMaggio &

Powell, 1983; 151). The modelling may occur unintentionally, indirectly or explicitly and the

organisation being modelled after might be unaware of the modelling or it might find the

modelling undesirable. Regardless of the way the modelling takes place “organizations tend to

model themselves after similar organizations in their field that they perceive to be more

legitimate or successful” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 152).

Normative isomorphism takes place because of professionalisation within the

organisational field. The professionalisation is a normative process which is defined “as the

collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their

work, to control “the production of producers”, and to establish a cognitive base and

legitimation for their occupational autonomy” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 152). DiMaggio &

Powell (1983) see professionalisation as being twofold. One is based upon education and

arises out of the universities, while the other comes from professional networks and the

spreading of professionals between organisations. Organisation can try to influence normative

isomorphism by “filtering” personnel. The more similar the personnel recruitment is, the more

the organisation will be affected by normative isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 152).

The professionalisation of the organisational field will facilitate information flows and create

a hierarchy of status among organisations, and thereby enhance the position of the

organisations most professionalised (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 153).

In a concluding remark DiMaggio & Powell (1983) state that “[i]t is important to note

that each of the institutional isomorphic processes can be expected to proceed in the absence

of evidence that they increase internal organizational efficiency. To the extent that

13


organizational effectiveness is enhanced, the reason will often be that organizations are

rewarded for being similar to other organizations in their fields” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;

153). However, isomorphic organisations do not necessarily have more success than

organisations less similar to other organisations in their field.

In his writing Scott (2001) combines the three pillars of institutions with DiMaggio &

Powell’s (1983) three isomorphic mechanisms into a table explaining institutionalisation

under each pillar. A simplified version of this table suitable for the scope of this paper is

presented below in Table 2.2.2-1

Table 2.2.2-1 Three Pillars of Institutions

Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive

Basis of compliance Expedience Social obligation Taken-for-grantedness,

Shared understanding

Mechanism Coercive Normative Mimetic

Indicators Rules, laws, sanctions Certification,

accreditation

Common beliefs, shared

logics of action

(Source: Scott (2001; 52))

The combination of the three pillars of institutions and institutional isomorphism provide a

good ground for understanding organisational change as a response to the external

environment. To elaborate on this and to explore possible behaviour of organisations under

external pressures to change I now turn to Christine Oliver’s (1991) work on how

organisations strategically will respond to institutional processes.

2.3 Strategic Responses to Organisational Change

In her article Oliver presents different strategic responses of organisations faced with external

pressures to conform. By doing so she strives to enhance “understanding of the behaviour of

organizations in institutional contexts and the conditions under which organizations will resist

institutionalization” (Oliver, 1991; 145). Oliver utilise notions of both Resource Dependence

and Institutional Theory to examine organisational behaviour. She proposes five strategic

responses of organisations: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and

manipulation. Oliver identifies three tactics under each strategy.

The strategy of acquiescence is one in which organisations accede to institutional

pressures. This can be done in form of habits, where organisations adhere unconsciously to

14


for example taken-for-granted rules and norms (Oliver, 1991; 152). Alternatively, the tactic of

imitation can be employed. This “is consistent with the concept of mimetic isomorphism”

(Oliver, 1991; 152). Lastly, organisations can chose to comply which is a conscious act of

obedience to values, norms or requirements. Organisations may chose acquiescence if they

find that conformity is in the interest of the organisation or it may be the result of

unawareness to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991; 153).

Compromise is a strategy organisations can turn to if they are “confronted with

conflicting institutional demands or with inconsistencies between institutional expectations

and internal organizational objectives related to efficiency or autonomy” (Oliver, 1991; 153).

In response to this organisations can attempt a balancing tactic to achieve an outcome

acceptable to all parties. This can for example be between different stakeholders, or between

internal and external demands. Organisations can also chose a pacifying tactic where the

organisation puts up a minimum of resistance and follows at least the minimum of

requirements. More actively organisations can try to bargain to reduce the demands set forth

(Oliver, 1991; 154).

Organisations may attempt avoidance as a response to pressures. Oliver defines

avoidance “as the organizational attempt to preclude the necessity of conformity” (Oliver,

1991; 154). One tactic deals with concealing nonconformity and thereby escaping pressures.

Normally concealment will take form of acquiescence except that conformity is apparent and

not real (Oliver, 1991, 154-155). Alternatively, buffering can be attempted by organisations in

order “to reduce the extent to which it is externally inspected, scrutinized, or evaluated”

(Oliver, 1991; 155). Another tactic is escape in which an organisation may all together

remove itself from external pressure by ceasing the activities which invite pressures (Oliver,

1991; 155).

An active strategy to resist pressures is defiance. One of the tactics of defiance is

dismissal where the organisation ignores rules and values. This will mostly be the case if the

organisation perceives the chance of enforcement low or if compliance compromise internal

objectives (Oliver, 1991; 156). Organisations can also try to challenge the norms, rules, or

expectations. Challenge is an active form of defiance in which the organisation will try to get

the norms, rules, or requirements changed. Finally, organisations can use the tactic of

attacking. The distinguishable feature from challenging is “the intensity and aggressiveness of

the organization’s active departure from institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991; 157).

15


The final strategy, manipulation, is a purposeful and opportunistic attempt to resist

pressures. It is the most active of all the strategies as “it is intended to actively change or exert

power over the content of the expectations themselves or the sources that seek to express or

enforce them” (Oliver, 1991; 157). Organisations can try to avoid pressures by co-opting the

source. This is a tactic in which institutional opposition is neutralised and legitimacy is

enhanced. One example of co-opting could be persuading “an institutional constituent to join

the organization or its board of directors” (Oliver, 1991; 157). Another manipulation tactic is

influencing “values and beliefs or definitions and criteria of acceptable practices or

performance” (Oliver, 1991; 158). Lobbying would be considered a form of influencing.

Lastly, by using a controlling tactic organisations can try to “establish power and dominance

over the external constituents that are applying pressure on the organization” (Oliver, 1991;

158). This is of course highly determined by the degree of chance of success the organisation

perceive it as having. It will be less inclined to try a controlling tactic against a large powerful

organisation (Oliver, 1991; 158).

These five strategies and their underlying tactics together constitute the possible

responses that organisations have when facing institutional pressures. The capability of the

organisation to act will vary from organisation to organisation and is determined by various

factors limiting or enabling organisational control (Oliver, 1991; 159).

Combining the theories of Resources Dependence and Institutionalism with the strategies for

response to organisational change now enable me to analyse my case by looking, not only at

how the relationship between the EU and DCA is expressed in terms of funding, but also on

what the effects of the funding relationship is to the organisational structure of DCA.

Resource Dependence Theory will allow me to asses how the relationship between the EU

and DCA is expressed with respects to power. Based upon this, Institutional Theory will then

make it possible to analyse how DCA has been affected by the relationship with the EU and

including the different strategic responses will explore on reactions of DCA. Together this

means that I will be able to analyse the division of power between the two organisations and

see how the smaller – DCA – is influenced organisationally by the power of the EU. This

should provide me with insights into the autonomy of DCA.

16

Methodological Considerations

Chapter 3 Methodological Considerations

The scope of this paper is to shed light on the relations between donor and receiver in the EU

Aid System. It aims at exploring how the autonomy of NGOs, who are members of this

system, is affected by interacting with the EU. As autonomy is a term which is immeasurable

it is not expected that the paper will provide an answer as to how much autonomy the NGOs

have. The humble goal of the paper is to analyse if the autonomy become affected by the EU

Aid System and to provide insights of what effect this has.

The paper does not however aim to analyse normative aspects of the system. It will not

deal with if the EU Aid System can be seen as either good or bad or what could be done

instead. This is part of a much wide debate about the role of NGOs in society and is beyond

the scope of this paper. The hope is however that this paper, by giving an understanding of the

EU-NGO relationship with respect to autonomy, is able to provide food for thought for

further work on humanitarian NGOs and their relations with the EU, as there are many other

aspects to this topic than the question of autonomy.

I have approached the subject of EU relations with NGOs hermeneutically. The subject was

fairly unfamiliar to me when I set out to write the paper. This has influenced both the way the

paper is structured and how the interviews were conducted. To get a good understanding of

the EU’s relations with NGOs in the field of development and relief aid the paper first sets out

to understand the EU’s relation with the third world. This forms the basis for understanding

the more specific relationship with NGOs within the field. This was also how I approached

the topic.

In presenting the two actors – the EU and DCA – I have tried to rely on data from the actor’s

perspectives. This can of course influence the objectivity of the content, but it has the

advantage that it presents data as the actors experience it. This is important as I aim to analyse

how the actors interact within the system and here their own perception is crucial. To give an

example, when analysing how DCA relates to a specific EU policy it is useful to have

knowledge of how the EU presents this policy and how DCA sees it. It will be necessary to be

critical but I will do so in the analysis where appropriate.

17

Methodological Considerations

In addition to this much of the information of DCA is based upon interview with three

employees at DCA’s funding unit. I got the opportunity to perform three interviews lasting

one hour each. Again, my approach was to learn as much about the work of DCA as possible

which I knew little of beforehand. I chose to perform in-depth qualitative interview for several

reason. First, what I needed for the paper was specialised knowledge of NGO funding. My

interviewees were able to provide me with this as their work function within DCA is exactly

this – getting funding. This made it obvious to focus on doing a few more in-depth interviews.

Second, as it was new material to me it was important to be able to be flexible and adaptive to

what I learned during the interview. Therefore I did not plan the interviews in details. Rather,

I prepared the topic which I wanted to learn more about and approach the interviews with an

attitude of conversation instead of structured interview. This meant that I was able to direct

the interviewee towards interesting topics that arose during the interviews.

The way the interviews are presented in the annexes is the transcribed version. It should

be noted that the transcription is made with focus on content of what was said, and not the

way it was said. This means that I have adapted some sentences to bring out the intended

meaning or that I occasionally have deleted excess words.

Part of the information about DCA was learned during informal talks when I visited

DCA to do the interviews and other parts originates from internal documents which I am not

permitted to enclose in this paper. I have been allowed to use gained knowledge. Though this

means that references will not always be included, I adhere to academic principles in my use

and presentation of this information.

In the initial phase of working on the thesis I performed an email interview with former EU

commissioner Poul Nielson. However, as the subject has developed from the beginning many

of the questions are no longer as relevant as they were initially. This is why it is only included

at a limited extent in this paper. I still deem the interview as having been very useful as it has

help me in understanding the field and developed the current subject of the paper.

18

The EU’s Relations with the Third World

Chapter 4 The EU’s Relations with the Third World

To be able to understand the nature of the EU’s relations with development NGOs it is

necessary to know what has formed the basis for co-operation. This prompts me to look into

the background for, and the history of, the EU’s relations with the third world to see how it

has developed from the time of the Treaty of Rome to its current form. The relations between

third world countries and some former colonial European countries predate the Treaty of

Rome of course and have had a role in shaping the relations with the EU.

It must be noted though that this chapter is intended to be an overview of the political

development and focus which is why I will not go into detail about the institutional

development. It is merely intended to paint a picture of the changes in the relationship

between the EU and the developing world, which on the basis of the changes in the general

development policy, will enable me to see what the co-operation with NGOs is founded upon.

Furthermore, I do not intend to deal much with the problems that have arisen throughout

the different co-operation arrangements. This is due to the fact that this paper does not deal

specifically with EU-third world relations, which is included solely to understand relations

with development NGOs better.

4.1 History of relations with the Third World

The EU’s relation with the developing world has its origin in the original member states’

colonial ties (Farrell, 2005; 267). During the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome France

pushed for provisions to protect its relation with its overseas collectivities/countries1 and

territories (OCT). This was controversial with the other member states, particularly with

Germany and the Netherlands who remained sceptical. However, France insisted and

managed to include a special Associate Status for the OCTs. (Holland, 2002; 25-26).

Initially 31 OCTs received associate status because of their special relationship with

four of the member states (France, Belgium, Italy, and Netherlands). This number has

changed over the years as several countries have obtained independence. The current number

of OCTs is 20 non-independent states constitutionally linked to four member states (Denmark,

1 The term “collectivities” are sometimes used to distinguish the French OCTs from the rest. However, “countries” are used more generally to cover all OCTs and is the term in use by the EU.

19


the UK, the Netherlands, and France).2 The specific arrangement with the EU and the member

states for the OCTs and its citizens vary from OCT to OCT.

Articles 131-6 in the Treaty of Rome (articles 182-8 in the Consolidated Versions of the

Treaties) covered the associated status of the OCTs with the member states and did in effect

treat member states and OCT similar “with respect to trade access, investment, and the

reduction and eventual abolition of customs duties (with the exception of certain ‘sensitive’

products) (Holland, 2002; 26).

However, as non-OCT developing countries were not covered by these provisions and

most of the OCTs gained independence in the beginning of the 1960s new arrangements

became necessary. These were to become known as the Yaoundé Conventions.

4.1.1 The Yaoundé Conventions

The first Yaoundé Convention was signed in 1963 in Yaoundé in Cameron and came into

force the following year. It created privileged trade agreements between the EC member

states and 18 former, mainly francophone, colonies (Mayall, 2005; 296). The geographical

focus of the Convention was on the African continent and these former colonies became

known as the EAMA countries from the French acronym for Associated African States and

Madagascar. The Yaoundé Convention created an institutionalised and contractual

relationship between the EC and the former colonies, features that had not been seen before

(Holland, 2002; 28). The Convention was initially negotiated for a period of five years, but

was subsequently renewed in 1969 for another five years lasting until 1976.

While the Yaoundé Conventions only lasted a little more than a decade and only dealt

with EC relations to a limited part of the developing world and while they have been criticised

by many for, in essence, being an extension of French colonial ambitions it nonetheless

constituted the beginning of the EC’s post-colonial relations to the third world (Holland,

2002; 30-32).

With the enlargement in 1973 and the UK’s membership it became evident that the

Yaoundé Conventions were not sufficient anymore and new arrangements were needed to

account for the Commonwealth states. This led to negotiations of Lomé Convention in 1975.

2 For a full list of current OCTs see (http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12300.htm).

20


4.1.2 The Lomé Conventions

As well as bringing more developing countries into the agreement raising the number to 46

countries, the Lomé Conventions brought a new geographical focus to EC-third world

relations. Where the focus of the Yaoundé Conventions, as mentioned above, had been on

Africa, the inclusion of Commonwealth states shifted this focus to also encompass Pacific and

Caribbean states. This new group of African, Caribbean and Pacific states were to become

known by its acronym as the ACP states.

At the time when the first of four Lomé Conventions were negotiated it was vital for the

UK that its relations with the Commonwealth states were maintained in the new conventions.

As opposed to the mainly French approach of Yaoundé the British argued for a relationship

with the former colonies founded on open trade and sovereignty (Holland, 2002; 32-33).

Despite French resistance, the philosophy of the Commonwealth and the fact that the

Yaoundé Conventions had been perceived as promoting dependency rather than development

meant that the Lomé Conventions came to focus on equal partnership between Europe and the

ACP states (Holland, 2002; 34-35).

The first two Lomé Conventions both sought to promote trade between the EC and the

ACP states and to develop agriculture and industry in the ACP states. It also included special

aid for the least developed states and focus on regional co-operation. These policy objectives

tried to deal with the critique Yaoundé had received. Lomé did away with the principle of

reciprocity that had been seen as highly problematic. The problem among others had been that

Yaoundé had attempted to create equal opportunities based upon the same rights for both the

EC and the EAMA countries. However, as the EC and the EAMA were clearly not equals this

proved to be a mistake, which meant that the developing countries were not able to gain as

much as intended from this relationship (Mayall, 2005; 298).

With the Lomé Conventions the EC only demanded of the ACP states that EC export

had at least as good conditions as export from other developed countries. The ACP states kept

their privileged trade preferences but did not have to give such to EC countries and they were

free to trade with other developed countries (Holland, 2002; 39). However, these initiatives

had primarily psychological effects and did not change the EC’s pattern of external trade

substantially (Holland, 2002; 36).

When Lomé III was negotiated in the mid 1980s it became evident that it would have to

deal with the fallout of the oil crises and recession of the 1970s that had been particular hard

21


on the African continent. The EC began to shift its political focus towards “broader

adjustment issues and to look for an international consensus on macroeconomic assistance”

(Holland, 2002; 41). This meant that institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank (WB)

came to play a larger role as the EC became more attentive to their policies and doctrines.

However, the most notable changes of Lomé III are its focus on thematic issues and the first

introduction of conditionality, which were to become more emphasised later (Holland, 2002;

41-42).

The last part of the Lomé Conventions (Lomé IV) coincided with the end of the cold

war and the change of realpolitik it brought along. No longer were the EC’s former colonies

of prime interest. Focus now shifted towards the eastern neighbours in the former east bloc.

The tendency was that the EC to a larger extent dominated the agenda and that the wishes of

the ACP states received less attention (Holland, 2002; 42).

Lomé IV underlined the policy of conditionality while at the same time introduced a

more flexible approach to the different ACP states. The idea was to give more responsibility

for the development co-operation to each of the ACP states. It was the right of the ACP states

to determine the direction of their development strategies and priorities as stated in Article

244 of the Convention (Holland, 2002; 44). Now democracy development, protection of

human rights and promoting of rule of law became essential focal areas to the EC.

However, throughout the 1990s it was clear that the attempts to improve the ACP states’

economy had failed. In fact, there had been a decline in the ACP states’ overall share of the

European market during the Lomé Conventions. The changes brought along by the end of the

cold war and shift in focus mentioned above also contributed to the dissatisfaction as the

political priorities of favouring the ACP states had changed and among many traditional

donors there was a feel of “aid fatigue” (Arts, 2003; 95-97).

Generally, it was felt that Lomé had not managed to achieve what it set out to do and

that reform was now needed. It was not enough to merely renegotiate the existing

conventions. New arrangements had to be made and negotiations in the latter part of the

1990s led to the adoption of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 (Holland, 2004a; 276-278).

4.1.3 The Cotonou Agreement

While the Cotonou Agreement was something new compared to Lomé, it still build on many

of the features and much of the acquis of Lomé, for example a contractual nature of the

22


agreements with the EU (Holland, 2004b; 117). Also, Cotonou kept the focus on democracy,

human rights and the rule of law that Lomé IV introduced to emphasise three ‘essential

elements’ to be included in the co-operation agreements (Holland, 2004b; 119).

The idea of flexibility that originated under Lomé IV was expanded as the Cotonou

Agreement did away with the uniformity that had characterised earlier co-operation. The new

paradigm of Cotonou became ‘differentiation’. The idea was to take account for the different

levels of developments of the ACP states in the co-operation and hereby enabling the ACP

states to better adapt to, among others, global economy. Now the ACP states were divided

into regional groups, which better corresponded with their development status (Holland,

2004a; 278-279).

Cotonou brought along two other paradigm changes as well. Firstly, it gave up the idea

of privileged trade preferences with the ACP states, which had been highly criticised by non-

ACP states and introduced the principle of free trade by working towards abolishing trade

barriers and adapting to WTO trade rules. A part of this is the negotiation of Economic

Partnership Agreements (EPA) between the EU and ACP sub-regions which in time seeks to

remove all trade barriers (Alecu de Flers & Regelsberger, 2005; 329).

Secondly, Cotonou reinterpreted political conditionality by for example insisting on

good governance, political dialogue and fighting corruption in the ACP states. The creation of

and agreement on a broad definition3 of good governance in the Cotonou Agreement was seen

as a success in itself (Holland, 2004a; 284-287). Also, Cotonou gave civil society and NGOs a

larger role as their participation is a ‘fundamental principle’ of co-operation – it will be part of

the requirements of a consolidated democracy (Arts, 2003; 100).

These three new paradigms were all implemented with the intent of working towards

poverty eradication combined with sustainable development while helping the ACP states to

integrate into the global economy. Though focus on poverty reduction is not new, this

combination has not been seen before in EU-third world relations (Holland, 2004b; 125).

The changes that Cotonou has brought along will undoubtedly entail some major

changes in relations between the EU and the ACP states (Arts, 2003; 111). It is still too early

to judge the effects of Cotonou and it is to been seen how it will affect the EU-ACP

relationship throughout its lifespan until 2020, but in Poul Nielson’s words Cotonou

3 See article 9.3 of the Cotonou Agreement for definition

23


constitutes “a new era of a relationship based on a profound reform of the spirit, the objectives

and the practice of our co-operation” (quoted by Holland, 2004a; 277).

4.1.4 Relations with Asian and Latin American (ALA) States

Whereas Yaoundé, Lomé and Cotonou covered arrangements with states in the ACP area, co-

operation with countries in Asia and Latin America have to a large extent been neglected

throughout the years. The ALA states did not receive the same amount of attention as the

ACP states did. This was especially clear during Lomé where the ALA states did have some

bilateral agreements, but nothing compared with the partnership that the ACP states enjoyed

(Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; 127).

Instead a model with focus on regional co-operation was favoured by the EU, which is

substitute of an overall coherent strategy. This has especially been the case in Latin America

where the EU has not had a single approach. Instead the typical attitude has been to work and

promote co-operation and integration at the sub-regional level (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006;

127-129).

This has been mirrored in relation to Asia. It was decided in 1973 not to include Asian

Commonwealth members in the Lomé Convention for several reasons, including a large

diversity within Asia and hostility towards and fear of Asia’s growing industries. Regional co-

operation received some limited attention during the cold war with an EC-ASEAN Co-

operation Agreement covering the more western-oriented Asian states. (Bretherton & Vogler,

2006; 129-130). However, shared for the ALA area is that it has not had the same interest of

the EU as has been the case with the ACP states. But with the removal of the privileged

partnership of the ACP states, the ALA states have come closer to a relationship with the EU

similar to that of the ACP states have.

As seen above the EU has moved from a relationship with the third world based upon colonial

remnants with a standardised approach towards differentiation between the various regions in

the third world. A differentiation based on several criteria, including strategic interests of the

EU and levels of development. An example of policy based on new strategic interests of the

EU is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), agreed upon in 2004 covering the EU’s

Neighbourhood in Northern Africa, parts of the Middle East and Central Asia and countries in

the former east bloc, where the EU sees a need for increased interaction. Another example is

24


the negotiations of EPAs with regions in the ACP area, which seeks to enhance sub-regions

integration. The negotiation of EPAs can also be seen as a move by the EU towards adopting

policies more in line with the philosophy of international organisations such as the WTO, WB

and IMF.

Furthermore, the EU has thoroughly adopted the concept of conditionality, especially

within the fields of protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law as well as the

fight against corruption. The fulfilment of EU requirements in these fields is one of the main

prerequisites for co-operation with the EU. Among others, this is where NGOs and civil

society have received an enhanced role as the EU sees participation and involvement as an

important part of a developed democracy.

The many changes in EU policies (e.g. Cotonou, ENP, and EPA) around the turn of the

millennium could be read as a signal that the EU is trying to adapt to a changing world and

create a more coherent and comprehensive policy. But what the motives behind this are and

whether these new approaches to the developing world prove to be successful in working

towards, among others, poverty reduction and possible eradication in the third world or they

end up hampering development for some is not to be discussed here as it is not what I set out

to do in this paper.

4.2 Financial Support to Third World Countries

Since Yaoundé, the main instrument for channelling money for development aid to the ACP

countries and OCT has been the European Development Fund (EDF) which also covers the

European Investment Bank (EIB). The EDF provides aid while the EIB supports in the form

of loans. The EDF has been renegotiated in conjunction with the different Conventions and

Agreements. The first EDF under Cotonou, the Ninth EDF (EDF9), covers the period from

2000-2007. Where the First EDF all included amounted to 581 million Euros, EDF9 is set to

15.2 billion Euros (Holland, 2002; 43 & Holland, 2004b; 120). However, EDF9 actually

consist of a grand total of 25 billion Euros. This is due to problems relating to issues of

disbursement of the funds available, which results in a pile up of funds available from EDF8.

As a compromise the EU has agreed that any unspent resources, will be carried over to the

next EDF. The reason for the problems of disbursement is primarily because of lack of

institutional capacity both within the EU itself as well as with the ACP states (Smith, M.E.,

2005; 165).

25


Another critique of the EDF from the ACP states is that it is not consistent with EU’s

supposed commitments of increasing development aid. Rightly so, the increase of resources

under EDF9 does in fact not constitute an increase from EDF8 in real terms (Holland, 2004a;

281).

The EDF is funded directly by national contributions from the EU member states and is

not a part of the EU general budget under heading 4, title 21, which covers the Community’s

Development and Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States that in the 2007

budget amounts to 1.2 billion Euros.

In addition to this individual member states provided bilateral assistance, which exceeds

the Community assistance several times. This model of bilateral and Community aid has

persisted throughout the different Conventions and Agreements though the balance have not

remained stable (Holland, 2002; 28-29).

As part of the budget for 2007-2013 the EU has adopted a model with six instruments

under which the funds for implementation of external assistance figure. The six instruments

are divided between what is referred to as horizontal and geographical instruments covering a

wide range over areas and programmes. An overview of the arrangements of the six

instruments can be seen below in Illustration 4.1.4-1.

Illustration 4.1.4-1 EU Financial Instruments for External Assistance

(Source: Website: BOND)

26


The ENPI (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument) covers assistance to 17

countries in EU’s Neighbourhood. The DCI (Development Cooperation Instrument)

establishes a financing instrument for development co-operation in general. It also covers

assistance to countries in the Middle East and ALA area not covered by the EDF or ENPI.

(European Commission, 2007b).

27

The EU’s Relations with European Development NGOs

Chapter 5 The EU’s Relations with European Development NGOs

In this chapter I will look into the specifics of the EU’s relations with European development

NGOs and how they receive funding. The aim of the chapter is to understand the

organisational field and thereby the EU Aid System. The chapter will deal with one of the

actors, the EU, of the EU Aid System relevant for the purpose of this paper. This will be done

by first looking at what the EU policies are in the field of aid and how these relate to NGOs.

Then to fully understand all the actors within the EU, the aid offices will be presented. Lastly,

details of funding will be covered. This includes overall objectives, values and principles,

which guide the funding, how the funding is allocated and what the requirements applicants

face. Together this will enable me to identify the EU Aid System for the purpose of analysing

on how NGOs are affected.

Financing of development NGOs is part of the EU’s general development co-operation, which

is based upon articles 177-188 of the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union

(TEU) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC). It is in this document the

framework for development co-operation is set out, with particular focus on sustainable

economic and social development, integration of developing countries into the world

economy, and poverty reduction. It is stated that the Community and the member states

(hence the EU) must work together, by co-ordinating and consulting each other, to achieve

these goals. Furthermore, the work should be done so to contribute to the development of

democracy and the principle of rule of law as well as protecting fundamental freedoms and

human rights. In addition, compliance with commitments to the UN or other international

organisations is obligatory (European Union, 2006; Title XX).

It is within this framework that the European Consensus on Development (Michel,

2006) is created. Drawn up in 2006 it deals with how the EU should meet the future challenge

of development. It sets out common objectives, values and principles for development co-

operation. Among the objectives the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) figures as

the foundation but with eradication of poverty as the primary focus. The common values are:

“respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance,

gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity and justice” as also mentioned several times

elsewhere (Michel, 2006; 14).

28


Political dialogue, inclusion of civil society and promoting of gender equality within the

developing countries are parts of the common principles, which strive to create a society

where involvement of the people is strong. This is part of the idea of promoting a consolidated

democracy. In addition to this, ownership and partnership also figures as common principles.

The EU sees the development co-operation as a partnership with the developing countries,

where it is the developing countries that own the process. This is to be understood in the

context, that it is the developing countries that have the main responsibility in creating

strategies and programmes, as well as ensuring that development is possible with the domestic

environment. They must “mobilise own resources [and conduct] coherent and effective

policies” (Michel, 2006; 14). The EU shares responsibility and accountability as a supporting

partner in working towards poverty reduction and the MDGs. The intention is that this

principle ownership will enable the developing country by direct participation to be in charge

of the development process. Together with the EU the developing countries play a major role

in drawing up a Country Strategy Paper which stipulates how the development process should

be.

5.1 Thematic programme

NGO involvement in the development process is governed by the Thematic programme for

Non-state actors and local authorities in development, which is guided by the European

Consensus on Development and which legal base is set out in article 14 of European

Parliament and Council Regulation 1905 of 2006 (the DCI) which establishes a financing

instrument for development co-operation. Article 14 states that the objective of the

programme is to “co-finance initiatives proposed and/or carried out by” (European Parliament

& European Council, 2006, Art. 14, Paragraph 1) European NGOs and that at least 85% of the

funding under the thematic programme should be allocated to NGOs. The first part of the

programme covers the period from 2007-2010 and is described in a Strategy Paper of the

Thematic Programme (European Commission, 2006a). This Strategy Paper goes into detail

about how the Thematic Programme is to be managed and what it aims to do. The Strategy

Paper summarises three specific objectives derived from article 14 of the DCI.

Objective 1: “Promote an inclusive and empowered society in partner countries to

facilitate non-state actors and local authorities’ participation in poverty reduction and

sustainable development strategies” (European Commission, 2006a; 9). This should be to the

29


benefit of the part of the population, which does not have access to the general services and

resources and which is not included in the policy making process.

Objective 2: “Awareness raising and development education in the EU and acceding

countries for development issues” (European Commission, 2006a; 9). As stated in Article 14,

this is to gain active support “for poverty reduction and sustainable development strategies in

partner countries, for fairer relations between developed and developing countries” (European

Parliament & European Council, 2006; Art. 14, Paragraph 1).

Objective 3: “Coordination and communication of NSA and local authority networks in

the EU and acceding countries” (European Commission, 2006a; 11). It should empower civil

society organisation in order to create more and better dialogue between NGOs and the states

and with Community institutions.

To achieve these objectives the Strategy Paper aspires to ensure that interventions in the

developing countries aim at getting active involvement in the development process, in order

to increase the capacity to take action of all actors in the country or region in question,

especially those groups most marginalised and vulnerable. The key is its actor-oriented

approach, which aims at capacity building by supporting initiatives from European NGOs

(European Commission, 2006a; 2). The interventions are subject to the development policy

and priorities and should be carried out within the framework of the Country Strategy Paper.

According to the Thematic Programme a fundamental principle of the EU’s

development policy is the complementary role of NGOs and local authorities bringing added

value to the development process. The NGOs are seen as being very experienced actors

having a dual role both acting as a key aid deliverer and as a strategic partner in political,

social and economic dialogue. The independence and autonomy of NGOs is important in

“bridging the gap between authorities and the grass-roots level and ensuring real ownership,

participation and empowerment of communities” (European Commission, 2006a; 5).

It is against this background that NGOs can apply for funding for programmes or

projects. Programmes figure under either national or EU development policy and country

strategies and cover broad policy area (e.g. a primary health care programme). There is no

clear definition of what constitutes a programme, which can differ substantively in scope and

scale. Projects are part of a programme and can be defined as “a series of activities aimed at

bringing about clearly specified objectives within a defined time-period and with a defined

budget” (European Commission, 2004a; 8). More details on projects and what they comprise

30


will be presented later when dealing with what NGOs need to do to get funding. Due to the

scale, most NGO work is done as projects, and it is rare that NGOs are able to manage entire

programmes. Undertaking entire programmes is only conceivable for a few major NGOs.

5.2 Funding of NGOs

There are two main sources of financing for European NGOs working within the field of

development and relief aid. These are the Commission’s Directorate-Generals (DG) European

Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and EuropeAid Cooperation Office (known

internally as DG AIDCO), with ECHO being responsible for humanitarian aid and EuropeAid

for external aid other than humanitarian aid. A more elaborate explanation of ECHO and

EuropeAid will be presented below and details on NGO funding will follow.

5.2.1 EuropeAid Cooperation Office4

EuropeAid’s main responsibility is implementation of EU’s external aid programmes, except

for those, as mentioned above, which figures under ECHO. EuropeAid’s task is to ensure that

aid is effectively in relation to the objectives, values and principles the EU has set forth, as

shown above, which also helps in promoting EU’s profile throughout the world. EuropeAid

deals with implementation and not with devising of strategies for external aid. This

responsibility lies with other DGs, e.g. with DG Development in charge of the ACP area or

with DG RELEX in charge of EU external relations.

However, it is EuropeAid who deals with all of the other parts of aid projects, from

identifying needs over preparatory measures to monitoring and evaluation. EuropeAid

transforms policies and strategies into practise in order to deliver Community aid.

Furthermore, as well as awarding funds for project proposals, it is also EuropeAid who issues

guidelines and evaluation procedures for co-operation with NGOs.

Formed in 2001, from a restructuring of aid activities, EuropeAid is structured mainly

as a decentralised body where much of the work is done away from Brussels. The

responsibility of programme management mostly rest with the EU delegations in the

programme countries (Stevens & Stevens, 2006; 417). In fact two out of three of EuropeAid’s

4 Unless otherwise specified the source of information in this section is the EuropeAid website: (http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm)

31


staff members working on implementation are doing their work in the field through EU

delegations in the developing countries. The dialogue between partners, such as international

organisations or NGOs, and EuropeAid is done both by HQ in Brussels and by the different

delegations in the recipient countries. But whereas the overall policy decisions are taken in

Brussels it is the delegations that manage and award almost all of the CfP, which are highly

subject to local conditions. For NGOs this can have the effect that it becomes more difficult to

apply for funding. As the delegations have received decision-making competence things are

not always done in the same way throughout different countries and areas. This decision-

making competence is referred to by the Commission as Deconcentration and not

decentralisation to distinguish from how it used to be. Nonetheless, the result is that it can be

more stringent for the NGOs (Allan Duelund Jensen, 2007-A2; 9).

EuropeAid had three different ways of delivering aid, which either stem mainly from

heading 4, title 21 of the general budget or from the EDF. It is either done by budget support

to a partner country. This is done by transferring funds to the country’s national bank which

in return will make imbursement in its national currency. EuropeAid also employs a sectors

approach in which the EU supports the partner government. This ensures that the government

receives the control over the development policy which in turn can help create a more

coherent policy. The government together with the EU and other donors work out a sector

programme fulfilling different criteria aiming at clear measurable outcome and efficient

implementation. Finally, EuropeAid assists in form of project approach where the EU finance

specific clearly defined projects. The project will need a clear objective, a defined time span

and a defined budget. It is for these kinds of projects NGOs mostly will be able to get

funding.

5.2.2 ECHO5

Being responsible for EU’s humanitarian aid ECHO is one of the world’s largest actors in this

field. The assistance provided by EU amounts to around 700 million Euros each year, which

figures under heading 4, title 23 of the general budget. This is at the level of the bilateral aid

provided by the member states or that of the US. ECHO estimates that its aid reaches some 18

million people around the world in over 60 different countries with the bulk of the money

5 The source of information in this section is both the ECHO website: (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/index_en.htm) and other sources, which then are listed as normal.

32


going to countries on the African continent6. Just as EuropeAid, ECHO relies on experts both

at HQ in Brussels and in the field at different EU delegations around the world. However, as

opposed to EuropeAid, the decision-making competence on ECHO funding lies in Brussels.

The people in the field are advisors to the HQ. The result is that ECHO in cases is more

liberal and flexible than EuropeAid when it comes to requirements for funding (Allan

Duelund Jensen 2007-A2; 9).

As part of ECHO’s mandate, impartiality and neutrality features prominently.

According to the EC regulation concerning humanitarian aid ECHO must act in a non-

discriminatory humanitarian way in helping victims of disasters, be they natural or man-made

(European Council, 1996). While working from a principle of respect for the humanitarian

space ECHO recognises that some instances require use of military resources. This will in

most cases be limited to logistic support for example when faced with major natural disasters.

However, in recent years ECHO has accepted that military and civil protection teams can be

used as long as they operate under strict rules and with clearly defined roles between the

different actors (European Commission, 2006c).

ECHO’s main mission is to fund programmes and projects to be drawn up and

implemented by international humanitarian organisations and NGOs. The funding for these

organisations come in form of grants via CfP and covers emergency and food aid, as well as

aid to refugees and displaced people. In addition to the emergency and disaster relief ECHO

also works pre-emptively by promoting disaster preparedness and prevention (European

Commission, 2006c; 1-2). ECHO has a somewhat different approach to the funding than

EuropeAid. In order to receive funds from ECHO NGOs must enter into a Framework

Partnership Agreement (FPA) with ECHO.

Framework Partnership Agreement: FPAs has as purpose to define the common

principles of the relationship between ECHO and NGOs and establish basis for long-term co-

operation. The aim is to certify that aid is delivered in the best way possible. The idea behind

the FPA is to simplify the procedures for NGOs delivering humanitarian aid supported by

ECHO. NGOs need to prove to ECHO that they are capable of carrying out project

satisfactory. This is due to the emergency nature of the work done. ECHO recognises that as

speed in many instances is of the essence it is necessary to have partners who are ready to

6 This was not the case in 2005 where the funds allocated to Asia were doubled due to the consequences of the tsunami in the Indian Ocean at the turn of the year before thereby reaching the same level as for the entire ACP area.

33


begin work quickly. However, to ensure that aid is delivered in the most efficient way and

that it lives up to agreed upon standards it is necessary to have pre-approved the partners

(European Commission, 2004b). There are eligibility criteria for entering into a FPA, just as

there are criteria for receiving funds from EuropeAid.

5.2.3 Objectives of co-financing of NGOs

NGOs seeking co-financing under article 14 of the DCI must strive to fulfil the three

objectives of the Thematic Programme. The Strategy Paper for 2007-2010 of the Thematic

Programme presents an indicative overview of how funds available for the period are to be

distributed by objectives. The bulk (82%) of the funds is allocated to the first objective which

is the one dealing with the actual work in the developing countries. In addition to the three

objectives a small amount (2%) of the funds are spent on management and support

expenditure and evaluation. A full overview of the distribution of funds can be seen in Table

5.2.3-2 below.

Table 5.2.3-2 Resources Distributed by Objectives

OBJECTIVES INDICATIVE AMOUNTS 2007-2010

(€ million, current prices)

Objective 1: in-country interventions 741 (82%)Objective 2: awareness raising and development education in the EU and acceding countries

126 (14%)

Objective 3: coordination between civil society and local authorities’ networks in EU and acceding countries

18(2%)

Management and support expenditure and evaluation

18 (2%)

TOTAL 903 (100%) (Source: European Commission (2007d; 16-17)).

Each year an Annual Action Programme is set out to guide the financing. In 2007 the

contribution amounted to almost 208 million Euros managed under budget heading 21.03.01

and 21.03.02 (European Commission, 2007a).The Annual Action Programme follows the

objectives of the Thematic Programme. A more elaborate description of these objectives and

what NGOs are to do to fulfil these is presented below. It should be noted that the Strategy

Paper does not specify actual end goals for projects based upon the initiative of NGOs, as

34


these are not “best placed to anticipate expected results” (Thematic programme, 12 & 15).

But, project proposals should include basic performance indicators of what the project will

contribute to in relation to the three objectives.

Objective 1: Promote an inclusive and empowered society in partner countries to facilitate

non-state actors and local authorities’ participation in poverty reduction and sustainable

development strategies. This is the objective that is to govern the priorities for any

programmes or projects proposed by NGOs. This objective can be interpreted somewhat

broadly. It is however supposed to strengthen NGOs and local authorities in partner countries

in order to work towards poverty reduction of the poorest people in developing countries. The

geographic priority of this objective is based upon size, number of countries and trends of

earlier years. This means that about half of the funds are allocated to the ACP states and

around 20% to both Asia and Latin America (see note for exact figures7) (European

Commission, 2006a; 12).

Objective 1 covers two different types of NGO actions. This is either in-country

projects which are managed by the delegations or initiative covering several countries. The

latter is managed by the headquarters in Brussels. Financing will mainly be provided to the

implementation of in-country projects. The projects do not exclusively have to be restricted to

one country. In case of, for example, Diaspora organisations a cross-border project would be

appropriate (European Commission, 2006a; 13).

In-country projects should contribute to:– Capacity building of Non State Actors and local authorities to strengthen their participation in

poverty reduction and sustainable development strategies

– Acceptance by governments to mainstream institutional support and capacity building provisions for local development structures , in particular in country situations which are not conducive to NSA and local authority involvement in the development process

– Changes in government policy and practice towards NSA and local authorities in favour of their involvement in the development process, including changes in legislation, removal of obstacles and/or improved government commitment regarding involvement of involving NSA and local authorities

– Degree of participation of poorest sections of the population in developing countries, including particularly marginalised and vulnerable groups out of reach of mainstream services and excluded from policy making processes

7 ACP: 49%, Asia: 23%, Latin America 21%, Eastern Europe, Middle East and Central Asia: 3.5%, MEDA: 3.5%

35


– Number of quality partnerships established promoting networking and alliances between a wide range of different stakeholders from the EU and partner countries (South-South and North-South)

– Increase in interaction between state and non-state actors in different contexts, including non state actor involvement in policy dialogue with government and capacity to play an oversight role

– Capacity of worker's organisations and employers to engage in social dialogue and promote corporate social responsibility (CSR)

– Strengthened citizens’ capacity to take action, defend their rights and take part in the political debate at local, national and international levels (European Commission, 2006a; 12-13).

The delegations managing the projects should ensure that the projects follow the principles of

and have subsidiarity with EC Country Strategy Papers. In addition complementarity with

other EC thematic programmes should be striven for. To do this the delegations should submit

a concept note to headquarters in which they outline a country programme that “transpose the

principles and orientations of [the] thematic strategy paper into the country context”

(European Commission, 2006a; 13). This should be done in consultation with member states,

civil society and relevant stakeholders. In addition, a prioritising list of countries for financing

will de drawn up based upon the concept notes and on consultations with member states.

Priority will be given to initiatives in countries where the:– country situations are not conducive to ensuring non state actor and local authority

involvement in the development process, including difficult partnerships8, unstable situations, conflict, poor governance etc. This programme is an important tool which may facilitate the acceptance and the translation into practice of participatory approaches

– specific needs of parts of the population are not addressed in the partner country development strategy and groups are out of reach of mainstream services and resources, excluded from the policy-making process (European Commission, 2006a; 9-10).

Interventions managed by headquarters with a global, multi-country or multi-regional scale

should contribute to:– Increased number of trans-national exchanges, confidence building, networking and

coordination activities between Non State Actors and local authorities (North-South, South-South);

– Increase in local civil society and local authorities' support for and involvement in global and regional development processes and dialogues;

8 Situations of difficult partnership are defined as those where for one of the following reasons the usual cooperation instruments cannot be fully used to support initiatives undertaken by stakeholders other than central governments: (1) countries where cooperation has been suspended, (2) countries where the authorities are not committed to objectives of poverty reduction and to other basic principles of development policy, including good governance and participation of civil society and decentralized authorities, (3) countries where the dialogue on participatory approaches to development is very limited (included in quote).

36


– Dissemination of best practices at global or regional level and replication at national or local level (European Commission, 2006a; 14).

Under this, priority will be given to:– global, multi-country/regional initiatives which are ensured more efficiently through this

thematic programme than through geographic programmes (European Commission, 2006a; 10).

The intent is that these kinds of projects should bring added value in relation to the country

programme. Projects should support the “local population and their involvement in regional

integration processes” (European Commission, 2006a; 14).

Objective 2: Awareness raising and development education in the EU and acceding countries

for development issues. The second objective focuses exclusively on initiatives within the EU

and acceding countries. The focus on awareness raising goes back to the beginning of the

1990s and played a part in the establishment of ECHO in 1992, which had as its aim to “make

Community aid more effective and more visible” (European Commission, 1991; 3). This aim

still figures prominently as there is a belief within the EU that “most Europeans still have a

limited knowledge of (…)” (European Commission, 2006b; 22) the field of development aid

in general and the involvement of the EU in particular. In order to work towards solving this

problem projects should contribute to:– Increased public awareness on global interdependencies between the EU and developing

countries and support for action against poverty and more equitable North-South relations;

– Change in attitudes and improved public understanding of the issues and difficulties facing developing countries and their peoples;

– Degree of integration of development issues into formal and non-formal education systems in Member States and acceding countries, ensuring inclusion of the development dimension in global agendas such as democracy, active citizenship, inter-cultural understanding etc;

– Level of commitment to promoting policy coherence and degree to which development cooperation objectives are accounted for in all EU policies with a likely impact on developing countries;

– Move beyond solidarity during humanitarian crises to support for long-term, structural development processes, inter alia, via a responsible media committed to informed action;

– Extent of mobilisation in new Member States and acceding countries, including through networking, campaign work, exchange of experience and best practices (European Commission, 2006a; 15).

Activities that aim at awareness raising should pay particular attention to development and

education policies and integrate with these if possible. Activities which are focused on cross-

37


border and multi-actor initiatives will receive preference, but one country activities are also

eligible for funding. If possible partners in developing countries should be included actively

in the activities (European Commission, 2006a; 15). Priority will be given to projects, which

fall under the following themes:– Public support for the MDG agenda, with a particular focus on sub-Saharan Africa

– Coherence for development, with a particular focus on areas of public interest where common goals with development are important such as migration, trade, security, human rights, social dimension of globalisation and decent work, .environment, and HIV/AIDS;

– Media and development (European Commission, 2006a; 10).

This is based on the MDG agenda and the policy framework of the European Consensus on

Development. The strategies and thematic priorities of these should be the guide for activities

while leaving the right of initiative with implementing actors (European Commission, 2006a;

10).

Objective 3: Coordination and communication of NSA and local authority networks in the EU

and acceding countries. Just as the second objective this focuses on initiatives within the EU

and acceding countries. As seen above the third objective is by far the one receiving least

funds – only 2%. Activities and initiatives should contribute to:– Level and quality of stakeholder potential to demonstrate leadership qualities, analytical and

advocacy skills, engage in constituency building;

– Strengthening of Non State Actor and Local Authority networks and platforms including their capacity to build trans-national alliances and to disseminate best practices

– Number of multi-actor partnerships established and consolidated exchanges between different types of Non State Actors and local authorities networks, within their organisations and with Community institutions;

– Capacity of non state actor and local authority platforms in new Member States and acceding countries to play an active role in their countries and at the EU level, including ensuring smooth integration of EU development policies (European Commission, 2006a; 15-16).

Working towards this priority will be given to:

– Information networks and exchange of best practices within and among their organisations

– Dialogue and exchange of best practice between different types of stakeholders, including between non state actors and local authorities

– Interaction of such organisations or networks with the EU institutions (European Commission, 2006a; 11).

38


The intent is to “support the development and consolidation of dialogue between North-North

stakeholder organisations and between these organisations and Community institutions”

(European Commission, 2006b; 11).

Finally, another 2% of the funds available go to Management and support expenditure and

evaluation. This can be used to employ additional supplementary staff in order to “support the

drafting, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and auditing of the thematic programme

(European Commission, 2006b; 16). In addition, external evaluations of the thematic

programme and operations will be conducted and taken into account when preparing the

second programming period spanning from 2011 to 2013 under the current budget.

The areas under each objective in which projects should contribute to are not to be seen as a

checklist that each project will need to complete in full in order to be considered for funding.

It should be seen more as a guide to focus areas of projects and to implementation of the three

objectives. Together with the priorities listed they will play a role in deciding the specific

objectives and priorities that guide funding for each project.

5.2.4 Call for proposals (CfP) & Tender Opportunity

Funding for NGOs, being it from EuropeAid or ECHO, is done by a Call for Proposal (CfP)

system in which EuropeAid or ECHO issue a call for project proposals with a defined

geographic area and topic. An example of a project with a somewhat broad scale could be on

dealing with Water Quality Management in Egypt.9 In addition to CfPs EuropeAid or ECHO

are also funding more specific projects in terms of geographic area and topic in which case it

is known as Tender Opportunity. This is in cases where EuropeAid or ECHO draws on terms

of reference a particular project that they wish solved. An example of this could be

Construction of Infrastructure for the Low Income Housing Project in Onderneeming (Region

3) West Coast Demerara, Guyana.10 Tender opportunities can also cover procurement

contracts in which case it should be clearly labelled as such.

9 This is an actual call from the EuropeAid website funding opportunities: (http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/cgi/frame12.pl).10 This is an actual tender from the EuropeAid website funding opportunities: (http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/cgi/frame12.pl).

39


Whether applying through a call or a tender there are specific objectives and priorities

that the NGOs will have to work towards to get funding. Obviously these will be more

specific in case of tenders. These objectives and priorities are defined by the Contracting

Authority. The Contracting Authority is whoever draws up the call or tender (e.g., EuropeAid

headquarters, national ministries, etc.). The fulfilment of these objectives and priorities will

be one of the primary grounds on which the decision to award funding or not is taken. The

funding is done by grants. These come in form of “a direct financial contribution, by way of

donation, from the EU budget or the EDF [and is used] in order to finance: either an action

intended to help achieve an objective forming part of a European Union policy; or the

functioning of a body which pursues an aim of general European interest or has an objective

forming part of a European Union policy” (European Commission, 2007c; 95).

Grants can be awarded either centralised or decentralised. If centralised they are

awarded by the Commission. In this case the Commission delegates the decision-making

competence to the Contracting Authority (e.g. delegations, headquarters). If decentralised a

Contracting Authority in the beneficiary country will be responsible. In the latter case the

Commission will pre-approve an annual work programme drawn up by the Contracting

Authority in which guidelines for applications are presented. The Commission will also need

to endorse evaluation reports, proposed grants and draft contracts. Furthermore, the

Commission will, when a grant is approved, be observing the further awarding procedure

(European Commission, 2007c; 97-98).

Calls and tenders must be published in order to ensure all potential applicants receive

the opportunity to apply. In case of a centralised grant, the publication of call or tender is done

via the relevant Commission website. If the grant is being managed decentralised, the

publication must also be done locally (European Commission, 2007c; 104). In special

circumstances grants can be awarded without a prior call. This must only be done in case of a

crisis situation of extreme urgency. Such a decision can only be taken by the Commission and

the Contracting Authority must submit a report explaining the basis for the decision and for

the details of the grant (i.e. beneficiaries, grant amount, award decision). The Contracting

Authority must adhere to the procedural rules relating to eligibility requirements of the grant

recipient (European Commission, 2007c; 103-104).

40


5.2.5 Eligibility

The eligibility requirements the NGOs will have to live up to cover both demands to the

organisational character of the NGO and to the project for which funding is sought. The

criteria are set out by the EU and are almost in all cases non-negotiable. NGOs not fulfilling

them will not be awarded any funds. There are exceptions to these criteria. Mostly the

exceptions are employed in cases where special flexibility is needed. However as they are

decided upon on a case-by-case basis and exceptions to the rule I will not go into details about

possible derogations. There are slight variations in the criteria depending on where the

funding originates from, whether it is from the EC Budget or the EDF, or for NGOs entering

into a FPA with ECHO. But the general principles are the same. The simplified rule is that all

types of non-profit making organisation “operating on an independent and accountable basis”

(European Parliament & European Council, 2006; article 24, Paragraph 2), NGOs as well as

trade unions, university and political foundation etc.11, may be eligible (European

Commission, 2006a; 8).

NGOs applying for a centralised grant covered by EuropeAid will have to register on

PADOR12 which is a data base with information on potential applicants. PADOR is the first

part of a new initiative to create on-line services for applicants. When applying NGOs will

have to provide information about their organisation – which contracts they have received

during the last years, how the organisational structure is, etc. – in addition to the information

about the project in question (Carsten Strandlod, 2007-A3; 4). Previously this had to be added

to every application but with PADOR some of it can be added on-line facilitating the

application process. When seeking funds from ECHO the application is different with regards

to the information about the organisation. This is due to the FPA (as described above in the

part about ECHO) NGOs will have to enter into with ECHO. The FPAs ensure that the NGOs

are eligible to receive funding.

The general principles of eligibility include the following rules and criteria: nationality

rule, non-profit, non-missionary, organisational code of conduct, and visibility. The ways

these rules and criteria are being applied vary depending on the situation. If seeking funding

from ECHO they rules and criteria will be part of the requirement for the FPAs, whereas if

11 A longer list of examples of non-state actors (including NGOs) is presented in European Parliament & European Council (2006; article 24, Paragraph 2).12 Potential Applicant Database On-line Registration. It should be noted that access to PADOR is limited to eligible organisations which is why I cannot access it to retrieve more detailed information.

41


seeking funding from EuropeAid they are covered either by PADOR or in the actual

application.

Nationality rule: The general rule here is that in order to gain funding the nationality of

the applicant must be that of an involved partner. Hence eligibility under the EDF is limited to

those originating from either an EDF contributing member states or an ACP state. Under the

Budget nationals from member states, candidate countries or a country directly beneficiary of

the aid are eligible. In addition, international organisations are also eligible. When

determining nationality and origin of NGOs the rules can vary from country to country

(European Commission, 2007c; 11-13, 98-99). In some instances it is decided by where the

NGOs are registered under national law while in others where no registration is needed it is

decided by the location of the headquarters of the NGO.

Non-profit: Grants are not intended to create profit for the NGOs (or other recipients).

In general grant recipients are non-profit making. In relation to grants profit is defined as “a

surplus of receipts over the costs incurred by the beneficiary (…)” or “(…) a surplus balance

of budget of beneficiary” (European Commission, 2007c; 101). The rule is that a “grant can

only be made for an operation whose immediate objective in non-commercial. Under no

circumstances may the grant give rise to profits” The exception to this is if the project in

question has as objective to reinforce “the financial capacity of the beneficiary” (European

Commission, 2007c; 96).

Non-missionary: NGOs applying for funding must be completely non-missionary in

their activities. The EU does not co-operate with missionary organisation in general nor does

it fund projects with missionary character. The exception is if there is a clear distinction

between which part of the organisation that is missionary and which is not (Allan Duelund

Jensen, 2007-A2; 6).

Organisational code of conduct: In order to be eligible for funding the NGOs must

employ a good organisational standard. This includes accounting procedures, procurement

requirements, transparency etc. The requirements to code of conduct are strict and non-

negotiable. They are imposed to ensure the NGOs are decent organisations, which maintain

specific standards e.g. impartiality, non-corruption etc. (Carsten Strandlod, 2007-A3; 3-4).

The requirement for code of conduct is normally used when NGOs apply for grants. But in

case of ECHO FPAs the code of conduct also applies to the general work of the NGOs. This

is the case with every-day work of the organisation as well as with projects financed by others

42


(Carsten Strandlod, 2007-A3; 6). The requirements to procurement are to ensure the best

value for money, transparency and quality. The rules for procurement are quite advanced,

depending on what kind of contract funding is awarded for, size of the contract and where the

money originates from (European Commission, 2007c; 20-21).13

Visibility: NGOs receiving funding from the EU are required to visibly and prominently

acknowledge the support. To ensure this the EU have drawn up a set of guidelines which use

is obligatory by anyone receiving funds as well as implementing partners. These rules are set

out in EU Visibility Guidelines for external actions (European Commission, 2005b), which is

a 34 pages document that in detail stipulates how the support of the EU must be

acknowledged. This covers everything from which communication tool (e.g. press

releases/conferences, leaflets & brochures, newsletters, banners, vehicle panels, reports, etc.)

are to be used to make clear the involvement of the EU, to how the EU is to be referred to

(e.g. compulsory use of EU logo, definition of the EU and its institutions). In addition, the

guidelines also include how programme descriptions and key messages are to be displayed

showing for example the commitment of the EU in a certain area (European Commission,

2005b). The requirements vary depending on the scope and size of the project or programme

but the demand for acknowledgment of EU support is compulsory.

5.2.6 Procedure for awarding of grants

Before the Contracting Authority awards funds after having received proposals an evaluation

process must take place. Part of this is to make sure the applicants live up to the eligibility

requirements. NGOs applying must submit a full application form which consists of several

parts. In addition, in case of proposals for larger grants an external audit report of the

organisation is required. After having the deadline for submission of proposals an Evaluation

Committee is appointed by the Contracting Authority. The consistency of the Evaluation

Committee depends on who the Contraction Authority is – if it is centralised or decentralised.

Strict measures are taken to ensure impartiality of the Evaluation Committee and the entire

decision-making procedure of the committee is confidential (European Commission, 2007c;

109-114).

13 I will not go into details on the different procurement requirements as I do not deem them important for my later work in this paper. However an overview table showing the different requirements can be found in (European Commission, 2007c) on pages 20-21.

43


After having assessed if the application lives up to the administrative criteria and

whether or not the applicant is eligible the evaluation process starts. In this process the each

subheading of the different parts of the application are ranked by score for the final

assessment. The ranking is based upon different criteria. Relevance in relation to the

objectives and priorities of the call is assessed. To achieve top ranking the proposal must

bring specific added-value. The proposal should pay attention to the needs and constraints of

the target area and be clear in its intended target group. The methodology of the proposal is

ranked on the activities’ consistency with objectives and expected results and on coherency.

In addition, the level of involvement of partners is taken into consideration. If no partners are

involved the lowest score will be awarded. Sustainability will be judged upon the likely

impact on the target group and on the expected result after the expiration of the action.

Activities which continue to have effect will be at high value when determining score.

Finally, the budget and cost-effectiveness of the proposal is ranked. Necessity of expenditures

and the ratio between cost and expected result is assessed (European Commission, 2007c;

annexes E5a & E5b). When the Evaluation Committee has made its decision based upon,

among others, the scores it will draw up a final evaluation report in which it ranks the

different proposals. The report will then be submitted to the Contraction Authority for

awarding of grants.

5.3 Sum up

This chapter has shown how EU funding is based upon what could be called the “pyramid of

development policy” in which the Treaty rest guiding the overall development policy. As one

moves downwards the policies get more comprehensive and elaborate but also more specific.

The Treaties guides the DCI which in return form the basis for the Thematic Programme and

then the Country Strategy Papers and Annual Action Programme subsequently. This means

that the policy of the EU develops from a grand overall policy for the entire field into a policy

specific for each country.

Thereby the actors of the field, EuropeAid, ECHO and local delegations, have a clear

framework to work within. An example of this is the objectives set out in the Thematic

Programme to which NGOs must adhere if they wish to be considered for funding. This

means that everyone, NGOs and EU actors alike, should have an easier time figuring out

procedures and how to relate to them. However, it also means that there is little room for

44


flexibility within the funding system as there are clearly stated procedures for e.g. eligibility

requirements and awarding of grants, which can be to the disadvantage of minor NGOs as

they do not have an organisation capable of handling the demands.

45

DanChurchAid (DCA)

Chapter 6 DanChurchAid (DCA)

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the other actor of the EU Aid System, in this paper,

namely DCA. This will be done by firstly looking at what constitutes DCA and how it relates

to its surroundings. Then the international department and the Global Funding Unit of DCA

will be presented as this is the actual actor of EU-DCA relations. The work methods of the

DCA in relations to EU, and other, projects will be covered in order to understand how DCA

approach aid projects. Finally, relations with the EU will be explained. All of this will be

included in order to fully understand how DCA is a part of the EU Aid System.

The history of DCA goes back to 1922 when the evangelical churches decided to work

together to help the victims of WWI. It was not before 1953 however that DCA got its current

name. Throughout the years the focus area of DCA has shifted from Europe dealing with the

fallout of the world wars to aiding the poorest people in the third world. Throughout the years

there has also been a shift in policy towards giving aid representing the different trends

throughout the aid community. Whereas the policy for a long time was that aid giving should

be free of politics this is no longer the case. Today political questions are part of the

considerations made when deciding on where to focus (DanChurchAid website: Historien).

With its roots as a Christian faith-based organisation DCA works from the perception

that all humans are created equal and therefore have equal rights. DCA believes “that every

individual is created uniquely with a natural right to a life in dignity” and “(…) that every

individual had been given the task of contributing to a world of peace, equality and justice”

(DanChurchAid, 2006; 4). It is on this basis DCA does its aid work with a focus on a life

before death.14 Currently, as stated in their vision and plan for the period 2006-2010, DCA

sees its mission as being:1) To assist disadvantaged and oppressed communities and to assist in church activities,

usually outside Denmark;

2) To carry out emergency aid and development activities in cooperation with local and religious and popular organisations; and

3) To inform the public about the causes of need and inequality as well as to mobilise popular and political will and power to change them (DanChurchAid, 2006; 3).

14 Slogan of DCA

46

DanChurchAid (DCA)

Today DCA does development and relief work in areas such as “democracy and human rights,

peace and reconciliation, food security, HIV/AIDS, refugees and internally displaced persons

and humanitarian mine action” (DanChurchAid, 2007a; 5). Working within these fields DCA

has set forth five overall objectives, which its activities are to aim at achieving. DCA has as

objectives:1) To become a strong advocate of poor and excluded people and support their rights and

influence on their own lives.

2) To ensure the credibility, visibility and independence of DanChurchAid as well as its popular, religious and political effectiveness.

3) To develop strong, equal and effective partnership and alliances, nationally as well as internationally

4) To create better coherence and becoming better at documenting and learning from the results of [its] activities in order to develop and improve [its] competencies, procedures and systems.

5) To make sure that DanChurchAid is an attractive and innovative organisation, with local roots and a global view, that is able to attract and develop competent and committed volunteers and employees. (DanChurchAid, 2006; 12-13).

When carrying out its activities the philosophy of DCA is that of advocacy in which it is not

enough just to deliver aid. Efforts must be taken to ensure sustainability by enabling the target

population to participate themselves thereby creating better development. Due to this belief

that aid to passive recipients is not enough DCA employs a rights-based approach in which

people are to be empowered “to claim their economic and social rights and thereby fight

structural causes of poverty” (DanChurchAid website: Rights Based Approach).

Through this approach rights standards and legal obligations and principles become part

of the development process and the duty-bearers (e.g. the national state authority) held

accountable for attending to structural causes and barriers that prevent the right-holders

(economically, socially, culturally, and politically marginalised and excluded people) from

claiming their principal rights (DanChurchAid, 2007c; 3-4). As a part of the universal human

rights gender equality is highly prioritised by DCA.

One way DCA works to get people involved in their own development process is by

strengthening local civil society in order to create a more efficient development and gain local

sustainability and thereby achieving synergy effect. This is why DCA in almost every area

works in close co-operation with local partners (DanChurchAid website: Objects & Values).

The belief is that “this develops local ownership and commitment to projects and

programmes, and the partnership ensures that relief and development support reaches the

47

DanChurchAid (DCA)

poorest” (DanChurchAid, 2007a; 5). In fact the only area where DCA is fully implementing

(where the people working are DCA staff) is under its Humanitarian Mine Action. In all other

areas implementation is done via local partners (Allan Duelund Jensen, 2007-A2; 3).

6.1 Co-operating with Other International Organisations

In addition to working with local partners DCA also works to ensure efficiency of

development and relief projects by co-operating with other international organisations through

networks. DCA is part of over 50 different networks both nationally and internationally.

Much of DCA’s co-operation internationally is done together with other faith based

organisations that have the same foundation. However, DCA also co-operates with other non-

faith based organisations. An example of this is DCA’s membership of the Danish EU-NGO

platform which is a place for 14 Danish development and relief NGOs to co-operate on

matters relating to EU development policies. This again is a part of “the European NGO

Confederation CONCORD which works to ensure that civil society organisations in Europe

and in the South play a larger role in EU's development policy” (The Danish-EU NGO

platform website).

As a member of CONCORD DCA has a better opportunity to lobby and influence EU

decision-making on development issues. It is of cause not DCA alone who does the lobbying

then. The intention of the network is that by co-operating and co-ordinating their efforts the

different NGOs will gain more influence than they would if they worked independently. One

of the more prominent issues CONCORD have managed to influence EU decisions on was an

idea by the Commission to make the DCI and the Industrialised Co-operation Instrument into

one. The NGOs of CONCORD did not think this was desirable as it would compile industrial

support to countries such as South Korea and Thailand and development aid to poorer

countries under the same budget line. After lobbying the different Commissioners,

representatives of the different foreign ministries, the member states representatives in

Brussels, and the European Parliament, the Commission abandoned finally the idea (Allan

Duelund Jensen, 2007-A2; 12). This was a case where CONCORD managed to change an

issue, but this is far from the case on all issues according to Allan Duelund Jensen, who is

head of DCA’s Global Funding Unit (GFU) and is a member of the board in the Danish EU-

NGO platform and thereby he also sits in some CONCORD committees. Some issues are

much harder to influence. The main reason for success in this case was that so many actors,

48

DanChurchAid (DCA)

from various side, all had the same belief, that the instruments should be kept apart (Allan

Duelund Jensen, 2007-A2; 13).

6.2 DCA International Department

The part of DCA which deals with the international aspects is the international department.

This is together with four other departments (general secretariat, secretariat, communication

department and national department) situated in Copenhagen, Denmark and forms the

headquarters of DCA. In addition DCA has three minor offices in other places in Denmark

and various regional offices abroad. These regional offices are responsible for assisting and

supporting in relation to programme development and constitute an important part of DCA’s

relations with local partners (DanChurchAid website: Organisational structure).

It is with the international department that the overall responsibility of the development

and relief work lies. The organisational structure of the international department can be seen

in Illustration 5.2.6-2 and will be explained below. Special attention will be given to the

Global Funding Unit as this is the main actor in relation to receiving funding from the EU.

Illustration 5.2.6-2 Organisational Structure of DCA International Department15

(Source: DanChurchAid (2007-A5))

15 Note: The size of the individual boxes does not represent the size or importance of the units. The difference of size is merely due to practical considerations of the model.

International Director

Christian Friis Bach

Development DirectorRelief Director

Programme Finance Unit

Staff (9)

Global Funding UnitStaff (8) includingHead of Unit Allan Duelund Jensen and

Programme Officers Troels

Victor Dalgaard & Carsten Strandlod

Programme Development

UnitStaff (9)

International Administration

Staff (6)

Country Co-ordinators

Staff (7) one covering each region:

- Central America- Middle East- Central Asia/Russia- Southern Africa/DRC- Great Lakes/Horn- Sudan- Asia

ProLog Unit

Staff (5)

HMA Unit

Staff (6)

Relief Co-ordination

Staff (5)

49

DanChurchAid (DCA)

In charge of the international department is international director Christian Friis Bach who is

supported by two other directors, one for development issues and one for relief issues. In

addition to the relief director there is also a Relief Co-ordination group which helps ensuring

quality of relief projects and who is responsible for those projects that fall outside of the

countries DCA normally works in (Allan Duelund Jensen, 2007-A2; 1).

The Programme Finance Unit maintains the financial aspect of projects. It does not deal

with the other parts of DCA’s finances as these are handled by the accounting department of

the secretariat. The Programme Development Unit houses technical advisors who are experts

with knowledge of the different programme types DCA focuses on. The Country Co-

ordinations are the ones in charge of 13 regional offices abroad. The regional representatives

report back to the country co-ordination responsible for their particular region. Procurement

and logistics are handled by the ProLog Unit, which works closely with the GFU because of

the strict procurement requirements by, among others, the EU. The HMA or Humanitarian

Mine Action Unit is, as mentioned earlier, the only implementing part of DCA with actual

field workers (Allan Duelund Jensen, 2007-A2; 1-2).

Global Funding Unit: The GFU is tasked with increasing DCA’s international funding

and aim at gaining a diverse funding base. The GFU identifies where there is a consistency

between what donors wish to fund and which projects DCA can and will carry out. In its

fundraising GFU makes use of staff, Danes and locals, in both Copenhagen and locally

around the world. It is within this unit my three interviewees (Allan Duelund Jensen (ADJ)

who is Head of Unit and Programme Officers Troels Victor Dalgaard (TVD) and Carsten

Strandlod (CS)) work.

When applying for funding GFU serves as a “focal point for elaboration of project

proposals and management of approved projects” and provides “technical expertise on donor

requirement, policies and priorities” (DanChurchAid, 2007-A5). GFU works together with

local partners and the regional offices in drawing up proposals and supports and supervises on

implementation. In these processes the GFU is highly dependent on the other units of the

international department (DanChurchAid, 2007-A5).

6.2.1 Project Cycle Management

The typical process of formulating a project starts by the GFU informing local partners or the

regional office of that area about a call and together with them discuss how the call

50

DanChurchAid (DCA)

correspond with current priorities, capacity of partners and how the timing is. If it is decided

that an application should be drawn up the GFU creates guidelines to the format while the

local partner or regional office writes the first draft. The draft is then worked over by the GFU

and the other units of DCA international department provide technical assistance if relevant.

Subsequently, a procurement plan is developed. This is particularly the case for ECHO

projects. Lastly, the draft is checked to ensure formalities and then finalised (DanChurchAid

2007-A5). If then a grant is awarded DCA enters into a contract with the donor and starts up

the project. Throughout the duration of the project several steps will be taken to ensure it lives

up to the standards needed. The different units of the international department as well as the

regional offices and partners participate in this process. The main tool used by DCA to

manage projects efficiently is the Project Cycle Management (PCM) created by the EU.

The PCM have been adopted by both EuropeAid and ECHO in 1992 in order to get the

best quality of projects. ECHO has adapted the PCM to make a version specifically intended

for humanitarian aid. It is slightly different from EuropeAid due to the different character of

their projects, but the PCM of ECHO is based upon EuropeAid’s which will be the one

focused on here. EuropeAid and ECHO use the PCM for all projects and not only the ones

with NGO involvement. The aim of the PCM is “to support good management practices and

effective decision making” (European Commission, 2004a; 1). In the most immediate

emergencies ECHO does not require strict adherence to the PCM but they do recognise that “a

minimum planning has to take place” (European Commission, 2005a; 1). The PCM is also

used to help the Commission staff in being objective and coherent in their analysis of

proposals. The thoughts behind the PCM originate from what is known as the Logical

Framework Approach (LFA) which was developed in the late 1960s in order to improve

project planning and evaluation of the US Agency of International Development. The LFA is

still a core tool in the PCM process. In fact the PCM guidelines fully incorporate and require

use of LFA. In short the LFA is a two phased tool, with an analysis phase consisting of

several stages (analysis of stakeholders, problems, objectives & strategies) leading to a

planning stage (European Commission, 2004a; 57). Though important for the use of PCM I

will not go further into the details of the LFA here as I do not consider an elaborate page

consuming description of the specifics of the LFA will bring added-value to my analysis of

the EU-NGO relationship. In order to address the problem of this paper it is not the working

specifics of the LFA which are important. What is important however is the fact that DCA

51

DanChurchAid (DCA)

makes much use of the LFA when designing projects. The different analysis stages are an

essential part of design workshops used by DCA in the initial project development phase.

NGOs are not required to use the PCM but it is strongly encouraged, by both EuropeAid

and ECHO, when designing and managing calls. The idea is that usage of the PCM helps to

ensure good management practices and standards of projects (European Commission, 2004a;

17). When designing projects DCA uses the PCM to a high degree in co-operation with its

partners. While NGO use of PCM is (in principle) voluntary, ADJ argues that even if it had

not been developed by the EU, DCA would still use many of the elements of the PCM in their

work (Allan Duelund Jensen, 2007-A2; 8). The description of PCM which follows here is

based upon the EuropeAid PCM guidelines and how the EU intends it to be used. When DCA

use the PCM it is these guidelines which are followed. However, in some parts I will be

selective in what I include as some of the features in each step are not relevant for NGO use.

The PCM is build upon three main principles. First, the criteria and procedures for

decision-making are defined in each phase. Second, each phase is to be completed fully

before the next phase can be initiated. Final, previous lessons are to be included in drawing up

new projects and programmes in “a structured process of feedback and institutional learning”

(European Commission, 2004a; 16). Following these principles the PCM makes use of what

is known as the Quality Frame to ensure structured and consistent analysis and decision-

making. The Quality Frame provides three criteria for each point of decision-making of the

PCM. When applied the Quality Frame address how Relevant, Feasible and Effective & Well

Managed the project is (European Commission, 2004a; 22). An overview of the three criteria

and sub-criteria of the Quality Frame can be seen below in Table 6.2.1-3.

Table 6.2.1-3 The Quality FrameA Relevance

The project meets demonstrated and

high priority needs

B FeasibleThe project is well designed and will

deliver sustainable benefits to target

groups

C Effective & Well managedThe project is delivering the

anticipated benefits and is

being well managed

1 Consistent with, and supportive of,

EC development and cooperation

policies

6 The objectives (Overall objective,

purpose and results) and the work

programme (activities) are clear and

logical, and address clearly identified

needs

12 The project remains relevant

and feasible

52

DanChurchAid (DCA)

2 Consistent with, and supportive of,

Partner Government policies and

relevant sector programmes (not

directly applicable to NGO

implemented projects)

7 The resource and cost implications are

clear, the project is financially viable

and has a clear positive economic

return

13 Project objectives are being

achieved

3 Key stakeholders and target groups

are clearly identified, equity and

institutional capacity issues analysed,

and local ownership demonstrated

8 Coordination, management and

financing arrangements are clear and

support institutional strengthening and

local ownership

14 The project is being well

managed by those directly

responsible for implementation

4 Problems have been appropriately

analysed

9 The monitoring and evaluation

(M&E) system and audit

arrangements are clear and practical

15 Sustainability issues are being

effectively addressed

5 Lessons learned from experience and

linkage with other ongoing/planned

projects/programmes have been

assessed and incorporated into

strategy selection

10 Assumptions/Risks are identified and

appropriate risk management

arrangements are in place

16 Good practice principles of

project management are applied

by EC Task Managers

11 The project is environmentally,

technically and socially sound and

sustainable

(Source: European Commission (2004a; 22))

Though the terminology is not the same what can be seen from this is that many of the criteria

and sub-criteria of the Quality Frame are the same criteria as the ones used in the procedure

for awarding grants as earlier described.

The PCM is divided into five phases (Programming, Identification, Formulation,

Implementation and Evaluation) as illustrated below in Illustration 6.2.1-3. The PCM adapted

by ECHO differs in phase 3, Formulation, which instead is divided into two phases called

Appraisal and Financing. However this is due to internal usage in decision-making process

when granting funds. For the purpose of dealing with how DCA use the PCM, I will only

shortly describe the original five phases and not the two dealing with appraisal of applications

and decisions on financing. As the PCM is made for use by EuropeAid many of the aspects

deal with how to use it internally within the Commission, however in describing the phases I

will solely deal with those aspects relevant for NGO (and DCA) use. It should be noted that

the importance of each phase will vary depending on the character of the project being

assessed (European Commission, 2004a; 18), but I will present a general description here.

53

DanChurchAid (DCA)

Illustration 6.2.1-3 Project Cycle Management

(Source: based upon European Commission (2004a))

The Programming phase or Phase 1 of PCM deals with identifying objectives and priorities

creating a framework for project development. In doing so, past lessons and experiences are

to be included in the deliberation process. In this phase the Country Strategy Papers drawn up

jointly by the EU and the developing countries are important in ensuring coherency with EU

development objectives (European Commission, 2004a; 25-27). In the Identification phase

project ideas are identified. The aim is to make these consistent with partner and EU

priorities. In addition to assessment on relevance and likely feasibility, local ownership

features as a prominent quality criterion (European Commission, 2004a; 27). The purpose of

the 3rd phase on Formulation is to prepare a detailed project design and a financing proposal.

The design should include “management and coordination arrangements, financing plan, cost-

benefit analysis, risk management, monitoring, evaluation and audit arrangement” (European

Commission, 2004a; 33). In order to promote local ownership implementing partners and

local stakeholders should hold a leading role in this phase. The most critical phase of the PCM

is the Implementation phase. In reality all the other phases are meant as support of this phase.

In this phase the results are to be delivered and the purpose of the project should be achieved.

Phase 1

Program-ming

Phase 2

Identifi-cation

Phase 3

Formu-lation

Phase 4

Implemen-tation

Phase 5

Evaluation

54

DanChurchAid (DCA)

Monitoring and reporting are important in ensuring the overall objective is reached. This

should be an ongoing process with regular reviews. In this 4 th phase the implementing partner

has the primary responsibility. This again is to promote local ownership of the development

process (European Commission, 2004a; 39-41). The final phase of the PCM is the Evaluation

phase. The purpose of the Evaluation16 phase is to make “an assessment, as systematic and

objective as possible, of on-going or completed activities, their design, implementation and

result. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, efficiency,

effectiveness, impact and sustainability (…)” (European Commission, 2004a; 46). As opposed

to monitoring which is an ongoing analysis, evaluation is done after projects are finalised.

Because DCA almost never implements much of the evaluation focuses on local partners.

This means that “the partner will be assessed on the capacity to deliver the agreed service to

the right-holder, and DCA will be assessed on its capacity to support the partner based on the

agreements made” (DanChurchAid, 2007b; 1). The lessons learned from the Evaluation are

then to be used in future project Programming phases (as well as subsequent phases).

6.3 Relations with the EU

DCA have managed to build up an expertise in applying for funding. In 2006 the GFU

submitted 45 project proposals and got contracts approved worth 11 million Euros17. In 2006

the GFU had a turnover of approximately 7.5 million Euros which constitute 13% of the

overall DCA budget. The turnover in 2006 constitutes an increase of 162% compared to the

turnover in 2000 (DanChurchAid, 2007-A5 & Allan Duelund Jensen, 2007-A2; 2-3).18

Currently the GFU has a success rate on contract applications funded by ECHO, with whom

DCA has a FPA, on approximately 75% and on projects funded by EuropeAid on

approximately between 25-35% (DanChurchAid 2007-A5). This expertise has been

developed through the last 10 years and GFU now has a structured system in place to seek

funds from the EU (Troels Victor Dalsgaard, 2007-A4; 2). According to ADJ and CS the

main reason for working to receive funding from the EU was to get a more diverse funding

base. It was felt that DCA was too dependent on DANIDA funding, which at one time

16 The definition of evaluation used in both the PCM and in DCA’s evaluation policy (DanChurchAid, 2007b) is taken from OECD-DAC Principles for Aid Evaluation. 17 Note: this is not the same as an annual turnover of 11 million Euros as some of the projects run for several years duration.18 From the information available the exact numbers on funding from the EU does not stand out clearly, however according to Allan Duelund Jensen GFU receives 95-98% of their funds from the EU.

55

DanChurchAid (DCA)

reached 60% (the current level is about 40%) of DCA’s budget. This meant that DCA was

highly vulnerable to a change in DANIDA priorities. In addition, opening up for funding from

the EU meant a change to enhance turnover and carry out more projects (Allan Duelund

Jensen, 2007-A2; 2 & Carsten Strandlod, 2007-A3; 1).

While, according to my interviewees the funding system (EuropeAid’s in particular) is

very stringent with no flexibility this is in itself not a big problem for the GFU. But it means

that it is important to know the rules by heart otherwise it will not be possible to gain and

carry out contracts (Troels Victor Dalsgaard, 2007-A4; 6 & Carsten Strandlod, 2007-A3; 5).

The fact the DCA has a FPA with ECHO and that ECHO is more flexible as described earlier

means that it is somewhat easier gaining funding (Allan Duelund Jensen, 2007-A2; 9). This

does not however mean that getting funding from ECHO is effortless. As CS argues many

smaller Danish NGOs simply does not even try as they find it too cumbersome. To CS this is

again something you need to learn completely and which is very difficult initially (Carsten

Strandlod, 2007-A3; 5). However, the expertise of DCA in carrying out projects also mean

that the EU from time to time will contact DCA and ask for a project to be carried out if it is

within a field where DCA has specific experience. This will primarily figure under ECHO as

the possible urgency requires ECHO to find a NGO quickly. An example of this was when

DCA wanted to do work in the Assam region in India and the EU asked DCA to also include

the Orissa region in the project. This of course mean that DCA asked for more funding

(Carsten Strandlod, 2007-A3; 5).

Though this strictness in the application system could be seen as undesirable by NGOs

this is at least not the case with DCA. In fact when asked directly about the matter both ADJ

and CS argued that it is a system which helps to ensure affectivity and effectiveness and that it

is a way of protecting against fraud (Allan Duelund Jensen, 2007-A2; 8 & Carsten Strandlod,

2007-A3; 4). According to CS the way the system is set up means that cases where things go

“wrong” are rare because there is a great focus on avoiding this from the side of EU (Carsten

Strandlod, 2007-A3; 7). An example of this can be seen in a visit from ECHO to audit eight

DCA projects which required considerable preparation by the GFU. ADJ argues that while

there are some cases where the rules are too strict the system in general makes sense and that

it is overall satisfactory (Allan Duelund Jensen, 2007-A2; 8-9).

Another area in which the EU has strict rules is on the matter of missionary work. As

described in the part on NGO eligibility the EU does not fund missionary activities. When

56

DanChurchAid (DCA)

asked how the fact that DCA has its foundation in Christianity has affected its co-operation

with the EU both ADJ and TVD answer that it had not at all. ADJ explained that though

DCA’s background is within the Danish church DCA is non-missionary and that even though

DCA co-operates internationally with other faith-based organisations, DCA has never had to

explain this matter to the EU. In addition, DCA does not focus its work solely on Christian

partners. In Bangladesh for example DCA works with Muslim partners (Allan Duelund

Jensen, 2007-A2; 5-6). Likewise, TVD explains that he has never in his work, for example in

the Middle East, experienced any problems relating to DCA’s faith-base (Troels Victor

Dalsgaard, 2007-A4; 3-4).

6.4 Sum up

What can be summed up from the above is that DCA has developed into professional

international organisation. Centred on the international department the DCA is proficient

working internationally with partners, both NGOs and international organisations, in most

regions of the world. At the same time DCA co-operates with other Western NGOs through

various networks such as the Danish EU-NGO platform and CONCORD. Though a faith-

based organisation DCA has not, according to my interviewees, experienced any problems

vis-à-vis the EU. This has enhanced DCA’s capability to act internationally in providing

forums for influencing decision-making in for example the EU.

The DCA has built a system for handling development projects in which the different

units of the international department plays a role. In this the GFU has become specialised in

seeking funding from among others the EU and makes sure that project proposals meet the

demands of the EU. When carrying out projects, both for the EU and otherwise, the DCA

employs internationally recognised tools (PCM, LFA and The Quality Frame) to ensure

proper handling of projects. The project proposal approval rating on EuropeAid and ECHO

project and the increase in turnover speaks to the development of a capability in carrying out

projects at a quality satisfactory to the EU. According to my interviewees the DCA have

become quite proficient in navigating EU funding and the demands and requirements of the

system, which can be straining on organisations less accustomed with it. Furthermore, the

DCA has become a recognised by the EU to the point where the EU will approach and ask

DCA to perform specific tasks deemed important.

57

Analysis of EU-DCA Relations

Chapter 7 Analysis of EU-DCA Relations

This chapter will be twofold. The first part will establish the organisational field and analyse

DCA’s role in it. It will analyse if DCA can be considered dependent on the EU for resources

and to what degree it is an interdependent relationship between the EU and DCA. This part

will be based upon the notion of Resource Dependence Theory. This part will end up assesing

to what degree the EU is able to exert power over DCA if at all. The second part of the

chapter will be on analysing how the potential power of the EU affects DCA. This will be

done by looking at the organisational practices of DCA and applying the Institutional Theory

to investigate if these practices can be seen as conformity to EU practices. Based upon this I

will utilize the strategic responses put forth by Olive to analyse what DCA has done in

response, or which possibilities DCA has to respond, to the EU’s influence.

7.1 DCA as an actor in the EU Aid System

As shown in Chapter 5 , EU funding of NGOs is composed of many elements together

forming a somewhat complex system of rules and norms, which are essential for NGOs to

take into consideration when applying for funding. It is within these rules and norms DCA

works as an international development organisation and as seen from Chapter 6 DCA has

become proficient in operating within these rules and norms. When working with Tvedt’s

notion of an International Aid System DCA can be considered a ‘member’ of the EU Aid

System. The EU Aid System is closed, as Tvedt describes, in the sense that in order to be a

member of it NGOs need to get their applications approved by the EU and as DCA receives

donor money it is considered inside the system. As Tvedt also describes it is the donor, in this

case the EU, who decides the extent of the system’s membership. This of course means that

DCA’s membership only exists as long as it receives funding from the EU. If DCA for one

reason or another were to stop receiving EU funding it would “lose” its membership. The EU

Aid System would still exist as such as long as other organisations would be allocated

funding, the system would just consist of other actors then.

The EU Aid System is what within Institutional Theory would be considered the

institutional environment. It is this environment or system which “encompasses rules, norms,

cultural beliefs as well as associated behaviour and material resources” as stated in the

theoretical chapter and accordingly it “affects organisational behaviour.”

58


It is this understanding of the EU Aid System, or institutional environment, and DCA’s

role within that will guide the further analysis. In case of lost membership it would become

redundant to discuss DCA autonomy in relation to the EU as DCA would no longer be on the

inside. However, the possibility of losing membership, either by DCA retracting its operations

from the system or the EU excluding DCA from the system, is quite relevant in analysing the

relationship between the EU and DCA. These possibilities of actions, by either DCA or the

EU, will be included throughout the analysis.

7.1.1 Degree of DCA dependency on the EU for resources

While resources, as defined by Pfeffer and Salancik, can have different character, for DCA

resources received from the EU are of monetary character. As DCA by no means is self-

sufficient economically it relies on an inflow of funds to carry out its activities. When

analysing to what degree DCA can be considered dependent on the EU for resources it is of

course important to keep in mind that DCA “only” receives about 13% of its total budget

from the EU. This has to be seen in relation to DCA receiving about 40% from DANIDA.

Without going into an analysis of DCA’s relationship with DANIDA, it is rather obvious that

as it is the same resource DCA receives from DANIDA, DCA is more dependent on

DANIDA as it receives three times the amount of resources from DANIDA as from the EU.

However, this does not mean that DCA cannot be dependent on the EU as well.

As stated in the theory, dependence is determined by three factors which are

importance, control and availability of the resource – in this case funding. The importance of

the resource, funding, is apparent. Without funds DCA would not be able to carry out project

to aid people and thereby work towards its purpose. Hence, funds are vital for DCA’s

“continued operation and survival” as Pfeffer and Salancik phrase it. The second factor,

control or “discretion over the resource allocation and use”, is more complex. It is DCA who

uses the funds but it is the EU who is in control of allocation, which is decided upon based on

an estimate of what is considered (by the EU) proper use. This can be seen in for example the

‘Procedures for Awarding Grants’ section and the criteria herein (i.e. relevance, methodology,

sustainability and budget and cost-effectiveness) on which score is determined. So arguable,

DCA is not in full control of use either. DCA is not free to spend the funds allocated as it

pleases. It has to be done accordingly to how it was described in the project proposal, which

formed the basis for the decision taken by the EU whether to award or not. Finally, DCA does

59


have the opportunity to gather resources elsewhere. Thus, as the EU is not the single supplier

it has limited control of the availability of the resource. The fact that DCA receives more

funding from DANIDA than it does from the EU underlines this. However, this does not

necessarily mean that DCA can obtain the funds it receives from the EU somewhere else. As

one of the reasons to work to get EU funding initially was “to enhance turnover and carry out

more projects.” It could be argued that if DCA had the opportunity to gather additional

resources form other sources it would do so simultaneously as receiving from the EU. As

there are many other NGOs in this field there is some kind of scarcity of the resource.

Taken together these three factors suggest that DCA is rather dependent on the EU for

resources. At least for that part of DCA’s activities based on EU funds. For those projects it

appears the EU is capable of controlling the resources to a high degree. It is the EU that

decides upon the allocation, and thereby use, of the resource and as the resource is of high

importance to DCA and not easily available elsewhere, DCA is dependent upon the EU.

7.1.2 EU-DCA – An Interdependent Relationship

As Resource Dependence Theory states the relationship between two organisations

exchanging resources is one of interdependence. The EU can be seen as receiving two kinds

of resources from its funding of DCA. It receives social legitimacy and it gets project carried

out. The EU’s focus on social legitimacy can be seen from its requirement to ‘visibility’ on

EU funded projects. The EU seems keen on making the public aware that it spends money on

aid projects. One possible reason for this could be that the EU seeks to get legitimacy, to the

EU as a whole and EU aid projects in particular, by informing the European public the money

is spend on aid. The resources received from getting projects carried out are the achievements

of the projects. These achievements are part of the EU policies for development co-operation.

So by funding NGOs the EU receives legitimacy among the European public it would

otherwise not have got and the EU get some of its policy objectives fulfilled. As the

achievement of these conditions is not fully controlled by the EU it entails an interdependent

relationship with DCA and as the two organisations are mutually dependent on each others’

actions it is a behavioural interdependence.

However, it is not a relationship characterised by an equal dependence. It is what Pfeffer

and Salancik call an asymmetrical interdependence. The EU is by far the largest organisation.

While DCA receives resources worth about 13% of its total resources, the resources

60


transferred from DCA to the EU “constitutes a smaller proportion”. It is of course impossibly

to measure the size of the resources received by the EU. But as the EU funds numerous other

projects, it must therefore be expected to receive larger amount legitimacy and get many more

projects carried out elsewhere.

Furthermore, the resources received by the EU cannot be considered to have to same

importance as funds have for DCA. Social legitimacy and carrying out of projects is not vital

for the EU’s survival and the possibility of the EU to gather these resources from other

sources it high. Though the EU from time to time approaches DCA to get a particular project

done, which DCA is specifically proficient in, most of the time there will be multiple

applicants for each call or tender. Therefore, the EU is not as dependent on DCA as the other

way around.

7.1.3 The EU Exerting Power over DCA

As just established after having taken all resource exchanges into consideration the

relationship between the EU and DCA is one of asymmetrical interdependence in which the

EU is the organisation less dependent. According to Resource Dependence Theory this means

that the EU has the possibility to exert control over DCA. This does not have to be the case,

but the possibility exists as the EU has discretionary control over resources needed by DCA

and because DCA lack countervailing resources and does not directly have access to

alternative sources.

Looking at Pfeffer and Salancik’s eight conditions facilitating control it is clear that the

social actor – the EU – is in a position where it possess some degree of control over DCA.

The EU possesses a resource which is of high importance to DCA and which cannot easily be

obtained elsewhere. The resource is important for activities that have a high degree of

visibility and the EU is in full control of allocation of the resource. Furthermore, DCA’s

capability of taking action is limited by the demand and requirements set forth in the project

description and as DCA is only one of many NGOs in the field it does not control resources of

critical importance to the EU. Lastly, as can be seen from the parts of Chapter 5 dealing with

project funding (Objectives of Co-financing, Call for Proposals & Tender Opportunities and

Procedure for Awarding Grants) the EU is well capable of making its preferences known to

DCA.

61


Of course it has to be stressed that the power the EU can exert because of the

dependence of DCA is not unlimited. Based upon the amount of resources DCA receives from

the EU I will argue that DCA is not vulnerable in respect to its survival. It is when an

organisation’s survival depends on another organisation’s allocation of resources it becomes a

problem. There is nothing to suggest that this is the case with DCA. As the EU fund on a

project by project basis, less EU resources would “only” entail a forced reduction of DCA

activities and no direct threat to the DCA as an organisation. The threat present in case of a

reduction of allocated resources would be to the stability and certainty of DCA’s resource

income and not its survival. This suggests that DCA will be less forced to comply with EU

demands and that compliance therefore is voluntary. Supporting this argument is one of the

ten conditions, determining organisational compliance, which states that compliance is

affected by the degree to which the demand is compatible with other demands from the

environment. DCA will have less problems complying to EU demands if they do not conflict

with demands from for example DANIDA.19

All together this indicates that, according to Resource Dependence Theory, the

relationship between the EU and DCA is one characterised by a highly asymmetrical

interdependent relationship but as DCA is not relying on EU financing for its survival it does

not mean that the EU is in full control of DCA and compliance seems voluntary. The EU does

exert power over DCA and to assess how this affects DCA I will now turn to analysing how it

affects DCA as an organisation and its practices. Resource Dependence Theory does not

provide me with the ability of analysing possible changes to DCA as an organisation. To do

this I will employ Institutional Theory.

19 Though I do not look at DANIDA demands and requirements this argument is supported by what my interviewees have said about the difference between EU and DANIDA funding. The requirements from the EU are much stricter than those DANIDA puts forth and DANIDA does not show any signs of opposing the stricter demands of the EU.

62


7.2 The EU Aid System Causing Organisational Change

This part of the analysis will be an attempt to explore how the power of the EU affects DCA.

Though, as established above, DCA chooses to comply with demands from the EU in order to

receive funding, Institutional Theory stipulates that an organisation will be affected by its

environment and that this have the possibility of causing organisational changes and affect

organisational behaviour. Therefore it is interesting to investigate if the asymmetrical

interdependent relationship affects DCA.

As no information has been available on previous practices of DCA I approach

analysing possible organisational changes from an alternative angle. In order to see if DCA

has been affected by the asymmetrical relationship with the EU I turn to looking at current

practices of DCA and compare these with EU practices while applying elements of

Institutional Theory. This might not provide me with a conclusive answer to whether or not

DCA has changed organisationally, but it will supply me with insights on the matter. More

specifically, I will look at three different points earlier described, namely the three missions of

DCA’s vision and plan, the five overall objectives of DCA and the use of tools such as PCM,

LFA and the Quality Frame. For the purpose of this analysis I assume that, as DCA receives

funding from the EU on a continuous basis, the practices of DCA are acceptable to the EU. It

would seem fairly odd for the EU to fund an organisation which organisational practices were

perceived as unacceptable.

7.2.1 DCA’s Mission Statements

The first of DCA’s three missions is “to assist disadvantaged and oppressed communities and

to assist in church activities.” This first part of this mission with focus on disadvantaged and

oppressed communities is well within the goal of Objective 1 of the Thematic Programme,

which states that projects should have a particular focus on the less fortunate part of the

population. However, the latter part of this mission statement dealing with church activities is

not in line with EU policies. As already mentioned, the EU does not fund missionary work.

This give grounds for a potential larger discussion on what constitute missionary work. It

could be argued that even though DCA does not carry out missionary work (based upon what

I was told during the interviews) it still empowers the local religious communities by using

them when carrying out development projects. If the population sees the local church helping

63


in improving their everyday life they might become more inclined to also turn to it for

religious reasons. However, this does not seem to concern the EU as it works on equal terms

with faith-based and non-faith-based NGOs.

The inclusion of DCA’s religious base is also present in the second mission. In fact, the

argumentation presented just above is also applicable for this mission statement which is “to

carry out emergency and development activities in co-operation with local and religious and

popular organisations.” Objective 1 of the Thematic Programme also applies here as it deals

with empowering local society.

The character of the third and final mission of DCA is different from the previous two.

This one deals with informing “the public about the causes of need and inequality as well as

to mobilise popular and political will and power to change them.” The goal of this mission is

almost exactly the same as Objective 2 of the Thematic Programme on awareness raising.

Objective 2 focuses highly on educating society on development issues to enhance

understanding and gain support and it also includes the element of promoting development

policy.

The religious elements aside the similarities of the above DCA missions and EU policy

objectives could been seen as a mimetic process in which DCA adopts the same priorities as

the EU. If seen from the cultural-cognitive pillar of institutionalism, this will be explained by

a shared perception of what is right. This means that compliance with EU practices is not seen

as a compromise – compliance is merely taken for granted. Whether or not the similarities

stem from the EU being in a position of power against DCA is hard to say. Chances are that it

is just seen as “the way we do these things” within the field. This was at least the impression I

got from doing my interviews. However, it could also be argued that, as NGOs have to strive

to fulfil the objectives of the Thematic Programme in order to be considered for funding, the

similarities could be a result of coercion by the EU. In this argument the EU persuade DCA to

comply by setting forth some “rules” which DCA has to live up to, to be able to get funding.

At least it is a fact that if the EU does not believe project proposals live up to the objectives it

will not award funds for that project.

The fact that DCA manage to maintain religious promotion in two of its three missions

while the EU is directly opposed to funding missionary work speaks against the EU exerting

control of DCA, at least at an overall organisational level.

64


7.2.2 Overall Objectives for DCA activities

DCA has identified five objectives which its activities should aim at achieving. The first of

these objectives is “to become a strong advocate of poor and excluded people and support

their rights and influence on their own lives.” The aim of this objective is in line with

Objective 1 of the Thematic Programme. The focus on the poorest and excluded people and

the local ownership is central to the EU’s development policy. The second objective: “to

ensure the credibility, visibility and independence of DanChurchAid as well as its popular,

religious and political effectiveness” is rather obvious not part of any EU policy as it focuses

on DCA. However, the EU is very focused on enhancing the capability of NGOs (or Non

State Actors). In fact, this objective and the third objective (“to develop strong, equal and

effective partnership and alliances, nationally as well as internationally”) are covered by

Objective 3 of the Thematic Programme on NGOs and networks.

The fourth objective is “to create better coherence and becoming better at documenting

and learning from the results of its activities in order to develop and improve its

competencies, procedures and systems.” This objective follows principles fundamental to EU

project management. The importance of this can be seen in the PCM. For the last objective on

ensuring “that DanChurchAid is an attractive and innovative organisation” the reasoning is

much similar as for the second. To achieve this good organisational practices are important

and this is, as mentioned, key to the EU.

Compared to the three missions of DCA these five objectives are of much more internal

character. Except for the first they all deal with improving the work of DCA and thereby

making it better at performing its tasks. While not directly explainable by Institutional Theory

it is interesting to note that the terminology is very alike and that the focus on good

organisational practices is also vital to the EU. In fact, its good organisational code of conduct

is one of the eligibility requirements. Again, this could suggest that it is part of a shared

understanding of best practices as explained by the cultural-cognitive pillar.

7.2.3 DCA use of Project Management Tools

As described in the previous chapter, DCA makes use of EU recognised tools for project

management, specifically PCM, LFA and the Quality Frame. Needles to say the usage by

DCA correspond almost perfectly with how the EU perceives it to be done. As DCA uses the

65


manual devised by the EU this is rather self-evident. What is interesting about the PCM is

that, as mentioned, while the EU does not directly require NGOs to make use of it DCA still

uses it. As ADJ argues, DCA would have used something similar had the EU not developed

it. As also mentioned earlier the EU does not demand that NGOs use the PCM but it is

strongly encouraged and as the aim of the PCM is “to support good management practices and

effective decision making” usage is recommended as it will be essential for a positive

outcome in the assessment procedure for awarding grants. In working towards fulfilling the

requirements on which grants are awarded the Quality Frame is highly relevant. The criteria

on which awarding decisions are taken (relevance, methodology, sustainability and budget

and cost-effectiveness) and the three elements of the Quality Frame (relevance, feasible and

effective and well managed) are well-matched.

When employing Institutional Theory this indicates compliance under the regulative

pillar. Though usage of the PCM is voluntary, it is questionable if NGOs would be awarded

grants if they did not employ some similar form of project management tool. And as elements

of the Quality Frame are the same as the ones awarding decisions are taken upon the PCM

appears unavoidable. The form of coercion employed to get compliance would then be

inducement. As before, one could argue that the use of a project management tool such as the

PCM is just part of a shared understanding of the way to do things within this field. The fact

that the PCM incorporated LFA supports this as the LFA is a generally accepted and used tool

across the field. This would mean that the similarities are part of a cultural-cognitive

perception in which modelling on EU practices occurs.

My analysis of organisational practices of DCA has not, as anticipated, provided conclusive

evidence to support or dismiss the notion of organisational change. However, almost all of

DCA’s practices can in one way or another be explained by Institutional Theory. Of course

this is not necessary the right explanation. The explanations based upon the regulative pillar,

with coercion as a mean of attaining compliance, supports the notion that the EU is capable of

exerting power over DCA. In this notion the EU controls “a stable system of rules, either

formal or informal, backed by surveillance and sanctioning power” to which DCA complies

because it is in its best interest to do so. But as noted the religions elements of DCA’s

practices remain an area, which the EU does not control. However, the explanations resting on

the cultural-cognitive pillar provide a different answer which would be more in line with the

66


notion of a shared understanding and that compliance happens due to modelling on the EU,

and others, because it is felt that this is the right and legitimate approach.

In either case, there is much to suggest that DCA is institutionalised to a degree and

have become “infused with values” from the environment which because of rules, norms and

beliefs guide organisational behaviour. To elaborate on this I now turn to looking at what

possibilities DCA has to respond to the institutional pressures. To do this I employ the

strategic responses described by Oliver.

7.2.4 Strategic Responses of DCA

Based upon the foregone conclusions the strategic response of DCA to institutional pressure

from the EU would be acquiescence. Acquiescence covers both the indications of coercive

pressure in that it explains conformity as resulting from serving the interest of the

organisation and it explains the responses suggested by the cultural-cognitive pillar. In this

case DCA’s similarities with the EU could be explained by the tactic of habit “where

organisations adhere unconsciously to taken-for-granted rules and norms” or by the tactic of

imitation which is a mimetic response.

Another strategy seen employed by DCA is manipulation by using the tactic of

influencing. DCA’s membership of various networks such as the Danish EU-NGO platform

or CONCORD is a clear example of DCA, and other NGOs trying to influence “values and

beliefs or definitions or definitions and criteria of acceptable practices or performance.” As

the example of CONCORD and the foil of the attempt to merge the two instruments showed it

is possible for NGOs to influence decision-making within the EU. But as also noted by ADJ

this is by far from the case always and it only happened because of a large-scale joint effort

by a variety of actors (NGOs, governments, MEPs, etc.). ADJ’s comments suggest that it is

not possible for DCA to manipulate the EU by itself and that even when working with others

it is not a given that the attempts will successful.

I have not seen anything to suggest use of the remaining three strategies put forth by

Oliver. In relations to DCA I have found nothing indicating that a compromise strategy is

present, nor have I seen anything implying defiance by DCA. In fact, it is questionable

whether this strategy is at all possible with the EU. Ignoring rules and norms would only

ensure that the NGO would not be considered for funding. Lastly, the strategy of avoidance to

conceal nonconformity could in theory be possible, but I have seen no evidence of DCA using

67


it. An avoidance strategy would be vulnerable as consequences of exposure are high. It would

be unlikely that an NGO would be awarded funding again if it were discovered. One of the

tactics of avoidance is escape in which the organisation “all together removes itself from the

external pressure”. This is of course a possibility, but it would mean that DCA should stop

trying to get funding from the EU and thereby move beyond the scope of this paper.

7.3 EU Aid System and DCA Autonomy

The analysis has attempted to explore how the EU Aid System affects the autonomy of DCA

in order to use this finding to answer my problem formulation on NGOs autonomy in general.

The conclusion must be that this cannot be answered unambiguously but that there are some

indications suggesting limitations on DCA’s autonomy in its interactions with the EU. The

use of Resource Dependence Theory showed that DCA is in an asymmetrical behavioural

interdependent relationship with the EU in which the EU has the possibility of exerting

control over DCA. DCA is dependent on resources the EU is capable of controlling to a high

degree. The exchange of resources between the two is not equal as the resources provided by

DCA are not vital to the EU. But what were also clear were the limitations to the power of the

EU as DCA is not vulnerable in respect to its survival. This means that the dependence is not

necessarily a problem for DCA and that compliance with demands from the EU seems

voluntary. The main gain for DCA from the relationship is stability and control and losing

resources from the EU will only entail termination of some projects and not the organisation

as a whole. Following the notion of Resource Dependence means that the situation for DCA is

that it relinquishes some autonomy in order to gain certainty.

As there is more to determining autonomy that looking at monetary dependence

Institutional Theory was incorporated into the analysis. This showed that there is a wide array

of similarities between EU and DCA practices which could be explained by functions of

either the regulative or cultural-cognitive pillar of institutions. The possibility of explanation

by one of the two pillars suggests that DCA is in fact institutionalised by the EU Aid System.

DCA has become infused with values similar to those present in EU development policies.

While the regulative pillar explained compliance by DCA serving its best interest by

conforming, the cultural-cognitive pillar instead suggests modelling and the perception of

shared understanding as the reasons for conforming. Whether one or the other the many

reoccurring similarities indicate that DCA is conforming to EU rules and norms and thereby

68


that the EU Aid System challenge DCA’s autonomy. This is supported by the analysis of the

possible strategic responses to the system. The only viable response available to DCA is

acquiescence either because it serves the interest of DCA or because conformity is taken-for-

granted. The only other option available within the system is lobbying. But as has been shown

this is of limited use. It can have great effect, but the frequency of success it low. Again, the

lack of conclusive evidence cannot be ignored as it makes the conclusion somewhat

speculative.

In concluding that the EU Aid System does impose restrictions on DCA’s autonomy it

must be noted that these restrictions themselves have limitations. This is seen in for example

the focus of DCA on religious activities. Though not directly missionary of character they

cannot, as I argued, be completely without effect in the development work of DCA. The

power of the EU over DCA seems to be linked with the fact that it is the EU who funds the

some of DCA’s projects. As the EU decides on what to fund based upon different criteria (set

forth by the EU) this have the effect that if DCA wish to be funded it will have to live up to

these criteria and thereby relinquish some of its autonomy. In addition the FPA with ECHO

strengthens this effect as EU influence stretches beyond projects. Of course it is for DCA to

decide on which projects it wishes to apply for which means that it completely at the mercy of

the EU.

69

Conclusion

Chapter 8 Conclusion

Having explored the EU Aid System throughout this paper the conclusion on how this allows

for NGO autonomy must be that it restrict the autonomy of NGOs to a certain degree. This is

at least the conclusion of the analysis of the relationship between the EU and DCA, which

functioned as a case. To the degree the findings of the case study can be applied generally, it

means that the EU has the power to exert influence on NGOs within the EU Aid System and

thereby lessen their autonomy. Being based upon a case study this conclusion of course has its

limitations in respect to the general applicability. However, I will argue that when looking at

the EU system for funding one sees that it is highly generalised which therefore means that

NGOs will be treated equally. When it comes to analysing how the NGOs react, my findings

have shown that in order to get funding, NGOs only have the option of conformity to

consider. Thus, the result of the case analysis is also usable to view EU-NGO relations in

general.

The EU does not dictate behaviour to the NGOs, but by awarding certain behaviour it

promotes specific values and norms. As long as NGOs remain members of the EU Aid

System it is these values and norms, which need to be central in their activities. The sphere of

the EU’s influence decreases where the EU Aid System ends. The EU only has limited

influence on external activities. This suggests that compliance with the demands from the EU

is voluntary and thereby not seen as a problem by the NGOs which conform. For activities

within the EU Aid System, or for elements covered by the FPAs, it would seem that the same

principle applies to all NGOs who wish to be a part of the EU Aid System, that as it is the EU

who decides upon funding it is therefore the EU who is in charge. The idiom of he who pays

the piper calls the tune captures the reality of the EU Aid System nicely.

The description of NGOs as contractors put forth by, among others, Poul Nielson seems

to be quite accurate. Via calls and tenders the NGOs bid for contracts in a way much similar

to what is seen elsewhere in society. Of course it is a different industry, with different norms

and values, but the basic principles are the same. Probably the biggest difference is the fact

that the NGOs are to remain non-profit. As this influences on how NGOs operate it speaks to

how the EU sees the role of the NGOs, as playing a role in developing democracies both in

the third would and in Europe.

70

Bibliography

Chapter 9 Bibliography20

Alecu de Flers, Nicole & Elfriede Regelsberger (2005), ”The EU and Inter-regional Cooperation” in C. Hill & M Smith (eds) International Relations and the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Arts, Karin (2003), “AP-EU Relations in a new era: The Cotonou Agreement”, Common Market Law Review, Vol 40, pp. 95–116.

Bretherton, Charlotte & John Vogler (2006), The European Union as a Global Actor 2nd edition, Oxon: Routledge.

Clinton, William Jefferson (2007), Giving – How Each of Us Can Change the World, London: Hutchinson.

DanChurchAid (2006), DCA Vision & Plan 2006-2010, (retrieved from http://www.danchurchaid.org/sider_paa_hjemmesiden/who_we_are/annual_report_and_vision_plan).

DanChurchAid (2007a), DCA Annual Report 2006-2007, (retrieved from http://www.danchurchaid.org/sider_paa_hjemmesiden/who_we_are/annual_report_and_vision_plan).

DanChurchAid (2007b), DCA Evaluation Policy, 13.03.07, (retrieved from http://www.danchurchaid.org/sider_paa_hjemmesiden/what_we_do/monitoring_evaluation).

DanChurchAid (2007c), DCA Programme Policy: Rights-Based Commitment, (retrieved from http://www.danchurchaid.org/sider_paa_hjemmesiden/what_we_do/rights_based_approach).

DiMaggio, Paul J & Walter W. Powell (1983), “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields”, American Sociological Review 1983, Vol. 48 (April: 147-160).

Economist, The (2000), “Sins of the Secular Missionaries”, The Economist print edition, Jan 27th 2000.

European Commission (1991), Commission decides to set up a European office for humanitarian aid, Press Release, P/91/69, 06.11.1991, (retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=P/91/69&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en).

European Council (1996), “Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid”, Official Journal of the European Union L 163, 02.07.1996 P.0001-0006.

European Commission (2004a), Aid Delivery Methods – Volume 1 Project Cycle Management Guidelines, DG EuropeAid, March 2004, (retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/index_en.htm).

European Commission (2004b), Framework Partnership Agreement with Humanitarian Organisations, Ver. 041221, DG ECHO, (retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/pdf_files/partnership/fpa_en.pdf).

European Commission (2005a), ECHO Manual Project Cycle Management, Ver. 050617, DG ECHO, June 2005, (retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/pdf_files/partnership/guidelines/project_cycle_mngmt_en.pdf).

European Commission (2005b), EU Visibility Guidelines for external actions, DG EuropeAid, September 2005, (retrieved from:

20 All links to websites were usable in 2008 before the hand-in date.

71

Bibliography

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/visibility/documents/europeaid_visibility_guidelines_en.pdf).

European Commission (2006a), Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – The Thematic Programme “Non-state Actors and Local Authorities in Development”, COM(2006) 19 final , Brussels, 25.1.2006, (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/worldwide/civil-society/working-documents_en.htm).

European Commission (2006b), Commission Staff Working Document – ECHO Operational Strategy 2007, SEC(2006) 1626, DG ECHO, Brussels, 01.12.2006, (retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/pdf_files/strategy/2007/strat_2007_en.pdf).

European Commission (2006c), DG for Humanitarian Aid – ECHO Financial Report 2006, DG ECHO (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/echo/pdf_files/financial_report.pdf#page=3).

European Commission (2007a), Annex – Thematic programme “Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development” Annual Action Programme for 2007, (retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/worldwide/civil-society/documents/nsa-la_annual_action_programme_2007_en.pdf).

European Commission (2007b), Implementation of external assistance: The new instruments, EuropeAid (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/delivering-aid/funding-instruments/index_en.htm)

European Commission (2007c), Practical Guide to Contract procedures for EC external actions, (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/procedures/implementation/practical_guide/index_en.htm).

European Commission (2007d), Thematic programme – Non-state actors and local authorities in development – Strategy paper 2007-2010, DG EuropeAid (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/worldwide/civil-society/working-documents_en.htm).

European Parliament & European Council (2006), “Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 378/41, 27.12.2006.

European Union (2006), “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community”, Official Journal of the European Union C 321 E/126, 29.12.2006.

Farrell, Mary (2005), “A Triumph of Realism over Idealism? Cooperation Between the European Union and Africa”, European Integration, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 263-283, September.

Greenwood, Royston & C. R. Hinings (1996), “Understanding Radical Organizational Change: Bringing Together the Old and the New Institutionalism”, Academy of Management Review, 1996, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1022-1054.

Holland, Martin (2002), The European Union and the Third World, Hampshire: Palgrave.Holland, Martin (2004a), “Development Policy: Paradigm Shift and the ‘Normalization’ of a

Privileged Partnership?”, in M.G. Cowles & D. Dinan (eds) Developments in the European Union 2, Hampshire: Palgrave.

Holland, Martin (2004b), “When is Foreign Policy not Foreign Policy? Cotonou, CFSP and External Relations with the Developing World” in M. Holland (eds), Common Foreign and Security Policy, London: Continuum.

72

Bibliography

Mayall, James (2005), “The Shadow of Empire: The EU and he Former Colonial World” in C. Hill & M. Smith (eds) International Relations and the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Michel, Louis (2006), The European Consensus on Development, Luxembourg; Office of Publications of the European Communities.

Oliver, Christine (1991), “Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes”, The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 16, No. 1. (Jan., 1991), pp. 145-179.

Pfeffer, Jeffrey & Gerald R. Salancik (2003), The External Control of Organizations: a Resource Dependence Perspective, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press.

Rosamond, Ben (2000), Theories of European Integration, Hampshire: Palgrave.Scott, W. Richard (2001), Institutions and Organizations 2nd edition, California: Sage

Publications, Inc.Selznick, Phillip (1957), Leadership in Administration – A Sociological Interpretation,

Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company.Smith, Michael E (2005), “Implementation: Making the EU’s International Relations Work”

in C. Hill & M Smith (eds) International Relations and the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stevens, Handley & Anne Stevens (2006), “The internal reform of the Commission” in D. Spence (eds) European Commission 3rd edition, London: John Harper Publishing.

Tvedt, Terje (1998), Angels of Mercy or Development Diplomates?: NGOs & Foreign Aid, Oxford: James Currey.

Tvedt, Terje (2006), “The International Aid System and the Non-Governmental Organisations: A New Research Agenda”, Journal of International Development, 18, 677-690 (2006).

Tvedt, Terje (2007), “Development NGOs Revisited: A New Research Agenda”, in P. Opoku-Mensah, D. Lewis & T. Tvedt (eds) Reconceptualising NGOs and Their Roles in Development – NGOs, Civil Society and the International Aid System, Aalborg: Aalborg University Press

Annexes:Poul Nielson (2007–A1), Interview made by Simon Holm by email in August 2007.Allan Duelund Jensen (2007–A2), Interview made by Simon Holm on 03.10.07 at

DanChurchAid in Copenhagen, Denmark.Carsten Strandlod (2007–A3), Interview made by Simon Holm on 04.10.07 at DanChurchAid

in Copenhagen, Denmark.Troels Victor Dalgaard (2007–A4), Interview made by Simon Holm on 04.10.07 at

DanChurchAid in Copenhagen, Denmark.DanChurchAid (2007–A5), Power Point Presentation at LWF/Nordic Agencies Meeting –

June 11th 2007 – Presentation DCA of Global Funding Unit.

Websites:DanChurchAid

Historien: http://www.noedhjaelp.dk/sider_paa_hjemmesiden/om_os/historienRights-based approach: http://www.danchurchaid.org/sider_paa_hjemmesiden/what_we_do/rights_based_approachObjects & Values: http://www.danchurchaid.org/sider_paa_hjemmesiden/who_we_are/objects_values

73

Bibliography

Organisational structure: http://www.danchurchaid.org/sider_paa_hjemmesiden/who_we_are/organisational_structure

British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND): http://www.bond.org.uk/funding/eu/faq.htm

DG ECHO: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/index_en.htmDG EuropeAid Cooperation Office

Main Site: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htmFunding opportunities: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/cgi/frame12.pl

The Danish-EU NGO platform: http://www.eu-ngo.dk/English/index.htm

74

Annexes

Chapter 10 Annexes

10.1 Annexe A1 Interview with Poul Nielson

1: What do you see as the main reason(s) behind EU’s funding of development NGOs?

In my view the reasons for the EU are very much the same reasons as for the member states at national level. Mobilising the public generally and supporting directly an engagement in the activities in the third world. But it is important to keep in mind, that many, but definitely not all, of the development NGO’s were there in their own right, with or without public support. For the EU there is also the dimension of stimulating the all-European perspective in the activities funded by the Commission. In some special cases, like Euronaid, the Commission more or less was the initiator behind the establishment of the NGO in order to have an adequate implementing partner alternative to the UN system.

It is also – both in the member states and in the Commission – the case that the NGO’s are supposed to contribute to the information and teaching of the public about the activities of the Commission (and member states governments) in development co-operation. This has been rather problematic, because even if the NGO’s are allocated certain money for this task, most of their information activity has normally been about themselves and their own projects.

- In which way, if at all, is EU foreign policy taken into consideration in the selection of projects for funding?

The EU has a clearly defined and formally adopted policy for development co-operation, and this is, naturally, the basis also for what the Commission is doing in regard to the development NGO’s. But not in the sense that one can trace certain specific elements or a certain political agenda. Development co-operation is never taking place in a political vacuum, and naturally there is an on going dialogue between the general foreign policy and the development side. But this is far away from influencing the selection of projects for funding.

- Do you see the NGOs as having advantages over the EU when dealing with development issues?

They are themselves and should not be compared with the representative and legitimate political institutions when dealing with development issues. They are never compelled to have to compromise. They are free to cultivate special constituencies, for instance environmental groups, women, children, AIDS etc. which gives them their individual identities and attractiveness. The relationship between NGO’s and the EU is more of a partnership with different roles.

2: What is the thought behind the EU funding system of NGOs, which is characterised by a highly contractual relationship between donor and receivers?

1

Annexes

The fact that every payment made by the Commission is done on the basis of a contract does not mean that the relationship as such becomes a contractual relationship. It must be understood that the Financial Regulation (finansforordningen på dansk) reflects the highly control-obsessed attitude of the Member States vis-a-vis the Commission and that NGO’s like all others receiving money from the Commission have to respect certain principles about auditing, guaranties etc. A lot of effort has been put into simplifying this, especially for purposes like NGO funding, but there is a limit to what deviations can be accepted.

- Do you see any problems in this contractual relationship between the EU and NGOs?

I need to stress the distinction between funding NGO’s on the basis of the contracts by which the funding of their approved projects is executed, and the role performed by NGO’s as contractors (as I like to call it) when they accept to step in as an implementing partner together with others in a sector program or a larger, complex rural development program, and where the overall decision making and management is placed in the hands of the host government in co-operation with the Commission. This is why I have been talking about the two basic roles of the development NGO’s: Free birds and contractors. The first is typically covering what they do based on their applications under the special NGO budget line, where they get a yes or a no to their applications, but where they have themselves defined the projects and are themselves responsible for the whole activity. The second is what we see in food aid and in many activities relation to implementation of sector programs, which can cover a very broad range of activities. Democratisation, reform of the judicial sector are areas, where there are many meaningful jobs to be carried out by NGO’s that are willing to enter into a more teamwork mode of operation.

Considering the general trend towards sector support and budget support it is clear that the traditional project-by-project carried out by NGO’s on a stand alone basis are getting to look more and more of an anomaly, and even more so in view of the growing emphasis on capacity building and strengthening of ownership in the partner countries. India was just one big case illustrating this point. The days of Northern development NGO’s in themselves being seen as the main tool of progress, reforms and development in the third world are simply gone. This is why I am arguing for finding ways in which the talent, experience and resources in the NGO’s can be meaningfully used in the emerging new context.

- Is there a risk that the way the funding system is constructed makes it too cumbersome for many smaller NGOs? For example by requiring a high degree of administrative work in order to satisfy the EU’s wish for reports, etc.

It is true that the system is difficult to relate to for smaller NGO’s. But the Commission is also supporting this category of players in the system by assistance to produce applications. But there is a limit to how much of this is reasonable to use public money for. Also it is not the case that we should be obliged to make sure that small organisations without much experience and no track record in financial management can still be granted large sums of money. Maybe the biggest problem for the smaller NGO’s is that it takes long time to prepare an application, checking that it corresponds to the different demands, then to wait for the decision and for the final implementation of the project. Bigger organisations can better handle this. But comparing with the situation when I took office, things are much faster and more predictable today.

2

Annexes

3: With the funding system in mind, how independent and autonomous do you see the NGOs as being?

This is an impossible question. Some would look at the percentage of the total turnover an organisation is getting from the Commission and simply say that with a high percentage this organisation is not very independent, and vice versa. I find this too simple. Independence is not only a matter of economic ties between recipient and funder. The whole character of the organisation, its background and membership etc. is as important. Certainly the voice of the European development NGO’s has not been muted by the fact that they to a large extend are funded by the Commission and the governments in the member states. But there are different political cultures and traditions in the different member states, and it is probably the case, that the Danish tradition with 100% funding is unique. But this comes out of the same tradition as we see it in the public funding of private schools, both in primary education and the special Folk High Schools.

- As the NGOs to a large degree have to target projects specifically to receive EU funds, are the NGOs then de facto carrying out EU policy as contractors?

No. It’s more the other way round. I suppose the question primarily relates to the special budget line of app. 200 mill. € annually for the development NGO’s and where the applications from the NGO’s are submitted on the basis of the call for proposals sent out by the Commission. But this is all about what I would call classical (= old fashioned) projects. This structure is similar to how support for scientific or cultural activities is administered, both in the Commission and by national governments. In order to have some sort of competition among the applications this is difficult to do differently, and this pulls in the direction of preserving the individual project structure. Long term and broader scope activities are difficult to fit into this. It should be kept in mind that there normally are applications for a much larger volume of money than what is available with the 200 mill. €.

The calls for proposals are not a straight jacket that specifically defines what the Commission will fund or not fund. The system does give indications of areas of priority, but these are broad and pretty normal and do not narrow the scope of ideas and new approaches that the NGO’s might want to try out. The other maybe more important function of the calls for proposals is to establish more clearly defined deadlines so as to get into better managed cycles in the decision making process. This was a huge problem when I arrived in the Commission with applications piling up for several years waiting for a yes or a no.

It is a serious mistake to discuss the relation between the Commission and the development NGO’s only on the basis of the special NGO budget line. The 200 mill. € in fact only represent a fraction of the total amount of money channelled through NGO’s. (The ECHO money for humanitarian aid is outside the scope of your paper, but humanitarian NGO’s normally get around 50% of the annual spending of 500 mill. €). Food aid is a special category and a big part of this has in fact been channelled through EuronAid, which is an NGO specialised in the logistic operations and management of food aid. Finally, European development NGO’s are involved as more or less specialised partners in the implementation of larger projects or sector programs where they may be responsible for some of the activities. In this capacity they work in the same fashion as consultancies.

3

Annexes

The conclusion of this is, that it might be misleading to talk about “the funding system” as if this is simply the budget line dedicated to development NGO’s.

- How much do the NGOs influence EU policy in the field of development? For example by providing and controlling the stream of information (local knowledge and project feedback)

The stream of information provided and controlled by the NGO’s is not in any way unique. The EU delegations in all the developing countries have their own direct picture of the reality on the ground in our partner countries, - including what goes on in the civil society in these countries. In fact, the feed back from the field from NGO activities is surprisingly weak and it often overstates the role played by the individual NGO’s in the processes they are involved in. Moreover, the professional feed back loop provided through systematic evaluations is particularly weak for the NGO’s. We also see nothing like the peer review in the DAC between state donors (and the Commission) covering the work of the NGO’s.

Their influence on EU’s policy is simply based on the fact that they devote a large share of their work on the lobbying of the European institutions, directly or through the media. Individually or collectively through their umbrella organisation they follow very closely all aspects of the work in the Commission, The European Parliament and the Council relating to development issues, and they never hesitate to express their opinion through all possible channels.

There is a regularly organised and formalised dialogue between the Development Commissioner and the umbrella organisation – in my time as Commissioner with direct meetings with me twice a year. The meetings in the Development Committee of the European Parliament are normally open to the public, and representatives of the NGO’s are always there. In general the political parties and especially the MEP’s in the Development Committee keep a close contact to the NGO’s, both in Brussels and at home in their national political environments. Finally, it should be noted, that they also exert influence by being active participants in the public debate – and in the lobbying activities – nationally in the member states, which is a direct way of influencing what the Ministers decide in the Council. Both nationally and in the EU context in Brussels the simple fact is, the NGO’s are funding a large number of full time professionals whose main function is to do political work in this field directed towards the decision making process in the EU rather than spending their time carrying out development work in the third world. They often work in consortia, or alliances, when producing comments to Commission proposals or writing reports with their views. This enables smaller, national NGO’s to present this material in their national political environment as if they themselves have produced all this, and the media in the member states never give much attention to this phenomenon, simply because the predominantly critical posture of the NGO’s is considered as evidence of their independence and objectivity, and in any case represent views which the journalists find useful to include in the debate, thereby avoiding having to produce these views themselves.

All this being said, the general function of the NGO’s efforts to influence the political processes in the field of development policy in my view should be seen as a positive factor – simply because they generally are on the side of a progressive policy similar to the views I

4

Annexes

myself stand for. But there are areas, like trade policy, where ideological left over from the struggle against globalisation (to put it very short and simple) are blocking for sufficient nuances in the established view of the NGO’s.

4: What is in you opinion the biggest achievement of the Cotonou Agreement that was signed and came into force during your time as Commissioner?

The Cotonou Agreement has a broader scope than the older Lomé Conventions. It covers development, trade, political relations. It reflects contemporary best practice in development co-operation, emphasising ownership and partnership with the focus on sector programs and budget support. It opens up for the direct involvement of civil society – non state actors – in the ACP countries, which means that the EU not only relates to civil society through European NGO’s but is funding many different organisations in the ACP countries. On trade the negotiations about Regional Economic Partnership Agreements represents a sincere effort to assist the ACP Countries in a smooth integration into the global economy. But the Cotonou Agreement has numerous new elements which can best be assessed by reading it and comparing with the former convention, - or simply by using the information material provided by the Commission.

- With regards to the future, what have the Cotonou Agreement brought of substantial changes to the field of development aid?

The spirit of partnership on an equal footing is essential, and this comes out clearly if one compares the EU-ACP relationship with that of the United States and the developing countries. The predictability of the country allocations and the on going political dialogue are important in this respect. All the important issues of human rights, democratisation, good governance, corruption, migration are covered by this thoroughly negotiated agreement. The modernisation of the EU’s general development policy which coincided with the Cotonou Agreement has strengthened the consensus among most donors about sector support and budget support.

- Where do you see the contractual relationship between the EU and development NGOs heading?

I don’t see a lot of change coming, even if I would like this to happen. There are many vested interests in keeping the system as it is, and among the NGO's themselves there are very differing interests and views. In the (many) new member states the situation is different from the situation in most of the old member states, where the development NGO’s have established themselves firmly, and where the boldness towards new ways of working with the Commission therefore might be bigger.

5

10.2 Annexe A2 Interview with Allan Duelund Jensen, Head of Global Funding Unit,

DanChurchAid (03.10.07)

ADJ = Allan Duelund JensenSH = Simon Holm

ADJ:Det her er en præsentation som jeg gav da jeg var i Geneve her engang i juni fordi vi arbejder jo sammen med noget der hedder LWF, Lutheren World Federation som er en stor international kirkelig udviklingsnødhjælpsorganisation. Vi har faktisk været en del af grundlæggerne af LWF. De blev jo grundlagt i 1946. Vi er jo grundlagt i 1922.Den er jo sådan set meget god at få lidt forstand på hvad det er Global Funding Unit gør fordi det er en præsentation til folk udenfor huset for at få dem til at forstå hvem er vi egentlig.Her kan du se et organisatorisk organogram over FKNs internationale afdeling. Der er jo så også en national afdeling og et sekretariat med generalsekretær. Men Christian Friis Bach er vores direktør helt overordnet for international afdeling og så er der en udviklingsdirektør og en katastrofe direktør. Katastrofe har deres egen lille enhed hvor det de gør, er at de støtte op omkring kvaliteten af katastrofe projekter og så har de ansvaret for nogle lande der ligger udenfor de lande vi normalt arbejder i.

SH:Altså nogle lande der bliver sat på efterfølgende en katastrofe?

ADJ:Ja. Det der var jordskælvet i Pakistan. Burma har at gøre med den situation der er nu. Der kan også godt komme andre lande på. Der kan lige pludselig stå Iran eller Nord Korea eller et eller andet

Så har vi de andre enheder her hen af. Vi har Programme Finance Unit. Det er hele den finansielle side af projekterne. Det har ikke noget at gøre med FKNs økonomi i huset som sådan, det ligger inde i sekretariatet hvor der er en regnskabsafdeling. Men på projektniveau der ligger det her.

Så er vi her, GFU, hvor du kan se hvem der er. Troels skal du møde i morgen. Birgitte var hende som ikke er her som ved rigtig meget om EU som du så kan snakke med. Southern Africa der er Ole der er derude, han er helt nyansat. Så er der Eva, der er hende der heller ikke er her som også ved meget om EU som du kan snakke med. Katrine hun er vores administrator. Det vil sige det er faktisk Camilla fordi Katrine er på orlov. Og så Carsten Strandlod som du skal mødes med i morgen og så har vi Rikke Holm, hun sidder ude ved Great Lakes, hun sidder ude i Uganda og er sådan en GFU’er der dækker området derude.

Så har man det der hedder PDU, Programme Development Unit, det er eksperterne inden for de 5 programtyper vi arbejder med. Jeg mener det er 5, vi har lige revideret det, nogen er blevet lagt sammen og sådan noget der. Overordnet set arbejder vi med Relief, HIV/AIDS, Political Space, Fødevarersikkerhed, og en mere som jeg ikke lige kan huske. Men de sidder derinde. De er programme technical advisors, specialiseret indenfor de forskellige områder vi arbejder med.

1

Så har vi det der hedder Country Coordinators. Det er dem der styrer vores regionale repræsentanter. Vi har 13 regionale kontorer ude i verden. Og på de her regionale kontorer. Vi har et i Central Amerika, et i Mellemøsten, Central Asien, osv. Der sidder der en regional repræsentant. Typisk en dansker med en hel række af lokale program officerer, nogle gange også en enkelt expat alt efter hvor vi er henne. De her regionale repræsentanter de refererer ind til de her Country Coordinators og der sidder så for de forskellige områder.

Så har vi det der hedder ProLog Unit, Procurement and Logistics, der er simpelthen en indkøbsafdeling. Det er især i samarbejde med GFU at de her er relevante fordi at EU og andre internationale donorer stille meget skræppe krav omkring indkøb. Det er en hel videnskab for sig. Jeg har en indkøbsmanual, det er sådan en moppedreng her (5cm). Det er vores egen som afspejler EU's krav, så det bruger vi en masse tid og kræfter på. Der er jo også meget fornuft i det, men noget af det er ganske problematisk. Men det kan vi komme ind på senere.

Så har vi det der hedder Humantarian Mine Action, HMA Unit. Det er det eneste hvor vi er udførende, hvor vi selv implementerer. Altså hvor du kan gå ud i felten og se folk med et flag i jorden hvor der står DanChurchAid og vi har ansat helt ned til cook, cleaner, field worker osv.

SH:Ellers så samarbejder i igennem lokale partnere?

ADJ:Ja. Så er der sådan en flydende grænse kan man sige hvor vi nogle gange er det man kalder ’med implementerende’ på forskellig vis. Det kan være fordi, vi siger det her projekt er så specielt teknisk krævende, eller donorerne kræver det, eller af andre hensyn at vi simpelthen sekunderer en person til at sidde som en programme coordinator eller en project manager eller en project advisor. De har lidt forskellige titler alt efter hvad det er for en forskellig funktion. Men ellers så implementerer vi igennem partnere.

SH:HMA unit’en arbejder kun i de lande der ses her?

ADJ:Ja, de er i Angola, Congo, Burundi, Albanien er vi faktisk gået ud af, og Sudan er vi også i. Nu er de på vej ind i Zambia tror jeg. Men for at få de helt sidste opdateringer om hvor vi er og sådan noget er det meget bedre at du går ind på internettet, der ligger det helt nyt.

Men GFU det er altså os der sidder heroppe. Vi er en del af international afdeling og det der er vores formål det er, siden vi blev skabt, og vi blev skabt tilbage i slutningen af 90’erne. Dengang hed vi en EU enhed, men kom senere til at hedder GFU fordi man ville se på andet end bare finansiering fra EU. Det der var ideen dengang var at sige vi vil ikke udelukkende være afhængig af funding fra DANIDA og hvad skal man sige egne midler. Men det var især DANIDA finansieringen der var spørgsmålet fordi vi var helt oppe på 60% af vores omsætning som var finansieret af DANIDA og nu er vi nede på, jeg tror det er, 39%. En ting var selvfølgelig at gøre sig lidt mere uafhængig af DANIDA finansieringen fordi at de kunne

2

jo finde på lige pludselig at skære drastisk ned, der kunne komme en ny regering eller et eller andet, og så ville vi stå der med skægget i postkassen og sige, hej det kunne vi måske godt have forudset det her. Det andet er også at der kunne slås tvivl om vores politiske uafhængighed hvis vi var alt for kraftigt finansieret af den danske stat. Og så det tredje kan man sige var at øge omsætningen som sådan for at kunne gøre mere af det gode arbejde vi gør. Så det gik vi i gang med og det er faktisk lykkes med GFU og få øget finansieringen. I 2000, tror jeg det var, havde vi en omsætning på 21 millioner kroner i GFU og i 2006 havde vi en på 55 millioner kroner. Det er gået ret kraftigt fremad. Det vi bringer til huset udgør ca. 13% af FKN’s budget.

SH:På jeres hjemmeside i årsrapporten står der 13% ud for EU, men dertil kommer vel også andre donorer?

ADJ:Ja der er også andre internationale donorer. Men det er fordi at GFU har indtil nu haft størst succes med EU så det er der vi får 95-98% af vores penge fra. Der hvor der er nogen der får nogle penge fra andre internationale donorer, det er dem i HMA fordi de får til minerydning så de har været i stand til at tiltrække finansiering fra specialiserede ’backdonor’ agencies, sådan nogle som hollændernes udviklingsmidler de giver noget, finnerne gør også, der er FN agencies som direkte går i, UNMAS og sådan noget der og giver til minerydning. Så det er på den måde , altså man kan sige, de har faktisk ikke skrabet særligt meget ind fra EU men fra alle mulige andre internationale donorer hvorimod vi har fået dem fra EU.

Så vores overordnede formål det er at søger for at vi har en øget finansiering og så også en diversificeret funding base. Og det vi gør egentlig her, vi er med til at sørge for at finde et match mellem vores partnere, deres projekter og vores programtyper og så det internationale donorer gerne vil finansiere. Så det er ikke så meget at vi, altså den der ide om at vi går hen til nogle donorer og prøver at få dem til at vise interesse for lige præcis det vi arbejder med hvis ikke det er sådan at de allerede har det som en prioritet. Altså det spilder vi egentlig ikke særlig meget tid på. Vi gør det egentlig den anden vej rundt og siger, jamen, hovedsageligt i hvert fald, vi undersøger hvad er det vi kan ude i de forskellige lande. Det gør vi sammen med vores regionale repræsentanter og deres program officerer og så de partnere de har. Så får vi lige som et billede. Vi har det der hedder funding action plans som simpelthen tilvejebringer sådan en oversigt over hvad er det for nogle programtyper vi arbejder med i det pågældende land. Det er så en af de her 5 eller 6 vi har helt overordnet. Hvad er det for nogle partnere, hvad er deres potentiale, hvad er deres styrker, hvad er deres svagheder, hvad for nogle af dem mener vi vil kunne være i stand til at trække finansiering fra de internationale donorer? Og det har jo selvfølgelig noget at gøre med hvad er deres kapacitet til at opsuge flere penge og administrere dem på forsvarligvis osv. Så får vi en ide om alt det der og så samtidig sige vi hvad er det for nogle donorer der er særlig interesseret i Malawi eller Zambia eller hvad det nu er

SH:Så går i ud og opsøger dem?

ADJ:

3

Ja altså før vi opsøger dem finder vi ud af, fordi mange af dem jo har altså en del offentlighed omkring hvad det er de vil finansiere, og så prøver vi at finde ud af hvad er det vi skal gå efter, hvor giver det mest mening. Der kan man sige sådan helt overordnet set EU er nogen af de mest åbne omkring hvad det er de vil støtte, hvad det er for nogle budget linier de har, og hvor det er der er mulighed for NGO’er at få fat i pengene. Det er faktisk meget sværere med en række af de andre.

Men det er sådan det vi gør overordnet set. Så står der noget om hvor mange vi er og sådan noget. Så får vi faktisk også nogle lokalt ansatte ude på vores kontorer. Vi har lige ansat 5 nye Global Funding Officers i Nepal, Bangladesh, Indien, Uganda og Honduras.

SH:Altså lokale – ikke danskere?

ADJ:Nemlig. Men som så arbejder tæt sammen med os der sidder her, men tilhører et regionalt kontor.Vi er simpelthen værkstedet for udarbejdelse af projektforslag og også til et vist omfang administration af dem. Men mere og mere af det bliver lagt ud til regional kontorerne fordi at vi, altså volumen af det her, sidste år sendte vi 55 ansøgninger ind. Så det vil sige at vi sender i hvert fald i gennemsnit en ansøgning ind om ugen og så mange er vi jo heller ikke her. Altså hvis man skulle forestille sig at vi skulle skrive det fra A-Z, det kan vi ikke. Vi skriver dem sammen med vores partnere og sammen med vores folk på regional kontorerne, men det er os der har den tekniske ekspertise til at sikre os at det bliver gjort på den måde det skal - i forhold til donorernes krav osv. Så man kan sige at vores involvering i selve det at formulere et projektforslag det varierer fra det ene ekstrem hvor vi er meget meget involveret hvor vi tager nogle Global Funding Officers herfra og sender dem en tur ud på regional kontorerne, sammen med partnerne, og holder en design workshop, følger, der er sådan nogle projekt design værktøjer, project cycle management og logical framework approach og sådan noget som EU også går meget op i. Så det går vi ud og gør sammen med partnerne og regional kontoret, og det er meget intensivt og det er meget dyrt – både i forhold til at rejse og tiden der bliver brugt osv. Det er det ene ekstrem. Det andet ekstrem er at vi egentlig er involveret meget mindre fordi vi har at gøre med nogle partnere som rent faktisk godt kan finde ud af at udfylde de her formater og designe projekterne, og i samarbejde med vores kontor faktisk kommer op på noget som er 60-70% i orden. Så det er sådan de ekstremer der er.

Så giver vi en masse træning til vores egne folk og til vores partnere omkring især ECHO og EuropeAid regler. Vi har et helt træningsmodul som vi har udviklet omkring det her af sådan en 2-3 dages varighed for hver. Og så er der selvfølgelig sådan noget kapacitetsopbygning af dem der er ansat på vores regional kontorer og vores partnere fordi man kan ikke – altså en ting er at gå på et kursus og så lære noget om det her i form af træning, men noget andet er at sætte sig ned og virkelig arbejde med det, og det er den sidste måde hvorpå man virkelig lære hvordan man skal gøre det.

Så gør vi det netop ikke alene. Vi får teknisk input eller samarbejde med de her HMA folk, med regional kontorerne og partnerne, og de her ProLog’er også med hele indkøbsplanen osv. Så er der de der PDU’er, altså Programme technical advisors inden for de forskellige programtyper. Hvis vi skal sende en fødevarersikkerhedsansøgning ind så har vi fat i

4

fødevarersikkerhedseksperten der går med ind og er med til at designe projektet og giver råd og vejledning. Så har vi selvfølgelig finansfolkene i forhold til budgetter og sådan noget, og så er der Relief hvis det er et katastrofeprojekt.

Her er nogle basis tal. 45 ansøgninger i 2006. 11 millioner euro i godkendte kontrakter, altså værdien af kontrakterne, det er ikke det samme som omsætningen fordi nogle af kontrakterne er jo over 3-4-5 år, så det er to forskellige måde at regne det ud på. Så er her noget med hvor succesfulde er vi. Når det kommer til ansøgningerne til ECHO – til katastrofe bistand – så er det ca. 75% af alle de ansøgninger vi sender ind der bliver godkendt, hvorimod ved EuropeAid er det kun måske 20-30-35%, vores rate er på vej op. Vi bliver bedre og bedre, heldigvis. Vi spilder ikke så meget tid på ansøgninger der ikke bliver godkendt. Her kan du se de lande vi er i for øjeblikket med ECHO projekter. DIPECHO det er jo det der hedder Disaster Preparedness under ECHO. Katastrofe forebyggelsesprojekter.

Her er det mere sådan teknisk projekt formulering, hvordan er det vi gør det. Det kan du jo bare læse. Hvad gør vi når vi implementerer, osv. Ja, det var kort fortalt.

SH:Jeg vil gerne starte med at høre hvor meget indvirkning det her for jeres arbejde og jeres projekter at i som Folkekirkens Nødhjælp har fundering i Kristendommen?

ADJ:Vi er ikke missionerende. Vi har en kirkelig baggrund i det danske kirkelige bagland. Med vores samarbejdspartnere sådan på europæisk plan er vi en del af det kirkelige netværk – det økumeniske samarbejde, så vores søsterorganisationer er sådan nogle som svensk FKN, norsk FKN, finsk FKN osv. Når det kommer til partnerne så fordi vi har den her kirkelige baggrund så er vores naturlige samarbejdspartnere, men ikke eksklusivt, er lokale kirker eller kirkelige organisationer. Og en af de store fordele vi har, er at hvis du kigger på kirken som organisation så er den ekstrem vidt forgrenet og når ud alle steder. Hvis vi tager Afrika er der jo ingen landsby uden at der er en kirke. Så er spørgsmålet om de alle sammen er i stand til at, hvad skal man sige, at udfører udviklingsarbejde og katastrofearbejde. Det er så en anden sag. Men alt andet lige, hvis man sagde at det der netværk det fungerede optimalt så er vi world wide og er helt ude på græsrodsniveau. Vi er helt der ude hvor befolkningen er, de fattigste af de fattigste. Men det er én måde at arbejde på, det er gennem de der kirkelige organisationer, hvor en del af dem har jo sådan en, hvad skal man sige, et departement, en fløj, eller en afdeling eller hvad man nu vil kalde det som arbejder med udvikling og katastrofehjælp. Så dem arbejder vi med, det er vores naturlige partnere. Men derudover arbejder vi også med det der hedder sekulære partnere og de fylder efterhånden mere tror jeg. Jeg er ikke lige klar over hvad fordelingen er, men rigtig mange af dem vi arbejder med det er almindelige sekulære partnerorganisationer.

SH:Så det er ikke noget der går ind og påvirker hvilke projekter i vælger?

ADJ:

5

Nej. Altså, man kan sige vi har historisk set har vi en baggrund i det her og et langvarigt samarbejde med kirkelige organisationer i forskellige udviklingslande. Så det er historisk og naturligt dem vi arbejder sammen med, men ikke kun dem. Altså, i Bangladesh er vi for eksempel og de er jo muslimer. Der er det der hedder Christian Commission for Development in Bangladesh, dem samarbejder vi også med, men det er ikke dem vi giver særlig mange penge. Vi giver dem i stedet til en organisation som hedder Rangpur Dinajpur Rural Service (RDRS) som er en muslimsk, eller den er jo ikke specielt muslimsk, det er jo bare en Bangladeshisk organisation, og de er tilfældigvis muslimer og ligesådan til Cambodja, de er Buddhister hele dyngen, Der er faktisk næsten ikke nogen kristne organisationer. Dem der er, de er så missionerende og dem har vi ikke noget med at gøre. Så der implementere vi igennem lokale partnere som ikke er specielt buddhistiske, men det er nu engang bare den religion der er der.

SH:Så i forhold til samarbejdet med EU er det ikke noget der giver problemer?

ADJ:Nej EU vil ikke samarbejde med organisationer der er missionerende. Altså hvis de vil samarbejde med dem er det i hvert fald noget med at der skal være et klart skil i mellem hvilken del af jeres operation er missionerende og hvilken er ikke, og de vil ikke på nogen måde finansiere den del som er missionerende. Og det er vi ikke. Vi har aldrig haft problemer at skulle forklare det på nogen vis. Vi kunne også godt hedde noget andet.

SH:Jeg kunne ikke lige se hvor længe i har samarbejdet med EU.

ADJ:Jeg ved ikke hvornår den første kontrakt er fra. Jeg har siddet og arbejdet med det her siden år 2000, og har faktisk kun arbejdet med det lige siden. Jeg tror den kontrakt jeg har set der går længst tilbage er fra 1993 eller sådan et eller andet – 1995 måske. Altså ECHO blev jo først etableret i 1996, så det har været EuropeAid vi har fået nogle penge fra, som ikke engang eksisterede dengang så det har nok været det der hedder DGdevelopment som også stadigvæk eksisterer.

SH:Har i kunne mærke noget til den større rolle NGO’er og civil society har fået med Cotonou Aftalen hvor der specifikt står at civil society skal have en større rolle.

ADJ:Det kan jeg ikke sige, altså det har jeg ikke været med længe nok til. Det jeg kan sige er at vi får penge igennem det som er en del af Cotonou Aftalen som er European Development Fund hvor der ligger jeg ved ikke hvor mange milliarder. Nu er de i gang med den 10. development fund og under den 9. har vi fået penge til fødevaresikkerhedsprojekt i Malawi. Og vi vil også søge fremover. Og jeg ved at mange af vores søster organisationer, blandt andet en stor hollandsk organisation som hedder ICCO fik en kontrakt under EDF på Madagaskar til 3 millioner euro til et vandprojekt. De har EDF hvis du går ind kan du se har de forskellige faciliteter, der er noget der hedder vand og energi og skov elle forest osv. Der er en del af de

6

linier, dem NGO’erne kan gå ind og søge. Men det er sådan de formaliserede i forhold til Calls for Proposals.

SH:Er det så ikke igennem EuropeAid når det er EDF man får det fra?

ADJ:Jo fordi det er EuropeAid der sidder og administrere det alligevel, ja både og. Det er en længere historie. De midler vi har fået fra european development fund i Malawi det er et call for proposal som blev offentliggjort af delegationen i Malawi, men hvor der står at dette er penge som egentlig administreres af de malawianske myndigheder. Så det de har gjort er at de har taget en del af den EDF bevilling der er til Malawi og så har de sagt at ca. 95 % går direkte ind i de forskellige ministerier i Malawi, til hvad end de nu er blevet enige om. Men så er der en lille slat tilbage som de siger, der vil vi gerne køre call for proposal til NGO’erne, civilsamfundet, og det er ikke os, vi vil ikke administrere dem. Men det er et særligt kontor der hedder NAO, National Authorising Office tror jeg det er, som er sådan et liaison office som den nationale myndighed opretter for at tilfredsstille EU for at sige jamen vi opretter et særligt kontor som tager sig af forvaltningen af de kontrakter der bliver indgået under det her. Så sidder de, EU delegationen og der her NAO kontor, og hjælper hinanden og holder lidt øje med hinanden. Så vores kontrakt der er faktisk skrevet under af NAO og jeg mener også vi får pengene udbetalt af den malawianske nationalbank, men det er jeg ikke helt sikker på. Men ideen er i det at det er nogle penge EU har aftalt med ACP landene at de skal gå til de her lande og så er der en eller anden nærmere fordeling, men så har EU sagt, vi synes det er en god ide at noget af det går til civilsamfundet igennem calls for proposals. Så kan det også godt være at der er en anden del af EDF’en der også går til civilsamfundet, det kan godt være de siger i jeres bevilling til Malawi at en del af EDF’en skal gå til jeres ’what ever’ ministerium som så kanalisere ud til civilsamfundsorganisationer, det ved jeg ikke, men det kan sagtens være.

SH:Så noget helt andet. Hvad ser du som hovedgrunden til at finansiere NGO’er sådan generelt inden for udviklingsarbejde? Hvad er det i kan bidrage med, som man ikke kan gennem EU eller staten for den sags skyld?

ADJ:Ja det er jo en længere historie. Det er der jo skrevet afhandlinger om, og vi har skrevet sider om det herfra også. Vi er jo en del af det der hedder Concord som er et paneuropæisk netværk som en tæt dialog med Kommissionen om hvad er netop civilsamfundets rolle osv. Men ganske kort fortalt så spiller vi en rolle. Man kan sige vi spiller en rolle her i nord og vi spiller en rolle i syd som international organisation, men så er der jo selvfølgelig også de lokale organisationer så man skal lige gøre klart hvem der er man snakker om. Men os, vores rolle i nord, er en del af et velfungerende demokrati hvor borgerne har retten til fri forsamling og ytringsfrihed og interessegrupper og til at etablere sig osv. Der spiller vi jo en stor rolle som, ikke nødvendigvis en modvægt til staten, folkelig forankring. Hvis du ser DANIDA hvad de måler os på så er det jo også, man skal have en rammeaftale med dem – hvad er jeres folkelig forankring? I hvilket omfang bygger i egentlig på et ønske og en involvering af befolkningen her og at vi varetager deres interesser. Man kan sige det er sådan det helt politiske, hvorfor skal vi være der, det er én ting og det kan du egentlig spørge nogen om der er meget bedre til

7

at svare på end jeg er. Men ud fra et andet synspunkt, som vil være, hvem er mest effektive i at sørge for at vi skaber udvikling eller at hjælpen når frem, der mener jeg at vi kan argumentere for at vi er på i hvert fald nogle punkter bedre til at sikre det end for eksempel statslige institutioner er. Hvis du forestiller dig EU sagde i stedet for at give noget overhovedet igennem civilsamfundsorganisationer, hvad enten det er i syd eller nord, eller international eller lokalt. Det gider vi ikke, vi kanaliserer det hele igennem de statslige myndigheder i de lande vi samarbejder med. Hvad er så deres garanti for at de rent faktisk når ud og når målgruppen i sidste ende? Altså noget af det når, men altså, korruption i de forskellige regimer og stater og ineffektivitet osv. Der tror jeg nok, det er jeg ret overbevist om, at det kan vi sagtens dokumentere, at det er vi i stand til at gøre. Om vi så er bæredygtige på langt sigt, det er en anden sag. Det bidrager vi også til med vores arbejde at gøre stater ansvarlige i forhold til deres befolkning, at det er rent faktisk dem der burde påtage sig den her opgave og ikke os. Altså hele den der service delivery debat om vi skal gøre det eller ej, det burde vi da ikke gøre, det burde da være de statslige myndigheder som sørgede for at passe på deres egen befolkning og sørgede for at de fik til dagen og vejen og de var beskyttede mod overfald og krig og trusler af den ene eller den anden art. Men når de nu ikke gør det, i hvert fald ikke på kort sigt, så mener vi godt at der er en rolle vi kan spille der, og vi spiller den faktisk bedre end nogle af de andre kanaler man har. Ikke at man ikke skal give noget til de andre, men det er måske meget godt at vise at man kan nå det her på to måder. Jeg er også sikker på at det er det EU gør med os nogle gange, det er også derfor de ser vores, hvad kan man sige, komparative fordele, det er da også at de kan måske hive os op som et eksempel i forhold til andre, statslige myndigheder osv. Prøv nu at se der, landbrugsudvikling, eller hvad det nu er, det kan rent faktisk godt lade sig gøre, hvordan kan det være at jeres landsbrugsministerium, jeres extension office system osv. at i aldrig når ud til de her stakkels bønder, men det gør de her organisationer. Så begynder de selvfølgelig at sige at de får også mange flere penge, og det koster også meget mere på beneficiary og det ene og det andet. Jo jo, men alligevel.

I virkeligheden burde du snakke med vores internationale direktør Christian Friis om hvad vores eksistensberettigelse og hvorfor vi mener vi er bedre til at gøre det. Ikke at det jeg har sagt ikke passer, fordi det gør det, men han kan uddybe det noget mere. Det kunne være godt for dine kilder til dit speciale.

SH:Hvorfor har EU et ønske om at have så meget kontrol med finansieringen som de tilsyneladende har? Er det efter din mening nødvendigt at have et system som er som komplekst og kontroleret?

ADJ:Der er jo mange aspekter af det her. Det her er et eksempel på en manual som EU har udarbejdet og som de kvit og frit og gladelig deler ud og som vi faktisk bruger og som vi formentlig også ville have brugt selvom EU ikke havde været der. Det her er project cycle management, det er egentlig hvordan er det du designer projekter og hvordan gennemføre du projekter på en logisk hensigtsmæssig rationel måde med det ene formål, der er måske mere end et, men der er i hvert fald ét hovedformål og det er at sikre sig at man når, hvad kan man sige, modtagerne og levere de resultater man har…

SH:

8

Altså effektivitet?

ADJ:Ja altså på engelsk er der jo to, der er både efficiency og så er der effectiveness. På dansk har vi kun effektivitet, men så har vi omkostningseffektivitet også. Så et det er, når du de mål du har sat dig for og gør du det på den mest omkostningseffektive måde. Og det er sådan et værktøj som vi bruger og som giver ganske god mening i forhold til at være sikker på at man gør det man har sat sig for og at man gør det på den mest hensigtsmæssige måde. Og det har vi overhovedet ikke noget imod, altså som sagt, hvis ikke EU havde udviklet det her, og det er faktisk ikke dem selv der har gjort det, altså de har tilpasset det, men det stammer faktisk – LFA (logical framework approach) og alt det sjov – det stammer fra det amerikanske militær i sin tid, en måde at planlægge tingene på. Jamen så ville vi gøre det alligevel langt hen af vejen, men man kan sige at EU de er dem der stiller de største krav, i hvert fald af dem jeg kender til, nu har vi ikke, vi mangler stadig at få hul på amerikanerne USAID og sådan noget der. Vores HMA folk de får penge fra State Department for eksempel. Amerikanerne skulle være ligeså forhippede og stringente på det her som EU er, endda måske mere. Men det er de meget interesseret i, og vi synes det giver god mening, og vi kan, altså GFU’er excellerer i den slags retningslinier og, hvad kan man sige, værktøjer til at designe projekter og selvfølgelig også når de så er godkendt og sørge for at de bliver implementeret på bedst mulig vis. Og så er der også noget omkring gennemskuelighed, fordi hvis du gør det på den her måde så er det faktisk ikke så svært at forstå hvad det hele går ud på og hvad det er der skal til og hvorfor har man – altså hvorfor ser budgettet ud som det gør, jamen det er fordi aktivitetsplanen er sådan og sådan og det er fordi man skal nå de og de resultater. Så det giver sådan set udmærket mening. Så er der selvfølgelig nogle ting som de kommer med EU som vi er trætte af, som vi synes simpelthen er for meget – for eksempel deres skrappe regler med hensyn til hvad du må flytte fra én budgetlinie til en anden budgetlinie inde i et budget. Men der er også forskel, ECHO er meget meget liberale, meget fleksible og EuropeAid er noget mere stringente. EuropeAid har det problem at de, ud over de regler der er udstukket fra Bryssel kan være mere eller mindre strikse på en uhensigtsmæssig måde, det er nu ikke så meget af det, men der kan godt være lidt, så har de det problem at de har jo dekoncentreret til delegationerne. De kalder det nemlig dekoncentreret. Men det der er sket er at hvert enkelt kontor, altså hver enkelt delegation har jo faktisk fået beslutningskompetence. Så det vil sige at når de sidder med de her regelsæt, generel condition og hvad det nu ellers er der gør sig gældende for de forskellige projekter. Der står det hele i den her Practical Guide to contract procedures for EC external actions, det er simpelthen retningslinierne. Og så er der jo sådan en stak bilag til her. Det der er sket fordi de er dekoncentreret er at delegation fordi de har fået beslutningskompetencen og dermed også til dels bevillingsmyndigheden, så har de også fået autoriteten til at være dem som siger, altså dem som egentlig fortolker reglerne og siger hvordan de skal forstås og gennemføres. Og det betyder at de ikke bliver gennemført ens. Hvis du har snakket med delegationen i Dakar så siger de én ting, men delegationen i Malawi siger noget andet. Og det gør livet vanskeligt for os, der var det nemmere hvis det hele havde været centraliseret i Bryssel. EU Kommissionen kalder det dekoncentrering og vi kalder det decentralisering. Det er to forskellige betegnelser. Det gør det meget i. Hvis man kommer til at sige decentralisation så siger de no no no its deconcentration. Det er faktisk fordi de har haft delegationerne derude før, men delegationerne har ikke haft samme status som de har i dag. Nu har de fået en status at de netop har kompetencen på en lang række områder og det havde de ikke før. Det er det der er den store forskel mellem ECHO og EuropeAid. Den måde ECHO opererer på, fordi de har også folk ude i felten, men de folk de har ude i felten de er

9

faktisk advisors til Bryssel og hvor beslutningskompetencen ligger i Bryssel. Så det vil sige når du har et katastrofeprojekt ude i felten og du går rundt og snakker med deres ECHO folk der hedder technical assistants, så skal man være klar over at de har faktisk ikke nogen beslutningskompetence. Deres formål det er at oplyse desk officers i Bryssel om sagens rette sammenhæng og så give en anbefaling af om man skal gøre det ene eller det andet, om man skal sige ja eller nej eller hvad det er, men det er faktisk i Bryssel beslutningen bliver truffet. Det er helt anderledes med delegationerne. Hos EuropeAid, når først noget er dekoncentreret og ligger ude hos delegationerne så er der ikke noget at rende til Bryssel med, så må du forholde dig til delegationen. Det man så kan gøre, det er fordi vi ved hvordan systemet det virker, så prøver vi nogle gange ad forskellige veje at få fat i dem i Bryssel og sige hallo hør her, den her delegation i Moskva, nu har de fundet på en eller anden skør idé om at de kræver det og det, kan det virkelig være meningen? Og så får vi nogle gange dem til at træde i karakter og henvende sig. Men det er vi heller ikke så glade for, fordi så nogle gange så bliver de jo sure på os ude i delegationerne, nå nu har DanChurchAid igen været i Bryssel og klage deres nød, kan i ikke godt holde op med det fordi vi ved nok hvordan vi skal gøre tingene her i Rusland.

SH:Du siger at i langt hen af vejen er meget godt tilfreds med de her retningslinie fordi de gør det mere praktisk?

ADJ:Ja altså overordnet set. Jeg kan sagtens påpege ting vi ikke er tilfreds med.

SH:Hvad så når de ændre procedurer og retningslinier? Altså, en ting er at i er tilfredse med det, men er det også noget i er nød til at følge op på? Jeg var inde og se på for eksempel jeres kriterier for evaluering og monitorering og de følger meget godt hvad EU kræver. Og det samme med at i skriver at i fokuserer på oplysning om årsagerne til fattigdom som også er en af EU prioriteter – altså awareness raising. Er det fordi i er enige i at det er det vigtige eller er det fordi man er nødt til at følge trop for at passe ind i forhold til hvem de gerne vil bruge penge på.

ADJ:Nogle gange kan de kræve at der skal være en evaluering, men det er nu sjældent der står det i call for proposal at der skal være evaluering i guidelinies’ene. Men man kan sige at hvis du skriver en evaluering ind så har EU en ide om terms of reference for evaluering. Hvis ikke de skriver dem for dig, og det gør det faktisk ikke mener jeg. ECHO har faktisk et blueprint for terms of reference, både for revision og for evaluering som vi så egentlig siger ja til, og det har vi heller ikke noget problem med. Og det de også kræver når det er sådan at du skal gennemføre evalueringen det er at de får lov til at se endelige terms of reference. Jeg kan ikke huske om de også har noget at skulle have sagt i forhold til hvem man udpeger til at evaluere. Det tror jeg faktisk ikke at de har. Men det er rigtig, de har noget at skulle have sagt i forhold til hvordan du udarbejder terms of reference for evaluering, hvad det er du skal kigge på og at de skal også høres osv. Men det er også dem der betaler for det, så.

Men i forhold til det du nævnte med public awareness og development education, det er jo simpelthen en separat budgetlinie de har. Det er jo ligesom DANIDA’s oplysningsbevilling de

10

havde i gamle dage hvor vi fik en masse penge for at lave oplysningsarbejde. Hvis du går ind og se FKN’s vedtægter og hele grundlag, så står der også deri at en vigtig ting vi skal gøre, det er vi skal oplyse danskerne om forholdene i tredje verdenslande og årsager til sult og fattigdom osv., for at påvirke folks holdninger og gøre dem solidariske og tænke på deres næste. Så det falde jo udmærket sammen, og der er en budgetlinie som vi har søgt nogle gange. Og ellers så ligger der jo inde i en hver kontrakt det som hedder visibility, det er jo lidt en anden ting. Det er EU's krav om at vi oplyser, hvad kan man sige, modtagerne af hjælp eller af projektet, dem der drager nytte af det, om hvor pengene kommer fra. Men også nogle gange benytter lejligheden til at oplyse i Danmark om hvad det er vi gør. Der er det jo tit og ofte, i hvert fald når det kommer til ECHO, så er det en forhandling fra gang til gang om, hvad synes de, hvad har de en interesse i og hvad er rimeligt. Skal vi sende en journalist og en fotograf med ned til det her katastrofeprojekt i Indien som kan lave nogle artikler som vi offentliggøre på vores egen medier. Vi har jo medlemsblad, vi har hjemmeside og nyhedsbreve og det ene og det andet, og så få dem afsat til internationale medier og lokale medier. Det forhandler vi fra gang til gang med EU. EU har jo krav om at der skal stå at, altså hvis vi går ud og fortæller et eller andet om det her katastrofeprojekt som vi implementerer i Indien efter tsunamien med penge fra ECHO, så skal det fremgå i vores kommunikation at vi har fået penge fra ECHO. Og der er en hel manual der fortæller lige præcis hvordan er det man skal gøre når det drejer sig om det, og det har vi egentlig ikke noget problem med. Det her er faktisk EU’s visibility guidelines, det er på udviklingsprojekter, så har ECHO også en som er på katastrofeprojekter som siger nogenlunde det samme.

Altså det der irritere os nogle gange det er at de tidligere tider har været ret forhippet på det der med at EU’s logo skulle på hver enkelt spand og spade og pumpe og hvad nu ellers vi udleverede osv. Men det er jo fordi EU bruger lidt samme argumentation som vi gør, altså det er et spørgsmål om at øge de europæiske befolkningers bevidsthed om at vi har en rolle at spille her. Også selvfølgelig at Kommissionen gør det, at de bruger nogle penge på det, at det er deres penge de bruger. Så det er jo transparency og accountability. Hør her, i betaler alt det her til EU, men vær klar over at vi er faktisk den største. Jeg tror ECHO er den største enkelte bidragsyder til humanitær bistand overhovedet. Og der er næsten ikke nogen der ved det i EU. Hvis du går ud og spørger en almindelig dansker på gaden hvem er ECHO, så ved de det ikke. Og det er lidt synd for dem faktisk, jeg kan godt forstå dem. Jeg synes bare der hvor vi har et problem med dem det er når de ligesom stopper alt for mange hatte og T-shirts og hvad det ellers er ned i halsen på os. Men vores holdning er lidt ’get over and done with it’, der er så mange dele af det der visibility som er interessante.

SH:Jeg vil gerne spørge dig, som vi også snakkede om i telefonen, nu du sidder i bestyrelsen for den danske NGO platform, hvilken mulighed i har for at påvirke beslutningsprocessen i EU. Altså som jeg ser det kan der være to områder i kan påvirke. Det ene kan være mængden af midler der bliver tildelt humanitære områder og det andet er hvilken politik man fører på området.

ADJ:Ja, men også forvaltningen af dem. En ting er hvor mange penge skal der være, hvilke områder skal de være til, men hvordan skal man så administrere dem. Det er jo alt det her med de forskellige regelsæt der er for hvordan du udfører arbejdet – hvad siger kontrakterne egentlig?

11

SH:Du snakkede også om at i ikke selvstændigt, altså FKN, lobbyer hos EU. At det gør i igennem netværket. Men har man så, altså i gør det igennem den danske platform som så igen gør det igennem Concord?

ADJ:Ja, det kan man sige. Nu er det sådan at den danske EU-NGO platform, dens bestyrelse, der er FKN en del af den. Og det er mig der er FKN’s repræsentant. Den danske EU-NGO platform indstiller så medlemmer til de forskellige udvalg i Concord, og der er en lang række udvalg. Der er et af dem der hedder funding for development and relief, som er det udvalg – der så har endnu en række udvalg under – som hovedsageligt kigger på hele funding aspektet af midler fra EU til udviklingsorganisationer. Splittet er lavet sådan at det som hedder VOICE tager sig af det humanitære og Concord tager sig af det udviklingsmæssige. Så der er sådan to hovednetværk. Så jeg sidder for den der danske EU-NGO platform som repræsentant i Concord. Så når jeg sidder nede i Concord og snakker og jeg er til møder med EU så har jeg egentlig to kasketter på. Jeg har en kasket på der hedder at jeg repræsenterer den danske EU-NGO platform, men alle ved godt at jeg kommer fra DanChurchAid, og jeg repræsenterer også DanChuchAid. Jeg samler selvfølgelig et mandat fra EU-NGO platformens medlemmer, hvor du har Røde Kors og Dansk Flygtningehjælp, og MS og IBIS og alle de andre der. Og vi bliver enige at vores holdning til det her er sådan og sådan.

SH:Altså i har en eller anden form for fælles dagsorden?

ADJ:Netop.

Jeg kan give dig et konkret eksempel på hvordan det kan lade sige gøre at påvirke noget hvis du vil have et. Der er det her som hedder Development Co-operation Instrument, altså EU’s generelle budget, i forhold til udvikling og andet samarbejde. Der er også et andet instrument som hedder Industrialised Co-operation Instrument. Dengang at Kommissionen skulle lægge nyt budget for 2007-2013, der fik Kommissionen den geniale ide at de ville lægge de to instrumenter sammen. Så det vil sige at du blandede, hvad skal man sige, industristøtte til Syd Korea og Thailand, eller hvad det nu er for nogle lande – altså mellemindkomstlandene faktisk. Det blandede du sammen med bistandshjælp til Bangladesh og Laos og fattige afrikanske lande. Og det var vi overhovedet ikke interesseret i fordi – altså, de prøvede på at simplificere antallet af budgetlinier. Men vi havde ikke nogen interesse i det fordi det ville blive kommissærernes, nærmest deres egen diskretion at flytte rundt på budgettet inden for de her instrumenter. Så det vil sige lige pludselig kunne de begynde at vægte, at vi vil meget hellere det her industrialised co-operation end vi vil development co-operation. Så derfor arbejdede vi meget intenst på at vi fik skilt de to instrumenter af igen. Og det gjorde vi på fineste vis gennem Concord og den måde det fungerede på det var. De forskellige EU-NGO platforme de havde samlet set en mening som de kanaliserede ind i Concord. Altså, Concord har jo ikke en mening for sig selv, ikke andet end at der sidder nogle eksperter som kan oplyse en sag, men de får dem jo af deres mandat af de her medlemmer. Medlemmerne sagde, nej vi synes også det her er en dårlig ide, lad være med det. Det blev først direkte ind til EuropeAid – hold op med det der. Og der er jo der kommissærerne sidder. Samtidig med gik de

12

forskellige nationale platforme i gang med at bearbejde deres udenrigsministeriers repræsentanter. Hvert udenrigsministerium har sådan set udpeget en repræsentant som tager til Bryssel og sidder på medlemsstaternes niveau. Der er en komite og den eksistere i dag – development co-operation committee tror jeg det er. Så der begyndte man at påvirke alle medlemsstaternes repræsentanter i forhold til Kommissionen og sige, hallo synes i det er nogen god ide? For eksempel danskerne synes ikke det var nogen god ide, det synes de ikke man skulle gøre. Det tredje var så at tage fat i Europaparlamentet fordi det nye budget for 2007-2013 som alle andre budgetter skal jo foreligges for Parlamentet, og der er en komite, udviklingskomite, development co-operation committee. Og der sidder jo parlamentariker inde som har en særlig interesse for det her felt. Og dem begyndte man så også at påvirke, det gjorde man både fra de nationale platforme i forhold til at de vidste at vi har et dansk eller et spansk eller et engelsk medlem. Samtidig med at Concord også fordi de her parlamentariker er jo i Bryssel kunne sådan mere direkte gå ind og påvirke den vej. Så det er hele vejen rundt pegede alle på Kommissionen og sagde til dem i skal skille de her to instrumenter af, og til sidst gjorde de det altså.

Hvis ikke det havde været for vores evne til at organisere os og påvirke osv. så var vi bare blevet dikteret og måtte have taget til efterretning at sådan var det. Jeg tror ikke nødvendigvis at medlemsstaterne havde fanget det her selv. Det skal man jo også være klar over, at det her fylder meget for os og vi kan det her rigtig rigtig grundigt kan man sige. Det kan de ikke nødvendigvis over i UM fordi der er det en enkelt fuldmægtig som har det som en del af en meget større portfølge. Vi er jævnligt over og snakke med UM’s repræsentanter og oplyse omkring hvad er NGO’ernes holdning til det her.

SH:Komme med ekspertviden?

ADJ:Ja det kan man godt sige. De spørger også ind til os hvordan var det lige med det og det og hvordan kan det være og hvad synes i om det. Det er et meget meget fint samarbejde.

SH:Det er meget interessant at det ikke bare går den ene vej. At i har mulighed for at påvirke.

ADJ:Ja altså det har vi, men man skal ikke overdrive. Vi har lige nu nogle store problemer i forhold til de her tematiske instrumenter. Der er det geografiske instrument – development co-operation instrument – og så er der forskellige tematiske også, og der er for eksempel sådan noget som investing in people og European initiative and democracy osv. der er forskellige. Og for hvert af de instrumenter går de ind og siger hvor mange penge har vi, men de siger også hvad er vores prioriteter og hvad er vores implementeringsmodalitet, hvem er det egentlig vi vil give pengene til og hvordan gør vi det. Og der kan vi se at der er egentlig ret meget hvor man kan se at der står direct award. Det vil sige at de går ud Kommissionen direkte og tager fat i for eksempel hvis det er trafficing så tager de ILO – FN organisationen – og siger vi forhandler med jer, og der er kun jeg og så får i en kontrakt på 20 millioner euro eller hvor meget det nu er. Vi kan se at der er en tendens til at der bliver flere og flere af den slags. Det vil sige det som hedder calls for proposals, og det er der hvor NGO’erne traditionelt

13

går ind og får fat i pengene, det bliver mindre og mindre. Det prøver vi på igennem Concord og anden vis og påvirke. Men den er langt svære.

SH:Altså man kan påvirke de mindre sager?

ADJ:Nej det var en stor sag den der development co-operation og industrialised co-operation, at få skilt de to instrumenter af, det var en meget stor sag. Der var virkelig kul på fra alle sider, og det var noget NGO’erne satte sig totalt i hovedet. Det vil vi bare have skilt af det her. Også fordi de fandt ud af rimelig hurtigt at det var der faktisk også, hvad skal man sige, en forståelse for andre steder der hvor der var nogen der skulle kigge på det her og være med til at træffe beslutningerne. Men med det andet her bliver det nok lidt vanskeligere, men vi gør da stadig et forsøg. Og vi får da noget igennem, men ikke alt. Det er klart.

END

14

10.3 Annexe A3 Interview with Carsten Strandlod, Programme Officer – Global

Funding Unit, DanChurchAid (04.10.07)

SH = Simon HolmCS = Carsten Strandlod

SH:Allan snakkede lidt om i går at i havde ændret tilgang for nogle år siden hvor i gik fra at få 60 % fra DANIDA til at omlægge det.

CS:Ja, det var et stort bevist valg omkring at vi ønskede at være mindre afhængige af DANIDA’s bevilliger. Ikke fordi vi er utilfredse med DANIDA for den sags skyld, men fordi at med regeringsskiftet osv. mærkede vi lige pludselig hvordan det gjorde ondt at der blev skåret. Vi har jo ikke fået, altså midlerne ligger jo fastfrosset på et 2001 niveau, og det går ikke. Altså, så kan vi ikke udfører vores arbejde ordentligt, så derfor har vi simpelthen måtte sadle om og prøve at få yderligere midler andre steder fra.

SH:Det er meget interessant at i ikke bare er bevidste om det, men også arbejder aktivt for det.

CS:Det gør vi i høj grad. Både på det overordnede funding niveau, men også på det mere sådan programmæssige. Der skal man jo også gerne være med i det som rører sig, fordi ellers så bliver du jo også skåret yderligere på et eller andet tidspunkt, fordi hvis du ikke er med på bølgen af hvad der er i fokus i udviklingsverdenen så har man et problem, fordi så bliver du sorteret fra i diverse ansøgninger, og du bliver også sorteret fra på et tidspunkt fra Udenrigsministeriet fordi du ikke længere følger med. Så det er en stor udfordring.

SH:Nu er det lige EU der er fokus i mit speciale, men det kunne også have været relevant at se på jeres finansiering fra staten. I får jo stadig flere penge fra staten end i gør fra EU. Men EU har jo også nogle andre forhold til Afrika og Asien osv.

CS:Ja der er jo ikke nødvendigvis de samme nationale interesser som man kan se UM har. Selvom bistand per definition gives efter upartiskhed osv. så er det jo ikke sådan der foregår i virkeligheden. Altså, vi så ambassaden i Malawi blev lukket. Det var jo et klasse eksempel på at det var udenrigspolitik som styrede det.

SH:Der er vel også en politisk bevidsthed i EU om hvad man gør. Altså hvis man for eksempel ser på de forskellige tilgange til udviklingslandene gennem tiden.

CS:

1

Ja afgjort, det ser du jo også i de budgetlinier som de slår op, hvor du kan søge på. Altså de har jo nogle budgetlinier som definerer hvad det indsatsområderne skal være, og lige så snart de gør det har de jo også sagt hvad det er de synes der er vigtigt. Og i og med at de definerer prioriteterne inden for et call for eksempel, jamen så får du at vide at det er human rights det handler om og det er de her underpunkter. Og så allokere de jo midlerne efter hvordan de prioriterer de forskellige calls. Altså der er jo forskel på food security i Asien og i Afrika for eksempel. Så ja, det er da klart en bevist struktur der ligger bag det og den er jo også defineret politisk, dels af Kommissionen, men også af Parlamentet.

SH:Hvad er det du sidder og arbejder med?

CS:Jeg har siddet i GFU siden 1. januar 2004 og har de sidste to år været i Sri Lanka som decentraliseret medarbejder og dækket hele syd Asien og er i det tilfælde Sri Lanka, Indien, Bangladesh og Nepal, og det er en del af vores decentraliseringsstrategi, vores forsøg på at blive dygtigere og få flere kontrakter på bundlinien selvfølgelig. Nu sidder jeg stadig og dækker syd Asien, men er bare hjemme igen. Det har været en god oplevelse, det har virkelig også givet pote på at lære folk ude, på udesystemet, at kende, både på vores udekontorer men også på EU’s delegationer rundt omkring. Det er vigtigt at få en lidt nærmere kontakt til dem.

Rent arbejdsmæssigt sidder jeg og samarbejder meget med vores udekontorer om at udvikle nye ansøgninger. Jeg holder øje med hvilke calls der kommer, hvilke muligheder der er. Der kommer calls for propopals som det hedder udviklingsdelen, EuropeAid og så har vi den humanitære del som hedder ECHO. Der kommer ikke så ofte calls, der kommer nærmere uformelle diskussioner og man hører om at nu kommer der snart en beslutning om at give nogle penge til det pågældende land fordi der er en oversvømmelse for eksempel, eller en krigssituation eller et eller andet. Det et sådan noget man bliver informeret om gennem kontakt med den lokale delegation. Og der er vi en partner, vi har underskrevet deres Framework Partnership Agreement og lever op til de krav de har om de her ting. Det betyder vi har lov at søge på de finansielle beslutninger der bliver truffet, og det gør vi. Så udvikler vi ansøgninger i samarbejde med en lokal partner, hvis det passer ind i vores overordnede ideer og strukturer og programtilgang og sådan noget. Der er nogle gange hvor vi forsøger at omdefinere lidt sådan at vi kan få ansøgninger alligevel, fordi et eller andet sted så – selvom det ikke passer 100 % ind i programmet så vil vi gerne lave tingene alligevel – det skal jo gerne komme den endelige modtager til gode. Det behøver ikke altid at passe 100 % ind i vores program.

SH:Altså i hjælper de samme mennesker alligevel?

CS:Ja vi vil i hvert fald nødigt stå og sige beklager, vi kan godt se at det står slemt til i øjeblikket, men vi kan ikke hjælpe fordi det ligger lidt udenfor vores programfokus det her. Det kan vi ikke være bekendt synes vi. Så derfor mingelere vi altså lidt med de fokusområder der er. Og det er der lidt en slåskamp om en gang i mellem, men det er sådan det er.

SH:

2

Hvad er det for nogle niveauer i arbejder på? Altså EU har de her tre forskellige niveauer, projects, block grants og contract programmes. Er det oftest projekter i udfører?

CS:Det er oftest projekter ja, enkelt projekter. Vi søger oftest på et enkelt projekt af gangen. Altså de lancere et call for proposals, for eksempel på den gamle co-financing budget line, hvor man selv skal finansiere 25 % af det samlede beløb og så finansiere EuropeAid 75 %. Den er på jeg ved ikke hvor mange millioner euro, jeg tror det var på 155 sidst. Så det er en kæmpe stor budgetlinie. Der udvikler man en ansøgning og søger et bestemt beløb på ét projekt. Altså vi har lige fået en som handler om access to justice i Indien og den er ret spændende. Der tager du simpelthen og definere ét område sammen med én partnerorganisation. Vi bruger jo implementerende partnere. Og så i samarbejde med dem, så definerer man hvad er det vi gerne vil lave. Vi laver simpelthen et projekt og går ud og viser, eller definerer aktiviteter og mål og alt muligt. Og så sender man et helt forslag ind som er meget meget fyldestgørende. Og så bliver det nogle gange antaget. Så du har ét projekt. Altså, selvfølgelig så hører det projekt ind i et større program, men det er et DCA program som vi har defineret i det pågældende land for eksempel eller region. Det projekt er en del af programmet, så programmet kan sagtens være 5-6-8 projekter som tilsammen danner et program. Men vi kan ikke gå ind og søge til et helt program, det er som regel for stort og det er også for vanskeligt, fordi så vil der være for mange implementerende partnere og den geografiske spredning vil som regel blive for stor. Plus budgetmæssigt kan vi ikke søge penge nok til det.

SH: Jeg snakkede med Allan om det i telefonen og du nævnte det også lige, det her med at i er godkendte…

CS:Ja, det er under EU Kommissionens kontor for humanitær bistand som hedder DG ECHO. Man kan ansøge om at blive godkendt som organisation til at underskrive deres Framework Partnership Agreement som er en stor aftale med en masse masse regler og procedure og ting og sager som skal følges. Om dem skal vi bevise at vi er i stand til at følge og leve op til og sådan noget. Man skal have en høj revisionsstandart og alle mulige mærkelige ting. Der er en vis standart for omsætning. Altså et helt organisatorisk setup som passer til at vi er professionelle. Det er også sådan nogle ting som at man skal være registrerede og alle de der ting. Man skal så ikke lige være registrerede i Danmark. Der er sådan noget code of conduct og andre sager. Men der er man så registreret som en officiel FPA partner som det hedder og så har man så lov at søge hos Kommissionens humanitære kontor. Det har vi gjort masser af gange. Efter tsunamien søgte vi rigtig meget og fik også et par store bevillinger rundt omkring. De har de der faste samarbejdspartnere som de bruger meget til at implementere deres projekter fordi EU’s humanitære kontor er jo ikke implementerende i den forstand. De sender penge videre og det kan være til FN systemet eller til NGO’erne eller også til private firmaer som laver kontrakter – service kontrakter for eksempel.

SH:Men det vil sige man bliver godkendt på det man er? Altså det er ikke noget man kan gå på kompromis med?

CS:

3

Nej. Man bliver godkendt på baggrund af nogle helt faste procedure og de kan ikke fraviges. De er meget strikse hvad sådan nogle ting angår. Alt muligt, det skal være dine vedtægter og din omsætning, dine regnskabsprincipper og alle mulige ting. De skal køre helt efter bogen. Og der er ikke nogen mulighed for små underlige sideløsninger. Og det sker da også at organisationer bliver frataget deres aftaler. Det er primært hvis de ikke har været i stand til at leve op til de regler der er omkring procurement og regnskabsaflæggelse.

SH:Så vidt jeg kan se så er den her meget strikse tilgang fra EU meget generel. Om det er ECHO eller EuropeAid. Altså de stiller krav til evaluering og monitorering.

CS:Ja det gør det. Altså selve aftalen med ECHO den er helt fast. Og den kan du se på deres hjemmeside. Der står simpelthen hvordan man bliver partner og hvad man skal leve op til. Den er ikke til at forhandle om overhovedet. På EuropeAid siden kan alle søge hvis du er en NGO. Selvfølgelig bliver du vurderet. Altså hver gang du laver en ansøgning, så laver du en ordentlig tyk del af ansøgningen som består i at beskrive ansøgeren, hvor du skal fortælle om hvilke kontrakter du har fået inden for de sidste 3-4 år og hvordan og hvorledes din struktur er, hvordan bestyrelse og hvordan er din finansielle soliditet og alle sådan nogle ting. Plus du skal også beskrive på det projektspecifikke hvordan du har tænkt dig at evaluere og hvordan du har tænkt dig at monitorere osv. Men, selvfølgelig så er det altid de første kontrakter der er de sværeste at få, for lige så snart du har fået nogle har du jo også en track record et eller andet sted, som siger kørte det her godt eller hvordan. Altså har vi haft problemer med den her organisation.

SH:Altså du kan genbruge dine ansøgninger?

CS:Ja, ja, og det bliver man jo dygtig til, så ved du godt at din organisationsstrategi for eksempel, implementeringsstrategi, på det pågældende program, civic and political space for eksempel som er en af vores programtyper. Hvis vi har skrevet den godt 2 gange før, så genbruger vi selvfølgelig det og pudser det af hver gang. Men det er klart man bliver bedre til at – man ved hvordan de der ting skal formuleres og sådan noget. Men der er ikke nogen tvivl om at der skal supporting documents i et væk. De er så blevet lidt bedre til det efterhånden fordi hvis du har fået en kontrakt inden for de sidste par år, så behøver du ikke sende de samme former for dokumentation med hver gang fordi så har de dem liggende. Men altså, årsregnskab, vedtægter, bankoplysninger og reviderede regnskaber og sådan noget, det skal med det hele. De skal have det.

SH:Er det for at have kontrol med hvad i laver? Eller er det for at søge for effektivitet?

CS:Altså alle de der ekstra dokumenter osv. det er for at sikre sig imod svindel. Det er helt klart. Der er ikke noget de frygter mere.

SH:

4

De ved hvad pengene bliver brugt til?

CS:Ja, men også at de ved at den organisation de giver pengene til. Der er to dele i det, fordi det handler ikke lige umiddelbart om hvad vi bruger pengene til i det pågældende projekt. Det bliver der revideret og monitoreret på også fra EU delegationens side i det pågældende land. Det andet her handler om at vi som organisation skal vise at vi er en anstændig organisation der har orden i vores sager. Og det er jo på grund af at de tidligere har oplevet for mange sager hvor det blev givet til sådan lidt mere suspekte organisationer som ikke levede op til alle mulige gode måde at opfører sig på – code of conduct – og diverse standarter osv. som upartiskhed osv. som er den essentielle del af at være en ordentlig udviklingsorganisation.

SH:Men det må jo på en eller anden måde afholde mange mindre fra at komme ind? Altså hvis man ikke lige er en forholdsvis stor NGO som har apparatet.

CS:Det gør det også. Det gør det i høj grad også. De mellemstore danske organisationer, der er nogen af dem der har en ECHO aftale, altså en FPA agreement, men som ikke bruger den, og det er simpelthen fordi de synes det er for vanskeligt. Alle de regler og procedure der er omkring hvordan du skal udføre dine indkøbsfunktioner for eksempel. De synes det er for vanskeligt, og det er vanskeligt. Men det er også noget man skal sætte sig ned og lære, og det er svært i starten. Det er dødssvært simpelthen at sikre sig at man får gjort alt efter bogen og at man får den erfaring der skal til, fordi hvis man er en tilfældig lille mindre organisation i Danmark. ADRA for eksempel som er adventisternes nødhjælpsorganisation. Den er ikke særlig stor, det er sådan en af de der mellem organisationer der ligger i laget lige under rammebevillinger osv. Der er vel en 17-18 medarbejdere eller noget i den stil. De har en aftale, en FPA agreement, og så vidt jeg ved bruger de den ikke ret ofte, fordi det er vanskeligt. Der er også andre organisationer af den størrelse der, de har bare ikke resurserne til at sætte sig ned og fokusere tilpas meget på det her. Og jeg ved også fra os, vi har da også haft vanskeligt – altså ikke vanskeligheder – men i starten der var det sådan du ved at man famlede sig lidt frem. Hvad må vi gøre her og hvad må vi ikke gøre? Og indtil vi fik opbygget den erfaring og ekspertise jamen altså så var det yderst vanskeligt. Men det var et bevist sats og valg fra vores side.

Break - Change of battery CS:ECHO’s store FPA som definerer de der ting er faktisk lidt værre synes jeg. Også fordi per definition er der jo flere indkøbsaktiviteter i nødhjælpssituation. Et udviklingsprojekt, ja der vil også være motorcykler og nogle gange bygninger, men det er ikke helt lige så vanskeligt. Du har bedre tid til at gøre ting op osv. Men hvis du står for eksempel og skal lave – der skal leveres 10.000 tons ris eller sådan et eller andet. Det skal købes, og det har en værdi der er så stor at du er nød til at sende det i åbent international udbud. Så er der nogle helt specifikke regler for hvornår du ikke behøver den slags, hvis det nu er en stor nødhjælpssituation, altså en meget akut situation, så er der nogle undtagelser fra de regler. Og man skal bare have dem på fingerspidserne, fordi ellers så går det galt altså, og du skal have erfaring fra implementering i forvejen fordi det er ikke alt du kan læse dig til. Selvom de er meget

5

specifikke osv. så er det juristeri engang i mellem hvor de har taget forbehold for noget og hvor de ikke rigtig definere det fuldstændig osv. Selvfølgelig så har du nogle technical assistants folk som er fra ECHO som sidder på de lokale delegationer som du kan spørge til råds. Men ifølge vores erfaring er de ofte meget meget venlige og velinformerede og hjælpsomme og vil gerne det hele, men de er lidt for ofte i konflikt med hvad folkene i Bryssel siger. Og folkene i Bryssel har altså det afgørende ord i den situation. Plus at folkene der sidder i deres grants and contracts section, som er deres faglige juridiske og økonomiske eksperter eller hvad vi skal kalde dem, de sidder der og så nærlæser de et eller andet og så har de det afgørende ord. Så man står altid og ved ikke helt præcist hvem der kan sige god for et eller andet, og du får aldrig noget der er 100 % på skrift osv. Så du skal vide hvordan man går til det og det får du altså kun gennem erfaring.

SH:Hvordan er det sådan sammenlignet med at søge igennem DANIDA for eksempel? Altså der har man selvfølgelig sin rammeaftale.

CS:Ja, altså på rammeaftalen har vi jo et beløb som stilles til rådighed over de næste 5 år eller sådan et eller andet, og dem kan vi stort set bruge som vi har lyst til inden for de definerede aftaler. Det er os der bestemmer hvordan vi vil bruge dem. Selvfølgelig skal det falde indenfor de retningslinier vi har lagt planer for og delt med DANIDA. Men fordi vi har en rammeaftale betyder det at vi bliver betragtede som værende en af DANIDA’s faste samarbejdspartnere der kan de her ting. Altså vi har igen en proven track record, altså vi kan de her ting. Og det gør det bare nemmere for både os planlægningsmæssigt, og det gør det også nemmere for DANIDA, fordi de behøver ikke holde samme styr på de her ting som de gør med enkeltbevillingerne som de giver til de lidt mindre organisationer. Der skal jo rapporteres på hver enkelt bevilling osv. Vi skal rapportere på programniveau og ikke på projektniveau. Så det er væsentligt nemmere administrativt.

I forhold til EU projekter på udviklingssiden, jamen DANIDA er 100 gange nemmere. Der er ingen tvivl. Det er så meget nemmere. Men så er der den krølle på halen at fordi vi er begyndt at være ECHO FPA partner, de kræver i stigende omfang – det er ikke 100 % implementeret endnu, men de kræver det, at alt de indkøb vi fortager os lever op til de regler de har i ECHO projekter, uanset om det er ECHO projekter eller ej.

SH:Så også det i køber i DANIDA projekter?

CS:Også det vi køber for DANIDA pengene, eller vores – du kan sikkert godt huske vores ”gi en ged” projekt her før jul. Det skal leve op til samme standarter som et ECHO projekt i indkøb. Når vi skal købe nyt kopipapir her i huset skal det leve op til samme standarter. Hvilke jo er fint i en eller anden forstand fordi det er designet til at garantere højst mulig kvalitet for færrest mulige penge. Det er så ikke altid lige tilfældet, men idéen er der. Selvfølgelig skal ting da i udbud. Hvorfor skal vi købe det nede på hjørnet barer fordi vi har købt det hos ham de sidste 20 år? Han er ikke nødvendigvis den billigste. Og det har vi da et ansvar overfor. Det er jo ikke vores egne penge.

6

SH:Det er sjovt at se den her forskel i bureaukrati om man vil – det kommer det i hvert fald til at virke som om.

CS:Det kommer det nemt til at virke som om, men det er også meget tydeligt at der har været en kæmpe forskel fra da vi begyndte på de her ting. Der var jo stor intern modstand i huset mod at gøre det fordi det virkede besværligt og svært og uoverskueligt. Altså det var angstprovokerende for mange mennesker.

SH:DANIDA har vel også en fordel af at det er mere overskueligt i Danmark og at man har en anden kultur? Man kan sige at når EU gerne vil have kontrol for, for eksempel at undgå korruption og deslige, der har man måske en anden kultur i Danmark. At det ikke er lige så stort. Det er forskellige lande man har fat i.

CS:Jo, men hvorfor stiller de ikke krav, hvorfor stiller DANIDA ikke krav om det. Altså det synes jeg er noget man burde spørge lidt om, hvorfor stiller de ikke specifikke krav til din procurement. Altså det gør de måske ikke fordi – og her spekulere jeg lidt – det gør de måske ikke fordi de gerne vil have de helt små NGO’er med. Altså projektrådgivningen for eksempel, når ulandsforeningen ”svalerne” eller ”Ghanas venner” eller sådan et eller andet, når de skal søge om et projekt. De har så vidt jeg ved bestemt ikke kapacitet til og køre et procurement efter de store forkromede regler. Og de synes det er vigtig tror jeg at de små også er med.

SH:Det hænger vel også sammen med en dansk kultur om ikke altid at hænge sig så meget i regler når det drejer sig om de små. Og det kan være hvad som helst, om det er en fodboldklub der laver røde pølser eller…

CS:Ja, men det betyder også at du jævnligt får en sag hvor det er gået lidt skævt og det får du sjældent med EU sagerne, netop fordi der er så stort fokus på det. Altså vi bliver revideret i øjeblikket. Vi har 8 ECHO projekter der skal revideres i næste uge. Det er helt sygt, vi har brugt så meget tid på det. Vores finans folk og procurement folk og os, jeg ved ikke, der er brugt mindst et par årsværk allerede på at forberede det. Det koster.

SH:Har du mulighed for at fortælle om et projekt i har kørende? For at få et billede af hvordan det er det fungere. Et typisk projekt i har kørende, hvor i søger penge gennem EU og hvor i samarbejder med lokale partnere.

CS:Jo, det kan jeg godt. Altså igen der er to forskellige former, der er selvfølgelig udvikling og så er der humanitær bistand. På udviklingssiden der har vi jo etableret nogle langvarige partnerskaber med en masse organisationer i de lande hvor vi arbejder. Og vi vil typisk have et fortløbende samarbejde med de her organisationer for DANIDA rammemidler og eventuelt

7

også for egne midler. Når der så opstår muligheder, så diskutere vi selvfølgelig jævnligt hvordan vi gerne vil udvide vores samarbejde. Men DANIDA rammemidlerne er jo forholdsvis begrænsede, så derfor er vi kommet dertil i hvert fald i Sydasien at skal der udvides så bliver det med EU eller andre donorer. Så der har vi en diskussion jævnligt omkring hvad vi godt kunne tænke os. Så har vi defineret det på forhånd, for vi kender jo godt de calls der efterhånden lanceres i de pågældende regioner. Så snakker vi om at vi kunne godt tænke os at lave noget på human rights education eller access to justice eller noget. Og så sætter vi os ned i god tid inden call’et kommer og snakker igennem hvordan skal vi gøre det her. Vores programme officers på udekontoret har den daglige kontakt med partnerne og står for udarbejdelsen af de første skriverier. Så kommer call’et. Og så er der nogle helt specifikke – hvad hedder sådan noget – requirements vi skal følge, standarter der skal leves op til og prioritetsområder osv. Der kommer jeg ind i billedet og begynder at gå ind og definere hvad vi skal, altså lave en tidsplan og snakke om hvad der er vigtigst her. Fordi vi har også noget erfaring fra tidligere calls hvor vi måske har fået en ansøgning godkendt eller afvist, og der har man sådan er score sheet man kan se på hvordan man har scoret under forskellige emner, så det tager vi men ind i erfaringen og ser hvilke områder vi skal prioritere på, og så begynder vi simpelthen at udarbejde en ansøgning. Det er selvfølgelig et område partneren kender noget til i forvejen, ellers så dur det ikke. Så begynder vi at skrive, og den måde vi skriver på det er jo en kort præsentation af situationen og så er det meget aktivitetsorienteret, med detaljerede aktivitetsbeskrivelser. Altså på et projekt som varer 3-4 år, der kan vi lave op til 9 siders beskrivelse af aktiviteter. Og det er helt ned i detaljen, hvad der skal laves, hvorfor det skal laves, hvor det skal laves, osv. Fordi alle de ting skal hænge sammen sådan så du i din helhed kan se hvordan du opnår dine mål, som du også har defineret. Og du definerer selvfølgelig nogle mål som er overordnede og nogle projektspecifikke. Det er garanteret ligesom at lave en problemformulering. Så laver man en log frame, som også strukturerer det fuldstændigt ud og et detaljeret budget. Jeg er meget involveret i at udarbejde de her ting. Så laver man et draft hvor man tager og sige så har man det her og så sender man det retur og så arbejder de på det. Det går meget frem og tilbage mellem de forskellige der er involveret i det. Vi sørger for at Procurement og Logistics som er vores afdeling her, at de er involveret i udarbejdelsen af en procurement plan. Vi har vores programtyperådgivere involveret, sådan så vi kvalitetssikre det vi laver. Det cirkler meget frem og tilbage og det hele. Min funktion i den sammenhæng er sådan en projektleder, sådan at være tovholder på det hele og sikre at alle får spillet ind og får leveret det de skal og sådan noget. Det ryger også gerne ned i vores finanssektion, hvis vi har behov for en budgetsikring og sådan noget. Den der del som hedder ansøger er jo standart, den udarbejder i Global Funding Unit, og det er en servicefunktion overfor vores udekontorer osv. Vi synes ikke de nødvendigvis skal ligge og rode med det, altså der er ikke nogen grund til at de laver det forskelligt hver gang når vi efterhånden ved hvordan den skal skrues sammen. Så den har vi liggende som skabelon efterhånden.

Er det på den humanitære side af sagen så snakker man meget med EU delegationens TA’er, som er det man kalder technical assistants, omkring hvad vi kan tilbyde og hvor vi arbejder osv. Så skal de have deres puslespil til at gå op fordi de sidder jo med et land eller en region hvor de godt kan se det ser slemt ud med de internt fordrevne i de her områder. Så sidder de med hvem der er partnere og hvem der kan levere hvad hvor og prøver at få det puslespil til at gå op. De har også kun en bestemt pose penge osv. Så der vinder vi en del og taber noget. Så nogle gange så bliver man bedt om at – fornyelig for eksempel – vi har lige fået en kontrakt i Indien på de oversvømmelser der har været. Der ville vi gerne have i den delstat som hedder Orissa, fordi der mente vi at vi havde en konkurrencemæssig fordel. Undskyld vi ville gerne

8

have i Assam. Men de ville også gerne have Orissa, men vi havde ligesom sagt at, til det her budget vi har udarbejdet osv. det er det vi skal bruge i Assam. Hvis i gerne vil have vi tager Orissa ind, det kan vi godt, men så kommer det altså til at koste noget mere fordi vi kan ikke bare sprede det så tyndt, så kommer det ikke til at hjælpe. Så indgår man i en dialog og forhandling osv. Og ECHO kan se, jamen vi mangler nogen til at lave noget i Orissa og vi kan ikke bare lade Orissa passe sig selv. Vi er nødt til også have en indsats der. Og de vidste at vi var de bedste til det og havde et godt netværk området osv. Så derfor går de ind og allokere nogle flere penge til os. Dem har de så taget fra nogle andre nogen, men det er jo en konkurrence situation og selvom det selvfølgelig handler om…

SH:Hvis de mener i er de bedste så er det vel også…

CS:Ja ja, plus de har også nogle prioriteter som skal mødes og det kan godt være at Røde Kors eller hvem pokker det var så får et mindre beløb end de havde ønsket, men det hele skal passe sammen, og selvom vi samarbejder osv. så er det en konkurrence situation. Og et eller andet sted mener jeg også at en konkurrence situation gør at du altid får det bedste arbejde – man er oppe på tæerne. Plus at du får også optimeret din omkostningseffektivitet. Og ECHO sidder jo og sammenligner, de sidder jo med alle forslag. Der er måske kommet 10 forslag og de har kun penge til de 6 af dem. Så sidder de jo og sammenligner – hvorfor koster det 4 euro om dagen og brødføde den familie, men kun 3 euro i et andet projekt. Hvad er lige forskellen? Jeg kan godt se at de for måske 20g majs mere, men det bør ikke betyde det. Det handler om at du skal være meget oppe på tæerne og du skal kende dit marked og lave markedsprisundersøgelser osv. Man skal virkelig på tæerne. Så i den der forhandling, så revidere man sit forslag. Det er også ret detaljeret afhængig af hvilken situation det er i. Er det det som hedder en emergency situation eller decision så er det et 6 måneders projekt man kan lave og så skal det gå forholdsvis hurtigt med at få lavet ansøgningen, så der stilles ikke lige så store krav. Men er det en ad hoc decision eller en global plan som også er noget de laver, altså det til forgotten crisis, for eksempel internt fordrevne på Sri Lanka. Det er typisk en ad hoc decision eller en global plan. Så er det et 12 måneders projekt og du forventes at du har lavet en rigtig færdig ansøgning med det samme. Ellers ved en emergency sender du som regler måske bare et concept paper til at starte på, på 4-8 sider. Så indgår man i dialog og får at vide, det ser meget rimeligt ud vi vil godt se en fuld ansøgning. Så gælder der bare om at komme i gang. Men igen, en fuld ansøgning er ikke så veludviklet fordi det er en emergency. Så der er visse forskelle. Men så indgår man også i en dialog med dem omkring at ændre nogle ting for eksempel. Og når man først er kommet dertil at ændre i selve forslaget er man stort set sikker på en kontrakt. Man er ikke nødvendigvis sikker på en kontrakt fordi man er blevet bedt om at sende et fuldt forslag og det er lidt ærgerligt fordi så spilder man ret lang tid på det, men sådan er vilkårene.

SH:Når de så kontakter jeg, hvor meget inden for jeres område skal det være, altså hvad kan man sige, hvad kan de hyre jeg til?

CS:Det skal være inden for noget vi ved noget om, hvor vi er sikre på at vores implementerende partnere de kan. Og der har vi selvfølgelig nogle områder hvor vi er bedre end andre. Det er

9

klart. Vi har jo for eksempel valgt ikke at fokusere særlig meget på vand og sanitet fordi vores søsterorganisation NorwegianChurchAid de er eksperter på det område. Så der går vi som regler ind i et samarbejde med dem hvis vi står i en situation hvor der er behov for det i en flygtningelejer for eksempel. Vi har en situation i Darfur hvor vi samarbejder meget med dem, hvor de er eksperter på det område. Så det handler om at gøre de ting du er god til.

SH:Så det gælder ikke om bare at få nogle projekter ind?

CS:Nej nej, også fordi vi skal jo. Altså dels så er vi jo ansvarlige overfor modtageren, men vi er også ansvarlige den anden vej. Hvis vi går ud og gaber over noget som vi ikke kan håndtere. Sådan noget bliver opdaget og så ryger vi i den sorte bog og det er vi ikke interesseret i. Selvfølgelig så er vi også omsætningsdrevne, det er klart.

SH:Det var det jeg tænkte. I er vel afhængige af at tjene penge?

CS:Vi er en NGO der ikke skal tjene penge, men vi har jo altså en masse mennesker der skal aflønnes, og vi er ikke gratis. Vi arbejder heller ikke for vores blå øjnes skyld. Det er professionelt ligeså vel som det vil være i en privat virksomhed som var hyret til at lave sådan en kontrakt for eksempel. Altså det sker jo også at Rambøll og Cowi og alt mulig andet får en kontrakt på noget. De skal så tjene penge på det, det skal vi ikke. Men det er samme professionalisme der ligger bag, og det får du selvfølgelig noget billigere her end du får ved Cowi og Rambøll.

SH:Der er mere fortjeneste…

CS:Ja, men også lønmæssigt. Vi følger statens overenskomst. Det handler om at vi ikke. Vi har også private midler i stor stil, så derfor vil vi aldrig nogen sinde komme til at være lønførende af nogen art. Det kan vi ikke tåle.

SH:Noget af det jeg har læst går også ud på at man skal gå væk fra at se NGO som at være frivillige som arbejder gratis.

CS:Det er rigtig, vi har da et frivilligt netværk osv. men det handler mere om at lave ting i Danmark for eksempel. Vi sender jo ikke folk ud som skal ud og grave en brønd. Det er slet ikke sådan vi arbejder. Det er højt professionelle. Jeg har det sådan, jeg kunne lige så godt arbejde over i Rambøll altså. Til en anden løn og til en anden arbejdstid, men det er det samme vi laver.

Men der er også forskel. Der er forskel på de store NGO’er og så på de små, hvad skal vi kalde dem, hjertesags-NGO’er. Altså der er nogen hvor det er interessen der driver værket.

10

Ghanas venner for eksempel. Jeg kender dem ikke særlig godt, men jeg ved bare der er sådan en. Altså det er jo typisk for der har været udstationeret i Ghana eller har været på ferie dernede og synes det var rigtig fedt eller et eller andet. Og ikke et ondt ord om deres organisation, fordi de laver et godt stykke arbejde. Det er frivillige de fleste af dem og det fungere rigtig godt. Men du er også på et størrelsesmæssigt niveau hvor det kan lade sig gøre. Det er en fuldstændig anden organisation. Det er et helt andet scenario. Og de ville aldrig være særlig komfortable med, tror jeg, at implementere en stor EU kontrakt. Det stritter fuldstændig i forhold til den måde som de gerne vil implementere på som er meget meget sådan community orienteret og mere sådan græsrodsagtig. Sådan arbejder vi slet ikke længere. Altså hvis du vil være lidt flabet kan du jo godt kalde det en forretning hvor vi ikke skal tjene penge.

SH:En noget mere professionel tilgang til…

CS:Ja, men uden at forklejne deres indsats, men ja.

SH:Hvad er det som i kan, altså hvorfor er det interessant for EU og betale penge til jer for at lave nogle projekter? Hvad er det i kan som EU, og den danske stat for den sags skyld, ikke kan? Hvilken added value bringer i til hele det her?

CS:Altså der er hele diskussionen om at involver civil samfundet, både i EU, men så sandelig også ude. Traditionel bistand, eller hvad vi skal kalde det, som køre gennem ambassader og EU delegationer osv. kører jo generelt igennem regeringsorganer ude. Der synes jeg personligt at, det er fint at give budgetstøtte og meget andet, men oftest er det systemstøtte frem for menneskestøtte. Og hvis du involvere civil samfundet noget mere ude er du altså i stand til at bygge en væsentlig bedre og bredere for at udvikle. Plus du har også en kapacitetsopbygning af de små organisationer ude, ja også de store organisationer, og du henvender dig meget omkring sådan noget som rettigheder og empowerment af lokal befolkningen. Plus at der bliver stillet krav lige pludselig. Hvis du får et civil samfund som vokser sig lidt større og lidt stærkere og er lidt mere bevist om at stille nogle krav til den lokale regering, så har du altså lige pludselig en stærk spiller. Så går statsbistanden ikke nødvendigvis lige til at bygge en bro det forkerte sted, men så går den måske mere på skoler hvis de kan råbe højt nok om det for eksempel. Altså udvikling af et stærkt civil samfund er vigtig for udvikling og det tror jeg seriøst at NGO’er er bedre til end de mere officielle kanaler. Det tror jeg også er derfor, altså det erkender DANIDA jo også for eksempel i deres civil samfundsstrategi, og det er også det som EU ved et eller andet sted. De har så også den anden side af sagen som hedder at vi skal – de vil meget gerne have at det her glider ned sådan forholdsvist nemt hos den europæiske befolkning, de europæiske skatteydere. Hvorfor i alverden bruger vi så mange penge på det her, altså den debat har vi jo også herhjemme og den er der også i EU. Det er dødssvært at argumentere for mængden af bistand. Og kanalisere vi den gennem europæiske NGO’er – vi har også en oplysningspligt, et oplysningsarbejde vi skal fortage internt i Danmark og Europa.

SH:

11

Og oplyse om hvad det er EU støtter?

CS:Ja, hvad er det lige vi laver, hvorfor laver vi de her ting. Så hver gang at vi – altså der er en masse mennesker som kender FKN, som ved lige nøjagtig hvad vi laver osv. Vi har en forholdsvis høj imagestjerne. Når vi får EU penge så gør vi også opmærksom på at de her penge kommer fra EU osv., så en del af de penge du betaler i skat som går til EU, de ryger faktisk den her vej igennem og går til noget fornuftigt. Det tror jeg også er en stor del.

SH:Altså hele pr. delen groft sagt?

CS:Ja, det er image. Det er vigtigt for dem, men det er også vigtigt af effektivitetshensyn at det kører gennem NGO’er. Men altså meget af det kører også gennem FN organisationer for eksempel.

SH:Jeg kan se de også skriver meget om det her awareness raising, som både er om problemerne med fattigdom, men også at de gør noget.

CS:Klart, og det er jo ikke for sjovt at tv for eksempel altid viser billeder af lastvogne fuld med sække med mel eller sådan et eller andet hvor der er et stort EU flag og der står European Commission – Humanitarian Aid stemplet på med store tykke farver osv. eller donated by USAID for eksempel. Det er visibility og det giver godt fjernsyn, man kan se at der bliver gjort noget. At det så ikke nødvendigvis er særlig godt udviklings- og nødhjælpsarbejde det er så en anden side af sagen. Altså du ved der hvor de kommer med flyveren og dumper det ud af, det er simpelthen klassisk at man ikke skal gøre sådan, men det ser så godt ud, og det får folk til pengepungen.

SH:Det spare vel også for at man skal have en masse folk siddende i Bryssel. Ligesom på så mange andre områder hvor de prøver at have så få ansat så muligt og bruge udefrakommende ekspertviden. Det er der i hvert fald nogle områder hvor de prøver på at bruge en form for konsulenter i stedet. Virker i som konsulenter når i har gang i et projekt i Indien for eksempel?

CS:Du kan måske kalde os interne konsulenter, fordi vi er en ekspertenhed som levere input og støtte osv. til vores udekontorer og partnere. Det er ikke os der sætter os ned og skriver det hele for dem. Vi bliver ikke hyret som konsulent til at sætte os ned og skrive det hele for dem. Det har vi prøvet med konsulenter, og det kan de ikke. Altså de kan ikke levere et færdigt produkt. I hvert fald ikke i den form vi gerne vil have det fordi dem måde man laver det på er jo også altid afhængig af den enkelte organisation. Du sætter jo dit eget organisatoriske præg på hvordan din ansøgning ser ud.

SH:

12

Jeg tænkte også på om EU’s viden om hvad der foregår stammer den fra hvad i fortæller dem? De har selvfølgelig deres folk derude.

CS:Det har de selv styr på. De har jo en EU delegation ude med mange mennesker. Det er jo en EU ambassade. Og de er store, så de ved alt om hvad der forgår i de forskellige lande.

END

13

10.4 Annexe A3 Interview with Troels Victor Dalgaard, Programme Officer – Global

Funding Unit, DanChurchAid (04.10.07)

SH = Simon HolmTVD = Troels Victor Dalgaard

SH:Hvis du vil fortælle hvad det er du laver i GFU så kan vi tage det der fra.

TVD:Jeg har været i GFU siden maj 2004, og har i øvrigt en fortid i UM med en anden NGO så jeg har ligesom været raden rundt. Det jeg laver i GFU nu, det er at jeg – for lige at tage det simple først – er at jeg sidder med Cambodja og Mellemøsten. Mellemøsten er blevet spændende fordi der er, hvad skal man sige, to steder hvor FKN endnu ikke har decentraliseret – det er Centralasien/Rusland og Mellemøsten, og vi arbejder faktisk med planer om her under budgettet for 2008 at der skal etableres et regionalt FKN kontor i Mellemøsten. Vi ved ikke hvor og hvordan og så videre, men det skal vi i gang med. Så skal der tilknyttes en GFU person også. Med mindre at vi er der, så har vi meget svært ved, hvad skal man sige, at sikre os en fast stabil funding base hos EU, men det gælder også hos andre donorer. Altså den der kontakt, lobbying, gøren opmærksom på sig selv, have en track record som viser altså vi kan bare det her. Sådan at vi kommer op som en naturlig, altså at vi popper op i hjernen som en naturlig ting, og det opnår du sandsynligvis ikke med mindre du er der. Vi har jo en række kontorer rundt omkring i verden, men som sagt Mellemøsten er et af de steder hvor vi mangler.

Det fører så over til det næste. Jeg sidder også med som jeg egentlig blev ansat til i begyndelsen, som var at opdyrke andre donorer. Vores indtægtskilder er jo meget – altså dels fokuseret på den nationale del, på forskellige indsamlinger og så den her aftale med DANIDA under rammen. Ud over det så var FKN meget interesseret i at yderligere diversificere vores funding base til noget mere, til andre bilaterale donorer. Vi har også en politik der går på, sammen med vores søsteragencies, altså andre FKN’er i Nordeuropa, om at hvordan gør vi det er, altså hvordan deler vi rovet så at sige. Men i dag må vi nok sige der er vores erfaringer meget blandet med den der – fordi vi har sådan meget opfattet, altså – og det er netop meget forskelligt fra det der meget centraliserede og stringente call for proposal system – hvor vi ligesom har forsøgt med en række donorer igennem en række forhandlinger, som vi jo rent faktisk også gøre med ECHO, som er sådan lidt mærkeligt, men det har selvfølgelig noget at gøre med at der skal tages nogle meget hurtige beslutninger, så går det hurtigere ved forhandlinger snarere end at man har et mere formaliseret system. Men det har vi nogle blandede erfaringer med og jeg tror et af problemerne har været at – punkt et, at vi på mange af de steder ikke har været til stede og ikke har kunnet sikre den der nødvendige opfølgning. Punkt to det er at FKN som bureaukrati, der er mange forskellige interesser og parter her inden for huset, og vi har også nogle partnere som vi skal have taget i ed. Så man kan sige det bliver lige pludselig mange mennesker der skal tages i ed når man formulere et projekt der skal have husets backup, og så kan man så gå ud til donorerne og sælge et eller andet produkt. Men der er meget der taler for – og det var også derfor jeg var meget glad for at du snakkede om det – det er at sådan som det er nu, er vi meget trykke og synes, altså GFU er meget gearet ind til at respondere på det her formalistiske call for proposal system, som har nogle strategier

1

og så kommer der nogle calls for proposals, og så svare vi på dem. Så har vi en eller andet rimelig høj rate for at vi får noget retur. Der er også andre donorer, USAID for eksempel, de bruger også et, det er stort set det samme, det er også sådan et formaliseret system. Der har vi rent faktisk også penge fra igennem Humanitarian Mine Action. Forskellen er vi implementere selv, men der har Allan sikkert også fortalt om, altså der er en forskel der. Der kan man sige at det er nok nemmere også at opnå funding når det ikke er arbejdet gennem partnere, fordi mange donorer vil næsten udelukkende fokusere på hvor mange brønde kommer ud af det her, snarere end at man kapacitets opbygger nogen eller samarbejder med nogen. Vores argument for at arbejde gennem partnere er jo netop at vi sikre os et unikt kendskab til det sted hvor vi nu gerne vil arbejde, fordi vi har et bredt partnernetværk hvor vi kan sætte partnerne sammen på en bestemt måde så vi kan løse et problem på en unik måde. Men det er klart at hvis det ikke er donorens prioriteter.

SH:Det giver vel også en mere kontinuitet for modtagerområdet.

TVD:Det gør det. Men for lige at vende tilbage. Det var nok også en af grundene til at, hvad skal man sige, vores lidt blandede erfaringer med andre donorer, at jeg tror at vi, fordi vi kender EU så godt og at det er blevet oparbejdet gennem de sidste ti år, så har vi virkelig en ekspertise inden for det her og ved hvordan vi får tingene til at fungere. Problemet er også at det bliver lidt sådan nogle laurbær vi hviler på, fordi når vi meget er fokuseret på det, så tager den ene opgave den anden og så får vi heller ikke fokuseret på det nye potentielle marked som ligger derude. Det er der også planer om at vi skal arbejde yderligere med i 2008. Blandt andet med at vi nu har fået decentrale GFU’er ansat i Asien landene. Der er en herhjemmefra i Great Lakes og der skal være en i det sydlige Afrika, og der kommer også yderligere GFU assistance i Latinamerika og så kommer der en i Mellemøsten.

SH:Altså simpelthen nogen som kan finde nye…

TVD:Ja, nogen der har en profil som, hvad skal man sige, som kender donoren, deres måde at arbejde på. Altså som har det der intime kendskab til, sådan er vi, at de kan, på en professionel måde, formulere nogle projekter som appellerer til den donor.

SH:Er der et specifikt projekt du kan fortælle om? Hvordan der er blevet håndteret osv. Det kunne give et meget godt indblik i hvordan i gør og hvordan i griber sagen an. Både med at søge støtte og at udføre det når pengene er givet og samarbejdet med lokale organisationer.

TVD:Jeg tror jeg vil pege på Libanon, der var jo den her korte krig, eller hvad man nu skal kalde det, som Israel førte i Libanon i sommeren 2006. Jeg var lige ved at kalde det en incursion, men det var mere end det, det var en kortvarig krig som også udløste sådan en borgerkrigslignende tilstand fordi det ligesom fik sat gang i hele det der. Vi havde besluttet os for at, jamen, der lå – dels så har vi et tidligere engagement i landet. Vores fokus på arbejdet i

2

Mellemøsten er jo, hvad skal man sige, hjælp til palæstinensiske flygtninge. Og der havde vi så besluttet at vi ville søge nogle ECHO penge, fordi vi var ret sikre på at ECHO i betragtningen af krisens størrelse, i betragtningen af de politiske aspekter omkring hele det palæstinensiske spørgsmål, at der ville være nogle, i anførelses tegn, nemme penge at komme efter. Der hyrede vi så en amerikansk dame, Christine Benneke, som har nogle danske forbindelser og som også taler dansk. Hun blev så hyret til at dels at følge op på sådan en, hvad skal man sige, appraisal mixed med en funding tur som GFU lavede derned under selve krigen. Der var så i det, at der var meget stor forskel, altså det var jo kun den sydlige del landet der blev bombet. Resten var stort set urørt af det. Men der fik vi ret hurtigt sat et setup op, der gjorde at vi fik dels et mindre – det vi kalder et non-food item, altså det var hjælp tæpper, varme, shelter til udvalgte flygtninge, og dels så fik vi et større HMA med mine rydning. Der var jo den meget, altså det var ret politisk fordi EU ville ikke have officielt at vi ved at Israel har kastet klyngebomber, men vi fjernede dem alligevel. Men der fik vi meget hurtigt sat – og der kom også senere nogle andre penge til. Jeg tror der var en lille smule fra USAID og så var der én mere som jeg ikke lige kan huske. Men der blev meget hurtigt sat et apparat op hvor vi på alle projekterne implementerede selv. Den non-food item der samarbejde vi igennem Middle Eastern Council of Churches, som sådan er vores partner dernede. Men det var et samarbejde. Vi var meget nede i substansen. Og man kan sige at ud fra et funding perspektiv, altså hun var eminent til at skubbe døre ind og netop være til stede, lobby, have gode forbindelser med folk. Hun kunne gå lige ind til folk. Og det er selvfølgelig sådan nogle typer personer som man gerne vil lede efter. Man kan sige at det der var ulempen ved det, det var at DCA systemet, eller bureaukratiet herhjemme havde lidt svært ved at følge med fordi det var et lidt usædvanligt setup. Det faldt sådan mellem forskellige stole, mellem os, vores relief coordination unit og vores HMA folk, så der var mange, også herhjemme, alligevel der skulle tages i ed. Og det gjorde sådan, hvad skal man sige, sagsgangen lidt langsom. Det var både godt og skidt, der var mange positive elementer, men der var også nogle negative elementer. Jeg tror, når vi snakker om fundraising, vi – FKN skal meget tænke igennem de bureaukratiske konsekvenser sådan at vi også sikre os at vi kan implementere på forsvarlig vis. Altså vi bliver bedre og bedre til det, men der er stadig – altså vi prøve sådan forskellige modeller. Netop den her med at nu hyre vi – nu har vi har sagt, jamen at have et lidt større apparat med udsendte folk. Hvis man for eksempel steder som Asien hvor human resources er til stede – jamen de kan rent faktisk, og de er på mange områder lige så dygtige som os. Der kan du godt gøre det, der er måske nogle andre steder hvor kulturelle, sociale forhold der gør at det skal være en expat. Men det er sådan noget man må vurdere fra sag til sag. Der er mange som sige – altså jeg har selv en fortid og kender Mellemøsten ret godt – der er mange herinde som vil sige altså der måske netop i Mellemøsten nogle racistiske, politiske undertoner som gør at det er svært for en araber for eksempel at gå til en donor og bede om penge på vores veje. Den er svær.

SH:Hvordan spiller det så ind at det er Folkekirkens Nødhjælp? Snakkede også med Allan om det, og han sagde at det ikke spiller den store rolle også fordi EU ikke giver penge til missionærarbejde. Men det må vel spille ind hvis man er i Mellemøsten? Altså det gør det vel ikke nemmere for en araber at bede om penge når det er til DanChurchAid?

TVD:Nej der er jo så igen det der religiøst, hvad skal man sige. Jeg vil sige, jeg har oplevet det sådan at for UM for eksempel som jeg var dernede for i det Palæstinensiske selvstyreområder

3

at overklassen, altså der hvor vi også rekruttere fra – UM’s lokale medarbejdere, mine lokale medarbejdere dengang det var også alle sammen kristne fordi det har noget at gøre med at kristne er bare de principielt de bedst veluddannede, de mest velhavende, altså det er typisk dem over- og høje mellemklasse. Og det er selvfølgelig også dem vi bedst socialt og kulturelt kan relatere os til. Men at man kan have muslimer som samarbejdspartnere, det har vi jo alle steder gennem local authorities på centralt niveau, andre vi skal samarbejde med. Så jeg tror ikke at vi, FKN, tænker på det som noget issue andet end at man naturligt relatere sig til sin egen kulturkreds og der er noget – en ramme som gør at det er dem vi møder først kan man sige. Selv i Irak hvor vi, FKN, var fra invasionen i 2003 indtil vi trak os ud der i efteråret da sikkerhedssituationen blev meget værre. August eller september tror jeg. De samarbejdspartnere der var også kristne. Men hvad skal man sige, det forhindre jo os ikke i at – jeg opfatter det egentlig ikke som noget issue, andet end at det bestemt er noget man skal tænke over og noget som man skal have som en del af at hov det er lige et element vi skal have med i vores overvejelser.

SH:Jeg tænkte mere på den fremtoning man får. Ikke så meget for jer internt, men for dem som i er ude for at hjælpe.

TVD:Det er da klart der ligger et konfliktpotentiale i at termen Folkekirkens Nødhjælp, at det ligesom er en forlænget arm af at være lutheraner. Jeg tror at – for det første siger vi jo meget markant at vi missionerer ikke. Folkekirken er en del af vores bagland og en del af vores styrke, men det er ikke sådan at vi, ja vi missionerer ikke. Vi er der for at hjælpe de udsatte uanset hvilken race, religion, ja alt. Vi er i ordets bedste forstand, neutrale, og hvad skal man sige, blot på de udsattes side.

SH:Der er ikke noget tidspunkt hvor i er nødt til at nedtone jeres baggrund for at…

TVD:Jeg har ikke oplevet det.

SH:Altså en ting er at man ikke missionerer, men noget andet er hvordan man bliver mødt og hvordan folk opfatter en.

TVD:Jeg har ikke oplevet det. Men det er da klart, det er også en problematik vi må møde i Asien og det sydlige Afrika. Men der er jo også, det ved du sikkert også, der er jo også meget stor forskel på sammensætningen af partnere i de forskellige lande og der er, det er en bred bred vifte af kirkelige samarbejdspartnere og ikke kirkelige, andre lokale NGO’er og sågar også nogle fra andre regioner. Så der er ikke noget fast.

SH:Nu nævnte du det der med at det ikke var særlig politisk acceptabelt at Israel havde brugt klyngebomber, men man måtte gerne fjerne dem alligevel. Hvordan kommer det til udtryk? Altså hvor meget indflydelse har de, er det noget de går ud og siger det

4

snakker vi ikke om? Hvordan påvirker det jeres arbejde at det er en politisk varm kartoffel?

TVD:Nu kan man sige at det her i Libanon var sagen også sat på spidsen fordi Mellemøsten er politik næsten uanset hvad man gør og ikke gør. Så i det tilfælde er sagen nok også sat på spidsen. Jeg tror at formålet med EU’s bistand er jo noget anderledes end Danmarks for eksempel som bilateral donor. Altså EU kigger jo meget på det som en slags promovering af EU selv og som et instrument til at sige at jamen vi gør rent faktisk en forskel og vi promovere alle medlemslandene som en samlet enhed – at EU som gruppe gør det herud og det er et instrument i vores udenrigspolitik. Hvorimod Danmark, og de andre nordiske lande, har sådan en lidt mere – altså kigger nok ikke så meget på det som instrument, men snare som fordi vi er ”gode mod dyrene”, som en slags fremhævning af at vi skal ud og støtte de fattigste, altså det moralske. Det var også derfor at da man oprettede DANIDA der tilbage i 60’erne at man nu engang overvejede om det skulle ligge under kirkeministeriet fordi det var en del af vores næstekærlighed, baseret på nogle værdier snarere end at det var et led i vores udenrigspolitik. Den med et led i udenrigspolitikken den er nok. Jeg tror stadig der er meget tidligt at sige noget om det, men man kan sige at Danmark har jo siden 90’erne da vi startede på vores støtte til Baltikum der tilbage i starten af 90’erne, slutningen af 89, har vi jo lagt en mere og mere aktivistisk udenrigspolitik for dagen som er blevet konsolideret med Irak og Afghanistan. Om pendulet er ved at svinge tilbage. Jeg tror det er vanskeligt at sige.

Men for lige at vende tilbage til det du spurgte om omkring EU. Jeg ser det nok mere som at – dels var den der konkrete sag i Libanon nok sat på spidsen fordi den arabisk-israelske konflikt er meget betændt og alting er politik. Hvor EU ligesom da vi forhandlede om sagde vi har et problem og vi har en kasse penge. I kan nok få sådan cirka i den her retning, lav et forslag over det. Og det gør vi så. Men det var så i den der forhandlingsfase hvor de kom og sagde at det visibility der jo er en del af EU’s bistand, hvor vi sammen med vores professionelle mediefolk laver som en integreret del af projektet laver en kommunikationsplan, hvor vi i overensstemmelse med EU’s guidelines som siger, det er reklame for os, det er en del af vores udenrigspolitik, osv. Der formulere vi så at vi vil ved hjælp af en masse instrumenter forklare, herhjemme, på stedet, i EU at vi gør det her og at det er for EU’s penge og nu kan i bare se hvor dygtige vi alle sammen er. Den er nok mere fremtrædende end hvad DANIDA forlanger af os. Vi har jo nærmest sådan en tendens til at nedtone at det er dansk bistand, det er igen det der næstekærlige og værdibaserede, altså vi gør det her for at hjælpe og ikke for at promovere os selv. At det så er en sandhed med modifikationer det sætter vi lige til side. Men jeg tror EU siger til os ret markant, altså vi har en visibility politik. Det har noget med at gøre at vi promovere selve projektet og det vi gør, men det indeholder sandelig også reklame for EU. Og det skal vi selvfølgelig tage højde for. At der så er nogle elementer derunder, altså for eksempel som indebærer forholdet til Israel der er sagen nok meget sat på spidsen. Jeg kan ikke huske at der er andre steder. Noget lignede kunne muligvis tænkes i Burma. EU igen fordi det er sådan et lidt tungere apparat, der er nogle medlemslande som går ind for – på den ene side en konstruktiv dialog hvor man igennem regeringen forsøger at gøre noget og ændre dem af den vej, og der er sådan en strammere linie som går ind for at den bedste måde man gør det på at ved ikke at arbejde med regeringen og i øvrigt undergrave den så meget som vi kan komme afsted med. Ellers tror jeg ikke, jeg kan ikke komme i tanke om noget hvor der har været konfliktstof.

5

SH:Så i render ikke så tit ind i at deres generelle udenrigspolitik spiller ind?

TVD:Nej jeg har ikke oplevet yderligere ting, og mens jeg var i UM kan jeg ikke huske at det var noget som der var konfliktstof i normalt. Igen, der er mange forskellige holdninger, og der er mange, hvad skal man sige, medlemsstaterne skal helst være enige og der er mange interesser. Og de store lande har nogle helt separate interesser som de nok skal sørge for bliver promoverede og kan også gøre det uden om systemet. Altså det har de magten og midlerne til at gøre.

SH:Det foregår vel også igennem den bilaterale støtte?

TVD:Ja, ja. Men det er jo igen det der med at der er Danmark igen forskellig fordi Danmark som en relativ småstat har jo alt andet lige interesse i at ting foregår igennem multilaterale organisationer og af frivilligheden og ser tilpasning som et forhandlingsresultat hvorimod en stormagt, Frankrig, England, Tyskland, Spanien måske, har nogle markante selvstændige interesser og har også midlerne til at gennemtænke dem hvis det er det de vil.

SH:Hvis man ser på baggrunden for EU’s relation med den 3. verden kan man jo også se at den har ændret sig fra starten hvor det var de franske kolonier, til da England kom med hvor de engelske kolonier med også, men med en anden tilgang som er mere på lige fod.

TVD:Og der det skægge er at EU er stadig en fin kopi af latinsk forvaltningstradition, eller fransk og sydeuropæisk forvaltningstradition, især fransk stadigvæk. Altså hele det der med kabinetstruktur og måden embedsværket fungerer, der er præcis som i Frankrig.

SH:Det er også noget jeg snakkede med de andre om, altså det her, måske lidt unfair at kalde det det, bureaukratiske system. Det lyder så negativt. Men hvor der er så mange kriterier i skal opfyld for at få støtte. Jeg har forstået det lidt sådan at det egentlig ikke er så slemt som det umiddelbart virker. Altså der er selvfølgelig meget arbejde, men der er nogle fordele ved at man sikre…

TVD:Absolut, det er et spørgsmål om at sætte sig ned og lære de formalia udenad, kende dem, vide hvor vigtige milepæle er. Og så følge dem fuldstændig striks. Det er sådan set meget enfoldigt. Det er det der med at fransk forvaltningstradition er bygget meget hierarkisk op, så der er nogle bestemte strukturer og måder man gør det på, og der er ingen fleksibilitet. Men det giver også, altså grunden til at jeg – jeg skrev speciale om det, jeg sammenlignede det franske og danske udenrigsministerium og politiker og embedsmandsforholdet. Og det interessante ved det franske system er at der er en excellent samling på top niveau, politikerne, embedsværket, det private erhvervsliv, NGO verdenen også, og EU bureaukratiet de har alle sammen gået på ENA eller en af de her fine skoler og de kender hinanden og der

6

foregår en vekselvirkning imellem, altså interchange, imellem de her forskellige. Og det gør at der er en udpræget målenighed i systemet. Det er også hvad jeg vil kalde professionalisme, og det er det der er kopieret over i EU systemet. Hvorimod i det danske system som har den der, hvor vores force er at fuldmægtig X kan snakke med fuldmægtig Y i et andet ministerium uden at kontorchefer og alle mulige skal involveres. Det vil også sige at idéer fra gulvet kommer relativt nemt op igennem systemet her og det giver også sådan en fleksibilitet, men det giver også samtidig på en eller anden måde en vis måluenighed og målforvirring. Som også er sådan en engelsk-nordeuropæisk tradition, fordi vi i grunden er mere demokratiske og mindre centralistiske i vores tilgang til livet. Men det er bare vigtigt at forstå at tankegangen er en anden i EU, det er nogle formater og systemet er indrettet til at der er et hierarki fordi dem der oppe på toppen de ved bedst.

SH:Så det er ikke et system man har sat op fordi det nødvendigvis er den bedste måde at gøre det, det er mere en tradition at sådan gør man det?

TVD:Det er en tradition, og fordi Frankrig dengang da Kul og Stål Unionen blev oprettet var det toneangivende land, og når man tænker på det – altså selvom Frankrig selvfølgelig har nogle problemer i dag med den udvidede medlemskreds, altså kontrollen og indflydelsen er mindre end den var dengang, så via det der med at franske embedsmænd i grunden forstår EU systemet bedre end vi gør, jamen det er da derfor at der er flere af dem, altså sydeuropæere ansat i EU, fordi de er vant til det der mere formalistiske og prøveprægede og udenadslæren system, det er klart.

SH:Jeg kommer nemlig ind på hvad baggrunden for det her stringente system er med checks and balances er, om det – altså den umiddelbare tanke var at det var for at sikre at man havde kontrol over hvad pengene gik til, hvor de gik hen og hvem der modtog dem.

TVD:Jamen det er det selvfølgelig også, men der er bare, jeg tror. Altså hele systemet, det franske system er bygget op på at toppen, eliten ved bedst og dem i Paris ved bedst. Og fordi Frankrig jo dengang, og stadig er et stort land, og der er mange hoveder der skal holdes øje med så siger man at så er centralismen bedst. Og igen overført til Bryssel, jamen Bryssel ved bedst. Det er for det samledes bedste, og for at få systemet til at fungere på en hensigstmæssig måde hvor man sikre der ikke sker snyd og bedrag jamen så er det der system formentlig bedst. Det er jo nøjagtig det samme man ser med FN systemet. Nu bliver det så yderligere kompliceret af at der er mange kulturer, eller endnu flere kulturer, der bliver indblandet. Men det formalistiske system er introduceret fordi kontrol i essens er bedre, er den bedste måde at styrer den her butik på. Og der er EU og tankegangen bag egentlig også. Og fordi eliten ved bedst.

SH:Et eller andet sted må det jo være i konflikt med det at man finansiere eksterne organisationer som jeres og andre NGO, der kan man sige der er ikke en del af EU

7

systemet, men alligevel. Der må være en eller anden, altså hvad i kan bidrage med hvor de går på kompromis med kontrollen mod at de så opnår noget andet.

TVD:Nej, det gør de faktisk ikke, fordi vi er jo hægtet op på sammen med andre som modtager penge fra EU, så har vi sådan en FPA, framework partnership agreement, og der står at vi skal opfylde dette og hin punkt og også give adgang til EU hvis de vil komme og lave revision på nogle af vores sager, hvad de i øvrigt også gør. De kommer i næste uge. Så nej det mener jeg bestemt ikke, snarere tværtimod. Og det andet punkt er at, som jeg tror er lige så vigtigt, er at EU ved jo godt at en integreret del af et ideel samfund, der er også en effektiv civilsamfundsudvikling. Jeg vil næsten sige at hvis man tager den der snak som kommer i ny og næ, at om 30-50 år så har Kina og Indien overhalet EU som økonomisk stormagt, jeg køber den ikke fordi der er nogle helt fundamentale – punkt et er at jo de har da en økonomisk vækst som siger spar to problemet er bare at der er så mange fundamentale ting i begge samfund som halter og som tager meget meget længere tid for dem at hente, hvis de altså nogen sinde gør det. Netop civilsamfundet, jamen i Kina eksistere det ikke, i Indien er der en helt masse problemer bland andet med det her kaste system. Og jeg ser ikke der afskaffet om 30 år. Og der er også mange andre ting, for eksempel good governance, det fungere langt fra lige så godt som det gør herhjemme. Jeg synes faktisk at det her med at EU også giver til NGO verdenen er et udtryk for at man netop forstår den her inkorporering af civilsamfundet og ønske at gøre det som en aktiv del af deres politik. Der har været meget snak omkring, som Allan sikkert også har fortalt om, at hele deres funding instrument system er under omkalfatring og at de introducere nogle nye som en del af deres planlægning for de næste 5 år. Og vi har jo lobbyet meget fordi der kan man jo se der er nogle modsatrettede og meget stærke kræfter i EU som blandt andet har arbejdet på at man skal gå mere i retning af at kigge på det som et økonomisk spørgsmål snarere end et udviklingsspørgsmål. Altså det der med at det skal være privatsektor orienteret. Der har været nogen snak om at man skulle gøre det mere regional og at man skulle give noget mere til de større multilaterale organisationer så som FN systemet og de forskellige regional banker, Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, og American Development Bank. Der har vi selvfølgelig skubbet godt på for at NGO delen skulle bevares og helst også udvides. Men det er igen det her med at det bliver jo, vi bliver bare en del af et meget større puslespil hvor der er nogle meget stærke interesser der alle sammen helst skal have en bid af kagen. Det er sådan et led i det der give and take system som der altid vil være.

SH:Men det kan godt lade sig gøre for jer at blive hørt?

TVD:Ja, det kan det sagtens. Vi er jo medlem af en lang række fora, hvor Allan og FKN er med, sammen med andre europæiske NGO’er. Hvor EU godt vil høre vores mening og invitere os til at give vores input. Og så har vi også en FKN person nede i Bryssel som også holde øje med hvad der foregår. Men en gang i mellem kan man sige så vedtager de ting som vi synes er mærkelige og som vi helst havde undgået, men sådan er det jo.

SH:Jeg var inde og se på nogle af jeres procedure og hvad i skriver, hvor der er mange fællestræk med det EU skriver. Altså hele det her med at involverer civilsamfundet, og

8

der awareness raising. Både med hvad årsagerne til fattigdom er, men også med at man er involveret, at man gør noget, at man bruger penge. Det er også noget af det i skriver – i har sådan tre punkter på jeres hjemmeside. Det passer meget godt sammen.

TVD:Men jeg tror, altså fordi at det passer godt både med hvad DANIDA mener og med hvad EU systemet mener. Altså det er sådan nogle generelle hensigter og statements hvorefter vi arbejder, som miljøet har vedtaget er ”god latin”, og det ændre sig selvfølgelig også undervejs. Men jeg tror der er mere og mere, hvis vi vælger at kigge på det sådan overfor Verdensbanken som jo meget kiggede på hele det her apparat omkring structural adjustment og hvor man mere som sådan den hårde hund gik ind og sagde til regeringer at i skal altså have styr på – og støttet af IMF – der er nogle key issues i skal have styr på i jeres budgettering og måder at prioritere et begrænset budget på. Hvor vi ligesom siger at vi har en lidt andet værdibaseret næstekærlig betragtning. Men det er vel en elegant combi af alle sådan nogle overvejelser. Jamen det er fornuftigt mange gange med structural adjustment, men det er jo også fornuftigt at afbalancere det med at der i et hvert land er en stærk civilsamfundssektor og der er god regeringsførelse, man har et procurement apparat, altså indkøbsapparat som er transparent. Altså hele det her spørgsmål omkring korruption som man sådan får indtrykket af at det egentlig bliver mere og mere alvorligt fordi – også udviklingen af civilsamfundet og god regeringsførelse, jamen verden bliver mere og mere interrelateret og du kan ikke gøre noget uden at det har en helt masse virkninger ude. Med udviklingen af verden bliver det formentlig mere og mere markant. Og det gælder alle ulande, det der med at lukke et land af, det kan simpelthen ikke lade sig gøre, og det tror jeg egentlig i bunden er positivt.

SH:Ud fra hvad du siger, forstår jeg det som at når i har nogle tilgange og holdninger så i de i virkeligheden mere funderet i en eller anden grundlæggende tankegang frem for en form for at følge samme spor som en holdning hos enten staten eller EU.

TVD:Det vil jeg nikke til. Jeg tror også at det vi, som FKN er god til, altså vi har den der common sense approach til ting, altså vi har lang erfaring med de lande vi arbejder i. Men man kan sige, det er den ene side, den anden side er at i GFU har vi jo altid en overvejelse med, hvor meget jagter vi bare penge og hvor meget er der også det her med den helt rigtige og korrekte erfaring. Og det er klart at et eller andet sted er det selvfølgelig en overvejelse og en vejning, hvad betyder mest i det her. Men det er jo ikke sådan, altså GFU går jo ikke ud og trumfer noget igennem bare fordi der er nogle penge, det gør vi ikke. Vi er selvfølgelig instrumentelle i at være eksperter i EU og andre donorer og være husets indfaldsvinkel til kvalitetssikring og at vi har et ens sæt format for at snakke med den her donor. Det er sådan en side af sagen, den anden er at vi skal jo selvfølgelig også kunne se os selv i spejlet og sige at det vi gør her er et ordentligt projekt og det kan gøre en forskel. Det er klart.

SH:Det er vel også nødt til at være et ordentligt projekt hvis i senere skal kunne søge penge?

TVD:

9

Ja helt sikkert. Det hænger simpelthen sammen, altså det ene kan ikke – sådan hænger verden ikke sammen. Men det er klart at, altså GFU hed jo før bare EU enheden ikke. Men det er klar, som også Allan sikkert forklarede, vi har jo et mål med en indtægtsforøgning op til 2012. Og der skal systemet selvfølgelig justeres til at kunne rent faktisk gøre det. Fordi en ting er at udstede et ønske, noget andet er rent faktisk at gøre det. Og det er klart, der må vi kigge på en lang række forhold, netop det her omkring en styrkelse af GFU’en – sikring af at resten af huset er fortrolig med alle de nye formater og retningslinier vi så skal følge, både hvad angår projekt implementeringen og hvad angår financial reporting, procurement logistics, visibility, der er mange ting, der er mange enheder her i huset der skal tages i ed før at vi professionelt kan sige at nu har vi apparatet det kan det her.

Vi har samarbejdet med EU i lang tid, siden midt 90’erne. Og det bliver mere, hvad skal man sige, at det vi selvfølgelig også går efter er at, i at vi får mere ekspertise på EU ’s regler og andre donorers regler og setup har vi da også tænkt i retningen af at øge samarbejdet med vores søster organisationer inden for det område. Altså kan det gå så vidt at man kan begynde og tjene penge på det. Altså udbyde det i forskellige konsulentydelser, altså også hvad angår procurement. Der er jo forskellige procurement center hvor man kan købe en ydelse. Altså vi har fået det her projekt så i tager jer af det her. Og så får man et eller andet fee for det. Så man kan sige at NGO verdenen, og det er jo sådan lidt et skisma, vi bliver også mere og mere professionaliseret. Og dermed går NGO idéen jo i teorien mere og mere af fløjten og man kan jo også mærke herinde at der er jo stor forskel de mennesker som for eksempel er i GFU og nogle andre steder her i huset. Og der er jo forskel på de folk der bliver ansat i dag, og dem for 20-25 år siden, det er da klart.

Det andet jeg vil huske og sige som også er en god pointe er at, som du også selv var inde på i begyndelsen, det er at EU systemet som vi snakkede om er jo meget centraliseret. Det pudsige er jo at vores, altså det danske, EU beslutningssystem er jo også meget centraliseret. Altså i Frankrig der har man det som hedder SGAE, Secrétariat général des affaires européennes, som varetager EU koordinationen, det er sådan et supersekretariat som ligger sammen med udenrigsministeriet. Hvor i Danmark, i den markedsafdeling som blev oprettet der i 72-73, eller hele departementet for udenrigsøkonomi, var et udtryk for den der centraliserede beslutningsstruktur hvor UM sad for bordenden og kørte den der proces. Man kan sige den er så oppe under pres, og tilsvarende den der centralisering som EU også laver, den er egentlig også på en måde under pres. Hvor de der calls for proposals og strategilægning meget har ligget i Bryssel, de bliver jo også decentraliseret, at du ligger mere og mere ud der hvor tingene sker, men det betyder jo også, som det har gjort herhjemme, det betyder at tingene, beslutningerne, overvejelserne og politiklægningen bliver lagt ud og derved bliver den også mere forskellig. Tankegange vil formentlig give os nogle udfordringer, altså EU delegationen i Bangkok tænker anderledes end EU delegationen i Jerusalem, så hvordan får vi lige gearet os selv til at håndtere det.

SH:Men det er vel der hvor lokale kontorer kommer ind?

TVD:Lige præcis, og det er også derfor jeg tror at tankegangen med at vi skal som GFU og som FKN skal være der hvor tingene sker, den bliver formentlig mere og mere vigtig, og en forudsætning for at vi kan fungere optimalt.

10

END

11

10.5 Annexe A5 Power Point Presentation of DCA GFU at LWF/Nordic Agencies

Meeting

Annexe A5 can be found in the printed version

1

projekter.aau.dk · web viewngos applying for a centralised grant covered by europeaid will have to...

Documents