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Doha 06/10/2020
ACRPS announces the results of the Arab Opinion Index
The ACRPS is proud to announce the publication of the 2019-2020 Arab Opinion Index. The AOI is a yearly public opinion survey conducted by the ACRPS across a range of Arab countries. This year’s AOI is based on the findings of face-to-face interviews conducted between November 2019 and September 2020 with 28,000 individual respondents in 13 Arab countries (Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar) with a margin of error of +/- 2-3%. It is the fruit of some 69,578 hours of work by more than 900 researchers in areas requiring 820,000km of travel, making it the largest public opinion survey in the Arab World in terms of sample size, the number of countries covered, the number of variables tested, and the volume of data collected. It supplies data used by many academic institutions and academics in their own work. The findings are presented by country and as pan-Arab averages. Countries are divided into different regional categories:
Arab Maghreb: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia. Nile Valley: Egypt, Sudan. Arab Mashreq: Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq. Gulf: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar.
The AOI is a yearly public opinion survey conducted by the ACRPS across a range of Arab countries. It provides important data about trends in Arab public opinion on a range of economic, social and political issues of direct relevance to Arab citizens, including democracy, citizenship, equality, and civil and political participation. It presents citizens’ evaluations of their own circumstances, general conditions in their home countries, state institutions and their confidence therein. It also looks at their attitudes towards Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as the regional policy of international and regional powers (such as USA, France, Germany, Russia, China, and Turkey).
Views on DemocracyThe results show that there is near unanimous support for democracy, with 76% of respondents indicating their support for a democratic system and only 17% opposed.
1
Figure 1: Agreement/disagreement with the statement that democracy remains better than other forms of government, despite its shortcomings (results from previous years)
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
28
26
29
30
31
23
31
48
48
43
42
41
45
36
12
13
16
15
12
14
10
4
4
6
7
5
4
5
8
9
6
6
11
14
18
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree DK /Declined to answer
Figure 2: Agreement/disagreement with the statement that democracy remains better than other forms of government, despite its shortcomings (by region)
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Levant/ Mashreq
The Gulf
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
36
31
25
23
28
42
46
54
46
48
11
10
12
15
12
4
4
5
5
4
7
9
4
12
8
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree DK/declined to answer
74% of respondents stated that a pluralist democratic system would be appropriate to their countries, while 57-72% agreed that undemocratic systems – governments based on Sharia without elections, army or military rule, authoritarian or limited democracies – would be inappropriate. Comparison with previous years’ results shows that general approval for democracy is still stable and indeed rising.
2
Figure 3: Respondents' perceptions of the appropriateness of various types of government for their home countries.
Democratic system
A government based on Islamic Sharia
Electoral system with competition limited to non-religious/secular parties
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
44
16
14
9
6
5
30
19
19
22
14
14
9
22
25
26
26
29
9
35
34
34
46
43
8
8
8
9
8
9
Very appropriate Appropriate to some extent Inappropriate to some extentCompletely inappropriate DK /Declined to answer
This consensus on support for democracy is accompanied by a negative evaluation of existing democracy in the Arab World. Respondents placed the level of democracy in the region at 5.8/10 – that is, democracy remains, as far as they are concerned, only halfway there.
Citizens’ assessment of the level of democracy as measured by their ability to criticise their governments (between 1 and 10) shows that this ability is limited: 6.0/10. Tunisia, Sudan and Mauritania received the highest evaluations, while Saudi Arabia (3.9) and Palestine (4.6) received the lowest.
3
Figure 4: Democracy Scale Average by Year
2019 /2020 2017 /2018 2016 2015 2014 2012 / 2013 2011
5.8 5.55.3
5.55.2
5.04.5
Figure 5: Criticism of the Government Scale by Country
Tunisi
a
Sudan
Mau
ritan
ia
Leban
on
Algeria
KuwaitIraq
Jord
anQat
ar
Moro
cco
Egyp
t
Palesti
ne
Saudi A
rabia
Aggre
gate
0.0
10.0
6.96.86.86.56.46.46.36.35.85.75.6
4.63.9
6.0
Figure 6: Democracy scale versus ability to criticise the government by region
The GulfThe MaghrebNile ValleyThe Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate0.0
10.0
7.2
5.75.35.05.8
5.4
6.46.25.96.0
Level of democracy The ability of citizens to criticize the government
4
State institutions and government performance
The results show that citizens’ confidence in state institutions is variable. While confidence in military and security institutions is high, confidence in judicial, executive and legislative institutions is weaker, with parliaments enjoying the least confidence of all the institutions. Public opinion is split on the performance of parliaments’ oversight of government or representation of society. Approximately half of respondents believe that parliaments are carrying out their functions in this regard, while the other half do not. These rates are higher in Tunisia and Kuwait, and respondents in the Mashreq disagreed particularly strongly that parliaments were successfully overseeing government performance. The results also show that assessment of government performance in foreign, economic and public and service policy is quite mixed: between 43% and 50% (depending on country) assess it positively, similar to results in previous years.
There is also near consensus on the fact that financial and administrative corruption are widespread in Arab countries: 91% believe that it is present, to varying degrees. Data from previous years show that citizens’ assessments on this point have not changed much. Respondents from the Mashreq were the most likely to say there is corruption, while those in the Gulf were most likely to say that there was no corruption. There is a widespread belief that corruption is similarly common in both the public and private sectors, with slightly more people reporting that it is present in the public sector. 43% of respondents believe that politicians are the group most involved in financial and administrative corruption, with 23% identifying senior economists and 16% senior state employees.
32% of respondents stated that their home countries apply the law equitably to all citizens, while 46% said that they apply the law while giving some groups favorable treatment and 20% that they do not apply the law equally whatsoever. The opinion that countries apply the law inequitably was most common among respondents from the Mashreq.
5
Figure 7: Citizens’ trust in major state institutions (aggregate of all countries)
The Army
Police /General Security/ Gendarmerie
Sharia Courts
The Judiciary
Government/ government Ministries
Councils/ Parliaments
Local Media
Municipal / local councils
Private companies
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
63
39
33
32
28
21
17
17
16
25
37
38
37
31
26
42
37
43
6
12
14
15
16
17
21
19
19
5
10
11
13
23
32
18
23
17
1
2
4
3
2
4
2
4
5
High degree of confidence Confident to some extent Lack Confidence to some extentCompletely lack Confidence DK /Declined to answer
Figure 8: Respondents ’evaluation of the performance of their representative legislative councils in their duty to monitor governments according to Arab world regions
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Gulf
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
27
18
16
9
16
35
39
52
21
38
15
18
13
23
18
13
15
5
44
20
9
10
13
2
8
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree DK/declined to answer
6
Figure 9: Extent of financial and administrative corruption in respondents’ countries over time
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
48
45
46
47
53
56
56
30
31
33
33
30
29
28
13
15
14
12
8
7
7
7
6
4
6
5
4
3
2
3
3
3
4
4
6
Very widespread Widespread to some extent Limited Prevalence
Completely not Prevalent DK /Declined to answer
Figure 10: Extent of financial and administrative corruption in respondents’ countries (by region)
The Levant/ Mashreq
The Maghreb
Nile Valley
The Gulf
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
69
56
52
9
48
22
28
30
41
30
5
9
10
28
13
2
4
5
18
7
1
3
3
5
2
Very widespread Widespread to some extent Limited PrevalenceCompletely not Prevalent DK/declined to answer
7
Figure 11: Extent of financial and administrative corruption in the public and private sectors
Public sector
Private sector
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
50
29
33
40
12
22
3
5
2
4
Very widespread Widespread to some extent Limited Prevalence
Completely not Prevalent DK /Declined to answer
Figure 12: Groups contributing most to contribution
Most contributing 2nd most contributing Average
Politicians 43 15 29Senior Economists 23 25 24Senior State Employees 16 30 23Municipality heads, mayors 4 10 7Junior employees 6 6 6Media and Press figures 3 6 5Others 1 0 1I don’t know/won’t reply 4 -- 2No other choice -- 8 4Total 100 100 100
8
Figure 13: Equitable application of the law over time
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
33
28
24
25
21
22
19
45
52
54
54
53
50
48
20
18
20
21
22
22
26
2
2
2
1
4
5
7
The state applies the rule of law fairly and equitablyThe state applies the rule of law but favors some groups of citizens over othersThe state dose not apply the rule of law at allDK /Declined to answer
Figure 14: Equitable application of the law (by region)
The Gulf
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
71
33
28
9
33
25
49
49
55
45
3
16
19
35
20
2
2
4
1
2
The state applies the rule of law fairly and equitablyThe state applies the rule of law but favors some groups of citizens over othersThe state dose not apply the rule of law at allDK/declined to answer
9
The Arab SpringSince 2011, the majority of respondents have looked positively at the Arab Spring, with 58% stating that the revolutions and protests of that year were positive (very or somewhat positive) and only 28% negative (very or somewhat negative). The highest level of support was in Egypt, where 82% of respondents stated that the Arab Spring had been positive; 57% of Jordanians deemed it negative. 22% of Saudis described it as negative, with a large rate of nonresponse: 44% refused to answer. Respondents held that the revolutions and popular protests were a response to corruption, poor economic conditions and authoritarian regimes and an attempt to bring about a transition to democracy.
The results show that popular opinion is confused about the present state and future of revolutions. 48% of respondents stated that that the Arab Spring is facing obstacles but will ultimately achieve its goals and 30% that it is over and that the old regimes have returned to power.
The majority of Arab citizens support the protests which have emerged recently in countries such as Sudan and Algeria. Majorities in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon and Sudan all expressed support for popular protests in their own countries: 85% of Sudanese respondents, 82% of Iraqis, 71% of Algerians and 67% of Lebanese. The reported rates of participation in protests ranged between 15% in Iraq and 37% in Sudan.
Figure 15: Support for the 2011 protests and revolutions over time
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
25
20
18
10
17
25
33
29
33
24
28
36
13
16
19
25
17
11
15
23
22
34
25
11
14
12
8
7
12
17
Very positive Positive, to some extent Negative, to some extent Very negativeDK /Declined to answer
10
Figure 16: Support for the 2011 protests and revolutions by region
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Gulf
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
45
28
21
17
25
30
32
34
34
33
9
10
13
18
13
7
14
12
21
15
10
16
21
10
14
Very positive Positive, to some extent Negative, to some extentVery negative DK/declined to answer
Figure 17: Most important most reasons for the outbreak of the Arab Spring
The reasons important most reasons
Against corruption 31Due to poor economic conditions 16Against dictatorship 16For political freedoms 6To end oppression 6For justice and equality 4For democracy 3For dignity 4Other 1don’t know, decline to respond 13No other choice 0Total 100
11
Figure 18: Support and opposition for protests in Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria and Sudan
Sudan
Iraq
Algeria
Lebanon
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
85
82
71
67
5
16
6
31
10
2
23
2
Support Oppose DK/Declined to answer
Figure 19: Assessment of the fate of the Arab Spring (choice of two statements) over time
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
48
45
45
48
60
30
34
39
35
17
8
9
7
9
10
14
13
10
8
13
The Arab Spring is presently facing obstacles but will eventually achieve its aimsThe Arab Spring has come to an end and the old regimes are returning to poweNeither of the two statementsDK /Declined to answer
12
Figure 19: Assessment of the fate of the Arab Spring (choice of two statements) by region
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Gulf
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
59
49
47
43
48
24
25
28
40
30
9
6
7
9
8
8
20
18
8
14
The Arab Spring is presently facing obstacles but will eventually achieve its aimsThe Arab Spring has come to an end and the old regimes are returning to powerNeither of the two statementsDK/declined to answer
Figure 20: Participation in protests in Sudan, Algeria, Lebanon and Iraq
Sudan
Algeria
Lebanon
Iraq
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
37
27
20
15
62
67
80
84
1
6
0
1
Yes No Declined to answer
13
The role of religion
Most Arabs define their own religiosity in one of three ways: “Religious to some extent” (63%) or “Very religious” (23%), and only 12% of Arabs defined themselves as “Not religious”.
Figure 21: Self-identified religiosity over time
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
23
21
20
24
24
21
19
63
65
65
63
64
67
66
12
12
12
9
8
8
11
2
2
3
4
4
4
4
Very religious Religious to some extent Not religious Dk/Declined to answer
Figure 22: Self-identified religiosity by region
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Gulf
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
34
28
20
15
23
55
54
69
72
63
9
14
8
12
12
2
5
4
1
2
Very religious Religious to some extent Not religious DK/declined to answer
14
While a majority of Arabs are religious, to varying extents, this does not preclude widespread religious tolerance: 65% of respondents believe that no religious authorities have the right to denounce followers of variant interpretations of their own religion, or to declare followers of other religions to be apostates. Additionally, 61% of Arabs show no real preferences for other religious individuals in their personal, day-to-day dealings, nor do they believe that irreligious people are generally worse individuals than they are. 71% of respondents believe that the state or electoral candidates should not use religion to win support or votes.
AOI data shows that public opinion in the Arab region is divided on the separation of religion and politics, with the majority favoring this separation. It is worth noting that the number of respondents supporting separation has been gradually increasing since 2011, with the highest level of support (more than 80%) in Lebanon and Iraq and the lowest in Saudi Arabia and Algeria (60%).
Figure 23: Support for the statement "No religious authority is entitled to declare followers of other religions to be infidels"
Egypt Jordan
LebanonTunisia
IraqMoroccoPalestine
KuwaitSudan
MauritaniaQatar
Saudi ArabiaAlgeria
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
5542
3829
272625
1616
1312
103
24
323746
2840
3855
5855
3546
4013
41
612
1015
1414
1319
2027
2124
5018
482
1714
754
516
1213
139
31
411
515
234
99
1321
8
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Dk/Declined to answer
15
Figure 24: Support for the statement "No religious authority is entitled to declare followers of other religions to be infidels" by region
Nile Valley
The Levant/ Mashreq
The Maghreb
The Gulf
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
36
33
18
13
24
43
45
29
48
41
13
12
27
22
18
5
7
13
10
9
4
3
14
8
8
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree DK/declined to answer
Figure 25: Responses to the question "In your day-to-day life, do you prefer to deal with religious individuals?" over time
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
30
31
35
35
38
35
26
7
7
9
9
8
7
0
62
61
54
55
52
56
70
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
I prefer to deal with religious individuals I prefer to deal with non-religious individuals
I have no preference Dk/Declined to answer
16
Figure 26: Responses to the question "In your day-to-day life, do you prefer to deal with religious individuals?" by region
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Gulf
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
37
35
26
24
30
8
5
5
8
7
54
58
68
68
62
1
2
1
1
1
I prefer to deal with religious individuals I prefer to deal with non-religious individualsI have no preference DK/declined to answer
Figure 27: Support for the statement "The government has no right to use religion to win support for its policies."
EgyptLebanon
IraqMorocco
TunisiaJordan
MauritaniaSudan
KuwaitPalestine
AlgeriaSaudi Arabia
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
5535
333332
3026
2120
1788
27
3549
4036
2743
375357
5353
4044
611
1414
1818
2518
1921
2018
17
33
124
158
65
35
311
6
121
138
16
31
416
236
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Dk/Declined to answer
17
Figure 28: Support for the statement "The government has no right to use religion to win support for its policies” by region
Nile Valley
The Levant/ Mashreq
The Maghreb
The Gulf
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
38
29
25
14
27
44
46
38
49
44
12
16
19
19
17
4
7
7
7
6
2
2
11
12
6
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree DK/declined to answer
Figure 29: Support for the statement "It would be better for my home country if religion was separated from politics" over time
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
20
21
23
22
24
19
26
29
31
30
30
27
27
17
27
25
25
27
25
27
16
17
16
16
16
15
14
26
7
7
6
5
9
13
16
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Dk/Declined to answer
18
Figure 30: Support for the statement "It would be better for my home country if religion was separated from politics" by region
The Levant/ Mashreq
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Gulf
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
29
24
16
11
20
37
30
21
30
29
20
26
29
31
27
11
16
23
19
17
3
4
11
10
7
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree DK/declined to answer
Economic and political conditions
44% of citizens characterized the political conditions in their country as generally good (very good or good), while 50% characterized them as bad (very bad or bad).
Figure 31: Respondents’ assessment of political conditions in their country over time
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
16
10
10
12
9
7
32
29
30
31
27
32
25
31
29
26
31
32
22
24
26
26
28
21
5
6
5
4
5
8
very good good bad very bad Dk /declined to answer
19
Figure 32: Respondents’ assessment of political conditions in their country by region
The Gulf
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
53
7
5
3
16
35
40
37
21
32
6
29
28
32
25
1
16
20
41
22
5
8
9
2
5
very good good bad very bad DK /declined to answer
The results also show that citizens’ economic conditions are very unsatisfactory. 45% say that their family’s income covers basic needs but that they are unable to save (i.e. in hardship), while 28% say that they face difficulties making ends meet (i.e. in need). Excluding Gulf respondents, the majority of citizens in Arab countries are either in hardship or in need.
Figure 33: Self-reported household income level by region
The Gulf
The Maghreb
Nile Valley
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
51
25
23
14
27
40
36
51
49
43
6
31
25
36
26
3
8
1
1
4
My household’s income covers expenditures sufficiently and allows us to saveMy household’s income covers our expenditures but does not allow us to saveMy household’s income is not sufficient for necessary expenditures and we face difficultiesDK /declined to answer
20
80% of respondents believe that the inhabitants of the Arab World constitute a single nation even if individual Arab peoples are differentiated from one another. Only 16% state that they constitute more than one nation.
Figure 34: Assessments of Arab national unity over time
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
36
35
40
37
39
44
35
45
42
37
42
42
35
36
16
19
19
18
14
14
17
3
4
4
3
5
7
11
The Arab peoples constitute a single nation, separated by artificial borders The Arab peoples constitute a single nation, even if each people has its own specificitiesThe Arab peoples are distinct nations, tied together by only tenuous links Dk /Declined to answer
Figure 35: Assessments of Arab national unity by region
The Maghreb
Nile Valley
The Gulf
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
41
38
37
28
36
41
49
51
43
45
14
10
7
27
16
5
3
4
2
3
The Arab peoples constitute a single nation, separated by artificial borders The Arab peoples constitute a single nation, even if each people has its own specificitiesThe Arab peoples are distinct nations, tied together by only tenuous links Dk /Declined to answer
21
Regional and international politics
Respondents’ assessments of some foreign powers’ policies showed a level of mistrust: the majority perceive US, Russian, and Iranian policy in the region negatively, more negatively in fact than in previous surveys. The view of US policy saw further decline this year, perhaps reflecting respondent assessment of/reaction to the Trump administration.
Figure 36: Public perception of various foreign powers’ Arab policy
Turkish foreign policy
Chinese foreign policy
German foreign policy
French foreign policy
Russian foreign policy
American foreign policy
Iranian foreign policy
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
29
23
21
17
14
11
8
29
32
31
29
26
21
17
10
13
13
16
17
16
18
18
16
15
23
24
42
40
14
16
20
15
19
10
17
Positive Positive, to some extent Negative, to some extent Negative Dk /Declined to answer
Almost three quarters of respondents characterized US policy on Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen as bad. Three fifths characterized Iranian and Russian policy with regard to the same countries as negative as well.
22
Figure 37: Assessment of US foreign policy
American policy towards Palestine
American policy towards Syria
American policy towards Yemen
American policy towards Libya
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1
2
2
1
6
8
10
6
27
28
30
22
54
49
44
48
12
13
14
23
Very Positive Positive Negative Very Negative Dk /Declined to answer
Figure 38: Assessment of Russian foreign policy
Russian policy towards Pales-
tine
Russian policy towards Syria
Russian policy towards Yemen
Russian policy towards Libya
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
3
6
3
8
15
15
15
15
29
24
30
26
30
36
30
21
23
19
22
30
Very Positive Positive Negative Very Negative Dk /Declined to answer
23
Figure 39: Assessment of Iranian foreign policy
Iranian policy towards Pales-
tine
Iranian policy towards Syria
Iranian policy towards Yemen
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
6
9
7
17
15
16
27
27
28
31
33
33
19
16
16
Very Positive Positive Negative Very Negative Dk /Declined to answer
Israel and the United States in particular were also identified as the greatest threats to collective Arab security: 90% of Arabs named Israel as the country which posed the greatest threat to collective Arab security, and 82% of respondents said that the US threatened collective Arab security. In a similar question, 68% of Arabs agreed that Iran is a threat to the stability of the Arab region, and 65% pointed to France. In sum, there is a firmly entrenched public view which regards Israeli policy as the greatest threat to the region’s security and stability.
24
Figure 40: Assessment of foreign threats over time
2017 /2018
2019 /2020
2016
2017 /2018
2019 /2020
2016
2017 /2018
2019 /2020
2016
2017 /2018
Israe
lUS
AIra
nRu
ssia
France
China
Turke
y0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
8082
8065
7063
4947
5231
3445
2322
3316
1322
1915
19
98
916
1419
1819
2124
2324
2123
2616
1517
1619
19
323
858
1212
102018
142725
2129
2627
2423
24
322
53
39
97
109
616
139
2425
2029
3028
5666
87
1213
91516
1013
1712
1521
141213
10
Certainly Yes, to an extent No, to an extent Certainly NotDk /Declined to answer
With respect to the Palestine question – and of particular relevance given recent developments and claims that Arabs are becoming less concerned with Palestine – the results show clearly that Arab societies continue to see Palestine as an issue of relevance to all Arabs and not just to Palestinians. 88% of citizens refuse to recognize Israel, citing a range of factors: particularly that the state of Israel is colonialist, racist or expansionist. It is clear that these positions are not rooted in cultural or religious positions. The majority of Sudanese and Saudi citizens reject recognition of Israel, in spite of a high rate of nonresponse in the Saudi context given current conditions of repression.
25
Figure 41: Support for governments recognizing Israel over time
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
6
8
9
9
6
6
9
88
87
86
85
87
87
84
6
5
5
6
7
6
7
Support Oppose Dk /Declined to answer
Figure 42: Support for governments recognizing Israel by region
The Maghreb
The Levant/ Mashreq
Nile Valley
The Gulf
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
3
6
13
7
6
93
92
82
82
88
4
2
5
11
6
Support Oppose Dk /Declined to answer
26
Figure 43: Reasons given for opposing diplomatic recognition of Israel since 2014 (as a percentage of respondents)
Reasons cited to oppose diplomatic recognition of Israel/year of survey
2019 /2020
2017 /2018 2016 2015 2014
Colonialist occupying power in Palestine 33.7 31.7 27.0 24.5 23.4
Expansionist state set on controlling more Arab territory 9.4 10.1 13.0 13.0 2.4
A terrorist state/supports terrorism 7.6 7.4 7.6 10.4 1.2
Israeli dispossession of the Palestinians; continued oppression of the Palestinians
6.8 8.3 8.1 6.9 5.5
Religious reasons to oppose Israel 6.7 6.6 5.2 3.3 4.9
(Israel) is racist towards Arabs 5.9 6.3 8.2 10.3 12.2
Recognizing Israel negates the Palestinian people 4.8 5.3 5.8 5.6 7.5
Israel is an enemy of my people/the Arabs in general 4.1 3.4 3.3 4.7 11.5
Israel threatens regional security 3.6 3.4 3.2 3.4 2.5
Israel violates agreements and treaties 1.6 1.6 2.1 2.4 2.3
Israel does not exist 2.3 1.1 0.6 0.3 3.4
No reasons given 1.9 1.6 1.8 0.6 10.2
Total of those opposed to recognizing Israel 88.2 86.8 85.9 85.4 87.0Approve of the recognition of Israel 6.2 7.9 9.5 8.9 6.0Do not know/declined to answer (as a percentage of respondents)
5.65 5 6 7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Figure 44: Reasons given for opposing diplomatic recognition of Israel by region
Mashreq Maghreb Gulf Nile Valley Average
Colonialist occupying power in Palestine 43.4 36.1 26.0 21.0 33.7
Expansionist state set on controlling more Arab territory
10.4 9.4 8.0 9.5 9.4
A terrorist state/supports terrorism 9.6 4.3 6.5 11.5 7.6
Israeli dispossession of the Palestinians; continued oppression of the Palestinians
5.1 8.4 6.5 7.4 6.8
Religious reasons to oppose Israel 3.6 10.5 6.0 6.3 6.7
(Israel) is racist towards Arabs 5.7 5.7 6.3 6.0 5.9
Recognizing Israel negates the Palestinian people
3.7 5.8 4.5 5.8 4.8
Israel is an enemy of my people/the Arabs in general
4.1 3.6 3.4 6.2 4.1
Israel threatens regional security 3.5 3.4 2.9 4.9 3.6
Israel violates agreements and treaties 1.5 1.5 1.3 2.6 1.6
Israel does not exist 1.1 1.4 6.4 0.1 2.3
No reasons given 0.7 3.1 2.7 0.8 1.9
Total of those opposed to recognizing Israel 92.1 93.2 80.4 82.3 88.2
Approve of the recognition of Israel 6.1 2.6 6.3 13.2 6.2
Do not know/declined to answer (as a percentage of respondents)
1.8 4.1 13.4 4.7 5.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
27
Social mediaInternet usage is on the increase, with only 27% of respondents stating that they do not use the internet as opposed to 72% who say that they do. 86% of internet users report having a Facebook account, 39% a Twitter account and 53% an Instagram account. 72% of social media users say that they use it to get political news and information, 57% to express their opinions on political events, and 53% to engage with political issues. Respondents from Saudi Arabia and Jordan were the least likely to use social media for political purposes. 86% of internet users report that they use Arabic to surf the web, while the most used second language was English (28%).
Figure 45: Frequency of internet use
Daily or semi-daily
63
Several times a week
5
Several times a month
1
Infrequently4
I do not use the internet
26
Declined to answer1
Figure 46: Respondents who report using the internet or not using the internet by region
The Gulf
The Levant/ Mashreq
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
78
77
45
44
63
5
3
4
7
5
1
1
2
2
1
3
2
7
5
4
11
17
42
40
26
3
1
2
1
Daily or semi-daily Several times a week Several times a month Infrequently
I do not use the internet Declined to answer
28
Figure 47: Respondents who report having a social media account, by website
Snapchat
Telegram
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
86
84
56
44
43
28
14
16
44
56
57
72
Yes, I have an account No, I do not have an account
Figure 48: Respondents who state that they have a social media account by region
The
Mag
hreb
The
Leva
nt/ M
ashr
eq
Nile
Val
ley
The
Gul
f
Aggr
egat
e
The
Mag
hreb
The
Leva
nt/ M
ashr
eq
Nile
Val
ley
The
Gulf
Aggr
egat
e
The
Mag
hreb
The
Leva
nt/ M
ashr
eq
Nile
Val
ley
The
Gul
f
Aggr
egat
e
The
Mag
hreb
The
Leva
nt/ M
ashr
eq
Nile
Val
ley
The
Gulf
Aggr
egat
e
The
Mag
hreb
The
Leva
nt/ M
ashr
eq
Nile
Val
ley
The
Gulf
Aggr
egat
e
The
Mag
hreb
The
Leva
nt/
Mas
hreq
Nile
Val
ley
The
Gulf
Aggr
egat
e
FacebookWhatsappInstagramSnapchatTwitterTelegram
0102030405060708090100
939094
64
86
60
899396
84
485142
85
56
2925
44
87
44
2925
44
87
43
1624
33
48
28
29
Figure 49: Frequency of internet use to engage with political issues
IraqSudanEgypt
MauritaniaTunisiaQatar
LebanonPalestine
AlgeriaKuwait
MoroccoJordan
Saudi ArabiaAggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
37373635
2513
2216151515
1312
22
252829
2317
2625
203335
29811
24
81315
12615
1411
2221
196
1113
2821
2030
5146
3752
2928
3472
6440
21
1
2111
3121
Daily or semi-daily Several times a week Less than once a week Never Declined to answer
Figure 50: Frequency of internet use to engage with political issues by region
Nile Valley
The Levant/ Mashreq
The Maghreb
The Gulf
Aggregate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
21
22
36
13
22
26
20
28
24
24
15
10
14
16
13
36
47
21
46
40
2
1
1
2
1
Several times a day Several times a week/once a week Less than once a week Never
Declined to answer
30
Figure 51: First and second languages used while surfing the internet
Most common language Second most common languageArabic 87 7French 7 13English 4 30Kurdish 1 0Other 0 1Refused to answer 1 --No second language -- 49Total 100 100
Results on ISIL or Islamic StateResults from the 2019-2020 survey show an overwhelming majority (92%) of the Arab public does has a negative view of ISIL, with only 2% expressing a “positive” view, and 3% “positive to some extent”. Positive views of ISIL do not correlate with agreement with their ideology or way of life: those who support the separation of religion and state are just as likely to have a positive view of ISIL as those who do not. Rather, these views are rooted in a political attitude linked to political conditions in the region.
Figure 52: General view of ISIL
Very positive3
Positive, to some extent
2
Negative, to some extent
10
Very negative78
DK /Declined to answer
7
Fighting terror in the region
The Arab public offers a diverse set of remedies when asked to suggest the best means by which to combat ISIL. When given the chance to define their first and second preferences on how to tackle ISIL in particular, and terrorist groups more broadly, 17% favored resolving the Palestinian issue; 15% foreign intervention; 13% direct military action; 12% supporting democracy; 11% solving economic problems; 7% purifying Islam of extreme positions; and 5% resolving the Syrian crisis and addressing the aspirations of the Syrian people.
31
Figure 53: Proposed remedies to ISIL/terrorism more broadly, first choice made by respondents
Resolving the Palestinian issue
Stopping foreign interference in the region
Intensifying military efforts in the war against terrorist organizations
Supporting democratic transition in the Arab region
Solving economic problems (such as unemployment and poverty)
Purging extremist interpretations of Islam
Finding a solution to the Syrian crisis in line with the aspirations of the Syrian people
Spreading a culture of religious tolerance
Changing sectarian policies in some countries (Iraq and Syria) to become citizenship states
Ending the Libyan crisis in a manner which meets the aspirations of the Libyan people
DK/Declined to answer
0 10 20 30
17
15
13
12
11
7
5
5
4
1
10
32