Zion(Williamson)ism Aff+Neg – Komodo Dragons

A Komodo Dragons’ Production, brought to you in part, by:AashniArhanAvishaCallumCatherineClaireDerekHarrisonJackJacksonJaniseJewelJudyJuliaLauraMaddyMateoNoahPranavQuinRyanSaatvikSoniaSterlingMaxWilliamTommyeMichael

***File Notes***A) 19 U.S. Code § 4452 = State of IsraelCornell Law No Date (“19 U.S. Code § 4452. United States-Israel trade and commercial enhancement,” https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/4452, ME)(a) Findings Congress finds the following:(1) Israel is America’s dependable, democratic ally in the Middle East—an area of paramount strategic importance to the United States.(2) The United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement formed the modern foundation of the bilateral commercial relationship between the two countries and was the first such agreement signed by the United States with a foreign country.(3) The United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement has been instrumental in expanding commerce and the strategic relationship between the United States and Israel.(4) More than $45,000,000,000 in goods and services is traded annually between the two countries, in addition to roughly $10,000,000,000 in United States foreign direct investment in Israel.(5) The United States continues to look for and find new opportunities to enhance cooperation with Israel, including through the enactment of the United States-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012 (Public Law 112–150; 22 U.S.C. 8601 et seq.) and the United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2014 (Public Law 113–296; 128 Stat. 4075).

B) Why U.S. Code and not “State of Israel?” – This avoids the plan explicitly “recognizing Israel” and implicitly “not recognizing Palestine.” No word PICs at the camp, but useful to think about for potential critique angles that could emerge from the Militarism K or something similar. Hint: The Militarism K + the Israeli DIB DA is slayer if you can explain the argument I’ve enthymematically suggested here and know how to make Floating PIKs happen.

C) How to Incorporate the Komodo Dragons’ and Golden Bears’ Files in a few easy steps when thinking about the camp tournament:

1. Most of the Golden Bears’ 2AC toolbox for disadvantages/counterplans/kritiks should also apply to this affirmative. The materials that would not apply are arguments specific to “phasing out arms sales.”

2. All of the DA work with the exception of the Israel DIB DA should be interchangeable as neg offense (I have not personally seen the file yet, so don’t quote me or blame a RFD on me if you didn’t read the files closely!). The Israel DIB DA (as a DA) is one of the Golden Bears’ advantages. Therefore, most of the Golden Bears’ advantage will boost the DA, and the neg to their advantage will supplement the Komodo Dragons’ aff answers.

3. Most of the “advantage” in this file can be reconstructed as a DA or “K” (unconditional, immediate CP with Settler Colonialism NB) against the Golden Bears’ affirmative if the cards are re-tooled a bit (re-tagged, re-underlined, etc.).

D) Other relevant camp files should supplement (at least) negative arguments (and corresponding affirmative answers) in this file, such as the Alliance DA, the Lashout DAs, the two counterplans, the China/Russia Fill-In DA (honestly don’t think those link), and so forth. 2020 DA probably not being put out by the camp, but included to help folks out with early season debates on the issue.

E) THERE IS VERY LITTLE “CASE NEG!” ARE YOU RIGGING THIS FILE? – No. Four things to consider. First, the Resettlement Turn, the Israeli DIB DA, and the Lashout DA are all probably better served as arguments on the case than their own positions but are separated for your convenience. Second, the Alliance DA is the bread and butter of going negative against this affirmative (regardless of which version of the Israel aff you are debating) and directly impact turns the affirmative (so “framing debates” will be especially important). Third, if you synthesize the Golden Bears’ Israeli Defense Industry advantage with the DA provided, you’ll have a very, very robust case debate. Finally, the advantage is settler colonialism, but the aff doesn’t make any “ontology” claims (and the case neg DOES include answers to the “epistemology first” arguments). What other arguments are you going to make? Settler colonialism good? Palestine bad? Come on folks, it’s 2019; you shouldn’t really be making those arguments. Plus, the aff doesn’t “take a stance” on the peace process (for good reason), so that isn’t going to get you far.

F) Okay, but why DOESN’T the aff take a stance on the peace process? – Well, a couple things. Anyone who thinks that 1) reducing arms sales would actually lead to successful peace negotiations lives in a very interesting world, and 2), Alt Causes – Jared Kushner, moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, and Netanyahu’s re-election – show me the cards that answer those three arguments and I’ll release a supplement. Plus, another camp already took that angle and I’m not here to be Some Other Camp 2.0. Feel free to do that after camp ends.

G) Why does the plan say “Indefinitely Suspend?” – As far as camp goes, only one real reason. Look at the other affirmatives and ask yourself if you’re going to (potentially) get any quality Topicality debates during the camp tournament? No? There’s your answer. If I’m wrong, I guess I invited a T debate for no good reason, but I’m in favor of increasing the diversity of arguments available at the camp, and in addition to writing the camp’s “K Aff” (whatever that means), our lab is interested in giving folks more opportunities to at least engage in a clearly delineated topicality debate (e.g. Reduce must be permanent) and an affirmative that takes a more critical-leaning approach to the topic (but still has a plan to preserve debates over the majority of the substance on Israel).

H) Last One! So, you have things labeled as “2AC,” “1NC,” etc. Good to go, right!? NO!!! These are suggestions for where things fit best, and very little is highlighted. WRITE BLOCKS AND FRONTLINES OR ACCEPT YOUR L AND MOVE ON!

AFFIRMATIVE

***1AC***Contention I is Settler Colonialism Is-rael

Our story begins in 1948, when Israeli settlers used the ruse of a “Jewish Majority in a Jewish State” to democratically eviscerate Palestinian culture

Lowrance in 2005 writes…(Sherry, assistant Professor of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, “Being Palestinian in Israel: Identity, Protest, and Social Exclusion”, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East,” Project Muse, ME)Zionist pioneers began moving to the area called Palestine at the end of the nineteenth century motivated by Enlightenment ideas of the nation-state and the occurrence of anti- Semitic violence in Eastern Europe . Their arrival and the establishment of protostate institutions did not prepare them

for the reality of Palestine at the time. How could Zionists create a Jewish state in Palestine when Palestinian Arabs comprised the overwhelming majority of inhabitants? Zionist thought had not done

much to answer this question, displaying instead mostly avoidance or denial of the issue.23 During the war of 1948 that established the state of Israel, the majority of Palestinians were expelled or fled , thereby nominally "solving" the so-called Arab problem. Those Palestinians remaining comprised about 19 percent of the population of Israel and were eventually made Israeli citizens. Most of

the Palestinian leadership and economic elite remained in exile, so Palestinian citizens in Israel found themselves leaderless and placed under harsh military rule similar to Israel's current rule in the West Bank and Gaza. Unaccustomed to Jewish politics and institutions, as well as the new language, Palestinians were largely unequipped to seriously negotiate with the new government about their plight. For their part, Jewish Israel is largely ignored the Palestinian minority and went about the business of state building and nation building. As Israeli Palestinians comprised a relatively small numerical minority, their Israeli citizenship was not thought to constitute a

threat to Jewish state- and nation-building activities, particularly since they were controlled by a tough military regime. Thus, the Israeli government was able to clear the borders of Palestinian villages—thought to be a security threat—and confiscate large amounts of land with little reaction from the demoralized and disorganized minority. Israeli actions remained largely uncontested until

the 1970s. Because of the legacy of centuries of discrimination and exile and the need to carve out a secure national home in hostile territory, Israeli policymakers created policies meant to serve Jewish interests in the state of Israel and to solidify Jewish

demographic, economic, and political predominance in the formerly Arab-majority territory. Thus, after the exigencies of war created a Jewish-majority Israeli state, Israeli elites were able to use the democratic legitimacy of the Jewish majority to create policies that favor Jewish Israelis at the expense of the Palestinian Israeli minority , thus solidifying the Jewish-ethnic ( nationalizing ) nature of the state. According to the Israeli Declaration of Independence, Israel is the state of the Jewish people, but Palestinian citizens are to be considered equal. Thus, in theory at least, they should enjoy equal rights with Jewish

citizens. In practice, however, Palestinian Israelis are not treated equally . [End Page 491] Most Israeli laws are ethnically neutral in their wording and appear to be nondiscriminatory at first

glance. However, the effects of Israeli policy are far from equal. The ostensibly neutral laws often employ nonneutral criteria , such as military service or geographic location, for the distribution of benefits. These criteria generally mask ethnic differences , as most Palestinian citizens do not serve in the military and they tend to live in geographically concentrated areas . As a result of Israeli policy, Palestinians suffer from low standards of living and considerable economic deprivation . Palestinian localities receive only a fraction of what Jewish municipalities receive from the government. For example, the 1999 budget for Arab local authorities comprised only 8 percent of the regular budget for local authorities in Israel, which represents an expenditure of only two-thirds of the per capita expense for residents of Jewish local authorities.24 Additionally, Palestinian localities are generally excluded from designation as " national priority areas ," which receive additional development funds from the government, even though Palestinian areas are among the poorest in the country. 25 Housing and land discrimination further compounds the economic

plight of Palestinian citizens. Palestinian lands have been expropriated at a dizzying rate since 1948. Today, 93 percent of all land in Israel comes under direct state control, whereas the Jewish community owned just 6 to 7 percent of the land prior to 1948.26 Much of the land that remains in Palestinian hands is restricted in use , which limits the growth of Palestinian localities in response to natural population increase. 27 In large part because of housing and land discrimination, Palestinian citizens of Israel experience considerable economic deprivation. Land expropriation and displacement have reduced their collective wealth,

leaving a legacy of economic disadvantage from the outset. Furthermore, inferior education in Palestinian localities inadequately trains them for high-paying jobs, 28 while inferior economic and physical infrastructures, combined with a lack of land and state investment provide an unfavorable climate for economic development in Palestinian centers of population.29 Israeli Palestinians are generally not allowed employment in

the "security complex," which plays a large role in the Israeli economy and provides a large proportion of high-skilled technical jobs such as engineering. Jobs in the military industries, private contractors to the military, and many other peripherally related jobs

require security clearance, which Palestinian citizens find difficult or impossible to obtain.30 Inequities such as those described above continue to exist in great part because of a lack of Israeli Palestinian representation in decision-making bodies. Palestinian Israelis have the right to vote in Israeli elections, but they are prevented from translating their potential voting power into effective policymaking. One reason is because of Section

7(A) of the Basic Law: The Knesset and the Law of Political Parties , which prohibits a party from contesting elections if it rejects Israel "as a state of the Jewish people." 31 According to Supreme Court

interpretation, the definition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people means that Jews form the majority in the state, and Jews are therefore entitled to preferential treatment. A political party that rejects these principles may be disqualified, according to this interpretation.

Thus, a political party that calls for equality between Arabs and Jews —as most Arab parties do— could [End Page 492] theoretically be disqualified from elections . As a result of this legal interpretation, the Arab parties remain in a precarious state

of legal limbo.32 Since the 1992 amendment of the law to its present form, however, no Arab political party has been disqualified on this basis. The most recent elections, in January 2003, witnessed attempts to disqualify several Palestinian Israeli candidates and parties, as well as some right-wing Jewish candidates. Although the Central Election Committee voted to disqualify the nationalist Balad/Tajamu' party and two Palestinian Israeli candidates, Ahmed Tibi and Azmi Bishara, the High Court reinstated their candidacies before the elections.33 Nevertheless, this development illustrates the precarious situation of Arab parties in Israel and their vulnerability to the demands of the Jewish majority. They are unable to represent their constituencies effectively because of the legal limits placed on their platforms and activities. In addition to the legal limits that they must endure, Arab parties are also negatively impacted by informal limits on their coalition participation. Israel's parliamentary system concentrates most state power in a coalition

cabinet and prime minister. Exclusion from the coalition effectively means exclusion from significant decision-making power. No Arab party has ever been part of an Israeli government coalition because of a powerful consensus among Jewish policymakers and public that Arab parties, as non-Zionist or anti-Zionist parties, are too radical for participation in decision making in a Jewish state. The most powerful position the Arab parties have ever reached was as part of a "blocking majority" that kept the rightist Likud party from forming a government between 1992 and 1996. Despite

their status as a blocking force, the Arab parties could not point to any concrete achievements benefiting Arabs in Israel.34 Although Israeli Palestinian members of Zionist parties have been included in coalitions, their influence within the party is quite limited, and they have been unable or unwilling to express non-Zionist viewpoints. Israel sees itself as concerned with Jewish issues with which non-Jews should have no part in influencing. Thus, many Jewish members of the Knesset have vehemently opposed participating in any coalition that includes Arab parties, and as a result, Arab parties have not even been invited to coalition-building negotiations. The platforms of Arab parties lie outside of the Zionist consensus that reigns in Israel among the Jewish population and is

institutionalized in the Israeli state structure. According to this consensus, Israel is the "state of the Jewish people," and thus it exists to benefit Jews and to rectify the legacy of centuries of anti-Semitism. As a result, As'ad Ghanem concluded that "Arabs have never had any real opportunity to participate in decision-making , whether on domestic or foreign policy issues."35 Since the outbreak of hostilities in the occupied territories in October 2000, Israeli Palestinian citizens have been subject to greater scrutiny by the Jewish majority. Their links to the Palestinians

engaged in a violent uprising have not been viewed favorably, and policies designed to neutralize Israeli Palestinians' capability to threaten the Jewish majority and its grip on the state have been instituted. New laws placing broader restrictions on parties and candidates for election were passed in 2002, which prevented candidates or parties from contesting elections that implicitly or explicitly deny Israel's existence as a Jewish and democratic state or supporting armed struggle against Israel. Another law criminalized incitement to racism, violence, or terror by prohibiting calls "for an act of violence for terrorism"; expressing sympathy, praise, or encouragement for violence or terror; or supporting or identifying with such acts. A third law allows the Knesset to strip a Knesset

member of parliamentary immunity if he speaks out against the state, expresses support for armed struggle against Israel, or denies that Israel is a Jewish and democratic state. These laws have been interpreted as prohibiting support for the Palestinian uprising [End Page 493] or for equality between Israeli Palestinians and Jews, thereby silencing the Israeli Palestinian leadership and stripping the Israeli Palestinian public of its voice on issues central to the community. 36 Together with physical attacks on Israeli Palestinian Knesset members and expensive, time-consuming legal investigations of their activities, the new laws and other developments have come to be called a "campaign of delegitimization" aimed against Israeli Palestinians' potential political power. 37 Framed against the background of more than a half century of discrimination and political disempowerment

contrasted with the democratic freedoms and influence promised — but not delivered —by the Israeli political system, Israeli Palestinians have become even more disillusioned with Israeli politics than ever before . Many frustrated Israeli Palestinians have come to identify the ethnic Jewish nature of the state as the cause for their suffering. Since the nationalizing policies of the Jewish state aim to strengthen the Jewish

demographic, economic, and political position in Israel, it is understandable that the Israeli Palestinian minority would target the nationalizing ethnic nature of the state in its criticisms. Such trends feed into the trend toward greater Palestinian identification and less Israeli identification and may encourage system-challenging behavior such as vote boycotting and protest action meant to send strong signals of disenchantment to the political establishment. Israel's nationalizing policies, therefore, are enormously unpopular

among Israeli Palestinians and are damaging to their interests. These policies can be seen as largely incompatible with the desires of Israeli Palestinians to identify, act, and be accepted as Israeli. Although Israel's democratic political system holds out the promise of equality for all citizens and the potential for all citizens to be considered "Israeli," the reality of Israeli Palestinian disempowerment has precluded such a possibility on a wide scale . While some Israeli Palestinians remain optimistic about their ability to improve their conditions through democratic politics and practical

accommodation to Zionism, this trend appears to be a diminishing minority in the Israeli Palestinian community.

Since 1948, arms sales to Israel have been the long-term, structuring element of settler colonialism and essential to the oppression of indigenous populationsBadillo research analyst at Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East ’19 (Anna, “The US-Israel ‘special relationship’ subsidizes American military industry and Israeli colonialism,” April 9 https://thedefensepost.com/2019/04/09/us-israel-arms-sales-opinion/, ME)In the wake of U.S. President Donald Trump’s recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Syrian Golan Heights, we are seeing a continuation of the Trump’s administration’s flat-out rejection of international law on the status of occupied territories held by Israel since 1967. The timing is significant because it is an attempt by Trump to meddle in the Israeli elections on April 9 which ultimately could benefit Benjamin Netanyahu’s chances for re-election. The Trump administration seems to care very little about international consensus and international law on the status of the occupied territories. Instead, it has sabotaged the American government’s standing as an “honest broker” and effectively encouraged support for the continuation of Israeli colonization of Arab land. Until now, no country had recognized Israel’s act of plunder in the Golan Heights. Following the Six Day war in 1967, Israel expelled 130,000 Syrians from the Golan Heights. 14 years later, in 1981, Israel annexed the territory – in violation of international law. The United Nations member states, including the U.S., immediately declared Israeli efforts to change the Golan Height’s status “null and void.” A small population of Syrian Druze are the only survivors of that ethnic cleansing operation. Greg Shupak, author of The Wrong Story: Palestine, Israel and the Media, argues that “American foreign policy and Israeli settler-colonial capitalism shape what happens across historic Palestine.” We recently saw this unfold when Trump issued his Jerusalem decree to recognize the city as the Israeli capital, which goes against the international community’s consensus of Jerusalem as a final status issue in negotiations and, again, violates international law. While the U.S. Embassy was moving from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem on May 15, Israeli snipers were massacring 60 Palestinians protesters in the Great March of Return at the Gaza fence. This is not the first time we have seen U.S. foreign policy and Israeli settler-colonial enterprise interfered with the international community’s consensus on Palestinian-Israeli affairs. The Jerusalem Basic Law of 1980 and the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 were highly controversial because of their timing and their political and legal implications, according to Michael Zank, a professor at Boston University. Both laws were enacted during times when the international coalition was making progress with the Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations. U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat had signed the Camp David Accords, a peace treaty with Israel and Egypt in 1979; consequently, the Jerusalem Basic Law endangered the peace process and negatively impacted the ongoing negotiations. The Jerusalem Embassy Act was signed into law shortly after the Oslo Accords were concluded and greatly affected the final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority that were held at Camp David in 2000. Both these legislative acts created a binding relationship between Israel and the U.S which ultimately

changed the status quo. But to fully conceptualize the U.S.-Israel special relationship we need to

unpack the preferential arms trade agreements that allows for this relationship to continue

at the expense of the indigenous population in the occupied territories. Max Ajl, a PhD candidate in

development sociology at Cornell University, writes: “U.S. ‘military assistance,’ more accurately understood as a

circular flow through which U.S. weapons firms profit off the colonization of Palestinian land

and Israeli destabilization of the surrounding states, is a long-term structuring element of

the U.S.-Israel ‘special relationship .’” U.S. military loans started arriving in Israel in November 1971, when

the Nixon administration signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Israel to build up its

domestic industrial-arms sector through technical and manufacturing assistance. Grants started to replace loans in

1974. The U.S. government shortly afterwards started to permit Israel to spend 26% of the annual military grant on purchases in Israel – a unique arrangement, since by U.S. law recipient countries must spend all of

their foreign military financing in the U.S. According to Ajl, “the Israeli military industry often relies on U.S.

tech nological inputs , and the U.S. forbids Israel from manufacturing crucial heavy weaponry ,

such as fighter jets, in order to maintain control over Israel .” U.S. military grants to Israel were often quid

pro quo, as Israel increasingly took on the work for which the U.S. could not publicly take responsibility, given popular unease in the States over aid to fascist dictatorships. As the International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network noted in their report, Israel’s Worldwide Role in Repression, in the 1970s, Israel armed the brutal military regime of the Argentinian junta that imposed seven years of state terrorism on the population. Israel also provided most of the arms that Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio “Tachito” Somoza used in the last year of his dictatorship to oppose the revolution, a conflict that killed tens of thousands of Nicaraguans in the 1970s. By the 2000s, the Israeli military-industrial complex had produced an industry capable of competing in small-arms and high-end security technology on a worldwide scale . Israel started to export arms that

have been refined through high-tech nology colonial policing of the Palestinian population ,

especially in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In recent years, Israel has risen to one of the top 10 arms exporters in the world. Last May Haaretz reported, “Israel’s defense-related exports in 2017 totalled $9.2 billion, an all-time record and whooping 40% increase over 2016 – when defense-related transactions totaled $6.5 billion.” The Obama administration adjustments to Israel’s military aid package came amidst a shifting geopolitical environment, both within the U.S. and Israel. There was a shift in original MOU that would slowly phase out the provisions through which Israel could spend up to 26% of its funding package within Israel, to Israel spending more of this funding on the advanced military capabilities that only the United States can provide – as much as $1.2 billion per year, according to Ajl. In addition, this MOU locked in $500 million annually for missile defense. The MOU mandates Israel update its fighter aircraft fleet, which is a direct investment into the U.S. military-industrial complex, given that fighter-jet factories are exclusively based in the United States. Not only does U.S. foreign policy and Israeli-settler colonialism shape what happens across historic Palestine , it also shapes what happens across the

Middle East region . The firm establishment of Israel’s military defense industry also provides

an excuse to sell ever-more-sophisticated weapons to other regional U.S. allies, especially

Saudi Arabia . As long as Israel has the latest U.S. tech nology , other countries can buy older

models, again to the great profit of the U.S. defense industry. Israel thus is the spark plug for a n entire region-

wide weapons bazaar , while also providing such countries the means to destroy and dismantle

even poorer countries like Yemen . This keeps the entire region aflame, oppressed and desperate ,

and thus unlikely to upset hierarchical regional and international social structures . Ajl suggests that one of reasons the United States pushed through this MOU before Obama left office is the rising discontent within the U.S. population over ongoing support for Israeli colonization of historic Palestine and the surrounding region. Frida Berrigan, author of Made in the U.S.A.: American Military Aid to Israel, writes that a major barrier to any shift in American policy towards Palestine-Israel is “ financial pressures from a U.S military industrial complex

accustomed to billions of dollars in sales to Israel and other Middle Eastern nations locked in

a seemingly perpetual arms race with each other by all buying American and using Foreign

Military Financing ( FMF ) to pay the bills.” The United States is the primary source of Israel’s far

superior arsenal. Israel’s dependence on the U.S. for aid and arms means that the Israeli military relies on spare parts and technical assistance from the U.S. to maintain optimum performance in battle. During the Bush administration, from 2001 to 2005, Israel had actually received more in U.S. military aid than it has in U.S. arms deliveries. Over this time period, Israel received $10.5 billion in FMF – the Pentagon’s biggest military aid program – and $6.3 billion in U.S. arms deliveries. According to Berrigan, the most prominent of those deals was a $4.5 billion sale of 102 Lockheed Martin F-16s to Israel. Unlike other countries, Israel receives its Economic Support Funds in one lump sum early in the fiscal year rather than in four quarterly installments. While other countries primarily deal with the Department of Defense when arranging to purchase military hardware from U.S. companies, Israel deals directly with U.S. companies for the vast majority of its military purchases in the United States. Other countries have a $100,000 minimum purchase amount per contract, but Israel is allowed to purchase military items for far less, according to Berrigan. Today, Israel has been the beneficiary of approximately $125 billion in U.S. aid. An unimaginable sum, more than any other country since World War II. U.S. aid is projected to further increase to $165 billion by the end of the new 10-year package, in 2029, according to Charles D. Freilich, a former Israeli deputy national security adviser. U.S. aid constitutes some 3% of Israel’s total state budget and about 1% of its GDP, a highly significant sum. Moreover, U.S. aid constitutes some 20% of the total defense budget, 40% of the budget of the Israel Defense Forces, and almost the entire procurement budget, according to Freilich. Israel’s dependence on the U.S. is not limited to financial aid and weapons sales. According to Freilich, the U.S. provides technologies for the development of unique weapons systems that Israel needs, such as the Iron Dome and the Arrow rocket and missile defense systems. It mans the radar deployed in Israel, which is linked to the global American satellite system. Fredilich writes, “There is simply no alternative to American weapons, and our dependence on the United States is almost complete; the bitter truth is that without the United

States, the IDF would be an empty shell .” The United States is Israel’s largest trading partner, at least partially due to

their bilateral free trade agreement, the first the United States signed with any country. The U.S.-Israel special relationship is rooted in preferential arms trade agreements as a way to subsidize the U.S.

military industry and reinforce support for Israeli colonialism . This special relationship is

locked into an arms trade cycle where both the Israeli and American elite class benefits , at

the expense of the indigenous population . The U.S. recognition of Israeli sovereignty over occupied territories provides a boost for Israeli colonialism. We must ask ourselves, “If Trump has consented to Israeli illegal seizure of the Golan Heights and Jerusalem, why not also the West Bank?” Prime Minister Netanyahu has vowed to annex Israeli settlements in the West Bank if he is re-elected, which will likely be considered as the final blow to the so called possibility of a two-state solution. The Trump

administration is expected to announce his “ultimate deal” following the Israeli elections and after a new

government is formed. It is only a matter of time till the Trump administration decides to follow suit and

recognize Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank, which will drive the final nail into the coffin of the

Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations and solidify Israeli apartheid .

And, the U.S.-Israeli arms trade is the foundation of a global industry of violence – it produces cultural and material technologies for settler colonialism across the planetJohnson Member of the International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network ’12 (Jimmy, “Israel’s Worldwide Role in Repression,” Available Online at http://www.ebony.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/israels-worldwide-role-in-repression-footnotes-finalized.pdf, ME)This pamphlet focuses on the role of Israel's government, its military, and related corporations and organizations in a global industry of violence and repression . The states most involved with this industry profit from

perpetual war and occupation across the globe while maintaining vastly unequal societies of their own. Israel exports weapons , technologies, training, and techniques of violence for use by governments and corporations against populations around the world. The expertise on which it relies has been developed through its occupation of Palestine and parts of Lebanon ,

Syria and Egypt as well as its repression of and military aggression against the people living

there. The colonization of Palestine was once part of the British and French assault on the movement for Arab unity

and independence that threatened European control of the region’s resources. The state of Israel is now a junior

partner in the U.S.-allied1 strategy for the same control of the region’s resources.2 For Israel, this partnership has enabled the imposition and maintenance of a settler colonial state 3 in Palestine. For its Western partners Israel has ensured control of what F.D.R.’s administration once described as "the greatest

prize in human history" – Arab oil.4 The importance of Israel to the U.S. is a reflection of the growing significance of both oil and the arms trade to the world economy. The United States, the main arbiter of power worldwide, is Israel’s largest funder. The majority of U.S. aid to Israel is in the form of military assistance. The U.S. government gives Israel approximately 3 billion U.S. dollars per year in financial aid and several billion more per year in military assistance and contracts.5 The U.S. provides 18% or nearly a fifth of Israel’s military budget.6 From 1949 until 2011, the estimated cumulative total in U.S. direct aid to Israel is between 115 and 123 billion U.S. dollars.7 In 2009, Israel’s military spending accounted for an additional 15.1% of the country’s overall budget. It was the biggest defense spender as a percentage of GDP. It also spent the greatest amount

of its overall budget on the military out of all developed countries.8 Israel uses U.S. aid to fund its ongoing

occupation of Palestine and Syria and its military campaigns , which in turn serve as a n

lab oratory to develop weapons , surveillance technology , and tactics of population control

that are then marketed across the globe . Israel’s unique skills in crowd control, forced displacement,

surveillance and military occupation have resulted in placing it at the forefront of a global industry of

repression : it develops, manufactures, and markets technologies that are used by armies and police

around the world for purposes of repression . Israel's role in this industry began with the Israeli military, which first used its weapons of war against Palestinian people in historic Palestine, and against neighboring countries. In recent years, as interest in surveillance and policing technologies and techniques has grown among governments around the world, an Israeli “homeland security” private service industry built on these field-tested instruments has emerged to exploit and export this interest. This industry includes government agencies, the Israeli military, and a network of private corporations that grossed over 2.7 billion U.S. dollars in 2008.9 This industry accounts for approximately 7% of the Israeli economy. The Israeli Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor says on its website: Israel has more than 300 Homeland Security (HLS) companies exporting a range of products, systems and services... These solutions have been born by the necessity of Israel’s survival and matured by the reality of the continual terrorist threat to the country... No other country has such a large pool of experienced former security, military and police personnel and no other country has been able to field test its systems and solutions in real-time situations. In addition to the Israeli government, military, and corporations, a network of Zionist organizations provides political and economic support to the state of Israel . For example, in the U.S. , these organizations participate in surveillance an d facilitate exchanges

between the Israeli military and U.S. police forces, federal agents, and armed forces .10 This network of

state bodies , corporations and non-profits shares intelligence information, coordinates strategies for surveillance and repression , and collaborates for profit . The precise function of each varies according to their role.11 Israel has provided arms, trained militia and military and civilian police, developed and provided surveillance technology and repression strategies, and supplied the means for a broad array of other control techniques from ”non-lethal” weapons to border

technology. Israel has played a role in arming and training the apartheid regimes of South Africa and

Rhodesia , colonial regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (otherwise known as Southwest Asia and

North Africa, or SWANA), and dictators in Central and South America and Asia . The Israel i

government has assumed a major , worldwide role in enforcing limitations on the freedom of

movement, policing of communities , and undermining peoples' struggles for justice. Though well

documented, this fact is rarely if ever mentioned or discussed, and even more rarely challenged .

Our movements – those in solidarity with the Palestinian people, against war, poverty, and an unjust globalized economy –

need to take into account the very real ways the state of Israel contributes to violence and

repression around the world . Israel sells its weapons, technologies, training, and techniques of violence to those it considers allies and even to those whom it considers enemies. Israel sells or has sold to Islamist, communist, capitalist, dictatorial, and social democratic states.

The driving force behind Israeli arms exports, in addition to the profit motive, is the need for a close and

strong alliance with major imperialist powers that provide it with continuous military and

diplomatic support , economic markets and access to power . Therefore, Israel has prioritized

selling weapons to the allies and agents of these powers.

Next, prioritize our impact over low-risk, high-magnitude internal links – the logic of disadvantages places the Palestinean body as permanently outside of the sovereign – this makes it the permanent site of endless violence and provides a framework for understanding all systems of oppressionLentin ‘8 (Ronit, Lecturer in Sociology at Trinity College in Dublin, Thinking Palestine, Pg. 37, ME)

Racial palestinianization accordingly is the prevailing response to a state of perpetual war. Indeed, it

is a state of war declared perpetual, a war made the normal state of affairs. Permanent war enables a state of emergency suspending all rights for the target population. But suspension is tantamount to evisceration: rights continue to exist in name only , shadow conceptions of a world lost, never to be

reinstated . But if sovereignty is defined in terms of the power to define the exception, then turning the exception into the norm effectively eviscerates the very grounds of sovereignty, as

Wendy Brown has commented (2007). As norm, as given, as the naturalized state of being, the exceptional ceases to be, well, exceptional, the power to define exceptionality is rendered irrelevant , powerless. In making war permanent, the (once-)sovereign has made itself dependent – on the enemy, on maintaining the enemy as such. The ground on which the sovereign stands, makes its stand, has become quicksand. Israel has perfected the bifurcated condition its principal patron now tries to emulate:

a permanent war elsewhere – its horrors hidden from view, complaint or criticism cordoned off behind the Wall (or across

the ocean), while the spectre of peace and prosperity is maintained at home. But such a state – or

states, because the bifurcation necessitates always a doubling , two states of being, one here, the other

there, one in peace but threatened always by the chaos beyond – requires, as Foucault says, that ‘truth functions exclusively as a weapon’ in the relationship of force . Perpetual war licenses ‘a rationality of calculations, strategies and ruses’ (2003). Force enables one to speak, to interpret the truth, to elevate one’s own proposals and claims to the status of truth while denouncing the other ’s as lies, illusions, errors, as deluded even. Racial palestinianization thus involves also transforming truth into a relationship of force, speaking truth in the name of power represented racially. A group is racially branded , as Mahmood Mamdani (2001) reveals, when it is set apart as racially distinct, thus rendering easier, and so more likely, its guiltless extinction , at least politically if not quite physically.

***Thanatopoltics is a fate worse than death – reject the logic of large-magnitude impactsLentin ‘8 (Ronit, Lecturer in Sociology, at Trinity College in Dublin, Thinking Palestine, Pg. 77, ME)Drawing the line between dieting and starvation becomes a political issue, making it crucial to understanding the delicate differences between dying and death. The distinctions between dying – a

process – and death, which intervenes between dying and being dead – help us understand that the power used against the Palestinians is not about killing them , eliminating them or pushing them collectively into their graves. Rather, it is about managing them as biological subjects through localizing them in the liminal zone between life and death , between dieting and starvation – not really dying but being one step before that, where ‘a decision on life becomes a decision on death. Biopolitics can turn into Thanatopolitics ’ (Agamben 1998: 222).

Thus, the plan: The United States federal government ought indefinitely suspend foreign military sales and direct commercial sales of arms to the country referenced in 19 U.S. Code § 4452.

Contention II is FramingFirst, threats of “extinction” are a white settler-colonialist fantasy that you should ignore in your decision calculusDalley ‘18

(Hamish, professor at Daemen College, “The deaths of settler colonialism: extinction as a metaphor of decolonization in contemporary settler literature”, Settler Colonial Studies Vol 8 No 1 NL)Settlers love to contemplate the possibility of their own extinction ; to read many contemporary literary representations of settler colonialism is

to find settlers strangely satisfied in dreaming of ends that never come. This tendency is widely prevalent in English-language representations of settler colonialism produced since the 1980s: the possibility of an ending – the likelihood that the settler race will one day die out – is a common theme in literary and pop culture considerations of colonialism’s future. Yet it has barely been remarked how surprising it is that this theme is so present . For settlers , of all people, to obsessively ruminate on their own finitude is counterintuitive , for few modern social formations have been more resistant to change than settler colonialism. With a few exceptions (French Algeria being the largest), the settler societies established in the last 300 years in the Americas, Australasia, and Southern Africa have all retained the basic features that define them as settler states – namely , the structural privileging of settlers at the expense of indigenous peoples, and the normalization of whiteness as the marker of political agency and rights – and they have done so notwithstanding the sustained resistance that has been mounted whenever such an order has been built. Settlers think all the time that they might one day end, even though (perhaps because ) that ending seems unlikely ever to happen. The significance of this paradox for settler-colonial literature is the subject of this article. Considering the problem of futurity offers a useful foil to traditional analyses of settlercolonial narrative , which typically examine settlers’ attitudes towards history in order to highlight a constitutive anxiety about the past – about

origins. Settler colonialism, the argument goes, has a problem with historical narration that arises from a contradiction in its founding mythology. In Stephen Turner’s formulation, the settler subject is by definition one who comes from elsewhere but who strives to make this place home. The settlement narrative must explain how this gap – which is at once geographical, historical, and existential – has been bridged, and the settler transformed from outsider into indigene. Yet the transformation must remain constitutively incomplete, because the desire to be at home necessarily invokes the spectre of the native, whose existence (which cannot be disavowed completely because it is needed to define the settler’s difference, superiority, and hence claim to the land) inscribes the

settler’s foreignness, thus reinstating the gap between settler and colony that the narrative was meant to efface.1 Settler-colonial narrative is thus shaped around its need to erase and evoke the native, to make the indigene both invisible and present in a contradictory pattern that prevents settlers from ever moving on from the moment of colonization.2 As evidence of this constitutive contradiction, critics have identified in settler-colonial discourse symptoms of psychic distress such as disavowal, inversion, and repression.3 Indeed, the frozen temporality of settler-colonial

narrative, fixated on the moment of the frontier, recalls nothing so much as Freud’s description of the ‘repetition compulsion’ attending trauma.4 As Lorenzo Veracini puts it, because: ‘settler society’ can thus be seen as a fantasy where a perception of a constant struggle is juxtaposed against an ideal of ‘peace’ that can never be reached, settler projects embrace and reject violence at the same time . The settler colonial situation is thus a circumstance where the tension between contradictory impulses produces long-lasting psychic conflicts and a number of associated psychopathologies.5 Current scholarship has thus focused primarily on settler-colonial narrative’s view of the past, asking how such a contradictory and troubled relationship to history might affect present-day ideological formations. Critics have rarely considered what such narratological tensions might produce when the settler gaze is turned to the future . Few social formations are more stubbornly resistant to change than settlement, suggesting that a future beyond

settler colonialism might be simply unthinkable. Veracini, indeed, suggests that settler-colonial narrative can never contemplate an ending: that settler decolonization is inconceivable because settlers lack the metaphorical tools to imagine their own demise .6 This article outlines why I partly disagree with that view. I

argue that the narratological paradox that defines settler-colonial narrative does make the future a problematic object of contemplation. But that does not make settler decolonization unthinkable per se; as I will show, settlers do often try to imagine their demise – but they do so in a way that reasserts the paradoxes of their founding ideology, with the result that the radical potentiality of decolonization is undone even as it is invoked. I argue that, notwithstanding Veracini’s analysis, there is a metaphor via which the end of settler colonialism unspools – the quasi-biological concept of extinction, which, when deployed as a narrative trope, offers settlers a chance to consider and disavow their demise, just as they consider and then disavow the violence of their origins. This article traces the importance of the trope of extinction for contemporary settler-colonial literature, with a focus on South Africa, Canada, and Australia. It explores variations in how the death of settler colonialism is conceptualized, drawing a distinction between historio-civilizational narratives of the rise and fall of empires, and a species-oriented notion of extinction that draws force from public anxiety about climate change – an invocation that adds another level of ambivalence by drawing on ‘rational’ fears for the future (because climate change may well render the planet uninhabitable to humans) in order to narrativize a form of social death that, strictly speaking, belongs to a different order of knowledge altogether. As such, my analysis is intended to draw the attention of settlercolonial

studies toward futurity and the ambivalence of settler paranoia, while highlighting a potential point of cross-fertilization between settler-colonial and eco-critical approaches to contemporary literature. That ‘ extinction’ should be a key word in the settler-colonial lexicon is no surprise . In Patrick Wolfe’s phrase,7 settler colonialism is predicated on a ‘logic of elimination’

that tends towards the extermination – by one means or another – of indigenous peoples.8 This logic is apparent in archetypal settler narratives like James Fenimore

Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans (1826), a historical novel whose very title blends the melancholia and triumph that demarcate settlers’ affective responses to the supposed inevitability of indigenous extinction. Concepts like ‘stadial development’ – by which societies progress through stages, progressively eliminating earlier social forms – and ‘fatal impact’ – which names the biological inevitability of strong peoples supplanting weak – all contribute to the notion that settler colonialism is a kind of ‘ecological process’ 9 that necessitates the extinction of inferior races. What is surprising, though, is how often the trope of extinction also appears with reference to settlers themselves; it makes sense for settlers to narrate how their presence entails others’ destruction, but it is less clear why their attempts to imagine futures should presume extinction to be their own logical end as well. The idea appears repeatedly in English-language literary treatments of settler colonialism. Consider, for instance, the following rumination on the future of South African settler society, from Olive Schreiner’s 1883 Story of an African Farm: It was one of them, one of those wild old Bushmen, that painted those pictures there. He did not know why he painted but he wanted to make something, so he made these. […] Now the Boers have shot them all, so that we never see a yellow face peeping out among the stones. […] And the wild bucks have gone, and those days, and we are here. But we will be gone soon, and only the stones will lie on, looking at everything like they look now.10 In this example, the narrating settler character, Waldo, recognizes prior indigenous inhabitation but his knowledge comes freighted with an expected sense of biological superiority, made apparent by his description of the ‘Bushman’s’ ‘yellow face’, and lack of mental self-awareness. What is not clear is why Waldo’s contemplation of colonial genocide should turn immediately to the assumption that a similar fate awaits his people as well. A similar presumption of racial vulnerability permeates other late nineteenthcentury novels from the imperial metropole, such as Dracula and War of the Worlds, which are plotted around the prospect of invasions that would see the extinction of British imperialism, and, in the process, the human species. Such anxieties draw energy from a pattern of settler defensiveness that can be observed across numerous settler-colonial contexts. Marilyn Lake’s and Henry Reynold’s account of the emergence of transnational ‘whiteness’ highlights the paradoxical fact that while white male settlers have been arguably the most

privileged class in history, they have routinely perceived themselves to be ‘under siege’, threatened with destruction to the extent that their very identity of ‘whiteness was born in the apprehension of imminent loss’. 11 The fear of looming annihilation serves a powerful ideological function in settler communities , working to foster racial solidarity, suppress dissent, and legitimate violence against indigenous populations who , by any objective measure, are far more at risk of extermination than the settlers who fear them. Ann Curthoys and

Dirk Moses have traced this pattern in Australia and Israel-Palestine, respectively.12 This scholarship suggests that narratives of settler extinction are acts of ideological mystification, obscuring the brutal inequalities of the frontier behind a mask of white vulnerability – an argument with which I sympathize. However, this article shows how there is more to settler-colonial extinction narratives than bad faith. I argue that we need a more nuanced understanding of how they

encode a specifically settler-colonial framework for imagining the future , one that has implications for how we understand

contemporary literatures from settler societies, and which allows us to see extinction as a genuine, if flawed, attempt to envisage social change. In the remainder of this paper I consider extinction’s function as a metaphor of decolonization. I use this phrase to invoke, without completely endorsing, Tuck and Yang’s argument that to treat decolonization figuratively, as I argue extinction narratives do, is necessarily to preclude radical change, creating opportunities for settler ‘moves to innocence’ that re-legitimate racial inequality.13 The counterview to this pessimistic perspective is offered by Veracini, who suggests that progressive change to settler-colonial relationships will only happen if narratives can be found that make decolonization thinkable.14 This article enters the debate between these two perspectives by asking what it means for settler writers to imagine the future via the trope of extinction. Does extinction offer a meaningful way to think about ending settler colonialism, or does it re-activate settler-colonial patterns of thought that allow exclusionary social structures to persist?

This is particularly true of Israel and PalestineSlavoj Zizek freelance Abercrombie & Fitch writer 200 9 August 18 Quiet slicing of the West Bank makes abstract prayers for peace obscene The Guardian UKOn 2 August 2009, after cordoning off part of the Arab neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah in east Jerusalem, Israeli police evicted two Palestinian families (more than 50 people) from their homes; Jewish settlers immediately moved into the emptied houses. Although Israeli police cited a ruling by the country's supreme court,

the evicted Arab families had been living there for more than 50 years. The event – which, rather exceptionally, did attract the

attention of the world media – is part of a much larger and mostly ignored ongoing process. Five months earlier, on 1 March, it had been reported that the Israeli government had drafted plans to build more than 70,000 new homes in Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank; if implemented, the plans could increase the number of settlers in the Palestinian territories by about 300,000 Such a move would not only severely undermine the chances of a viable Palestinian state, but also hamper the everyday life of Palestinians. A government spokesman dismissed the report, arguing that the plans were of limited relevance – the construction of homes in the settlements required the approval of the defence minister and the prime minister. However, 15,000 have already been fully approved, and 20,000 of the proposed housing units lie in settlements that Israel cannot expect to retain in any future peace deal with the Palestinians. The conclusion is obvious: while paying lip-service to the two-state solution, Israel is busy creating a situation on the ground that will render such a solution impossible. The dream underlying Israel's plan s is encapsulated by a wall that separates a settler's town from the Palestinian town on a nearby West Bank hill. The Israeli side of the wall is painted with the image of the countryside beyond the wall – but without the Palestinian town , depicting just nature, grass and trees. Is this not ethnic cleansing at its purest, imagining the outside beyond the wall as empty, virginal and waiting to be settled? On the very day that reports of the government's 70,000-home plan emerged, Hillary Clinton criticised the rocket fire from Gaza as "cynical", claiming: "There is no doubt that any nation, including Israel, cannot stand idly by while its territory and people are subjected to rocket attacks." But should the Palestinians stand idly while the West Bank land is taken from them day by day? When peace-loving Israeli liberals present their conflict with Palestinians in neutral, symmetrical terms – admitting that there are extremists on both sides who reject peace – one should ask a simple question: what goes on in the Middle East when nothing is happening there at the direct politico-military level (ie, when there are no tensions, attacks or negotiations)? What goes on is the slow work of taking the land from the Palestinians on the West Bank: the gradual strangling of the Palestinian economy, the parcelling up of their land , the building of new settlements, the pressure on Palestinian farmers to make them abandon their land (which goes from crop-burning and

religious desecration to targeted killings) – all this supported by a Kafkaesque network of legal regulations. Saree Makdisi, in Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation, describes how, although the Israeli occupation of the West Bank is ultimately enforced by the armed forces, it is an "occupation by bureaucracy": it works primarily through application forms, title deeds, residency papers and other permits. It is this micro-management of the daily life that does the job of securing slow but steady Israeli expansion: one has to ask for a permit in order to leave with one's family, to farm one's own land, to dig a well, or to go to work, to school, or to hospital. One by one, Palestinians born in Jerusalem are thus stripped of the right to live there, prevented from

earning a living, denied housing permits, etc. Palestinians often use the problematic cliche of the Gaza

strip as "the greatest concentration camp in the world". However, in the past year, this designation

has come dangerously close to truth . This is the fundamental reality that makes all abstract "prayers for peace" obscene and hypocritical. The state of Israel is clearly engaged in a slow, invisible process, ignored by the media; one day, the world will awake and discover that there is no more Palestinian West Bank, that the land is Palestinian-free, and that we must accept the fact. The map of the Palestinian West Bank already looks like a fragmented archipelago.

Next, be skeptical of neg offense – there is a huge epistemological bias in favor of Israel – vote aff and join the call to stop U.S. complicity in Israeli settler colonialismZunes Institute for Policy Studies ‘2 (Stephen, “Why the U.S. Supports Israel,” May 1, https://ips-dc.org/why_the_us_supports_israel/, ME)In the United States and around the world, many are questioning why, despite some mild rebukes, Washington has maintained its large-scale military, financial , and diplomatic

support for the Israel i occupation in the face of unprecedented violations of international

law and human rights standards by Israeli occupation forces. Why is there such strong bipartisan support for Israel’s right-wing prime minister Ariel Sharon’s policies in the occupied Palestinian territories? The close relationship between the U.S. and Israel has been one of the most salient features in U.S. foreign policy for nearly three and a half decades. The well over $3 billion in military and economic aid sent annually to Israel by Washington is rarely questioned

in Congress, even by liberals who normally challenge U.S. aid to governments that engage in

widespread violations of human rights–or by conservatives who usually oppose foreign aid in

general . Virtually all Western countries share the United States’ strong support for Israel’s legitimate right to exist in peace and security, yet these same nations have refused to provide arms and aid while the occupation of lands seized in the 1967 war continues. None come close to offering the level of diplomatic support provided by Washington–with the United States often standing alone with Israel at the United Nations and other international forums when objections are raised over ongoing Israeli violations of international law and related concerns. Although U.S. backing of successive Israeli governments, like most foreign policy decisions, is often rationalized on moral grounds, there is little evidence that moral imperatives play more of a determining role in guiding U.S. policy in the Middle East than in any other part of the world. Most Americans do share a moral commitment to Israel’s survival as a Jewish state, but this would not account for the level of financial, military , and diplomatic support provided. American aid to Israel goes well beyond protecting Israel’s security needs within its internationally recognized borders. U.S. assistance includes support for policies in militarily occupied territories that often violate well-established legal and ethical standards of international behavior. Were Israel’s security interests paramount in the eyes of American policymakers, U.S. aid to Israel would have been highest in the early years of the existence of the Jewish state, when its democratic institutions were strongest and its strategic situation most vulnerable, and would have declined as its military power grew dramatically and its repression against Palestinians in the occupied territories increased. Instead, the trend has been in just the opposite direction: major U.S. military and economic aid did not begin until after the 1967 war. Indeed, 99% of U.S. military assistance to Israel since its establishment came only after Israel proved itself to be far stronger than any combination of Arab armies and after Israeli

occupation forces became the rulers of a large Palestinian population . Similarly, U.S. aid to Israel is higher now than twenty-five years ago. This was at a time when Egypt’s massive and well-equipped armed forces threatened war; today, Israel has a longstanding peace treaty with Egypt and a large demilitarized and internationally monitored buffer zone keeping its army at a distance. At that time, Syria’s military was expanding rapidly with advanced Soviet weaponry; today, Syria has made clear its willingness to live in peace with Israel in return for the occupied

Golan Heights–and Syria’s military capabilities have been declining, weakened by the collapse of its Soviet patron. Also in the mid-1970s, Jordan still claimed the West Bank and stationed large numbers of troops along its lengthy border and the demarcation line with Israel; today, Jordan has signed a peace treaty and has established fully normalized relations. At that time, Iraq was embarking upon its vast program of militarization. Iraq’s armed forces have since been devastated as a result of the Gulf War and subsequent international sanctions and monitoring. This raises serious questions as to why U.S. aid has either remained steady or actually increased each year since. In the hypothetical event that all U.S. aid to Israel were

immediately cut off, it would be many years before Israel would be under significantly

greater military threat than it is today . Israel has both a major domestic arms industry and an

existing military force far more capable and powerful than any conceivable combination of

opposing forces . There would be no question of Israel’s survival being at risk militarily in the foreseeable future. When Israel was less dominant militarily, there was no such consensus for U.S. backing of Israel. Though the recent escalation of terrorist attacks inside Israel has raised widespread concerns about the safety of the Israeli public, the vast majority of U.S. military aid has no correlation to counterterrorism efforts. In short, the growing U.S. support for the Israeli government, like U.S. support for allies elsewhere in the world, is not motivated primarily by

objective security needs or a strong moral commitment to the country. Rather , as

elsewhere, U.S. foreign policy is motivated primarily to advance its own perceived strategic

interests . Strategic Reasons for Continuing U.S. Support There is a broad bipartisan consensus among policymakers that Israel has advanced U.S. interest in the Middle East and beyond. Israel has successfully prevented victories by radical nationalist movements in Lebanon and Jordan, as well as in Palestine. Israel has kept Syria, for many years an ally of the Soviet Union, in check. Israel’s air force is predominant throughout the region. Israel’s frequent wars have provided battlefield testing for American arms, often against Soviet weapons. It has served as a

conduit for U.S. arms to regimes and movements too unpopular in the United States for

openly granting direct military assistance, such as apartheid South Africa , the Islamic Republic

in Iran , the military junta in Guatemala, and the Nicaraguan Contras . Israeli military advisers have assisted the Contras, the Salvadoran junta, and foreign occupation forces in Namibia and Western Sahara. Israel’s intelligence service has assisted the U.S. in intelligence gathering and covert operations. Israel has missiles capable of reaching as far as the former Soviet Union, it possesses a nuclear arsenal of hundreds of weapons, and it has cooperated with the U.S. military-industrial complex with research and development for new jet fighters and anti-missile defense systems. U.S. Aid Increases as Israel Grows Stronger The pattern of U.S. aid to Israel is revealing. Immediately following Israel’s spectacular victory in the 1967 war, when it demonstrated its military superiority in the region, U.S. aid shot up by 450% . Part of this increase, according to the New York Times, was apparently related to Israel’s willingness to provide the U.S. with examples of new Soviet weapons captured during the war. Following the 1970-71 civil war in Jordan, when Israel’s potential to curb revolutionary movements outside its borders became apparent, U.S. aid increased another sevenfold . After attacking Arab armies in the 1973 war were successfully countered by the largest U.S. airlift in history, with Israel demonstrating its power to defeat surprisingly strong Soviet-supplied forces, military

aid increased by another 800% . These increases paralleled the British decision to withdraw its forces from “east of the Suez,” which also led to the massive arms sales and logistical cooperation with the Shah’s Iran, a key component of the Nixon Doctrine. Aid quadrupled again in 1979 soon after the fall of the Shah, the election of the right-wing Likud government, and the ratification of the Camp David Treaty, which included provisions for increased military assistance that made it more of a tripartite military pact than a traditional peace agreement. (It is noteworthy that the additional aid provided to Israel in the treaty continued despite the Begin government’s refusal to abide by provisions relating to Palestinian autonomy.) Aid increased yet again soon after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In 1983 and 1984, when the United States and Israel signed memoranda of understanding on strategic cooperation and military planning and conducted their first joint naval and air military exercises, Israel was rewarded by an additional $1.5 billion in economic aid. It also received another half million dollars for the development of a new jet fighter. During and immediately after the Gulf War, U.S. aid increased an additional $650 million. When Israel dramatically increased its

repression in the occupied territories–including incursions into autonomous Palestinian territories provided in treaties guaranteed by the U.S. government–U.S. aid increased still further and shot up again following the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States. The correlation is clear: the stronger and more willing to cooperate with U.S. interests that Israel becomes, the stronger the support. Ensuring Israel’s Military Superiority Therefore, the continued high levels of U.S. aid to Israel comes not out of concern for Israel’s survival , but as a result of the U.S. desire for Israel to continue its political dominance of the Palestinians

and its military dominance of the region . Indeed, leaders of both American political parties have called not for the U.S. to help maintain a military balance between Israel and its neighbors, but for insuring Israeli military superiority. Since the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, there has again been some internal debate regarding how far the United States should back Israeli policies, now under the control of right-wing political leader Ariel Sharon. Some of the more pragmatic conservatives from the senior Bush administration, such as Secretary of State Colin Powell, have cautioned that unconditional backing of Sharon’s government during a period of unprecedented repression in the occupied territories would make it more difficult to get the full cooperation of Arab governments in prosecuting the campaign against terrorist cells affiliated with the al Qaeda network. Some of the more right-wing elements, such as Paul Wolfowitz of the Defense Department, have been arguing that Sharon was an indispensable ally in the war against terrorism and that the Palestinian resistance was essentially part of an international terrorist conspiracy against democratic societies. Other Contributing Factors Support for Israel’s ongoing occupation and repression is not unlike U.S. support for Indonesia’s 24-year occupation of and repression in East Timor or Morocco’s ongoing occupation of and repression in Western Sahara. If seen to be in the strategic interests of the United States, Washington is quite willing to support the most flagrant violation of

international law and human rights by its allies and block the United Nations or any other

party from challenging it . No ethnic lobby or ideological affinity is necessary to motivate

policymakers to do otherwise. As long as the amoral imperatives of realpolitik remain

unchallenged, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and elsewhere will not reflect the

American public’s longstanding belief that U.S. international relations should be guided by

humanitarian principles and ethics . Some of the worst cases of U.S. support for repression

have not remained unchallenged , leading to reversals in U.S. policy on Vietnam, Central America, South Africa, and East Timor. In these cases, grass roots movements supportive of

peace and justice grew to a point where liberal members of Congress , in the media and

elsewhere, joined in the call to stop U.S. complicity in the repression. In other cases, such as U.S. support for Morocco’s invasion and occupation of Western Sahara, too few Americans are even aware of the situation to mount a serious challenge, so it remains off the radar screen of lawmakers and pundits. The case of Israel and Palestine is different, however. There are significant sectors of the population that question U.S. policy, yet there is a widespread consensus among elite sectors of government and the media in support of U.S. backing of the Israeli occupation. Indeed, many of the same liberal Democrats in Congress who supported

progressive movements on other foreign policy issues agree with President George W. Bush–

or, in some cases, are even further to the right – on the issue of Israel and Palestine. Therefore, while the perceived strategic imperative is at the root of U.S. support for Israel, there are additional factors that have made this issue more difficult for peace and human rights activists than most others. These include the following: The sentimental attachment many liberals–particularly among the post-war generation in leadership positions in government and the media–have for Israel. Many Americans identify with Israel’s internal democracy, progressive social institutions (such as the kibbutzim), relatively high level of social equality, and its important role as a sanctuary for an oppressed minority group that spent centuries in diaspora. Through a mixture of guilt regarding Western anti-Semitism, personal friendships with Jewish Americans who identify strongly with Israel, and fear of inadvertently encouraging anti-Semitism by criticizing Israel, there is enormous reluctance to acknowledge the seriousness of Israeli violations of human rights and international law . The Christian Right, with tens of millions of followers and a major base of support for the Republican Party, has thrown its immense media and political clout in support for Ariel Sharon and other right-wing Israeli leaders. Based in part on a messianic theology that sees the ingathering of Jews to the Holy Land as a precursor for the second coming of Christ, the battle between Israelis and Palestinians is, in their eyes, simply a continuation of the battle between the Israelites and the Philistines, with God in the role of a cosmic real estate agent who has deemed that the land belongs to Israel alone–secular notions regarding international law and the right of self-determination notwithstanding. Mainstream and conservative Jewish organizations have mobilized considerable lobbying resources , financial contributions from the Jewish

community, and citizen pressure on the news media and other forums of public discourse in support of the Israeli government. Although the role of the pro-Israel lobby is often greatly exaggerated–with some even claiming it is the primary factor influencing U.S. policy–its role has been important in certain tight congressional races and in helping to create a climate of

intimidation among those who seek to moderate U.S. policy, including growing numbers of

progressive Jews. The arms industry , which contributes five times more money to

congressional campaigns and lobbying efforts than AIPAC and other pro-Israel groups , has

considerable stake in supporting massive arms shipments to Israel and other Middle Eastern allies of the United States. It is far easier, for example, for a member of Congress to challenge a $60 million arms deal to Indonesia, for example, than the more than $2 billion of arms to Israel, particularly when so many congressional districts include factories that produce such

military hardware. The widespread racism toward Arabs and Muslims so prevalent in

America n society , often perpetuated in the media. This is compounded by the identification

many Americans have with Zionism in the Middle East as a reflection of our own historic

experience as pioneers in North America , building a nation based upon noble, idealistic

values while simultaneously suppressing and expelling the indigenous population . The failure of progressive movements in the United States to challenge U.S. policy toward Israel and Palestine in an effective manner. For many years, most mainstream peace and human rights groups avoided the issue, not wanting to alienate many of their Jewish and other liberal constituents supportive of the Israeli government and fearing criticism of Israeli policies might inadvertently encourage anti-Semitism. As a result, without any countervailing pressure ,

liberal members of Congress had little incentive not to cave in to pressure from supporters of the Israeli government. Meanwhile, many groups on the far left and others took a stridently anti-Israel position that did not just challenge Israeli policies but also questioned Israel’s very right to exist, severely damaging their credibility . In some cases, particularly among the more conservative individuals and groups critical of Israel, a latent anti-Semitism would come to the fore in wildly exaggerated claims of Jewish economic and political power and other statements, further alienating potential critics of U.S. policy. Conclusion While U.S. support for Israeli occupation policies, like U.S. support for its allies elsewhere, is primarily based upon the country’s support for perceived U.S. security interests, there are other factors complicating efforts by peace and human rights groups to change U.S. policy. Despite these obstacles, the need to challenge U.S. support of the Israel i occupation is more important than ever . Not only has it led to enormous suffering among the Palestinians and other Arabs, ultimately it hurts the long-term interests of both Israel and the United States, as increasingly militant and extremist elements arise out of the Arab and Islamic world in reaction. Ultimately, there is no

contradiction between support for Israel and support for Palestine , for Israeli security and Palestinian rights are not mutually exclusive but mutually dependent on each other. U.S. support of the Israeli government has repeatedly sabotaged the efforts of peace activists in Israel to change Israel i policy , which the late Israeli General and Knesset member Matti Peled referred to as pushing Israel “toward a posture of calloused intransigence.” Perhaps the best kind of support the United States can give Israel is that of “ tough love ”–unconditional support for Israel’s right to live in peace and security within its internationally recognized border, but an equally clear determination to end the occupation. This is the challenge for those who take seriously such basic values as freedom, democracy, and the rule of law.

This makes the plan desirable even if they win a DA - Calling out anti-Palestinian forms of Zionism in the arms trade is essential to undoing the dominant paradigm the debate community has toward the Middle EastBy Jacques Berlinerblau director of the Program for Jewish Civilization at Georgetown University May 1, 2011, 11:46 am The ‘Arab Spring,’ Israel, and the Silence of the AcademyThe Arab world is experiencing a series of convulsions resulting in the quotidian slaughter of citizens in Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and elsewhere. Yet the reaction on American college

campuses is comparatively muted . Muted compared to what, you ask? Compared to the tragic shedding of

one life in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Having directed Jewish Studies programs in universities for most of my

career I can assure you of this: If Israel were to inflict the type of violence on Palestinians that Arab regimes (and Iranian ones) casually inflict on their own dissenting populations in the course of one day,

many colleges across America would be virtually shut down . Remember the “Jenin Massacre”? I

do. The university where I taught at the time came to a near complete standstill because of the alleged Zionist atrocities committed in the West Bank. During those days of rage I had the misfortune of wandering into a

“teach in.” That gathering featured an overheated array of faculty members and “community activists” lecturing at an audience of students (and whether the students had been “urged” or forced to attend by

their professors was subsequently a source of unresolved controversy). Needless to say, the conversation on stage did not adhere to academic standards of disinterested inquiry, sober assessment, or rigorous adherence to the facts. I took up the microphone to point that out and was lustily booed and insulted by colleagues (many of whom had been nothing but friendly prior and, strangely enough,

after as well). I was eventually escorted out of the auditorium by campus security for my own safety. That was just the

beginning. Appeals were made for faculty to integrate the theme of Israeli aggression into their class

lectures. As such, everyone from the professor of evolutionary biology to the specialist in Portuguese literature was asked to link his or her subject matter to the theme of Zionist aggression. Astonishingly, many of

them were able to do so. Efforts to psychologically, and even physically, immobilize the campus

proceeded apace. “Zionist sympathizers,” were called out , lectures were disrupted, divestment initiatives were pursued , “die ins” were staged —these were the reflexive responses to highly

complex problems in the Mideast in April of 2002. Ditto for Israel’s wars with Hezbollah and Hamas. I am struck, however, by

the relative calm on American campuses as each day brings forth fresh and repulsive

evidence of civilian massacres in the Arab world . No demonstrations. No “teach-ins.” No “die-ins.” And there is less calling out of professors who support(ed) these regimes than I would

ever have imagined possible. This is not to say that faculty and students are unconcerned. It’s more as if they are speechless, unworded. They are not protesting, as much as they are trying to puzzle this catastrophe

through (and let me be the first to say that this is precisely what people on college campuses should be doing). Their speechlessness confirms a truism: The old dominant paradigm for explaining Mideast dysfunction is not working. It is hard to understand what the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has to do with Muammar el-Qaddafi strafing his own citizens or Bashar Assad unleashing his goons on protesters (though whether all of those protesters are offering more democratic alternatives is a conversation I will leave for another day).

***CASE***

**Advantage**

Inherency – Israeli Arms Exports Now

Israel funds human rights violators with weaponsToi Staff, 3-13-2019, ("Israel named world’s 8th largest arms exporter," The Times of Israel, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-named-worlds-8th-largest-arms-exporter/ - Noah)Israel is the world’s eighth-largest weapons exporter , with India, Azerbaijan and Vietnam its three largest clients in 2014-2018, according to a report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute released Monday. Israel was responsible for 3.1 percent of global arms exports in the period surveyed, [with] a 60% increase in volume over previous years. The report also found a large increase in American arms exports to Israel, with 64% of Israel’s weaponry procurements coming from the US. Twenty-seven percent of Israel’s arms imports came from Germany, and 8.9% from Italy. According to the report, arms imports by countries in the Middle East increased by 87% from the period 2009-2013 to the period 2014-2018, and accounted for 35% of global arms imports in the past five years. For that same period, Saudi Arabia was the world’s largest arms importer with an increase of 192% compared with 2009-2013. Arms imports by Israel rose by 354%, by Qatar (225%) and by Iraq (139%) from the period 2009-2013 to the period 2014-2018. Syria’s arms imports fell by 87% during that time. Congress has recently pushed for the US to end the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi by officials from the kingdom, allegedly at the direction of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Last month, a committee in the UK’s House of Lords said that the country should also suspend some sales to the kingdom over its “unconscionable” war in Yemen. The report editor, Pieter Wezeman, told the Globes newspaper that Israel exports arms to all regions of the world, with the exception of the Middle East. “Israel exports weapons to many countries in the world,” Wezeman said. “The only region in which the Israeli defense industry, with government encouragement, is inactive is in the Middle East, now that its relations with Turkey have deteriorated.” Israel has been accused of selling weapons and military services to human rights violators around the world for decades, including to apartheid South Africa, Rwanda during the 1994 genocide and in recent years to South Sudan , despite a near-universal arms embargo over the bloody civil war there. Most recently, Israel has been accused of supplying Myanmar with “advanced weapons” during the country’s ethnic cleansing campaign against its Rohingya Muslims. The Foreign Ministry admitted last year to selling Myanmar weapons in the past, but said that it had frozen all contracts earlier in 2017. In 2018, controversial Philippines’ President Rodrigo Duterte told President Reuven Rivlin that his country would henceforth only buy weapons from Israel due to its lack of restrictions. He has said in the past that he sees Israel as an alternative supplier of weapons after the US and other countries refused to sell him arms over human rights violations. The recent warming of ties between Israel and Chad was reportedly conditioned on Jerusalem’s willingness to sell arms to the African country, which critics say is guilty of human rights violations. India’s ties with Israel have warmed in recent years, particularly in the area of military cooperation and weapons

development, with the countries exchanging billions of dollars in defense contracts. In February it was reported Israeli-made smart bombs were used by India in an airstrike on Pakistani jihadists across the volatile Kashmir border, in an attack that raised tensions between the two nuclear arch-rivals. Azerbaijan is seen as an important ally to the Jewish state, given that it shares a border with Israel’s nemesis, Iran. Last year, the country’s president, Ilham Aliyev, revealed Azerbaijan had purchased some $5 billion worth of weapons and defense systems from Israel. Israel has come under criticism for its cooperation with Azerbaijan over the country’s reported human rights violations, despite it being one of the few majority-Muslim countries with which Israel enjoys an openly positive relationship. Israel’s defense exports are regulated according to a 2007 law that requirdes defense contractors to consider what and where the Israeli weapons will be used for. The law is designed to prevent companies from knowingly selling weapons to countries that intend to use them to commit atrocities. While the contractors are legally required to take potential human rights violations into consideration under the law, this requirement can be overruled out of diplomatic or security concerns . Currently, Israeli law only prevents the sale of weapons to countries that are under an official embargo from the UN Security Council. However, such embargoes rarely happen, generally because of vetoes by China and Russia.

Israel Arms Exports High NowKubovich K. 2018 Israel's Arms Exports Spike, Hitting Record $9 Billion. March 02, 2018. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-s-defense-export-sales-exceed-record-9-billion-1.6052046, Pranav

Fifty-eight percent of these exports went to Asia and the Pacific, stemming primarily from the $2 billion defense contract Israel signed with India. Under the agreement, Israel Aerospace Industries will supply India with advanced Barak 8 air defense systems worth $1.6 billion including missiles, launchers, communications devices and command, control and radar systems. Next in line is Europe, which took 21 percent of Israel’s defense exports, followed by North America, Africa and Latin America.“This continues the upward trend and is a very significant increase this past year,” said export branch head Col. (res.) Mishel Ben-Baruch. “Israel’s defense industries are highly valued, respected and trusted throughout the world, thanks to advanced, high-quality technologies based on unique solutions that have been proven operationally by the Israel Defense Forces.” Ben-Baruch stressed that, “In recent years Israel has been one of the world’s top 10 defense exporters .” The Defense Ministry believes the increase in sales stems from several international trends, one being is an increase in defense budgets of NATO countries. Ben-Baruch said the defense establishment sees Europe as a significant target for defense transactions, mainly in terms of “border defenses, the consequences of immigration and all aspects of terrorism.”Asia has also been a major destination for defense exports in recent years, he said. “This is a global trend, and of course there is competition with other countries, but thanks to

the quality and prestige of our systems, we manage to compete in the Asian and European markets.”Another reason for the increase in sales, defense officials say, is that arms deals have become an important part of Israel’s relations with other countries. For example, a half-billion dollar deal was recently signed between Israel and Croatia for the sale of F-16 aircraft.

Current regulatory loopholes allow Israel to sell weapons to unethical governmentsHarel 19 Amos Harel is one of Israel's leading media experts on military and defense issues. He has been the military correspondent and defense analyst for Haaretz for the last 12 years. In this role, he has written extensively about Israel's ongoing fight against terrorist organizations, its battles during the Palestinian Intifadah (uprising) and the last war in Lebanon.(“Arming Dictators, Equipping Pariahs: Alarming Picture of Israel's Arms Sales”) Accessed 7/6/19 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-arms-sales-to-dictators-pariahs-states-alarming-picture-1.7250048 (Quin Nguyen Le)

A thorough report by Amnesty International is harshly critical of Israel’s policies on arms exports. According to the report written in Hebrew

by the organization’s Israeli branch, Israeli companies continue to export weapons to countries that systematically violate human rights. Israeli-made weapons are also found in the hands of armies and organizations committing war crimes. The report points to eight such

countries that have received arms from Israel in recent years. Often these weapons reach their destination after a series of transactions, thereby skirting international monitoring and the rules of Israel itself. Amnesty calls on the government, the Knessetand the Defense Ministry to more tightly monitor arms exports and enforce transparency guidelines adopted by other Western countries that engage in large-scale weapons exports. In the report, Amnesty notes that the supervision of the arms trade is “a global, not a local issue. The desire and need for better monitoring of global arms sales derives from tragic historical events such as genocide, bloody civil wars and the violent repression of citizens by their governments …. There is a new realization that selling arms to governments and armies that employ violence only fuels violent conflicts and leads to their escalation. Hence, international agreements have been reached with the aim of preventing leaks of military equipment to dictatorial or repressive regimes.” The 2014 Arms Trade Treaty established standards for trade in conventional weapons. Israel signed the treaty but the cabinet never ratified it. According to Amnesty, Israel has never acted in the spirit of this treaty, neither by legislation nor its policies. “There are functioning models of correct and moral-based monitoring of weapons exports, including the management of public and transparent reporting mechanisms that do not endanger a state’s security or foreign relations,” Amnesty says. “Such models were established by large arms exporters such as members of the European Union and the United States. There is no justification for the fact that Israel continues to belong to a dishonorable club of exporters such as China and Russia.” In 2007, the Knesset passed a law regulating the monitoring of weapons exports. The law authorizes the Defense Ministry to oversee such exports, manage their registration and decide on the granting of export licenses. The law defines defense-related exports very broadly, including equipment for information-gathering, and forbids trade in such items without a license. The law does not include a clause limiting exports when there is a high probability that these items will be used

in violation of international or humanitarian laws. But the law does prohibit “commerce with foreign agencies that are not in compliance with UN Security Council resolutions that prohibit or limit a transfer of such weapons or missiles to such recipients.” According to Amnesty, “the absence of monitoring and transparency have for decades let Israel supply equipment and defense-related knowledge to questionable states and dictatorial or unstable regimes that have been shunned by the international community.” The report quotes a 2007 article by Brig. Gen. (res.) Uzi Eilam. “A thick layer of fog has always shrouded the export of military equipment. Destinations considered pariah states by the international community, such as Chile in the days of Pinochet or South Africa during the apartheid years, were on Israel’s list of trade partners,” Eilam wrote. “The shroud of secrecy helped avoid pressure by the international community, but also prevented any transparency regarding decisions to sell arms to problematic countries, leaving the judgment and decision in the hands of a small number of people, mainly in the defense establishment.” The report presents concrete evidence on Israel’s exports over the last two decades, with arms going to eight countries accused by international institutions of serious human rights violations: South Sudan, Myanmar, the Philippines, Cameroon, Azerbaijan, Sri Lanka, Mexico and the United Arab Emirates. In some of these cases, Israel denied that it exported arms to these countries at specifically mentioned times. In other case it refused to give details. In its report, Amnesty relies on the research of other human rights groups, on documentation published in the media in those eight countries, and on information gathered by attorney Eitay Mack, who in recent years has battled to expose Israel’s arms deals with shady regimes. Amnesty cross-checks descriptions of exported weapons with human rights violations and war crimes by those countries. In its report, Amnesty says that some of these countries were under sanctions and a weapons-sales embargo, but Israel continued selling them arms. According to the organization, “ the law on monitoring in its current format is insufficient and has not managed to halt the export of weapons to Sri Lanka, which massacred many of its own citizens; to South Sudan, where the regime and army committed ethnic cleansing and aggravated crimes against humanity such as the mass rape of hundreds of women, men and girls; to Myanmar, where the army committed genocide and the chief of staff, who carried out the arms deal with Israel, is accused of these massacres and other crimes against humanity; and to the Philippines, where the regime and police executed 15,000 civilians without any charges or trials.” Amnesty says that this part of the report “is not based on any report by the Defense Ministry relating to military equipment exports, for the simple reason that the ministry refuses to release any information. The total lack of transparency by Israel regarding weapons exports prevents any public discussion of the topic and limits any research or public action intended to improve oversight.” One example is the presence of Israeli-made Galil Ace rifles in the South Sudanese army. “With no documentation of sales, one cannot know when they were sold, by which company, how many, and so on,” the report says. “All we can say with certainty is that the South Sudanese army currently has Israeli Galil rifles, at a time when there is an international arms embargo on South Sudan, imposed by the UN Security Council, due to ethnic cleansing, as well as crimes against humanity, using rape as a method of war, and due to war crimes the army is perpetrating against the country’s citizens.”

Inherency – Israel Non-Compliant With HR

Israel fails to comply with hr restrictionsWorld Report March 30th 2018, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/israel/Palestine, PranavThe Israeli government continued to enforce severe and discriminatory restrictions on Palestinians’ human rights; restrict the movement of people and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip; and facilitate the unlawful transfer of Israeli citizens to settlements in the occupied West Bank. Israeli forces stationed on the Israeli side of the fences separating Gaza and Israel responded to demonstrations for Palestinian rights on the Gaza side with excessive lethal force. Between March 30 and November 19, security forces killed 189 Palestinian demonstrators, including 31 children and 3 medical workers, and wounded more than 5,800 with live fire. Demonstrators threw rocks and “Molotov cocktails,” used slingshots to hurl projectiles, and launched kites bearing incendiary materials, which caused significant property damage to nearby Israeli communities, and, in at least one instance, fired towards soldiers. Officers repeatedly fired on protesters who posed no imminent threat to life, pursuant to expansive open-fire orders from senior officials that contravene international human rights law standards. In May, the United Nations Human Rights Council set-up a commission of inquiry to investigate the events in Gaza, with a view to identifying those responsible, including in the chain

of command, and ensuring accountability. The Israeli army also launched intermittent air and artillery strikes in the Gaza Strip, killing 37 Palestinians between March 30 and November 19, including at least five civilians. Palestinian armed groups fired 1138 rockets and mortars indiscriminately toward Israel from Gaza as of November 13, according to the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, a major increase over previous years, killing one person and injuring at least 40, including civilians. Attempts to reconcile did not end the rivalry between Palestinian groups Fatah and Hamas. Both the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza arrested opposition supporters and other critics, and mistreated and tortured some in their custody. The Independent Commission for Human Rights in Palestine (ICHR), a statutory commission charged with monitoring human rights compliance by the Palestinian authorities, received 180 complaints of arbitrary arrest, 173 complaints of torture and ill-treatment, and 209 complaints of administrative detention pursuant to orders from a regional governor by PA security forces as of October 31. In the same period, the body recorded 81 complaints of arbitrary arrest and 146 complaints of torture and ill-treatment against Hamas security forces.

Link – Arms Sales = Palestinian Oppression

Israelis are able to terrorize the Palestinians because of the $5 billion dollars the US funds them annually

Johanna Fernandez ’15 is a native New Yorker. She received a PhD in History from Columbia University and a BA in Literature and American Civilization from Brown University. Professor Fernández teaches 20th Century U.S. History, the history of social movements, the political economy of American cities, and African-American history. She has previously taught at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburg, PA and Trinity College in Hartford, CT and is, most recently, the recipient of a Fulbright Scholars grant to the Middle East and North Africa that will take her to Jordan in spring 2011, where she will teach graduate courses in American History. “Structures of settler colonial domination in Israel and in the United States,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 6, No. 1, 2017, pp. 29-44

Despite Israel’s well-funded and heavily militarized project of repression, the Palestinian people are resilient. In Palestine we witnessed that “there is something in the soul that cries for freedom.” Yet, the daily oppression that Israel inflicts on Palestinians was, for those in our delegation, a sobering reminder of the work we must do back home to weaken, from the inside, U.S. imperialism and its support for Israel. The terrorism that the state of Israel deploys against Palestinians would not be possible without the approximately $5 billion it receives annually in U.S. military, ad hoc, and special aid.30 If we build it, BDS (Boycott, Divest, Sanctions)—like the movement against South African apartheid—is a platform for educating people of conscience around the world about the atrocities suffered by Palestinians at the hands of Israel’s lawless occupation. BDS is also an entry point for building broad international support for the right of Palestinians to reclaim their land, culture, history, and dignity without preconditions—a universally recognized right enshrined in international law which repeatedly reaffirms “the legitimacy of peoples’ struggle for liberation from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation by all available means, including armed struggle.”31These are rights historically accorded to all oppressed people, from the North American colonies that launched the American Revolution and Nat Turner’s slave rebellion to Vietnam’s National Liberation Front.

Link – Arms Sales = Settler ColonialismIsrael is a settler colonial state, its dominance perpetuated by a state apparatus of violence and oppression made possible by continued governmental support and the US war machine

IJAN 12 –International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network (“Israel’s Worldwide Role in Repression,” pg. 6-7, by the International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network. Accessed July 2, 2019. The International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network (IJAN) is a network of anti-Zionist Jews founded by Sara Kershnar.)—RSP*, Sterling

Origins: The Colonization of Palestine & the Region Israel is a settler colonial state in Palestine founded and sustained by over a century of steady Jewish immigration. Israel was established in 1948, with support from the United Nations. Starting in 1947, Zionist militia forces brutally expelled three quarters of a million Palestinians in order to take their land and create a Jewish majority. One result of this was the creation of a large Palestinian diaspora. Those Palestinians who remained in Israelformed a national minority that is now s ubject to systematic discrimination and repression. In 1967, Israel expanded its colonial territory to the remaining land of historic Palestine as well as to Egyptian and Syrian territory. Israel perpetrated large-scale ethnic cleansing in the course of establishing its occupation of the Golan Heights, the West Bank including East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Desert (which was returned to Egypt in full by 1982). Today, part of Syria is still occupied, and millions of Palestinians remain under a ruthless regime o f Israeli military occupation . Today, the colonization of Palestine continues. Palestinian refugees are refused the right to return to their country of origin –a right officially protected by international law. Palestinians living inside of the state of Israel face over 20 apartheid laws.13 Palestinians living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem are subjected to a military occupation, home demolitions, ongoing and repeated forced displacement, theft of land, and lack of access to water for thef arming population, severe restrictions on freedom of movement, and deadly violence, all of which is enforced officially by the Israeli military and informally by Jewish settlers. Palestiniansliving in Gaza are trying to survive what the United Nations recognizes as a manufactured humanitarian crisis . Their lives are daily threatened by a lack of access to water, food, trade, electricity and medical needs, ongoing military attacks from Israel, and an international block ad eenforced by Israel.Attempts to dislocate and destroy Bedouin communities in the “unrecognized villages” of the Naqab (Negev) desert have recently intensifieddramatically.14Meanwhile, immigrant and refugee communitiesin Israel, particularly those from Africa, are increasingly criminalized, and subjected to both state and vigilante violence and deportation. The sections that follow give evidence of Israel’s role in supporting and facilitating the repression done by other aggressors around the world. In the M iddle E ast, Israel is the primary aggressor . Locally, Israel does not sell to its own neighbors but uses its own weapons and technology against them. While Israel exports its instruments and strategies of mass murder, repression

and incarceration outside of the region , within the region it perpetrates all three. Israel exports what it uses to repress and dominate Palestinians and perpetrate aggression against its neighbors.The following are some of these tools, technologies, methods and weapons: •Training of police, military and militia. Systems of surveillance used to criminalize populations considered potential threats to the legitimacy or security of repressive states and regimes. This information is used for mass incarceration, deportation, assassination, torture and forced removal to secure land or resources. •Methods of isolating populations through forced migration and destruction of land into concentrated areas whose air space, borders/parameters and telecommunications are controlled. •Militarized borders and border technology used to prevent freedom of movement.

Impact – Global RepressionIsrael’s weapons exports regime is the perpetrator of violent regimes and government massacre around the globe, perpetuation endless cycles of violence and psychological trauma

IJAN 12 –International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network (“Israel’s Worldwide Role in Repression,” pg. 8-9, by the International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network. Accessed July 2, 2019. The International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network (IJAN) is a network of anti-Zionist Jews founded by Sara Kershnar.)—RSP*, Sterling

8Central and South America15 Israel has soldits signaturefirearms , the Uzi submachine gun and the Galil rifle, in countries throughout the region, arming Guatemalan death squads, Nicaraguan Contras 16, Pinochet’s Chile, and the military junta in Argentina against the population and their movements. In Nicaragua, Israel provide d 98% of the arms Somoza usedin the last year of his dictatorship to kill 50,000 Nicaraguans.17 Israe l also sold missiles, fighter jets andarmored vehiclesand provided counterinsurgency experts to the repressive forceslisted above as well as the dictatorships in Honduras18and El Salvador.19 In Costa Rica, as early as 1981, in addition to selling arms to the police to repress the population, Israel provided passports, aliases and arms to Contras operating out of Costa Rica against the people of Nicaragua.20•In El Salvador, the Histadrut, Israel's national “labor federation”(see text box on page 14), cooperated with the United States AFL-CIO and the CIA to undermine rural cooperatives.21•In El Salvador Israel was involved in training the military, police, and death squads of the dictatorship beginning in 1972. It developed a youth military program sponsored by the Israeli Defense Force and supported counterinsurgency training for secret police including the military commander Sigifredo Ochoa, who was responsible for civilian massacres in 1981.22•As early as the1950s, Israel sold small arms to Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo who subjected the Dominican people to a 31-year reign of terror.23 In El Salvador and Guatemala, to assist the government’s tracking of suspected opposition, Israelintroduced computerized equipment tomonitortelephones and to interfere with radio transmissions. The information gainedwas then used by right-wing death squads to assassinate opposition figures. Borrowing from its long-standing tactic of displacing Palestinians , I srael helped plan and implement “scorched earth” policies in El Salvador and Guatemala.In Guatemala t hese policies were combined with “development poles ” –concentrated villages of displaced populations that allowed for greater government control over the popular movement and the repression of any grassroots organizing. 25Israel provided small arms and military training to Colombian para militaries and drug traffickers in the 1980s, and since that time, has provided counterinsurgency training, aircraft, missiles and small arms to the brutal Colombian government.26•The Pinochet dictatorship of 1973-1990, that murdered, raped and tortured opposition in Chile, including trade unionists and socialists, bought Israel’s weaponry for crowd control—including vehicles fitted with water-cannons.27Through

the 1980’s, Israel also provided surveillance to the Pinochet regime.28•In the 1970s,Israel armed the brutal military regime of the Argentinian Junta that imposed seven years of state terrorism on the population , including the t orture and “disappearance” of an estimated 22,000-30,000 left-wing activists, trade unionists, students, journalists, and other alleged anti-regime civilians. •The Argentinian regime and its supporters also targeted its Jewish civilians and espoused anti-Semitic rhetoric. Although just 2% of Argentina’s population was Jewish, between 10-15% of the people who were arrested, tortured and disappeared during the Junta were Jewish.29•Rather than condemn the Junta, Israel worked with the Argentinian government to establish a program called “the Option,” allowing Jews to flee to Israel. It used, rather than confronted, the regime’s anti-Semitism to facilitate Jewish emigration to Israel.30

Impact – Racial Palestinianization

Israeli Settler Colonialism results in permanent displacement of Palestinian subjects – the aff’s analysis is keyFernandez 2015 (Johanna, “Structures of Settler Colonial Domination in Israel and in the United States” she has a PhD in History from Columbia University and a BA in Literature and American Civilization from Brown University, ‘15(Johanna,”Structures of settler colonial domination in Israel and in the United States,”03-03-2015, 7-6-2019, JY) Structures of settler colonial domination 31 British Empire in the early 20th century and U.S. hegemony after World War II.3 Its aim was— and remains—the creation of an exclusively Jewish state. The 1948 invasion displaced 85% of Palestinians from their lands to the West Bank, Gaza, and nearby Arab countries of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Palestinians call this event the Nakba, or “catastrophe.”4 Those Palestinians who remained were internally displaced in their own country, confined to its poorest regions, forbidden from moving freely, stripped of land rights and subjected to a brutal system of racial apartheid. This strategy was deployed by the Israelis to maintain social control and military rule for the entire period spanning 1948 to 1966. After 1948, Arab Palestinians—who had been the majority population in that region—soon became demographic minorities within the 1948 borders through the ongoing confiscation of their lands, forced expulsion, and a vast and ongoing project, designed and funded by the state of Israel, to settle European Jews in Palestine.5 While primarily a European Jewish settler state, Zionists have also promoted immigration of entire Jewish communities from across the Arab-Muslim world. The diverse activists with whom we met, who held differing political perspectives and approaches, were unified in their belief that justice in Palestine can only be achieved through redress of the root cause of their oppression, which is found in the Nakba. This more accurate analysis, which links the contemporary crisis in Palestine to Israel’s settler-colonial apartheid project and regime, can prepare people of conscience around the world to recognize and reject bankrupt proposals for change. And given the historical precedent of the settler-colonial project in the U.S.—whose strategies and contemporary forms were studied and replicated by Israel in Palestine—those fighting against the legacy of colonial oppression in the U.S. stand to strengthen their own movements through comparative analysis. Israel and the United States share common themes in their origin histories. Both are colonial-settler apartheid states, justifying their projects through the racialized dehumanization of the Indigenous people they displaced from their lands. In the U.S. this included the mass enslavement of Africans and acquisition by war of other territories during the Spanish American War of 1898, among them the island of Puerto Rico.

**Framing**

Impact Framing – Root CauseIsrael’s military export regime is the bulwark of violent colonial practices that export unfathomable quantities of destabilizing violence and psychological trauma

Silvestein 18 -(“Israel’s Genocidal Arms Customers,” by Richard Silverstein, on November 17 2018. Accessed online July 6, 2019. Richard Silverstein covers the Israeli national security state. He has contributed to the essay collections, A Time to Speak Out: Independent Jewish Voices on Israel, Zionism and Jewish Identity and Israel and Palestine: Alternate Perspectives on Statehood. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/11/israel-arms-sales-eitay-mack-idf)--RSP*, Sterling

For the past few years, a group of nine Israelis led byhuman rights lawyerEitay Mack has sought to peel back the layer of secrecy shrouding Israel’s collusion with some of the worst genocide regimes in the world . They have done so by filing freedom of information requests with their country’s defense ministry, seeking documents concerning Israeli arms deals, consulting contracts, and training of the armed forces in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Serbia, South Sudan, and Rwanda during decades of ethnic conflict in those nations. They’ve sought to learn the extent of the trade, what weapons were supplied and to whom, how the weapons were used, and how long the trade continued. In every instance, the ministry denied their request, and they were forced to appeal to the Supreme Court. In every appeal, the court has sided with the military and ruled that such information was legitimately sealed from public view in order to protect the security of the nation. It’s difficult to understand how the knowledge that Israel armed Rwandan murderers in the 19 90s would harm national security. Much more likely, this exposure would damage Israel’s reputationand give ammunition to critics who claim it is a rogue state intent on violating international law and norms of conduct. Protecting the State In Israel, a national security state in which individual rightsand the public’s right to know are subordinated to the interests of the military-intelligence apparatus, these two factors are often conflated. It is much easier to justify secrecy using the concept of protecting the state and its citizens than it is to admit that secrecy is meant to protect the reputation of the very security apparatus charged with protecting them. Israel has recently censored two major reports claiming that the country was secretly arming nations and groups engaged in genocide or mass violence.The first again concerned Eitay Mack, who had appealed to the Supreme Court to permit exposure of Israeli arms trade to Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese forces. These forces exterminated the Tamil Tiger rebellion during a thirty-year civil war that ended in 2009, with the loss of forty thousand to seventy-five thousand civilians and combatants.Here is Mack’s account of the major role Israeli weapons played in some of the worst massacres of that thirty-year civil war: In Sri Lankathe State of Israel played a most pivotal role in war crimes and crimes against humanity carried out there : [it] supplied drones which directed planes and warships made in Israel, andthese deliberately targeted and bombed civilians and . . . humanitarian sites, and determined the fate of the war at an extremely high human cost. Sri Lankan forces which carried out the crimes had received [Israel Defense Forces] IDF training (especially from the Israeli

Air Force and Navy), as well as from the Israeli Police. One of the famous cases in which Israeli Kfir planes were used took place on August 14, 2006. The Sri Lankan air forceused Kfir planes to bomb an orphanage for girls, in which 400 girls . . . resided. Security forces claimed the girls were being trained to be LTTE [Tamil Tiger] combatants. Around 60 girls were killed on the spot, and tens of girls were injured. Earlier, in 1999, another Israeli war plane attacked a school,killing 21 children and teachers. The Government of Sri Lanka and [its] senior officials . . . have repeatedly [revealed], in official as well as media interviews, during and after the war, details [of] Israeli security exports, their extent and their massive use in the effort to win the war. Repeated statements [acknowledging] watching Israeli drone footage ahead of every attack, have incriminated the Sri Lankan government and proven that civilians and civilian targets had been deliberately hit with full awareness of the government’s security forces. District Court Judge Shaul Shohat ruled that documents held by the Israeli defense ministry could be protected from public view. But his argument revealed the inner workings of the security apparatus and how it works hand in glove with the judiciary and intelligence services. He revealed that he held closed-door hearing with the state’s representatives, including attorneys, defense ministry officials, and even Israel’s national intelligence agency, the Mossad, from which Mack was excluded. During this hearing, the state presented secret evidence to the judge meant to persuade him that revealing any of this information would irreparably harm the state. Shohat dutifully agreed with the defense and wrote in this passage of his ruling (one of the passages the defense ministry sought to suppress is in italics): I . . . learned from a review of these documents that most of the[m] deal with the operational capabilities of the IDF and the security industries involved in various deals, and their ties with military industries in Sri Lanka. The documents contain the details of internal discussions among senior officials in the security establishment regarding the issue as well as discussions and agreements between senior officials in the security establishment and senior officials in the Sri Lankan government, specifically involving the formulation of security policies; working procedures and internal processes in the Ministry of Defense, mutual visits and data as to the deals that were signed and the extent of military exports, including the specification of various types of weapons, etc. It was also noted that there is a secrecy agreement with Sri Lanka, and that its violation by Israel would create a problematic precedent which would reflect on relations with other states, harm existent secret agreements and deter other states from forging new military ties [with Israel]. It was argued in this context that even if Sri Lanka has violated its obligation by the agreement and published specific, ad-hoc information, this does not detract from the State of Israel’s obligation under the agreement. Israeli journalist John Brown published a report in Haaretz on Shohat’s ruling. Shortly thereafter, he discovered that the defense ministry division responsible for protecting military secrets, MALMAB, had asked the judge to censor a

portion of his ruling, which Brown had included in his article.The ministry’s main concern was preventing the revelation of the fact that representatives of the Mossad had urged the judge to restrict media publication about Israeli arms sales to Sri Lanka. MALMAB also sought to suppress media reporting about the secret nature of the weapons dealing. Both parties had agreed to maintain secrecy about them (even though Sri Lankan officials had since revealed them publicly). Brown appealed via Facebook for others to protect and preserve the article in the event it was censored. It seems that even censors in a national security state face obstacles, as the article remains available, uncensored, on the Haaretz website. Another reason why the Israeli censor may be extremely sensitive to revealing such information is that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has announced pre-trial proceedings investigating Israel’s conduct during the 2014 Gaza invasion, Operation Protective Edge. During the month-long conflict, 2,300 Palestinians were killed, two-thirds of whom have been declared civilians by independent Palestinian human right groups and the United Nations. The ICC announced the pre-trial phase amid this year’s Great March of Return, during which Israel has murdered nearly two hundred Gazans protesting Israel’s siege of the enclave. Israeli officials are aware that the publication of any evidence that it has been an accessory to genocide in other conflicts could bolster a case to be made before the international court. Returning to Sri Lanka, it’s no wonder, given the close relations between Israel’s military and Sri Lanka’s, that the army chief of staff responsible for the genocide, after the conclusion of his Sri Lankan military service, was appointed the nation’s ambassador to Israel. The World’s Seventh-Largest Arms Exporter Sri Lanka is only one of Israel’s many weapons buyers. The country is one of the largest arms exporters in the world. It is the seventh-largest exporter of weapons systems worldwide, while its GDP, $350 billion, ranks only thirty-second in the world. This means that the nation’s arms industry is not just one of the

export engines of the economy, but it plays a far more prominent role than in other major arms-exporting nations, which have much larger economies than Israel’s. The armaments industry is powered by ongoing conflicts between Israel and its frontline neighbors . They develop , test, and deploy some of the world’s most advanced weapons systems, which maximize the death and suffering of its enemies. Then it turns around and exports not just the weapons systems, but the suffering they cause . In effect, just as Israel destabilizes the Middle East with invasions, assassinations, air assaults, and repeated military operations outside its own borders, it offers its clients the capability to inflict maximum damage on their own rivals and enemies. This makes Israel a major force for destabilization among the nations of the world . Half of Israel’s overall weapons sales are to India, whose government is also engaged in an illegal occupation of Kashmir. It is the largest supplier of weapons to India as well. To understand how Israel functions as one of the world’s principal weapons dealers, it’s worth examining some of its other major clients. When Duterte Came Shopping for Israeli Guns Last summer, the Philippines’ president and accused war criminal, Rodrigo Duterte, completed a highly successful visit to Israel, during which he signed contracts to purchase some of Israel’s most advanced weapons. Duterte stands accused of the murder of tens of thousands of Filipinos targeted in so-called drug busts. Among the Israeli shrines the Philippine leader visited was Yad Vashem, the memorial to the Holocaust. Duterte has, in the past, likened himself to

Hitler and expressed admiration for the Nazi leader.Duterte sees himself as eradicating the plague of drugs in his country, presumably, as Hitler eradicated the “plague” of Jews. There appears to be no dictator too brutal, no thug too murderous to be considered treif as far as the Israeli arms industry is concerned. Duterte praised Israel’s ask-no-questions approach to weapons sales. Unlike even the US, Israel placed no restrictions on their use. It asked no questions and expected no answers from any of its clients. Arming Serbian and Rwandan War Criminals In 2016, Brown also revealed that Israel supplied military training and weapons to the Serbian war criminal Radko Mladic, who commanded Serbian forces that massacred thousands of Bosnian civilians at Srebrenica. Yet another Israeli court refused to release documentary evidence that Israel armed the Rwandan militias, which ultimately murdered eight hundred thousand Tutsis during the 1994 genocide. Again, a court determined that Israel’s facilitation of genocide was news the world should not hear, because it would hurt the country’s reputation. It certainly would. Israel , which touts itself as the protector of world Jewry in the aftermath of the Holocaust, has been a willing participant in some of the worst instances of genocide since the Holocaust. But Israel’s judiciary, at the urging of its military-intelligence apparatus, deems this information damaging to the nation. Myanmar’s Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims, Aided by Israeli Naval Warships Last year, during the ethnic cleansing of Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslim minority, the same group of activists led by attorney Eitay Mack brought to the public’s attention Israeli arms sales to the Myanmar military junta. The court refused to intervene to stop the trade and even refused to permit its ruling to be made public. Luckily, at a public protest, one of the speakers

revealed the result of the ruling. I published video of his speech and the court’s ruling, believing that such opacity was completely unwarranted. As late as last month, a judge ruled that the charade of silence should continue. As the world shrinks in disgust from former Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, Israel embraces her generals, who have wiped out entire villages in Rakine State, expelling five hundred thousand refugees to Bangladesh. Mack’s work on this case led to the Israeli military and its arms

dealer partners suspending such sales. But if past behavior is any guide, as soon as the furor dies down, the commerce will resume. Israel Fuels Genocide in Sudan Israel has also interceded in the Sudanese civil war, selling weapons to both sides in a conflict that has taken four hundred thousand lives. In 2017, Mack and a group of Israeli activists petitioned the Supreme Court to end Israeli weapons sales on the grounds that they constituted a war crime. In this case, Israeli-made Galil ACE rifles were used by the South Sudanese government to attack members of a rival tribe in a massacre that commenced the civil war. It also supplied eavesdropping equipment permitting the

South Sudanese to monitor the communications of their enemies. The Court later ruled that the arms sales were legal. Acknowledging, Then Censoring The second major story that broke last month is the censoring of a Jerusalem Post article that confirmed to Israelisfor the first time that the IDF has supplied weapons and ammunition tothe al-Qaedaaffiliate in Syria, al-Nusra. I’ve reported before that the Israeli military has physically coordinated with these Islamist rebels, providing intelligence gathering and communications gear. It also built a camp just inside the Israeli occupation zone in the Golan that housed the families of Syrian militant fighters. The Wall Street Journal and Foreign Policy have also published exposés of this arms trade. Until now, Israel only touted its humanitarian and medical aid to Syrian rebels, pretending that this somehow served as Israel’s contribution to ameliorating the suffering of Syrians during the civil war. Otherwise, Israel has falsely claimed it is either neutral in the Syrian conflict or restrained in its involvement. It is neither. But that hasn’t stopped credulous journalists from parroting the Israeli line. Israel has flown hundreds of air sorties attacking Syria n air basesand targeting Hezbollah and Iranian weapons convoys. Further, it has assassinated leading Syrian, Iranian, and Hezbollah military commanders inside Syria. It’s hard to know why an IDF officer offered this information to a Jerusalem Post reporter, then the army censor countermanded him, declared the story treif, and censored it. It appears the right hand doesn’t know

what the left hand is doing. Israel has made these alliances with Syrian Islamists as its prime minister has toured the world boasting that his country is the last bulwark against Islamist terrorism; that the West should thank Israel for warning of such terror attacks on European soil; and that ISIS and al-Qaeda seek first to destroy Israel and then follow up by invading the West. It doesn’t seem to bother him at all to make common cause with the self-same al-Qaeda when his country’s interests are aligned with Israel’s. Few world leaders or journalists have noted the ultimate cynicism of this Israeli gambit. In the brave new world of IHRA-era Great Britain, such news might be greeted with charges of antisemitism.

Impact Framing – Middle East War/Instability

U.S. Arms Sales to Israel are the root cause of violent Middle Eastern conflict and instabilitySatloff et al, 5/6-2019, Robert Satloff, Ian S. Lustick, Mara Karlin, And Tamara Cofman Wittes "Commitment Issues," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2019-04-16/commitment-issues, Mateo

Mara Karlin and Tamara Cofman Wittes argue that the United States’ tendency to overcommit to Middle Eastern partners has created “a moral hazard,” prompting them “to act in risky and aggressive ways” while feeling “safe in the knowledge that the United States is invested in the stability of their regimes.” As evidence of their claim that much of the chaos in the Middle East can be traced to this effect, Karlin and Wittes cite the perverse incentives that caused leaders in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to adopt destabilizing policies toward Libya, Qatar, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories. But they neglect to mention the best example of this dynamic: Israel. The economic and military aid the United States has provided to Israel, and the political and diplomatic protections it affords that country, have, by any measure, far exceeded anything it has given to the Arab states mentioned in the article. The United States has delivered more than $134 billion in direct economic and military aid to Israel, and it pledged another $38 billion to be delivered over the next decade—immense sums, especially considering Israel’s relatively small population and high standard of living. And since 1967, the United States has vetoed 41 un Security Council resolutions criticizing Israel (accounting for 77 percent of all its vetoes during that period). These policies have emboldened Israeli governments to engage in undesirable behavior in just the way Karlin and Wittes describe Arab states acting in response to overly generous, no-stringsattached support from the United States. The consequences of the cocoon of immunity that successive U.S. administrations have spun around Israeli governments include Israel’s defiant nuclear posture, its ruthless and violent policies toward the two million inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, its refusal to negotiate constructively with the Palestinians or respond to the decades-old Arab peace initiative, its support for Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and its efforts to drag the United States into a war with Iran. What is more fundamental, by reducing the incentives for restraint, Washington’s virtually unconditional support has undermined moderate Israeli politicians and empowered belligerent ones. Why vote for moderates when their willingness to compromise never seems to be required, and when their predictions of a confrontation between the United States and Israel never come true? By omitting Israel from their analysis (with the exception of one sentence wisely advising against further diplomatic efforts to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), Karlin and Wittes ignore the most consequential alliance the United States has in the Middle East. Concern about the domestic political sensitivity of the question of U.S.-Israeli relations is precisely what explains why U.S. support for Israel has been so free of conditions and mechanisms of

accountability. It is also the reason the authors’ advice—that U.S. Middle East policy be determined by core U.S. interests instead of the whims of overconfident Middle Eastern leaders—is even more important when applied to Israel. Bellicose Arab allies embroil Washington in needless quarrels abroad, but coddled and overconfident Israeli leaders also whipsaw U.S. presidents at home and thereby hugely complicate the pursuit of U.S. interests. The problems posed by unconditional U.S. support for Israel are glaringly apparent when it comes to Iran. Karlin and Wittes advise the U.S. government to abandon Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s announced policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran in favor of returning to the nuclear deal. Such advice treats the issue as if it could be addressed independent of the pressure that Israel, and the Israel lobby, put on U.S. politicians and policymakers to prevent the agreement, scuttle it after it was signed, and then adopt an all-out strategy of regime change against Iran—including military action—a call that Israeli leaders have been making regularly for the last 15 years. Indeed, a major obstacle to dealing comprehensively with Iran’s nuclear threat is that doing so would ultimately mean transforming the Middle East into a nuclear-weapons-free zone, a proposal that Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states have already made. But this would require Israel to acknowledge and dismantle its large nuclear arsenal, something the United States has refused to advocate. According to Karlin and Wittes, curbing Iran’s “bad behavior” remains a priority for the United States. They recommend doing so in coordination with regional allies. Although they note the difficulties that aggressive Saudi policies toward Qatar pose for an effective alliance in the Gulf against Iran, they ignore the need to distinguish U.S. interests from Israeli policies and actions in Syria, Lebanon, and the Golan Heights. The United States is so closely associated with Israel that no tough but restrained policy toward Iran will be sustainable so long as Israel is launching hundreds of air strikes against Iranian targets in Syria, sparring with Iran’s Hezbollah allies in Lebanon, and taking every opportunity it can to drive Washington to undertake regime change in Tehran. The authors also contend that combating terrorism remains a priority, but here again the relationship with Israel gets in the way: nothing makes it easier for the Islamic State (also known as isis) or al Qaeda to recruit terrorists than U.S. support for a state that blockades the Gaza Strip, shoots and gases Palestinian protesters, and takes Arab land in the West Bank and East Jerusalem to construct settlements. Anti-Zionist, anti-Israel, and anti-Semitic appeals are prominent in the propaganda of these groups not because their leaders necessarily care about the issue but because they know that many of the people they are trying to recruit do. Karlin and Wittes refer in passing to “recalcitrant domestic politics” in Israel (and among the Palestinians) to advocate an end to U.S. efforts to rescue “the fairy-dusted prospect” of successful peace negotiations. I agree. Improving Israeli Palestinian relations is not about establishing a separate state in some of the territory Israel rules—the two-state solution. It is—as Karlin and Wittes say is true for all U.S. partners in the Middle East—about building regimes that are “transparent, responsive, accountable, and participatory.” In Israel, that will be achieved not by negotiating an impossible separation of Jews and Palestinians but by democratizing the state that dominates, even if it does not directly govern, all who

live between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. Working to improve this one-state reality will require that the United States shift its focus, for example, from where Israel constructs housing to whether that housing is available to all who need it, whether Jewish or Arab. The United States often invokes democratic values to justify its special relationship with Israel, but it rarely applies them. Changing that would mean insisting that all who live under Israel’s power enjoy civil and political rights and equal protection under the same laws. Neither U.S. President Donald Trump nor his successor is likely to be able to overcome the United States’ own recalcitrant domestic politics when it comes to Israel. But the sound advice offered by Karlin and Wittes—to end extravagant and open-ended commitments to allies in the Middle East in order to reduce reckless behavior and U.S. exposure to its consequences—will never be followed if U.S. profligacy toward Israel is treated as unmentionable.

2AC DA Framing – Epistemology First

US epistemological bias of Israel is used to further justify continued involvement

Mearsheimer and Walt 7 [Mearshimer, Professor of Political Science at UChicago; Professor of IR at Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 2007, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy Page 78-79, Harrison] John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and the co-director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. He graduated from West Point in 1970 and then served five years as an officer in the U.S. Air Force. He then started graduate school in political science at Cornell University in 1975. He received his Ph.D. in 1980. He spent the 1979-1980 academic year as a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, and was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs from 1980 to 1982. During the 1998-1999 academic year, he was the Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs. He previously taught at Princeton University and the University of Chicago, where he served as Master of the Social Science Collegiate Division and Deputy Dean of Social Sciences. He has been a Resident Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and a Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution, and he has also served as a consultant for the Institute of Defense Analyses, the Center for Naval Analyses, and the National Defense University. He presently serves on the editorial boards of Foreign Policy, Security Studies, International Relations, and Journal of Cold War Studies, and he also serves as Co-Editor of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, published by Cornell University Press. Additionally, he was elected as a Fellow in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in May 2005.

When George W Bush spoke at the annual policy conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee in May 2004, he invoked a set of moral themes to help explain U.S. support for Israel. The president began his speech by applauding AIPAC's efforts to “strengthen the ties that bind our nations--our shared values, our strong commitment to freedom." He went on to emphasize that Israel and the United States “have much in common. We're both born of struggle and sacrifice. We're both founded by immigrants escaping religious persecution in other lands. We have both built vibrant democracies, built on the rule of law and market economies. And were both countries founded on certain basic beliefs: that God watches over the affairs of men, and values every life. These ties have made us natural allies, and these ties will never be broken." Bush also noted one important difference and drew a moral conclusion from it. Whereas the United States was relatively safe in the past because of its geographical location, "Israel has faced a different situation as a small country in a tough neighborhood. The Israeli people have always had enemies at their borders and terrorists close at hand. Again and again, Israel has defended itself with skill and heroism. And as a result of the courage of the Israeli people, Israel has earned the respect of the American people. " ' Bush's remarks underscore the degree to which U.S. support for Israel is often justified not on strategic grounds but on the basis of essentially moral claims . The moral rationale for American support rests on several distinct lines of argument, and Israel's supporters often invoke one or more of these claims in order to justify the "special relationship." Specifically, Israel is said to deserve generous and nearly unconditional U.S. support because it is weak and surrounded by enemies dedicated to destroying it; it is a democracy, which is a morally preferable form of government; the Jewish people have suffered greatly from past crimes; Israel's conduct has been morally superior to its adversaries behavior, especially compared to the Palestinians; the Palestinians rejected the generous peace offer that Israel made at Camp David in July 2000 and opted for violence instead; and it is clear from the Bible that Israel's creation is Cock will. Taken

together, these arguments underpin the more general claim that Israel is the one country in the Middle East that shares American values and therefore enjoys broad support among the American people. Many U.S. policy makers accept these various arguments, but even if they did not, the American people supposedly want them to back Israel and certainly do not want them to put any pressure on the Jewish state. Upon close inspection, the moral rationale for unqualifiedU.S. support is not compelling. There is a strong moral case for supporting Israel's existence, but that fortunately is not in danger at present. Viewed objectively, Israel's past and present conduct offers little moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians or for undertaking policies in the region that are not in America's strategic interest. The moral rationale relies heavily on a particular understanding of Israel's history that is widely held by many Americans (both Jews and gen-tiles). In that story, Jews in the Middle East have long been victims, just as they were in Europe. 'The Jew,' Elie Wiesel tells us, "has never been an executioner; he is almost always the victim." The Arabs, and especially the Palestinians, are the victimizers, bearing a marked similarity to the anti. Semites who persecuted Jews in Europe. This perspective is clearly evident in Leon Uris's famous novel Exodus (1958), which portrays the Jews as both victims and heroes and the Palestinians as villains and cowards. This book sold twenty million copies between 1958 and 1980 and was turned into a popular movie (1960). Scholars have shown that the Exodus narrative has had an enduring influence on how Americans think about the Arab-Israeli conflict. The conventional wisdom about how Israel was created and how it has subsequently behaved toward the Palestinians as well as neighboring states is wrong. It is based on a set of myths about past events that Israeli scholars have systematically demolished over the past twenty years.' While there is no question that Jews were frequently victims in Europe, in the past century they have often been the victimizers in the Middle East, and their main victims were and continue to be the Palestinians.Not only is the basic point backed up by an abundance of evidence, but it is also intuitively plausible. After all, how could Jews coming to Palestine from Europe create a state of their own without taking harsh measures against the Arab population that already dwelt in the land they wanted for their new state? Just as the Europeans who created the United States and Canada could not do so without committing significant crimes against the native inhabitants, it was virtually impossible For the Zionists to carve out a Jewish state in Palestine without committing similar crimes against the local residents, who were bound to re-sent their encroachments and attempt to resist them. Unfortunately, this "new history," as it is called in Israel, has not been adequately acknowledged in the United States, which is one reason why the moral rationale still carries significant weight for many Americans.' Israel's more recent conduct is a different matter, however. With the global reach of the Internet and twenty-four-hour cable news networks, many Americans have seen considerable evidence of Israel's brutal treatment of its Palestinian subjects in the Occupied Territories. They have also seen the consequences of Israel's actions in the second Lebanon war (2006), in which the Israel Defense Forces pummeled civilian targets across Lebanon and then dumped several million deadly cluster bomblets in the towns and villages of southern Lebanon.' Although these actions have tarnished Israel's public image in the United States, its supporters remain undaunted and continue

to make the moral case for sustaining the present relationship between those two countries. In fact, a good case can be made that current U.S. policy conflicts with basic American values and that if the United States were to choose sides on the basis of moral considerations alone, it would back the Palestinians, not Israel. After all, Israel is prosperous and has the most powerful military in the Middle East.No state would deliberately start a war with it today. Israel does have a serious terrorism problem, but that is mainly the consequence of colonizing the Occupied Territories.By contrast, the Palestinians are stateless, impoverished, and facing a deeply uncertain future. Even allowing for the Palestinians' various shortcomings, which group now has the stronger moral claim to U.S. sympathy? Getting to the bottom of this issue requires that we look in more detail at the particular arguments that make up the moral rationale. Our focus will be primarily on Israeli behavior, and no attempt will be made to compare it with the actions of other states in the region or in other parts of the world. We are not focusing on Israel's conduct because we have an animus toward the Jewish state, or because we believe that its behavior is particularly worthy of censure. On the contrary, we recognize that virtually all states have committed serious crimes at one time or another in their history, and we are cognizant of the fact that state building is often a violent enterprise. We are also aware that some of Israel's Arab neighbors have at times acted with great brutality. We focus on Israel's actions because the United States provides it with a level of material and diplomatic support that is substantially greater than what it gives to other states, and it does so at the expense of its own interests. Our aim is to determine whether Israel deserves special treatment because it acts in an exceptionally virtuous manner, as many of its supporters claim. Does Israel behave significantly better than other states do? The historical record suggests that it does not.

Voting neg silences our critique of modern Zionism. This shuts down all discussion and perpetuates the Israel lobby’s control of US media - harrison

Mearsheimer and Walt 7 [Mearshimer, Professor of Political Science at UChicago; Professor of IR at Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 2007, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy Page 168, Harrison] John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and the co-director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. He graduated from West Point in 1970 and then served five years as an officer in the U.S. Air Force. He then started graduate school in political science at Cornell University in 1975. He received his Ph.D. in 1980. He spent the 1979-1980 academic year as a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, and was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs from 1980 to 1982. During the 1998-1999 academic year, he was the Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs. He previously taught at Princeton University and the University of Chicago, where he served as Master of the Social Science Collegiate Division and Deputy Dean of Social Sciences. He has been a Resident Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and a Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution, and he has also served as a consultant for the Institute of Defense Analyses, the Center for Naval Analyses, and the National Defense University. He presently serves on the editorial boards of Foreign Policy, Security Studies, International Relations, and Journal of Cold War Studies, and he also serves as Co-Editor of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, published by Cornell University Press. Additionally, he was elected as a Fellow in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in May 2005.

At the same time, groups in the lobby try to marginalize anyone who criticizes Israeli policy or challenges the "special relationship," and try to prevent that person's views from getting a fair hearing in the public arena. To do this, the lobbysometimes employs

heavy-handed tactics to silence critics, accusing them of being anti-Israel or anti-Semitic. Channeling public discourse in a pro-Israel direction is critically important, because an open and candid discussion of Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories, Israeli history, and the lobby's role in shaping America's Middle East policy might easily lead more Americans to question existing policy toward Israel and to call for a relationship with Israel that more effectively serves the U.S. national interest.

2AC DA Framing – Justifies Aff Ballot

Zionism in the media justifies Israeli-instigated genocide and apartheid – the Aff is a step against this media

Mearsheimer and Walt 7 [Mearshimer, Professor of Political Science at UChicago; Professor of IR at Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 2007, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy Page 173-174, Harrison] John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and the co-director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. He graduated from West Point in 1970 and then served five years as an officer in the U.S. Air Force. He then started graduate school in political science at Cornell University in 1975. He received his Ph.D. in 1980. He spent the 1979-1980 academic year as a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, and was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs from 1980 to 1982. During the 1998-1999 academic year, he was the Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs. He previously taught at Princeton University and the University of Chicago, where he served as Master of the Social Science Collegiate Division and Deputy Dean of Social Sciences. He has been a Resident Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and a Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution, and he has also served as a consultant for the Institute of Defense Analyses, the Center for Naval Analyses, and the National Defense University. He presently serves on the editorial boards of Foreign Policy, Security Studies, International Relations, and Journal of Cold War Studies, and he also serves as Co-Editor of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, published by Cornell University Press. Additionally, he was elected as a Fellow in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in May 2005.

One of the lobby's most energetic media watchdog groups—though not the only one—isthe Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA). It has been especially critical of National Public Radio, which itsometimes refers to as "National Palestine Radio." In addition to maintaining a website to publicize alleged examples of media bias, CAMERA organized demonstrations outside National Public Radio stations in thirty-three citiesin May 2003, andit tried to convince contributors to withhold support from NPR untilits Middle East coverage became more sympathetic to Israel. One of Boston's public radio stations, WBUR, reportedly lost more than $1 million in contributions as a result of these efforts.In 2006, CAMERA ran expensive full-page advertisementsin the New York Times and New York Sun criticizing Jimmy Carter's book Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, ads that included the publisher's phone number and encouraged readers to call and complain. Additional pressure on NPR comes from Israel's friends in Congress. In March 2003, for example, a group of congressmen—whose ranks included staunch defenders of Israel such as California Democrats Tom Lantos, Brad Sherman, and Henry Waxman—wrote a letter to NPR President Kevin Klose, asking for an internal audit of its Middle East coverage. Klose refused, but he also began reaching out to various Jewish groups in an effort to deflect the pressure. The lobby's efforts to gain favorable coverage take other forms as well. In August 2003, for example, the writer Ian Buruma wrote an articlein the New York Times Magazine titled "How to Talk About Israel." He made the obvious point that it is sometimes difficult to talk "critically and dispassionately" about Israel in the United States and pointed out that "even legitimate criticism of Israel, or of Zionism, is often quickly denounced as anti-Semitism by various watchdogs." In response, Bret Stephens, then the editor of the Jerusalem Post and now a columnist and editorial board member at the Wall Street Journal, published a vitriolic open letter in the Post that began by asking Buruma, "Are you a Jew?"Two

paragraphs later, Stephens declared, "What matters to me is that you say, 'I am a Jew.'" Why did this matter? Because in Stephens's view, "One must be at least a Jew to tell the goyim how they may or may not talk about Israel." The message of this remarkable letter was, in short, that non-Jews should talk about this subject only in ways that Jews deem acceptable. Sensitivity on this point may also explain why an editor at the New York Times asked the historian Tony Judt to identify himself as Jewish in an op-ed he had written defending our original London Review of Books article. Stephens's views are undoubtedly anathema to many people—including most American Jews—but the fact remains that some leading figures in the lobby are uncomfortable with a free and open discussion of issues related to Israel. ADL head Abraham Foxman told New York Times Magazine writer James Traub that it is "naïve" to think that the "free market of ideas ultimately sifts falsehood to produce truth." As Traub recounts, "Experience . . . has taught [Foxman] that the truth does not win on its own merits; the market for falsehood is too powerful." Falsehood, in this view, is what would follow from a serious interrogation of the United States-Israel relationship and Israel's strategic and moral standing.Groups like the ADL want to make sure that critics of Israel and unconditional U.S. support for the Jewish state remain on the margins of public discourse, and that their views about Israel be regarded as illegitimate.

2AC DA Framing – Victimization K

Settlers deny history and victimize themselves to negate the suffering of the PalestiniansPerugini 14. (Nicola Perugini, 2014: The Moral Economy of Settler Colonialism: Israel and the “Evacuation Trauma.” Perugini's research focuses on international law, human rights, and political violence. He has published articles on embedded anthropology, asylum seekers, humanitarianism and visual cultures, law and spatial practices, the politics of international law, settler colonialism and trauma in Israel/Palestine. Nicola has been a member of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton (2012/2013) and a Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow at Brown University (2014-2016), and he is currently a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow (2017-2019). He has taught at the American University of Rome, the Al Quds Bard College in Jerusalem where he also directed the Human Rights Program, Brown University, and the University of Bologna, Aashni)I propose to answer these questions by exploring the specific ways in which different Israeli social actors have relied upon a series of clinical terms and tropes with which the Israeli public has become quite familiar to mobilize a set of moral feelings and values. The political valence of this mobilization effectively reproduces both the Jewish settler colonial morality and the polity. I argue that the evacuations—what Palestinian scholar Maha Samman poignantly defines as “colonial contractions”—are relatively un- explored moments in which a certain kind of settler colonial ethos emerges, one in which a particular political utilization of trauma becomes clearly manifest. Indeed, defining and experiencing the evacuations (the potential end of the colony) as traumatic and thus morally illegitimate corresponds to reaffirming the legitimacy of the entire colonization enterprise and re- tracing the moral-political limits of a settler community based since 1948 on the dispossession of the Palestinians. In this moral economy, to frame the evacuation of the colonies as an act lacking in morality and producing trauma is to affirm the moral value of settler colonialism.This re-legitimization takes place through a twofold utilization of the register of trauma—a socio-political register that has a global dimension, as many of the cases described by Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman in Empire of Trauma show—in a way that allows the perpetrators of violence (the “traumatized settler”) to become victims and thus to find legitimization for their activities of dispossession.10 The first utilization involves dehistoricization: trauma and victimhood are claimed by erasing the fact that the settlers initially dispossessed the Palestianians. Then it is as if the land they settled was their own from the beginning. The second usage consists in the transformation of the clinical register of trauma into a moral one, whose ultimate aim is the legitimization of settling as an act of justice, and the identification of certain acts of un-settling with injustice. We could define this twofold utilization of the register of trauma in the context of Palestine/Israel as the moral economy of settler colonialism—the social production, mobilization and circulation of moral values and norms politically functional to the perpetuation of settler colonial dispossession. Here the trauma discourse acquires three main functions: it describes an experience of suffering; it erases the historical

conditions that led to that experience; and it fuels a twofold moral claim about the justness of the colony and the un-justness of its end.

A2 Aff = Anti-Semitism

Anti-Zionism is not Anti-Semitism, We need to talk about it

Svirsky 6/17 (Dr. Marcelo Svirsky, Senior politics lecturer, Transcribed by Argon Lafiti, “Zionism triggered Israeli-Palestinian conflict: UOW professor”, Illawarra Mercury, June 17, 2019, https://www.illawarramercury.com.au/story/6218678/zionism-triggered-israeli-palestinian-conflict-uow-professor/ ) -CTA University of Wollongong senior politics lecturer says Zionism as a western kind of nationalism was the trigger that set in motion the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Dr Marcelo Svirsky will talk about the long-running Palestinian-Israeli conflict at the next Alternatives to 'Western Civilisation' seminar. He will be one of the speakers at the Free Uni in the Pub series hosted by UOW staff and community members. The second Wollongong seminar, held on the same dates as the Ramsay Centre speaker series in Sydney, will be at the Illawarra Brewery on Tuesday, June 18 from 6pm. Dr Svirsky will speak as an Israeli Jew who is an expert on the Palestine-Israel conflict. "We will be discussing the similarities in settler colonialism in Israel Palestine with the view on how western civilisation was part of that particular formation," he said. "It is not just going to be on one aspect of this conflict. We will try to look at the history of the conflict as well as the present and possible solutions to the conflict." Dr Svirsky said before Zionism came into Palestine in late 19th century Jews and Arabs were living together peacefully. "Zionism as a western kind of nationalism was the trigger to a conflict that we are still experiencing," he said. "People tend to think the conflict is eternal and that it always existed but in fact it was formed very late in the 19th century. And it was formed because Zionism as a Jewish national movement came into the country with a view to displace the native population. "This is a theme or topic that echoes with the Australian experience. "We will be talking also about the Palestinian struggle from the viewpoint of an indigenous struggle." Dr Svirsky said he will also discuss how everyday Israelis "are actually involved in the oppression of Palestinians". "This is something that needs to be discussed. Why this happened and what are the social process through which people go and form themselves to become oppressors," he said. Read more: Wollongong pub hosts Alternatives to 'Western Civilisation' series Read more: UOW staff pen their Ramsay Centre deal objections Dr Svirsky said the seminar will also discuss the very important question that has already been addressed globally. Are we allowed to criticise Israel or if we keep criticising Israel, we will be deemed as anti-Semitic," he said. "My answer will be obviously of course we are entitled and we should criticise Israel because it employs settler colonial policies of domination....and there is nothing anti-Semitic about that. "I myself am a Jew. I'm an Israeli Jew, and I'm talking also from that perspective."

A2 College Campuses Not KeyZionism on campus only creates conflict among college campuses. Benjamn 18 (lecturer at the University of California, Santa Cruz and the cofounder and director of AMCHA Initiative, a non-profit organization devoted to investigating, documenting, educating about, and combating campus antisemitism in America, Tamni Romssman-Benjamin, “Anti-Zionist attacks at Universities Have Increased”, 17 jul 18, 6 jul 19, https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/402337-anti-zionist-attacks-on-campus-have-increased-yet-schools-arent-doing , Jewel) A few months ago, a professor at San Francisco State University posted to her program’s Facebook page that welcoming Zionists to campus is “a declaration of war against Arabs, Muslims, [and] Palestinians.” Soon after, graffiti and flyers showed up all over campus stating, “Zionists Are Not Welcome On This Campus.” At a University of Illinois rally against white supremacy, a member of Students for Justice in Palestine led a large crowd in chanting, “No Zionists, no KKK, resisting fascism all the way!” At New York University, 53 student groups pledged to boycott NYU’s pro-Israel clubs and refuse to co-sponsor events with them. The president of Students for Justice in Palestine stated, “Our point is to make being Zionists uncomfortable on the NYU campus.” New research recently conducted by our organization found that because of their presumed support for Israel, Jewish students on dozens of campuses have been openly targeted for vilification, destruction of property, disruption of events, and exclusion from participation in campus activities, with incidents of Israel-related ostracization and discrimination more than doubling from 2015 to 2017. And such acts are not only increasing in frequency but in brazenness, with open calls for the boycott, and even expulsion, of Jewish and pro-Israel students and student groups from campus jumping from 3 incidents in 2015 and 4 in 2016, to

14 incidents in 2017 and 18 in the first half of 2018 alone. Anti-Israel campus activities are no longer intent on harming Israel, but increasingly, and alarmingly, they are intent on harming pro-Israel members of the campus community. Our study also found that while acts of classic anti-Semitism (e.g. swastika graffiti, neo-Nazi fliers, vandalism of Jewish religious objects, etc.) made up the vast majority of incidents on campus, it was the Israel-related incidents, which were far more likely to directly target Jewish and pro-Israel students for harm, that contributed the lion’s share of hostility to the campus climate.

Anti-Zionism is harassment, violates student’s rightsBeckwith & Rossman-Benjamin 18 ( Beckwith, Professor @ UCLA; Rossman-Benjamin, Professor @ University of California, “Zionists Off Our Campus!”Campus Antisemitism in 2017, August, 2018, https://amchainitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Campus-Antisemitism-2017.pdf, SAATVIK)In addition, an examination of the prevalence of these prominent features of anti-Israel incidents over time revealed a

disturbing trend. While incidents involving behavior that attempted to suppress pro-Israel expressio n remained relatively constant over the last three years, those involving the direct and personal targeting of specific pro-Israel individuals or groups for ostracizing or excluding more than doubled during the same time. Moreover, this behavior has seemed to grow more flagrant over time, with public calls for the boycott 17 of Zionists or pro-Israel groups or their exclusion from campus life increasing significantly from 2015 through the first half of 2018. These trends suggest that anti-Israel campus activists are not only intent on harming Israel, but increasingly, and alarmingly, they are intent on harming pro-Israel members of the campus community. Despite the fact that acts of Israel-related antisemitism appear to be the larger contributor to a hostile environment for Jewish students, university administrators have generally been far less likely to adequately address these Israel-related incidents than they have acts of classic antisemitism. In large part, this is due to university administrators recognizing that classic antisemitism may violate state or federal anti-discrimination law and most schools’ peer-on-peer harassment policies, which prohibit the harassment of students

based on characteristics such as race, color and gender, as well as religion or ethnicity. However, university administrators rarely recognize anti-Zionist harassment as a form of unlawful discrimination, because they see it as motivated by political considerations rather than ethnic or religious ones. In addition, when acts of classic antisemitism occur on campus, many in the campus community are sympathetic with Jewish students and stand in solidarity with them, but this is not the case when acts of anti-Zionist harassment occur. Few in the campus community are sympathetic to the plight of pro-Israel students, and many are even complicit in creating a hostile environment for them. The reality for students, however, is

that harassment is harassment. The effect of intolerant and exclusionary harassing behavior on students is the same, regardless of the motivation of the perpetrator or the identity of the victim. And the abhorrent behavior that prevents students from an education free from harassment must be addressed, and addressed equitably. Students cannot freely express themselves and learn from their professors or each other if they face ongoing and pervasive intolerance, as Jewish and pro-Israel students do now. The fact that anti-Zionist harassment is not treated as other forms of harassment and that few on campus are sympathetic to pro-Israel students’ concerns creates increased vulnerability for many Jewish students. Although efforts are a foot to ensure that Jewish students are protected from anti-Zionist harassment by ensuring that a definition of antisemitism that includes anti-Zionism isused in interpreting federal and state anti-discrimination law, these efforts will take time, and they may or may not succeed. In the mean time, we believe there is an immediate, easy and equitable solution to the problem ,that starts with urging university administrators to consider that peer-on-peer harassment is not only a form of identity-motivated discrimination. As our data on Israel-related incidents suggest, peer-on-peer harassment is also behavior that violates every student’s fundamental rights to freedom of expression and full participation in campus life. And while Jewish students may be particularly vulnerable to such behavior, in the highly polarized atmosphere that has pervaded many campuses in the last few years, Jewish students are not the only ones to suffer from harassing behavior that suppresses speech and denies students equal access to campus life. Only once university administrators focus squarely on the deleterious effects of all peer-on-peer harassment, irrespective of the motivation of the perpetrator or the identity of the victim, can the civil rights and the safety and well-being of all students, including Jewish students, be guaranteed.c

Zionism silences Palestinian voicesFredman 18 (Researcher at Brandeis University, “Feminism and Zionism”, November, 2017, https://academicengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Janet-Freedman-pamphlet-.pdf, SAATVIK)But we have a history of silencing Palestine at San Francisco State. So what’s going on with the Lawfare lawsuit that the judge dismissed on Nov. 8th, but gave them leave to amend? So they may come back and amend, and they already said that they are going to be amending. The Lawfare Project is actually aided by a law firm in San Francisco that is almost a thousand lawyers, pro bono. I have two incredible and amazing pro bono lawyers who are standing by me day in and day out, and I would not change them for anybody. So we are fighting, and justice is on our side. That’s really important. But who is attacking Palestine at SFSU? It is what we call an Israel lobby industry network. The International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network report of 2015 outlines who are some of these donors, and the fact that the Israeli government also has put in millions of dollars in this. So we are not talking about a cottage industry. We are talking about people who are quite organized. These are the list of the groups that I don’t have time to go into. The only two groups that have not directly attacked us, although we’re getting a public record request, is the Brandeis Center—Kenneth Marcus. I’m sure he’s on the horizon somewhere. Friends of the IDF have been involved, copied on e-mails, about attacking us, but they have not directly attacked—although we do have Israeli soldiers on campus that continue to be in active duty in the Israeli army. So we are calling this new McCarthyism. The reason we’re saying this is because it’s exactly as McCarthyism in the ’50s worked. What it does is that it attaches a terrorism label. It incites Islamophobia, uses Islamophobia by billing Arab Palestinians and Muslims as terrorists, so immediately it’s crossing people’s minds. It engages the anti-Semitic smear. It spreads misinformation and false allegation. The university invents new rules and regulations every single time they’d like to curb freedom of speech and our ability to organize and teach. They police activists, organizers and scholars. They try—as the Lawfare has done, as I will continue telling you—to ruin careers. Basically the Lawfare co-founder, Brooke Goldstein, said that we are going to make the enemy pay in a video in 2016 in which she also said there are no Palestinians and Islamophobia does not exist, and also said that San Francisco State University is one of their main targets. So by trying to ruin my career, they would like to teach a lesson to other junior scholars and recent Ph.D.s whose careers are on the line—watch out, this is what might happen to you—to silence people and engage in McCarthyist attacks to prevent people from speaking up, from organizing, from doing anything about justice. Basically stay away from Palestine. They also, at San Francisco State, one of the main targets has been to starve and defund our program—that is part of my contract when I came to San Francisco State in 2007—and rely on donors, pro-Israel donors who are pouring millions of dollars in the university and tell the university that we will continue funding you if you are able to discipline Palestinians students and silence Rabab Abdulhadi and basically shut down the AMED studies program. One of the ways that they do it is backroom deals, lack of transparency, no accountability. A lot of the stuff is happening in secret. They don’t even release the public record FOIA request that we submit. They don’t release, period. The reason

we actually have the public record request is because the university gave it to Lawfare, and my lawyers asked the university to just give us a copy of the public record that they gave to Lawfare. They dragged their feet and finally gave us—we don’t know if they gave us everything. They’re claiming that the officer who does the compliance is not in touch with other people. You’d think with such a high profile case in a federal court the university lawyers would be watching the whole question of compliance and what’s going on. But that’s what they claim. I’m not going to give you all of this history, but this is from at least 2002. It goes: Palestine has been silenced, intimidated, bullied, criminalized, policed and smeared at San Francisco State both by organizations within and outside the university. So when we talk about a war of attrition has been declared, we’re talking about groups outside of the university that are collaborating with groups within the university. We don’t see the two of them divorced from each other.

Anti-Zionism is fueled by hatredOstrov 18 (Author of Jewish News Syndicate, “Anti-Zionism on campuses”, July 5, 2019, https://www.jns.org/, SAATVIK)To most people, BDS is the campaign to boycott Israel for the purpose of highlighting the perceived plight of the Palestinians. Were it this simple, honest people might disagree on the merits of such a campaign. However, the well-documented statements of the BDS movement’s founders (and many of their successors) reveal the campaign’s true intent: the eradication of Israel as a Jewish state. On college campuses, this intent can be discerned from the oft-heard chanting of the words “from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free.” How did / How did the only thriving democracy in the Middle East become so vilified on college campuses as to induce students to chant a slogan calling for Israel’s end as a Jewish state? The answers are many, and it’s tempting to look solely to Israel’s status as occupier. But more is at play. In the progressive environment that pervades today’s academic world, power is often equated to oppression—and both Israel and the Jewish community are seen as powerful. Subscribe to The JNS Daily Syndicate by email and never miss our top stories From the perspective of those groups within academia who see themselves as history’s mistreated figures, dialogue with the powerful is problematic, if not anathema. On the one hand, most college students and their teachers support free speech. But just as many oppose speech that, to their ears, smacks of oppression. This tug of war often tilts against speakers whose message is seen as hurtful—an understandable, if not always appropriate, reaction. Unfortunately, for those campus constituencies who only see Israel as occupier and oppressor, it also means that pro-Israel speech is viewed as unacceptable and its advocates racist. I know countless alums who are concerned about anti-Israel fervor and anti-Semitism at their alma maters. Now is the time for them to speak up. Thus, campus organizations such as Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) take the view that there can be no dialogue with lsrael’s defenders, lest such dialogue lead to “normalization,” i.e., legitimization of the pro-Israel point of view. As one academic known for her anti-Israel provocation has put it, dialogue cannot take place if it “humanizes” the Israeli people. Carried a step further, this attitude also translates into pro-Israeli speakers being shouted down—a practice that occurs with regularity on today’s college campuses. How does all of this affect our Jewish college-age students and what can be done about it? Some students with modest backgrounds in Judaism and Israel may not be affected at all. Others who arrive at college with a strong connection to Israel, but who also hold strong progressive views, may find themselves torn. These students may have to choose between supporting Israel and being ostracized, or rejecting a core part of their Jewish identity in order to gain acceptance as a progressive. This quandary may be less of a problem on larger campuses, where Jewish students can disregard in-your-face annual campus events such as the annual “Israel Apartheid Week.” However, as time goes on, students will find it difficult to avoid the anti-Israel drumbeat even at larger schools. The recent unwillingness of two University of Michigan teachers to write letters of recommendation on behalf of two students who wanted to study in Israel is a case in point. What can be done to influence the debate and make Jewish students more comfortable? On smaller campuses, such as the Claremont Colleges in California, where the Pitzer faculty voted to dissociate itself from a study-abroad program with the University of Haifa, anti-Israel behavior can not only be devastating, but also seamlessly morph into anti-Semitism. The irony is that the University of Haifa’s inclusiveness, with a third of its students being non-Jewish—namely, Arab—would be the envy of many an American university seeking to build a minority representation. At Pomona, another Claremont College, one student was recently quoted as saying that even the act of going to Shabbat services was being derided as a political statement. At Oberlin, a liberal arts college in Ohio traditionally favored by progressive-minded Jewish students, a group of more than 90 Oberlin alumni recently published an open letter calling upon Oberlin’s president to end “the concerted hostility toward Israel on campus,” and stating that such hostility “fosters a hostile environment for Jewish students.” Sadly, the beat goes on at many other revered small colleges, as a casual survey of my book readily indicates. What can be done to influence the debate and make Jewish students more comfortable? Here are a few pointers. From a myriad of sources, prospective students can learn about campus attitudes towards Israel even before applying. Once on campus, there is strength in numbers. On many campuses where SJP and like-minded elements of the “intersectional” spectrum are active, Jewish students far outnumber the most vocal of Israel’s detractors. At schools such as Columbia (where one professor recently wrote on his Facebook page that “Every dirty treacherous ugly and pernicious act happening in the world just wait for

a few days and the ugly name of ‘Israel’ will pup [sic] up as a key actor in the atrocities”) and Rutgers (where one teacher spread the blood libel that “young Palestinian men … were [being] mined for organs for scientific research”), anti-Israel hostility from certain faculty departments, as well as student organizations, is unremitting. Yet Jewish life at these institutions—although, not without it’s discouraging moments—is thriving, owing to the large size and resilience of the Jewish student bodies. Rutgers, alone, enrolls more than 6,000 Jewish undergraduates. At other schools with large Jewish populations (of which there are many), size can be used creatively to demand dialogue and defend against attacks on pro-Israel speech. But the fight against campus hostility towards Israel should include all of us, not just students. Just as Oberlin’s alumni wrote the school’s president to object to the debilitating anti-Israel environment on campus, other influential alumni and alumni groups can do the same. I know countless alums who are concerned about anti-Israel fervor and anti-Semitism at their alma maters. Now is the time for them to speak up. Jewish campus leadership is essential. Most importantly, Jewish campus leadership is essential. On many campuses, Israel’s detractors have taken over the student governments, positioning themselves to introduce, if not enact, BDS resolutions. Jewish students need to enter the fray and involve themselves in student government, even though for some the effort may be painful and the end may not immediately be in sight. Finally, for Jewish students who arrive on campus passionate about Israel, they must possess both a background and tool kit with which to work. For the lucky ones, both of these requisites can be obtained at the dinner table. For others, more is needed. That’s where community organizations such as local federation chapters and national advocacy organizations, such as the American Jewish Committee, come into play with courses designed to prepare Jewish high school students for what they are likely to encounter at college. But not all children are going to respond enthusiastically to that kind of formal training. For them, Jewish summer camp can provide a solid Judaic grounding in an uplifting and memorable environment.

***TOPICALITY***

**T – Reduce = Permanent**

2AC – Counter-Interpretation

Reductions can be temporaryFISHER 09 [J.A.D. Fisher, Superior Court of New Jersey judge, Donnelly v. Donnelly, 963 A.2d 855, 405 N.J. Super. 117 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009)., 1-14-2009, Accessible Online at https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2252662124732332561&q=%22reduction%22+%22temporary%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2006] DL 6-27-2019VI. THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND THAT THE DEFENDANT'S REDUCTION IN INCOME WAS A TEMPORARY CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE REDUCTION HAS BEEN ONGOING FOR 4 YEARS.

1AR – Counter-Interpretation

Reductions can be temporarySCHNACKENBERG 61 [SCHNACKENBERG, circuit judge, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961)., 1-25-1961, Accessible online at https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6632872868159376325&q=%22reductions%22+are+%22temporary%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2006] DL 6-27-2019AB's two price reductions were parts of an experimental program of sales promotion in the St. Louis market and the reductions were temporary and made necessary by competitive conditions. A primary result of AB's price reductions was that the consumers of beer in St. Louis enjoyed a lower price on Budweiser, since the price reductions were passed on to them by the retailers.

Includes suspensionDISCS (Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies) January 2019 “The Management of Security Cooperation”, otherwise known as the “Green Book”, the textbook used to educate personnel, https://www.discs.dsca.mil/_pages/resources/default.aspx?section=publications&type=greenbookSecurity Cooperation Program SuspensionsSecurity cooperation programs may be suspended by the Department of State (DoS) for various reasons, as described in Chapter 2 of this textbook and the SAMM C6.6. If the DoS determines that it is necessary to suspend security cooperation to a particular country, it issues guidance for execution. Upon receipt of this guidance, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) issues appropriate instructions to the implementing agency informing the Combatant Commander and the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO).The DoS may direct that all deliveries of defense articles to the suspended country be stopped immediately. Materiel is not released to the country’s freight forwarder or to the country. In the absence of such direction, materiel support cases implemented prior to the effective date of sanctions are allowed to continue regardless of term. New LOAs are not signed. If procurements have started but contracts have not been awarded, the IA provides details to DSCA and requests guidance. Contracts that have been awarded should continue. However, when items are ready for delivery, DSCA issues guidance on possible diversion of the materiel to another country, to the DoD itself, or to storage consistent with DoS guidance.If the DoS so directs, shipments of defense articles, where the materiel is under USG control, are not loaded at the ports of embarkation. Materiel already in route to the country is not delivered; it is retained under USG control. These articles are stored by the appropriate DoD component until DSCA issues further direction.Materiel ready for shipment from a contractor may be shipped to a DoD facility for segregated storage to await DSCA disposition instructions. If economical, the materiel may be stored at the contractor’s facility. The purchaser is responsible for any storage fees if the title has passed. Any requisitions submitted against either a Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Agreement (CLSSA) or a blanket order FMS case may be required to be held by the IA and not be filled. The DoS may extend a suspension to become a cancellation in accordance with AECA, Sections 2(b) and 42(e). DSCA directs case cancellation and appropriate contract actions to include termination. DSCA provides guidance on the disposition of items, funding, etc., after a case-by-case review.

***DISADVANTAGES***

**China/Russia Fill-In DA**

2AC No Link – MESAMESA will prevent Russian and Chinese influence in the Middle East

Farouk 2/8 (8 Feb 19, Yasmine Farouk, PhD, Sciences Po Paris, France, MA, Sciences Po Paris, France, BA, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Egypt, “The Middle East Strategic Alliance Has a Long Way To Go” https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/08/middle-east-strategic-alliance-has-long-way-to-go-pub-78317, jewel )

The MESA framework incorporates governance mechanisms and member states’ commitments to each other. It would also provide member states with a mechanism for dispute resolution and a much-needed platform to coordinate action during regional crises. It would prevent the resulting vacuum that terrorists, China, or Russia could otherwise fill. The United States also counts on MESA’s coordinated action to support its “deal of the century” in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and to implement a rapprochement with Israel that could join MESA. MESA countries have different assessments of how the intra-GCC crisis (Qatar against the quartet of Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) affects MESA. The Qatari foreign minister stated that “the real challenge facing the U.S.-led alliance is to solve the Gulf crisis.” The recent resignation of General Anthony Zinni, the U.S. envoy tasked with resolving the Gulf crisis and establishing MESA, as well as U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s recent statements, seem to confirm the Qatari view. Nevertheless, the U.S. administration continues to pursue MESA. MESA’s economic and energy pillars are far less noticed than the defense pillar. MESA would “boost trade and foreign direct investment between its members,” according to the foreign minister of Bahrain. In fact, these pillars helped dilute MESA’s political and military identity, encouraging less wealthy and skeptical Arab states to join. Through the economic pillar, MESA becomes a venue to plan and coordinate regional economic development and energy sector integration with assistance from U.S. agencies such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Projects to reform, connect, and insulate energy markets in the region are a priority. MESA would therefore challenge the rapidly growing Chinese and Russian investments and infrastructure projects in the region, especially in the oil, gas, and nuclear energy sectors. At the same time, it would coordinate Arab replacements of U.S. financial contributions to regional stabilization and assistance programs.

**Defense Industry DA**

2AC Impact Framing – Economy Impact

The logic of their impact is akin to Palestinian genocideCook 13 (Jonathan Cook is He received a B.A. (Hons) in Philosophy and Politics from Southampton University in 1987, a postgraduate diploma in journalism from Cardiff University in 1989, and an M.A. in Middle Eastern studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies in 2000 ““The Lab”: Israel Tests Weapons, Tactics On Captive Palestinian Population.”. 9/13. https://www.wrmea.org/013-september/the-lab-israel-tests-weapons-tactics-on-captive-palestinian-population.html JACK JACOBS) However, as one Israeli website noted, this $3 million salute to the head of the Israeli state was financed chiefly by the arms industry. The three biggest funders were major arms dealers, including the honorary chair of the conference, Aaron Frenkel. That was fitting given Israel’s stunning ascent through the international rankings of the arms trade over the past decade. Despite having a population smaller than New York City, Israel has emerged in the last few years as one of the world’s largest exporters of weapons. In June defense analysts at Jane’s put Israel in sixth place, ahead of China and Italy, both major weapons producers. Surveys that include Israel’s growing covert trade put it even higher—in fourth place, ahead of Britain and Germany, and beaten only by the United States, Russia and France. The extent of Israel’s success in this market can be gauged by a simple mathematical calculation. With record sales last year of $7 billion, Israel earned nearly $1,000 per capita from the arms trade—up to 10 times the per capita income the United States derives from its weapons industry. The Israeli economy’s huge reliance on arms dealing was underscored in July, when local courts forced officials to reveal data showing that some 6,800 Israelis are actively engaged in exporting arms. Separately, Ehud Barak, the defense minister in the last government, has revealed that 150,000 Israeli households—or about 10 percent of the population—depend economically on the weapons industry. Aside from these disclosures, however, Israel has been loath to lift the shroud of secrecy that envelopes much of its arms trade, arguing that further revelations would harm “national security and foreign relations.” Traditionally Israel’s arms industry was run by the Defense Ministry, as a series of state-owned corporations developing weapons systems for the Israeli army. But with the rise of the hi-tech industries in Israel over the past decade, a new generation of officers recently discharged from the army saw the opportunity to use their military experience and their continuing connections to the army to develop and test new armaments, for sale both to Israel and foreign buyers. In the process Israel’s arms industry was reinvented as a major player in the Israeli economy, now accounting for a fifth of all exports. Or as Leo Gleser, who runs an arms consultancy firm that specializes in developing new markets in Latin America, observes: “The [Israeli] defense minister doesn’t only deal with wars, he also makes sure the defense industry is busy selling goods.” Gleser is one of several arms dealers interviewed in a new documentary that lifts the lid on the nature and scope of Israel’s arms business. “The Lab,” which won a recent award at DocAviv, Israel’s documentary Oscars, is due to premiere in the U.S. in August. Directed by Yotam

Feldman, the film presents the first close-up view of Israel’s arms industry and the dealers who have enriched themselves. The title relates to the film’s central argument:that Israel has rapidly come to rely on the continuing captivity of Palestinians in what are effectively the world’s largest open-air prisons.The reason is that there are massive profits to be made from testing Israeli military innovations on the more than four million Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. According to Feldman, that trend began with Operation Defensive Shield, Israel’s re-invasion of the West Bank and Gaza in 2002, which formally reversed the process of Israeli territorial withdrawals initiated by the Oslo accords. Following that operation, many army officers went into private business, and starting in 2005 Israel’s arms industry started to break new records, at $2 billion a year. But the biggest surge in sales followed Operation Cast Lead, Israel’s month-long assault on Gaza in winter 2008-09, which killed more than 1,400 Palestinians and 13 Israelis. Record sales in the wake of that attack reached $6 billion. These military operations, including the most recent against Gaza, last year’s Pillar of Cloud, the film argues, serve as little more than laboratory-style experiments to evaluate and refine the effectiveness of new military approaches, both strategies and weaponry. Gaza, in particular, has become the shop window for Israel’s military industries, allowing them to develop and market systems for long-term surveillance, control and subjugation of an “enemy” population. Given that most Palestinians are now tightly contained in urban settings, traditional policies designed to maintain a distinction between civilians and fighters have had to be erased. Amiram Levin, former head of the Israeli army’s northern command in the 1990s and now an arms dealer, is filmed at an arms industry conference observing that Israel’s goal in the territories is punishment of the local population to create greater “room for maneuver.” Considering the effects, he comments that most Palestinians “were born to die—we just have to help them.” The film highlights the kind of inventions for which Israel has become feted by foreign security services. It pioneered robotic killing machines such as the airborne drones that are now at the heart of the U.S. program of extra-judicial executions in the Middle East. It hopes to repeat that success with missile interception systems such as Iron Dome, which goes on display every time a rocket is fired out of Gaza. Israel also specializes in turning improbably futuristic weapons into reality, such as the gun that shoots around corners. Not surprisingly, Hollywood is also a customer, with Angelina Jolie marketing the bullet-bending firearm in the film “Wanted.” But the unexpected “stars” of “The Lab” are not smooth-talking salesmen but former Israeli officers turned academics, whose theories have helped to guide the Israeli army and hi-tech companies in developing new military techniques and arsenals. Shimon Naveh, a manically excited philosopher, paces through a mock Arab village that provided the canvas on which he devised a new theory of urban warfare during the second intifada. In the run-up to an attack on Nablus’ casbah in 2002, much feared by the Israeli army for its labyrinthine layout, he suggested that the soldiers move not through the alleyways, where they would be easy targets, but unseen through the buildings, knocking holes through the walls that separated the houses. Naveh’s idea became the key to crushing Palestinian armed resistance, exposing the only places—in the heart of overcrowded cities and refugee camps—where Palestinian fighters could still find sanctuary from Israeli

surveillance. Another expert, Yitzhak Ben Israel, a former general turned professor at Tel Aviv University, helped to develop a mathematical formula that predicts the likely success of assassination programs to end organized resistance. Ben Israel’s calculus proved to the army that a Palestinian cell planning an attack could be destroyed with high probability by “neutralizing” as few as a fifth of its fighters. It is precisely this merging of theory, hardware and repeated “testing” in the field that has armies, police forces and the homeland security industries of the U.S., Europe, Asia and Latin America lining up to buy Israeli know-how. The lessons learned in Gaza and the West Bank have useful applications, the film makes clear, in Afghanistan and Iraq. Or as Benjamin Ben Eliezer, a former defense minister turned industry minister, explains in the film, Israel’s advantage is that “people like to buy things that have been tested. If Israel sells weapons, they have been tested, tried out. We can say we’ve used this 10 years, 15 years.” Yoav Galant, head of the Israeli army’s southern command during Cast Lead, points out: “While certain countries in Europe or Asia condemned us for attacking civilians, they sent their officers here, and I briefed generals from 10 countries so they could understand how we reached such a low ratio [of Palestinian civilian deaths—Galant’s false claim that most of those killed were Palestinian fighters]. “There’s a lot of hypocrisy: they condemn you politically, while they ask you what your trick is, you Israelis, for turning blood into money.” The film’s convincing thesis, however, offers a disturbing message to those who hope for an end to Israel’s occupation of Palestine. That is because, as Israel has made its arsenal more lethal and its soldiers ever safer, Israeli society has become increasingly tolerant of war as the background noise of life. If Israelis pay no price for war, then the army and politicians face no pressure to end it. Rather, the pressure acts in the opposite direction. With the occupied territories serving as an ideal laboratory, regular attacks on Palestinians to test and showcase its military systems provide Israel with a business model far more lucrative than one offered by a peace agreement. Or as Naftali Bennett, the far-right industry minister, observed—both hopefully and euphemistically—after a trip to China in July: “No one on earth is interested in the Palestinian issue. What interests the world from Beijing to Washington to Brussels is Israeli high-tech.”

**Alliance DA**

2AC – No Impact – Collapse Inevitable

Collapse inevitable ---- partisanship ensures inconsistent American support Fuchs 18 [Michael H Fuchs is a contributing opinion writer for the Guardian US, is also a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, and a former deputy assistant secretary of state for east Asian and Pacific affairs, “The US-Israeli relationship faces a storm on the horizon,” May 18, 2018, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/18/us-israel-relationship-jerusalem-embassy-palestine-violence]These two experiences were emblematic of two vastly different versions of the US-Israel relationship trying – and increasingly struggling – to coexist. One version of the US-Israel relationship is all sunshine and rainbows: deep political and military bonds between governments, extensive trade, special ties between peoples, and America’s backing for the historical justice of safeguarding a democratic homeland for the Jewish people. The other version of the relationship is one of deepening polarization in both countries: the rightwing Israeli government cozies up to US Republicans and pursues extreme policies, while American views of Israel are increasingly divided along partisan lines. Israel wants to be judged on its thriving democracy and economy, for which it deserves real credit. But one cannot ignore Israel’s military occupation of the West Bank and blockade of Gaza where a combined almost 5 million Palestinians live. Government-supported settlements in the West Bank are expanding, slowly taking over Palestinian land in what appears to be a creeping annexation. In America, views of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are more partisan than they’ve been since 1978, according to one study, which revealed that 79% of Republicans say their sympathies lie more with Israel than with the Palestinians, while only 27% of Democrats are more sympathetic to Israel. Another study revealed that, while a large majority of Democrats see Israel as a strategic asset, 55% of Democrats also see Israel as a strategic burden, and 60% of Democrats believe the United States should impose sanctions or take serious action in response to Israeli settlements. The political fight in the United States over the Iran nuclear deal illustrates the partisan divide. In 2015 there was a Democratic uproar when the Republicans invited the Israeli prime minister to speak to Congress in opposition to the Iran nuclear deal being pushed by a Democratic president. This growing link between Israeli and American rightwing parties was reinforced by Netanyahu’s recent presentation supposedly showing Iran’s previous nuclear ambitions, which was just days later referenced by Donald Trump as justification for violating the deal. The same goes for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Trump is backing Netanyahu’s government with hardly a critical word of Israeli activity towards the Palestinians. The embassy move is a case in point – it gains nothing for the United States, makes it impossible for the Palestinians to view this administration as a neutral mediator for peace talks, and stoked violence. Israel has genuine security concerns, and the second intifada left deep scars on the Israeli psyche. For Israelis who remember wondering each day if their children were going to be killed by a suicide bomber on the way to school, the occupation allows Israelis to keep the Palestinians out of sight and out of mind. This is no small part of the reason why rightwing parties promising security have run Israel for almost two decades now. But Israel cannot remain a democracy in the long run while continuing to rule millions of Palestinians who do not have any say in their governance. As I stood in the settlement in Hebron next to a young Israeli soldier guarding Israeli settlers, it was clear that while Israel is good at solving short-term problems – say, protecting Israeli settlers – it is not good at figuring out long-term solutions, like preventing Israel from becoming a perpetual occupier. As one Israeli journalist told me in response to a discussion of the myriad challenges facing Israel, “we’ll schlep through”. Surely, the US-Israel relationship will also schlep through – but what kind of relationship will it be? On my trip, I repeatedly heard the claim that fewer American Jews support Israel because they are moving away from Judaism, not because of Israeli policies towards Palestinians. As an American Jew who strongly supports Israel, but not necessarily Israel’s policies, this deeply offended me. Instead of criticizing American Jews for how they choose to live their personal lives, Israelis should recognize that, whatever the reason, falling support for Israel among a younger generation of American Jews will fracture the US-Israel relationship. Fueling the fire in America are radicals such as Sheldon Adelson, who funds the largest Israeli daily newspaper “Israel Today” to support a rightwing agenda, and who has offered to pay for the new US embassy in Jerusalem. The Trump administration chose Pastor Robert Jeffress as one of the speakers at the opening of the Jerusalem embassy – the same Jeffress who once said: “Mormonism, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism – they lead people to an eternity of separation from God in hell.” There are no obvious perfect solutions. But if the U nited S tates and Israel don’t work together to confront longer-term trends, the relationship could become unrecognizable, with a hyper-partisan segment of America

supporting an Israel that has lost much of its claim to democracy. And that would be devastating for both countries.

2AC – No Impact - Samson Option

No Israel strikes --- hotspot escalation is more likely in a world in which Israel has US support, but rogue Israel would not pre-emptively strike IranLouis Beres 15. Professor of political science and international law at Purdue University. **Leon Edney is a retired US Navy admiral, NATO supreme allied commander, and distinguished professor of leadership at the US Naval Academy. “What -Now for Israel?” US News. 7/14/2015. http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2015/07/14/after-the-iran-nuclear-agreement-what-are-israels-security-optionsTo be sure, following careful assessments of the new Iran agreement, Israel's prime minister will need to make an 11th-hour decision on preemption. In principle, at least, considering any such defensive first strike against Iranian nuclear assets and

infrastructures could still make strategic sense if the following conditions were assumed: 1. Iran will inevitably become militarily nuclear; 2. Iran will very likely plan to use its new nuclear forces in a first-strike aggression against Israel; and 3. Iran's key decision makers will likely be irrational. Regarding core definitions, irrational decision-makers would be those Iranian leaders who could sometime value certain preferences or combinations of preferences (e.g., certain Shiite religious expectations) more highly than Iran's national

survival. In the absence of any one of these three critical assumptions, the expected retaliatory

costs to Israel of any contemplated preemption would plausibly exceed the expected

benefits . Moreover, there would be nothing genuinely scientific about making such difficult policy choices. For one thing, all of

the associated probability judgments would need to be overwhelmingly subjective. How, for example, could Israeli analysts say anything meaningfully predictive about unique or unprecedented circumstances? In science, probabilities must always be based upon the determinable frequency of past events.

Here, however, in pertinent history, there exists no usable guidance. To wit, exactly how many preemptive attacks have already been launched by a nuclear state against a nearly-nuclear state? The "zero"

answer is obvious and irrefutable . It must, therefore, be a cautionary reply. An additional complication exists. The

nearly-nuclear state, Iran, will still possess large conventional and chemical rocket forces .

Many other threatening missiles will remain under the operational control of its sub-state

terrorist proxies. Hezbollah , the well-armed Shiite militia, already has more rockets in its arsenal than do all NATO countries combined; it is even less likely than Iran's own leaders to hold back on any post-preemption retaliations. All things considered, Israel's best security plan, going forward, would be to enhance its underlying nuclear deterrence posture , and to render this critical enhancement as

conspicuous as possible. More precisely, this means that Jerusalem should do everything possible to signal to any future Iranian aggressor that its own nuclear forces are plainly survivable, and capable of penetrating any of Tehran's ballistic missile or other active defenses. Correspondingly, it will also become necessary for Israel to move very carefully beyond its traditional posture of deliberate nuclear ambiguity, or the so-called "bomb in the basement." In the irremediably arcane world of Israeli nuclear deterrence, it can never be adequate that enemy states should simply acknowledge the Jewish State's nuclear status. It is equally important that these adversarial states believe Israel to hold usable and survivable nuclear forces, and be willing to employ these weapons in certain clear and readily identifiable circumstances. Israel's nuclear doctrine and weapons are necessary to various scenarios that could require conventional preemptive action, or more residually, a specifically nuclear retaliation. In any event, for Israel, the core purpose of its nuclear weapons must always be deterrence ex ante, not revenge ex post. An integral part of Israel's multi-layered security system lies in maintaining effective ballistic missile defenses, primarily, the Arrow or "Hetz." Yet, even the well-regarded and successfully-tested Arrow could never achieve a sufficiently high capacity for missile intercept, a quality needed to adequately protect Israeli civilians from any Iranian nuclear attack. In essence, this means that Israel can never rely too heavily upon active defenses for its national protection. What about the prospect of an irrational Iranian adversary? Any

Israeli move from ambiguity to disclosure, however selective, might not help in the particular case of an irrational nuclear enemy . It remains possible, or even plausible, that certain elements of Iranian leadership will determinedly subscribe

to certain end-times visions of a Shiite apocalypse. Still, taken by itself, such subscription does not automatically or even persuasively call for an Israeli preemption.

Turn - Israel can’t start war with Iran unless the US maintains arms salesShahtahmasebi 4/23(Darius Shahtahmasebi has completed a Double Degree in Law and Japanese from the University of Otago, with an interest in human rights, international law and journalism. He's a fully qualified lawyer in two separate jurisdictions, and writes about foreign policy for Anti-Media. “Retired US Colonel: Israel Is Dragging the United States Into World War III” April 23, 2019 https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/retired-us-colonel-israel-is-dragging-the-united-states-into-world-war-iii, Accessed 7/6/2019, Catherine Zhu)But why is there a danger that the U.S. will be dragged into this war, and why does Israel need America’s help? As Wilkerson explains: I believe the answer is fairly clear once you push aside the cobwebs that surround it. The legitimacy of great power is what I call it. And that is precisely what Netanyahu and Lieberman desire. It’s also what Riyadh desires, especially with the new boy king Mohammed bin Salman, now an erstwhile ally of Israel. In short, the IDF could defend Israel but it could not attack Iran. Not successfully, anyway. And were it to do so, it would be damned internationally and thus isolated even more than it already is today, perhaps devastatingly so. Last year, a top Israeli general tasked with writing his country’s defense policy admitted that Israel cannot take on Iran’s military alone if the day should come that the regional powers face off in a direct military confrontation, saying they would need to rely on the U.S. for assistance According to a Politico report, during the Obama years, Israel drew up a military strike option but never really used it. Deep down, Israel knew its effectiveness lied in its ability to pressure the U.S. government into taking further action of its own lest it be dragged into a catastrophic war with Iran that it may or may not be prepared to fight. From the Politico report: They [the Israelis] ordered the Israel Defense Forces and the intelligence arms to prepare for a huge operation: an all-out air attack in the heart of Iran. Some $2 billion was spent on preparations for the attack and for what the Israelis believed would take place the day after – a counterattack either by Iranian warplanes and missiles or by its proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah. The latter could use either the 50,000 missiles it had stockpiled (by 2018, Israeli intelligence estimated the number had increased to 100,000), or it could activate its terror cells abroad, with the assistance of Iranian intelligence, to strike at Israeli or Jewish targets. This is what it did in 1992 and 1994 when it responded to Israeli attacks in Lebanon by blowing up the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and the Jewish community center AMIA in that city, with a massive number of

casualties in both attacks. The strike plan never took place, of course, but according to Politico, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continued to use it to put pressure on the U.S. government to achieve its anti-Iranian objectives. Every day, the likelihood that a war might erupt between Israel and Iran, in turn involving the United States, which has sworn to come to Israel’s defense if attacked by Iran, continues to inch that much closer to reality.

2AC – No Link

Military assistance doesn’t correlate with alliance strength --- Obama era proves Kane et al. 16 [Chen Kane is director of the Middle East Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington, DC. , and W. Seth Carus and Nima Gerami are, respectively, Distinguished Research Fellow and Research Fellow at the National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, “Why the U.S.-Israel Military Aid Package Matters,” National Interest, September 25, 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-the-us-israel-military-aid-package-matters-17818]Despite record levels of U.S. military assistance to Israel under the Obama administration,

the state of U.S.-Israel relations has worsened, not strengthened, in recent years. This strategic drift

goes beyond the personal friction between President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. At the core of this tension are fundamental differences in threat perceptions, strategic prioritization, and

policy options for confronting unprecedented change in the Middle East. Whereas Washington has

been frustrated by Israel’s settlement policy and the lack of progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Tel Aviv sees Iran and its destabilizing activities as its most immediate security threat—even more than the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The signing of the Iran nuclear agreement last year widened U.S.-Israeli strategic differences and contributed to a growing perception, shared by Tel Aviv and Gulf Arab capitals, that the United States is tolerating Iran’s antagonistic role in the region at the expense of its traditional allies. The perception of eroding U.S. credibility in the region—a view held by conservative and moderate members of the Israeli national security community, as well as by America’s staunchest allies in the Gulf region—has exacerbated these fears. For Netanyahu and many Israeli officials, mistrust with the United States reached its low point when Obama surprised Netanyahu with a request for a settlement freeze in their first meeting at the White House in May 2009. A year later, Israeli officials felt betrayed again when the United States allowed for the “singling out of Israel” in the final document adopted by the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, but which ignored Iran’s nuclear transgressions. The final document also called for convening a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East weapon of mass destruction-free zone in contradiction to alleged U.S. promises made to Israel. When, in 2013, Israel learned of the secret U.S.-Iran nuclear talks —reportedly six months after the talks began and before Obama briefed Netanyahu on them—the nuclear negotiations cemented Netanyahu’s view that Obama was bent on clinching a deal with Iran regardless of whether it ultimately served Israel’s national security interests. Despite Netanyahu’s earlier opposition to the Iran nuclear deal, one year later numerous senior officials in the Israeli military and intelligence establishments have indicated their belief that implementation of the deal has so far reduced the immediate threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon for at least the next five to ten years. As Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot, the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, stated at a conference in Tel Aviv in January, “the [Iran] deal has actually removed the most serious danger to Israel’s existence for the foreseeable future … and greatly reduced the threat over the longer term.” Israel has thus refocused its attention from preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons in the short-term to deterring Iran’s medium- and long-term nuclear ambitions, as well as protecting its northern and southern borders from Hezbollah and Hamas. In contrast, the United States has recently focused on destroying ISIL and forging new alliances to achieve this objective. Overall, the Obama administration’s Middle East priorities have been to confront aggression against its allies, ensure the free flow of energy, dismantle terrorist networks, and prevent the acquisition or use of WMD by state and non-state actors. Toward this end, the Iran deal has succeeded in “rolling back Iran’s nuclear program,” preventing further conflict in region, and allowing Iran to eventually “rejoin the community of nations,” if it fully meets its international obligations. Yet despite these intentions and achievements, Israel does not feel more secure today and is seeking closer relations with Sunni Arab states that have not traditionally seen eye to eye with Israel. Israel has discovered that its strategic interests are more aligned with those of the Sunni Arab world and Turkey than with the United States. This has paved the way for a remarkable transformation in the geopolitics of the region. Military and intelligence cooperation between Egypt and Israel today is unparalleled, including a revision to the peace agreement between the two countries to allow for more Egyptian troops into the Sinai to engage ISIL. In June, Turkey and Israel reconciled their six-year rift by normalizing diplomatic relations and ending a crisis that erupted following the 2010 Gaza strip flotilla raid. The two governments are soon expected to exchange ambassadors. Moreover, on several occasions, unofficial dialogues have taken place between Israeli officials and former Saudi officials, although

the two countries still do not have formal diplomatic relations. In 2016, Netanyahu’s former national security advisor Yaakov Amidror and Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal discussed regional security issues in a public event in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Prince Turki shook hands with then Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Yaalon during a conference in Germany. In an even rarer event, Dr. Anwar Eshki, a retired Saudi general, led a delegation of Saudi academics and businessmen to Israel in July to promote the Arab Peace Initiative and a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel’s recent outreach to Gulf Arab states and Turkey is emblematic of their shared sense of abandonment by the United States and a common interest in developing new security relationships to compensate for what they all see as a

U.S. desire for rapprochement with Iran and a reduction of America’s footprint in the region. According to many Israeli officials, this belief is reinforced by the U.S. “pivot” to Asia; reduced dependence on oil and natural gas from the region; a perceived lack of response to Iranian missile tests; and the seeming abandonment of

other traditional regional allies, such as Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak during the Arab uprisings that

began in 2010. Such views are echoed elsewhere in the region.

2AC – No Internal Link

Israeli aggression ruins the strategic benefit of the alliance – decreases regional stabilityWalt 11 [Stephen Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and a contributing editor at Foreign Policy, “Whiff of Desperation,” Foreign Policy, April 25, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/25/whiff_of_desperation]Oren's third line of argument is that Israel is a unique strategic asset, implying that unconditional support for Israel makes Americans safer at home . For example, he claims that Israel maintains stability in the eastern Mediterranean. But that is not true . Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 made the region less stable and led directly to the creation of Hezbollah , the Lebanese Shiite militia. The United States eventually had to send troops into Lebanon because Israel had created such a mess, and that decision led to a suicide attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in which 241 American servicemen died. Similarly, Israel's assault on Lebanon in 2006 killed more than a thousand Lebanese (many of them civilians), inflicted billions of dollars of property damage, undermined the U.S.-backed "Cedar Revolution," and enhanced Hezbollah's political influence within Lebanon. Finally, Israeli control of the occupied territories led directly to the first and second intifadas and the brutal 2008-2009 war on Gaza -- all of which created enormous popular blowback in the region . None of these events were in America's strategic interest, and they belie the claim that Israel is somehow bringing "stability" to the region.

2AC – Link Turn

Plan solves the alliance better --- encourages Israel to reform their self-destructive behavior Freeman 15 – (3/10, Charles, 30 year veteran of the United States Foreign Service, the State and Defense Departments, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, former president of the Middle East Policy Council, co-chair of the U.S. China Policy Foundation and a Lifetime Director of the Atlantic Council, “Responding to Failure: Reorganizing US Policies in the Middle East,” http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/speeches/responding-failure-reorganizing-us-policies-middle-east)Two related problems in our overall approach need correction. They are “enablement” and the creation of “moral hazard.” Both are fall-out from relationships of codependency.

Enablement occurs when one party to a relationship indulges or supports and thereby enables another party’s dysfunctional behavior. A familiar example from ordinary life is giving money to a drunk or a drug addict or ignoring, explaining away, or defending their subsequent self-destructive behavior. Moral hazard is the condition that obtains when one party is emboldened to take risks it would not otherwise take because it knows another party will shoulder the consequences and bear the costs of failure.

The U.S.-Israel relationship has evolved to exemplify codependency. It now embodies both enablement and moral hazard. U.S. support for Israel is unconditional. Israel has therefore had no need to cultivate

relations with others in the Middle East , to declare its borders, or to choose peace over continued expansion into formerly

Arab lands. Confidence in U.S. backing enables Israel to do whatever it likes to the Palestinians and its neighbors without having to worry about the consequences.

Israel is now a rich country, but the United States continues to subsidize it with cash transfers and other fiscal privileges. The Jewish state is the most powerful country in

the Middle East. It can launch attacks on its neighbors, confident that it will be resupplied by the U nited S tates. Its use

of U.S. weapons in ways that violate both U.S. and international law goes unrebuked. 41 American vetoes in the United Nations Security Council have exempted Israel from censure and international law. We enable it to defy the expressed will of the international community, including, ironically, our own.We Americans are facilitating Israel's indulgence in denial and avoidance of the choices it must make if it is not to jeopardize its long-term existence as a state in the Middle East.

The biggest contribution we could now make to Israel's longevity would be to ration our support for it, so as to cause it to rethink and reform its often self-destructive behavior . Such peace as

Israel now enjoys with Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians is the direct result of tough love of this kind by earlier American administrations. We Americans cannot save Israel from itself, but we can avoid killing it with uncritical kindness. We should support Israel when it makes sense to do so and it needs our support on specific issues, but not otherwise. Israel is placing itself and American interests in jeopardy. We need to discuss how to reverse

this dynamic.

Israel doesn’t need the aid – weening them off enables the alliance to become more flexible and resilient Tobin 16 [Jonathan S. Tobin is editor in chief of JNS—Jewish News Syndicate, “The wrong debate about American aid to Israel,” April 16, 2019, https://www.jns.org/opinion/the-wrong-debate-about-american-aid-to-israel/]There was a time when Israel desperately needed both U.S. economic and military aid . But in 1996, Netanyahu told a joint session of Congress that it was time to end the economic portion of the assistance. With free-market reforms enabling it to break free of the shackles imposed by its socialist founders, Israel no longer needed economic subsidies. But defense requirements were different. With so many of its foes, including Gulf states, able to buy the most sophisticated U.S. weapons, Israel needed to keep up and maintain a qualitative advantage that ensured its security. But 23

years later, the political price of accepting U.S. aid remains onerous. It limits Israel’s options and

flexibility with respect to defense procurement, especially when it comes to its own

industries. It also creates the impression that Israel is a beggar that requires Washington’s assistance in order to defend itself. That encourages resentment of Israel on the part of Americans who don’t like foreign aid

even when, as in Israel’s case, the United States gets a great deal in return. It also boosts Palestinian

intransigence, which remains rooted in a foolish belief that sooner or later, America and the West will hand Israel to them on a silver platter . It also creates fodder for resentment of

Israel’s influence in the Beltway. That feeds the bile of pro-BDS forces, including critics like AOC and her friends who hope to use it, as Obama sometimes tried to do as leverage to force Israel to make dangerous concessions on national-security issues. While there’s no need to worry that AOC and other anti-Israel Democrats will be able to do that in the short term, it would be far better if Israel started to think about ending military aid, too. For far too long, pro-Israel activism was

solely the function of keeping aid flowing to Jerusalem. While the Israel Defense Force has benefited from such assistance, it’s time to acknowledge that the Jewish state is on a path to paying its own way, even when it comes to defense. In the long run, that will be far healthier for both Israel’s economy and for strengthening the relationship between two democracies that should relate to each other as friends and allies, not as a patron and a dependent client state .

**Israeli Defense Industry DA*

2AC – Link TurnIsrael could not continue its military dominance without Americas guns-leads to the end of the Israel

Danziger and Gordon 06(Raphael Danziger is research and information director at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and editor of Near East Report, and Bradley Gordon is legislative director at AIPAC. “End American Aid to Israel?: No, It Remains Vital”. Setember 1995 https://www.meforum.org/259/end-american-aid-to-israel-no-it-remains-vitalJACK JACOBS)

A reduction in U.S. aid would erode Israel's qualitative military edge, without which the Israelis would risk a deterioration in their ability to defend themselves. That would undermine Israel's effectiveness as a U.S. ally. The threat.

Progress in the peace process has not translated into a reduced threat to Israel. The armed forces of the Arab world and Iran outnumber Israel's eight-to-one in manpower, seven-to-one in tanks and armored fighting vehicles, and more than four-to-one in aircraft. Radical regimes throughout the Middle East seek weapons of mass destruction, along with delivery systems such as ballistic and cruise missiles. The Arab states and Iran place orders for billions of dollars in new weapons each year and have tens of billions of dollars still in the pipeline from past years. By the turn of the century, Israel may well be faced with as many as two thousand such missiles under the control of hostile states. The destructive power of these weapons, even if armed only with conventional warheads, would be devastating. Iran and Syria offer two examples of the Middle East's continued military build-up. Iran is rapidly becoming the most serious threat to stability in the Middle East and is swiftly developing the means to strike Israel. Iranian rearmament and military expansion started at the beginning of the 1990s and remain top priorities of Tehran. Western governments have estimated that Iran could produce a nuclear device in five to ten years--sooner if key technologies are imported or stolen from abroad.3U.S. intelligence sources have publicly described Iran as also having active chemical and biological weapons programs.4Iran is on the verge of acquiring a new, accurate, intermediate-range missile from North Korea, the Nodong, which will for the first time give Tehran the means of reaching Israel with these deadly weapons. Some reports indicate prototype missiles may have already arrived in Iran for test flights.5Syria won a financial windfall of almost $3 billion in payment for its nominal military contribution in the Kuwait war. The country's military spending went up by 31 percent in 1994, 6and as much as a third of Syria's military budget is going into modern weaponry. As a result, Damascus fields armed forces totalling over 400,000 troops. Syria's arsenal includes more than 4,500 modern tanks and some 600 combat aircraft. In short, the regime of President Hafiz al-Asad alone has more troops, tanks, aircraft, and artillery than Israel does. Syria's new arms are of higher quality than in the past, and for several reasons. Soviet-bloc weaponry was often delivered without the sensitive components and subsystems judged too secret to export; but today, Russia's financial plight largely outweighs such concerns; frontline systems now offered for export include the T-80 tank and S-300 air defense anti-missile system. Further, Syria has taken delivery, via Iran, of as many as 150 extended-range North Korean Scud-C missiles, more than doubling the size of its ballistic missile arsenal. These missiles can carry chemical weapons. Israeli intelligence analysts estimate that Syria will be able to produce its own Scud-Cs within two years. The accurate SS-21 missiles increase Syria's first-strike attack capabilities against such key Israeli installations as air bases and mobilization points. Damascus also retains an interest in obtaining M-9 intermediate-range missiles from China. 7And lastly, the European Union in November 1994 lifted its arms embargo on Syria, which may allow Damascus to upgrade some

weaponry with Western components. The American role. Given these threats, U.S. assistance has so critical an impact on the security of the Jewish state that for Israel's qualitative edge to be maintained, the U.S. government must continue the current levels of security assistance. Even with a full U.S. aid package, Israeli planners will find it difficult to preserve their country's security, in part because the real value of American aid has declined by more than a third since 1985 owing to the rising costs of U.S. weapon systems. Israel's defense requirements exceed available budgetary resources.Israeli military expenditures were 17.3 percent of GNP in 1986, but only 9.1 percent in 1993, reflecting major cuts in defense spending.8At an economically challenging time of absorbing hundreds of thousands of immigrants

and cuts in its defense budget, Israel must constantly upgrade its defenses against a conventional or unconventional attack by the rapidly growing Arab armies and Iranian threat.

Israel needs Americas weapons-no one else could fill including themselvesFreilich 18 (Charles D. (Chuck) Freilich, a former deputy national security adviser in Israel, is a senior fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center. “Has Israel Grown Too Dependent on the United States?”. 2/5/18. https://mosaicmagazine.com/essay/israel-zionism/2018/02/has-israel-grown-too-dependent-on-the-united-states/ JACK JACOBS)The actual military consequences would be even more severe with regard to the supply of weapons, where Israel’s dependence on the United States is critical. Unlike the case with the Arabs, who can procure weapons from numerous

sources with few constraints, it is hard to imagine the other major arms producers today—Britain, France, Russia, China—stepping in to take America’s place. Even assuming the political willingness to do so—a highly questionable assumption—none would be willing to provide the

funding; nor is there any qualitative substitute for American arms. Israel does manufacture (and export) a remarkable variety of munitions on its own, but these are designed to fulfill unique operational needs. Otherwise, there are only three exceptions to its reliance on weapons systems from the U.S: it produces its own tanks, albeit equipped with American engines, and buys submarines and missile boats from Germany. Moreover, as we saw earlier, the U.S.-Israel military relationship extends far beyond the supply of weapons to include the link to the American warning system, bilateral and trilateral exercises, and even a de-facto security guarantee. No other country can or would provide Israel with such capabilities and assurances, and no other country would have helped Israel build a rocket and missile shield—the only one of its kind in the world—or (reportedly) engage with

Israel in joint offensive cyber operations. On the diplomatic level, too, there is no alternative to the United States today. No other permanent member of the Security Council would repeatedly use its veto to protect Israel from sanctions, or provide diplomatic cover in virtually all international forums, or even try to take a balanced position on the peace process. As Israel’s international isolation has grown, its dependence on the U.S. diplomatic shield has become almost complete. In brief: economically, were it forced to, Israel might somehow tough it out virtually alone in a globalized world, but the adjustment

would certainly be difficult and require drastic domestic changes. Militarily and diplomatically, it would be close to impossible. No one likes to be reliant on a foreign power, even one as friendly and well-meaning toward Israel as the United States. This, however, is the reality, and its implications for policy need to be faced soberly.

2AC – No Link

Israel isn’t interested in developing it’s own defense industries --- even if it were they lack capabilities

Kurc and Neuman 17(Çağlar & Stephanie G., “Defence industries in the 21st century: a comparative analysis,” 31 Jul 2017, 6 Jul 2019, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14702436.2017.1350105, Jackson Witt)These three case studies also serve to illustrate the variety of defence industrialisation policies adopted by emerging countries in response to changing domestic and international conditions. Uzi Rubin, for example, tracks the origins, evolution and role of the Israeli defence industry from a historical perspective in Israel’s Defence Industries – An Overview. Rubin defines four historical periods – the pre-state, the formative, the munitions independence years, and the current era – in which the motivations for defence industrialization varied with the military’s security needs and the availability of foreign military technology. Thus, Israeli defence industries took different forms and played different roles, shaped by the unique factors present at each historical moment. The small arms need of the militia organizations (the pre-state era, 1933–1948) gave rise to the scattered and covert production facilities, that later became the foundations for the centralized government-owned defence industries (the formative era 1948–1967). Eventually, the development of nascent defence industries was hampered by the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) need for the fast acquisition of foreign weapons during periods of regional conflict. Rather than waiting for Israel’s indigenous industry to develop and produce them, the IDF looked abroad for the necessary armaments. Rubin shows how, in turn, the French arms embargo and the unreliable supply of foreign weapons and munitions ushered in the policy of munitions self-sufficiency (the era of Munitions Independence (1967–1987)). Currently, this policy has come to an end, due to the mounting financial burden and the availability of military technologies and economic aid from the United States. Based on this historical analysis, Rubin contends that Israeli defence 224 Ç. KURÇ AND S. G. NEUMAN industries will shift further away from producing major weapons platforms and will focus on those technologies where both international and domestic demand will increase. Marc DeVore, in the Value of Arms Industries: Supply Security or Military Adaptation, investigates the motivational changes that drive defence industrialization. While supply security has been one of the main drivers of defence industrialization in small- and medium-size states, maintaining

supply security through local production has become increasingly unattainable for all but the

largest industrial states . DeVore, therefore, questions whether and how smaller states derive benefits from their defence industries. According to DeVore, defence industries contribute to a state’s ability to adapt to unanticipated military challenges. Defence industries, as opposed to civilian companies, are better positioned to answer to the state’s military’s needs because engineers and technicians have a long working relationship with military organizations. They can talk the same language and better understand what is requested of them. This increases the effectiveness of finding solutions to unanticipated threats. By comparing the cases of Israel and Yugoslavia/Serbia, DeVore shows that domestic defence industries with limited arms production capabilities can enhance a state’s military power through improved military adaptiveness. This raises the question of whether or not either supply security or defence autarky are really

necessary goals for defence industries in emerging states. For some states, hsocioeconomic gaps, voices around the world that deny its right to exist, and now Iran's nuclear program. Israel has made uneven progress toward addressing these issues and needs to do more to remain an attractive partner for the United States. But its past successes in incorporating huge numbers of immigrants, bridging deep social divides, and showing remarkable resilience in the face of war and terrorism provide reason to believe that Washington can continue to count on its closest partner in the Middle East, and will continue to benefit from its alliance with the Jewish state. Michael Eisenstadt is director of the Military and Security Studies Program at The Washington Institute. David Pollock is the Institute's Kaufman fellow. This article was adapted from their recent report Asset Test: How the United States Benefits from Its Alliance with Israel.

1AR – No Link

Israel will not risk loosing the US alliance- it is too valuable.FREILICH 17 (How Long Could Israel Survive without America?, July 14, 2017. July 9, 2019. https://www.newsweek.com/how-long-could-israel-survive-without-america-636298, Maddy)The true impact would be on Israel's defence budget. In recent years, US aid has constituted approximately 20 percent of Israel's total defence budget (which includes pensions, and care and

compensation for wounded veterans and widows), or 40 percent of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) budget,3 and

almost the entire procurement budget. Termination would thus have a devastating impact on Israel's defence posture, unless a major reordering of national priorities took place, with profound economic and societal

ramifications. Unlike Israel's adversaries, who can procure weapons from numerous sources with few political constraints, Israel's reliance on the US is critical. None of the other major arms producers today – Britain, France, Russia, China – would, or could, replace the US. Certainly, none would be willing to provide the funding, and, in

any event, there is no qualitative substitute for American arms. Indeed, the US is committed by statute to preserving Israel's qualitative military edge (QME: that is, "the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual state, or possible coalition of states, or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damage and casualties … including weapons … superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalitions of states and non-state actors"). Israel apparently enjoys a de facto US security guarantee, an important addition to its own deterrent capabilities at all times, but one which may prove critical in the future, for example, if the nightmarish – but possible – scenario of a Middle East with multiple nuclear actors emerges. No other country would or could address Iran's nuclear program, a potentially existential threat for Israel, as the US did, even if there were eventual differences over the means of doing so. No other country would have helped Israel build a rocket and missile shield, the only one of its kind in the world, or have engaged (reportedly) in joint offensive cyber operations. The US further provides Israel with a link to its global satellite missile launch surveillance system, which gives it an invaluable extra few minutes of warning time, enabling civilians to take shelter, and the IDF to prepare and take countermeasures.

Israel’s homegrown arms won’t sell internationally- would require US aidNortham 14(Jackie Northam is NPR's International Affairs Correspondent. She is a veteran journalist who has spent three decades reporting on conflict, politics, and life across the globe “With Homegrown Technology, Israel Becomes Leading Arms Exporter” August 29, 2014 https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/08/29/344030354/with-home-grown-technology-israel-becomes-leading-arms-exporter Accessed 7/6/2019 Catherine Zhu) She says Israel is a tiny domestic market, so its arms industry needs to export nearly 80 percent of its goods in order to break even. Some of the weapons are so unique that no one else wants or needs them. Case in point is the Iron Dome. It has proved generally effective against Hamas rockets, which are made in Gaza workshops and are relatively unsophisticated. But no other country faces this persistent threat from short-range rockets. The same holds true for the Arrow, an anti-ballistic missile system. Uzi Ruben, the former head of Israel's missile defense program, says the Arrow was designed to destroy long-range missiles coming from Iraq or Iran. It went into development in 1991 and took nine years to bring it to operation. "It was never used; it was just deployed," he says. One of the new

technologies likely to emerge from this conflict will focus on detecting and destroying tunnels, like those used by Hamas to move fighters and weapons underground. Ben-Israel, the former defense researcher, says it's not likely to be a big seller on the international market.

2AC – No Internal Link

Developing weapons will be ineffective and cost Israel millions

Efrati 11 (Ido, “Iron Dome's Fatal Flaw: It Could Bankrupt Israel,” 1 Dec 2011, 6 July 2019, https://www.haaretz.com/1.5215271, Jackson Witt)All this is meant to provide Israel with a missile defense system ready for action. But if Israel needs to make intensive use of these capabilities, the cost of defending its skies will grow much larger - and not just because of the need to replace every missile launched. The cost of a missile ranges from $70,000 for Iron Dome to between $700,000 and $1 million for Magic Wand, and up to between $2.5 million and $3 million for each Arrow 2 missile. Wars tend to be progressively more expensive. In the next war Israel won't settle for the passive protection afforded by reinforced safe rooms and bomb shelters: The country is expected to bear the cost of expensive home front missiles, which will drive up the war's price tag. To avoid bankruptcy

in the next war, Israel can't ignore economic considerations . A manifestly uneconomic battle on terror Israel's war on terror is manifestly uneconomic: Iron Dome launches a $70,000 missile against every $200 Qassam fired. This celestial confrontation between cutting edge technology and a primitive pipe was preceded by hundreds of millions of dollars, invested in development and operational implementation. "These systems are constantly being developed against the changing threats," says Arie Herzog, head of the Defense Ministry's Homa Missile Defense Agency. "For one thing, human life is most important and doesn't have a price," states Herzog. "The basic economic equation is wrong: The cost of the missile should be compared with the cost of direct and indirect damage that would occur if it reached its target. From this viewpoint it is economically logical." However, since 2007, when Israel decided to equip itself with the Iron Dome system, there has been controversy over investing billions in protecting Israel's skies. The system inspires a sense of security, but to what extent is it justified, and at what price? "No system can provide full protection - not Iron Dome, Magic Wand, or any other alternative," explains Yiftah Shapir, a senior research fellow at Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies (INSS ). "If rockets are shot, some will reach their targets. If you look at it in a military or economic context you'll see it isn't logical to spend a penny on a system like this, but from a political vantage point the money isn't wasted." "The damage from each rocket isn't great," Shapir claims. "In Sderot, for instance, the physical damage doesn't match the disruption of life and the impact on daily routine. We aren't talking just about Sderot anymore, however, but about larger cities like Be'er Sheva and Ashkelon, and even Rishon Letzion. In this sense a defensive system won't do anything." The security establishment is criticized for instilling in the public a greater sense of security than it can promise. The Israeli public, especially in areas where the threat draws steadily closer, is convinced the multi-level defense system will protect it. But no security official is rushing to admit that Israel can't afford the luxury of a blanket missile shield. "To protect Be'er Sheva alone you need to deploy dozens of batteries and, still, life will be disrupted," claims Shapir. "The Grad rocket is cheap and simple, and therefore easy to make and launch on a large scale." Former security officials counter that the acquisition of defense systems is mainly to provide the political echelon with room to maneuver: It can mean the difference between being dragged into an expensive war and the possibility of minimizing damage, exercising restraint, or reacting in various other ways.

**Terrorism DA**

2AC – No Terror Attacks

No nuclear terror --- laundry listJohn Mueller et. al 17, political scientist at Ohio State University, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, author of Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats and Why We Believe Them, coauthor of Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism, and coeditor of A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security. Ted Galen Carpenter, Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history is a senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and author of Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America. Benjamin H. Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute. Eric Gomez is a policy analyst for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and author of The Korean Conundrum.

Emma Ashford is a research fellow at the Cato Institute. Adam Bates is a policy analyst with Cato’s Project on Criminal Justice. Jason Bedrick, a former analyst in the Cato Institute’s Center for Educational Freedom, is director for state programs for EdChoice. David Boaz is executive vice president of the Cato Institute, author of The Libertarian Mind: A Manifesto for Freedom, and editor of The Libertarian Reader. Ike Brannon is a visiting fellow at the Cato Institute. Trevor Burrus is a research fellow in the Cato Institute’s Center for Constitutional Studies and managing editor of the Cato Supreme Court Review. Mark A. Calabria is director of financial regulation studies at the Cato Institute. Michael F. Cannon is the Cato Institute’s director of health policy studies, coeditor of Replacing Obamacare: The Cato Institute on Health Care Reform, and coauthor of Healthy Competition: What’s Holding Back Health Care and How to Free It. Chris Edwards is director of tax policy studies at the Cato Institute, editor of DownsizingGovernment.org, and coauthor of Global Tax Revolution: The Rise of Tax Competition and the Battle to Defend It. Matthew Feeney is a policy analyst at the Cato Institute. Thomas Firey is managing editor of the Cato Institute’s magazine Regulation. Benjamin H. Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute. Eric Gomez is a policy analyst for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Jim Harper, a former senior fellow at the Cato Institute, is a vice president at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, author of Identity Crisis: How Identification Is Overused and Misunderstood, and coeditor of Terrorizing Ourselves: How U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Is Failing and How to Fix It. Gene Healy is a vice president at the Cato Institute and author of The Cult of the Presidency: America’s Dangerous Devotion to Executive Power. Juan Carlos Hidalgo is a policy analyst on Latin America at the Cato Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity. Daniel J. Ikenson is director of Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies and coauthor of Antidumping Exposed: The Devilish Details of Unfair Trade Law. Paul C. “Chip” Knappenberger is assistant director of the Center for the Study of Science at the Cato Institute and coauthor of Lukewarming: The New Climate Science that Changes Everything. Thaya Brook Knight is associate director of financial regulation studies at the Cato Institute. David B. Kopel is research director at the Independence Institute, an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, and author of The Truth about Gun Control. Robert A. Levy is chairman of the Cato Institute. He served as co-counsel in District of Columbia v. Heller, the successful Supreme Court challenge to Washington, D.C.’s gun ban. Brink Lindsey is vice president for research at the Cato Institute, author of Human Capitalism: How Economic Growth Has Made Us Smarter — and More Unequal, and editor of Reviving Economic Growth: Policy Proposals from 51 Leading Experts and Understanding the Growth Slowdown. Tim Lynch is director of the Cato Institute’s Project on Criminal Justice and editor of In the Name of Justice: Leading Experts Reexamine the Classic Article “The Aims of the Criminal Law” and After Prohibition: An Adult Approach to Drug Policies in the 21st Century. Neal McCluskey is director of Cato’s Center for Educational Freedom and author of Feds in the Classroom: How Big Government Corrupts, Cripples, and Compromises American Education. Patrick J. Michaels is director of the Center for the Study of Science at the Cato Institute and coauthor of Lukewarming: The New Climate Science That Changes Everything. Jeffrey Miron is director of economic studies at the Cato Institute, director of undergraduate studies in the Department of Economics at Harvard University, and author of Libertarianism from A to Z. Daniel J. Mitchell is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and coauthor of Global Tax Revolution: The Rise of Tax Competition and the Battle to Defend It. Mark Moller, the former editor of the Cato Supreme Court Review, is an associate professor of law at DePaul College of Law. Alex Nowrasteh is an immigration policy analyst at the Cato Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity. He is the coauthor of the booklet Open Immigration: Yea and Nay. Walter Olson is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute’s Center for Constitutional Studies and author of The Rule of Lawyers, The Excuse Factory, The Litigation Explosion, and most recently Schools for Misrule. Randal O’Toole is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and author of Reforming the Forest Service, The Vanishing Automobile and Other Urban Myths, The Best-Laid Plans, and American Nightmare: How Government Undermines the Dream of Homeownership. Tom G. Palmer is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, executive vice president for international programs at the Atlas Network, author of Realizing Freedom: Libertarian Theory, History, and Practice, and editor of The Morality of Capitalism: What Your Professors Won’t Tell You and Self-Control or State Control? You Decide. Roger Pilon is vice president for legal affairs and director of the Center for Constitutional Studies at the Cato Institute. Christopher Preble is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, author of The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous, and Less Free, and coeditor of A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security and Terrorizing Ourselves: Why U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Is Failing and How to Fix It. Sheldon Richman is executive editor of The Libertarian Institute. John Samples is vice president and publisher at the Cato Institute and author of The Struggle to Limit Government: A Modern Political History and The Fallacy of Campaign Finance Reform. Julian Sanchez is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. George Selgin is a senior fellow and director of the Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives at the Cato Institute and author of The Theory of Free Banking and most recently Good Money: Birmingham Button Makers, the Royal Mint, and the Beginnings of Modern Coinage, 1775–1821. Bradford Stapleton is a research fellow in defense and foreign policy at the Cato Institute. Michael D. Tanner is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, author of Going for Broke: Deficits, Debt, and the Entitlement Crisis and The Poverty of Welfare: Helping Others in Civil Society, and coauthor of A New Deal for Social Security. A. Trevor Thrall is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, professor of international security at George Mason University, and coeditor of American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation since 9/11. Marian L. Tupy is the editor of HumanProgress.org and a senior policy analyst at Cato’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity. Ian Vásquez is director of the Cato Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, coauthor of The Human Freedom Index, and editor of Global Fortune: The

Stumble and Rise of World Capitalism. Peter Van Doren is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, editor of the quarterly journal Regulation, and author of Chemicals, Cancer, and Choices; Risk Reduction through Markets. “76. Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Terrorism.” 2017. https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policy-makers-8th-edition-2017/nuclear-weapons BWThe possibility that small groups could set off nuclear weapons is an alarm that has been raised repeatedly over the decades.

However, terrorist groups thus far seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. Perhaps, after a brief exploration of the possible routes, they have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to succeed.One route a would-be atomic terrorist might take would be to receive or buy a bomb from a generous, like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad. That route, however, is highly improbable . The risk would

be too great — even for a country led by extremists — that the source of the weapon would

ultimately be discovered . Here, the rapidly developing science (and art) of “nuclear forensics” — connecting

nuclear materials to their sources even after a bomb has been detonated — provides an important deterrent . Moreover, the weapon could explode in a manner or on a target the donor would not approve — including, potentially,

the donor itself. Almost no one , for example, is likely to trust al Qaeda : its explicit enemies list includes all

Middle Eastern regimes, as well as the governments of Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Russia. And the Islamic State, or ISIS, which burst onto the international scene in 2014, has alienated just about every state on the planet.

Nuclear-armed states are unlikely to give or sell their precious weapons to nonstate actors . Some

observers, though, worry about “loose nukes,” especially in post-Communist Russia — meaning weapons, “suitcase

bombs” in particular, that can be stolen or bought illicitly. However, as a former director at the Los Alamos National Laboratory

notes, “Regardless of what is reported in the news, all nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very seriously .” Careful assessments have concluded that it is unlikely that any nuclear devices

have been lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be very low or even nonexistent because

nuclear weapons require continual maintenance.

Moreover, finished bombs are outfitted with devices designed to trigger a nonnuclear explosion that will destroy the bomb if it is tampered with. Bombs can also be kept disassembled with the component

parts stored in separate high-security vaults (a common practice in Pakistan). Two or more people

and multiple codes may be required not only to use the bomb, but also to store, maintain, and deploy it.

There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to fail, collapsing in full disarray. However, even under those conditions, nuclear weapons would still have locks or be disassembled and would likely remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb would most likely end up going off in their own territory.Most analysts believe that a terrorist group’s most promising route would be to attempt to make a bomb using purloined fissile material — plutonium or highly enriched uranium. However, as the Gilmore Commission — the advisory panel on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction — stressed, building and deploying a nuclear device presents “ Herculean challenges .” The process requires a lengthy sequence of steps; if each is not fully met, the result is not simply a less powerful weapon , but one that can’t produce any significant

nuclear yield at all or can’t be delivered.

First, the terrorists would need to steal or illicitly purchase the crucial plutonium or h ighly e nriched

u ranium. This would most likely require the corruption of a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and

money transmitters, any one of whom could turn on the terrorists or, out of either guile or incompetence, furnish

them with material that is useless. Any theft would also likely trigger an intense international policing effort .

Second, to manufacture a bomb , the terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped

machine shop and populate it with a team of highly skilled and extremely devoted scientists , technicians, machinists, and managers. These people would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while generating no consequential suspicions among friends, family, or police about their sudden and lengthy absence from normal pursuits back home. Throughout, the process of fabricating a nuclear weapon would require that international and local security services be kept perpetually in the dark, and that no curious locals, including criminal gangs, get wind of the project as they observe the constant coming and going of outside technicians over the months or even years it would take to pull off.

Physicists who have studied the issue conclude that fabricating a nuclear weapon “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group” because of “the difficulty of acquiring the necessary expertise , the technical requirements (which in several fields verge on the unfeasible), the

lack of available materials and the lack of experience in working with these.” Others stress the “daunting problems

associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” and conclude that the notion that a terrorist group could fabricate an atomic bomb or device “is far-fetched at best.”

Finally, the resulting weapon, likely weighing a ton or more, would have to be moved to a target

site in a manner that did not arouse suspicion . Then a skilled crew would have to set off the improvised and

untested nuclear device, hoping that the machine shop work has been perfect, that there were no significant shakeups in the treacherous process of transportation, and that the device, after all the effort, isn’t a dud.

The financial costs of such an extensive operation could easily become monumental : expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay — or pay off. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies in the project would likely discover boundless opportunities for extortion and be psychologically equipped by their profession to exploit them.Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the designated “mastermind” behind the 9/11 attacks, reportedly said that al Qaeda’s atom bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. Even so, that raises the popular notion that the Internet can be effective in providing operational information. However, that belief seems to be severely flawed. Researcher Anne Stenersen finds that the Internet is filled with misinformation and error and with materials hastily assembled and “randomly put together,” containing information that is often “far-fetched” or “utter nonsense .”

2AC – No Israel First Strike

No Israel first strikeTarnopolsky 15 (Noga – journalist for Reuters. She has two decades of experience covering international politics. “Israel won't strike Iran alone, no matter how much it hates the nuclear deal.” Reuters. July 16th 2015. http://www.trust.org/item/20150716200538-sujfm)Israeli officials across the political landscape decried the "very bad deal ," as Netanyahu termed the agreement,

which the United States and five world powers hope will curb Iran's weaponization of its nuclear program. But no one, not

even the prime minister, rattled the sabers of war. "An Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear sites is no longer a relevant scenario," wrote Amos Harel, military analyst for the Israeli daily Haaretz. Once the agreement was announced late Tuesday night, Netanyahu's first, brief statement ignored the nuclear issue entirely and asserted that "the world is a much more dangerous place today than it was yesterday." "The leading international powers have bet our collective future on a deal with the foremost sponsor of international terrorism," the statement said. "They've gambled that in 10 years' time, Iran's terrorist regime will change while removing any incentive for it to do so." It was not a frivolous sentiment for the leader of a small state on permanent war alert with two of Iran's ruthless proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, on its northern and southern borders. In an interview with the New York Times a few hours later, President Barack Obama responded soberly (if testily) to the charge. "What's been striking to me is that increasingly the critics are shifting off the nuclear issue, and they're moving into, 'Well,'" the president said, slipping into his opponents' characters, "'even if the nuclear issue is dealt with, they're still going to be sponsoring terrorism and they're still going to get the sanctions relief and so they're going to have more money to engage in these bad activities.'" "That is a possibility," the president acknowledged. "And we are going to have to systematically guard against that and work with our allies, the Gulf countries, Israel, to stop the work that they are doing outside of the nuclear program." The difference in perspective is essential. If Iran represents a challenge - and, possibly, a future nuclear power - to the United States, for Israel, Iran is an implacable foe that strikes on every level and on every platform, from its flagship nuclear program to its support of Mideast Islamist groups, from cyber warfare to its sponsorship of attacks against Israeli targets worldwide. Israel views the sanctions that have crippled Iran's economy as a force that curtails it on all fronts. "Israel is like the little child who is pointing its finger and saying, 'The king is naked, this agreement is naked!'" said Yuval Steinitz, Israel's minister responsible for nuclear affairs. The grim ping pong between Washington and Jerusalem was so intense that, had relations between the two allies not already been at a nadir, it would have been tempting to speculate that the United States and Israel were playing a coordinated game of good cop, bad cop. The American gambit, made explicit by the president, is to separate the nuclear issue from all other "odious" Iranian activities and hope for a nuclear-bomb halt for 10 years. In Israeli eyes, those are 10 years in which Iran will invest in all sorts of odiousness, including, but not limited to, the nuclear. Iran has two paths to the bomb, Netanyahu told NBC. "One is if they keep the deal, and the other is if they cheat on the deal. They can cheat on the deal because inspections are not instantaneous. In fact, you don't have inspections within 24 hours;� you have 24 days before you can inspect any site that you find suspicious in Iran." "Twenty-four days. Can you imagine giving a drug dealer 24 days' notice before you check the premises? That's a lot of time to flush a lot of meth down the toilet." Frank-

Walter Steinmeier, Germany's foreign minister, slammed Netanyahu's recalcitrance and defended the deal as "responsible." He said, "Israel should also take a closer look at it and not criticize the

agreement in a very coarse way." Worse, British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond, who will be in Jerusalem on

Thursday, betrayed his lack of sympathy for Netanyahu's hard line: "The question you have to ask yourself is what kind of a deal would have been welcomed in Tel Aviv. The answer, of

course, is that Israel doesn't want any deal with Iran. Israel wants a permanent state of stand-off, and I don't believe that's in the interests of the region." The significance of the statement is not principally in its uncommon public expression of exasperation but in the seemingly offhand reference to Israel's commercial capital. It is almost unheard of for a representative of an Israeli ally to use Tel Aviv as shorthand for the state, which claims Jerusalem as its "eternal, unified

capital." The offense to Israeli sensibilities on the eve of a state visit is huge. Why such fury? Netanyahu is reaping the harvest of the scorn he's heaped on the West and his brazen alliance with Republicans, which culminated in last

March's controversial address to Congress in which he railed against this very Iran deal. That bad blood is exposing Israel to a risk that is no less significant than that posed by Iran: the danger of

international isolation . Harel, the military analyst, estimates that "the serious crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations, at

whose lies the tense relationship between Obama and Netanyahu, has produced a situation in which the prime minister's

influence over the nuclear talks' final stages was marginal." Israel's response to the threat posed by Iran's new stature, he concludes, "depends on achieving closer ties with the United States."

2AC – No Hamas Strike

Hamas won’t get involved in any war between the US and Iran – no motive, no large-scale capabilitiesTOI Staff 6/28 [Times of Israel newspaper, written and edited by the staff of the newspaper, “Islamic Jihad hints it may strike Israel in case of US-Iran war”; published 6/28/19, accessed 7/6/19; https://www.timesofisrael.com/islamic-jihad-hints-it-may-strike-israel-in-case-of-us-iran-war/] “Our action against Israel will remain limited to restituting Palestinian rights like the return of Palestinian refugees, getting Jerusalem back, freeing the detainees and liberating the occupied Palestinian territories,” Al-Monitor quoted an unnamed “prominent leader” in the Gaza-based PIJ as saying. “But if Israel decides to ally with the US to engage in a military confrontation against Iran, we will take a different stand, which we will reveal in good time.” The PIJ member said the terror group, which is the second-largest in the Strip, “will not abandon the country that supported it [Iran] in fighting Israel, if that party faces an attack.” Hamas, meanwhile, indicated it was unlikely to intervene in the case of a war between Iran and the US. “Iran and Hamas have an old political alliance based on Iranian bias to Palestinian rights, but this alliance does not entail Hamas engaging in a war for Iran’s sake,” Yahya Moussa, a member of the Gaza-ruling terror group, told Al-Monitor. “No military confrontation between

Israel and the resistance has ever had foreign goals,” he added. “We don’t have to be dragged into a war with Israel if Iran faces a military attack.” Since the start of protests on the Gaza border last year, Israel has engaged in numerous rounds of fighting with Hamas and PIJ that have included heavy rocket fire from the Palestinian enclave and retaliatory Israeli strikes. Last month, the leader of Hamas in Gaza thanked Iran for providing his terror group with rockets it used to strike deep into Israel. “Had it not been for Iran, the resistance in Palestine would not have possessed its current capabilities,” Yahya Sinwar said at the time. Israel has long charged Iran with trying to arm Palestinian terror groups in Gaza and maintains a blockade of the Strip to try and stop the import of sophisticated weapons systems. Earlier this month, the chief of Israel’s Military Intelligence addressed the prospect of war in the Gaza Strip, saying that Hamas is not interested in a large-scale conflict. But he added that the PIJ had far fewer responsibilities toward Gaza residents and thus less to lose in a war, making it a far likelier instigator of violence. “Hamas is quite deterred from war and is deeply interested in staying the course of a ceasefire in which they expect to receive certain concessions — and therefore they really don’t want a war,” he said.

Hamas wont attack

Haniyeh 5/5 (Ismail, President of Hamas and Prime minister of Palestinian National Authority, “The Latest: Hamas says it doesn't want a new war with Israel”, May 5, 2019, accessed July 6, 2019, https://www.apnews.com/7965a592ba4b4e79ad93276ff97a1159, callum)JERUSALEM (AP) — The Latest on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (all times local): 11:15 p.m. The leader of Hamas says his group is “not interested in a new war” with Israel, after two days of heavy rocket fire from Gaza and Israeli airstrikes on the blockaded territory . Ismail Haniyeh said in a statement late Sunday that the militant group is ready to “return to the state of calm” if Israel stops its attacks “ and immediately starts implementing understandings about a dignified life.” Israel and Hamas have fought three wars since the Islamic militant group seized control of Gaza from Western-backed Palestinian forces in 2007. Recent rounds of fighting, however, have ended relatively quickly with informal truces brokered by Egypt and the U.N. In the past, Hamas has halted attacks in return for the easing of an Egyptian and Israeli blockade imposed on Gaza.

1AR – No Hamas Strike

Hamas needs Israel, mitigated attacks

Miller 19 (Aaron, is a Distinguished Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center and a former State Department analyst. He is the author of the End of Greatness: Why America Can’t Have (and Doesn’t Want) Another Great President. “Israel and Hamas Need Each Other,” March 29, 2019, accessed July 6, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/israel/2019-03-29/israel-and-hamas-need-each-other, callum)war, like politics, makes for strange bedfellows. Israel is currently preparing for a potentially dramatic faceoff with Hamas. Over the past week, the group has launched rockets into Israel, and it has called for a million man march this weekend along the Israeli-Gaza border to mark the anniversary of last year’s March of Return. The protests may either fizzle or spark an intensified round of conflict. Whatever happens though, it will not undermine the curious, co-dependent relationship that has evolved between Hamas and the Israeli government, especially under Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. These two key Middle East actors despise yet depend on one another . Israel and Hamas are unlikely partners . They call for each other’s destruction and have been through three major military confrontations, most recently in 2014. Nevertheless, these two sworn enemies have long cooperated out of practical necessity. On certain issues—including managing their conflict through Egypt and preventing the Palestinian Authority from reunifying Gaza and the West Bank—their objectives even align. Although neither wants to admit it, Israel and Hamas need each other. THE ODD COUPLE. For as long as Hamas has existed, it has maintained a strangely functional relationship with Israel . In the 1970s, even before Hamas was founded, Israel believed that Palestinian Islamist groups could serve as a useful counterweight to Fatah, the more secular, revolutionary, and (at the time) violent political party that dominated the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In order to undermine Fatah, Israel allowed these groups, including the forerunners of Hamas, a fair amount of freedom to organize in Gaza. In 1979, Israel even officially recognized an Islamic charity created by Ahmad Yassin, one of the co-founders of Hamas. Within five years, Yassin would be arrested for weapons smuggling, and the Israelis would eventually assassinate him in March 2004 in an effort to stop Hamas terrorist attacks.

Hamas are too weak to attack Israel and neither side wants war. Byman 5-10-19 Daniel L. Byman (Senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, his research focuses on counterterrorism and Middle East security, served as the research director of the center, vice dean for undergraduate affairs at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service and a professor in its Security Studies Program, staff member with the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (“The 9/11 Commission”) and the Joint 9/11 Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, was a policy analyst and the director for research in the Center for Middle East Public Policy at the RAND Corporation and worked for the U.S. government) 7-6-19 “Why Gaza hasn’t erupted into all-out war” https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/05/10/why-gaza-hasnt-erupted-into-all-out-war/ AVISHA PANDEYAs always, responsibility for civilian dead is hotly disputed, but the Palestinians count two pregnant women and two infants among the dead. The latest round of fighting between Israel

and Hamas illustrates not only the constant potential for conflict in Gaza but also—perhaps more counterintuitively—why the combustible situation there has not exploded into outright war. Some Israeli citizens this week called on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to escalate the fight, and some militants welcome a broader clash. But both sides have reasons for restraint. Hamas leaders recognize their own military, political and diplomatic weakness; a longer war would achieve little and leave Gaza in even worse shape. And Israel, for its part, recognizes that a weak extremist regime in Gaza is better than the collapse of order in the strip or the rise of an even more radical group there. As Israeli security analyst Gabi Siboni pointed out, “If Israel collapses the Hamas regime, what comes after? Every alternative is awful.” So Israel uses enough force to keep Hamas weak and to send a message that shootings and rocket attacks will be severely punished. But it restrains itself to avoid a full conflagration. On both sides, however, domestic politics and misconceptions could spur decisions that could cause the violence to spiral out of control.

Hamas don’t want to go to war with Israel in fears of making the situation in the Gaza Strip worse.Shehada 11-15-19 Muhammad Shehada (Muhammad Shehada is a writer and civil society activist from the Gaza Strip and a student of development studies at Lund University, Sweden. He was the PR officer for the Gaza office of the Euro-Med Monitor for Human Rights.) 7-6-19 “Why Islamic Jihad Won't Attack Israel Right Now” https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/why-islamic-jihad-won-t-attack-israel-right-now-1.5465721The recent exchange of threats between Israel, Hamas and Islamic Jihad marks a new stage in their cold war. But none of the parties want a real escalation. Islamic Jihad personnel in Gaza received a green light from their top leaders in Damascus to retaliate to Israel’s attack on one of their main tunnels, which led to the death of several leaders in the movement’s armed 'Saraya al-Quds' wing. Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders in Gaza, however, are convinced that now isn’t the time for a direct conflict with Israel that would bring more devastation to the besieged Gaza Strip. Hamas has numerous reasons to prevent a retaliation against Israel, not least popular pressure against escalation in the middle of the historic, yet extremely delicate, process of Palestinian reconciliation. Hamas’ Gaza chief, Yahia al-Sinwar, is deeply invested in its success. In addition, the current status quo provides both Hamas and Israel with the deterrence equation both parties want to maintain. Israel deems Hamas the ‘devil we know’, far preferable than the only potential successors - anarchist jihadist groups. Israel’s currently not interested in provoking Hamas by targeting its senior leadership for assassination. In return, Hamas’s elite polices the Israeli siege, actively arrests jihadists and prevents as far as it can rockets from falling into Israel, not least when the usual Israeli retaliation against jihadist projectiles always targets Hamas’ vital facilities. Hamas’ usual response is to shout apocalyptic slogans about how "the enemy is testing our patience" and "revenge is coming soon." Furthermore, Hamas leaders evidently sense the escalating tensions between Israel/Saudi Arabia and Hezbollah/Iran. If Gaza’s front is heating up, Israel’s northern front has been heating up for years, and there that the tension could burst at any moment, given the accumulating omens signifying confrontation since Lebanese PM Saad Hariri’s Saudi Arabian resignation. In Hamas’ view, the military alert on Gaza’s borders could be either camouflage - a distraction so that Israel launches a surprising attack on the other, northern front - or a tool to pressure Hamas to capitulate and compromise more in the ongoing, Egyptian-brokered talks with the Palestinian Authority, and to spare its people another war. And although Hamas might be well-prepared to engage in a new round of conflict with Israel, its leaders are entirely opposed to being Iran’s

patsy and scapegoat, absorbing a death blow for Iran’s sake. The Islamic Jihad, for its part, is currently under pressure to retaliate for the death of its military commanders. But, aside from its keenness to maintain the reconciliation process undisturbed, Islamic Jihad is constrained by several practical barriers. Gaza’s skies are heavily punctuated by countless Israeli surveillance and combat drones that increase the risk of undertaking an attack. But Hamas remains a stronger reason for the Islamic Jihad to avoid escalation. Since this latest Israeli attack on the militants’ tunnels, the ruling movement in Gaza has exerted great pressure on the Islamic Jihad maintain self-control; Hamas and Islamic Jihad operate consensually in regards to decisions to confront Israel, and the former retains superior power and dominance over the latter (not least when its ranks are infiltrated by Hamas operatives). Moreover, Islamic Jihad personnel enjoy a superior status over the rest of Gaza’s population, granted by Hamas. They parade freely, can designate specific locations for their exclusive use for military training, and they can upgrade their armory with no constraints. Their relative leverage means some of its leaders are above the law. And that advantage would most likely dissipate if Islamic Jihad crosses the lines drawn by Hamas. What concerns the parties on both sides of the Gaza border wall at the moment, and encourages them to intensify their efforts, is the likelihood of an individual act of retaliation, undertaken by unauthorized Islamic Jihad personnel, and as such is a wild card: an act that can’t be predicted, prevented or controlled. There have been several precedents for incidents like this. In May 2015, in a Samson-like cliché of "Let it fall on me and my enemies!", and as an outcome of an internal dispute between Islamic Jihad leaders, a primitive projectile rocket was launched from Gaza on the Israeli city of Ashkelon. There were no casualties. That rocket triggered an immediate Israeli retaliation of four airstrikes on several Islamic Jihad training posts, that same night. All in all, more than two weeks have passed on the tunnel incident and both Hamas and the Islamic Jihad has shown discipline and self-control, aside from statements made for public consumption. The more time that passes, the less likely an attack in direct retaliation will occur. The end-of-November meeting of Palestinian factions in Egypt makes it even harder for Islamic Jihad to undertake an act that would squarely put further escalation solely on its shoulders. The militants’ rage is more likely to come to a flash point if the Palestinian reconciliation process is thwarted. If progress continues to be made, that rage will be sublimated and disappear with time, at least until the next flashpoint.

Hamas does not have the means to win a war with Israel.Byman 5/10 (Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. May 10, 2019. Why Gaza hasn’t erupted into all-out war. Brookings. July 6, 2019 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/05/10/why-gaza-hasnt-erupted-into-all-out-war/, Maddy)The latest round of fighting between Israel and Hamas illustrates not only the constant potential for conflict in Gaza but also—perhaps more counterintuitively—why the combustible situation there has not exploded into outright war. Some Israeli citizens this week called on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to escalate the fight, and some militants welcome a broader clash. But both sides have reasons for restraint. Hamas leaders recognize their own military, political and diplomatic weakness; a longer war would achieve little and leave Gaza in even worse shape. And Israel, for its part, recognizes that a weak extremist regime in Gaza is better than the collapse of order in the strip or the rise of an even more radical group there. As Israeli security analyst Gabi Siboni pointed out, “If Israel collapses the Hamas regime, what comes after? Every alternative is awful.” So Israel uses enough force to keep Hamas weak and to send a message that shootings and rocket attacks will be severely punished. But it restrains itself to avoid a full conflagration. On both sides, however, domestic politics and misconceptions could spur decisions that could cause the violence to spiral out of control. The latest fighting was intense but should come as no surprise. Israel and Hamas clashed in 2008-

2009, 2012 and 2014, resulting in the deaths of almost 100 Israeli soldiers and civilians and that of more than 3,000 Palestinians. Between 2014 and 2018, Israel regularly bombed Gaza to stop rocket attacks and punish Hamas—operations the Israeli military calls the “campaign between the wars.” Hamas has long used or tolerated rocket attacks as a way to draw international attention to Gaza—and to Israel’s alleged failure to honor past agreements that would enable more economic activity and development on the strip. In addition, this time the group may believe that the timing was especially opportune, because Israel’s Memorial Day and Independence Day are coming up (on Wednesday and Thursday) and because in a week, Tel Aviv hosts the Eurovision song contest; Israel may have been more sensitive to disruption. More broadly, Hamas may seek to send the world, including the Trump administration, the message that no peace deal can happen without Hamas’s tacit approval.Hamas governs Gaza ineffectively, which hampers its ability to gain leadership of the Palestinian cause. Israel and Egypt both maintain tight control over Gaza’s borders, and Hamas’s archrival in the West Bank—the Palestinian Authority—uses its ties to Israel and the international community to control money going into Gaza (and undermine Hamas). The resulting misery and stagnation in Gaza are one reason Hamas is willing to risk conflict: to show militants that it is standing up to Israel and let frustrated Gazans know that it will not meekly accept a grim status quo. Yet the lack of an all-out conflict comparable to 2014 suggests that both sides are reluctant to escalate. Hamas’s rockets spread terror and some death, but they aren’t a winning military strategy, and the group was quick to press for a ceasefire. Israel’s tough but calibrated military response ended the barrage without upending the government in Gaza, and it provoked little international criticism (this time, at least).

Hamas won’t even respond to Israeli provocation- why would they attack first?Inlakesh 3/4 (Robert Inlakesh. March 4 2019. AMN. July 6, 2019 https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/israel-continually-strikes-gaza-and-hamas-hasnt-fired-back/, Maddy)Since the start of 2019 Israel has been consistently striking the Gaza Strip, as well as shooting dead demonstrators during Gaza’s Friday protests. But despite Israel’s constant aggression, Palestinian armed factions in Gaza have refrained from responding for some time. The last time any of the Palestinian armed factions fired back was on the 22nd of February, when an unprovoked tank shelling killed 24 year, Mahmoud al-Nabahin, injuring two others. The response came from an al-Qassam brigades [Hamas’s Armed Wing] sniper, who shot an Israeli sniper in the helmet critically injuring him. The response on the 22nd of January was fully legal under international law, as the 4th Geneva Convention permits for an occupied people to use armed resistance against their occupiers, it was also a military target hit and with a discriminate weapon. Since then however neither the armed wing of Hamas nor any other armed group in Gaza have responded to the following unprovoked attacks:-6th February, airstrikes struck Eastern Rafah.-17th February, artillery strikes struck Northern Gaza reportedly near Beit Hanoun.-27th February, 7 missiles were fired into Eastern khan Yunis.-2nd March, Eastern Rafah was struck with multiple airstrikes.-3rd March, (Yesterday) East of Beit Hanoun was fired upon by Israeli drones.In addition to these attacks have been tens of accounts of Israeli bulldozers violating the Gaza demarcation zone, entering into its territory to raise farm land. Israeli violence has also taken the lives of approximately 20 Palestinians this year, so far, as well as injuring around 1,000.

Hamas will fall – no escalationCoehen 19 ( Kelly Coehen works at VOX, May 58, 2019. " Violence continues as Israel and Hamas exchange fire over 2 days of

fighting,” https://www.vox.com/world/2019/5/4/18529287/israel-rocket-attack-hamas-450-rockets-idf-airstrikes-tel-aviv)

Arab Spring-like anti-Hamas demonstrations that began this month have received little attention outside the Middle East, but they are growing. Sick of Hamas’ cruelty, misrule and corruption, dissident Gazans have been pouring into the streets. The revolt has persisted even as Hamas thugs have used force, including live ammunition, to snuff it out. Hence the Hamas leadership’s decision to turn to an old playbook: escalating attacks on Israel to divert attention from their own unpopularity back home. Hamas tried to explain away its missile launch as “a mistake” on the same day. But it was too late: Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu cut a Washington trip short, while IDF jets bombed to smithereens the offices of Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas political chief. Also hit were intelligence and military buildings and other symbols of the organization’s power. But symbolism won’t do the job. On Wednesday, a smiling Haniyeh was photographed next to the ruins of his former office, flashing a victory sign. No wonder an opinion poll Tuesday showed more than half of all - Israelis deem the army response too weak. They are tired of the Qatar- and Iran-backed Hamas and its endless provocations, which aren’t limited to missiles. Even before the latest launch, Gazan rockets regularly, and indiscriminately, targeted Israeli border towns, forcing residents to seek shelter, often with only seconds to avoid being hit. And those crowds that gather weekly at Israel’s border aren’t peaceful protesters, contrary to Western media perceptions. Typically, women and children provide cover as terrorists deploy incendiary devices mounted on balloons or kites, burning down Israeli fields. see also Hamas announces Egyptian-brokered truce with Israel This week’s attack was especially egregious, since the rocket hit far from Gaza, at Mishmeret, a small town near Kfar Saba. The home of Israel’s UN ambassador, Danny Danon, is in Mishmeret, a mere 100 yards from where the missile landed. “If the terror from Gaza continues,” he warned at the Security Council Tuesday, “the Hamas leadership will . . . be buried in the tunnels of Gaza.”

2AC – No Hezbollah Strike

No Hezbollah strikes – would be political suicideWhittington Research Associate at the National Defense University’s Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies ’12 (Kip, March 22, “Will Hezbollah Attack Israel? Only if...,” https://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/will-hezbollah-attack-israel-only-if, ME)In the middle of a region experiencing unprecedented change, a question lingers: Will Israel attack Iran? As a result, a flurry of writings have appeared attempting to answer this pertinent question. A "yes" comes with a list of consequences of which the most troubling is the threat of an escalating regional conflict. In the middle of this regional war it is said that the most powerful non-state actor in the Middle East, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, would be a key player. Conventional wisdom amongst analysts suggests that Hezbollah, acting as an Iranian proxy, will retaliate against Israel. While certainly a possibility, policy-makers should recognize that today's Hezbollah is fundamentally different from the one that fought

Israel for 34-days during the summer of 2006. Members can no longer afford to take actions that don’t pass a cost-benefit test. Recent remarks by Hassan Nasrallah best reflect this altered strategic calculus. The Secretary General

declared that if Israel attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities, Hezbollah’s leadership would have to “sit

down, think and decide what to do.” This seemingly uncharacteristic remark can be attributed to two factors: 1)

Hezbollah is now the strongest political actor in the Lebanese government; and 2) both Hezbollah and the state of Lebanon will incur a massive retaliatory military campaign by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Therefore,

Hezbollah will only undertake military action against its historic enemy if Israel pursues a policy that harms the organization’s vital geostrategic interests -- primarily regime change in Iran. As long as Hezbollah retains both a political and military wing, they will still require Iran’s ideological, military and financial assistance. With uncertain days ahead for their other ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s

regime, ties between Iran and Hezbollah will only strengthen. Although Hezbollah maintains a military wing, they are no longer the 1990s resistance movement whose sole purpose was to fight off an Israeli occupation. In the last two decades, they have gone through a 'Lebanonization.' Essentially, they have chosen to transform themselves into a Lebanese political party by participating in a sectarian parliamentary system. Last year the party and its allies effectively

toppled Lebanon’s coalition government and formed a new one by selecting the next prime minister. Ironically, Hezbollah's power play in a democratic system makes them vulnerable to multiple constituencies. If Hezbollah were to provoke a conflict with Israel that violently consumes Lebanon and its neighbors,

Lebanon’s Sunnis would take political -- perhaps even violent -- action to reassert their dominance in the government. Other groups, such as Christians, Druzes and maybe even some Shi’as may not react too kindly to Hezbollah starting another war. Sectarian tensions are already high with the accusations made by the UN-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon that Hezbollah operatives were behind the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri -- an immensely popular Sunni leader. Additionally, Nasrallah’s support for the Syrian regime’s crackdown against a primarily Sunni revolt further agitates sectarian tensions. Hezbollah is now forced to simultaneously navigate the road between being what has historically been their calling -- a "resistance" movement -- and what they have evolved into -- the most powerful political party in Lebanon. Since the 2006 Lebanon War,

Israel and Hezbollah have largely lived in a peaceful state of mutual deterrence . This can be

attributed to the cliffhanger that defined the end of the last conflict. In July 2006, Hezbollah’s military wing crossed the Israel-Lebanon border and ambushed an Israeli patrol, taking two hostages for a prisoner exchange. Unexpectedly, a 34-day war ensued in which Israel responded with a massive bombing campaign and ground incursion. Their goal was to destroy Hezbollah's military wing while simultaneously turn the non-Shi’a population of Lebanon against the group. The results were a Lebanon that temporarily rallied around the resistance movement, the deaths of 1,200 Lebanese (mostly civilians), considerable damage to Lebanon’s infrastructure (more than $3.6 billion) and an outcry from the international community. The Israelis were unable to decisively defeat Hezbollah, who inflicted heavy casualties on the IDF (121 killed) by successfully using a combination of guerilla and conventional tactics. They also launched thousands of rockets into northern Israel, killing 44 civilians. Both sides claim to have won but in reality the conflict ended in a stalemate, albeit with a symbolic victory for Hezbollah who enjoyed increased popularity in the Arab world immediately thereafter. Still, the cost to the Lebanese state was immense and later resulted in political backlash, specifically from segments of Sunnis, Druze and Christians, all of which questioned Hezbollah’s right to bring such destruction upon their country.

Nasrallah later claimed he would have not ordered the raid if he had known the consequences would be so dire. Since then, rhetoric has taken the form of threats emanating from both sides on how they will respond to any future military provocation. Both sides learned vital lessons from their last conflict and have been actively preparing for the next. Israel appears to be following a refined policy of massive retaliation. Their military campaign can take one of two forms: a combination of air and ground operations to destroy Hezbollah’s military assets, or a strategy that avoids a ground war by using air and naval forces to bomb Hezbollah’s strongholds and Lebanese infrastructure. The latter is a form of “punishment” and serves as a deterrent by making sure the very state Hezbollah resides in suffers for their aggression. Both of these strategies would undoubtedly attract serious international criticism due to inevitable civilian casualties. But if attacked, Israel would feel compelled to respond using military force in order to maintain its military credibility in the region and protect its civilian population. Given the unsatisfactory ending of the last conflict and the changing political landscape in the region, Israeli leaders will be more determined than ever to remove the Hezbollah threat. Hezbollah’s deterrent comes in the form of an estimated 42,000 missiles and rockets, including increasingly sophisticated weapons, such as long-range surface-to-surface missiles and surface-to-air missiles, which have been redeployed deeper into Lebanese territory and can strike any Israeli city. Publicly, Nasrallah has threatened to use them if deemed necessary, and recently escalated his threats to include a ground invasion of Galilee. If the IDF were to pursue a ground campaign, Hezbollah would attempt to wear down Israeli forces through a protracted guerilla war and a simultaneous bombing of Israeli cities. Their intricate tunnel system and anti-tank weapons would also cause the IDF great headache. If the Israelis focused on a “punishment” strategy, Hezbollah would bomb civilian centers to compel them to stop. In both scenarios, the IDF would encounter serious difficulties in defeating Hezbollah but would inflict significant damage on the organization. In the end, neither side wants another conflict for fear of a more violent, destructive and broader war. But the region is boiling and Israeli leaders seem to be seriously considering a pre-emptive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities for fear that the country is on course for building a bomb. Some have even argued that the only real way to remove the nuclear threat is to rid Iran of the current regime. For Hezbollah, Iran is a vital ally. Along with an unstable Syria and waning Hamas, the four form the “Axis of Resistance,” intent on challenging the hegemony of Israel, the United States and their allies in the region. Hezbollah’s nexus with Iran developed in the 1980s when the Islamic Revolutionary Guard trained and assisted Shi’a militants in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. To date, Iranian support has empowered Hezbollah with state-like capabilities. For example, financial assistance has helped the organization win the trust and support of Lebanon’s historically downtrodden Shi’a community, as Hezbollah offers social services not provided by the state. At the core of this relationship is the Iranian revolutionary principle known as Wilyat al-Faqih or ‘guardianship of the jurist’. Hezbollah’s leaders have always been ideologically loyal to this doctrine prescribed by the Supreme Leader in Tehran. There has never been, however, any clear indication that Hezbollah receives direct orders from Tehran. Therefore, the question should not be, will Iran order Hezbollah to attack Israel, but rather will Hezbollah feel the need to? That need will become clearer as it is increasingly apparent that instability in neighboring Syria could spell the end for Hezbollah’s arms supplier and geostrategic linchpin to Iran. If Syria’s Alawite (a branch of Shi’ism) regime falls and a Sunni regime takes power in Syria, Hezbollah and Iran will need each other more than ever. For Iran, Hezbollah would be their only ally and credible counterweight left against Israel in the region. For Hezbollah, Iran would be their sole ideological ally and supplier of money and weapons. One must wonder how long Hezbollah could sustain itself and its ideology of resistance if the regime in Tehran were to fall. Will Hezbollah attack Israel? It is my belief that

only if there is a clear and present danger to the survival of the Iranian regime . Striking Iran’s nuclear facilities fails to meet that criterion.

They’ll only strike on Iran’s orders – US is a deterrent even if they have conventional capabilitiesStahl 6/21 [Julie, journalist on foreign affairs for CBN News, “Hezbollah Armed, Ready to Strike Israel, if Iran-US Tensions Grow”; published 6/21/19, accessed 7/6/19; https://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/israel/2019/june/hezbollah-armed-ready-to-strike-israel-if-iran-us-tensions-grow]With talk of possible U-S military action against Iran, there are questions about whether Israel might be dragged into any regional conflict because Hezbollah in Lebanon gets its money and marching orders from Iran. From the Israeli side of the border the Lebanese villages look peaceful and pastoral, but it’s hard to imagine a well-armed enemy is hidden and possibly waiting to strike where yellow Hezbollah flags flutter just across the border. “The fact that Hezbollah is involved in every aspect of life of the people in those towns on the other side of the border enables it to deploy such a huge and massive military infrastructure in south Lebanon,” said Res. Lt. Col. Sarit Zehavi, founder of the Alma Research and Education Center, an organization that seeks to understand the security challenges on Israel’s northern border. The IDF estimates Hezbollah has hidden well over 100,000 rockets in these towns and villages in southern Lebanon. “All of them comfortably hidden behind Lebanese civilians, inside Lebanon. All of them aimed at our civilians,” said IDF spokesman Lt. Col. Jonathan Conricus. Conricus says that plays into Hezbollah hands. “The aim of Hezbollah is to be able to have those rockets, fire them at the Iranian orders at our civilians and then once we retaliate, which we will be forced to do that will cause collateral damage and they will then try to use that for their advantage ,” Conricus told CBN News during an interview along Israel’s northern border. During the fighting in 2006, Hezbollah launched some

4,000 rockets at northern Israeli cities. Now, most of Israel is in range of its rockets. “Hezbollah is still more armed than many European armies today, they have still lots of money, lots of loyal operators and experience and know-how and most importantly hostile intentions toward Israel,” Conricus said. And it’s financed by Iran. “Iranian money has facilitated this as well as many other hostile aggressive endeavors that Hezbollah has – whether it is the vast rocket arsenal that Hezbollah has, whether it is their current project by which they are trying to convert rockets into accurate missiles or the tunnel project,” he said. CBN News recently got a rare look inside the sixth and largest tunnel Israel has uncovered along its border with Lebanon. The tunnel is the equivalent of a 22-story building underground. Had it not been discovered, hundreds of armed Hezbollah fighters could have filled the tunnel waiting to attack, kidnap and kill Israelis. The exit of the tunnel was near Zarit, the closest Israeli community to the Lebanese border. Standing at the edge of Zarit, it’s possible to see a nearby Lebanese restaurant and cars driving along the road. It demonstrates the danger this Hezbollah terror tunnel posed to the people of northern Israel. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said his country isn’t looking for a fight. “We do not wage war with any nation. Our opponents are a bunch of inexperienced politicians,” Rouhani said recently, just prior to Iran shooting down a US surveillance drone. But Reserve Lt. Col. Sarit Zehavi says there’s always a possibility of war. “Especially when you have on the other side someone who doesn’t acknowledge Israel’s right to exist,” Zehavi told CBN News. “I think it (will) also depend on how much pressure will be put on Iran and Hezbollah. It depends, like (Hassan) Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah himself said, that if there will be war between Iran and the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia will be attacked,” Zehavi said. So will there be a war with Hezbollah? “We sure aren’t looking for one,” Conricus said. “But at the end of the day if Iranians order Hezbollah to attack Israel they will be met with a very firm and strong and a painful response by the IDF, one that is definitely not in the interest of Hezbollah, the Iranians and most definitely not the State of Lebanon and their civilians,” Conricus added. For now, Israel and the rest of the Middle East wait to see whether US-Iranian tensions grow or dissipate.

1AR – No Hezbollah Strike

Hezbollah is weak now, no attack

Limor 6/13 (Yoav, 30 year writer about Israel’s defense industry, “Hezbollah is sweating under the collar”, June 13, 2019, accessed July 6, 2019, callum)Little public attention, if any, has been paid to the drama taking place on Israel’s northern borders. But these developments are nothing short of dramatic and will shape the sector for years to come. Much of this drama is unfolding in plain sight: from the IDF’s discovery and demolition of a grid of cross-border tunnels dug by the Iranian-backed Shiite terrorist group Hezbollah, strikes on Iranian assets in Syria, to diplomatic moves by the US and Russia opposite the Lebanese government. All of these also include intensive intelligence, operational, economic and diplomatic efforts that take place behind the scenes and, in fact, constitute the lion's share of Israel's security operations. The IDF is spearheading this effort and its main objectives are preventing Iran from entrenching itself militarily in Syria, curtailing arms smuggling into Lebanon, and preventing Hezbollah from operating in the Golan Heights. The latter was also the objective of Wednesday's airstrike near Syria’s Tal al-Hara, a site that houses some of the Syrian military’s intelligence apparatus and which has been targeted in the past. The strike was independent of another security incident on Wednesday, during which a Lebanese drone breached Israeli airspace. This was not the first incident of its kind, and likely it won’t be the last. This incident was, however, made public by the IDF because, unlike in previous cases, the drone was spotted by civilians, who alerted the media. It is possible the IDF also sought to embarrass Hezbollah, in one of the most difficult periods in its history. These two events obscure a much larger picture. Hezbollah is under pressure – the result of years of fighting in Lebanon and Syria and the significant cut in its budget as a result of the US economic sanctions imposed on Iran – and it shows. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah's anxiety is becoming increasingly palpable : from his nervous speech and threats against Israel two weeks ago, through Hezbollah’s conspicuous disregard for the IDF’s construction of a barrier in contested areas on the Israel-Lebanon border, to its acquiescence over the fact that Beirut’s government will hold direct, US-mediated talks with Israel over the two countries’ disputed maritime border. These talks will take place against the backdrop of a tripartite meeting set to take place later this month in Jerusalem between the national security advisers of the United States, Russia, and Israel. Syria’s problems may not be resolved in this meeting, but it places Israel squarely alongside the “good guys,” who happen to represent the superpowers. This sends a clear signal to Iran and its allies in Lebanon and Syria and also serves as a green light for Israel’s defense policies in the northern sector. It appears that Israel will be able to continue – albeit cautiously – with these policies, which include striking Iranian assets in Syria and Lebanon, as long as its actions do not embarrass the Russians or provoke a direct conflict with Syria or Hezbollah. Still, we must remember that no one is infallible and that the enemy is watching, learning and evolving in ways that may challenge Israel in the future in a multitude of ways.

Hezbollah can’t attack Israel --- prior attempts have failed due to the IDF and UN restrictions

TOI 19(TOI Staff, “IDF chief: Hezbollah had grandiose attack plan to ‘shake Israel’,” 10 Jan 2019, 6 Jul 2019, https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-chief-hezbollah-had-grandiose-attack-plan-to-cause-earthquake-in-israel/, Jackson Witt)Israel’s top general said Lebanese terror group Hezbollah planned to use its array of underground attack tunnels to carry out a surprise invasion of Israel that would “throw Israel off balance and cause an earthquake in Israeli society.” Gadi Eisenkot’s comments came a month after the IDF launched an ongoing operation to locate and destroy the cross-border attack tunnels dug from Lebanon. In an interview aired just days before he is set to leave his post on January 15, Eisenkot told Hadashot TV news that Hezbollah “had grandiose notions. They were looking many years ahead, to a war or wide escalation, where they [believed they] would have a surprise, an ace in their deck.” Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, he said, “now knows that Israel has known for years about his most secret plan: to carry out a secret, surprise attack on Israel in the future” via the tunnels. Eisenkot once quipped that if Nasrallah “knew what we know about him, he’d be the most worried man in the Middle East.” On Thursday he said this was even more accurate: “I know much more today.” Excerpts of Eisenkot’s comments aired on Thursday ahead of the full broadcast on Saturday evening. Hezbollah, the outgoing army chief said, “had built what they thought was a fantastic plan, with several tunnels [entering Israel under the border] from the Metulla area to the sea, and their intention was to launch an attack that would begin with a surprise attack from underground — sending 1,000 to 1,500 fighters into our side.” To cover the invasion, “they planned a massive artillery bombardment of IDF bases. [They aimed to] gain control of a piece of Israeli territory and hold it for weeks,” he said. Hezbollah’s goal, he said, was to demonstrate Israeli frailty. “They said, this is something Israel has never experienced since its founding, and it will be an achievement that will disrupt the State of Israel’s ability to attack inside Lebanon, throw Israel off balance, and cause an earthquake in Israeli society,” he said. In excerpts from a second interview, with the Kan public broadcaster, Eisenkot said that Israel was “not currently striking in Lebanon openly, but [is] working through many clandestine channels that contribute to Israel’s security without causing an escalation.” Channel 10 News reported that Eisenkot went down into one of the tunnels last weekend. When he emerged, he told an interviewer, “I didn’t realize how big it was… We’ve not seen anything like this in the past.” The Hezbollah tunnel “project is over,” he said, “but not their goal to capture parts of the Galilee.” On the subject of the Gaza Strip, and criticism he and government officials — including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — have faced for the handling of Hamas and the terror threat posed by the restive Palestinian enclave, Eisenkot told Kan: “The Gaza problem is not only a military problem, it is a much more complex problem that demands a multi-pronged approach. “Whoever says a little bit more force, checkpoints and strikes will bring an end to terror, doesn’t know what he’s talking about.” He also said he was amused by critics who claimed he was too soft on Hamas. “Those who know me and follow my service [know that] it has usually been characterized by initiative, offensive [tactics], subterfuge and use of force. It makes me laugh when they say I’m part of the leadership of Peace Now,” he said, referring to the dovish peace lobby group. Prime Minister Netanyahu announced the conclusion of Operation Northern Shield as he toured the northern border with lawmakers in late December — just after kicking off a campaign for re-election in which national security is expected to be a central issue. The IDF launched Northern Shield in early December to destroy

Hezbollah’s tunnels that crossed into Israeli territory. “This operation is almost entirely behind us,” Netanyahu said in a statement released by his office on December 25. “There is exceptional work being carried out here that has disarmed the Hezbollah tunnels,” he said. “It [Hezbollah] invested heavily in it and we destroyed it.” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (2nd-R) and other members of the security cabinet receive a briefing from Maj. Gen. Yoel Strik (L), head of the IDF’s Northern Command, during a tour of the northern border on December 25, 2018. (Haim Tzach/GPO) Netanyahu, who is also defense minister, was accompanied by other security cabinet members. They received a briefing on the security situation from Eisenkot and the head of Northern Command, Maj. Gen. Yoel Strik. Eisenkot, too, said the operation was nearing completion late last month. “Most of the passages that enter Israel have been found, and I believe that we will complete this mission in the near future,” he said. But a senior officer told journalists on a visit to the northern border that the army viewed the operation as an open-ended effort. “We are not restricted by time. It can take days, weeks, months. We will find all of them,” the officer said, referring to Hezbollah’s tunnels. So far, the Israeli military has uncovered five tunnels. After studying them, the IDF began the process of destroying the passages on December 20. Israeli soldiers stand around the opening of a hole that leads to a tunnel that the army says was dug by the Hezbollah terror group across the Israel-Lebanon border, near Metulla, on December 19, 2018. (AP Photo/Sebastian Scheiner) Israel has said it believes the tunnels were meant to be used by the Iran-backed terror group as a surprise component of an opening salvo in a future war, to allow dozens or hundreds of its fighters into Israel, alongside a mass infiltration of operatives above ground and the launching of rockets, missiles, and mortar shells at northern Israel. The UN peacekeeping force UNIFIL confirmed in mid-December that at least two of the tunnels crossed into Israel and were therefore a violation of the UN resolution that ended the 2006 Second Lebanon War, but did not confirm Israel’s allegations they were dug by Hezbollah. United Nations peacekeepers have stepped up patrols since the launch of the operation to ensure the frontier remains calm. UN Resolution 1701 requires all armed groups besides the Lebanese military to remain north of the country’s Litani River.

UN resolution prohibits fighting on the Lebanon and Israel border ---- Lebanon and Hezbollah support it, other countries ensure

United Nations 06(United Nations, “SECURITY COUNCIL CALLS FOR END TO HOSTILITIES BETWEEN HIZBOLLAH, ISRAEL, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1701,” 11 AUG 2006, 6 JUL 2019, https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8808.doc.htm, Jackson Witt)Expressing utmost concern at the spiralling deadly violence and destruction in Lebanon, the Security Council today called for a full cessation of hostilities in the month-long war between Israel and Hizbollah, mapping out a formula for the phased withdrawal of the Israel Defence Forces from southern Lebanon, while up to 15,000 United Nations peacekeepers help Lebanese troops take control of the area. The Council’s concern over the hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, the extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and massive internal displacement triggered by the 12 July abduction of two Israeli soldiers in a cross-border raid, led the 15-nation body to unanimously adopt resolution 1701 (2006), which calls for “the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations” in Lebanon. Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the conflict, the Security Council created a buffer zone free of “any armed personnel” –- both Hizbollah militants and Israeli troops -- between the United Nations-drawn Blue Line in southern Lebanon and the Litani River (12 miles from the Israeli border), and called for both

Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and comprehensive solution to the crisis. Tonight’s action caps a week of intense negotiations on the French and United States-negotiated text, which had been introduced this past Saturday but met with stiff resistance from Arab leaders, who said it disregarded key Lebanese concerns in favour of Israel. It sparked an urgent visit to New York by senior Arab League officials who pleaded Lebanon’s case in a closed-door meeting with United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan and presented to the Council an Arab-backed deal which, included the Lebanese Government’s demand for a broad ceasefire and, among other things, called for a prisoner exchange between Israel and Hizbollah. In a lengthy address ahead of the Council’s action, the Secretary-General said he was greatly relieved that the resolution provided for a full and immediate cessation of all hostilities. “It is absolutely vital that the fighting now stop”, he said, adding: “Provided it does, I believe this resolution will make it possible to conclude a sustainable and lasting ceasefire agreement in the days ahead. And I hope that this could be the beginning of a process to solve the underlying political problems in the region through peaceful means.” But Mr. Annan said he was profoundly disappointed that the Council had not reached this point much earlier, and that he was convinced that his disappointment and sense of frustration were shared by hundreds of millions of people around the world. For weeks now, he had been calling repeatedly for an immediate cessation of hostilities, for the sake of the civilian population on both sides. “All members of this Council must be aware that this inability to act sooner has badly shaken the world’s faith in its authority and integrity”, Mr. Annan said, adding that “War is not politics by other means”, but “represents a catastrophic failure of political skill and imagination.” He said that, with the Lebanese Cabinet meeting tomorrow, and the Israeli Cabinet on Sunday, to review the resolution, he would work over the weekend on the task entrusted to him under the text, namely to establish with both parties the exact date and time at which the cessation of hostilities would come into effect. He would also begin working with the parties on proposals to delineate the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa Farms and report to the Council within 30 days. The new resolution emphasizes the need for an end of violence, but at the same time emphasizes the need to urgently address the causes that have given rise to the crisis, including the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers. “Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners”, the text also encourages the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel. It also calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a long-term solution based on, among others, full respect for the Blue Line by both parties; full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords; no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government; no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government; and provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon in Israel’s possession. Welcoming the 7 August decision of the Lebanese Government to deploy 15,000 armed troops in Southern Lebanon, the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) through the end of August 2007, and increased its troop strength –- currently at some 2,000 -– to a maximum of 15,000. In addition to carrying out its original mandate under Council resolutions 425 and 426 (1978), UNIFIL would, among other things, monitor the cessation of hostilities; and extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons. The text emphasizes the importance of the Government of Lebanon extending its control over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), and calls upon that Government to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry, without its consent, of arms or related materiel. It further decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent,

“by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft” the sale or supply of arms and related materiel of all types, to any entity or individual in Lebanon. Lebanon’s Acting Foreign Minister Tarek Mitri told the Council that, while his country is eager to see a cessation of hostilities, the nature of the cessation must be the same for both sides. “The Lebanese are not confident in [an] Israeli distinction between ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’. The end to military operations should be unqualified”, he said, adding that “the obscenely disproportionate and unjustifiable Israeli retaliation” has already led to the deaths of more than 1,000 Lebanese. Israeli Ambassador Dan Gillerman said the way to avoid the crisis between Israel and Lebanon had been clear: implementation of the unconditional obligations set out in resolutions 1559 and 1680, which had set out issues for resolutions between Syria and Lebanon. The clear path forward was by disarming and disbanding Hizbollah and other militias, as well as by Lebanon’s exercise of authority over all its territory. But the will to implement such actions had been lacking, leading the people of Israel and Lebanon to pay a heavy price. The resolution adopted this evening represented “an opportunity to correct the mistakes of the past and to create a genuine new reality in our region”. “Finally, the Security Council of the United Nations is deciding to halt war in Lebanon and Israel”, said the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, Philippe Douste-Blazy, adding that, by adopting the present resolution, the world community was shouldering its responsibilities to put an end to the destruction for hundreds of thousands of displaced people on both sides of the border, and to an economic and humanitarian situation that had grown more tragic by the day. He called on all countries to contribute to a reinforced UNIFIL, and said France, which was already part of the Force, was examining the additional supplementary support that it might be able to provide. “Now, the hard and urgent work of implementation begins”, said United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, stressing that the resolution would allow a new, stronger Lebanon to emerge, with the world’s help. She urged the Governments of Israel and Lebanon to commit to ending large-scale violence, adding that “Hizbollah now faces a clear choice between war and peace, and the world should help to ensure that the choice is the right one”. The most pressing challenge was to help thousands of displaced people, she said, pledging the support of the United States in that effort. Also speaking this evening were the Foreign Ministers of Qatar, Greece, United Kingdom, Denmark and Ghana. The representatives of China, Slovakia, Russian Federation, Argentina, Japan, United Republic of Tanzania, and Peru also spoke.

UN resolution prohibits any non-Lebanese weapon on the border --- Lebanon supports peace

UN 06(United Nations, “SECURITY COUNCIL CALLS FOR END TO HOSTILITIES BETWEEN HIZBOLLAH, ISRAEL, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1701,” 11 AUG 2006, 6 JUL 2019, https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8808.doc.htm, Jackson Witt)“Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hizbollah’s attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons, “Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time emphasizing the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers, “Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and encouraging the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel, “Welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese

Prime Minister and the commitment of the Government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, welcoming also its commitment to a United Nations force that is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, and bearing in mind its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, “Determined to act for this withdrawal to happen at the earliest, “Taking due note of the proposals made in the seven-point plan regarding the Shebaa farms area, “Welcoming the unanimous decision by the Government of Lebanon on 7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in South Lebanon as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of additional forces from UNIFIL as needed, to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region and to restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces with material as needed to enable it to perform its duties, “Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the conflict, “Determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international peace and security, “1. Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations; “2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, calls upon the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL as authorized by paragraph 11 to deploy their forces together throughout the South and calls upon the Government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel; “3. Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon; “4. Reiterates its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line; “5. Also reiterates its strong support, as recalled in all its previous relevant resolutions, for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949; “6. Calls on the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbours, consistent with paragraphs 14 and 15, and calls on it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon; “7. Affirms that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action is taken contrary to paragraph 1 that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, including safe passage for humanitarian convoys, or the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, and calls on all parties to comply with this responsibility and to cooperate with the Security Council; “8. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements: -- full respect for the Blue Line by both parties; -- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area; -- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State; -- no foreign forces in

Lebanon without the consent of its Government; -- no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government; -- provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of land mines in Lebanon in Israel’s possession;

UN Resolution and Lebanese government prohibit future HIzbollah

United Nations 06(United Nations, “SECURITY COUNCIL CALLS FOR END TO HOSTILITIES BETWEEN HIZBOLLAH, ISRAEL, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1701,” 11 AUG 2006, 6 JUL 2019, https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8808.doc.htm, Jackson Witt)The United States would continue to work with the Governments of Israel and Lebanon to rebuild Lebanon and provide humanitarian relief. Indeed, she said, her country had already committed resources to the humanitarian effort and in the coming days would do more. Today, it had increased its initial assistance package to $50 million. Through common efforts, the international community must help the people of Lebanon become more prosperous than ever before. She said that the past month had been one of heartache, suffering and loss for both Lebanon and Israel. The resolution made it clear that the hostilities began when Hizbollah crossed an international boundary and captured and killed Israeli soldiers and began indiscriminately firing rockets into Israel. Hizbollah had dragged the people of Lebanon into a war that had nothing to do with them. But it was now time to end the violence and exploitation of the people of the Middle East. The time had come to transform tragedy into opportunity and to change old patterns of violence. The international community must see this through, she said, in order to ensure that all the people of the Middle East achieved the peace they deserved. PHILLIPE DOUSTE-BLAZY, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, said that, by putting forward the present resolution, the international community was shouldering its responsibilities to put an end to the destruction of hundreds of thousands of displaced people on both sides of the border, and to an economic and humanitarian situation that had grown more tragic by the day. For its part, France, being linked to Lebanon by deep historical and cultural ties, and similarly linked to other countries of the region, had called for two requirements to be respected: that of allowing Lebanon’s sovereignty to be restored; and of reaffirming Israel’s right to security. He said that the Lebanese Government’s announcement of its intention to deploy its Army in South Lebanon, with the help of UNIFIL, was a “historic turning point for the country”. It was one of the decisive elements that had made the current result possible. Indeed, the decision was a response to a recurring request on the part of the international community, and it was the world’s duty to respect it. The main objective was to immediately begin a process involving the deployment of the Lebanese Army, concurrently with the gradual, progressive withdrawal of the Israeli Army south of the Blue Line, he said.

2AC – Link Turn

Arms sales create an incentive for an escalatory conflict between Israel and Hamas

Glenn Greenwald, 8-3-2014, Glenn Greenwald is one of three co-founding editors of The Intercept. He is a journalist, constitutional lawyer, and author of four New York Times best-selling books on politics and law "Cash, Weapons and Surveillance: the U.S. is a Key Party to Every Israeli Attack," Intercept, https://theintercept.com/2014/08/04/cash-weapons-surveillance/The U.S. government has long lavished overwhelming aid on Israel, providing cash, weapons and surveillance technology that play a crucial role in Israel’s attacks on its neighbors. But top secret documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden shed substantial new light on how the U.S. and its partners directly enable Israel’s military assaults – such as the one on Gaza. Over the last decade, the NSA has significantly increased the surveillance assistance it provides to its Israeli counterpart, the Israeli SIGINT National Unit (ISNU; also known as Unit 8200), including data used to monitor and target Palestinians. In many cases, the NSA and ISNU work cooperatively with the British and Canadian spy agencies, the GCHQ and CSEC. The relationship has, on at least one occasion, entailed the covert payment of a large amount of cash to Israeli operatives. Beyond their own surveillance programs, the American and British surveillance agencies rely on U.S.-supported Arab regimes, including the Jordanian monarchy and even the Palestinian Authority Security Forces, to provide vital spying services regarding Palestinian targets. The new documents underscore the indispensable, direct involvement of the U.S. government and its key allies in Israeli aggression against its neighbors. That covert support is squarely at odds with the posture of helpless detachment typically adopted by Obama officials and their supporters. President Obama, in his press conference on Friday, said “it is heartbreaking to see what’s happening there,” referring to the weeks of civilian deaths in Gaza – “as if he’s just a bystander, watching it all unfold,” observed Brooklyn College Professor Corey Robin. Robin added: “Obama talks about Gaza as if it were a natural disaster, an uncontrollable biological event.” Each time Israel attacks Gaza and massacres its trapped civilian population – at the end of 2008, in the fall of 2012, and now again this past month – the same process repeats itself in both U.S. media and government circles: the U.S. government feeds Israel the weapons it uses and steadfastly defends its aggression both publicly and at the U.N.; the U.S. Congress unanimously enacts one resolution after the next to support and enable Israel; and then American media figures pretend that the Israeli attack has nothing to do with their country, that it’s just some sort of unfortunately intractable, distant conflict between two equally intransigent foreign parties in response to which all decent Americans helplessly throw up their hands as though they bear no responsibility. “The United States has been trying to broker peace in the Middle East for the past 20 years,” wrote the liberal commentator Kevin Drum in Mother Jones, last Tuesday. The following day, CNN reported that the Obama administration “agreed to Israel’s request to resupply it with several types of ammunition … Among the items being bought are 120mm mortar rounds and 40mm ammunition for grenade launchers.” The new Snowden documents illustrate a crucial

fact: Israeli aggression would be impossible without the constant, lavish support and protection of the U.S. government, which is anything but a neutral, peace-brokering party in these attacks. And the relationship between the NSA and its partners on the one hand, and the Israeli spying agency on the other, is at the center of that enabling. Last September, the Guardian revealed that the NSA “routinely shares raw intelligence data with Israel without first sifting it to remove information about US citizens.” The paper published the full top secret Memoranadum of Understanding between the two agencies governing that sharing. But the NSA/ISNU relationship extends far beyond that. One newly disclosed top secret NSA document, dated April 13, 2013 and published today by the Intercept, recounts that the “NSA maintains a far-reaching technical and analytic relationship with the Israeli SIGINT National Unit (ISNU) sharing information on access, intercept, targeting, language, analysis and reporting.” Specifically, “this SIGINT relationship has increasingly been the catalyst for a broader intelligence relationship between the United States and Israel.” Moreover, “NSA’s cyber partnerships expanded beyond ISNU to include Israeli Defense Intelligence’s [Special Operation Division] SOD and Mossad.” Under this expanded cooperation, the Americans and Israelis work together to gain access to “geographic targets [that] include the countries of North Africa, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union.” It also includes “a dedicated communications line between NSA and ISNU [that] supports the exchange of raw material, as well as daily analytic and technical correspondence.” The relationship has provided Israel

with ample support for both intelligence and surveillance: “The Israel i side enjoys the benefits of expanded geographic access to world-class NSA cryptanalytic and SIGINT engineering expertise, and also gains controlled access to advanced U.S. technology and equipment via accommodation buys and foreign military sales . ” Among Israel’s priorities for the cooperation are what the NSA calls “Palestinian terrorism.”

The cooperation between the NSA and ISNU began decades ago. A top secret agreement between the two agencies from July 1999 recounts that the first formal intelligence-sharing agreement was entered into in 1968 between U.S. President Lyndon Johnson and Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, and informally began in the 1950s. But the relationship has grown rapidly in the last decade. In 2003 and 2004, the Israelis were pressuring the NSA to agree to a massively expanded intelligence-sharing relationship called “Gladiator.” As part of that process, Israel wanted the Americans to pay hundreds of millions of dollars to fund Israeli activities. The specific proposed “Gladiator” agreement appears never to have been consummated, derailed by Israeli demands that the U.S. bear the full cost, but documents in the Snowden archive pertaining to those negotiations contain what appear to be two receipts for one or more payments of $500,000 in cash to Israeli officials for unspecified purposes: The surveillance-sharing relationship with Israel has expanded to include the NSA’s British and Canadian counterparts, GCHQ and CSEC, both of which actively participate in feeding the Israelis selected communications data they have collected. Several documents from early 2009, at the height of the Israeli attack on Gaza called “Cast Lead” that left more than 1,000 people dead, detail some of this cooperation. One top secret 2009 GCHQ project named “YESTERNIGHT” involved “Ruffle,” the British agency’s code name for ISNU. According to the document, the project involved a “trilateral (GCHQ, NSA and Third Party RUFFLE) targeting exchange agreement covering respective COMSAT accesses.” One of the “specific intelligence topics” shared between the parties was “Palestinians”, although the GCHQ document states that “due to the sensitivities” of Israeli involvement, that particular program does not include direct targeting of Palestinians and Israelis themselves. Another GCHQ document from February, 2009, describes “a quadrilateral meeting for RUFFLE, NSA, CSEC and GCHQ.” The British agency noted in early 2009 that it had been spying on emails and telephone numbers specifically requested by ISNU, “and they have thanked us many times over.” The NSA and GCHQ receive intelligence about the Palestinians from many sources. The agencies have even succeeded in inducing the U.S.-supported Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) to provide them with surveillance and intelligence about other Arab groups in the region. One July 2008 GCHQ document states: Jordan also feeds surveillance data about the Palestinians to the NSA. One classified NSA document from 2013 describes how “NSA’s partnership with EWD [the Jordanian Electronic Warfare Directorate] is a well established, long-standing and trusted relationship dating back to the early 1980’s.” Specifically, the two agencies “cooperate on high-priority SIGINT targets of mutual interest” that includes the Palestinian Security Forces. The document continues: “EWD provides high-interest, unique collection on targets of mutual interest, such as the Palestinian Security Forces; EWD is the sole contributor to a large body of NSA’s reporting on this target.” But even as the NSA and its partners are directed by political branches to feed the Israelis surveillance data and technology, they constantly characterize Israel as a threat – both to their own national security and more generally to regional peace. In stark contrast to the public statements about Israel made by American and British officials, the Snowden archive is replete with discussions of the Israelis as a menace rather than an ally. NSA documents previously published by the Guardian stated that “one of NSA’s biggest threats is

actually from friendly intelligence services, like Israel.” Another notes that the National Intelligence Estimate ranked Israel as “the third most aggressive intelligence service against the U.S.” British officials have a similar view of the Israelis, describing them as a “very real threat to regional stability.” One top secret GCHQ planning document from 2008 notes that “policy makers remain deeply concerned over the potential threat that Israel poses to a peaceful resolution of the Iran problem, and to some of Israel’s less desirable activities in the regi on .” Moreover, “Israel’s thinking on the long-term threat offered by Iran to its fundamental foreign policy strategy of armed deterrence may create very real threats to regional stability in 2009.” The NSA’s 2007 Strategic Mission List, identifying priorities for surveillance targeting, repeatedly identifies Israel as one of the leading threats in a diverse range of areas, including: “Combating the threat of development of weapons of mass destruction” and “delivery methods (particularly ballistic and nuclear-capable cruise missiles).” The “focus area” for that concern is “WMD and missile proliferation activities,” and one of the leading threats is listed as “Israel (cruise missiles).” The NSA internal discussion from that document regarding “Mastering Cyberspace and Preventing an Attack on U.S. Critical Information Systems” includes a subheading on “FIS [financial/banking system] threats.” The nations identified as the leading FIS threats include India, North Korea, Cuba and Israel. Similarly, Israel appears on the list of countries believed by the NSA to be “Enabling EW (producers/proliferators).” Another section of the threat assessment document is entitled “Foreign Intelligence, Conterintelligence; Denial & Deception Activities: Countering Foreign Intelligence Threats.” It is defined as “Espionage/intelligence collection operations and manipulation/influence operations conducted by foreign intelligence services directed against U.S. government , military, science & technology and Intelligence Community .” The countries posing the greatest threat : “China, Russia, Cuba, Israel , Iran, Pakistan, North Korea, France, Venezuela, and South Korea.” Asked about its cooperative relationship with Israel, an NSA spokesperson told the Intercept: “We are not going to comment on specific intelligence activities and relationships. The fact that intelligence services sometimes cooperate in a lawful and appropriate manner mutually strengthens the security of both nations. Whenever NSA shares

intelligence information or technology, we comply with all applicable laws and rules.” A GCHQ official refused to comment on the record beyond the agency’s standard boilerplate claiming its activities are legal and subject to “rigorous oversight.” Legal or not, the

NSA’s extensive, multi-level cooperation with Israeli military and intelligence agencies is part of a broader American policy that actively supports and enables Israeli aggression and militarism. Every Israeli action in Gaza has U.S. fingerprints all over it. Many Americans may wish that the Israeli attack on Gaza were a matter of no special relevance or concern to them, but it is their own government that centrally enables this violence.

**2020 DA**

2AC – No Link Uniqueness

No democratic candidates plan to attend the AIPAC meeting prior to the 2020 election because of the platform AIPAC provides.Mikelionis 3/22 (Lukas, Lukas Mikelionis is a journalist based in London, United Kingdom. He is a reporter at Fox News. Mikelionis attended University of London, graduating in 2016, with a BSc in international politics. He joined Fox News in August 2017. Mikelionis has contributed to Breitbart News, SPIKED LTD, and Telegraph Media Group., 22 March 19, Top 2020 Democrats snub AIPAC conference with little or no explanation, marking far-left shift on Israel, https://everipedia.org/wiki/lang_en/lukas-mikelionis, jewel)Several Democratic presidential candidates are declining invitations to a key pro-Israel policy group's conference next week, an annual meeting that has usually been a must-attend meeting for members of both parties, in what some see as a further sign of the party's growing disdain for the Jewish state. Sens. Bernie Sanders, Kamala Harris, Elizabeth Warren, former Rep. Beto O’Rourke and many others have said they won’t be attending the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's annual Policy (AIPAC) conference, a move that coincides with a moneyed progressive advocacy group’s call to boycott the event. MoveOn.org, a group that spent around $3.5 million in the 2018 midterm elections, called on the 2020 Democratic candidates to skip the conference, even though in the past all presidential candidates viewed the AIPAC conference as a crucial campaign stop. The three-day conference this year will be headlined by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Vice President Mike Pence, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio, and Democratic House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer. Bernie Sanders calls Democratic socialism a 'vibrant democracy'Video So far no Democrats who are officially running for president have issued a statement confirming their attendance at the conference. Sanders’ aide Josh Orton told media outlets that the leading candidate among the Democrats won’t be attending because “he’s concerned about the platform AIPAC is providing for leaders who have expressed bigotry and oppose a two-state solution” in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Other candidates such as Kamala Harris or Elizabeth Warren, meanwhile, confirmed that they don't plan to attend the conference, but provided no explanation for their decisions. Harris addressed the AIPAC in 2017, saying it was “an honor” to speak there and praised the group’s leadership. “And I'm proud to say and be among the many voices represented here, the California delegation is the largest and hopefully the loudest. There you go,” she said. O’Rourke criticized the embattled Israeli prime minister during a campaign stop earlier this week, saying Netanyahu “has openly sided with racists.” “Right now, we don’t have the best negotiating partners on either side. We have a prime minister in Israel who has openly sided with racists,” he charged. Trump announces the US will recognize Israel’s sovereignty over Golan HeightsVideo Other Democratic candidates who won’t be attending the conference are Julian Castro, Pete Buttigieg, and Rep. John Delaney, though the latter politician said he’s unable to attend due to scheduling conflicts. AIPAC is a non-partisan organization that seeks to foster the relationship between the U.S. and Israel. The group, despite misleading portrayals on the far-left, supports a two-state solution and doesn’t endorse nor donate to political candidates. Earlier this year, Democrats came to reckon with the split of views in the party after Minnesota Rep. Ilhan Omar prompted charges of anti-Semitism after she accused AIPAC of paying politicians to support Israel. Pelosi called on Omar to apologize for the use of “anti-Semitic tropes and prejudicial accusations about Israel’s supporters.” In response, Omar

promised Pelosi, fellow lawmakers and voters that she is “listening and learning, but standing strong.”

AIPAC is undermining Democrats through adsMackey 19 (Robert Mackey is a writer for the New York Times and the Intercept, April 9, 2019. " AIPAC Targets Bernie

Sanders in Facebook Ads Focused on Key Democratic Primary States," https://theintercept.com/2019/04/09/aipac-targets-bernie-sanders-facebook-ads-focused-key-democratic-primary-states/)Sen. Bernie Sanders, who could be the first Jewish president of the United States two years from now, is currently the target of a pressure campaign on Facebook paid for by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the pro-Israel lobbying group known as AIPAC. The sponsored post urges Facebook users to add their names to an online petition telling Sanders that “America stands with Israel.” A screenshot of AIPAC’s Facebook page featuring a paid post aimed at Sen. Bernie Sanders. According to data from Facebook’s Ad Library, three versions of the sponsored post paid for by AIPAC are currently running across the country, focused mainly on users in three important Democratic primary states: California, Texas and Florida. The text of the post makes no mention of why the lobbying group thinks the independent senator from

Vermont needs such a reminder, but its only other current paid ads on Facebook all target Rep. Ilhan Omar, a progressive Muslim Democrat who has questioned the lobbying group’s influence. Sanders has been one of the few congressional voices to rise in defense of Omar. A screenshot of AIPAC’s Facebook page featuring a paid post aimed at Rep. Ilhan Omar. Sanders, whose father’s family in Poland was nearly wiped out in the Holocaust, has been a frequent critic of Israeli policy. During the 2016 campaign, he called Israel’s use of force during its bombardment of Gaza in 2014 — killing at least 1,473 civilians, including 501 children — had been “disproportionate” and “indiscriminate.” After he was denounced by Israeli politicians for supposedly giving comfort to Hamas, he told CNN that he favored “a more balanced position” on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “Israel has a right to live in freedom, independently and in security without having to be subjected terrorist attacks,” he said, “but I think that we will not succeed to ever bring peace into that region unless we also treat the Palestinians with dignity and respect.” During an interview with the Daily News editorial board that year, Sanders — who lived on a kibbutz as a young man and has relatives who still live in Israel — frankly criticized another aspect of Israeli policy, the building of Jewish-only settlements in the occupied West Bank, as a violation of international law. Asked if he would insist on the evacuation of settlements as president, Sanders replied: “I think if the expansion was illegal, moving into territory that was not their territory, I think withdrawal from those territories is appropriate.”

1AR – No Link Uniqueness

The democratic party is boycotting AIPAC which means AIPAC is not keyEdelman, Hurtado and Holzberg 6/21/19 I am an engaged journalist adept in all aspects of researching, writing and producing engaging news and editorial stories. I'm experienced in both writing and the production processes with a firm grasp of AP writing style. I currently serve as a researcher and production assistant at NBC's Meet the Press. (Adam, Ludwig, Melissa, Several 2020 Democrats to skip AIPAC conference after call to boycott, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/several-2020-democrats-skip-aipac-conference-after-call-boycott-n986006, Sonia Shenoy)

Several Democratic presidential candidates will skip the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's policy conference this year after a prominent progressive group called on them to boycott the event.Sens. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., Kamala Harris, D-Calif., and Bernie Sanders, I-Vt., will all ditch the conference, the Associated Press reported, and a spokesman for former Rep. Beto O’Rourke, D-Texas, told NBC News that he also will not attend.Pete Buttigieg, the mayor of South Bend, Indiana, will not be going, The Jewish Week reported, and former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Julian Castro also won't show, according to HuffPost.Former Starbucks CEO Howard Schultz, who is considering running for president as an independent, will also skip the conference, the Associated Press reported.Josh Orton, a policy director for Sanders, told NBC News that the senator is "concerned about the platform AIPAC is providing for leaders who have expressed bigotry and oppose a two-state solution.”Sanders didn't attend the 2016 conference while he was running in the Democratic presidential primary, but addressed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at length during a speech around the time of the event.The candidates' decisions to skip the prominent pro-Israel lobbying group’s conference come one day after liberal group MoveOn.org called on all 2020 presidential candidates to steer clear of the event . “It’s no secret that that AIPAC has worked to hinder diplomatic efforts like the Iran deal, is undermining Palestinian self-determination, and inviting figures actively involved in human rights violations to its stage,” Iram Ali, campaign director for MoveOn's political action committee, said in a post on the group's website. “We asked our members what they think so that we can make more informed decisions — and over 74% agreed that progressive presidential candidates should skip the AIPAC conference. This should also give a clear insight to 2020 candidates on where their base stands instead of prioritizing lobbying groups and policy people who rarely step outside of D.C.”

2AC – No Link – AIPAC Not Key

AIPAC doesn’t financially back candidatesKirchick 3/29 Quit Harping on US aid to Israel, The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/american-military-aid-israel-context/585988/James Kirchick is a visiting fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of The End of Europe: Dictators, Demagogues and the Coming Dark Age and is writing a history of gay Washington.

One of the country’s most influential lobbies, AIPAC has long been the subject of avid (and

conspiratorial) condemnation by those who dislike the role it plays in sustaining bipartisan

support for the Jewish state. In recent weeks, the famously press-shy organization unwittingly

became the subject of a fierce national debate over anti-Semitism after Democratic

Congresswoman Ilhan Omar suggested that American elected officials support the Jewish state

because they are paid to do so. Contrary to popular belief (an impression abetted by its

confusing acronym), AIPAC does not donate money directly to candidates; it is not a political-

action committee.

***COUNTERPLANS***

**End-Use CP**

2AC – No SolvencyIsrael will ignore the CP – Durable Fiat can’t force Israel’s response

Harol 5/19 (Amos Harol 19 May 2019 leading media experts on military and defense issues. He has been the military correspondent and defense analyst for Haaretz for the last 12 years. In this role, he has written extensively about Israel's ongoing fight against terrorist organizations, its battles during the Palestinian Intifadah (uprising) and the last war in Lebanoneditor for the Haaretz Hebrew print edition, and from 1999-2005 was the anchorman on a weekly Army Radio program about defense issues. He also frequently appears in the Israeli and foreign media as a military pundit. Along with Avi Issacharoff, Harel co-wrote "The Seventh War: How we won and why we lost the war with the Palestinians", a 2004 book about the second Intifadah. The book- a best-seller in Israel - has been translated into French and Arabic, and won the prestigious Chechic award in 2005, for outstanding security research, “Arming Dictators, Equipping Pariahs: Alarming Picture of Israel’s Arm Sales”, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-arms-sales-to-dictators-pariahs-states-alarming-picture-1.7250048)

The law on monitoring in its current format is insufficient and has not managed to halt the export of weapons to Sri Lanka, which massacred many of its own citizens; to South Sudan, where the regime and army committed ethnic cleansing and aggravated crimes against humanity such as the mass rape of hundreds of women, men and girls; to Myanmar, where the army committed genocide and the chief of staff, who carried out the arms deal with Israel, is accused of these massacres and other crimes against humanity; and to the Philippines, where the regime and police executed 15,000 civilians without any charges or trials.” Amnesty says that this part of the report “is not based on any report by the Defense Ministry relating to military equipment exports, for the simple reason that the ministry refuses to release any information. The total lack of transparency by Israel regarding weapons exports prevents any public discussion of the topic and limits any research or public action intended to improve oversight.”One example is the presence of Israeli-made Galil Ace rifles in the South Sudanese army. “With no documentation of sales, one cannot know when they were sold, by which company, how many, and so on,” the report says. “All we can say with certainty is that the South Sudanese army currently has Israeli Galil rifles, at a time when there is an international arms embargo on South Sudan, imposed by the UN Security Council, due to ethnic cleansing, as well as crimes against humanity, using rape as a method of war, and due to war crimes the army is perpetrating against the country’s citizens.” According to Amnesty, the defense export control agency at the Defense Ministry approved the licenses awarded Israeli companies for selling weapons to these countries, even though it knew about the bad human rights situation there. It did this despite the risk that Israeli exports would be used to violate human rights and despite the embargo on arms sales imposed on some of these countries by the United States and the European Union, as well as other sanctions that were imposed by these countries or the United Nations . In response to letters written to the export control agency, its head, Rachel Chen, said: “We can’t divulge whether we’re exporting to one

of these countries, but we carefully examine the state of human rights in each country before approving export licenses for selling them weapons.” According to Amnesty, this claim is false, as shown by the example of the eight countries mentioned in the report. Amnesty recommends steps for improving the monitoring of defense exports. It says Israel lags American legislation by 20 years, and European legislation by 10 years. “The lack of transparency has further negative implications, such as hiding information from the public,” Amnesty says.

***KRITIKS***

**Epistemology Ks**

2AC – Epistemology K – Top Shelf

The Aff’s discussion reorients scholarship – this changes the fundamental nature of how we orient ourselves in the context of nuclear scholarship – all of their policy debate good arguments exist in a falsified world of knowledge production that must be rejectedRebecca S. Bjork, Prof of Communications @ University of Utah, 1995 [inWarranting Assent, “Public Policy Argumentation and Colonialist Ideology in the Post-Cold War Era,” p. 232, ME]The assumption , all too often taken for granted in academic circles, that scholarship takes place in an “ivory tower” that has no relationship to the real world, is problematic in light of Said’s thorough critique of the discursive practice of Orientalism and his advocacy of “worldly” criticism. As I have attempted to demonstrate in this essay, all scholars and public policy arguers, myself included, cannot escape the cultural embeddedness of their positions, authority and work. If it is the case that human beings are constantly shaped by their surroundings, and form attitudes, beliefs, and values in response to their circumstances, then it seems clear that attempts to “objectively” discover and communicate knowledge are doomed to fail. It is my belief that formalist argumentation theory, with its goals of accurately describing arguments and applying “rational” tests to determine whether they warrant assent, clings to the goal of objectivity. Furthermore, presuming that “rational” argument takes place between equally empowered voices in an “ideal” civic and democratic society, obscures the role of power relations as they are culturally and historically coded in society. Once it is granted that academic discourse circulates throughout culture and becomes part of the taken-for-granted assumption that drive society, then it is imperative that scholars who produce such discourse are vigilant and aware of the power and implications of their work. In this essay, I have attempted to illustrate the ways in which public policy argumentation (scholarly and otherwise) concerning the threats posed by nuclear proliferation, and the potential deployment of ballistic missile defense as a way of alleviating those threats, depict “other” nations in ways that are racist and sexist, and which serve to perpetuate global inequalities. Some might argue that it is easy to point fingers, lay blame, and complain about the current state of international relations without offering any concrete solutions to the dangers that face our world each day. Adopting a critical stance to the evaluation of arguments, however, represents a first step toward constructive change, in that awareness of the ideological power of argumentation opens up possibilities for reconceptualizing the role of scholarship. Listening to the voices of “others,” with sensitivity to the particular situations from which such voices emerge, seems to be logically prior to suggesting alternatives.

2AC – Anti-Semitism K – Link Turn

Criticizing Israel’s policies isn’t anti-Semitic – false accusations of anti-Semitism are influenced by lobbying in Congress Bennis ’19 -- Phyllis, directs the New Internationalism Project at IPS, focusing on Middle East, U.S. wars and UN issues. She is also a fellow of the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam. In 2001 she helped found and remains active with the U.S. Campaign for Palestinian Rights, served as an informal adviser to several top UN officials on Middle East issues and was twice short-listed to become the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (“Why False Accusations of Anti-Semitism Against Ilhan Omar Are So Harmful”, In These Times, 3/4/19, http://inthesetimes.com/article/21778/false-accusations-antisemitism-ilhan-omar-israel-palestine-democrats)The bad news is that false accusations of anti-Semitism—usually linked to criticism of Israel or Israel's supporters in the United States—are on the rise as well. And we need to be clear: It is not anti-Semitic to support Palestinian rights, demand a change in U.S. policy towards Israel, expose the kind of pressure that the pro-Israel lobby brings to bear on elected officials, or call out Israel's violations of human rights and international law. False accusations of anti- Semitism are used to undermine Palestinian rights, violate the First Amendment and demonize social movements. They also serve as a powerful diversion from the urgent task of combating the real thing. False accusations aren't made equally against all critics of Israel and supporters of Palestinian rights. They are far more likely to be deployed against people of color, especially Black and Arab intellectuals, as we've recently seen with Marc Lamont Hill, who was fired by CNN

following complaints about his Palestinian rights speech at the United Nations. Angela Davis was awarded the Birmingham Civil Rights Institute's prestigious Fred L. Shuttlesworth Human Rights Award in her hometown, only to have the award revoked because of her support for Palestinian rights (In response to massive public pressure, the Institute offered to renew the offer, but Davis instead chose to participate in a public event that included solidarity with Palestine). Michelle Alexander, whose extraordinary New York Times column rooted support for Palestinian rights

squarely in the legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., faced charges of “ sneaky anti-Semitism .” Most of all, at this moment, we see the targeting of some of the new cohort of amazing brave young women of color now in Congress for the first time. When Rep. Ilhan Omar (D.-Minn.) called out AIPAC and the Israel lobby earlier this month for using money to win support in Congress—as every lobby worth its donors does—she was not condemned and threatened just because of what she said, but because of who she is when she said it. She is a Somali-born former refugee, a Black Muslim woman who wears her hijab in the halls of Congress. And for some in Congress, in the White House and in the media and in too much of the country, such a person does not belong in Congress. If Omar had written a formal statement instead of a tweet, if she had issued a serious analysis of how every lobby, including the pro-Israel lobby led by AIPAC, directs funds to ensure support from members of congress, rather than casually quoting the Puff Daddy line that it's “all about the benjamins, baby,” the response would have been the same. Because it's far more about who she is than what she said. Roughly three weeks later, the congresswoman was again accused of anti-Semitism, this time for a phrase taken out of context from a town hall discussion in Washington, D.C. What she actually said was, “I want to talk about the political influence in this country that says it is okay for people to push for allegiance to a foreign country. And I want to ask, Why is it ok for me to talk about the influence of the NRA, of fossil fuel industries, or Big Pharma, and not talk about a powerful lobby … that is influencing policy?” She also faced accusations for tweets published on March 3 saying, “I am told everyday that I am anti-American if I am not pro-Israel. I find that to be problematic and I am not alone. I just happen to be willing to speak up on it and open myself to attacks … I should not be expected to have allegiance/pledge support to a foreign country in order to serve my country in Congress or serve on committee. The people of the 5th elected me to serve their interest.” The worst aspect was that powerful members of her own party, rather than coming to her defense, led the attacks. Democratic Rep. Juan Vargas (D-Calif.) actually claimed Monday on Twitter that “questioning support for the U.S.-Israel relationship is unacceptable.” The pro-Israel lobby It's hardly news, let alone shocking, that AIPAC and the broader pro-Israel lobby it coordinates are among the most influential of Washington influence-peddlers. This is not only because of the

millions of dollars in campaign contributions the lobby—which includes organizations like Christians United for Israel—spends every year. But also because, historically, the lobby's power has been braided into, and been strengthened by, its link to the decades-old strategic ties

between U.S. and Israeli military, security, geo-political and nuclear goals. Those ties—between the Pentagon and the IDF, the CIA and the Mossad, Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump with their shared antagonism to Iran and eagerness to partner with Saudi Arabia—are all far more important in maintaining the Washington-Tel Aviv alliance than any embrace of Israel by the U.S. public. The intersection of the lobby and militarized strategic interests have strengthened both over the years, even as one or the other rose to be

more important. Starting in 1967 when the so-called “special relationship” between Washington and Tel Aviv took shape after the Pentagon decided that Israel's victory in the Six-Day War portended the beginning of a beautiful friendship, the strategic ties were most important. The lobby had been there since decades before the state of Israel was created in 1948, but it had never been all that influential on its own. At the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was

winning rising influence across the Arab world, and the United States was desperate to expand its competitiveness in the region. That meant access to oil, political and economic influence, arms sales, military presence and power projection. Israel fit the bill, not least because the perception in official U.S. circles was that Israelis were white and western—and therefore assumed to be inherently more trustworthy than even the most subservient Arab allies. So the embrace began. The lobby suddenly appeared far stronger, since it was now pushing for a policy trajectory that matched the powerful

forces in the Pentagon and military corporation boardrooms, also urging stronger ties, military aid, and massive arms sales to Israel.

**Militarism K**

2AC – Militarism K – Link Turn

Arms sales embolden Israeli hardliners to undertake aggressive military actions against both regional rivals and Palestinians Lachmann 19 [Richard Lachmann, professor of sociology at the University at Albany, Feb 27, 2019, “How to Build a Socialist Foreign Policy,” Jacobin, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/02/socialist-foreign-policy-bernie-sanders-us-military]For more than forty years the United States has used Israel as its enforcer in the Middle East . Israel,

in return for arms and diplomatic support, has intimidated and waged war when necessary on

Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and on leftists in Jordan and elsewhere while quietly assisting Egypt and Saudi Arabia in their

repression of domestic opponents. US arms sales have served to embolden the most militaristic and

intransigent elements in Israel, encouraging aggression rather than negotiation with

Palestinians. The United States tips the scale in favor of the most reactionary elements within Israel and toward policies rejected by a majority of Jews in the United States and around the world. Sanders and other left politicians need to be clear that departing from the establishment policy on Israel is not antisemitic. Since the United States is the biggest supporter of Israel’s policies, it is the United States and not Jewish people who are responsible for the oppression of Palestinians. Neither Iran nor Venezuela pose a threat to the United States. Their militaries are tiny in comparison to ours. The people of those countries should be able to decide on their own government without US

interference. Nor should we encourage neighboring countries to attack . An Israeli attack on Iran

or an invasion of Venezuela by any of its neighbors would lead to regional war and create massive

numbers of refugees, further destabilizing those regions .

NEGATIVE

***CASE***

**Resettlement Turn**

1NC – Resettlement Turn

The plan causes Israeli resettlement – escalates and causes multiple scenarios for global conflagrationPearl 3-5-15 Mike Pearl “We Asked a Military Expert What Would Happen if the US Stopped Giving Money to Israel” https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/dpwnkm/what-would-happen-if-the-us-stopped-giving-money-to-israel-305, AvishaOn Tuesday Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint session of Congress, and what he said was more or less what you'd expect: Basically, Iran is untrustworthy and dangerous, and allowing it to continue even a limited version of its nuclear program is going to lead to an "arms race" in the Middle East. The audience was dominated by Republicans, and they clapped like crazy as they listened to the speech. The fact that the speech even happened was bananas. Netanyahu was invited by House Speaker John Boehner, who declined to ask the White House whether it would be OK for a foreign head of state to come preach to Congress about the dangers of the administration's impending nuclear deal with Iran. Obama didn't meet with Netanyahu during his visit, and Democrats—including usually staunch defenders of Israel—didn't hide how upset they were over the Israeli prime minister's heavy-handed slight. But it was also a powerful reminder that no matter how tense things get between the US and Israel, it is virtually impossible to untangle the two countries, or roll back US support for Israel. According to the Congressional Research Service, for the 2015 fiscal year the Obama administration requested $3.1 billion in aid for Israel from the United States Foreign Military Funding program, plus another $282.7 million from other funds the US pays out. And thanks to America's long history of turning loans into free money, funds originating in the US constitute a thick slice of Israel's total defense budget. So what would happen if that were all gone? It's not as though the US is actually itching to cut off money. Obama is sure to keep aid flowing for the rest of his time in office, and it's hard to imagine any future president taking a harder line with Israel than he has. But what if some irrevocable schism forced the US government's hand, and the funds vanished tomorrow and never came back? I ran the question by Rob Pinfold, former researcher at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and a freelance explainer of Israeli politics. And his answer scared the shit out

of me. VICE: Hi, Rob! What would happen if the US stopped sending money to Israel ? Rob Pinfold: I think

it would be a mess for Israel basically. Would it be good for the US? The US would have a lot less traction

over Israel . It would be a downside for the US, and it would also be a downside for the

[Middle East] . For a long time the US has been trying to use its aid politically to change Israel's

behavior. What behaviors wouldn't the US be able to control? I think any end to this aid would mean that

Israel would be much more likely to take radical moves that would not necessarily have the

support of the international community. I think it would be dangerous . What are the likely events in

the short term ? I think that the big difference you'd see straightaway is an escalation in

settlement building because the Israeli right would really be able to unleash it. You see a lot, the Israeli government in particular, they've announced some big settlement-building initiatives of several thousand homes in East Jerusalem over the green line. And then the Americans say, "Na-uh, sorry, this is not happening," and then the idea is quieted for another five years, and then it happens again, ad nauseam. But without any American influence over Israel,

especially with this aid , I think you would see a drastic exploration in settlement building . Would they attack Hamas targets in Gaza? I think they would need to be provoked. Very, very rarely does Israel just willy-nilly launch itself into a conflict, not just because of influence from the US but also at the end of the day, Israel is a democracy—so actually instigating conflict has to have that legitimacy, otherwise it becomes a big issue. But what if they were provoked? Israel in the future would be much more unpredictable and any war would be likely to go on for a lot longer, because there wouldn't be one big power to really exert the pressure and squeeze both sides into a ceasefire. And how would the US react if they couldn't influence them with money? Military action is somewhat unfeasible, in my eyes, against Israel. It just wouldn't happen. You might have some sort of short-term sanctions against the regime by the US on Israel, and maybe on other belligerents as well. And what would the outcome be? Israel wouldn't lose the conflict, that's for sure. They get a lot of money from the States in terms of support in terms of the Iron Dome anti-missile program, but at the end of the day they have enough hardware already in the sheds to be able to thoroughly defeat any belligerents—for example, non-state-level actors like Hamas or Hezbollah, but also state-level actors like Iran. I don't think it would be a question of turning the tide of battle it would just be a question of how long the war would go on, how bloody it would be, and who would get dragged in. Who would get dragged in? I think the US, even if they

really fell out with and really strongly dislike[d] Israel, would probably still work toward a cessation of hostility as a superpower. I think that no matter what happens, we would go back to some sort of

paradigm representing what we have at the moment. But the fighting would probably be longer and bloodier, and the US would have less of an ability to stop it straight away. Would Israel make moves on Iran? I think the Saudis would be ready to turn a blind eye to an Israeli attack [on Iran], which has been suggested

before. So I think again the probability of mass-casualty warfare and violence would be much higher if the US, tomorrow, said, "Screw you, guys. I'm going home. This is too much effort." What kind of warfare

would we see? In terms of Iranian retaliation, Iran has a lot of medium- to long-range missiles. They're not very accurate, but they stopped firing them at the end of the Iran-Iraq war, so they do have a very hefty stockpile that they could then fire at Israel. Israel would inevitably retaliate with their stock. So it'd be quite hard for them to launch a bombing campaign against Iran because they'd have to go through unfriendly territory on the way. What might the targets of Israel's military action be? I think you'd see one Israeli strike,

one very pinpointed, strategic attack on Iranian nuclear assets. Then afterwards Israel would basically try to hold its own, because Iran would unleash its proxies on the region, which are primarily Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon. I think we'd see fighting very close to Israel's doorstep and I think you'd see a lot of devastation of both Gaza and Lebanon. But on the flip side you'd also see a lot more damage to Israel's home front than you've seen in a very long time. Would Iran have any luck? The missiles that Iran has have overwhelmed the Iron Dome system. The Iron Dome system can shoot down the missiles that you saw [from] Hamas [during the war this past summer]. The Iron Dome can deal with that, but it wouldn't be able to do with the stockpiles of rockets that Iran has. Would things escalate beyond exchanging missile attacks? If there is more damage to the Israeli home front, the Israeli domestic scene would be more willing for the Israeli military to go all out on flattening large parts of Lebanon and Gaza. There would be much less resistance to a ground invasion, and much less resistance to moving troops in. Israel historically has very quick campaigns and very decisive victories. So I think the leashes would be off, so to speak. I think the Israeli army would be going en masse into Lebanon and into Gaza and wherever else they'd be getting attacked from. But the fighting would be mainly restricted to the area around Israel, unless they do some sort of massive campaign into Iran. Does Israel have the fire power to successfully cripple the Iranian nuclear program? That's a tough one because it's anyone's guess, really. I don't know exactly where and how the Iranians are hiding all their material. They probably know. It would still be very hard for Israel. Their planes would have to refuel in midair, in enemy territory. Their equipment is very limited. It's not known if they actually have any bunker-busting missiles, like the Americans have, that can penetrate deep underground. I think we'd probably have to see Israeli forces in Iran—special forces teams, demolition teams, that kind of thing. It would have to involve some sort of covert support from the Saudis to have a very good chance of success. It would be very, very difficult and it would end in a lot of casualties on both the Israeli and the Iranian side. If the Israelis want to do it, there is nothing stopping them from doing it. If they see them as a potential threat, they will go in and they will go in hard. Would the fighting be limited to just Iran, Lebanon, and Gaza? I think it would definitely trigger a whole powder keg in the entire region. You look at the Middle East today, and it's the most unstable it's been in absolutely years. You have the Islamic State operating out of both Iraq and Syria. They're making headway in Lebanon as well. Egypt has its own problems with iihadists in the Sinai. It's very unstable... in Libya. [And] any conflict with Iran would not just be limited to Gaza, it would also spread to the West Bank where there are a lot of Iranian agents .

But in the long-term, if a terrible war weren't immediately sparked, how would a halt in funding from the US affect Israel's military budget? In Israel, the military budget is very much sacrosanct. Any cut to the military budget, and you're putting the state in existential danger. Personally I think you'd see cuts to many other social, welfare, or educational programs within Israel before you'd see massive, damaging cuts to the army. They'd try to keep the military budget as steady as possible. So you'd see a damaging of Israeli society. Could Netanyahu stay in power? I personally don't think so. If any Israeli leader were willing to seriously jeopardize their ties [with the US], [causing] a complete cut off of all military and financial aid, I personally—and I could be proven wrong—I don't think the government would be able to withstand the pressure within Israel that would result from that. What political change do you think the country would see internally? If it happened today, I think you would see the rise of the Labor Party in the Israeli election. What kind of economic impact would this have on the US and other countries? I think the US would survive. The European Union is Israel's biggest trading partner, not the US. In Europe, they would cut off all money because they have been more critical of Israel than the US has been, traditionally. I think the crisis would be more on Israel's side than on Europe or the US. Is there a possibility that any of Israel's enemies would look more favorably on the US's presence in the region? I don't think that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria would be welcoming the US, and developing ties with Uncle Sam... Well, not them... It might make a difference. It might

make some sort of short-term blip, but I think the countries in the Arab world have enough reasons to be mad at the US the next day for whatever reason. But speaking of the Islamic State, would they make a move? I doubt that. They talk a lot about Jews in the world, and Jewish money, and Jewish power, and how much they hate Israel. But generally they have very little to actually do with Israel, in terms of fighting or invading Israel. They go for Jewish targets but they're not so much in the movement against Israel itself. In any one-on-one confrontation between the Islamic State and Israel, Israel would completely wipe the floor with them.

**Framing**

1NC – Freedom of Speech Turn

Anti-Zionist campuses deny Zionist students basic human rights to amendments and discriminates groups because of their beliefs.Jacabson 18 (Aliyah Jacabson, Junior at Brooklyn College and a CAMERA 2018\2019 Fellow, a young Jewish professional who serves on the Chabad Young Professionals of Brooklyn board, “How Anti-Semitism Has Sprung Up on College Campuses,” 14 Nov 2018, https://cameraoncampus.org/blog/how-anti-semitism-has-sprung-up-on-college-campuses/ , Jewel)These hostile anti-Israel activists do not realize that students like Segev and myself could bring them closer to the “justice” and rights that they claim to seek for Palestinians. Simply because Segev and I support Israel, anti-Zionist students refuse to see us as fellow organizers or hold dialogue with us on campus. The City College of New York’s standard on freedom of speech has been perverted to the point where Students for Justice in Palestine felt comfortable chanting “intifada,” effectively a call for violence, at their Nakba commemoration. Oshra Bitton, a former CAMERA Fellow at City College, expressed that “the administration at CUNY claims that anti-Israel students are just expressing their first amendment rights ignoring the fact that it is terrifying for us Jewish students to hear a group calling for our deaths.” While SJP claims to promote justice human rights and liberation for the Palestinian people, their calls for an intifada neglect any self-respecting social justice goal. This hate speech and fear mongering is the same incitement that preceded the Holocaust. We need to work towards a climate on campus in which freedom of speech is not twisted to incite violence. Harassment and threats tragically go against this ideal and have followed the Jewish people for millennia. Students should be able to get their degree and enjoy their full rights and privileges as all students do without being harassed. We, as Jewish students, are not lesser than any other group and should be treated as equals in all forums.

Freedom of speech must be upheld on college campuses because that is the backbone of the constitution. The road to tyranny begins when Zionist voices are silenced.Leikind 19 (Robert, director of the American Jewish Committee’s Boston region, “Don't Choose Comfort Over Free Speech” 29 May 2018, https://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2019/05/29/williams-college-wifi-israel-rob-leikind, jewel)Williams College has been ranked the country's top liberal arts college, but its sterling reputation was recently tarnished. The College Council, the campus student government, denied the Williams Initiative for Israel (WIFI) certification as a “registered student organization.” It was an astonishing decision. WIFI met all requirements identified in the College Council’s bylaws for recognition, which would bring campus funding. The group was established “to support Israel and the pro-Israel campus community, as well as to educate the College on issues concerning Israel and the Middle East." Three supporters explained in an op-ed in The Williams Record that “our goal is simply to bring an additional perspective into the ongoing campus discourse.” The College Council would have none of it. “The state of Israel does not need a student group defending its ‘right to exist’ on this campus any more than we need to ‘defend’ the rights of wealthy, straight white men,” wrote two students in The Williams Record. Another student who spoke at a public College Council meeting said, “almost everyone will agree that massive abuses” are being perpetrated by Israel against Palestinians and that “special consideration and debate” are warranted when approving students groups affiliating with Israel. Open, respectful debate ... would

place this complexity on full display. But not everyone would agree. The conflict between Israel and its Palestinian and Arab neighbors is profoundly complicated. Open, respectful debate as has been customary in American universities, would place this complexity on full display. Regrettably, this is precisely what some critics of Israel seek to avoid. To her credit, Williams College President Maud Mandel took action to overturn the College Council decision. WIFI is now a recognized campus club. The larger issue, however, remains. Many students, including those on elite campuses like Williams College, look upon ideas they don’t like as violations of their safe spaces and see no problem in discriminating against, rather than debating, those with whom they disagree. Anti-Israel initiatives on college campuses have been led by organizations like Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), which has chapters across the country (including one at Williams that was recognized by the College Council). SJP alleges that Israel is a colonial state, guilty of apartheid and genocide against the Palestinian people. SJP’s claims are tendentious and blind people to a far more complex and tragic reality. Israel is not without fault, but a primary reason this conflict has persisted is that Palestinian leaders, many of whom remain committed to Israel’s destruction, have rejected multiple opportunities to establish a Palestinian state. Obscuring this reality ensures that suffering continues and the path to compromise and conciliation remains barred. To advance their cause, SJP supporters often invoke an idea they call “anti-normalization.” One SJP chapter explained the concept this way: “We reject any and all collaboration, dialogue and coalition work with Zionist organizations through a strict policy of anti-normalization and encourage our comrades in other organizations to do the same.” But we also know that there is no better protection against the prejudices of an unruly mob than the right to freely respond. The readiness of some university students on campuses to dispense with dialogue and openly discriminate against predominantly Jewish pro-Israel students is a source of growing concern within the Jewish community. But it should be of no less concern to all who prize the preservation of our democratic ideals. In his classic study, "Democracy in America," Alexis de Tocqueville observed that American commitment to the sovereignty of the people will remain so long as the free exchange of ideas is embedded in our nation’s way of life. Today, however, some argue that free speech needs to be limited to protect “marginalized people” from the verbal assaults of bigots and other oppressors. Proponents of free speech, they contend, place the protection of ideas over the protection of marginalized people. As two members of the College Council argued, the student body needed to be protected against an organization that would “erase the voices of Palestinian students, erroneously redefining colonialism or concealing acts of genocide.” The irony is hard to ignore. For many Jews, the obsessive, frequently uninformed and increasingly widespread interest in assigning to Israel preposterous allegations (as opposed to serious criticisms that one might legitimately level at any nation) that frame Israel and its people as among the world’s most morally flawed is a source of considerable pain and distress. It is not difficult to sympathize with students who fear harm from the words of bigots, who perpetuate false and harmful stories about their national, religious, racial or ethnic identities. I and many other Jews share that fear. But we also know that there is no better protection against the prejudices of an unruly mob than the right to freely respond. The alternative to sustaining a high regard for freedom of speech is allowing groups, like the Williams College Council, to be guided by their prejudices in determining what speech they deem acceptable. This may serve the interests of some organizations that want to weaponize college campuses in the service of their political goals. It will not serve the interests of Williams College, vulnerable minorities, the academe or our nation. The framers of our Constitution sought to protect free and open debate because they feared the effect of demagogues armed with moral certainty. In the words of Benjamin Franklin, “Freedom of speech is a principal pillar of a free government. When this support is taken away, the constitution of a free society is dissolved, and tyranny is erected on its ruins.”

2NC – Freedom of Speech Turn

Anti-Zionism prevents free speech and non-politicized learning on college campuses; Zionists need to speak up for their convictionsKirsch 18. (Jonathan Kirsch, publishing and intellectual property attorney based in Los Angeles, an expert witness on publishing industry matters, an Adjunct Professor on the Faculty of New York University’s Professional Publishing Institute, and a lecturer and consultant on publishing matters, “The Zionist Dilemma on College Campuses,” Oct. 3 2018, https://jewishjournal.com/culture/books/239769/zionist-dilemma-college-campuses/, Aashni)Of all the challenges that confront those of us who identify ourselves as Zionists, perhaps none is so poignant and so heartbreaking as the fact that “Zionism” has become a fighting word on the college campus, the very place where open-mindedness should be enshrined as a core value. That’s the focus of “Anti-Zionism on Campus: The University, Free Speech and BDS,” edited by Andrew Pessin and Doron S. Ben-Atar, a new title in the Anti-Semitism Series of the Indiana University Press. Pessin, a philosophy professor at Connecticut College, and Ben-Atar, a playwright and history professor at Fordham University, have collected more than 30 contributions from scholars and students who have studied and experienced the dilemma they write about. “Those in the academy who support Israel, or who merely don’t despise Israel, are finding it increasingly difficult to speak up without risk of verbal attack, social and professional ostracization, setbacks to their careers, and sometimes even physical threats,” Pessin and Ben-Atar write. “As a result, the Israel-friendly (or merely non-anti-Israel) voice on campuses around the world and in the global ‘republic of letters’ is rapidly being silenced. The implications of this phenomenon, not only for Jews but also, we believe, for

free speech, for the academy, and for Western values in general, are chilling.” They alert the reader to a parade of horribles: “Protests and disruptions confront not only Israel-related campus events but also Jewish events, including talks by famous people about their Jewish heritage, campus Shabbat dinners, and Hillel student meetings,” the editors sum up. “More and more, individuals are being targeted, smeared, falsely accused of saying or doing objectionable things, shamed, singled out for public condemnation and rage, and subject to hateful and threatening messages.” Each chapter is a case study, detailed and nuanced, of a particular incident of anti-Zionist excess. For example, Jeffrey Kopstein, describes the scene when some 50 protesters stormed the screening of an Israeli film for an audience of 10 students at UC Irvine, screaming, “Long Live the Intifada,” first trying to break into the room and then blocking the door in order to trap the audience inside. A pro-Israel advocacy group “decided to double down and rescreen the film on campus with a much larger community and official presence,” including 30 uniformed officers, bomb-sniffing dogs, physical barriers, and strict security protocols.” The second screening was not disrupted, but Kopstein — a UC Irvine political science professor who witnessed the various anti-Zionist incidents that took place at the campus — laments that the necessity for elevated security was “[h]ardly the description of an atmosphere conducive to non-politicized learning.” His dilemma — the painful effort to balance freedom of speech and academic integrity — is a theme that runs throughout the collection. Another veteran of campus confrontation is UCLA emeritus professor Judea Pearl, who writes about the invitation he received to participate in a campus debate about the boycott,

divestment and sanctions (BDS) movement, sponsored by the Los Angeles Review of Books. “[S]hould I bestow academic credibility onto an ideology that accuses me of crimes as ridiculous as ethnic cleansing, apartheid, and colonialism when I do research at my alma mater, the Technion, in Israel?” he writes. “It would be like hosting a balanced debate between supporters and detractors of the Flat Earth Society or, God forbid, the Americans for the Restoration of Slavery.” Pearl, a world-renowned computer scientist and the father of the murdered journalist Daniel Pearl, decided to participate in the debate in the hope of proving the BDS movement to be wrong on the strength of argument and evidence, the tools of authentic scholarship. His chapter summarizes the case he made against BDS, but he widens the focus to propose how colleges should deal with the excesses of anti-Zionism: “Selective neutrality should be the instrument with which the university administration distinguishes those who contribute to the respectful campus climate and productive discourse from those who disrupt such a climate.” And he concludes with a one-sentence prescription for achieving peace in the Middle East: “Two states for two peoples, equally legitimate and equally indigenous.” “When Palestinian leadership gathers the courage to utter the magical words “equally indigenous,’ ” he concludes, “peace will become unstoppable — not even BDS will be able to stop it.” My alma mater, UC Santa Cruz, is the focus of a chapter by Tammi Rossman-Benjamin. As a lecturer in Hebrew and Jewish studies, she was the target of what she calls “a sustained campaign of harassment, intimidation, and defamation” that was carried out by anti-Israel activists, including one of her own former students. When Rossman-Benjamin tried to invoke the protection of the 1964 Civil Rights

Act, the student claimed that the civil rights investigation “is actually being used to stifle Palestinian-related speech on campus,” and her adversaries complained that her civil rights complaint “violated the First Amendment rights of Muslim, Arab, and pro-Palestinian students” and “created a ‘hostile environment’ for them.” All of her claims were ultimately dismissed by the authorities. “My story may be extreme,” she insists, “but it is not unique.” What is to be done? The whole point of “Anti-Zionism on Campus” is that it takes courage to speak out in defense of Israel on campus today. “[C]ampus anti-Israelists are in it for the long haul,” writes Pessin in an epilogue titled “Inconclusive, Unscientific Postscript: On the Purpose of the University, and a Ray of Hope.” He continues: “It remains unclear whether those who do notbelieve that Israel is an unqualified abomination will be able to stay in it for the long haul as well. It is a hard battle to fight, and the personal costs are great.” His words are intended to inspire — and, perhaps, to shame — the reader to speak up for his or her convictions in the face of anti-Zionism wherever it is found. When compared with what others have already given to the cause of the Jewish state, and what the citizens of Israel continue to give, it is not much to ask of anyone who proudly calls himself or herself a Zionist.

Their critique is anti-semitic and it’s okay to oppose IsraelBeinart 19. (Peter Beinart, Associate professor of journalism and political science at the City University of New York, a contributing editor at the Atlantic and a senior columnist at Haaretz. His books include The Crisis of Zionism (2012). “Debunking the myth that anti-Zionism is antisemitic,” March 7 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/mar/07/debunking-myth-that-anti-zionism-is-antisemitic, Aashni)Maybe it is not bigoted to oppose a people’s quest for statehood. But it is bigoted to take away that statehood once achieved. “It is

one thing to argue, in the moot court of historical what-ifs, that Israel should not have come into being,” argued New York Times columnist Bret Stephens earlier this month. However, “Israel is now the home of nearly 9 million citizens, with an identity that is as distinctively and proudly Israeli as the Dutch are Dutch or the Danes Danish. Anti-Zionism proposes nothing less than the elimination of that identity and the political dispossession of those who cherish it.” But it is not bigoted to try to turn a state based on ethnic nationalism into one based on civic nationalism, in which no ethnic group enjoys special privileges. In the 19th century, Afrikaners created several countries designed to fulfil their quest for national self-determination, among them the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Then, in 1909, those two Afrikaner states merged with two states dominated by English-speaking white people to become the Union of South Africa (later the Republic of South Africa), which offered a kind of national self-determination to white South Africans. The problem, of course, was that the versions of self-determination upheld by the Transvaal, the Orange Free State and apartheid South Africa excluded millions of black people living within their borders. This changed in 1994. By ending apartheid, South Africa replaced an Afrikaner ethnic nationalism and a white racial nationalism with a civic nationalism that encompassed people of all ethnicities and races. It inaugurated a constitution that guaranteed “the right of the South African people as a whole to self-determination.” That wasn’t bigotry, but its opposite. I don’t consider Israel an apartheid state. But its ethnic nationalism excludes many of the people under its control. Stephens notes that Israel contains almost 9 million citizens. What he doesn’t mention is that Israel also contains close to 5 million non-citizens: Palestinians who live under Israeli control in the West Bank and Gaza (yes, Israel still controls Gaza) without basic rights in the state that dominates their lives. One reason Israel doesn’t give these Palestinians

citizenship is because, as a Jewish state designed to protect and represent Jews, it wants to retain a Jewish majority, and giving 5 million Palestinians the vote would imperil that. Even among Israel’s 9 million citizens, roughly 2 million – the so-called “Arab Israelis” – are Palestinian. Stephens says overturning Zionism would mean the “political dispossession” of Israelis. But, according to polls, most of Israel’s Palestinian citizens see it the opposite way. For them, Zionism represents a form of political dispossession. Because they live in a state that privileges Jews, they must endure an immigration policy that allows any Jew in the world to gain instant Israeli citizenship yet makes Palestinian immigration to Israel virtually impossible. They live in a state whose national anthem speaks of the “Jewish soul”, whose flag features a Star of David and which, by tradition, excludes Israel’s Palestinian parties from its governing coalitions. A commission created in 2003 by the Israeli government itself described Israel’s “handling of the Arab sector” as “discriminatory”. So long as Israel remains a Jewish state, no Palestinian citizen can credibly tell her son or daughter that they can become prime minister of the country in which they live. In these ways, Israel’s form of ethnic nationalism – Zionism – denies equality to the non-Jews who live under Israeli control. My preferred solution would be for the West Bank and Gaza to become a Palestinian state, thus giving Palestinians in those territories citizenship in an ethnically nationalist (though hopefully democratic) country of their own. I’d also try to make Israel’s ethnic nationalism more inclusive by, among other things, adding a stanza to Israel’s national anthem that acknowledges the aspirations of its Palestinian citizens.

1NC – Extinction Outweighs

Prioritize existence because value is subjective and could improve in the future Torbjörn Tännsjö 11, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, 2011, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” online: http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdfI suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living , they believe they do . And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better . They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us . My conjecture is that we should not commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular

perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning , if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

2NC – Extinction OutweighsConsequences is the only logical impact frame---ethical obligations are nonsensical and make action impossible---don’t decide on justifications or a yes/no link questionSikkink 8 – Professor of political science at the University of Minnesota(Kathryn, “The Role of Consequences, Comparison, and Counterfactuals in Constructivist Ethical Thought,” http://www.polisci.umn.edu/centers/theory/pdf/sikkink.pdf)Ethical arguments of these different types are ubiquitous and necessary. But because they are also slippery and open to manipulation and misuse, we also need to be very careful and precise about how we go about using them. I would recommend that first we distinguish very carefully between the comparison to ideals and historical empirical comparison. I believe that many critical constructivist accounts rely on the comparison to the ideal or to the conditions of possibility

counterfactual argument. In almost every critical constructivist work there is an implicit ideal ethical argument. This argument is implicit because it is rarely clearly stated, but it is found in the nature of the 36 critique. So, for example, in her discussion of U.S. human rights policy, Roxanne Doty critiques a human rights policy carried out by actors who sometimes use it for their own self aggrandizement and to denigrate others. 42 The implicit ideal this presents is a human rights policy that is not used for denigration or surveillance or othering those it criticizes or conversely, of elevating those who advocate it. What would be examples of such a policy? The book does not provide examples. We do not know if examples exist in the world. So the implicit comparison is a comparison to an ideal – a never fully stated ideal, but one present in the critique of what is wrong with the policies discussed. Nicolas Guilhot makes a similar argument in his recent book. The promotion of democracy and human rights, he argues, are increasingly used in order to extend the power they were meant to limit. “The promotion of democracy and human rights defines new forms of administration on a global scale and generates a new political science.” He historically examines how progressive movements for democracy and human rights have become hegemonic because they “systematically managed to integrate emancipatory and progressive forces in the construction of imperial policies.” But once again, the book offers no alternative political scenario. In the final sentence of the book, the author clarifies that “this book has no other ambition than to contribute to the democratic critique of democracy.” 43 In the introduction, he clarifies, “This book does not provide answers to these dilemmas. At most, its only ambition is to highlight them, in the hope that a proper understanding constitutes a first step toward the invention of new courses of action.”44

Ethically , I believe this is a cop-out . Politically and intellectually , I find it too comfortable and too

easy. This critique has a crucial role to play in pointing to hypocrisy (as Price highlights in the introduction). It could also serve as a catalyst for policy change in the direction of policy that would include less surveillance or less cooptation of human rights discourse. But it is unlikely to serve as a catalyst for new action or policy change unless it ventures something more than pure critique, unless it risks a political or ethical proposal. Without that, it has the impact of delegitimizing any human rights policy without suggesting any alternative. Any policy to promote human rights of democracy policy is shown to be deeply flawed or even pernicious. It is portrayed as part of the problem, certainly not as offering any kind of solution. Human rights policy appears to make the situation worse, not better. The critique has the effect of telling us clearly what we do not want, what we can not support—human rights policies by imperfect and hypocritical actors like the U.S. In its historical comparisons, it also lumps human rights policy together with colonialism and does not provide any elements to distinguish between one policy of surveillance and other. All are equally flawed . The ethical effect is to remove normative support from existing policies without producing any alternatives . This is similar to what Price means when he says that “critical accounts which do not in fact offer constructive normative theorizing to follow critique ironically lend themselves to being complicit with the conservative agenda opposing erstwhile progressive change in world politics. ” Neither Doty nor Guilhot, for example, contrast two human rights policies to give examples of policies that are more of less hypocritical or where there has been more or 44 Guilhot, p. 14. 38 less surveillance. They don’t contrast human rights policies or democracy promotion policies to previous policies that were also hypocritical and self aggrandizing, but more pernicious – e.g. national security ideology and support for authoritarian regimes in the third world. By presenting no contrasts, the critique would appear to say that there is no ethical or political difference between a policy that supports coups and funds repressive military regimes and a policy that critiques coups and cuts military aid to repressive regimes . These policies would appear to be ethically indistinguishable. Indeed, by these standards, a realist policy (a la Kissinger) might be preferable. Kissinger didn’t denigrate his authoritarianism allies. He took regimes as they were. He treated them as valuable allies. He didn’t lecture them on how they

should change. He also, in doing so, encouraged , in some cases, coups and mass murder. But at least he didn’t “Other ” . Doty and Guilhot give me no ethical criteria to distinguish between the policies of the Kissinger administration, the Carter administration, and current Bush administration policy. Because the comparison is an implicit ideal, never an empirical real world example, the critique is very telling and can delegitimize the critiqued policy . But nothing is put in its place . So, it demobilizes any support we might have for any human rights

policy. It puts the analyst in an ethically comfortable position , but by not proposing any explicit comparison, it demobilizes the reader. We learn what to oppose, to critique, but we don’t learn explicitly what to support in its stead . The result can be political paralysis. One finds it difficult to act.

The goal of policy-making should be to maximize benefit and minimize costs---that requires analysis of consequences, not adherence to moral absolutesFettweis 13 – Professor of IR @ Tulane(Chris, “The Pathologies of Power,” p. 242-243)Classical realists have long considered prudence, in Hans Morgenthau's words, "the supreme virtue in politics ."47 Their conception of the term, and how it has traditionally been used in U.S. foreign policy, is similar to the dictionary definition: wisdom, caution, circumspection, and "provident care in the management of resources."48 Simply put, a prudent foreign policy would aim above all to minimize cost and maximize benefits .49 It would strive to be rational, careful, and restrained, and it would not waste national resources pursuing low-priority goals or addressing minor threats.∂ Prudence

is essentially the ability to weigh potential consequences of alternative political actions. It demands that the main criteria for ∂ any decision be a cost-benefit analysis, or an honest attempt to assess the implications for the national interest. Although such calculations are by necessity uncertain in a world where rationality is bounded and values unquantifiable, if policy makers were to value prudence above all other virtues they would by force of habit explain and justify their decisions using a rational framework, with reference to reason and evidence rather than emotion. Were prudence the defining virtue in policy debates, the ideal for which

policy makers strive, it would quickly silence the voices of fear, honor, glory, and hubris. The process of evaluation can never be foolproof, but by insisting that it be at the center of decision making at

the very least prudence can make assumptions clear and offer a basis for evaluation absent in those decisions driven by pathology.∂ The evaluation of policy cannot be done without recognition of cost. Simply achieving a goal - or winning - does not justify action. To be considered rational, the other side of the ledger must be considered as well . This may sound obvious, but a surprising number of scholars and analysts judge foreign policies based solely on whether or not objectives are fulfilled.50

Neocons ervatives in particular tend to ignore costs , assuming that the United States is capable of paying

virtually any price in the fight against evil. The war in Iraq , that exemplar of imprudence, was not preceded by extensive projections of the likely price tag. When pressed, Bush administration officials repeatedly

deferred such discussions by denying such estimates were possible.5' At best, they were of secondary relevance. In the war's aftermath, the same officials stress how much better the world is without Saddam rather than how much worse it is without those who gave their lives in removing him.∂ Like realism itself, prudence is hardly amoral. It merely demands a focus on the morality of outcomes , not intentions . Actions that produce bad results are imprudent, no matter how good the intent . On this, Morgenthau quotes Lincoln:∂ I do the very best I know, the very best I can, and I mean to keep doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is said against me won't amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference.2∂ Although the central criteria for prudent cost-benefit analyses must be the national interest, no abnegation of national ideals or international responsibility need follow. Foreign humanitarian assistance is cheap, relatively speaking, and often carries benefits for donor and recipient alike. The entire operation in Somalia, during which as many as a quarter million lives were saved, cost U.S. taxpayers less than two billion dollars.53 More was spent every week at the height of the Iraq war. Qaddafi was removed for half that.∂ A focus on the outcome makes it clear that the Iraq war was a blunder of the first order. Even if the intentions

of the Bush administration were indeed good, it is hard to see how the outcome can be said to be worth the cost. Thomas Ricks quotes a senior intelligence official in Iraq as saying that the long-term American goal after the surge is "a

stable Iraq that is unified, at peace with its neighbors, and is able to police its inter-nal affairs, so it isn't a sanctuary for Al Qaeda. Preferably a friend to us, but it doesn't have to be."54 Presumably one could add the absence of weapons of mass destruction to this rather scaled-back list of goals, and perhaps the continuation of the uninterrupted flow of oil from the Gulf. In other words, if all goes well over the course of the next few years -and there is obviously no guarantee it will - Iraq might look quite a bit like it did in 2003, only with a marginally more friendly dictator in charge. The cost of this restoration of the virtual status quo ante will be at least forty-five hundred American dead and some thirty thousand wounded, at least a hundred thousand Iraqis killed and millions more displaced, and up to as many as three trillion U.S. taxpayer dollars spent.55 The war inspired many young Arabs, such as Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, to join the∂ ranks ofjihadi terrorists, swelling the ranks of America's true enemies. Al-Asiri is currently the main bomb maker for "Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula," the group that operates out of Yemen and continues to try to take down Western airliners, and he is considered the "most dangerous man in the world" according to many people who maintain such rankings.56 The decision to invade Iraq may well turn out to be the most imprudent action this country has ever taken.∂ Another operation from the same year might serve as a counterexample to Iraq, a prudent foreign policy adventure where the benefits outweighed the costs. The July 2003 intervention in Liberia may be little remembered, but that is partially because it was such a success. The United States deployed around two thousand Marines to Monrovia and ended a siege during a particularly brutal civil war. Security returned to the capital and an unknowable number of lives were saved. Unlike in Somalia, die mission did not creep into nation building, proving that intervention need not be tainted by hubris. By October the civil war had effectively ended and the Marines withdrew, having suffered no casualties and incurring little cost to the U.S. taxpayer. In the years since, Charles Taylor, the paragon of the West African kleptocradc despot, was put on trial at The Hague and the security situation in Liberia has improved markedly. The Marines have not returned.∂ No assessment of costs and benefits can guarantee good decisions, of course. But by making assumptions clear, by inculcating and rewarding a systematic evaluation of alternatives , expectations can be assessed more rationally and decisions rescued from emotion . If leaders work actively to minimize pathologies and replace them with rational, fact-based beliefs, the odds of arriving at rational conclusions rise. If prudence is the goal, therefore, the following should form the core of the foreign policy conventional wisdom:∂ • The world is more peaceful than ever before.∂ • While no country is ever completely safe, the United States has few - if any - serious security threats.

Extinction first – it’s key to value to life and potential for future life – prereq to social progressCerutti 14 - Professor of Political Philosophy emeritus at the University of Florence and Adjunct Professor at the Scuola superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa. In the last fifteen years, Cerutti has been aVisiting Professor at Harvard, the Universit´e de Paris 8, the Humboldt Universit ¨at zu Berlin, the London School of Economics and Political Science,(China Foreign Affairs University), Beijing, and Stanford University in Florence. Beyond the publications quoted in this article, Cerutti has written widely on the political identity of the Europeans and the legitimacy of the European Union (last publication: Debating Political Identity and Legitimacy in the European Union, ed. with S. Lucarelli and V. Schmidt, Routledge: London 2011). Also, his MOOC ‘Political Philosophy: An Introduction’ is accessible on the platform <iversity.org>.(Furio “Humankind’s First Fundamental Right: Survival,” Constellations)This article’s main thesis1 is that, given the existence of at least two global threats, nuclear weapons and climate change, which endanger the life of humankind as a civ- ilized species , its right to survive should be asserted as its first human or rather

fundamental right . The sense of this assertion is not just philosophical but legal as well.¶ To substantiate this thesis, I shall go through six

argumentative steps:¶ 1. Why begin with global threats.¶ 2. Why survival is the leading category in this field, and¶ how it interplays with justice.¶ 3. What interest humankind has in its survival, and why¶ it should be protected as a right.¶ 4. Why regard

“humankind” rather than “all indi-¶ viduals” as a possible actor.¶ 5. Why speak of a fundamental rather than human¶ right, and how to constitutionalize this right.¶ 6. How two developments in international law after 1945 can contribute to support the argument

I have¶ been sketching.¶ **¶ 1. If philosophical thinking starts with being amazed at something in the world (Plato’s θαυμα ζειν), my in- terest in the present matter2 was first stimulated by the pre-philosophical amazement I always felt in seeing that in the now ́

enormous human rights discourse (both in politics and academia) so much care is dedicated to the single individuals, and so wide-ranging designs of a cos- mopolis to come are based on their rights. Yet nobody seems to take note that the life of all present and futur e individuals could be annihilated by a nuclear war or up- set by catastrophic

developments of climate change. It is like insisting on first debating the rights of a ship’s third- class passengers 3 instead of taking action in the light of the fact that the ship is already taking in seawater from a leak (climate

change is already happening) and also risks to hit a mine that is floating around and would send it along with all passengers and crew straight to the ocean depths (by thinking and acting timely, leaks can be filled, mines detected and swept away, all ac- tions that

would put the care for third-class passengers¶ on a firmer ground). These dangers are philosophically significant because they tell something about human beings, the only ones who have become able to destroy their own race, as well as about modernity: the possibil- ity of self-destruction sets an end to this era, opens a new one, which

can only vaguely be termed post-modern,4 and requires an updated rewriting of the Dialectics of the Enlightenment. It is also politically significant as it challenges present politics to restructure itself by ex- tending its attention to the far future, something which is

not possible within the boundaries of modern politics because of its narrow time structure.5 In a more precise language, I term challenges like nuclear weapons (con- sidered in themselves, while nuclear

proliferation is but a subphenomenon) and climate change global (in a very specific sense) because they are lethal and planet-wide, can hit approximately everybody on earth

and can be reasonably addressed only by the near totality of coun- tries and peoples. They would not wipe out biologically humankind, although this cannot be excluded in case of an all-out nuclear war; but they would destroy human civilization:6 not a set of values, but the set of material and cultural tools (agriculture, communications, trans- portation and trade) that allow unspecialized animals like the humans to survive and to

thrive.¶ It is clear that my thesis presupposes a revised scale of relevance among the issues requiring and stimulat- ing theoretical investigations: in my philosophical view global threats have a greater relevance and are intellec- tually more challenging than the issues suggested by the media’s headlines (present wars, terrorism, group and minority rights in the US, multiculturalism in Canada or Australia, immigrants in Europe, or, more recently, the crisis of the global economic system). As a reflection upon the deeper longue dure e determinants of hu[hu]man- ity’s fate, political philosophy should not necessarily espouse the agenda suggested by current politics and journalism and, instead, seek its own independent as- sessment of the state of the world as part of its business; ́

this is a critical attitude that cannot be implemented without a philosophical view on history (not to be con- fused with a revival of the “grand narratives”). Besides, the shifting of most of Critical Theory to pure normativity has favored the emergence not just of worldviews based on the predominance of Sollen, but also of an exclusive attention on intersubjectivity and its troubles; as if challenges to politics and civilization caused by systemic imperatives (such as the nuclear threat and¶ climate change) were beyond the grasp of critical inquiry. What I am attempting in this article is to address an issue such as human rights that is typical of the self- centered normative approach mentioned and to show how it

should be restructured to address the challenges for humankind’s survival .¶ In this attempt I am driven by the intent to debunk

the layer of denial (or repression in pshychoanalyti- cal sense) that, more intensely after the end of the Cold War, has removed the nuclear threat from the philosoph- ical reflection on modernity and has later prevented cli- mate change from entering the main agenda of Critical Theory. There is also an epistemological aspect in this: a critical Zeitdiagnose, or an informed assessment of where history has taken us to in our post-modern times is not possible without first taking what hard science has to say about the threats

for humankind very seriously.7 With rare exceptions, critical theorists seem to be reluctant to address the philosophical issues raised by global challenges , not to mention their complete denial beginning with Horkheimer and Adorno in the Fifties and Sixties (when Mutual

Assured Destruction became a real possibility) of the meaning of nuclear weapons. It is as if Critical Theory , despite its claim to be a gen- eral assessment of

our civilization, had accepted a tacit division of labor in which its competence is restricted to social justice (in continuation of its original being rooted in the Marxian critique of political economy) and the “damaged”8 subjectivity. The rest of the real world is left to a purely Hobbesian (and later

Luhmannian) reading, or to the perception of side-figures such as Karl Jaspers or Gu nther Anders. ̈ ¶ A last epistemological remark: starting from problems and threats that, however socially

generated, come up as physical events and are accounted for by hard science has the advantage that philosophy can work on them without first engaging in a complicate and doubt- ful theorizing about how the world should be reshaped according to a general normative theory. This ad hoc theorizing shows the ability or inability of a philosoph- ical view to come to terms with

problems that are of paramount importance to everybody, not just to the prac- titioners of Schulphilosophie.¶ 2. I have explained elsewhere9why survival rather than justice is the leading category of a philosophy of global threats. The now thriving

literature on justice and climate change misses the point that before we look for ways to establish justice between generations, we have to motivate our interest in their existence and wellbeing, or rather in the existence and wellbeing of humankind.10 While survival of humankind is what best defines our problematic situation, when it comes

to the normative aspect I believe that we should assume responsibility for future generations rather than do justice to them; talking responsibility I move from its

most elementary¶ manifestation, the responsibility parents take on for their children. Justice as fairness comes in when we have to fight back “generational nepotism:” it is wrong for any generation to spoil the environment without regard to the consequences in the future, far that it may be, that is not just out of respect for those that may harm our children and children’s children. Out of elementary fairness, as expressed in the Golden Rule, we cannot deny parents of the, say, twenty-fifth century the chance to bear and

educate their children in decent conditions.¶ Now, survival is a Hobbesian category, as such it sounds like an anathema to critical thinking, just as most categories stemming from the tradition of politi- cal realism do. Since under global threats present and future humankind is really endangered in its survival, it is however hard to see the rationale of denying the fact because the name comes from the enemy’s vocabu- lary. More importantly, there is an essential difference: Hobbes’ survival regards the individual and is there-

fore self-centered and adversarial (in common parlance, mors tua vita mea), while humankind’s survival as a moral and political goal is by its own definition an uni- versalistic feature. More on this later.¶ A much talked-about issue in this context is the so- called identity problem, which I am however inclined to dismiss. If it means the doubtfulness of any engagement in favor of future generations because we do not know if they will exist (we could decide to stop procreating), the problem is surrounded by an air of futility: there is no imaginable decision process that could effectively lead to a total procreation stop. On the other hand, if only a few humans were alive in the far future, this would be enough of a reason for our engagement. Of course future humanity could never be born because meanwhile the planet may have been burnt out by an asteroid (natural precariousness of human life) or an all-out nuclear war ([hu]man-made precariousness). Neither type of precarious- ness can however be a reason not to endorse the interest of future generations in survival, because reducing that precariousness is exactly the engagement’s telos. The other aspect of the identity problem — the non-identity of posterity’s values and preferences with our own, or their indeterminacy — is not relevant to our case, be- cause the goal for whose attainment we are called to save or sacrifice something for their survival has to do with their sheer survival (in an indispensably civilized framework, as explained above) rather than with our own and the posterity’s moral configuration; in

other words, there is no paternalistic attitude in it.¶ In a fairly different meaning, closer to social rather than moral (analytical) theory, identity comes up in an- other sense. Assuming responsibility for (or, for that matter, being fair to) future generations is not just an

altruistic attitude. Not in the sense that we can do as well do so by acting on egoistic grounds: were this the¶ main reason to take action, we were justified to limit our effort to the less costly adaptation policies instead of funding the restructuring of the economy necessary for mitigation, the only way-out from global warming for generations of the far future. To be true, addressing the limitation of global warming or the neutralization of nuclear weapons requires wide-ranging undertakings that can be justified only on

grounds of a moral attitude towards future generations rather than of our enlight- ened self-interest. But doing what we can for the survival of humankind can give ourselves reassurance that our individual life (also seen in the context of our gen- eration’s) is meaningful beyond the limits of our own existence

on earth, because doing so helps us shed our isolation as single individuals or single generation and become partners in a wider transgenerational covenant of solidarity .¶ 3. That the interest to live and to raise children in de- cent conditions

we attribute to future generations ought to be translated into a right is not self-evident. It is not simply that we should abstain from transforming every reasonable claim into a right, and instead reserve this category for the essentials that make the associated life of individuals in the polity possible and acceptable ac- cording to each evolutionary stage.11 More importantly, doubts may also arise as to whether it is wise to translate any goal of social and political struggles into a right, that is to “juridify” it instead of focusing on the underlying conflict dynamics and the participation of the conflict- ing parties. In general I share this preoccupation, and have misgivings at any inflationary expansion of the hu- man rights catalogue. On the other hand, moral rights that do not translate into legal rights12 are politically pointless or at least much less significant than the rights enshrined in a legal order. Also, our case is different, and the issues we are confronted with are more radi- cal than the worries with ‘juridification;’ this is all the truer, since the

establishment of a right to survival for humankind would require a long and fierce political and intellectual battle in the first place.¶ First of all, does the right of humanity to survival qualify as a (basic or human) right? Before we proceed, let us note that humankind’s survival is not a good like civil liberties, which is completely at the disposal of human beings; instead, it can depend on the orbits of asteroids and other NEOs.13 The “right of humankind to survival” should therefore be read as a short for “the right of humankind, including future people, to have all previous generations doing their best to ensure their sur- vival and protect them from [hu]man-made threats.” In this version, we are clearly afar from the confusion between rights and goals criticized by Dworkin14

(§3.1 in the chapter on Difficult cases), the causation of the good at stake (survival) being elusive, or not completely nor (in the case of climate change) undoubtedly human; also¶ the content of the right is not a physical state, but rather the behavior influencing it.

In a manifest way, this also identifies the right’s indispensable correlate, that is the duty of the relevant actors (individuals and institutions) to refrain from behaviors that are likely to cause harm to that good.¶ Whether or not this claim can translate into a right

should be investigated from two points of view, those of its structure (a) and its bearer (b).¶ a. As for structure, three of Feinberg’s15 four crite- ria for being a right are already met (to have a content, a holder and an addressee). The fourth, the ‘source of validation,’ gradually emerges from the argument I am unfolding. Frydman and Haarscher also list four condi- tions, of which three are already present (titulaire, objet, opposabilite ) – even if more remains to be said about the first one; while the fourth condition ́(sanction) shall be discussed below in the framework of the constitu- tionalization problem.16 Finally, let us look at the stan- dard distinction of negative and positive rights, which Shue rightly believes to be substantially untenable. This is also true in our case, because the ‘behavior’ of in- dividuals and institutions, which humanity is entitled to expect, according to the new right, can be imple- mented either by abstaining in single cases from using or possessing nuclear weapons and emitting excessive GHGs or by establishing new institutions (a global En- vironmental Protection Agency, say) and strategies (for example, technology transfer from advanced to develop- ing countries to help the latter rein in global warming). What would be acknowledged would be the right, not

the policies that according to time and circumstances are devised for its realization.¶ Does this new right share with the other fundamental or human rights the need to be founded in a conception of the human, such as those focused by Donnelly on dignity, by Meyers on moral agency and by Frydman and Haarscher on autonomy?17 Not properly, or not di- rectly. Humanity’s right to survival is a meta-right rather than being the first right and sharing the same founda- tion with the others.18 Therefore, its foundation is for-

mal rather than rooted in a substantive view of what is human: acknowledging this right is the pre-condition for making all other rights possible. It is their Bedingung der Mo glichkeit, to put it as Kant might have done. Not only in the trivial but sturdy physical sense that ̈ human rights can only apply to a living humankind , but not to a ”republic of insects and grass” (Jonathan Schell on the state of the earth after a large nuclear war19). The meta-right as a pre-condition has rather to be un- derstood in the moral sense: no foundation of morality or legality (except in a totally positivistic view of the latter) makes sense if it cannot rely on the respect of the fundamental right s of those (poor populations al- ready affected by global warming, future generations¶ as victims of nuclear war or extreme climate change) harmed by our acts and omissions. Here I mean moral-

ity at large, regardless of its being based on a conception of the right or the good. In other words, the two global challenges, which have received so little attention in the mainstream philosophy of the last decades, have indeed philosophical implications

capable of undermining the business-as-usual attitude in moral and political theory; I mean the attitude to think of the foundations of

moral- ity and polity as if the [hu]man-made (modern) world in which they operate had not been substantially altered by humankind’s newly achieved capability to destroy itself and/or the planet.¶ Let us make a further step on the road that leads to uncouple, as far as it goes, the foundation of a new right of paramount importance from a substantive conception of the human – an effort aimed at protecting it from the uncertain or frail fate of such conceptions. On the one hand, as a meta-right to individual-only human rights, the right to survival does not imply a choice among substantive values; this right does not refer to a partic- ular conception of what is good for future generations, as it only wants to ensure for them existential condi- tions that are an indispensable basis for their members to pursue whatever idea of the good, of liberty and self- realization they may choose. On the other hand, survival is indeed referred not to the mere biological fact, but to the survival of humankind in decent, civilized condi- tions, taking civilization in the meaning explained in §1. Alone, as I explained above, this qualification is not an added axiological component (civilization as a sys- tem of values), as it rather relies on the analytical view that some technical and cultural features of civilization are essential to the

life of the human species.¶ There is a last aspect to be examined with regard to the structure or nature of this right: its emergence not from a shift in the doctrine of human rights, but as a response to a new situation in world history, in which survival goods (a livable atmosphere in the first place) that were so far tacitly taken for granted turn out to be no longer guaranteed, but more and more endangered. As such, this new right reconnects to what we know about individual human rights, that is that they come up as a

response to “perceived threats” and build an “evolving whole”.20¶ b. Let us now come to the question of the right’s bearer. It is humankind, defined as the generality of the living individuals along with those who will be born. There are three possible objections to

this proposition.¶ First, it seems to be self-evident that the notion of a human right for the so defined humankind cannot be subject to the classical liberal objection that bearers of such rights are individuals, not groups.21 Humankind is not an exclusive and self-

contained group opposed to others (at least until we do not have our first contact with¶ dwellers of other regions of the universe), nor is it meant here to represent particular sets of values. Between the two meanings of “humanity” — as species (Artbegriff) and as regulative notion of a community cemented by shared values and goals (Zielbegriff)22 — I am referring to the first one; it is now becoming philosophically sig- nificant because not even its biological existence can be taken for granted under [hu]man-made threats. Humankind is not a hypostasis detached from the individuals, as in the case of ‘the community’ or ‘das Volk,’ as it rather means the totality of the living individuals of any given generation including (a) their potential to generate fur- ther human beings and generations and (b) their knowl- edge that the latter will exist and probably suffer. This reflexive notion of humankind raises a problem, but remains open to different ethical choices: indifference towards future generations, responsibility for them, and obligations

assumed in their favor.¶ 4. A second question is: why should we speak of humankind instead of limiting ourselves to the more sober expression “all present and future individuals?” There is first a lexicological advantage, in as much as we thus use one word instead of connecting two by an “and.” This better conveys the sense that the bond of solidarity based on the responsibility for the elementary living conditions of posterity makes present and future individuals one community – in this sole, thin sense in- deed, which does not try to conceal the deep fractures existing between contemporaries within the present and the successive generations of this community. The very inclusion of future people into humankind is not an act of inclusive kindness towards them, but is rather made compelling by the lethal threats that past and present people have projected into the life of posterity, in an amount unprecedented in history. Lastly, introducing humankind as a bearer of rights highlights that the right of the individuals to be alive and free can be enjoyed only in the middle of a larger community, which makes the claim of human rights possible and helps to im- plement them. In times of economic globalization and global threats, we have come to know that this com- munity is the whole humankind, not just nations. All this however does not alter the truth that who is entitled to vindicate the right to survival is not humanity as a hypostasis, but every individual either living or not yet born – very much like what happens with individual human rights, whose constitutional

formulation makes them enjoyable for every citizen who will in the future be born under the same Constitution.¶ Third comes the standard objection: it does not make sense to endorse obligation towards future people, since, if men and women agree to stop

reproduction, those people might never be born. I have already dismissed this as a futile mental experiment. It could further be argued, though, that future generations might turn out¶ to have moral standards totally different from ours. Yet, the possibility that posterity will be not amenable to our moral world is not huge enough to release us from any responsibility towards them. We can still under- stand, and to an extent share, the moral problems raised by the Bible or the Greek classical tragedy of millen- nia ago and

should not easily assume that our fellow humans of the year 3000, dwellers of a planet spoiled by global warming, will be morally so hugely different from us.¶ Finally, let me anticipate here one of the legal con- siderations that will be developed later on. Any right- establishing text (but I am now referring to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UDHR 1948) works with the basic formula “everyone has the right to etc.”23 The validity of the claims is limited only by the spatial ex- tension of the law: a right established by the French Constitution may be thought to be valid universally, but is legally protected only on French territory, while the rights mentioned in the UDHR apply by definition to the entire world where humans live. This can be dubbed spa- tial universalism, while establishing a right of present and future humanity to survive is tantamount to adding a time universalism. In other words, this makes explicit that the right of everyone to a just international order (UDHR 1948, Art. 28; more below) also holds for the ‘everyones’ of the year 3000. This may have always been tacitly intended by the law, the only time limit ly- ing in the possibility that the law is at some point in the future dismissed by another law canceling or expand- ing those rights. In a present like ours, in which it has become known that the future is no longer guaranteed to be essentially homogeneous (with no radical change in the physical and anthropological life conditions) to the present and the past, it has become necessary to openly establish a linkage between our obligations and

the rights of future generations, as far as existential issues are concerned; a link that will likewise apply to them as soon as they become the present generation.¶ So far, I have clarified the moral and, to a lesser extent, legal reasons for introducing the notion of hu-

mankind as right bearer. I will now stress that the hu- mankind discourse in this article remains political rather than moral.¶ It is not necessary here to rerun the history of the humankind/humanity notion; it is enough to remember that its denial has been a stronghold in the battle of value nihilists (Nietzsche) and realist thinkers (Oswald Spen- gler, who dismissed it as a “zoological notion,” and more extensively Carl Schmitt in Schmitt 1976, particularly §6). As self-contained units (such as the Westphalian system states)

were deemed to be the only sustainable and legitimate polities, any reference to humanity was seen as toothless or manipulative, as a noble universalis- tic alibi for particularistic interests.24 Setting aside this¶ sort of criticism, which mistakes the ideological use of the term for its very substance, we know that humanity, as a good-will aspiration of philosophers, poets and re- ligious men, could not be regarded as a political notion because only non-voluntaristic communities can be re- garded as political. They alone allow for

binding and effective decisions, whereas any partner can at any time and according to its convenience withdraw from mem- bership in “humanity” or other large associations based on just good will.¶ This can now be expected to change, because

planetary lethal threats such as nuclear war or disastrous climate change have the potential strength to forge all relevant political actors into one community , not unlike Hobbes’ individuals, who received the push to unite from the threats to their life and limbs : first because they are all put in danger , and

second because they have to act jointly if they really want to fight back those dangers. This is a possibility, not an actual and inevitable process, as there are enough counter-forces that impede those ‘Hobbesian’ threats to fully make hu- mankind one political community: fear, the protecting passion, does no longer work as smoothly as in Hobbes’ model of Leviathan.25 Nor is the

potential contained in global challenges supposed to generate a world state as its only outcome: practicing survival policies, who- ever the actors may be, is more important than a uni- fied state-like structure in charge of doing so. Nonethe- less all this is enough to use ‘humankind’ in a political sense , as something that is a potential constituency rather than a fragmented multiplicity of individuals and states.¶ 5. Why a

fundamental rather than a human right? The distinction between human and fundamental is not univocally worked out in the literature.26 In the vocab- ulary I am using here, human rights are seen as a philo- sophical concept and a moral (deontological) precept, while fundamental rights are those positively acknowl- edged in a legal order, entrusted to political and institu- tional processes for their implementation, and claimable in courts – this last feature being more problematic. Putting on humankind’s survival the label of a funda- mental right avoids leaving it in a philosophical limbo as a regulative idea,27 and gives it a better defined political and legal nature; this is more adequate to the character- istic of survival as something endangered by political decisions (or the lack thereof)

and requesting a political solution by a given deadline (the next few years if we want to try to keep the temperature increase expected by 2100 under two degrees).¶ If humankind’s survival is acknowledged as a funda- mental right, it follows that it should be constitutional- ized, that is inserted in new and old (and aptly modified) Constitutions as well as in a new version of the Univer- sal Declaration of Human Rights; as such, it could be referred to as highest guidance in international treaties aimed at implementing it – rather than being enshrined in a specific ‘survival’ treaty. In constitutional law, a development in this sense is already taking place, in as much as either the rights of future generations to a safe environment or our responsibility towards them in this regard or the imperative to preserve the environ- ment (without mention of the future generations, but implicitly to their benefit) have been affirmed in consti- tutional amendments of the last two decades in countries such as Germany, France, Switzerland, but also Burkina Faso and Burundi. Having rights or being protected by the legally defined responsibility of the previous gener- ations is however not the same thing, and with regard to humankind’s survival I would point at its stronger formulation as a right: it is more binding, while the ob- jections against endowing future generations with rights can be easily argued against. Just because it is conceived in favor of those who cannot yet uphold their interest, this right should be protected against cancellation by a sort of Ewigkeitsklausel as in Art. 79.3 of the German Grundgesetz.28 A right to survival is more specific and more stringent than the right to a safe environment be- cause it derives from lethal and global challenges that affect the very core of the polity, protection, rather than from a generic care for

a balanced relationship to na- ture or from a diffuse feeling of benevolence for the posterity.¶ In national or regional Constitutions, the acknowl- edgment of this right could be accompanied by the establishment of corresponding institutions, promoting the implementation of the new right; it could be for example an ombudsman29 for future generation as a (countermajoritarian)30 authority protecting their inter- ests against damages resulting from new legislation, and endowed with the power to send it back to the legislative rather than to veto it straight away.31 Not to be underes- timated are the difficulties that would arise in striking a very delicate balance on two levels: in general between the interests of present and future generations,32 but also between parliaments or

executives, which act under the pressure of their constituencies, and the members of the ombudsman authority, who remain nonetheless contem- poraries of the former rather than being appointed by the latter – for all too natural reasons.¶ The same difficulty would affect the national courts in which the new fundamental right, as jus cogens principle, should be made claimable at the initiative of institutions such as the ombudsman or of advocacy groups representing a significative number of citizens in a referendum-like

counting procedure. In international courts,33 the interest of future generations should be represented by an ombudsman to be established at the UN as well as at regional associations of states such as the EU or Mercosur. A point however that remains¶ open to further discussion has been raised in the de- bate on socio-economic or solidarity rights, which may have some affinity with the right to survival: theoreti- cally, Frank Michelman has made clear that the status of a norm as constitutional law ought not to be con- flated with the question of its availability for judicial enforcement.34 In practice, conflicts are easily possi- ble between the courts sentencing on the states’ failure to implement those rights and “the vain or overbearing nature of these sentences” on a matter that is political rather than judicial. 35 This is true in our case as well: the attainment of a new international order without national possession of nuclear arms or a carbon-free reordering of the world economy are goals for policy-making, not something that can be attained in courts. In this frame- work, however, courts are not jobless: sentencing the nuclear-armed states for their failure in implementing art.VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),36 or the US of the Bush years for withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol and

failing to cut emissions is a typical judicial matter, as the two cases would regard the break of treaty obligations or the failure to cease doing some- thing harmful, not to bring about something good.37¶ Finally, two more fundamental objections could be raised against the idea of a legal protection of the inter- est of future generations. It could be argued that what would be represented (in a time-universalistic mode) is not the interest of future generations, but rather the interest of a particular fraction of the present ones, dis- guising itself as standard bearer of those people to come. On the one hand this should be taken into account as critical point of view in the public debate on those inter- ests. On the other hand, this criticism, strictly speaking, would also delegitimize such an ancient principle of Roman and Western law as the protection of the child. In morality it would affirm a radical skepticism that denies the possibility of slipping into another person’s clothes and acting from a non-egoistic stance. This can be obviously upheld, but at

the price of the disappear- ance of morality as well as of the polity, which is – in any case and among other things – a solidaristic association.¶ A second problem, which is more difficult to deal with, is that we do not know as a general piece of knowl- edge what the interest of future generations is; whereas in the case of legal protection of the child we share a generally accepted knowledge of his or her future in- terest (to remain healthy, to get sufficient education, to be free to make the best of him/herself). What the real life conditions and the presumable vital interests of fu- ture generations will be can only be tentatively argued from what the several branches of natural and economic (e.g. demography) science are able to tell us about what is likely to remain constant in physical and

cultural anthropology and what is likely to be most endangered.¶ As such, it is important that moral and political theory renew their relationship to the natural sciences after a time of reciprocal disdain between the two. While sci- ence cannot by itself draw an encompassing picture of future life under global threats, philosophy should learn from science what those future problems are likely to be and elaborate on them, instead of reflecting on the future of humanity by just moving from the doctrines of past philosophers

or relying on the hearsay about it based on media reports or the philosopher’s personal divinations.¶ 6. My philosophical proposal to fill a hole in human rights discourse and legislation by introducing a first or meta-fundamental right of humankind to survival and

positivizing it in national, international and world law38 resonates with two legal developments. The first related to ‘humanity’, the second to ‘human rights.’ The latter resonates with the novelties in constitutional law men- tioned in §5.¶ The first one began in 1970 as the UN General As- sembly adopted Resolution 2749, the Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean Floor, con- taining the notion of a “common heritage of mankind”; it was originally introduced to protect the seabed and ocean floor and later the “moon and other celestial bod- ies” from exploitation by powerful countries against the interest of the developing ones.39 In the 1990s, the competing and “thinner” concept of “common concern of mankind” emerged, as in the Convention on Bio- diversity of 1992; nonetheless it can be said that hu- mankind has become a notion contained in binding in- ternational law and referred to indivisible (climate) and divisible (seabed, ocean floor, moon) objects, and that this has happened as an answer to problems and

chances generated by huge technological advancement.¶ In another corner of legal development, it could be argued that the logical structure, so to speak the norma- tive algorithm of the UDHR norms — the aforemen- tioned ‘everyone has the right . . . ’ — implies that hu- mankind, not just single individuals, is to be the bearer of those rights, even if the collective singular is not used. Turning to a more substantive level, we could go as far as to say that the legal protection of humankind’s survival was implicitly enshrined as early as 1948 in the UDHR and later in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as the In- ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both of 1966. Art. 28 UDHR (“ev- eryone has the right to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Decla- ration can be fully realized”) could be rethought in the direction of institutions bound to implement for every- one, now and in the future, the right to life (Art.3 UDHR, Art. 6 ICCPR), the right

to an adequate standard of liv- ing incl. adequate food (Art.11 ICESRC)40 as well as¶ the right of the family to be protected (Art.10 ICESRC), a right that would be denied to families of the posterity bound to live under insufferable environmental condi- tions (cf.

above the notion of a transgenerational chain of parents). While the different binding strength of the several legal formulations (treaty, covenant, convention, declaration) cannot be ignored, it

remains clear that le- gal documents do not advance by themselves the cause of humankind’s survival, except if they can be effec- tively referred to in a court of justice; but they create an appropriate and stable environment for what can really bring about a change, that is educational and political struggles, the former aiming at a change in the political culture.¶ To sum up, (hu)mankind has thus ceased to be just a concept used by philosophers and theologians, whose presence in international law was merely philo- sophical, if not rhetorical, as in the Preamble to the UN Charter of 1945. Though not explicitly endowed with rights in the documents quoted above, the

humankind of the “common heritage” doctrine is an important prece- dent in the direction, suggested by this article, of in- troducing this new legal actor. When looking at the implementation of the rights that can be attributed to it, the other legal novelty of the “common but dif- ferentiated responsibility”41 of individual actors, such as countries, should also be brought to bear. This is important when it comes to distributing the burden of the duties corresponding to those rights – which is in- deed one of the major issues in

the debate following the Copenhagen Accord on Climate Change of 2009. In any case, the legal acknowledgment of a “common responsibility” for the global commons is a further step in designing humankind as a juridical notion.¶ This article is policy-oriented in the peculiar sense of a constitutional policy that will require decades, if ever, to become the subject of debate and even longer to be legally implemented. Impulses in this direction are cer- tainly not be expected from the world of politics, but rather from the scientific

community (provided a now utopian sounding collaboration of physics, philosophy and legal theory materializes) or from scattered sen- tences of national and international courts, particularly in environmental matter.42 Support from civil society would help.¶ Finally, the author’s suggestion as to how to read this proposal: it has a clearly cosmopolitan (or better: cosmopolitical) character, not however in the sense of cosmopolitanism as a general doctrine

of government/ governance. It is rather generated by tools coming from realist thought: new threats as source of new rights, and lethal and planetary threats to the survival of hu- mankind’s civilization as drivers towards a new level of legal protection.

1NC – Threats are Real/Outweigh

Threats are real – none of their framing assumes a nuclear Trump- New hairtriggers and first-use standards- Ex-Sec of Defense says arms race already started- New tests and RnD initiatives- Really shitty conception of deterrence- Desire for “limited nuclear options” in a conflict- Jeopardizing international disarm agreements and treaties- Impact calc args about North Korea- Miscalc

Hennigan 2/1, WJ Hennigan, political correspondent for Time, “Donald Trump is Playing a Dangerous Game of Nuclear Poker,” February 1, 2018, Time Magazine, published in the Feb. 12 edition, http://time.com/5128394/donald-trump-nuclear-poker/At a vast tract of uninhabited desert in southern Nevada, hundreds of moonlike craters dimple the wasteland, remnants of Cold War nuclear explosions that melted the bedrock and fused the sand to ensure that America could take part in the unthinkable: global

thermonuclear war. The crowds of scientists and generals are long gone– the U.S. hasn’t tested a nuke since 19 92 ,

when then President George H.W. Bush declared a self-imposed testing moratorium. But the Nevada National Security test site is not completely abandoned. A skeleton crew of custodians oversees the long dormant facility, less than 90 miles northwest of Las

Vegas, standing by to turn the lights back on if the day ever comes. It may come sooner than many thought. Since 19 93 , the

D epartment o f E nergy has had to be ready to conduct a nuclear test within two to three years if

ordered by the President. Late last year , the Trump Administration ordered the department to be ready ,

for the first time , to conduct a short-notice nuclear test in as little as six months. That is not enough time

to install the warhead in shafts as deep as 4,000 ft. and affix all the proper technical instrumentation and diagnostics equipment. But the purpose of such a detonation, which the Administration labels “a simple test, with waivers and simplified processes,” would not be to ensure that the nation’s most powerful weapons were in operational order, or to check whether a new type of warhead

worked, a TIME review of nuclear-policy documents has found. Rather, a National Nuclear Security Administration

official tells TIME, such a test would be “conducted for political purposes.” The point , this and

other sources say, would be to show Russia’s Vladimir Putin, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, Iran’s Ayatullah Ali Khamenei and

other adversaries what they are up against . President Trump has not ordered such a test, but even the consideration of a show of force–by the nation that announced the atomic age by dropping nuclear weapons on Japanese cities in August 1945–marks a provocative shift from the sober, almost mournful restraint that has characterized the U.S. posture toward the weapons for decades. To prevent nuclear war and the spread of weapons to non-nuclear states, the strategy of Republican and

Democratic Commanders in Chief alike has been to reduce nuclear arsenals and forge new arms-control agreements. The Trump

Administration , by contrast, is convinced that the best way to limit the spreading nuclear danger is

to expand and advertise its ability to annihilate its enemies. In addition to putting the Nevada testing ground on

notice, he has signed off on a $1.2 trillion plan to overhaul the entire nuclear-weapons

complex . Trump has authorized a new nuclear warhead, the first in 34 years . He is funding

research and development on a mobile medium-range missile. The new weapon, if tested or deployed,

would be prohibited by a 30-year-old Cold War nuclear-forces agreement with Russia (which has already violated the agreement).

And for the first time , the U.S. is expanding the scenarios under which the President would

consider going nuclear to “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks,” including major

cyberattacks . “We must modernize and rebuild our nuclear arsenal, hopefully never having to use it, but making it so strong and powerful that it will deter any acts of aggression,” Trump said on Jan. 30 during his State of the Union address. “Perhaps someday in the future there will be a magical moment when the countries of the world will get together to eliminate their nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, we are not there yet.” The rapid strategic changes have been matched by Trump’s norm-breaking rhetoric. Previously, every U.S. Administration since Dwight D. Eisenhower’s had avoided referring to the prospect of launching nuclear war and explicitly maintained, advanced or defended treaties designed to limit the spread of nuclear arms. Trump has openly threatened to unleash “fire and fury like the world has never seen,” and has been hostile toward international agreements. He reportedly called for more, not fewer, nuclear weapons in a July 20 Pentagon briefing, where military advisers were upbraided for presenting global reductions in nuclear stockpiles as progress. Trump has criticized New START, which reduces and limits nuclear arms in the U.S. and Russia, as a bad deal. He has repeatedly questioned the multilateral deal under which Iran suspended its nuclear program, and promised to decertify it in May if changes aren’t made. He has publicly undermined Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s diplomatic talks aimed at denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, instead warning North Korea about his “much bigger & more powerful” nuclear button. “The long-standing strategic policy of the United States has been to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons,” says Andrew Weber, who spent 30 years on nuclear-weapons issues in the State and Defense departments before retiring in 2015. “That idea seems to have been balled up and thrown out the window.” The Trump team says it is responding to bad policy by past Administrations that left the U.S. vulnerable as other countries broke their word, and non-nuclear countries decided to pursue the weapons. “The President hates bad deals,” one senior Administration official tells TIME. “There’s a view of arms control as an intrinsic good, per se. Any agreement is a good agreement. That’s not where we are.” Aggressively responding to violations of treaties, launching new nuclear-weapons programs and reminding the world about the power of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, officials say, is the best way to deter others from expanding, or seeking, arsenals. Foreign nations have issued dire warnings in response.

China’s Ministry of National Defense in January urged the Trump government to abandon a “Cold

War” mind-set , and view matters more “rationally and objectively.” Russian President Vladimir Putin in December

accused the U.S. of violating a landmark Cold War–era nuclear arms deal and carrying out an

aggressive military policy that “seriously affects security in Europe and in the whole world.” Both China and

Russia are upgrading their nuclear weapons. Other nuclear powers, such as North Korea,

Pakistan, India and Israel, continue to build new systems . Rather than dissuading such

efforts, arms-control experts from both political parties say, Trump’s moves will accelerate

them . A new nuclear-arms race would not be limited to two superpowers seeking strategic balance in a Cold War but would

include many nations, including foes in regions where hot wars are a regular occurrence. “ The new arms race has

already begun,” says former Defense Secretary William Perry. “It’s different in nature than

the one during the Cold War, which focused on quantity and two superpowers producing

absurd numbers of weapons. Today it is focused on quality and involves several nations

instead of just two. The risk for nuclear conflict today is higher than it was during the Cold

War.” The Trump administration is planning to take a step toward developing a new generation of nuclear weapons this month

in its Nuclear Posture Review, a strategy document for the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has not designed any new nuclear weapons as it and Russia have worked to scale back their strategic arsenals. A draft proposal of the 64-page document, published in January by the Huffington Post, included two new sea-launched weapons, one outfitted with a small atomic warhead for battlefield use. The new warhead, known as a tactical nuclear weapon, would be delivered by a submarine-launched missile against an advancing army. It differs from a strategic weapon, which is designed to destroy cities and hardened

military targets. America needs battlefield nukes , the Trump team says , to match and deter adversaries’

tactical arsenals. In an escalating fight with Russia or China, the U.S. military could engage in a “limited nuclear

war” rather than leveling whole cities with strategic weapons. Air Force General Paul Selva, vice chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, tells TIME the President needs options. Trump and his successors should not face a choice between killing millions of civilians or backing down, he says. “It makes people uncomfortable to hear about nuclear war–fighting and presenting options to the President, whomever that person might be,” Selva says. “Strategic stability in the world between our nuclear

competitors and our nuclear peers has been assumed. It is not a birthright.” Trump’s new plan also expands the

President’s “first use” of nuclear weapons to circumstances that include “non-nuclear strategic

attacks” against the U.S. or its allies. That could mean cyberattacks on nuclear command and control systems or

civilian infrastructure, like the electricity grid or air-traffic-control system, arms-control experts have concluded. Previous

Adminis trations limited the threat of a nuclear response to mass-casualty events , like chemical- and

biological-weapon attacks. Stephen Schwartz, a nuclear weapons policy expert, said the key concern is the expansion of the nuclear umbrella to “include these new and not extreme possibilities, thus dramatically lowering the threshold for nuclear use.” The Trump plan also takes a new, skeptical approach to nuclear arms-control agreements. In the 2018 Pentagon budget, Trump included funding for the development of a new missile. If tested or deployed, the missile would violate a 30-year-old arms-control pact with Russia, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Unlike his predecessors, Trump is directly confronting Russia’s prior violation of the treaty, says David Trachtenberg, Defense Undersecretary for Policy, who helped oversee the new plan. “The world is not as benign as some hoped it would be,” he says. Trump’s nuclear moves, rolled out in policy papers and secret briefings over the past year, have garnered responses abroad ranging from quiet concern to outrage. On Nov. 8, nearly five weeks before Trump approved research on the new missile, Secretary of Defense James Mattis assembled the defense ministers of the member-countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the 29-nation alliance that contained and defeated the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Convened inside a secure conference room under NATO’s highest security classification, known ominously as “Cosmic Top Secret,” the Mattis briefing laid out the American intelligence case indicating Russia’s violation of the INF treaty. U.S. intelligence agencies had captured overhead imagery and additional information that Moscow had for years been testing a treaty-violating cruise missile at the Kapustin Yar rocket-launch test site in western Russia, Pentagon sources tell TIME. Now the missile had been deployed with two different Russian military units, putting European capitals at risk. The weapon was derisively nicknamed the SSC-8 “Screwdriver” by NATO analysts because “Russia used it to screw us,” say former U.S. officials. The Russian cruise missile that violated the treaty could be launched without giving allies much advance time to determine what was coming their way. Leaders would have to quickly discern the blip on their radar screens and decide whether to respond in kind. The INF agreement, signed by President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Union leader Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1987, was the only nuclear arms-control agreement to eliminate a class of nuclear weapons. It forced the superpowers to scrap more than 2,600 missiles with ranges of about 310 to 3,420 miles–weapons considered destabilizing to Europe because they could deliver a nuclear strike in less than 10 minutes. But if Europeans were concerned about Russia’s violation of the accord, they feared that the Trump Administration’s response would distract from it, said Kingston Reif, director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association. The last thing Europeans want is Moscow and Washington launching a new arms race in Europe. “There is no indication that NATO supports a new [missile], and attempting to force it upon the alliance would be incredibly divisive,” Reif says. “It is thus a weapon to nowhere.” Three days after Trump signed the defense bill, NATO issued a statement touting the INF treaty as “crucial to Euro-Atlantic security” and reiterated that “full compliance” was essential. NATO also called on Russia “to address these concerns in a substantial and

transparent way.” Arguments over U.S.-Russia nuclear deployments are not new. Strategists have

long disagreed about whether to counter Moscow’s nuclear threat with escalation or

restraint . It’s a high-stakes game of nuclear poker. The Trump Administration, in its aggressive approach, is betting on coercion.

“We have to have this strong stance in order to get Russia to return to the negotiating table,” says Laura Cooper, a top Pentagon

Russia expert. “But we are not throwing out the treaties that have served us so well in the past decades.” If they can’t fix

INF , officials tell TIME, the Trump Administration is not willing to engage on future arms agreements

with Russia. That’s a particular problem, because New START , a linchpin arms-control agreement, will

expire in three years. The 2010 deal limits each side to 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads. If it sunsets, it will be the first time the effort to limit the strategic stockpiles in the U.S. and Russia has lapsed since 1991. Former U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, whose bipartisan partnership was crucial to gaining ratification of nuclear-weapons treaties in the chaotic years

following the Cold War, fear an end to arms control altogether. “We have severe erosion,” Nunn says. “ We are going into a

period of much greater risk in the nuclear arena.” Says Lugar: “The trend has been moving away from these sorts of

international agreements, which is deeply troubling–and frankly dangerous.” At the same time, the U.S. and Russia are

accelerating their spending on nuclear forces. The current U.S. plan would require spending $1.2 trillion to modernize the aging U.S. “nuclear triad” of bombers, submarines and land-based missiles over the next three decades. The U.S. is reinvesting in the labs and factories that produce warheads. While the U.S. nuclear stockpile has been slashed over the past 30 years, the U.S. military has said the remaining arsenal is unmatched. Russia is in the midst of overhauling its nuclear forces, including new ICBMs, ballistic-missile submarines and modernized heavy bombers. It’s developing a massive RS-28 Sarmat ICBM that boasts countermeasures designed to elude U.S. antimissile systems. It’s also practicing nuclear snap drills that involve missile launches from the air, land and sea. The rest of the world is not blind to the accelerating U.S.-Russia competition. While the two nations account for

nearly 93% of the world’s nuclear arsenal, there are now nine countries with stockpiles. Not only do they have no

plans for disarmament, but they aren’t seeking reductions. The number of nuclear weapons in the world has declined since the Cold War, from a peak of about 70,300 in 1986 to 14,550, according to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). But the pace of reductions has drastically slowed. Around the globe, the perceived value of acquiring nuclear weapons has

gone up, while the repercussions of violating treaties has declined, says Hans Kristensen, director of the nuclear-information project at FAS. “We’re certainly in a dynamic strategic competition where all sides are arming themselves,” he says. “If the dynamic is not stopped and reversed, it will almost inevitably escalate into an arms race. That is in the nature of the beast.” If Trump undoes the nuclear deal with Iran, analysts fear that Tehran will sprint for a weapon. Its regional rival Saudi Arabia could then develop its own atomic weapon, or import one from close ally Pakistan, which has its own fast-growing nuclear arsenal to counter arch-rival India’s. (Pakistan is building up its stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons.) China now has a nuclear-powered submarine, known as the Jin-

class, that gives its military the ability to launch ICBMs from the sea. Few threats loom larger, or more

immediate , for the U.S. than North Korea . Pyongyang has launched a record 23 missiles during 16 tests since Trump

took office. It has tested at least six nuclear warheads, and U.S. intelligence believes it has made progress on miniaturizing a nuclear warhead to mount on a missile. The isolated nation’s most recent launch, on Nov. 29, climbed 2,800 miles into outer space, more than 10 times higher than the International Space Station. If that flight path were flattened out, it could have hit New York City, Washington or nearly any other city in America. Hawaii’s false ballistic missile alert on Jan. 13 was the most visceral reminder yet of what’s at stake. Ballistic missile threat inbound to Hawaii. Seek immediate shelter. This is not a drill, read the emergency-system alert pushed to people’s smartphones statewide. It took 38 minutes to issue an all clear for the mistake; a worker had mistaken a

drill for the real thing. Disarmament experts warn that this is just one of the risks in a new era of

brinkmanship . “Trump has not said what the last 10 Presidents have said, which is we will lead on arms-control agreements

and nonproliferation issues,” says Thomas M. Countryman, a 35-year career diplomat who retired last year after leading the State Department’s nonproliferation efforts. “I think that is an indication that the importance of appearing masculine is more important

than actually reducing the threat of nuclear warfare.” Philip Coyle, a former test director at the Nevada Test

Site , also warned about the chance of miscalculation . “This is a time where we need more thought about

where we’ve been and where we’re headed,” he said. “There is little room for error.” Americans of a certain age will remember

the Doomsday Clock maintained by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. It expresses the risk of nuclear annihilation as

time remaining until midnight. On Jan. 26, citing Trump’s moves, it pushed the second hand 30 seconds forward, the

closest Doomsday has loomed since 1953 , when the U.S. and Russia first tested hydrogen bombs within months of

each other.

1NC – Scenario Planning Good

Scenario analysis is pedagogically valuable – enhances creativity and self-reflexivity, deconstructs cognitive biases and flawed ontological assumptions, and enables the imagination and creation of alternative futures.Barma et al. 16 – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf)

Over the past decade, the “cult of irrelevance” in political science scholarship has been lamented by a growing chorus (Putnam 2003; Nye 2009; Walt 2009). Prominent scholars of international affairs have diagnosed the roots of the gap between academia and policymaking, made the case for why political science research is valuable for policymaking, and offered a number of ideas for enhancing the policy relevance of scholarship in international relations and

comparative politics (Walt 2005,2011; Mead 2010; Van Evera 2010; Jentleson and Ratner 2011; Gallucci 2012; Avey and Desch 2014). Building on these insights, several initiatives have been formed in the attempt to “bridge the gap.”2 Many of the specific efforts put in place by these projects focus on providing scholars with the skills, platforms, and networks to better communicate the

findings and implications of their research to the policymaking community, a necessary and worthwhile objective for a field

in which theoretical debates, methodological training, and publishing norms tend more and more toward the abstract and esoteric.¶ Yet enhancing communication between scholars and policymakers is only one component of bridging the gap between international affairs theory and practice.

Another crucial component of this bridge is the generation of substantive research programs that are

actually policy relevant —a challenge to which less concerted attention has been paid. The dual challenges of bridging the gap are especially acute for graduate students,

a particular irony since many enter the discipline with the explicit hope of informing policy. In a field that has an admirable devotion to pedagogical self-reflection, strikingly little attention is paid to techniques for

generating policy-relevant ideas for dissertation and other research topics. Although numerous articles and conference workshops

are devoted to the importance of experiential and problem-based learning, especially through techniques of simulation that emulate policymaking processes (Loggins 2009; Butcher 2012; Glasgow 2012;

Rothman 2012; DiCicco 2014), little has been written about the use of such techniques for generating and developing innovative research ideas.¶ This article outlines an experiential and problem-based approach to developing a political science research program using scenario analysis. It focuses especially on illuminating the research generation and pedagogical benefits of this technique by describing the use of scenarios in the annual New Era Foreign Policy Conference (NEFPC), which brings together doctoral students of international and comparative affairs who share a demonstrated interest in policy-relevant scholarship.3 In the introductory section, the article outlines the practice of scenario analysis and considers the utility of the technique in political science. We argue that scenario analysis should be viewed as a tool to stimulate problem-based learning for doctoral students and discuss the broader scholarly benefits of using scenarios to help generate research ideas. The second section details the manner in which NEFPC deploys scenario analysis. The third section reflects upon some of the concrete scholarly benefits that have been realized from the scenario format. The fourth section offers insights on the pedagogical potential associated with using scenarios in the classroom across levels of study. A brief conclusion reflects on the importance of developing specific techniques to aid those who wish to

generate political science scholarship of relevance to the policy world.¶ What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science?¶ Scenario analysis is perceived most

commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends , preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible

future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate

planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not

inherently limited to these uses . This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning

its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and

describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created.¶ The Art of Scenario Analysis¶ We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate

surprising and yet plausible futures , often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios

are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of

contemporary patterns , and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions . Nor

should they be equated with simulations , which are best characterized as functional

representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead,

they are depictions of possible future states of the world , offered together with a

narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures .

Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way.¶ While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector.¶ Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall

Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013).¶ Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking .5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges . Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known

cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005).

The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of

conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations

of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future . Imagining

alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables

policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from

the known present .¶ Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry¶ The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited

to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and

dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation.¶ Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda . In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8¶ An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around

them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given

situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are

deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such,

counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained

historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or

other methodological tools.¶ In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research

agendas.¶ The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative

method for identifying questions of likely future significance.¶ The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out

issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that

they can begin thinking critically about them now . This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass,

participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning

the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and

understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs .

***Topicality***

**T – Reduce = Permanent**Note – Some of this evidence is borrowed from the Topicality file, some of it is not.

1NC – T Reduce = Permanent

Interpretation—topical affs must permanently reduce sales from the current number.

Reductions are different from suspensions. Suspensions are temporary, reductions are not.Montesani v Levitt 59 [MATTER OF MONTESANI v. Levitt, 9 A.D.2d 51, 189 N.Y.S.2d 695 (App. Div. 1959), 8-13-1959, Accessible Online at https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1402552157078234696&q=Montesani+v.+Levitt&hl=en&as_sdt=2006] DL 6-26-2019Under his retirement contract deceased agreed that in return for a plan that would insure payment of the remainder of his initial fund to his beneficiary after his death he would accept a lower rate of lifetime compensation. Implicit in this agreement were various statutory provisions governing the rights of both parties. One of these provisions was section 83 which provided that if deceased were able to return to a gainful occupation or actually did so his pension would accordingly be reduced. This reduction would be governed by the amount he actually earned or was capable of earning. We now reach one of the major issues in the case, to wit: Is section 83 to be considered as a binding factor in his contract and if so does "reduce" mean "forfeit" or "temporarily suspended"?It seems obvious that section 83 was in the law to protect the System against disability retirees who might, in truth, be capable of providing for themselves without being on dole (albeit a "contractural" dole). See Matter of Stewart v. O'Dwyer (271 App. Div. 485, 490 [1st Dept., 1946]), where such a purpose is ascribed to section 83's counterpart in the New York City retirement statute. Deceased quit his work here because of his physical defect and elected the plan of retirement he fancied most suitable. He impliedly agreed to all the terms of the contract which included section 83. When he became employed in California at a considerable salary section 83 came into play and cut off his monthly pension payments although his annuity payments were not affected (thus he was not being deprived of anything he had contributed). There is no persuasive 56*56 argument that this was not proper. When the California employment ceased, assuming deceased to be still living, should he then be entitled to the withheld payments?Section 83's counterpart with regard to nondisability pensioners, section 84, prescribes a reduction only if the pensioner should again take a public job. The disability pensioner is penalized if he takes any type of employment. The reason for the difference, of course, is that in one case the only reason pension benefits are available is because the pensioner is considered incapable of gainful employment, while in the other he has fully completed his "tour" and is considered as having earned his reward with almost no strings attached. It would be manifestly unfair to the ordinary retiree to accord the disability retiree the benefits of the System to which they both belong when the latter is otherwise capable of earning a living and had not fulfilled his service obligation. If it were to be held that withholdings under section 83 were payable whenever the pensioner died or stopped his other employment the whole purpose of the provision would be defeated, i.e., the System might just as well have continued payments during the other employment since it must later pay it anyway. The section says "reduced", does not say that monthly payments shall be temporarily suspended; it says that the pension itself shall be reduced. The plain dictionary meaning of the word is to diminish, lower or degrade. The word "reduce" seems adequately to indicate permanency.

Aside from the practical aspect indicating permanency other indicia point to the same conclusion.From 1924 (L. 1924, ch. 619) to 1947 (L. 1947, ch. 841) a provision appeared in the Civil Service Law which read substantially as follows: "If the pension of a beneficiary is reduced for any reason, the amount of such reduction shall be transferred from the pension reserve fund to the pension accumulation fund during that period that such reduction is in effect." (See L. 1924, ch. 619, § 2 [Civil Service Law, § 58, subd. 4]; L. 1947, ch. 841 [Civil Service Law, § 66, subd. e].) This provision reappears in the 1955 Retirement and Social Security Law as subdivision f of section 24. This provision is useful for interpretative purposes. Since it prescribes that moneys not paid because of reduction should be transferred back to the accumulation fund the conclusion is inescapable that such reductions were meant to be permanent. If temporary suspensions were intended this bookkeeping device would result in a false picture of the funds, i.e., the reserve fund would be depleted when it would contain adequate funds to meet eventual payments 57*57 to present pensioners. Likewise, the accumulation fund would be improperly inflated with respect to the present pensioners.Section 64 of the Retirement and Social Security Law (§ 85 under the 1947 act) provides that any disability pension must be reduced by the amount payable pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Law if applicable. In Matter of Dalton v. City of Yonkers (262 App. Div. 321, 323 [1941]) this court interpreted "reduce" to mean "offset" in holding that under then section 67 (relating to Workmen's Compensation benefits as do its successors sections 85 and 64), pensions were to be offset by compensation benefits. This is merely another indication that "reduce" means a diminishing of the pension pursuant to a given formula rather than a mere recoverable, temporary suspension during the time other benefits or salaries are being received by the pensioner. (Also, cf., Retirement and Social Security Law, § 101 [§ 84 under the 1947 act].)

Violation—they temporarily suspend aid/suspend aid until a condition is met

Ground – the aff gets to spike out of topic disads that link to US loss of leverage over target countries. Conditions CPs are also core negative ground supported by topic lit. Vote neg to preserve core topic controversy.

2NC – Reduce = Permanent

It’s not a reduction even if it returns to the same baseline at a later dateRitter v Strauss 58 [Justia Law, John C. Ritter, Appellant, v. Lewis L. Strauss, Secretary of Commerce, et al., Appellees, 261 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1958), 12-4-1958, Accessible Online at https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/261/767/159753/] 7-1-2019In March 1953 Bloom received a reduction in force (R.I.F.) notice from the National Production Authority, and his last day of work in that branch was May

22. In view of the R.I.F., Bloom asked for his old job in the Bureau of the Census, and resumed it immediately after May 22. On May 29, 1953 the appellant was given a R.I.F. notice by the Bureau of the Census, stating that his last day of work would be June 30. By subsequent letters, the appellant's separation was postponed to August 28. On August 30 Bloom was promoted from his GS-11 position to the GS-12 position which the

appellant had been holding in an acting capacity for more than a year. The appellant claims that there was no genuine

reduction in force since Bloom was brought in to replace him, leaving the same number of employees after as before the purported reduction. The fact of Bloom's former employment in the Bureau of the Census is immaterial, since the parties agree that Bloom had no reemployment rights. Executive Order No. 10180, U.S.Code Cong. Service 1950, p. 1671, issued November 13, 1950, 15 F.R. 7745, granted authority to the Civil Service Commission to prescribe regulations governing the rights to reemployment of employees transferring from one agency of the Government to another. The Civil Service Commission, by Transmittal Sheet 316, of November 13, 1950, by Departmental Circular No. 643 and a press release, both issued on November 30, 1950, by Departmental Circular No. 653 issued on February 23, 1951, prescribed the procedure by which an employee might obtain reemployment rights. The prescribed procedure was not followed in Bloom's case.1 The defendants rely upon Civil Service Regulations, section 8.108, 17 F.R. 343, which in fact was cited by the Bureau of the Census in its personnel files as the legal basis for Bloom's reemployment. The section says: "The Commission hereby delegates authority to agencies: "(1) To promote, demote, or reassign any permanent employee having a competitive status and serving in a competitive position." The defendants say that Bloom's reemployment was merely a "reassignment" within the same "agency", the Department of Commerce. The plaintiff disputes this, and cites 13 U.S.C. 1, which denominates the Bureau of the Census as an agency within, and under the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce. He cites 5 U.S.C.A. § 1001, defining the term agency for the purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act, giving it a definition which would apply to the Bureau of the Census. He cites the United States Government Organization Manual, 1951-52, which lists in Appendix C at page 656ff the departments and agencies which have submitted separate statements of organizations pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, and listing the Bureau of the Census and the National Production Authority as two such agencies. His most persuasive citation is that of Commerce Department Order No. 130, which rescinded Order No. 123 and provided that the Civil Service regulations relating to the transfer of employees between agencies should thereafter apply to the transfer of employees of the Department to the National Production Authority. We think that the Department of Commerce itself regarded the Bureau of the Census and the National Production Authority as separate agencies, for the purpose of the application of Civil Service regulations. The defendants, however, argue that one's retention status for the purpose of a reduction in force is not, in any event, an agency status, but a Government-wide status. They point to section 20.2(h) of the Regulations of the Civil Service Commission, 17 F.R. p. 11733 which says: "`Retention credits' are credits given for length of government service and performance ratings." It may well be that if a vacancy occurs in an agency, and an employee with long Government service in an entirely different branch of the Government is hired to fill it, and there later develops the necessity for a reduction in force, the long period of

Government service will give that employee a higher retention status than those who have been in the particular agency longer than he has been. But if an agency, a week before reduction in force notices are to be sent out, can hire such an employee from a different agency, and retain him and discharge another employee who has been longer with the particular agency, there is no real protection for faithful employees of the agency. While it would be hard to spell out in regulations any time limits within which such hiring could not be done, and we are cited to no regulation which attempts to cover such a situation, the instant case presents no real difficulty. The excess of employees making the reduction in force necessary was created by the hiring of Bloom shortly after May 22. On May 29 the plaintiff, whom Bloom was to replace, was given his reduction in force notice. The creation of the surplus of employees and the reduction in force eliminating that surplus were steps in the same transaction, both steps being in contemplation when the first step was taken. In general, Government agency actions adversely affecting Government employees, whether they be demotions or separations, are occasioned for one of two reasons and there are statutes and regulations governing the circumstances under which such adverse actions may be taken and the manner in which they must be carried out. Separations for cause, that is, separations which are necessitated because of the poor performance or undesirable behavior of the employees are covered by the Lloyd-La Follette Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 652, and by section 14 of the Veterans Preference Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 863. Separations or demotions which are required to meet some administrative exigency within an employing agency are known as reductions-in-force and the applicable authority for such action is found in section 12 of the Veterans Preference Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 861 and in the Civil Service regulations issued thereunder. From February 2, 1948 to

June 29, 1949 section 20.2(a) of the regulations of the Civil Service Commission contained the following definition of a reduction in force: "` Reduction in force'

means the involuntary separation from the rolls of a department, or furlough in excess of thirty days, of one or more employees in order to reduce personnel.

Reduction in personnel may have to be made because of lack of funds, personnel ceilings, reorganization, decrease of work, to make a position available for a former employee with established reemployment or restoration rights, or for other reasons. * * *" [Italics supplied.] The italicized clause in the above quoted regulation sets forth the circumstances which, in general, justify an agency in initiating a reduction in force. On June 29, 1948 the Civil Service Commission made a minor change in this regulation. On January 30, 1953 the Civil Service Commission issued an extensive revision to Part 20 of its regulations relating to reduction in force in general. For some reason not explained in Transmittal Sheet 414 of the United States Civil Service Commission Federal Personnel Manual, the definition of reduction in force omitted the second clause of the former regulation, the one italicized in the above quotation. The transmittal sheet stated that the revisions in the regulation were intended to simplify and clarify reduction in force regulations. The primary concern of the Commission appears to have been to reduce the 23 possible subgroups of competing employees which had been set up in the former regulation to 6 subgroups. This revised regulation was the one in effect when the plaintiff was separated from his position. On May 14, 1957 the Commission again revised Part 20 of its regulations relating to reduction in force. At that time the primary concern of the Commission was to reflect in its regulations the holding of the United States Court of Claims in Parks v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 261, 137 C.Cls. 297, which held that a demotion occurring in connection with a reorganization in an employing agency amounted to a reduction in force and that preference eligible employees demoted in the course of such reorganization were entitled to the benefits of the provisions of section 12 of the Veterans Preference Act of 1944 and the Civil Service regulations governing reduction in force. Transmittal sheet No. 567 of the Federal Personnel Manual pointed out that as then written, the reduction in force regulations were applicable only where there was a reduction in the net strength of the employing activity. A demotion, of course, does not necessarily affect such net strength of the agency and the regulations were therefore revised to reflect the court's holding in the Parks case. The substance of the italicized sentence from section 20.2(a) of the 1949 regulations was reinstated in the 1957 version of the regulations which read as follows: "`Reduction in force' is the release of an employee from a competitive level by means of separation from the rolls, furlough for more than thirty (30) days, reassignment involving displacement, or change to lower grade; when such actions are caused by lack of work, shortage of funds, reorganization, or exercise of regulatory reassignment or reemployment rights. * * *" [Italics supplied.] The transmittal sheet did not explain why the above-quoted regulations was revised to once more define the circumstances under which a reduction in force may be initiated. The transmittal sheet did state, however, that there are many situations in which the use of the reduction in force system is the most orderly and equitable means of shifting or separating employees whose skills have become surplus to the activity and that reduction in

force applies to situations where adverse actions must be taken as the result of planned management decisions to change or eliminate previously assigned duties for reasons which are impersonal to the employees who are adversely affected. A reading of the reduction in force regulations as they have existed since the enactment of the Veterans Preference Act of 1944 makes it clear that this comment on the part of the Civil Service Commission in 1957 did not represent any change in policy with respect to the circumstances which would give rise to a reduction in force in a particular Government agency. In the circumstances of this case it would seem that the plaintiff's separation was not a "reduction in force" because it was not required by lack of work, shortage of funds, reorganization, exercise of regulatory reassignment or exercise of reemployment rights. It was made necessary by the employment of Bloom — not the regulatory reassignment or the reemployment of Bloom — but the employment of Bloom in a competitive level

in which there was no vacancy. Our conclusion is that the action of the defendants in discharging the appellant was in violation of the law and the applicable regulations.

Excludes suspensionsWilliams ‘2 – US Court of Appeals judge for the Seventh Circuit, writing the majority opinion (Thomas E. HEINZ and Richard J. Schmitt, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CENTRAL LABORERS' PENSION FUND, Defendant-Appellee. No. 00-3314. Decided: September 13, 2002, https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-7th-circuit/1161072.html

The Fund argues that these cases are distinguishable because a change in the eligibility requirements, as in Ahng for example, differs from a change in the conditions triggering suspension of benefit payments in that the former permanently reduces benefits or eliminates certain participants' rights to benefits, whereas a suspension is temporary.   We find the distinction unconvincing.   Although with a suspension the interruption in benefit payments is

temporary, the retiree never recovers the payments lost during the employment period .   The amendment thus “eliminates” monthly benefit

payments for participants who take certain jobs after retirement and “reduces” the participant's total early retirement benefits by an amount determined by how long the disqualifying work continues.   Plaintiffs lost a valuable right they had earned before the amendment-the right to continue to work in the industry while receiving monthly benefit payments-and that loss was permanent .5  In our judgment, this was a reduction of early retirement benefits within the plain meaning of § 1054(g)(2).6

***DISADVANTAGES***

**Alliance DA**

1NC – Unique Internal Link

The alliance is strong – but decreasing arms sales could destroy itBeauchamp 5-14-18 Zack Beauchamp “Why are the US and Israel so friendly?” https://www.vox.com/2018/11/20/18080080/israel-palestine-us-allianceThat’s a hugely controversial question. Though American support for Israel really is massive, including billions of dollars in aid and reliable diplomatic backing, experts disagree sharply on why. Some possibilities include deep support for Israel among the American public, the influence of the pro-Israel lobby, and American ideological affinity with the Middle East’s most stable democracy. The countries were not nearly so close in Israel’s first decades. President Eisenhower was particularly hostile to Israel during the 1956 Suez War, which Israel, the UK, and France fought against Egypt. As the Cold War dragged on, the US came to view Israel as a key buffer against Soviet influence in the Middle East and supported it accordingly. The American-Israeli alliance didn’t really cement until around 1973, when American aid helped save Israel from a surprise Arab invasion. Since the Cold War, the foundation of the still-strong (and arguably stronger) relationship between the countries has obviously shifted. Some suggest that a common interest in fighting jihadism ties America to Israel, while others point to American leaders’ ideological attachment to an embattled democracy. Perhaps the simplest explanation is that the American public has, for a long time, sympathized far more with Israel than with Palestine: One very controversial theory, advanced by Professors John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, credits the relationship to the power of the pro-Israel lobby, particularly the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Critics of this theory argue that AIPAC isn’t as strong as Walt and Mearsheimer think. AIPAC’s failure to torpedo the Iran nuclear deal during the Obama administration underscored the critics’ point. Regardless of the reasons for the “special relationship,” American support for Israel really is quite extensive. The US has given Israel $118 billion in aid over the years (about $3 billion per year nowadays). Half of all American UN Security Council vetoes blocked resolutions critical of Israel. Despite this fundamentally close relationship, there are occasionally tensions between Israeli and American officials. This was particularly true under US President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu; the two leaders clashed regularly over issues like settlements and Iran. The relationship reached a particularly nasty point when Netanyahu planned, with congressional Republicans, a March 2015 speech to a joint session of Congress that was highly critical of Obama’s approach to Iran. The Obama administration was furious over what it saw as Netanyahu conspiring with Obama’s domestic political opposition to undermine his policies. The Trump administration

has led to renewed warmth in the Israeli-American relationship, culminating in Trump’s December decision to

formally recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. The stark difference between Obama and Trump approaches to Netanyahu reflects a growing partisan gap inside the United States, with Republicans

taking an increasingly hard-line “pro-Israel” position. If Democrats end up concomitantly becoming more willing to criticize the Israeli government, Israel may well end up a partisan issue in America — which actually would threaten the foundations of the US-Israel alliance.

2NC – Uniqueness – Alliance Stable

U.S.-Israel ties are stable

Ben-Zvi 6/28 (Abraham, professor emeritus at Tel-Aviv university, “Israel and the US: The eternal covenant,” June 28, 2019, accessed July 6, 2019, https://www.israelhayom.com/2019/06/28/eternal-covenant/, Callum)The beginning of a beautiful friendship Eisenhower continued to heed the advice of his pro-Arab advisers even after the 1958 crisis and refused to sell Israel Hawk missiles, but his attitude toward Ben-Gurion was much more positive due to the fact that Israel’s stature in Washington had changed dramatically. A UN National Security Council memo from August 1958, two months after the operation, made it clear: ”If we choose to combat radical Arab nationalism and to hold Persian Gulf oil by force if necessary, then a logical corollary would be to support Israel as the only pro-West power left in the Near East .” Eisenhower also joined this assessment and in a discussion he held on this matter, he proposed making Israel the head of the spear in this new regional strategy, whose goal was to “decapitate the head of the [Egyptian] snake.” This perceptual shift in the relationship is what led four years later to the Hawk deal and to the sale of much more sophisticated weapon systems later on. The Hawk deal closed the gap between the two competing attitudes toward Israel and created a symbiosis between those who harbored a more value-based approach and those who saw Israel through the strategic lens only . From then on, it was impossible to go back to the dark days of the 1950s. With the help of public opinion. Despite the strategic shift in relations and the considerable sway Israel’s supporters had in Washington (including through lobbying groups), the two countries have had their share of crises. In 1963, the “nuclear crisis” erupted after President Kennedy insisted that Israel allow inspectors access to the Dimona reactor. Another crisis took place during Richard Nixon’s presidency, when the administration tried to promote its regional peace plan based on an almost complete Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the West Bank. Nixon’s successor Gerald Ford also locked horns with the Israeli government and declared a potential “reassessment” in his policies toward Jerusalem because Israel refused to make more territorial concessions as part of its interim deal with Egypt. President George H.W. Bush also clashed with Israel, twice. In 1992, he refused to grant Israel loan guarantees because he wanted an Israeli settlement freeze in return. A year earlier, Bush and then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir had a feud over the peace process. President Barack Obama’s presidency was also full of bilateral crises owing to his determination to move forward in the peace process and his accommodating approach to Iran and pro-Islamist movements in the region. But for all the crises and disagreements, the foundation of the relationship has remained rock solid because it has always been based on security interests and shared values. And all through the crises, never did America revert back to its hostile approach from the 1950s. Moreover, in many cases, it was Congress that has stood by Israel’s side and made sure the president would not take punitive steps against Israel. This was the case after Ford threatened a reassessment and after President Jimmy Carter tried to impose a peace plan on Israel. The Golden Age Even though in recent years support for Israel has eroded among liberals in the Democratic Party, support for Israel among the general public has remained steady . Moreover, the bold moves on the part of the Trump administration show that the two nations are now in a golden age in their relationship. The extraordinary personal bond between President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is very much like the chemistry between Lyndon B.

Johnson and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol in the 1960s. Thus, in light of this deep appreciation and empathy, it is safe to assume that the administration’s much-anticipated peace plan will not create a major rift between the two sides. The Israel-US alliance has a promising and stable future.

1NC – Link (Generic)

Arms sales key to the allianceMandell ’17 (Ariane, “US approves possible $440 million arms sale to Israel,” April 29, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/US-approves-possible-440-million-arms-sale-to-Israel-489299, ME)The State Department approved a “Possible Foreign Military Sale” to Israel, according to a Defense Security Cooperation Agency press release published on Friday. The agency said that the Israeli government requested to purchase 13 76-mm. naval guns, as well as a variety of naval maintenance materials and tools, technical, logistics and support services, operations and maintenance training and other related supplies and services. The estimated cost of such a deal is $440 million. “The United States is committed to the security of Israel,” said the press release. “And it is vital to US national interests to assist Israel to develop and maintain a strong and ready self-defense capability... This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a strategic regional partner that has been, and continues to be, an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.” In terms of specifics, the agency

said the equipment “will improve Israel’s capability to meet current and future threats in the defense of its borders and territorial waters. The naval guns will be installed on Israeli Navy Sa’ar-4.5 and Sa’ar-6 missile patrol boats. One gun will be located at an Israeli naval training center to be used for training maintenance personnel.” In September, Israel and the US signed a defense agreement worth $38 billion over 10 years, the largest such pledge in American history, which was

hailed by both countries as a cornerstone of their alliance . The deal incorporates several budget lines that

have previously been negotiated and approved by Congress each year, and requires Israel to abide by these terms over the course of the next decade, through 2029, without further lobbying of the US legislature for additional funds. Israel will receive $3.1b. in foreign military financing this fiscal year, followed by $3.3b. in subsequent years, plus $500 million designated to missile defense. Israel will return any money Congress may allocate in its 2017-2018 budget for Israel beyond the $3.1b., acting National Security Adviser Ya’acov Nagel, who negotiated the deal on Israel’s behalf, said. At the time of the signing, then-US president Barack Obama

praised the agreement as an example of his “ unshakable ” commitment to the Jewish state. “For as

long as the State of Israel has existed, the United States has been Israel’s greatest friend and partner, a fact underscored again today,” he said.

1NC – Impact – Middle East War

U.S.-Israel alliance key to overall foreign policy objectives in the Middle EastZeidman chairman of the Council for a Secure America 5-15-19 (Fred, “Israel needs bipartisan support,” https://thehill.com/opinion/international/443798-israel-needs-bipartisan-support, ME)The Middle East grows more and more volatile each day. Israel emerged from a contentious election, Hamas launched rockets against Israel and the Israeli army responded with lethal force, President Trump ordered a carrier group to the Persian Gulf, and Iran announced it would not comply with the nuclear agreement that contained its capacity to make bombs. All of these events happened in May, and the month is only half over. The latest agitation was a statement over the weekend by Democratic Representative Rashida Tlaib of Michigan. “There is kind of a calming feeling I always tell folks when I think of the Holocaust,” she said before claiming that Palestinians suffered “in the name of trying to create a safe haven for Jews.” This is a repugnantly tone deaf and woefully contorted version of history. It is also a grave disservice to the vast majority of Republicans and Democrats in Congress who profoundly disagree. One of us is a conservative Republican fundraiser and a Bush appointee, and the other was chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. While we disagree on many issues, we are in complete and total agreement about continuing support for the relationship with Israel, which is a vital tenet of United States

foreign policy in an increasingly unstable world. While we may have disagreements with various facets of Israeli

policy, now is not the time to allow this critical alliance to erode. Geopolitics in and near the Middle East is as

stable as a river rapid. Turkey was once a dependable ally, but has turned against our interests and fundamental

democratic norms. Syria is increasingly becoming a platform for the Russian military. Iran funds and supports terrorism in the region. As the Middle East has been evolving through a multitude of leaders and movements from Pan Arabism to the Arab Spring, the support that Israel has for the United States has remained steadfast. That is not to say the relationship has always been in perfect harmony. There was the clash over settlements in the 1990s between President George H.W. Bush and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir that resulted in the United States placing billions of dollars in loan guarantees on hold. The address by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Congress four years ago bypassed President Obama and rankled many Democrats. The seeming drift from a two state solution further strains our alliance. Despite these disagreements with some

elements of Israeli policy, one ideal that has remained paramount is that the alliance with Israel is vital to protecting American interests. This is why we need to occasionally step back and remind ourselves of the basics. A strong ally in the war on terror, intelligence cooperation with Israel is unparalleled . The only

democracy in the region, Israel has an exemplary record of human rights that celebrates due process. Its judicial system has investigated, prosecuted, and jailed its own leaders. While Israel proudly identifies as a Jewish state, it is not a theocracy and the Knesset remains a vibrant and often chaotic example of the diverse Israeli parliamentary system. Arab party members, left wing supporters, and right wing settlers all sit in the same Knesset chamber. Israel is torn by the same social upheaval as other nations, but remains a flourishing democracy that promotes civil and religious liberties for all of its citizens. Women have served in major leadership roles, including prime minister, foreign minister, and Supreme Court chief, among other senior roles in government. While its neighbors have actively persecuted and threatened death to its homosexual citizens, Israel still remains the only LGBTQ friendly country in the Middle East. In fact, one would be hard pressed to find a more LGBTQ friendly environment than Tel Aviv, where the annual Gay Pride Parade rivals that of Dupont Circle or New York City. Presidents and prime ministers come and go. Disagreements flare and subside. But today, global affairs spin with centrifugal force, uprooting long established

norms and assumptions. Certain things must center us. The alliance between the United States and Israel is one. On this issue, there is no disagreement between this Republican and this Democrat.

Middle East war escalates and causes extinctionSaab 18 [Bilal Y. Saab is senior fellow and director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University, The coming Middle East missile arms race, https://thebulletin.org/2018/09/the-coming-middle-east-missile-arms-race/]The main reason Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have yet to pursue ballistic missiles is that Washington has managed for years to convince

them not to. The last thing the United States needs in the Middle East is an offensive missile

race , which could quickly lead the antagonists into a deadly military confrontation that

drags Washington and Moscow into war . Missiles are inherently destabilizing weapons

because of their potential to quickly escalate conflicts. Their flight times can be very short ,

and new tech nologies are dramatically improving their accuracy and lethality.

As if that were not scary enough, the nuclear future of the Mid dle East is also increasingly uncertain , now

that the U nited S tates has withdrawn from the J oint C omprehensive P lan o f A ction, the deal that

limited Iran’s nuclear development in exchange for sanctions relief. At the same time , at least half a dozen regional powers including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar see peaceful

nuclear energy as a long-term solution to their fossil-fuel dependence. The growth of nuclear power generation in the region could exacerbate the risk of nuclear prolif eration, as the same technologies and materials are required to develop both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. Should Middle East civilian nuclear development become militarized , possession of

fleets of offensive missiles —arguably the most effective delivery vehicle for nuclear

warheads —could magnify the potential danger .

1NC – Impact – Iran War

U.S.-Israeli arms cooperation key to contain Iran – the plan causes Israel-Iran war and draws the U.S. inShufutinsky Master’s in International Peace and Conflict Resolution 4-30-19 (Dmitri, “US and Israel Should Help Craft Regional Policy to Contain Turkey’s Erdogan,” https://www.algemeiner.com/2019/04/30/us-and-israel-should-help-craft-regional-policy-to-contain-turkeys-erdogan/, ME)Turkey poses a long-term threat to the security of the Middle East. Containing neo-Ottomanism requires a defensive policy that integrates Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and the Kurds into a regional alliance. A new era has dawned in the northern Levant. The Republic of Turkey has left behind its Kemalist, secular foundations in pursuit of Islamist, authoritarian governance. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), headed by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has alienated the US, Israel, and the EU, and abandoned the country’s pro-Western and NATO credentials. The AKP has adopted a neo-Ottoman policy of imperialism, seeking to usurp the position of “leader of the Muslim World” from Saudi Arabia. In colonial language reminiscent of Mussolini’s fascist Italy, Erdogan has threatened to conquer the Greek Isles, Cyprus, and the Levant. And he has taken concrete steps towards advancing this vision, despite alienating European and Arab allies. Some analysts have called for maintaining ties with Turkey in the hope that the AKP government will fall and relations with a more moderate leader can resume. But this is wishful thinking. Despite poor showings in local elections and a recent poor economic performance, ultra-nationalist and neo-fascist organizations like the Grey Wolves have been emboldened since the AKP’s rise. The AKP has also sought to Islamize the still-secular North Cyprus, turning the conflict from an ethno-national one into a religious one. Ankara has hopes of changing the peace process in Cyprus from one of reunion with equal rights, to a two-state solution. This would be the pretext for an eventual annexation of the island (or at least its northern portion). Given Ankara’s increasing interference in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean, it is necessary to build and strengthen a multilateral mechanism among the region’s most affected states and “statelets” to contain it. The US is already providing major support to both the Kurds in Syria and the burgeoning “Axis of Antiquity” of Greece, Israel, and the Republic of Cyprus. The Kurds and the eastern Mediterranean coalition have a common interest in challenging Erdogan’s hegemonic ambitions and protecting their sovereignty. These actors — perhaps with guidance from Washington — must iron out a cohesive plan to make it happen. Turkey’s decision to buy the S-400 missile defense system from Russia at the expense of Washington’s F-35s has angered the US, to the point of threatening sanctions. Last summer, the US damaged Ankara’s economy with tariffs and threatened sanctions if it attacked the Kurds in Syria. The Syrian Kurds are floating the idea of diplomacy with Turkey if it stops occupying the enclave of

Afrin — but without it, they say, there will be war . Meanwhile, Athens has expressed interest in acquiring F-35 fighter jets. Greece’s military is inferior to that of Turkey, and F-35s would provide a valuable deterrent to prevent further violations of airspace. With that said, Greece would have to make the purchase at a relatively low price, given its economic situation. Washington should consider a Greek F-35 sale at a discount, on condition that they also be used to protect Cypriot airspace in the event of Turkish military provocation on the island. Greece already has Patriot missiles. To further deter Turkey, the US should consider stationing THAAD missiles in Crete, where the US maintains a military base. It should also seriously consider pressing Britain to allow Patriot and THAAD missile defense systems to be placed at its Akrotiri and Dhekelia military bases in Cyprus.

Greece is building a joint radar system on Crete with the Israelis , that is possibly aimed at monitoring Turkish aggression. Israel should consider placing Arrow, Iron Dome, and David’s Sling systems near the Crete radar

installation to ensure its protection, and consider selling the systems to Nicosia as well to prevent a Turkish attack. These systems would be extremely valuable in view of Turkish aggression aimed at gas exploration in Cyprus. The Cyprus gas project is critical to Israel’s economic and diplomatic interests in the coming decades, and must be protected at all costs. The defensive nature of these weapons systems should nullify any possible Turkish diplomatic criticism of “militarization” of the northern Levant. Meanwhile, as the Kurds increasingly consolidate their power in northern

Syria, the US and Israel should look to mediate a possible peace agreement or cooperation mechanism between Iraqi Kurdistan and Rojava (Kurdish Syria). While the primary goal of the Kurdish fighters is aimed at counterinsurgency against the remnants of jihadists, these forces will also need the capability to deter Turkey and Iran’s “axis of resistance” should diplomacy fail. The US and Israel should consider deploying Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, THAAD, and Patriot missile systems in the broader Kurdish region, under

the full control of Washington and Jerusalem. These systems would protect the Kurds from missile attacks, such as those previously launched by Iran. They would also protect Israel, regional Arab allies, and US military bases in the region, which may be more vulnerable to attack after the US’ designation of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terror group. More can be done to integrate the Kurds and Israelis into the greater energy scheme in the eastern Mediterranean. Israel has oil in the Negev, the Meged oil field, and the Golan. Jerusalem could easily replace Tehran when it comes to supplying oil to Greece and Italy, both of which secured waivers from Washington when sanctions on Iran were resumed last year. This would further tighten Israel’s alliance with Athens and the new right-wing government in Rome. Kurds in the northern portions of Syria and Iraq also control vast oil sources and are selling it to stimulate the local economy. Adding Kurdish and Israeli oil — even if only temporarily — to the energy pipelines being built from the Mediterranean to southern Europe would enrich Israel, stabilize Kurdistan, and give the Kurds and Israelis more regional clout. Doing so would also undermine European excuses that they must continue buying oil from Iran or Arab dictatorships in the Gulf. A coalition of this kind in the eastern Mediterranean and northern Levant would allow for greater US involvement in the region, which would help to ensure a successful outcome while shoring up the regional economy. This would contribute toward regional stability, wean Europe off “autocratic oil,” and contain Ankara’s neo-Ottoman aspirations in the region

through purely defensive means. It would also foster “local multilateralism” without resorting to the bloated and ineffective approach of the EU, UN, and Arab League.

It goes nuclearAfrasiabi & Entessar 6/4 (Afrasiabi taught political science at the University of Tehran, Boston University, and Bentley University and was a visiting scholar at Harvard University. Entessar, professor and chair of the department of political science and criminal justice at the University of South Alabama, June 4, 2019. “What a War With Iran Would Look Like.” https://thebulletin.org/2019/06/a-nuclear-war-in-the-persian-gulf/, Saatvik)

Tensions between the United States and Iran are spiraling toward a military confrontation that carries a real possibility that the United States will use nuclear weapons. Iran’s assortment of

asymmetrical capabilities—all constructed to be effective against the United States—nearly assures such a confrontation. The current US nuclear posture leaves the Trump administration at least open to the use of tactical nuclear weapons in conventional theaters. Some in the current administration may well think it to be in the best interest of the United States to seek a quick and decisive victory in the oil hub of

the Persian Gulf—and to do so by using its nuclear arsenal. We believe there is a heightened possibility of a US-Iran war triggering a US nuclear strike for the following reasons: The sanction regime set against the Iranian economy is so brutal that it is likely to force Iran to take an action that will require a US military response. Unless the United States backs down from its present self-declared “economic warfare” against Iran, this will likely escalate to an open warfare between the two countries. In response to a White House request to draw up an Iran war plan, the Pentagon proposed sending 120,000 soldiers to the Persian Gulf. This force would augment the several thousands of troops already stationed in Iran’s vicinity. President Trump has also hinted that if need be, he will be sending “a lot more” troops. Defeating Iran through conventional military means would likely require a half million US forces and US preparedness for many casualties. The US nuclear posture review is worded in such a way that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in conventional theaters is envisaged, foreshadowing the concern that in a showdown with a menacing foe like Iran, the nuclear option is on the table. The United States could once again justify using nuclear force for the sake of a decisive victory and casualty-prevention, the logic used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Trump’s cavalier attitude toward nuclear weapons, trigger-happy penchant, and utter disdain for Iran, show that he would likely have no moral qualm about issuing an order to launch a limited nuclear strike, especially in a US-Iran showdown, one in which the oil transit from the Gulf would be imperiled, impacting the global economy and necessitating a speedy end to such a war. If the United States were to commit a limited nuclear strike against Iran, it would minimize risks to its forces in the region, defang the Iranian military, divest the latter of preeminence in the Strait of Hormuz, and thus reassert US power in the oil hub of the Persian Gulf. Oil flowing through the Strait of Hormuz is critical to a rising China. US control over this merchant waterway would grant the United States significant leverage in negotiations. A limited US nuclear strike could cause a ‘regime change’ among Iranian leadership, representing a strategic setback for Russia, in light of their recent foray in the Middle East with Iranian backing. Undoubtedly, there are several significant negative consequences to a US use of nuclear weapons,

opening the way for other nuclear-armed states to emulate US behavior, and for many other non-nuclear weapons states to seek their own nuclear deterrent shields. There would also be a huge outcry in the international community causing the US global image to suffer. Will such anticipated consequences represent sufficient obstacles to prevent a limited U.S. nuclear strike on Iran? With President Trump, who counts on “bomb Iran” billionaire Sheldon Adelson as one of his main campaign contributors, the threshold for using nukes certainly seems to have been lowered.

1NC – Link (Samson Option)

Foreign Sales are Israeli Blackmail – the plan removes the stick that keeps Israeli nuclear ambiguitySmith ’19 (Grant, “U.S. Foreign Aid and the Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program,” May, Middle East Affairs, May 2019, pp. 26-30, available online at https://www.wrmea.org/2019-may/u.s.-foreign-aid-and-the-israeli-nuclear-weapons-program.html ME)Grant F. Smith: I haven’t had a chance to introduce the Institute for Research: Middle Eastern Policy, co-organizer of this conference. We’re an organization that began doing Middle East policy research in 2002. As part of that research, we did keep running into the Israel lobby and its multiple policies and programs. So the Institute for Research has three core programs, many of which focus on the lobby. The first one of those programs is Freedom of Information Act [FOIA] requests. The Freedom of Information Act is in a period right now where any real bona fide effort is going to require a lawsuit to complete. We have multiple lawsuits going on at any single time, but the purpose of Freedom of Information Act lawsuits is really to ferret out information that the government has kept secret about Middle East policymaking that Americans should know. So our second major program, as Delinda mentioned at the top of the hour, is our effort to do public opinion polling that asks, in many cases, questions that the mainstream pollsters, whether Gallup or Pew or Rasmussen, do not ask about U.S. Middle East policy. There’s a huge wide range of questions that they will never ask about U.S. foreign aid, about what they think about Middle East nuclear proliferation. So what we’ve done with our polling is—using the Google surveys platform, which is a representative polling process that costs money—attempt to ask questions and track Gallup, in particular, which has, even within the polling world, many polls about the Middle East that are extreme outliers with even other pollsters like Pew Research, but certainly with our polling. Finally, we put together research reports and the data we’ve gathered through FOIA and polling results and other sources to publish policy research. It often appears online at Antiwar.com. It’s published by the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. And we think that this research that we’ve been performing has potential to reduce a lot of the enormous waste and misdirected efforts and huge opportunity costs that we’ve been paying as a nation. So today, I’d like to talk about the Israeli nuclear weapons program. It’s a topic that is of interest because, back in the 1960s, as Professor Hixson mentioned this morning, the United States correctly opposed the Israelis going nuclear. Nevertheless, the U.S. effort to make non-proliferation a key policy goal was undermined—I call it supplanted. So we’re going to go through a few details about that, because everybody in this room, everybody watching this in one way or another, has paid a price as U.S. obligations under treaty and our own Arms Export Control Act have been systematically

undermined for 50 years. And so, what we need to understand is that the root cause of this undermining leads directly to the Israel lobby. They want you to pay. They want you to continue paying. But they would prefer that you do not know what is going on, so it can continue indefinitely. I’m going to basically base a lot of the points I’m making on three concurrent lawsuits that are happening right now in DC District Court. One of them is about obtaining the entire black budget from U.S. foreign aid to Israel which is very large, but never disclosed. The other is to expose a new gag order that came out in 2012 which bans all U.S. federal workers and contractors from discussing the Israeli nuclear weapons program.

Finally, a newly unearthed part of nuclear ambiguity policy , which are secret letters signed by presidents

promising, in effect, to violate NPT and our arms export control regime . Professor Hixson already

mentioned this this morning: This era in the 1960s, at the end of it, where the policy goals of the entire U.S. policymaking community for the Israeli nuclear weapons program were to compel Israel to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to uphold U.S. obligations under that treaty, withhold the sale of nuclear delivery-capable Phantom jets from Israel that they wanted to buy, and compel the Israelis to dismantle their Dimona nuclear weapons facility. Their consensus, as stated in a memo compiled by National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, was to avert a disaster in terms of the peace process. They felt that nuclear weapons would “sharply reduce the chances for any peace settlement in the future”—and, boy, were they

ever right. Israeli policy goals were to buy those nuclear-capable jet fighters, to maintain their Dimona facility, and to get

the United States to enter into an Israeli-contrived policy of forever being ambiguous about whether they did or did not have a nuclear weapons program. And so, these two policy objectives were fundamentally opposed, and the United States decision factors really rotated around the Nixon assessment of the Israel lobby’s ability to mount pressure upon them. Henry Kissinger noted that if they made public the fact that they were going to base sales of these jets on the nuclear program, that an enormous pressure would be mounted on them by the lobby. Previous presidents, as Professor Hixson had alluded to, had already collapsed under this very same pressure, that they couldn’t pressure the Israelis without immediately having U.S.-based groups come to them and say, “you can’t do this.” So, there was another consideration within the policy compilation which they all considered. This is something most Americans don’t know about, but there was concern because they knew that the Israelis had in fact stolen weapons-grade uranium from the United States beginning in about 1965 from a plant in Apollo, Pennsylvania. As Kissinger said, this is one program on which the Israelis have persistently deceived us, and may

even have stolen from us. Subsequent document releases from the CIA and FBI leave no doubt about that. But what happened ultimately was that, with all these policy considerations out on the table, the Nixon administration nevertheless adopted an Israeli policy of nuclear ambiguity and sold the jets in a meeting with Golda Meir on Sept. 26, 1969. Ever since, United States

presidents have, while in office, mostly abided by a policy of never confirming, denying, or talking about the Israeli nuclear weapons programs, just as most Israeli prime ministers do not. But there were two senators who were not satisfied, and made some trouble for the CIA and the National Security Council. These were Sens. Stuart Symington and John Glenn. Although in numerous meetings with the Central Intelligence Agency they couldn’t compel any action on their part, or on the part of the NSC or anybody else, to do anything about the diversion, they did pass an amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act, which is now part of the Arms Export Control Act, which provides conditions that the U.S. has to follow if it ever wants to transfer foreign aid to a nuclear weapon state that has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nevertheless, the United States has never followed its own law. So, from our standpoint as Freedom of Information Act users, we hit a wall every time we move to attempt to make the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department or any other agency release information about the Israeli nuclear weapons program. The CIA has released things before: in 1974, they released a special national security estimate which leaves no doubt that they know the Israelis have nuclear weapons. The Department of Defense, after fighting us in court for half a year, released a very lengthy 1987 analysis of the Israeli nuclear development program, which included hydrogen bomb developments, which included using U.S. resources provided under Atoms for Peace for making nuclear weapons designs. So, the U.S. government can fight these things, but they’re [faced] with 50 years of history, 50 years of slip-ups and releasing information. There’s plenty of compelling evidence that we’ve been able to use to convince judges that, at this point, the only possible reason that they’re still maintaining a lot of this information under classification is that they don’t want anybody to come after them and challenge them on the laws and the treaty that they’re breaking. So, nuclear ambiguity has been around for so long that it requires heavy maintenance in this day and age to maintain. New Yorker

reporter Adam Entous wrote a stunning piece in June of 2018 in which he talked about a series of letters that the Israelis have been making presidents sign since Bill Clinton in 1993 until Donald Trump more recently, in which they promise in a

letter, a secret letter, that they will not compel the Israelis to sign the NPT. They will not talk about Israel’s nuclear weapons in public. And, of course, the National Archives and Records Administration will and is fighting not to even confirm the existence of these letters. But it is clear that they are part of ambiguity maintenance. This ambiguity maintenance has even taken another form, in which the Obama administration, after being very positive in talking about nuclear non-proliferation, in talking about a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East, finally buckled to pressure and not only signed the letter, but also passed a new classification guideline which says, essentially, that any government employee, any government contractor, that even so much as references information about the Israeli nuclear weapons program from the public domain will be fired, prosecuted, lose their security clearance or possibly much worse. And this has already happened to one Department of Energy employee by the name of James Doyle, who used to work at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. James Doyle made the mistake of writing a single article called, “Why eliminate nuclear weapons?” in a magazine called Survival, the February/March edition from 2013. James Doyle wrote the following: “Nuclear weapons did not deter Egypt and Syria from attacking Israel in 1973, Argentina from attacking the British in the Falklands War or Iraq from attacking Israel in the 1991 Gulf War.” Clear reference to Israel’s nukes not being a great conventional deterrent, but a congressional staffer noticed that he had written this. That representative’s office contacted the Department of Energy, hugely dependent on Congress’ good graces for funding. They looked at the article, which they had already reviewed for classified information. Then they retroactively classified it, raided Doyle’s home, fired him, pulled his security

clearances—and that’s how it works. So, if we look at some of the costs of nuclear ambiguity policy , one way to do

that is to look at all of the foreign aid that’s been given since Symington and Glenn first managed to pass their

restrictions of foreign aid to non-NPT states. If you look at the aid figures—which are never given in inflation-adjusted terms—that foreign aid since 1949 has now surpassed $260.9 billion—and again, this does not include any of the black budget aid, which we still haven’t been able to release. That’s far more than the United States spent rebuilding Europe under the Marshall Plan. It’s far more aid than given to any other foreign country . It’s interesting, then, to take a

data cut of that aid and see that 85 percent of that foreign aid has been given to Israel since the Symington and Glenn amendments became law in 1976. So by law, none of that almost quarter-billion dollars should have been allowed absent some Arms Export Control Act compliance and absent some Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty compliance. If you look at how much aid has been given since President Clinton, President George W. Bush, President Obama, President Trump, acquiesced to signing new pledges to Israel to promise to ignore their weapons, to promise to ignore the NPT and U.S. law, the amount is $99.9 billion. Let’s round it up to a hundred. Israel’s demands have another component. This, again, goes back to the concerns expressed in the report about adopting nuclear ambiguity in the first place. That is, the cleanup of the toxic waste site left by the plant that Henry Kissinger referred to. The Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation [NUMEC] was, as the CIA once said, an Israeli operation from the beginning. Yet because the NUMEC diversion information gathered by the CIA, gathered by the FBI, gathered by other parties, has never fully been released, the cleanup cost and the blame for this toxic waste left by this underfunded plant have been shifted on to other parties. The FBI has documents indicating that they know that underfunding and shoddy treatment of protocols on waste handling contributed to the toxic pollution in Apollo, Pennsylvania, because they had wiretaps on the plant owners talking about the results of the toxic spill in which they were sending unprotected workers to go make cleanups—but the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is estimating this $500 million toxic cleanup will have to be paid by U.S. taxpayers. So, I think the story of nuclear ambiguity,

the cost that it transfers to U.S. taxpayers, the pretty much illegitimate discussion that comes around

nuclear non-proliferation in policy-making circles, can be traced back to this particular nuclear

ambiguity policy . But what’s interesting about it is that it’s not unique. If you look at other policies, you can see a cycle at work: supplant, silence, and exploit. Supplanting: devise an original or supplant a policy of the United States that benefits the United States with one that broadly benefits Israel is the supplantation stage. Silence: figure out a way to gag or prevent stakeholders or government employees, officials, contractors, from effectively communicating about the supplanted interest. And then exploit: compel the U.S. taxpayers, voters, businesses, others, to provide resources for Israel and the lobby rather than the common good. So, this is taking place and has taken place in other arenas. Ali Abunimah mentioned that there was an organization back in the 1960s called the American Zionist Council which was, in fact, ordered to register as an Israeli foreign agent because it received funding from Israel to start up and conduct public relations. But that same organization—along with pressure on the Justice Department—managed to supplant the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act and their desire to have open information on the money coming in and the policies being enacted, and silenced the Justice Department through pure internal pressure into not even releasing the registration that was finally compelled in 1962. The Justice Department held on to it until 2010. But there’s a clear set of documents that shows that AIPAC was originally ordered, when it was operating as an unincorporated organization inside the AZC, to comply with the FARA order and it never did. The Justice Department never did anything about it, and they won’t even talk about it. So that exploitation is that foreign agent activities immediately resumed for the Israeli government when AIPAC incorporated itself in 1963, just six weeks after that order. AZC’s gone, AIPAC’s been with us ever since. The First Amendment—and this is something that we’ll be talking about more this afternoon, supplanting and conditioning the First Amendment where it pertains to people wanting to boycott Israel over its human rights issues. The silence part of the cycle is free speech activities, seeking peaceful change through nonviolent protests. People are now being asked to sign waivers and pledges that they will not engage in that speech activity. The exploitation basically is that if you don’t sign as a government employee or contractor in many states, now, a pledge saying that you won’t boycott Israel, then all those revenues and opportunities are going to go to others more willing to prioritize Israel’s policy objectives. This has happened in weapons smuggling. Telogy is a recent example of Tektronix oscilloscopes being shipped to Israel for their nuclear weapons program. They were able to simply get a slap on the wrist for an export violation. But it’s been going on since the very first Neutrality Act violations in the 1940s, where there was a major Israeli weapon smuggling ring in the United State. Some people called it the Haganah smuggling ring, others call it other things, but it was able to move a large number of conventional weapons out of this country to Israel with almost no criminal prosecutions. What I’m hoping our friends from the Virginia Coalition for Human Rights will talk about this afternoon is another case of supplant, silence, and exploit called the replacing textbook histories in the K-12 education system with what’s essentially the Israeli government line on territory, settlements and other things, in order to spread a line of government propaganda, basically through the textbooks. So I’m not going into that. But I can express some hope in the sense that Americans are increasingly, if you ask them the right question, increasingly interested in seeing more proper regulation and governance in questions like this. A poll we conducted in August of 2018 asked Americans whether—given the fact that Arms Export Control Act laws that govern foreign aid to countries with nuclear weapons programs that haven’t signed the NPT, and the fact that Israel has not signed the NPT—should those laws be enforced, 54.8 percent said yes. So this is material, raw material. Someone just asked me before this, how do we contact these people? Well, that’s the work at hand, but raw material for building more representative rule of law governance in this country. People are clearly out there who are willing to and eager to see some of these things enforced. So signs of hope are certainly that Americans are becoming better informed about some of the things the lobby has been doing. Hopefully, they can grasp, if they have the spectacles of supplant, silence, and exploit, they might be able to see something going on in their states or community. Courts are beginning to play a slightly more aggressive and productive role in allowing people to question these things using our legal system, and Martin McMahon and Saqib Ali will talk about that. Some members of Congress are obviously demonstrating that they’d like to see more popular action. Most importantly, the institutionalization of groups who know something about what’s been going on and are willing to take some action is my biggest hope. My biggest hope is seeing some of the groups, particularly that come to this conference year after year, and hearing about their work attacking the silence, which is the weakest point of the cycle and the one that we have the best chance of prevailing against as organizations, activists, and people willing to take more of a leadership role in confronting these abuses. Thank you. Questions & Answers Dale Sprusansky: Thank you very much. We have a couple of minutes for questions here. So if you have any questions out there, please feel free to give them to someone collecting them so they can send them up to me. We have a couple of questions on the relationship between South Africa—apartheid South Africa—and Israel, and so the question is: What was the collaboration between Israel and apartheid South Africa to develop nuclear weapons? Grant Smith: Right, so someone noticed I skipped a couple of slides in this presentation. What the 1974 CIA special report talking about Israel’s nuclear weapons most feared was collaboration with South Africa and Taiwan. The Israelis did in fact sign a contract with [South African Prime Minister] P.W. Botha to sell them nuclear-tipped missiles, Jericho missiles. Sasha Polakow-Suransky wrote an entire book about that after he obtained the documents from the post-apartheid government. Most people who are doing credible work on nuclear non-proliferation believe that the so-called Vela flash in the Indian Ocean in 1979 was an Israeli nuclear test with South Africa. So, yes, we can do an entire day-long conference, and I hope someday we can, about the Israeli nuclear weapons program and just how much information there is out there about it. But the U.S. ignores, it will not accept officially, that the Vela flash was an Israeli nuclear test. They don’t accept the authenticity of the South African government document release that there was an attempted sale of turnkey weapons systems to the apartheid regime. So just another example of your government at work under a supplanted policy of nuclear ambiguity. Dale Sprusansky: Very good. Another question here: What can you say about President Carter’s divulgence of Israel’s nuclear weapons in 2008 and the aftermath? Grant Smith: Yeah, I can say something about that. A judge won’t accept that. A judge will say, well, Carter wasn’t in office, so that’s not really an authoritative official statement. We’re sorry, IRmep, nice try, but we’re not going to release information based on the premise that it’s already official that presidents have acknowledged a nuclear weapons program. Is Sam Husseini in the audience? Well, Sam Husseini is a reporter for the Institute for Public Accuracy who has done videos of major political figures in power—Condoleezza Rice, Dick Cheney—all running away from him and his camera

crew when asked “Excuse me, sir, does Israel have nuclear weapons?” You would not believe the circumlocutions that you see these people go through when Sam Husseini traps them with his camera. So it doesn’t matter, unfortunately. Dale Sprusansky: We have

someone wondering what leverage does Israel use to compel U.S. presidents to sign the letters that

you discussed? Grant Smith: Right. According to the story, these nuclear ambiguity maintenance letters come at the

worst possible moment. For President Trump, it was as he was facing the ouster of a general and dealing with all sorts of startup conflicts, and suddenly Dan Meridor of the [Israeli] Embassy shows up with a letter, saying, well, you have to sign this, Mr. President, because every other president three times before you signed them and you have to do it. You have to give us this guarantee that you will not be as spontaneous with us as you are in a lot of things. So he signed it. Apparently, they were angered by it within the administration. They felt undue pressure. They felt like this was out of line. But they signed it.

1NC – Internal Link – Miscalc (Samson Option)

The plan brings the bombs out of the basement – guarantees miscalcSagir ’18 (Dan, “From Nixon to Trump, America Has Always Backed a Nuclear Israel. This Is Why,” July 8, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium-from-nixon-to-trump-america-has-backed-a-nuclear-israel-this-is-why-1.6247109, ME)Since the early 1990s, Israel has been asking incoming American presidents, including President Donald Trump, to sign off on letters continuing their predecessors’ policy regarding Israel's nuclear status, as the New Yorker recently revealed. The secret letters state that the U.S. will not press Israel to give up its nuclear weapons so long as it faces existential threats in the Middle East These secret understandings were a major enabling factor behind Israel’s unique

nuclear strategy. Behind the thin veneer of nuclear ambiguity, Israel, with American support, became, according to foreign sources, regional nuclear power. Israel’s practice of seeking presidential letters on its nuclear capacities is anachronistic and ludicrous, as Avner Cohen has argued ("Time for Israel to Drop Nuclear Ambiguity"): "...Almost 50 years after the original understandings, Israel’s nuclear capability – declared or not – is a solid fact recognized by all...[Israel no longer needs] a presidential piece of paper to confirm this...The time has come for post-ambiguity." I agree with Cohen's conclusion, but for entirely different reasons. For many years now ambiguity has not been the most important issue in Israel-U.S. nuclear relations. Israel’s nuclear ambiguity was originally a compromise offered to then-U.S. President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger, in order to end clashes with Washington over Israel’s nuclear program. Paradoxically, however,

ambiguity evolved into a diplomatic fiction that also proved to be a top Israeli strategic asset.

Israel became a nuclear state, but without having to pay the heavy political price. It's worth reviewing the milestones over the past half-century that attest to America's full commitment to Israel on the nuclear issue and how Israel's nuclear status has bolstered its relationship with America – a commitment that obviates the need for these official letters of confirmation. In the late 1960's, Israel’s nuclear status allowed it to abandon its pursuit of an official alliance with the U.S.: Israel’s leadership felt that the country had been left to its fate during the 1967 crisis. The Johnson administration did not meet the 1957 commitment by U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower to ensure that the Straits of Tiran would remain open for shipping, which was a causus belli for Israel. Against this background, Israeli decision-makers set their sights on strategic depth and nuclear capability; official American security guarantees were perceived as a poor substitute. The consent Israel received from the

Nixon administration in 1969 for its status as an alleged undeclared nuclear state effectively obviated the

need for official American guarantees for Israel’s survival. In the early 1970's, Israel's nuclear

status triggered the U.S. to supply it advanced conventional weapons : Israel’s alleged nuclear

capabilities became, paradoxically, a kind of "incentive" for the U.S. government to supply Israel

with state-of-the-art conventional arms , in order to prevent a weakened Israel from being forced

to communicate nuclear threats or abandon its ambiguity. The connection between the

American conventional weapons supply and Israel’s alleged nuclear capability came to the fore

during and after the Yom Kippur War in 1973. In the 1990-91 Iraq war, Israel's nuclear status was leverage for the U.S. against Iraq: The U.S.-Iraq crisis that followed Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait had far-reaching consequences in terms of the U.S. approach to Israel’s nuclear status. Responding to Saddam Hussein’s threat to launch chemical warheads at Israel – even though Israel was not part of the U.S.-led anti-Iraq coalition – Israel and the U.S. conveyed harsh deterrence signals to Baghdad during the 1990-1991 crisis and war. The most significant incident was a wartime CNN interview given by then-Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, in which Cheney warned Iraq that Israel might respond with unconventional weapons should Iraq fire chemical weapons at it. Cheney’s

statement was a quantum leap in terms of the U.S. government’s attitude toward Israel’s nuclear posture. For the first time in the history of the two nations, the U.S. transmitted an obvious deterrence signal to Iraq based on Israel’s nuclear capability. The U.S. has backed Israel's alleged Mideast nuclear monopoly: Israel’s efforts to ensure that no Arab or Muslim country in the region obtains nuclear weapons, referred to as the Begin Doctrine, were at first supported silently by the U.S., and later largely became joint policy. The Reagan administration, surprised by Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, confined itself to half-hearted protests and a minor delay in supplying arms. Following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the U.S. led an effort to divest Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction, ultimately toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime. Another example was the discovery of a nuclear facility in eastern Syria in 2007. Israel shared this surprising and disturbing information with the American

government and proposed a military strike. For domestic political reasons the White House preferred that Israel carry out the strike, and it did, as then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert revealed this year. In the 1980s, the U.S. backed Israel against campaigns for a denuclearized Mideast: The international effort led by Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone posed a thorny dilemma for the U.S. and Israel. The campaign, which centered around the demand that Israel sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), peaked during the 1995 NPT Review Conference. The initiative was consistent with U.S. policy favoring nuclear non-proliferation, yet it would mean dismantling Israel’s nuclear arsenal. The U.S., under Clinton, helped Israel withstand pressure to sign the NPT. Against this background Israel began to request letters of commitment from all incoming U.S. presidents to help it maintain its nuclear status. The campaign to halt Iran’s nuclear program: A variety of efforts to halt the Iranian nuclear program have been underway for the past two decades. Intelligence, security-operational, and political coordination between Israel and the U.S. on the Iranian issue have been maintained at very high levels. It is clearly in Israel’s interest that the U.S. lead the campaign against Tehran, but under the Obama administration there was fierce disagreement between Israeli and American leaders regarding the policy and strategy by which Iran’s nuclear program should be stopped. The most striking reflection of the depth of American support for Israel’s nuclear capability was the fact that, even during the bitter discord over the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, neither the Obama nor any administration spokespeople resorted to mentioning longtime U.S. support for Israel’s exclusive nuclear capability. The only ones who publicly called attention to Israeli "hypocrisy" or American double standards were the Iranians. Israeli nuclear concerns currently revolve around the latter two issues. Israel fears a nuclear Iran, the creation of a regional balance of terror vis-a-vis Tehran, and its regional political ramifications. Israel also harbors concerns about pressure to dismantle its alleged nuclear capability as part of a wider call for Mideast nuclear disarmament. Israeli decision-makers consider these two issues intertwined. So long as the danger of Iran becoming a nuclear state still exists, it is easy for Israel to reject the idea of a Mideast nuclear weapon-free zone, with support from the U.S., Europe, and even from the Sunni Arab nations. Given the close Israel-U.S. alignment on Israel’s nuclear status, Israel’s request for a secret letter of commitment from President Trump indeed seems anachronistic and redundant. Today’s Israel is a responsible Western nation like France and the U.K., who have an independent nuclear deterrence to safeguard

their existence. So long as no change occurs in the nuclear world order that would cause first-generation and second-

generation nuclear states – the latter of which according to foreign sources includes Israel - to gradually dismantle their nuclear arsenals, it is hard to imagine Israel doing so in response to international pressure. And that includes

pressure from the U.S. itself.

1NC – Link (Bibi)

Trump is key to Netanyahu’s political support – the plan undermines the security salience of the allianceShalev 18 [Chemi Shalev is a Haaretz Correspondent, Analysis These Three Wild Cards Threaten a Netanyahu Win on April 9, Analysis Trump’s Syria Withdrawal and Mattis’ Resignation Startle Israel – and Undercut Netanyahu, December 21, https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium-trump-s-syria-withdrawal-and-mattis-resignation-startle-israel-undercut-netanyahu-1.6766824]The realization by Israel’s rational right and center-right that it may have been living in a fool’s paradise could prove most damaging, perhaps even fatal , for Netanyahu’s political prospects .

His prestige as Israel’s ultimate Mr. Security has already been tarnished in recent months by his

restraint in Gaza , by the constriction of Israel’s freedom of action over Syria after the September

downing of a Russian spy plane over Syria and, among the cognoscenti, by the potential collapse of his gamble on

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the wake of the murder of dissident Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in

Istanbul. The reliance on the alliance with Trump , however, was the most crucial of Netanyahu’s

credentials, his jewel in the crown . It proved him wiser , supposedly, than critics who had bemoaned his

belligerent attitude to Obama and warned of dire days to come.The timing of the disruption in the Trump administration could not have been worse, as far as Netanyahu is concerned. With

elections looming in eleven months at the very latest, but probably sooner, Netanyahu’s image as Israel’s ultimate

maven in foreign affairs and defense matters was supposed to offset his mounting legal

problems and the growing public disgruntlement over Israel’s high cost of living . If Trump

will now be seen as a fair weather friend whose administration is going off the rails , Netanyahu’s main

claim to fame will be eroded , if not demolished completely .

1NC – Internal Link (Bibi)

He uses Trump’s relationship as a strong leaderChakraborty 19 [Barnini Chakraborty writes for Fox News, Netanyahu campaigns on cozy friendship with Trump ahead of Israel's April election, February 7, https://www.foxnews.com/world/netanyahu-campaigns-on-cozy-friendship-with-trump-ahead-of-israels-april-election]With a cloud of corruption charges swirling around him , Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is hoping his cozy relationship with President Trump will not only solidify his base but also court

undecided voters ahead of April’s elections. Netanyahu’s Likud party has erected two huge billboards on major highways in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv that show him and Trump smiling, clasping hands and touting Netanyahu as being a “league apart” from his political rivals.Trump on Tuesday reposted a photo of the billboards on his Instagram feed which prompted Netanyahu to thank Trump in a tweet.The prime minister has been busy lately trying to mold his politics in Trump’s image.Netanyahu has adopted Trump’s “fake news” catchphrase to go after media outlets he believes aren’t giving him a fair shake, and has also started to publicly target perceived domestic enemies.The pro-Trump push in Netanyahu’s campaign reflects Trump’s popularity in Israel, one of the few countries

where an alliance with the American president is considered a political asset. By tying his political

ambitions to Trump , Netanyahu hopes to sail into a fifth term. “This administration, not just Trump, has been the friendliest administration to Israel since 1948,” Michael Oren, a deputy minister and former ambassador to Washington, said. “Netanyahu is just tapping into these current global trends of people living in a world of uncertainty who want strong , sometimes brutally strong, leaders .”

Weakening Netanyahu’s popularity causes Israeli Trump – that’s worseAin 18 [Stewart Ain - journalist for Jewish Week, Is A Right-Wing Populist In Store For Post-Bibi Israel?, 2018, https://jewishweek.timesofisrael.com/right-wing-populist-in-store-for-post-bibi-israel/]“He has been prime minister for a long time [since 2009] and people are waiting for the minute he

will go,” he said. “And there is a big political risk that a right-wing populist will rise .”

He noted that Netanyahu remains popular in Israel and is expected to win re-election next year , but

that the search for Netanyahu’s successor has given him pause because it may lead to “a dangerous

right-wing leader who will arise.”

“I’m looking at the energy and frustration on the right wing,” he explained. “I’m looking at issues that the right wing cares about — illegal immigration from Africa, the Gaza Strip being out of control, and donations from foreign governments to Israeli human rights organizations that [the right wing] see as traitors. I see this energy and frustration. But because Netanyahu is so popular , they still support him . Once he is gone … all the

energy can lead to a very populist message — and I think that is a huge threat .” Asked who this populist leader might be, Levinson said it may be someone currently unknown.

“I’m sure that five years ago very few people knew of the man who is now president of Brazil ,

and that five years ago no one believed Donald Trump would be president either.”

1NC – Impact – Gaza War (Bibi)

Increased political risk causes Gaza escalation and collapse – turns the case but also causes warAhronheim 18 [Anna Ahronheim writes for The Jerusalem Post, CAN ISRAEL'S POLITICAL CHESS GAME LEAD TO A SECURITY DISASTER?, 2018, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Can-Israels-political-chess-game-lead-to-a-security-disaster-572273]A prime minister also serving as defense minister can lead Israel to pay a heavy price in terms of

security , defense experts believe.

With a shaky coalition and facing several investigations , the challenges facing Netanyahu, who currently holds five portfolios (Prime Minister, Foreign, Health, Immigration and now

Defense) are not simple.

While defense experts believe that Netanyahu has the ability to act as both defense and

prime minister in the short term, the current political situation could lead Israel to make

decisions it could regret . According to one defense establishment source who spoke to The Jerusalem Post, “politics is leading us to do things in the Gaza Strip which we shouldn’t be doing...we don’t want Gaza to face a humanitarian collapse

which will lead it to a disaster security-wise .” Netanyahu’s government seems to be a cat with nine lives, saved this time by Education Minister Naftali Bennett and Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked announcing on Monday morning that they would not be resigning.During the dramatic announcement that they would not force elections by resigning from Netanyahu’s government if Bennett was not appointed defense minister, he took a huge political risk and criticized the IDF.According to him, the country is in a “deep security crisis” and “has stopped winning” since the Second Lebanon War in 2006.“I’ve seen it. I’ve seen the confusion, the chaos, the lack of determination, the lack of spirit,” he said.Dr. Eitan Shamir, former head of the National Security Doctrine Department in Strategic Affairs Ministry told The Jerusalem Post that while it would have been good for Bennett to hold the defense portfolio, it would have come with a significant risk had something were to happen under shift.For Shamir, Netanyahu’s long history of involvement in Israel’s foreign and security affairs will “ at least for the coming months , fill the void ” and will not have a negative effect on the defense establishment,

as long as he has a competent deputy who is not chosen due to political considerations. “The defense establishment is a well-oiled machine,” Shamir said, adding that any “big decisions will be taken by Netanyahu as the prime minister.”On Sunday night at the IDF’s Kirya military headquarters in Tel Aviv, Netanyahu said that Israel is “in one of the most complex security situations.” The next day during his first address as defense minister at the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs committee, he once again stressed that Israel was “still in a military campaign.”

Defense establishment officials do agree that the current situation Israel finds itself in is complex, and the risk of a major

conflict on either the northern or southern front can explode at a moment’s notice. But unlike Netanyahu, who has been flying around the world wooing government leaders, they stress that the security challenges the Jewish state faces have not dramatically changed in recent weeks.

The IDF , unlike what Bennett said Monday, still wants to win and can still win. The only change in recent

weeks is the political environment . And one wrong move in Israel’s political chess game can

lead to deadly mistakes .

2NC – Impact – West Bank (Bibi)

West Bank withdrawal collapses Israeli strategic depth and defense – that causes existential conflictHacohen 19 [Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen, Benny Gantz’s Dangerous Ambiguity on West Bank Disengagement, BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,090, February 18, 2019]EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Unilateral disengagement from the West Bank, which Israeli PM candidate Benny

Gantz seems to support, would have far-reaching adverse implications for Israel in the

security, economic, social, infrastructural, and ecological spheres. For all his efforts to keep his views on key national issues under wraps, so as to make his premiership bid appealing to the largest possible number of Israelis, former IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz has indicated his readiness to apply the highly controversial unilateral disengagement formula that Sharon applied to Gaza in 2005 to the West Bank as well. “We need to find a way in which we’re not controlling other people,” Gantz told the daily Yediot Ahronot in his first interview as a PM candidate. “[The unilateral disengagement] was a legal move, a decision made by the Israeli government and carried out by the IDF and the settlers in a painful, but good manner. We need to take the lessons learned and implement them elsewhere.” Leaving aside the ambiguity of these well-worn terms (e.g., most of the world views Jewish neighborhoods in east Jerusalem as “settlements” while Israelis consider them an integral part of Israel), or the feasibility of evacuating some 140,000 Jewish residents from their homes with no Palestinian quid pro

quo, Gantz’s thinking seems to be predicated on dated suppositions that have long been overtaken by

events. The political and strategic precepts underlying the Oslo “peace” process, which Gantz echoes,

vanished long ago. The PLO has unequivocally revealed its true colors : its total disinterest in

peace , unyielding rejection of the idea of Jewish statehood, and incessant propensity for violence and

terror ism . The US, which rose to world preeminence after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the east European bloc, has largely lost this status over the past decade, while Russia has recovered much lost ground and regained a firm military and

political foothold in the Middle East. Tehran is rapidly emerging as regional hegemon , with its tentacles

spreading from Yemen and Iraq to the Mediterranean Sea and its dogged quest for nuclear

weapons continuing apace under the international radar. Even the terror groups of Hezbollah and

Hamas pose a far greater threat to Israel’s national security than they did a decade ago. Under

these circumstances, Israel’s withdrawal from the West Bank’s Area C would constitute nothing short of an existential threat . Nor does Israel need to find a way to stop “controlling other people,” as Gantz put it, for the simple

reason that its control of the Palestinians ended some two decades ago. In May 1994 the IDF withdrew from all Palestinian population centers in the Gaza Strip. In January 1996 it vacated the West Bank’s populated areas (the Oslo Accords’ Areas A and B), comprising over 90% of the West Bank’s Palestinian residents, and handed control of that population to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Effectively realizing PM Rabin’s vision of ending Israel’s control of the Palestinians without creating a fully-fledged Palestinian state, this move should have ended the debate about the supposed contradiction between Israel’s Jewish and democratic nature. These territories (Gaza and Areas A & B) are to all intents and purposes independent entities that will never become a part of Israel. This in turn means that the real dispute between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as within Israel itself, no

longer revolves around the end of “occupation” but around the future of East Jerusalem and Area C. And

since Area C (which is home to only 100,000 Palestinians) includes all Jewish West Bank localities, IDF

bases , transportation arteries , vital topographic sites , and habitable empty spaces between the Jordan

Valley and the Jerusalem metropolis, its continued retention by Israel is a vital national interest. Why?

Because its surrender to a potentially hostile Palestinian state would make the defense of the Israeli

hinterland virtually impossible – and because these highly strategic and sparsely populated lands

are of immense economic, infrastructural, communal, ecological, and cultural importance , not to mention their

historical significance as the bedrock of the millenarian Jewish ancestral homeland.

2NC – Internal Link – Iran Strikes

US arms sales are the exclusive restraint on Israeli first strikesFreilich 17 (Chuck Freilich is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel, is a senior fellow at the Belfer Center “How long could Israel survive without America?” 7/14/17 https://www.newsweek.com/how-long-could-israel-survive-without-america-636298 Accessed 7/6/19 , Catherine Zhu )Whether on the peace process, in which there has been competition with the Arab side for American favour, the Iranian nuclear programme, other issues of regional WMD proliferation, terrorism, efforts to delegitimize and impose sanctions on Israel, and just about everything else, turning to Washington has been Israel's primary recourse. In effect, the US and Israel long ago reached an unwritten understanding. The US provides Israel with massive military assistance, a de facto security guarantee, broad but not total diplomatic support and (previously) economic assistance. In exchange, Israel is expected to consult with Washington on issues of importance prior to taking action, demonstrate military restraint and diplomatic moderation, even make some concessions, and accord the American position overriding importance. Israel certainly does act independently at times, probably more often than one might expect in a totally asymmetric relationship such as this. With a few exceptions, however, US policy has been the primary determining factor in virtually all major national-security decisions Israel has made ever since the special relationship emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, and in many cases long before then. On matters pertaining to major military operations, Israel virtually always accords primacy to the US position, and it does so on most diplomatic issues as well. In 1967, at a time when US–Israeli relations were still quite limited, the Israelis only went to war after president Lyndon Johnson informed them that he would not be able to fulfil the earlier US commitment to open the Straits of Tiran, which Egypt had closed to Israeli shipping, and arguably provided an "amber light" for Israeli action. In 1973, the primary reason Israel refrained from conducting a pre-emptive strike, even once it had become clear that an Egyptian and Syrian attack was imminent, was the fear of the American response. Israel only launched the 1982 Lebanon war after at least partially convincing the US of the need for a large scale military operation, a process which took the better part of a year. In 1991, Israel refrained from responding to Iraqi missile attacks largely due to American

pressure. The American demand that Israel refrain from attacking Lebanon's civil infrastructure during the 2006 war left the IDF without a viable military strategy, and was one of the primary reasons for the difficulties Israel encountered. Concern over a potential lack of support by the incoming Obama administration led Israel to terminate the 2008 operation in Gaza earlier than intended. Israel's decision to refrain from a strike on the Iranian nuclear programme, even though it considered it an existential threat, is a particularly important example of the primacy it accords the US position, and especially of the need for American support for major military action.

2NC – Internal Link – Counter-Terrorism Co-Op

Israel-United States Alliance is key to innovation and counter-terror

Eisenstadt and Pollock 12(Michael and David, “Friends with Benefits: Why the U.S.-Israeli Alliance Is Good for America,” 7 Nov 2012, 6 Jul 2019, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/friends-with-benefits-why-the-u.s.-israeli-alliance-is-good-for-america, Jackson Witt)At the final presidential debate of the 2012 campaign season, President Barack Obama and Governor Mitt Romney mentioned Israel some 30 times, more than any other country except Iran. Both candidates called the Jewish state "a true friend," pledging to stand with it through thick and thin. Some political commentators criticized these effusive declarations of support as pandering, suggesting that the candidates were simply going after Jewish and pro-Israel votes. But if support for Israel is indeed such a political winner, then it's at least in part because the voters know best. The U.S.-Israeli alliance now contributes more than ever to American security, as bilateral cooperation to deal with both military and nonmilitary challenges has grown in recent years. The relationship may not be symmetrical; the United States has provided Israel with indispensable diplomatic, economic, and military support totaling more than $115 billion since 1949. But it is a two-way partnership whose benefits to the United States have been substantial. The other, less tangible costs of the U.S.-Israeli alliance -- mainly, damage to Washington's reputation in Arab and Muslim countries, a problem also caused by American interventions and decades of U.S. support for autocratic leaders in the Middle East -- pale in comparison with the economic, military, and political gains it affords Washington. U.S.-Israeli security cooperation dates back to heights of the Cold War, when the Jewish state came to be seen in Washington as a bulwark against Soviet influence in the Middle East and a counter to Arab nationalism. Although the world has changed since then, the strategic logic for the U.S.-Israeli alliance has not. Israel remains a counterweight against radical forces in the Middle East, including political Islam and violent extremism. It has also prevented the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region by thwarting Iraq and Syria's nuclear programs. Israel continues to help the United States deal with traditional security threats. The two countries share intelligence on terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and Middle Eastern politics. Israel's military experiences have shaped the United States' approach to counterterrorism and homeland security. The two governments work together to develop sophisticated military technology, such as the David's Sling counter-rocket and Arrow missile defense systems, which may soon be ready for export to other U.S. allies. Israel has also emerged as an important niche defense supplier to the U.S. military, with sales growing from $300 million per year before September 11 to $1.1 billion in 2006, due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Israel's military research and development complex has pioneered many cutting-edge technologies that are transforming the face of modern war, including cyberweapons, unmanned vehicles (such as land robots and aerial drones), sensors and electronic warfare systems, and advanced defenses for military vehicles. The U.S.-Israeli alliance has paved the way for the countries to cooperate on far more than just traditional security issues. In part because of the long-standing political and security relationship between the United States and Israel, most Israelis know the United States and harbor positive feelings toward it. Israeli companies looking for a global market for their products have often viewed their American counterparts as partners of choice. So today, Israeli civilian technological innovations are helping the United States maintain its economic competitiveness, promote

sustainable development, and address a range of non-military security challenges. Dozens of leading U.S. companies have set up technology incubators in Israel to take advantage of the country's penchant for new ideas, which is why Bill Gates observed in 2006 that the "innovation going on in Israel is critical to the future of the technology business." Likewise, Israeli high-tech firms often turn to U.S. companies as partners for joint production and marketing opportunities in the United States and elsewhere, creating tens of thousands of American jobs. And although Israelis make up just three percent of the population of the Middle East, in 2011 Israel was the destination of 25 percent of all U.S. exports to the region, having recently eclipsed Saudi Arabia as the top market there for American products. U.S. companies' substantial cooperation with Israel on information technology has been crucial to Silicon Valley's success. At Intel's research and development centers in Israel, engineers have designed many of the company's most successful microprocessors, accounting for some 40 percent of the firm's revenues last year. If you've made a secure financial transaction on the Internet, sent an instant message, or bought something using PayPal, you can thank Israeli IT researchers. Israeli innovators have also come up with novel solutions to the water and food security challenges posed by population growth, climate change, and economic development. By necessity, given the geography of the Middle East, Israel is a world leader in water conservation and management and high-tech agriculture. Israel recycles more than eighty percent of its wastewater -- the highest level in the world -- and has pioneered widely used techniques of conserving or purifying water, including drip irrigation and reverse osmosis desalination. And a number of Israeli companies are leaders in the development of renewable energy sources; BrightSource Industries, for example, is building a solar power plant in California using Israeli technology that will double the amount of solar thermal electricity produced in America. These innovations, bolstered by the substantial American investment in Israel, contribute to long-term U.S. domestic and foreign policy objectives relating to sustainable development. To be sure, the alliance with Israel has not been without risks or costs for Washington. The 1973 War between Israel and its neighbors brought America to the brink of conflict with the Soviet Union and prompted an Arab embargo on oil exports to the United States. Following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Reagan administration dispatched U.S. marines to help stabilize the country, which ultimately resulted in costly attacks on American diplomats and military personnel there. And U.S. diplomatic and military support for Israel has reinforced negative attitudes toward the United States in many Arab and predominantly Muslim countries. But these costs should not be overstated. Beyond leading to largely symbolic UN votes against U.S. positions, Washington's support for Israel has hardly damaged the United States' ties with its Arab and Muslim allies. Standing with Israel certainly has not hobbled U.S. policy toward the region as much as the war in Iraq or Washington's backing of autocratic Arab regimes. Meanwhile, no Arab ally of the United States has ever, as a result of its pro-Israel posture, refused to cooperate with Washington on counterterrorism or denied its requests for access, basing, or overflight rights. In fact, the U.S.-Israeli alliance has at times helped spur closer U.S.-Arab relations, on the theory that only the United States could convince Israel to make concessions in negotiations; this was part of the logic behind Egypt's shift away from the Soviet Union and toward the United States in the 1970s. And even during the past decade of close U.S.-Israeli cooperation, and despite an impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Arab ties with the United States have largely flourished: bilateral trade and investment are booming, as U.S. exports to the Middle East in 2011 reached an all-time high of $56 billion. Defense cooperation is as close as ever, indicated by the several multi-billion-dollar arms deals that Washington has struck with Gulf allies in recent years. Moreover, several states, including Egypt and Jordan, along with the Palestinian Authority, share intelligence with Israel and at various times have worked behind the scenes to enlist Israel as an

intermediary with Washington. This has been the case even with Egypt's post-revolutionary government. All this underscores the fact that self-interest, not ideology, is the primary driver of the Arab states' relations with Washington. Despite the ties that continue to bind the United States and some Arab countries, the last two years of upheaval have brought turmoil to many of Washington's traditional allies in the region. At a time of great uncertainty, particularly as tensions with Iran mount, the United States is even more likely to depend on its somewhat stable nondemocratic allies, such as Saudi Arabia, and its stable democratic allies, such as Israel and Turkey, to secure its interests in the region. If anything, recent events have reinforced the logic underpinning U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation. The benefits to the United States of its relationship with Israel belie the argument that the alliance is based solely on the two countries' shared democratic values, on the popularity of Israel in American politics, or on the elusive pursuit of progress in the peace process. It is a relationship based on tangible interests -- and will remain so for the foreseeable future. It isn't always easy being Israel's ally (and Israeli actions don't always make it easier).

2NC – Internal Link – Iran Prolif

Arms sales key to prevent Iran prolif

Menenberg 15(Aaron, “Can Israel’s Military Edge Be Sustained?,” Oct 2015, 6 Jul 2019, http://www.thetower.org/article/can-israels-military-edge-be-sustained/, Jackson Witt)One measure of this is Israel’s responsibility as a nuclear power. It has been credibly rumored to possess nuclear weapons for decades. Yet it has never used them, even in such desperate situations as the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Indeed, Israel has studiously adhered to its stated policy that it will not be the first state to “introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.” The region has been able to operate effectively as a nuclear-free zone, which means that there has been no need for a strategic balance of nuclear deterrence between multiple states. But nuclear proliferation in the Middle East has now become an issue because of the serious threat of Iranian and Arab nuclear power, not Israel’s ambiguous nuclear capabilities . A scientist enters the reactor hall of the nuclear facility in Nahal Sorek. Unlike the nuclear reactor at Dimona, the reactor at Nahal Sorek is inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency twice a year. A scientist enters the reactor hall of the nuclear facility in Nahal Sorek. Unlike the nuclear reactor at Dimona, the reactor at Nahal Sorek is inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency twice a year. If arming Israel with nuclear weapons seems too strong a reaction to the JCPOA, then the reason it must be seriously considered—Iran’s nuclear program— must be

eliminated . If Iran’s nuclear program can be dismantled before the Tehran regime achieves a nuclear weapon, than the radical enhancement of Israel’s nuclear deterrent by the U.S. need not be pursued. This would be a much more desirable outcome than one that produces (at least) two nuclear-armed countries in the Middle East. Unfortunately, no international leaders have shown the appetite or courage to go after Iran’s nuclear program, because they understand Iran will fight such an effort every step of the way. It is a sad irony that the present fear of conflict, along with the belief that the feeble provisions of the JCPOA will prevent Iran from weaponizing, has increased the odds of a future conflict that would be far more horrific.

Yet that risk must be accepted if we are to reduce the chances of nuclear war , which means moving to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program and creating a capable Israeli nuclear deterrent as a Plan B. Thus, Congress and the administration must look seriously and honestly at the options we have if we are to continue our role as the predominant influencer in the Middle East: Outfit Israel with a superior nuclear program, or eliminate Iran’s nuclear program altogether. This effort naturally must include Israel, which may not want to draw any more attention to a nuclear program it may or may not have given its deliberate policy of ambiguity on the subject. As the discussion takes place, all parties involved must also look for other ways to enhance Israel’s capabilities so as to compensate for its lack of territorial depth in the face of an Iranian nuclear weapon. The challenge will be finding the means to allow Israelis to remain in Israel while under nuclear attack from Iran or its proxies. Some of these will be military , but they

must also be more than that. They must be diplomatic, they must be subversive, and they must

be economic , because there is no military means of keeping Israelis safe in an attack involving a nuclear-armed Iran whether Iran uses the bomb or not. And so we come full circle to the reality that the JCPOA is not enough to keep the region safe from Iran. In order to limit nuclear

proliferation and keep poisonous Iranian influence to a minimum, America, Israel, and their allies need a robust plan to ensure Iran’s nuclear program is eliminated , and the courage to see it through. Talking about ensuring that Israel can neutralize a nuclear-armed Iran, and moving towards that reality in order to create a credible deterrent, is a start, but demonstrative action towards the elimination of Iran’s nuclear program will be required if we are to achieve a stable Middle East free of radical rulers wielding nuclear weapons. The future of Israel, and the future of American regional influence, depends on ensuring that Israel’s QME is maintained and succeeding in eliminating Iran’s nuclear program. Failure to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities means the price will be much higher for the people of the Middle East, including Iranian citizens who suffer severe oppression at the hands of a regime that will only get stronger under the JCPOA. Even without a nuclear weapon, the death and destruction that Iran has wreaked on the region has been incredible: Hundreds of thousands dead and millions displaced. There is no forgiving that, and there ought to be no accommodating it either.

2NC – Internal Link – Economy

The US economy is linked to Israel – destroying the alliance would destroy the economyMenenburg 16 Israel Gives Much More to the U.S. Economy Than You Imagined, The Tower, http://www.thetower.org/article/israel-gives-much-more-to-the-u-s-economy-than-you-imagined/Aaron Menenberg is the Executive Director of the Public Interest Fellowship. He also covers foreign policy and energy for Roubini Global Economics' The Economonitor, and is a member of the Foreign Policy Initiative Leadership Network Council. Aaron formerly worked as the Director of Congressional Affairs at the Israel Allies Foundation, was a 2010-2011 Menachem Begin Heritage Center Israel Government Fellow, and worked with the Civil Administration at the Israel Defense Forces and Civil Administration base in Beit El.

The U.S.-Israel alliance’s backbone is the two countries’ macroeconomic ties. America has FTAs

with twenty countries. Through our exports to those countries, 17,638,294 American jobs were

directly supported between 2009 and 2014, according to the Department of Commerce. Of that

total, trade with Israel contributed 254,562, the eighth-largest contribution among the 20 trade

partners. When the data is further examined, however, it turns out that exports to Israel

generate the highest amount of export dollars per job. While Israel’s economy does not offer the sheer

volume of market opportunities for American products and services that FTA partner economies like Canada, Mexico, and Australia

do, the quantity of export dollars generated by each American job supported by trade with Israel is far more significant than those

larger economies on a per job basis. As demonstrated in the graphic below, US jobs supported by exports to Israel represent the

highest value per job of any of the 20 free trade partner countries. This number is found by taking the dollar amount of trade

between the U.S. and a given country, then dividing it by the number of jobs supported by that country. One reason that U.S. jobs

supported by exports to Israel provide so much bang for the buck is the nature of the goods and services provided. It is no secret

that Israel has one of the most advanced economies in the world. The “Startup Nation” is among the world’s top innovators and its

work touches the lives of people around the globe in nearly every imaginable sector: Mobile and computing technology and services,

healthcare, food and agriculture, scientific research and development, water, environmental protection, and defense. And as citizens

of an advanced nation, Israelis are also users of these advanced technologies and their applications. This makes the Israeli market

ripe for the kind of exports that create and sustain high-paying jobs in America. The top American export categories to Israel by

dollar value in 2014 are among those considered blue- and white-collar industries: Precious stones, electrical and mechanical

machinery, aircraft, and optic and medical instruments. Another reason high-paying American jobs are tied to

trade with Israel is the amount of foreign direct investment Israel sends to America, which is

primarily concentrated in the human capital-heavy manufacturing sector. According the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Israel’s cumulative investments in

the U nited S tates through 2013 are more than economic giants like China, India, Russia, Hong

Kong, and Brazil, not to mention major oil producer Venezuela, mutual defense treaty partner

Taiwan, and all of Africa’s individual countries. Inasmuch as foreign investment factors into

American foreign policy, this consideration should rank higher for Israel than any of those

countries, which is a striking statement when you consider how much leeway countries like

China, India, and Russia in particular receive from our government on human rights concerns the

boycott movement claims to care about. We have data on the impact of the economic

relationship with Israel on individual states as well. Every state in the union has its own

economic ties to Israel. At the very lowest level of economic engagement, Alaska still did over

$287,000 in trade with Israel as of 2014, not to mention the more than $2.7 million received in

2012 alone by the Alaska defense industry in purchases made through Foreign Military Financing

(FMF) provided by the U.S. to Israel through bilateral assistance. At the top end of state

economic ties with Israel is New York, which enjoyed over $6.3 billion in trade with Israel in

2014, making Israel its fourth-largest trading partner. Five years prior, the state signed a

memorandum of understanding with Israel that builds industrial cooperation and provides

assistance to companies seeking financial support for research and development projects, while

also establishing information and personal exchanges in nanotechnology, biotechnology, and

security. Major companies operating in New York like GE and Eastman Kodak count Israel as an

important market, while medical companies like J. Jamner Surgical Instruments consider Israel a

key market because of the high value Israel places on providing quality health care to its citizens.

The 48 states between New York and Alaska have similar stories to tell: Profitable economic

ties that sustain many jobs.

2NC – Internal Link – Climate Change

Israeli-US science programs – a result of the alliance – support the US economy and solves disease and climate change Menenburg 16 Israel Gives Much More to the U.S. Economy Than You Imagined, The Tower, http://www.thetower.org/article/israel-gives-much-more-to-the-u-s-economy-than-you-imagined/Aaron Menenberg is the Executive Director of the Public Interest Fellowship. He also covers foreign policy and energy for Roubini Global Economics' The Economonitor, and is a member of the Foreign Policy Initiative Leadership Network Council. Aaron formerly worked as the Director of Congressional Affairs at the Israel Allies Foundation, was a 2010-2011 Menachem Begin Heritage Center Israel Government Fellow, and worked with the Civil Administration at the Israel Defense Forces and Civil Administration base in Beit El.

Another level to the U.S.-Israel economic alliance, but no less important to it, are the three

U.S.-Israel binational programs: the Binational Science Foundation (BSF), the Binational

Industrial Research and Development Foundation (BIRD), and the Binational Agricultural

Research and Development Foundation (BARD). These programs were started in the 1970s by

the American and Israeli governments with the initial goal of strengthening the U.S.-Israel

alliance through fostering Israel’s then-nascent technology industry. The three programs have

been more than successful in meeting this goal, helping to lay the foundation for Israel’s

success as one of the world’s leading scientific, industrial, and technologically advanced

nations. They have also accelerated advances in similar industries in America. These programs

receive equal funding from both countries and then distribute those funds through competitive

processes into joint American and Israeli research and development efforts. The results have

been staggering, and they have undoubtedly contributed to better quality of life—including

basic life expectancy—around the world, in addition to driving American and Israeli societies

forward. The BSF funds nonprofit collaborative research by U.S. and Israeli scientists that can

become the basis for commercially viable technological developments. Grants are made through

a peer-reviewed process juried by leading scientists from around the world. Thirty-eight Nobel

laureates have received BSF funding. In 2004 alone, six of eight Nobel Prize winners were BSF

grantees. That year, the Nobel Prize for Chemistry was awarded to Avram Hershko and Aaron

Ciechanover of the Technion—Israel Institute of Technology and Irwin Rose of University of

California, Irvine (incidentally, a bastion of the anti-Israel movement) for their BSF-funded

discovery of the ubiquitin system for protein degradation, which opened up new research

opportunities on cancer treatments, neurodegenerative disorders, and more. Two of BSF’s

projects, an algorithm that has revolutionized online auctions and advertising, and the Positron

Emitting Tomography, a diagnostic tool that identifies cancer, have had such commercial

success that they’ve paid for the entire BSF program several times over. According to a 2011 Economic Strategy Institute (ESI)

study on the three binational programs, scientists in 47 of America’s 50 states, plus Puerto Rico, had received BSF grants. The BIRD

Foundation promotes non-defense industrial research and development jointly conducted by Israeli and American companies with

an eye toward commercialization. Different from BSF and BARD, if a BIRD project is successful and generates revenue, the grant

must be repaid by the recipients. As of 2011, the ESI study found that 384 of the 826 BIRD-funded projects have been repaid,

representing about a third of the total amount invested. Return on BIRD’s total investment was 600 percent as of 2011, while

recipients of BIRD funding were spread across 41 states. BIRD successes abound. One BIRD-funded project contributed to the

creation of the digital signal processing chips that have become essential to a wide variety of electronic products, including the

multibillion-dollar digital camera industry. Another American corporation turned a $675,000 grant in 1992 into annual sales of $100

million, profits of $20 million, and over 500 jobs. All told, BIRD-sponsored projects have produced over $5

billion in global sales and $100 million in tax payments to the US government. BIRD has had

several medical successes as well. One is the development of Krystexxa, a drug that treats

chronic gout in adult patients. Another is a joint project between the pharmaceutical company

Kamada and the American Red Cross (a member of the historically anti-Israel International

Committee of the Red Cross) that produced a breakthrough on treatment of Alpha1 Antitrypsin

Deficiency, a genetic disorder that causes lung and liver disease. In 2007, Congress passed the

Energy Independence and Security Act, which included funding for BIRD to expand its work into

the energy sector, creating BIRD Energy. The program provides matching financial contributions

from the U.S. and Israeli governments for joint U.S.-Israel private sector energy research and

development. Projects have thus far focused on energy efficiency, hydroelectric energy

production, lowering energy consumption in water treatment, energy optimization in

manufacturing, wind energy storage, fuel efficiency, carbon dioxide emissions reduction in

tractor-trailers, and noise control for distributed power generation. Israeli-American programs

like the BSF, BIRD, and BARD greatly contribute to the economy and welfare of both nations.

The BARD program competitively funds and promotes collaboration by U.S. and Israeli scientists on agricultural research and

development projects that aim to increase agricultural productivity and emphasize plant and animal health, food quality and safety,

and environmental issues. Although commercialization is not a factor in BARD grant-making, ten BARD projects, with a total BARD

investment of $2 million, have resulted in $1.7 billion in economic benefits to the U.S., according to the ESI study. Other successful

BARD projects include the development of a machine that screens for a wider variety of pesticides and chemicals in food, which

allows government agencies to maintain security of the food supply; a zero-discharge intensive aquaculture system for fresh and sea

water fish that prevents environmental pollution (two have already been built in New York and Washington state); a preservation

method for the transport of cut flowers that reduces costs and environmental impact; the creation of a database for cows that

allows farmers to optimize breeding; and genetic mapping of fruit so scientists worldwide can study aroma, taste, and quality. Want

to know why tilapia fish has shown up on nearly every restaurant menu and grocery seafood section? The answer is in large part a

BARD-funded project that researched selective breeding in tilapia that helped launch the industry in America. The ESI study found

BARD recipients in 47 U.S. states and Puerto Rico. According to the ESI study, “a very conservative estimate of the historic number of

jobs created in the United States by the investments of the [three] binational foundations is 18,000-50,000. But it could well be in

the 200,000 or more range.” The study found that total economic benefits to the United States totaled $7.7

billion, and $700 million in tax revenue for the U.S. government. Researchers will be hard

pressed to find better-performing federally-funded projects.

US – Israeli Science Collaboration will solve for climate changeYudelvich 1/21 CLIMATE CHANGE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ISRAEL-U.S. COOPERATION The

Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Climate-change-an-opportunity-for-Israel-US-

cooperation-578189

The writer is the executive director of the BIRD Foundation.

The National Climate Assessment (NCA) report, published recently by the US government,

creates opportunities for cooperation between Israeli and US companies and academic

institutions to deal with global warming and climate change, a problem that poses a

fundamental threat, especially to weaker populations. The NCA report stresses the need to

promote mitigation processes on a global level and to adapt to the new situation on a regional

level. Mitigation processes focus primarily on reducing greenhouse gas emissions – an

international effort that is struggling to achieve its goals. The major challenge facing humanity

lies in reducing increasing temperatures to less than 2 degrees Celsius, while an increase of 1.5

degrees is likely between 2030 and 2052. Although the Paris Agreement has been signed and

ratified in Israel, the problem of climate change, which stems from human behavior, does not

attract much attention, neither from politicians nor from the general public. This can be

explained by the more immediate concerns regarding security that often directly affect Israelis

in a very tangible way. However, Israel does contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions

through a determined transition from coal-fired power plants to natural-gas power plants. In

addition, there is a (relatively modest) target to adopt renewable energy. By 2022, all electricity

in Israel will be produced mainly from gas or from renewable sources. With regard to adaptation

to climate change, the Israeli government adopted a resolution titled, “Israel’s Preparation for

Adaptation to Climate Change: Implementation of Government Recommendations for a Strategy

and National Action Plan.” This resolution, based on the Environmental Protection Ministry’s

detailed preparation plan, relates to damage to life and property, sustainability of the biological

environment, promotion of research and knowledge, education and public awareness, and the

promotion of international cooperation. Despite the impressive scope of the plan and its

strategic importance, it has barely resonated with the public. Israel’s resolution regarding

climate change and the publication of the NCA report in the US opens a window for closer

cooperation between Israel and the US regarding adaptation to climate change, especially in

the promotion of knowledge and technologies. A recently adopted US-Israel initiative may

prove to be impactful by increasing collaboration in climate change related topics such as

energy and water. In June 2018, US Secretary of Energy Rick Perry and Israeli Energy Minister

Dr. Yuval Steinitz signed an agreement to establish a US-Israel Energy Center (the US-Israel

Center of Excellence in Energy, Engineering and Water Technology). The aim of the center is to

promote research projects through joint consortia, including academia and industry from both

countries. The initiative began with congressional legislation within the United States-Israel

Strategic Partnership Act of 2014 and was first allocated funds by Congress in fiscal year 2018. In

parallel, the Israeli Energy Ministry together with the Innovation Authority successfully

promoted a government decision to increase the budget allocated to US-Israel cooperation in

energy. Four main areas were defined for the Energy Center: energy storage, energy

infrastructure protection, energy-water nexus and fossil energy (mainly natural gas). Israel has

significant know-how and capabilities that may contribute to adaptation to climate change.

The new US-Israel Energy Center can also contribute by promoting relevant research and

technologies such as in water and infrastructure protection.

**Israeli Defense Industry**

1NC – Israeli DIB

Israel dependent on American arms salesFREILICH C. HOW LONG COULD ISRAEL SURVIVE WITHOUT AMERICA? 07/14/17. https://www.newsweek.com/how-long-could-israel-survive-without-america-636298, PranavThe importance of the United States to Israel's national security cannot be overstated. Washington is usually the first, and often the sole, port of call for strategic consultation – almost always the foremost one, and inevitably the primary means of addressing the challenges Israel faces. America is the be-all and end-all of most policy deliberations in Israeli national-security decision-making forums. Some four decades into this "special relationship," the price of a truly remarkable partnership has been a significant loss of Israeli independence. Indeed, Israel's dependence on the US has become so deep that it is questionable whether the country could even survive today without it. For Americans and Israelis alike, these are controversial assertions. Many Americans are critical of what they perceive to be ongoing Israeli disregard for US policy preferences, and even acts of defiance, despite an entirely asymmetric relationship and vast American aid. This is particularly true at a time when Israel is led by a hardline government. Israelis, for their part, do not wish to be this dependent on a foreign power, even one as friendly and well meaning towards Israel as the US, and they view Israel's ongoing freedom of decision and manoeuvre as vital to its national security. Total American assistance to Israel , from its establishment in 1949 up to 2016, amounts to approximately $125 billion , a whopping sum, making Israel the largest beneficiary of American aid in the post-Second World War era.1 By the end of the ten-year military-aid package recently agreed for 2019–28, the total figure will be nearly $170bn. US aid in recent years has accounted for some 3 percent of Israel's total national budget, and 1 percent of its GDP . 2 As such, its termination would require significant belt-tightening and painful cuts to Israel's already overstretched budget for domestic needs, such as health and education, which would inflame social tensions. It would not, however, pose an insurmountable challenge to Israel's national economy. The true impact would be on Israel's defence budget. In recent years, US aid has constituted approximately 20 percent of Israel's total defence budget (which includes pensions, and care and compensation for wounded veterans and widows), or 40 percent of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) budget,3 and almost the entire procurement budget . Termination would thus have a devastating impact on Israel's defence posture , unless a major reordering of national priorities took place, with profound economic and societal ramifications. Unlike Israel's adversaries, who can procure weapons from numerous sources with few political constraints, Israel's reliance on the US is critical. None of the other major arms producers today – Britain, France, Russia, China – would, or could, replace the US. Certainly, none would be willing to provide the funding, and, in any event, there is no qualitative substitute for American arms. Indeed, the US is committed by statute to preserving Israel's qualitative military edge (QME: that is, "the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual state, or possible coalition of states, or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damage and casualties … including weapons … superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalitions of states and non-state actors").4 Israel apparently enjoys a de facto US security guarantee, an important addition to its own deterrent capabilities at all times, but one which may prove critical in the future, for example, if the nightmarish – but possible – scenario of a Middle East with multiple nuclear actors emerges. No other country would or could address Iran's nuclear program, a potentially existential threat for Israel, as the US did, even if there were eventual differences

over the means of doing so. No other country would have helped Israel build a rocket and missile shield, the only one of its kind in the world, or have engaged (reportedly) in joint offensive cyber operations. The US further provides Israel with a link to its global satellite missile launch surveillance system, which gives it an invaluable extra few minutes of warning time, enabling civilians to take shelter, and the IDF to prepare and take countermeasures. The military relationship also includes extensive bilateral exercises, allowing the IDF to learn some of the most advanced tactics in the world. Some of the exercises have been multilateral, thereby contributing to the strengthening of Israel's foreign relations, in some cases with strategic importance. The US has prepositioned a large store of weapons and munitions in Israel, to which Israel has partial access,5 and the two countries engage in a wide variety of counter-terrorism, homeland-security and counter-proliferation measures. Unequivocal American support for Israel during the 2006 war in Lebanon made it the first military confrontation in the history of the Arab–Israeli conflict in which Israel did not face constraints of 'diplomatic time'. The US and Israel conduct unusually close and intensive strategic dialogue and planning. On the Iranian nuclear program in particular, the two countries engaged in a broad, largely unprecedented strategic conversation for some 20 years.

Cutting off military aid to Israel strengthens them – they have a big enough GDP to weather the hit, but removing dependence builds their domestic arms industry and shifts to ground operations – both of those are inherently less limited than conditioned US aidJacoby 16 [Jeff Jacoby, An Op-Ed columnist and nationally recognized conservative voice, hired from the Boston Herald in 1987. He briefly practiced law and was a commentator for WBUR-FM. His awards include the 1999 Breindel Prize and the 2004 Thomas Paine Award. I support Israel, which is why I don’t support US aid to Israel. September 4, 2016.https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/09/04/support-israel-which-why-don-support-aid-israel/SXvLm92jTazjoV33k7Y65L/story.html]But is it possible to support Israel and uphold the importance of the US-Israeli relationship while simultaneously opposing the annual

subsidy Congress provides to Israel’s military? Of course it is. The Jewish state , with its booming economy ,

doesn’t need America n charity. If only out of national self-respect, Israel should want to wean itself off the US dole — and America shouldn’t want its friendship for its stalwart Middle East ally to be tainted by financial dependence. Admittedly, this is not

the traditional pro-Israel view. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) characterizes US military aid to Israel

as “the most tangible manifestation of American support.” That aid currently amounts to $3.1 billion a year , and will

likely rise to $3.8 billion if a proposed 10-year aid package — which AIPAC vigorously supports — is approved. For decades, pro-Israel groups like AIPAC have stressed that US aid represents “the immutability of the US-Israel alliance.” And Israel-bashers agree: Many of them venomously denounce US aid precisely because they detest the close ties between Washington and Jerusalem that the aid

reflects. But the US-Israel alliance would be stronger , not weaker , if the financial largesse were

removed from the picture . That money comes with strings attached — strings that by definition limit

Israel’s freedom to make choices. For example, Israel is required to spend 75 percent of each year’s

assistance in the U nited S tates. That money may not be used to pursue military R&D or

acquire weapons in Israel itself, even though the country has a domestic arms industry with a

global reputation. (Under the new package being negotiated, Israel would have to spend all US aid in the United States.) Military aid to Israel thus amounts to a significant subsidy for the US defense industry. That may be great for Lockheed Martin, but it has

inevitably distorted Israel’s military decision-making. In an interview with Defense News last month, the former

commander of the I srael D efense F orce’s Northern Corps , and one-time commander of its military

colleges, argued that US defense assistance “ harms and corrupts” his country’s national security

interests . “ Israel is so addicted to advanced US platforms and the US weaponry they deliver

that we’ve stopping thinking creatively in terms of operational concepts ,” said Major General Gershon

Hacohen, who is now a reservist in the IDF. Dependence on US aid , he contends, has institutionalized Israeli

reliance on air power and ever-more-advanced technology , at the expense of focusing more

intensively on ground maneuvers and the unique threat posed by enemies waging asymmetric warfare. Hacohen thinks

Israel should break its addiction to US aid, and he’s not alone in saying so. Naftali Bennett, an Israeli cabinet minister who made a

fortune in software engineering before entering politics, also wants to cut the cord. US military aid , he points out,

amounts to only 1 percent of Israel’s nearly $300 billion GDP . A generation ago , American

aid might have been indispensable . But the country today, he says, “is much stronger, much

wealthier , and we need to be independent.” Support for winding down the military handouts comes as well from elder statesman Moshe Arens, a former Israeli defense minister and ambassador to Washington. “We love to get it . . . but we could get along without it,” Arens told a parliamentary conference in 2013.

Israel will lash out with nuclear weapons to peempt enemy aggression – nuclear response, bioweapons, conventional, or preemption. That’s scarier the weaker they get, and the aff doesn’t solve because aid is not key to nuclear weapons which they already haveBeres 19 [Prof. Louis René Beres The writer (Ph.D, Princeton, 1971) is emeritus professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, Staving off nuclear war in the Middle East, February 20, www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/23480]The residual prospect of atomic weapons firings could never be ruled out altogether.What then? There are four pertinent and intersecting narratives that best "cover the bases" of Israel's obligatory nuclear preparedness: Nuclear Retaliation; Counter Retaliation; Preemption; and War fighting.[2] Here is what these four critical scenarios could reveal to responsible and capable scholars:(1) Nuclear RetaliationShould an enemy state or alliance of enemy states ever launch a nuclear first- strike against Israel, Jerusalem would respond, assuredly, and to whatever extent possible and cost-effective, with a nuclear retaliatory

strike . If enemy first-strikes were to involve certain other forms of unconventional weapons, notably high-lethality

bio logical Weapons of mass destruction, Israel might still launch a nuclear reprisal . This particular

response would depend, in large measure, upon Jerusalem's calculated expectations of follow-on aggression and also on its associated assessments of comparative damage-limitation.

If Israel were to absorb "only" a massive conventional attack , a nuclear retal iation could still not be ruled out, especially if: (a) the state aggressor(s) were perceived to hold nuclear, and/or other unconventional weapons in reserve; and/or (b) Israel's leaders were to believe that exclusively non-nuclear retaliations could not prevent annihilation of the Jewish State. A nuclear retaliation by Israel could be ruled out entirely only in those evident circumstances where enemy state aggressions were conventional, and solely hard-target directed (that is, directed only toward Israeli weapons and military infrastructures, and not at any "soft" civilian populations).(2) Nuclear Counter retaliation

Should Israel feel compelled to preempt enemy state aggression with conventional weapons the target state(s)' response would largely determine Jerusalem's next moves. If this response were in any way nuclear, Israel would expectedly turn to nuclear counter retal iation. If this retaliation were to involve other weapons of mass

destruction, Israel might then feel pressed to take an appropriate escalatory initiative.

2NC – Link

Aid makes them less effective and less efficient because of conditions. But, bilateral coop is an alt cause the aff doesn’t solveBandow 12 [Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author and editor of several books, including Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire (Xulon) and Perpetuating Poverty: The World Bank, the IMF, and the Developing World (co-editor, Cato Institute). The Case for Ending Aid to Israel. June 5, 2012. https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-case-ending-aid-israel-7005]There’s another problem with U.S. aid. While bilateral defense coop eration has helped boost the Israeli arms industry, the conditions on American aid do the opposite . Since in some cases the Israeli

government has to go with U.S. weapons even if the domestic products were better ,

cheaper or both , efficient Israeli producers lose government contracts and consequent economies of scale. Israeli companies also have to purchase American raw materials , which raise the costs of Israeli weapons in world markets .

Further, notes Gazit: “Due to Israel’s reputation as a military power, any acquisition choice of Israel’s will instantly increase the demand for that product on the international market. When a foreign country contemplates a purchase from an Israeli arms manufacturer, the question of whether Israel’s own army uses that product often plays into the decision.” Thus, if the Israeli government buys American instead, Israeli companies may lose contracts abroad.Washington even uses its leverage to limit Israeli overseas arms sales. For instance, in 2000 Congress threatened to reduce aid if Israel provided weapons to China. “American assistance places pressure on Israel in this area, with the resulting economic loss,” says Gazit.

Another impact of foreign aid on Israel is the same as elsewhere—a disincentive to be efficient . The

guaranteed payment irrespective of Israel’s defense needs “ leaves the system with no

incentive to become more efficient ,” warns Gazit. Former prime minister Ehud Olmert argued that Israel could cut

its military outlays with no harm to its security but that American money reduces the pressure to do so.

Perhaps even worse is how U.S. “assistance” further inflates Israel’s already bloated government .

Government-to-government “aid” has expanded the overbearing, money-wasting regulatory state around the globe. Israel is no different.Explains Gazit:Without this aid, it stands to reason that the government would be forced to reduce the public sector in size, through defense budget cuts, restructuring and increased efficiency in other frameworks. This would direct many more resources toward the private sector, which would be motivated to seek creative and growth-oriented solutions, involving personnel, financing, as well as land and other resources currently held by the government.

Encouraging a larger and less efficient government naturally reduces Israel’s economic

strength , which is necessary to maintain an effective defense . More broadly, he argues, “the Government of Israel’s reliance on the American taxpayer sets a negative example which acts to encourage a culture of dependence.”

Israel can weather the hit – they have a strong economy and a booming tech sector that will strengthen their military in the absence of aidBandow 12 [Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author and editor of several books, including Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire (Xulon) and Perpetuating Poverty: The World Bank, the IMF, and the Developing World (co-editor, Cato Institute). The Case for Ending Aid to Israel. June 5, 2012. https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-case-ending-aid-israel-7005]

Israel does not need foreign aid —it is a wealthy nation with a booming hi- tech sector .

Weaknesses elsewhere in the economy are largely self-inflicted through collectivist economic practices. Moreover, Israel is a regional military superpower . If anything , the transfers should run in the other direction . However, the Senate is considering legislation to extend $9 billion in loan guarantees and provide more military support. Rather than reflect warming ties, however, the extra cash indicates an election-year financial raid. Israeli politicians enjoy having more American money to spend while U.S. politicians enjoy spending more American money to win votes.

Cutting off aid doesn’t solve the “special relationship” because it comes from shared morals and “special ally” status, not only from military aidLerman 18 [Eran Lerman is vice-president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies and teaches Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at Shalem College. Toward a New Model for the U.S.–Israel Relationship. February 12, 2018. https://mosaicmagazine.com/response/israel-zionism/2018/02/toward-a-new-model-for-the-u-s-israel-relationship/]Nor are military and strategic factors the only reason the U.S.-Israel bond is

“unbreakable” (to use President Obama’s term). In its present form, the relationship is now written into law —

with regard not only to ensuring Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME) but also to Israel’s standing as a “special

ally” of the U nited S tates (in the Strategic Partnership Act of 2014). This has happened not only

because various administrations have come to see Israel as critically helpful in the pursuit of

U.S. interests but also because of the deep-seated moral and political considerations grasped and

articulated by David Ben-Gurion in 1946. An affinity of values with Israel is central to the worldview of

many Americans , not least those socially conscious and combative patriots known in the 1980s as Reagan Democrats and

memorably described by Walter Russell Mead (in his 2008 Foreign Affairs essay “The New Israel and the Old”) as “Jacksonians.”

In the context of this powerful triad of common values , common interests , and common

political commitments , the so-called “lobby” of Israel’s greatest friends, particularly on Capitol Hill, should

be seen as a supplement , albeit a key one. Never enough in itself, the “lobby” is a force-multiplier precisely because the

three other pillars exist to legitimize its efforts to influence policy and budgets.

2NC – A2 Link Turn

Empirics prove – Israel will develop their own weaponsKatz 17 Yaakov Katz is an American-born Israeli journalist and author who currently serves as the Editor-in-Chief of The Jerusalem Post. His most recent book is "Shadow Strike - Inside Israel's Secret Mission to Eliminate Syrian Nuclear Power" which was published in May 2019 by St. Martin's Press, (“Why Israel has the most technologically advanced military on Earth”) January 29, 2017, Accessed 7/6/19 https://nypost.com/2017/01/29/why-israel-has-the-most-technologically-advanced-military-on-earth/, (Quin Nguyen Le)In 2000, the Israeli air force received its first operational Arrow missile battery, making Israel the first country in the world with an operational system that could shoot down incoming enemy missiles. The idea to create the Arrow was born in the mid-1980s after US President Ronald Reagan floated his Star Wars plan and asked America’s allies to partner in developing systems that could protect the country from Soviet nuclear missiles. The Arrow was a revolutionary idea. Due to Israel’s small size and lack of territory, all ballistic missiles deployed in the region — by Syria, Iraq and Iran — can reach anywhere within the country and pose a strategic and possibly even existential threat. Israel, the developers argued, needed a system that could shoot down enemy missiles over neighboring countries and provide overall protection for the tiny Jewish state. The program had its ups and downs but got a huge boost in funding after the First Gulf War in 1991, when Saddam Hussein fired 39 Scud missiles into Israel, paralyzing the country and forcing millions of Israelis into bomb shelters with their gas masks. The Arrow was just the beginning. Today, Israel has the Arrow, which is partially funded by the United States, to intercept long-range ballistic missiles, David’s Sling to intercept medium-range rockets and cruise missiles as well as the combat-proven Iron Dome, which has intercepted hundreds of Katyusha rockets fired from the Gaza Strip in recent years. Israel is the only country in the world that has used missile defense systems in times of war. These systems do more than just save lives. They also give the country’s leadership “diplomatic maneuverability,” the opportunity to think and strategize before retaliating against rocket attacks. While other countries have also invested in missile defense , none has created a multi-tier architecture like Israel. In 1988, Israel launched its first spy satellite into space, gaining membership in the exclusive club of just eight nations with independent satellite-launching capabilities. From the beginning, there were those who doubted Israel was capable of developing, building and launching its own satellite, but in the nearly 30 years since that day, it has grown into a satellite superpower, now operating eight different spy satellites in space. This is a critical capability considering the threats Israel faces from countries like Iran, which it still suspects is planning one day to build a nuclear weapon. Israel has shied away from building big satellites and instead designs what are known as “mini satellites,” which weigh about 300 kilograms (661 pounds) in comparison to America’s 25-ton satellites. Israel’s spy satellites are split into two categories. Most of Israel’s satellites come with advanced high-resolution cameras like the Ofek-9, launched in 2010, which can discern objects as small as 50 centimeters (20 inches) from hundreds of miles away. Israel’s other category of satellites are known as the TecSar. These satellites use a synthetic aperture sensor, basically a radar system that can create high-resolution images at almost the same quality as a regular camera. The advantage this technology provides Israel is tremendous. A camera cannot see through clouds or fog, but radars can work in all weather conditions and can even see through camouflage nets. What this means is that Israel has the ability to track its enemies and gather intelligence on them at all times of the day and through rain, fog or clouds. Israel’s success in developing state-of-the-art satellites has caught the world’s attention. In 2005, the French entered a strategic partnership with an Israeli company to develop a satellite, and in 2012, Italy ordered a reconnaissance satellite, paying $182 million. Singapore and India have also reportedly purchased Israeli satellites over the years. It is referred to in Israel as the “drone that can reach Iran.” The Heron TP is Israel’s largest unmanned aerial vehicle with an 85-foot wingspan, the same as a Boeing 737 airliner. It can stay airborne for 24 hours and carry a 1-ton payload. While Israel doesn’t openly admit it, the Heron TP is believed to also be capable of launching air-to-surface missiles. Israel was the first country in the world to operate drones in combat operations. Its first use of drones was in 1969, when the Israel Defense Forces flew toy airplanes with cameras glued to their bellies along the Suez Canal to spy on Egypt. In 1982, it flew its first combat drone, called Scout, in Lebanon, where they played a key role in locating and neutralizing Syrian anti-aircraft missile systems. That operation caught the world’s attention, and in 1986, Israel supplied the US Navy with its first drone, known as the Pioneer. A few years later, one Pioneer made history when it flew over a group of Iraqi soldiers during the First Gulf War. The soldiers saw the aircraft, took off their white undershirts and waved them in the air. It was the first time in history that a military unit had surrendered to a robot. Israel’s drones have revolutionized the modern battlefield. They cost a fraction of a manned fighter jet — some as little as a few million dollars — and participate today in every single operation conducted by the IDF. Drones give soldiers the ability to make calculated decisions before invading territory or storming enemy compounds. Before Israel bombs a building in the Gaza Strip, for example, it always has a drone in the air to ensure that civilians are not inside. They also reportedly fly almost daily over Lebanon, tracking fighters for Hezbollah, which is believed to have about 130,000 missiles capable of striking Israel. To this day, the Merkava tank is one of Israel’s most top-secret projects. It is said to be one of the most lethal and protected tanks in the world, and its construction started out of pure necessity — the United Kingdom and other countries refused to sell Israel tanks. So in the

1970s, it started to build its own. The newest model — known as the Merkava Mk-4 — is the most impressive. It can reach speeds of 40 mph and comes with a new modular armor kit, meaning that the tank can be fitted with the armor it needs based on the specific mission it is heading into.

Israel is self-sufficient, hi-tech weapons and personnel keep defense force sustainingSetton, BA, International Relations at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Senior Producer of the Associated Press 2019 (Keren, “Israel's defense industry continues thriving despite facing less security, May 13, 2019, Accessed 7/6/19, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-02/09/c_136962700.htm, DH)

Israel is perhaps facing less security threat than anytime in the past in its 70-year history. Still, the Jewish state's defense industry is thriving with hi-tech weapons and capabilities attractive to global markets. Indeed, the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan leave Israel battling with enemies who do not share its military might. A nuclear threat from Iran has been halted by an international treaty since 2015, and Syria is distracted by a seven-year bloody civil war. And still, Israel's defense industry is thriving, booming with hi-tech weapons and capabilities. Many innovations from Israeli defense firms are hits. That is because

Israel is continuously on a state of alert, dealing with a decades long low-intensity conflict with the Palestinians, who do not have a traditional army, that has also created the need for solutions to new threats. Israel is "a country that was born in a war and since then has more or less never stopped

being in a war," said Isaac Ben Israel, chairman of the Israel Space Agency and a retired military general. This is a fertile ground for immediate testing of weapons, said Gilad Alper, head of research at Excellence Nessuah Trust Company. Alper said that there is zero latency between the lab and the war zone in Israel, where the feedback from the soldiers on the ground is almost instantaneous. This advantage is huge and unique, Alper noted. "This is an ongoing improvement process that simply doesn't exist for other countries. They just don't have the know-

how or the experience," Alper said. Israel's small population, approximately 8 million, coupled with mandatory

military service for most citizens, means that everyone either has some extent of combat experience or knows someone who does. Israel is ranked 11th of the 20 biggest arms exporters in the world between 2011-2015, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), a rank that is disproportionate to Israel's size, one of the smallest in the world. It is a billion-dollar industry for the country that has managed to capitalize on its conflict-ridden history. This history has also resulted in a closely knitted network in which there is continuous flow of information and manpower between the military and civilian defense firms. "Made in Israel" is a good stamp to have when shopping in the defense sector. "The brand matters, but it is a result of those companies having close ties with the military and therefore always being able to develop something that works and is

relevant to the modern battle ground," Alper said. Israel's small size is also a factor. "In its bordering countries

alone there is 20 times the population of Israel," Ben Israel said. "This forced it to close the quantitative gap ... by making weapons that fit Israel exactly and give it an advantage to close that gap." Israel's quest for self-reliance came after a bitter lesson in politics was learned -- Franceimposed a weapons embargo on the

Middle East during the 1967 War. It was a severe blow to the Jewish state. Fast-forward to decades later, Israel is today not only self-reliant on many critical weapons systems, but also a major exporter. Big Israeli firms in the industry do not specialize in one sub-sector but often span to various sub-categories in an attempt to reach a wider market. This has both a downside and an upside.

Israel testing new airborne ballistic missiles, the United States doesn’t compareAxe, Defense Editor of the National Interest and American military correspondent, 19 (David, “The Rampage Missile Might Be Israel's New Super Weapon”, May 13, 2019, Accessed 7/6/19,

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/rampage-missile-might-be-israels-new-super-weapon-57267, DH)

According to aviation journalist Babak Taghvaee, on April 13, 2019 Israeli air force warplanes fired, for the first time, at least one Rampage air-launched ballistic missile at a missile factory

and weapons warehouses in Masyaf, Syria. The Israelis chose to deploy Rampage “due to the danger of Syria Air

Defense Force's S-300PM-2s,” Taghvaee tweeted. The S-300 surface-to-air missile, in theory, can intercept aircraft flying as far as 120 miles away. Report Advertisement The Israeli air raid succeeded in striking the target facilities and “destroying multiple artillery rockets and ballistic missile launchers,” according to Taghvaee. He tweeted commercial satellite imagery that appears to confirm damage to the site in Masyaf. Rampage first broke cover in the summer of 2018. Israel Aerospace Industries and Israel Military Industry Systems announced they had tested, from an F-16, the 15-feet-long, 1,200-pound, GPS-guided Rampage — and had already inked a sale contract with one customer, presumably the Israeli air force. Report Advertisement With Rampage, the Israeli air force joined a slowly growing number of air arms developing ALBMs for non-nuclear attacks. Russia has introduced its own, much larger ALBM. China reportedly is working on one, too. Among leading powers, only the United States apparently doesn’t see the value in an air-launched ballistic missile. America’s existing cruise missiles — which already are available to U.S. forces in very large numbers — are capable of striking, in large salvos, a wide range of distant targets.

**Lashout DA**

1NC – Unique Link – Hezbollah

U.S. arms sales provides leverage to demand Israeli cease fire William D. Hartung is Director of the Arms and Security Initiative at the New America Foundation, which serves as a resource for journalists, policymakers, and organizations focused on issues of weapons proliferation, military spending, and alternative approaches to national security strategy. John Feffer is director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies. He is the author of several books and numerous articles. He has been an Open Society Foundation Fellow and a PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of World Policy Journal. He has worked as an international affairs representative in Eastern Europe and East Asia for the American Friends Service Committee. Frida Berrigan serves on the Board of the War Resisters League and is a columnist for Foreign Policy In Focus. Everyone’s talking about the arms suppliers behind Hezbollah. But who’s supplying Israel? July 26th 2006. https://fpif.org/whos_arming_israel/, Pranav

Over the past decade, the United States has transferred more than $17 billion in military aid to this country of just under 7 million people. Israel is one of the United States’ largest arms importers. Between 1996 and 2005 (the last year for which full data is available), Israel took delivery of $10.19 billion in U.S. weaponry and military equipment, including more than $8.58 billion through the Foreign Military Sales program, and another $1.61 billion in Direct Commercial Sales During the Bush administration, from 2001 to 2005, Israel received $10.5 billion in Foreign Military Financing—the Pentagon’s biggest military aid program—and $6.3 billion in U.S. arms deliveries. The aid figure is larger than the arms transfer figure because it includes financing for major arms agreements for which the equipment has yet to be fully delivered. The most prominent of these deals is a $4.5 billion sale of 102 Lockheed Martin F-16s to Israel. Given the billions of dollars of aid it provides to Israel every year and the central role of U.S.-supplied weaponry in the Israeli arsenal, the United States has considerable leverage that it could use to promote a cease fire in the current conflict between Israel and Hezbollah before more Israeli and Lebanese civilians are killed and displaced. President Bush needs to go beyond vague calls for “restraint” to demands for a cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah, bringing in other key actors in the region, including Iran and Syria.

2NC – Link – Hezbollah

Both Israel and Hezbollah are gearing up for war and Israel’s only advantage is its weapons.Eilam 18 Ehud Eilam is an independent scholar with a PhD in history from Bar-Ilan University and a former private contractor for the Israeli Ministry of Defense where he conducted research in different branches of the IDF. July 7, 2018 (“What will the Next Israel-Hezbollah War Look Like?”) Accessed 7/6/19 https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/35878 (Quin Nguyen Le)The next round between Israel and Hezbollah might be much more destructive than the 2006 war, as the IDF would face a stronger, bigger adversary than it was twelve years ago. Analysis by Dr. Ehud Eilam. Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy and a non-state organization based in Lebanon, had fought the IDF in the 1980s and mostly in the 1990s when the Israeli military was deployed in Lebanon. In 2006, the two sides clashed again, for 34 days, a war that ended in a kind of a tie. They might fight again because of escalation or if Israel attacks Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, following an Iranian attempt to produce a nuclear weapon. It might happen if the July 2015 nuclear agreement will collapse completely after the United States already pulled out of it.  Israel’s evaluation of the duration and mostly the cost of a war with Hezbollah, in all levels, along with its other ramifications, will play a major part in Israel’s decision whether to bomb Iran’s nuclear sites or not. Meanwhile, there is ongoing   friction between Israel and Hezbollah, due to Israeli strikes in Syria, aiming at disrupting the transfer of advanced weapons from Iran to Lebanon, i.e., to Hezbollah. Hezbollah has suffered heavy casualties in the Syrian civil war, up to 2,000 and counting. The organization will require time to rehabilitate, so it does not seek to confront Israel for now. Yet a miscalculation by one or both sides might ignite a war no one wants. For example, if Israel bombs a convoy in Lebanon, one that carries weapons that came from Iran through Syria, then Hezbollah will retaliate against Israel, and the situation might get out of control. The IDF, one of the most powerful militaries in its region, outnumbers and outguns   Hezbollah in both manpower and weapon systems such as tanks, aircraft, etc. Yet Hezbollah has quite a significant hybrid force, which has anti-aircraft, anti-ship, and anti-tank missiles, hundreds of drones and above all up to 150,000 rockets and missiles. They have various warheads and some of which cover all of Israel. Hezbollah could fire more than a 1,000 rockets a day and maybe even more than that during a confrontation with Israel. Israel has systems to shoot down rockets and missiles, such as Arrow and the Iron Dome. Yet Israel does not have enough of them to intercept most of Hezbollah’s rockets and missiles, so the IDF can’t rely on a purely defensive strategy. The Israeli Air Force has been training to launch thousands of sorties in Lebanon, but it might not be able to stop the pounding of Israel by Hezbollah. Accomplishing this kind of mission also requires boots on the ground, i.e., to carry out a major land offensive inside Lebanon. In April 2018, the IDF published an updated version of "IDF Strategy" (the first one was published in 2015), which explains among others how the IDF plans to operate in the next war. In recent years, the military held many exercises, aimed against Hezbollah. The IDF, which had some setbacks in the 2006 war, is determined to perform better. However, defeating Hezbollah once and for all is a tall order. Even if Hezbollah takes a major hit, the group,   which   is rooted inside the Shi’ite community in Lebanon, can always continue fighting   with guerrilla and terror tactics. Israel will   therefore   seek more limited objectives, mostly to destroy Hezbollah’s rockets and cause the group heavy casualties, aiming at deterring it and other groups –primarily Hamas – from provoking, let alone confronting, Israel. The IDF will penetrate several dozen kilometers into Lebanon. The IDF’s elite armor and infantry units, mostly the regular ones, will carry the burden of the offensive. Special Forces such as the 89th commando brigade will assist by launching raids behind the lines, collecting information, etc. The IDF relies on reserves. Tens of thousands of them will be

mobilized at the outset of the war, if they are not called for active service before the battles begin. Many might be called while rockets fall around them at their homes or on their way to their bases, where they get their weapons, vehicles, etc. Rockets might continue to strike them when they will move to the frontline. In that sense, it will be more difficult for them to do their duty, in contrast to former wars.  Israeli officials, both military and government, repeatedly warned about the danger of storing rockets in about 200 villages and towns in Lebanon. When rockets are launched from those places, the IDF will strike them hard, causing severe collateral damage. The civilians living there will be warned in advance, as soon as possible, to evacuate their homes immediately. Hopefully, they will be able to do that, for Hezbollah might order some of them to remain behind, to serve as human shields.The IDF can inflict a major blow to Hezbollah by catching the group off guard. A massive surprise attack might be Israel’s best chance to handle the rockets and reduce Israel’s casualties. However, such an attack could cause significant collateral damage since the Lebanese population might not have sufficient time to escape from their towns and villages, where the rockets are stationed.The IDF will have to engage in urban warfare, including underground, in tunnels. The military has been training for that   in various ways. Its troops   must   be familiar with the terrain of Lebanon so they exercise in similar areas, in northern Israel. Cooperation between the difference corpses such as   infantry and armor is another important factor the IDF has been working on, as part of the preparations to fight Hezbollah. The IDF will also use its advanced C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence) network.Hezbollah got stronger and bigger during the Syrian civil war. The group is now more like a military than an organization, but this could actually benefit the IDF. If Hezbollah fighters move in relatively large formations it will be easier for the IDF to find and attack them. Hezbollah also got accustomed to enjoying air supremacy and receiving air support from the Russian and the Syrian air forces while confronting Syrian rebels who had no aircraft. In a war against Israel, Hezbollah will be both without air support, and it will have to deal with a powerful air force. It might cost Hezbollah dearly if its men are not well aware of that.The United States sees Hezbollah as a terrorist group. Prior to 9/11, Hezbollah killed more Americans than any other terrorist group. In the next war, Israel will require US support. On the diplomatic level, Israel will need the United States to stand by it in the UN Security Council. Militarily, the United States can provide Israel with weapons, ammunition and spare parts, without sending US troops.   The next round between Israel and Hezbollah might be much more destructive than the 2006 war. The IDF should try to reduce the cost to Israel by conducting an effective large-scale air, land and sea offensive. The best way is to do that in total surprise.

1NC – Impact – Nuclear Retal

Lack of US commitment causes Israeli preemption – terrorism magnifies the riskFarley 18 [Robert, author of Battleship Book and senior lecturer in the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, “3 Reasons Israel Would Start a Nuclear War”; published 5/12/18, accessed 7/6/19; https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/3-reasons-israel-would-start-nuclear-war-25794]Israel’s nuclear arsenal is the worst-kept secret in international relations. Since the 1970s, Israel has maintained a nuclear deterrent in order to maintain a favorable balance of power with its neighbors. Apart from some worrying moments during the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli government has never seriously considered using those weapons. The most obvious scenario for Israel to use nuclear weapons would be in response to a foreign nuclear attack. Israel’s missile defenses, air defenses, and delivery systems are far too sophisticated to imagine a scenario in which any country other than one of the major nuclear powers could manage a disarming first strike. Consequently, any attacker is certain to endure massive retaliation, in short order. Israel’s goals would be to destroy the military capacity of the enemy (let’s say Iran, for sake of discussion) and also send a message that any nuclear attack against Israel would be met with catastrophic, unimaginable retaliation. But under what conditions might Israel start a nuclear war? Nuclear Pre-emption If a hostile power (let’s say Iran, for sake of discussion) appeared to be on the verge of mating nuclear devices with the systems needed to deliver them, Israel might well consider a preventive nuclear attack. In the case of Iran, we can imagine scenarios in which Israeli planners would no longer deem a conventional attack sufficiently lethal to destroy or delay the Iranian program. In such a scenario, and absent direct intervention from the United States, Israel might well decide to undertake a limited nuclear attack against Iranian facilities. Given that Iran lacks significant ballistic missile defenses, Israel would most likely deliver the nuclear weapons with its Jericho III intermediate range ballistic missiles. Israel would likely limit its attacks to targets specifically linked with the Iranian nuclear program, and sufficiently away from civilian areas. Conceivably, since it would be breaking the nuclear taboo anyway, Israel might target other military facilities and bases for attack, but it is likely that the Israeli government would want to limit the precedent for using nuclear weapons as much as possible. Would it work? Nuclear weapons would deal more damage than most imaginable conventional attacks, and would also convey a level of seriousness that might take even the Iranians aback. On the other hand, the active use of nuclear weapons by Israel would probably heighten the interest of everyone in the region (and potentially across the world) to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Nuclear Transfer One of Israel’s biggest concerns is the idea that a nuclear power (Iran, Pakistan, or North Korea, presumably) might give or sell a nuclear weapon to a non-governmental organization (NGO). Hamas, Hezbollah, or some other terrorist group would be harder to deter than a traditional nation-state. Even if a terrorist organization did not immediately use the weapon against an Israeli target, it could potentially extract concessions that Israel would be unwilling to make. In such a scenario, Israel might well consider using nuclear weapons in order to forestall a transfer, or destroy the enemy nuclear device after delivery. This would depend on access to excellent intelligence about the transfer of the device, but it is hardly impossible that the highly professional and operationally competent Israeli intelligence services could provide such data. Why go nuclear? The biggest reason would be to ensure the success of the strike; both the device itself and the people handling the device would be important targets, and a nuclear attack would ensure their destruction more effectively than even a massive conventional strike (which might well accompany the nuclear attack). Moreover, committing to the most extreme use forms of the use of force might well deter both the NGO and the originating state (not to mention any states that facilitated transfer through their borders; hello, Syria!) from attempting another transfer. However, the active use of nuclear weapons against a non-state actor might look to the world like overkill, and could reaffirm the interest of the source of the nuclear device in causing more problems for Israel. Conventional Defeat The idea that Israel might lose a conventional war seems ridiculous now, but the origins of the Israeli nuclear program lay in the fear that the Arab states would develop a decisive military advantage that they could use to inflict battlefield defeats. This came close to happening during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, as the Egyptian Army seized the Suez Canal and the Syrian Arab Army advanced into the Golan Heights. Accounts on how seriously Israel debated using nukes during that war remain murky, but there is no question that Israel could consider using its most powerful weapons if the conventional balance tipped decisively out of its favor . How might that happen? We can imagine a few scenarios, most of which involve an increase in hostility between Israel and its more tolerant

neighbors. Another revolution in Egypt could easily rewrite the security equation on Israel’s southern border; while the friendship of Saudi Arabia seems secure, political instability could change that; even Turkish policy might shift in a negative direction. Israel currently has overwhelming conventional military advantages, but these advantages depend to some extent on a favorable regional strategic environment. Political shifts could leave Israel diplomatically isolated, and vulnerable once again to conventional attack. In such a situation, nuclear weapons would remain part of the toolkit for ensuring the survival of the nation.

2NC – Internal Link – Hezbollah LashoutUS ending arm sales would cause Israel to lash out at Iran, Hezbollah and Syria due to the past war crises .

Colin, co-director of Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. He was deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East from 2009 to 2011 and deputy assistant to President Barack Obama and national security adviser to Vice President Joe Biden from 2014 to 2017, 2019(H, “This is how easily the U.S. and Iran could blunder into war”, 5-23-2019, 7-6-2019,, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/this-is-how-easily-the-us-and-iran-could-blunder-into-war/2019/05/23/40dbbcae-7c07-11e9-8ede-f4abf521ef17_story.html?noredirect=on&amp;utm_term=.98a415c00bda, Judy Yen ) As tensions mount between the United States and Iran, American and Iranian leaders publicly insist they want to avoid war. Yet history is littered with accidents, misperceptions, miscalculations, hidden bureaucratic agendas and other factors that produced armed conflicts nobody seemed to want. This is one fictional example of how easily a war between the United States and Iran could start. None of this has happened — but it could. On Aug. 7, 2019, Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, rushed out of an emergency session of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. The meeting was discussing how to respond to news that Iran’s oil sales — the lifeblood of the Islamic republic’s economy — had plummeted to only a few hundred thousand barrels a day, down more than 2 million barrels in just 18 months, because of U.S. sanctions. Soleimani had a few important calls to make. The first two were to the commanders of Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah, the most prominent Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Iraq. Since the defeat of the Islamic State’s territorial “caliphate,” these militants had been itching to turn their sights on the 5,000 U.S. troops who remain in Iraq, with the goal of driving them out. Soleimani had cautioned patience, but his guidance now took a decisive turn: “Brothers, you have my authorization. Follow the righteous path.” Soleimani’s next call went to Hasan Nasrallah, the leader of Lebanese Hezbollah, the most capable Iranian proxy in the

Middle East. Despite hundreds of Israeli strikes in recent years against Hezbollah arms shipments and Iranian bases in Syria, the organization and its backers in Tehran had not yet waged an all-out war across Israel’s northern frontier. Still, everyone knew that such a conflict was inevitable at some point, and Soleimani told Nasrallah that the time might be approaching. “The American-Zionist alliance is plotting and a storm is coming,” he said. “Be ready.” One week after

Soleimani’s calls, a U.S. diplomatic convoy traveling from the heavily fortified Green Zone to Baghdad International Airport was hit by several powerful roadside bombs. A high-level State Department political officer, three other diplomats and a U.S. Army colonel were killed instantly. Within hours, other attacks followed, including a barrage of rocket and mortar fire on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad that destroyed the main dining hall and killed five Iraqis cleaning the grounds. At the same time, a suicide

attacker hit a U.S. military unit operating in eastern Syria, near the Iraqi border. Two American Special Operations troops were killed, and two more were taken hostage by a Syrian militia widely believed to be backed by Iran. Under any circumstances, these incidents would spark a crisis. But they occurred against a backdrop of escalating tensions and provocations between Washington and Tehran that began after the Trump administration withdrew from the

Obama-era nuclear agreement with Iran in 2018. The subsequent “maximum pressure” campaign the administration applied to cut off Iran’s oil sales and connections to the international banking system deepened the siege mentality in Tehran. The U.S. decision to designate the Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization, overruling warnings from the Pentagon, made the situation even tenser. Iran responded by restarting some proscribed nuclear activities and carrying out calibrated provocations in May, hoping to reciprocate U.S. pressure and build leverage in the event that negotiations with the Great Satan ever resumed. In June and July 2019, there were more incidents of sabotage targeting ships across the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen stepped up their attacks on Saudi Arabia, firing missiles at oil facilities and attacking Saudi oil tankers on their way to Europe. Then, in late July, Saudi Aramco — the national oil and gas company — suffered a devastating cyberattack, shutting down its operations for nearly a week. Stepping back from the nuclear accord, Iran also began accumulating higher-than-allowed levels of heavy water and low-enriched uranium. By late July, after European negotiators failed to salvage the deal, Iran had reinstalled centrifuges at its deeply buried Fordow facility, threatening to resume enrichment. Soon, Western intelligence agencies estimated that it would take less than a year for Iran to produce the explosive fuel for a single nuclear device, eroding the delays in “break-out time” that the nuclear accord had brought. This prompted Israeli and American threats to take military action if Iran got too close to acquiring the bomb. So the region was already on a knife’s edge when news of the August attacks in Iraq and Syria reached the White House. Predictably, Trump lashed out on Twitter: “We will respond to Iran’s acts of Aggression and there will be even more Hell to pay if our Brave Soldiers are not returned immediately. The demented and decaying regime in Tehran will feel Power and Wrath the likes of which the world has never seen.” Ayatollah Ali Khamenei responded with his own tweet: “The great Iranian nation will not be intimidated by a corrupt and criminal superpower spreading lies and beating the drums of war. The world knows Iran is in the right and all should be certain of America’s defeat.” It was unclear exactly what Trump’s threats implied. But the president found himself under increasing pressure from Republican hawks in Congress and hard-liners within his administration to take immediate military action. Trump worried about what this would mean for his reelection prospects. He had campaigned against further interventions in the Middle East. But he had also spent years trashing Obama’s “horrible” nuclear deal, and he had repeatedly promised to use “great force” in response to Iranian attacks. Ultimately, Trump feared that looking weak would do him more harm in 2020 than risking further escalation. So having sent one aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf in May, Trump agreed to deploy a second carrier, along with additional squadrons of aircraft. U.S.-based strategic bombers were placed on high alert. Trump also authorized unilateral raids in Baghdad against an Asaib Ahl al-Haq bombmaking cell and a Kataib Hezbollah rocket team. Mysterious explosions were reported at several munitions depots and training camps inside Iran, near the Iraqi border, and ATMs across Iran suddenly ceased functioning for two days. While no one claimed credit, Iranian and international media outlets suggested that the CIA and the Mossad were responsible. Tensions finally boiled over in the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow passageway in the

Persian Gulf through which 20 percent of the world’s tradable oil passes. Several Iranian fast-attack craft swarmed nearby U.S. naval vessels. When the Iranian boats ignored U.S.

warnings, an American destroyer fired on them, killing everyone aboard Iran’s vessels. Fearing that this was the first skirmish in a wider naval war, Iran began dispersing its mines, anti-ship cruise missiles and mobile ballistic missiles, lest they be struck by U.S. bombers. The Pentagon’s proposed response was a large-scale preemptive strike to neutralize the weapons before they posed a significant threat to U.S. forces, bases, allies and shipping. National security adviser John Bolton and Secretary of State

Mike Pompeo also urged Trump to hit Iran’s nuclear program at the same time (something Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, during numerous calls to Trump, agitated for as well). Pompeo assured the president that he did not

require additional congressional authorization beyond that provided after 9/11 to launch such an attack, given alleged links between Iran and al-Qaeda. Within days, the United States unleashed a multi-day bombardment of Iranian air and coastal defense systems, mine storage facilities, ports, and ballistic missile locations, as well as strikes on the Natanz and Fordow uranium enrichment plants, the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan, the Arak reactor, and several Revolutionary Guard bases where the administration alleged (with no clear evidence) that suspicious nuclear-related research had been conducted. Coordinated cyberattacks — believed to originate from Israel and the United States — struck Iran’s electrical grid. The Islamic republic responded by dropping hundreds of surviving mines into the Strait of Hormuz, terrorizing oil shipping with suicide boats and kamikaze drones, and targeting U.S. military facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates with missiles. Meanwhile, Houthi attacks on Saudi territory escalated. As the battle unfolds, American overmatch soon produced significant tactical successes. Iran’s nuclear program was set back at least two years, its air and coastal defenses lay in ruins, and much of

its navy was sunk to the bottom of the sea. Yet global stock markets panicked as oil prices spiked and fears of an all-out regional war grew. The Iranian regime, defiant and far from defeated, announced its formal withdrawal from

the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. “Having been attacked by a nuclear aggressor,” President Hassan Rouhani declared, “Iran has no choice but to pursue all necessary capabilities to deter the enemy.” Determined to “restore deterrence” and show that

its homeland could not be struck with impunity, Iran also directed Lebanese Hezbollah to unleash tens of thousands of rockets and precision-guided missiles against Israel , overwhelming missile defenses and

striking civilian targets in Tel Aviv and other cities. Simultaneously, Hezbollah and Iranian forces launched attacks from Syrian territory, opening a second front against Israel. Hundreds died, and Israel’s economy stood paralyzed. Israel responded with massive force , not just bombarding southern Lebanon but also saturating Hezbollah and government targets in Beirut, killing or wounding thousands of civilians. Israel’s air force struck Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria, as well, while Israeli ground forces prepped for a large-scale land incursion to clear out Hezbollah strongholds in Lebanon and establish a buffer zone in Syria across the Golan Heights . As the bloodshed mounted, the Trump administration defended Israel’s

right to use all means to protect itself, while a horrified world called for calm. Nothing seemed to be enough to end the cycle of carnage. Iran and its proxies drew more Israeli and

American blood — and vice versa — and oil prices surged even higher, risking a U.S. recession. The voices calling on Trump to come to Israel’s aid and finish off the Iranian regime once and for all became an unstoppable crescendo. As in 1914,

at the outset of World War I, events took on a cruel logic of their own, and the Guns of August sounded. Having invested his credibility and political future in looking tough, Trump seemed to have no choice. A president who promised to extricate America from endless wars in the Middle East found himself sending more than 100,000 troops back into the desert. Only this time, the United States was invading a country with 80 million people (twice Iraq’s population), a territory 68 percent larger than Iraq and Afghanistan combined, and with hundreds of thousands of the best paramilitary troops in the world. Asked at an impromptu news conference about the deployment, Trump simply said, “I warned Iran that if they chose to fight, we would end them.” It was a war that neither Trump nor Iranian leaders wanted — and yet, at each critical moment, escalation seemed like the only way to defend vital national interests and respond to political imperatives. Circumstances had simply become too combustible. And once the fuse was lit, no one could stop the explosion.

2NC – A2 Impact D – Hezbollah

Escalation inevitable in next Israel-Hezbollah War Daud D. The New Hezbollah: Israel’s Next War Will Be A Godawful Mess. Sepember 2016, http://www.thetower.org/article/the-new-hezbollah-israels-next-war-will-be-a-godawful-mess/

Hezbollah remains the one Arab force to have denied the IDF a single decisive victory in the past three decades. It has done so by operating as a guerrilla force. However, pundits are now suggesting that when the Iranian proxy group initiates its next war with Israel, it will employ the conventional military experience it has gained in the Syrian Civil War, thus presenting a challenge to the Jewish state. Mistakenly, they ignore that Hezbollah would be exposing itself by operating as a conventional force, facilitating the IDF’s victory. Instead the group will revert to operating as a guerrilla organization, leaving Lebanon and its civilians to bear the brunt of the Israeli onslaught. Hezbollah has been conducting itself as a regular army since the escalation of its role in the Syrian Civil War in 2013. Following the battle of Qusayr, Hezbollah has moved from insurgency to counterinsurgency. It has been fighting openly along established front lines in order to conquer and control territory so as to weaken and destroy its opponents. Its fighters have even acted as battlefield commanders of Syrian troops. Hezbollah’s weaponry in Syria also reflects a more conventional strategy. The group has operated Syrian tanks and artillery systems, jeeps with recoilless rifles, and is even rumored to have acquired its own 75-tank armored brigade. Although Hezbollah has grown considerably stronger since the 2006 Second Lebanon War with Israel, it is far from closing the power gap with the IDF. Notwithstanding its bellicose propaganda, Hezbollah’s leadership recognizes the IDF’s continued military superiority. The group’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, readily acknowledges that Israel is a “real power” to be reckoned with, and his deputy Naim Qassem has admitted that Hezbollah never envisioned fighting the Jewish state in “a classic war,” because it lacked the “sufficient numbers, equipment, and military capabilities” a conventional army enjoys. For their part, the Israelis have made it clear that their intentions are to exploit this “total asymmetry” to their advantage in the next war. They will aim to hit the group “in the most muscular way possible” and score the decisive victory that has eluded them in the past. Per what is called the Gideon Doctrine, Israel intends to quickly unleash its full force against Hezbollah, throwing it off-balance and dealing it a crushing blow before it can recover. Instead of aiming to “erode” Hezbollah forces with overwhelming standoff firepower, the IDF will now give priority to a rapid deployment of ground forces, simultaneous with immediate and integrated

aerial, naval, artillery, and cyber-attacks. As part of this new strategy, the IDF will not aimlessly hunt Hezbollah’s Katyusha rockets with air power, as it did in 2006. Instead, it will seek to penetrate the group’s territory quickly in order to damage its political and military infrastructure, while simultaneously deploying massive force against Hezbollah targets.

1NC – Link – HamasHamas is waiting to attack Israel- US withdrawal of arm will make Israel vulnerable, and Hamas sees that

Lawrence ’18 ( BY LAWRENCE J. HAAS, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR —  04/11/18 03:45 PM EDT  845 THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT THE VIEW OF THE HILL , “HAMAS ATTACKS ISRAEL—AND THE WORLD CONDEMS ISRAEL” HTTPS://THEHILL.COM/OPINION/INTERNATIONAL/382681-HAMAS-ATTACKS-ISRAEL-AND-THE-WORLD-CONDEMNS-ISRAEL Lawrence J. Haas is a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council . He served as a former senior White House official and

as senior communications director for Vice President Al Gore and is the author of, most recently, Harry and Arthur: Truman, Vandenberg, and the Partnership That Created the Free World.)

The world “should wait for our great move,” said a top Hamas leader, speaking to Palestinian protestors during violent clashes with Israeli forces along the Gaza border, “when we breach the borders and pray at al Aqsa.”With hundreds around him chanting, “We are going to Jerusalem, millions of martyrs,” and with 20,000 Palestinians protesting along the border — some burning tires, others throwing Molotov cocktails and rocks — Yahya Sinwar declared during April protests that Hamas was “following in the path of martyr Yasser Arafat in resisting the enemy” and “if we explode we will explode in [Israel’s] face.” That Sinwar and other Hamas leaders made clear that their “March of Return” is only the latest tactic in their efforts to destroy Israel, however, hasn’t convinced much of the global community, the West, or the media to abandon its comfortable narrative – of a peace-loving Palestinian people in Gaza, driven to violence by an iron-fisted Israel. Such is life as the world’s only Jewish state — with Hamas and other terrorist groups across its border in Gaza; with the more dangerous Hezbollah across its northern border in Lebanon; with terrorists roaming the Sinai; and with Hezbollah and Shi’a militias implanted amid the chaos of Syria. However carefully it responds to violent efforts to breach its borders and attack its people, Israel finds itself falsely portrayed, second-guessed, and ultimately condemned. Thus, the current turmoil along Israel’s border with Gaza is playing out along predictable lines in the court of public opinion. Hamas, which seeks Israel’s destruction and has run Gaza since ousting the Palestinian Authority in a violent coup in 2007, launched the “March of Return” on March 30 to remove the “transient border” between Israel and Gaza and fulfill the “right of return” of all seven million descendants of the Palestinians who fled their homes when Arab nations launched the 1948 war against the new Jewish state. (With such a full “right of return,” Palestinians would outnumber Jews in Israel, upending a state that emerged from the Holocaust and marked a people’s return to their historic homeland.) The second such “march” came on Friday, April 6, and Hamas vows to mount one each Friday until “Nakba Day,” the annual day when Palestinians mark the “catastrophe” of Israel’s creation in May of 1948. For that day, the group promises a “march” that will include at least a million participants. But these weekly “marches” aren’t marches at all. Like the rockets that Hamas launches into southern Israel or the tunnels it uses to infiltrate underground, these marches are violent efforts to breach Israel’s border — and they’ve left about 30 dead at the hands of Israeli forces that say all 30 were engaged in violent activity. “Palestine and Jerusalem belong to us,” top Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh declared this week. In an Orwellian twist, he termed the “March of Return” a “peaceful, civilized, and popular march.” But Hamas is not only orchestrating the violence on Israel’s border; it’s incentivizing it. The group is paying $3,000 for the family of a “martyr” who dies in a confrontation with Israeli forces, $500 to protestors who are seriously wounded, and $200 to those who are moderately wounded. It’s also reportedly jailing bus drivers who refuse to take Gazans to the border to protest. With Hamas laying bare its strategy, much of the world has nevertheless found it easier to blame Israel for the chaos. The International Criminal Court’s prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, warned both Israel and Hamas that each could be committing crimes — as if a terror group using violence to breach a border and a nation defending itself are equivalent. The European Union’s High Representative Federica Mogherini called for an investigation of Israel’s use of “live ammunition,” said its force should be “proportionate,” and urged a “full opening of the crossing points.” Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), who exerts enormous influence over the Democratic Party’s activist wing, laid the blame squarely on Israel, tweeting, “The killing of Palestinian demonstrators by Israeli forces in Gaza is tragic. It is the right of all

people to protest for a better future without a violent response.” Maybe Israel’s critics don’t realize that with their one-sided condemnations, they’re emboldening Hamas. Or maybe they do.

1NC – Internal Link/Impact – HamasHamas has the capability to launch a catastrophic strike against Israel in the near futureIssacharoff, 5-4-2019, Avi Issacharoff, The Times of Israel's Middle East analyst, fills the same role for Walla, the leading portal in Israel. He is also a guest commentator on many different radio shows and current affairs programs on television."In ‘cash for calm’ bid, Hamas shows it’s ready to fight," The Times Of Israel https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-cash-for-calm-bid-hamas-shows-its-ready-to-fight/ Even after firing over 450 rockets at Israel since Saturday, Hamas continues to demonstrate it maintains disciplined control over its arsenal, and has escalated the conflict with Israel in a measured and deliberate way. The terror group’s long-range rockets have not yet been deployed — a message to Israel that there is still room for talks, and that the current crisis can be ended quickly. The group’s chief demand for doing so: allowing donated cash to enter the Gaza Strip with the start of Ramadan, which begins Sunday or Monday in different parts of the Muslim world. In another sign of Hamas’s remarkable control over the situation, in the first day and a half after the group started firing at Israel, not one of its operatives or fighters were hurt. Indeed, despite over 200 strikes by the Israeli Air Force on targets tied to the group in the Gaza Strip, its military wing did not suffer a single casualty.

Free Sign Up That’s not because Israel’s aim is getting worse, but because Hamas is working hard to demonstrate a high level of military discipline and a dramatic improvement in its ability to operate under fire. The entire organization has gone underground — literally, into the endless tunnels that crisscross the Gaza Strip. Hamas has been preparing those tunnels for years in expectation of war, all the while showing it has the capacity to rain rockets continuously on Israel despite a massive air campaign against it. At the moment,

there’s no obvious way for either side to back away from the dangerous precipice on which they are perched. Despite the fact that Hamas’s top officials, including Gaza chief Yahya Sinwar, are in Cairo at the moment, alongside Islamic

Jihad head Ziad Nakhla’a — ostensibly for talks on returning to the ceasefire — the terror groups don’t appear eager

to end the fighting . They seem thoroughly unimpressed by demands for quiet from Egyptian intelligence officials. The Qatari

envoy Muhammad al-Amadi, who was able in the past to resolve such impasses, is in the US for medical treatment, and the lack of a mediator and envoy who can restore calm — for example, by facilitating the transfer of $15 million in cash in a suitcase — is felt on the ground. It is no longer possible to continue ignoring the woeful decision taken by the government over six months ago that created the current predicament: when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to allow suitcases into Gaza carrying $15 million in cash each month that were destined for Hamas’s coffers. It was that decision that created the current equation of cash for calm, and which is now exacting a high cost from Israel to ensure the cash continues to flow. As soon as the cash was delayed, the deterioration was only a matter of time. Hamas understands it can extort Israel and threaten it during this week of Memorial Day and Independence Day, and with next week’s Eurovision contest. The calendar, and the government’s keen desire to see the Eurovision contest go off without a hitch, limit Israel’s ability to respond to Hamas’s rocket-based taunting. That realization has put wind in the terror group’s sails, convinced as it is that it has a window of

opportunity to raise the cost for Israel of its blockade and obtain more concessions in exchange for quiet.

1NC – Impact – Retaliation

Terrorists have the capabilities and evade detection --- independently causes retaliation Bunn 15 (Matthew Bunn is an American nuclear and energy policy analyst, currently a professor of practice at the Harvard Kennedy School at Harvard University. “Nuclear Terrorism: How Big is the Risk to Japan.” 2015. https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/nuclear-terrorism-how-big-is-the-risk-to-japan/) BWhttps://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/nuclear-terrorism-how-big-is-the-risk-to-japan/_THE RISK OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM: A QUALITATIVE APPROACH Nuclear theft and terrorism are not just

hypothetical worries. There have been approximately 20 cases of seizure of stolen nuclear bomb

material that are well documented in the public record, and multiple cases of actual or planned nuclear

sabotage .[4] Do terrorists want nuclear weapons? For most terrorists, focused on the limited violence appropriate for

accomplishing local political objectives, the answer is no. But for a limited set of terrorists with extreme global objectives or apocalyptic visions, the answer is decidedly yes. Al Qaeda and the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo both made repeated attempts to get nuclear weapons or the material and expertise needed to make them, and there is evidence that Chechen terrorists may have sought nuclear weapons as well. Al Qaeda had a focused program reporting directly to Ayman al-Zawahiri, now the group’s leader, which progressed as far as carrying out crude conventional explosive tests for the bomb program in the Afghan desert.[5] Most of the participants in al Qaeda’s program – including the man who led it – have neither been killed nor captured. There is no hard evidence in the public domain that the Islamic State (IS) is yet seeking nuclear weapons. But the Paris attacks make clear that they are planning mass casualty attacks far beyond their territory, and they have an apocalyptic ideology that envisions a final war between the “Crusader” forces and their Islamic forces, for which extremely powerful weapons would

presumably be needed. If IS were to seek nuclear weapons, it has more money , more control of territory , more

people, and more ability to recruit experts globally than al Qaeda at its best ever had – all of which could increase its chances of success. Could terrorists make a crude nuclear bomb if they got the necessary nuclear material? Here, unfortunately, multiple studies by the U.S. government and other governments have concluded that the answer is “ yes ” – a sophisticated

terrorist group with enough plutonium or HEU might well be able to fashion a crude but workable nuclear bomb. [6] As one U.S. government report summarized the issue in the 1970s, long before the voluminous information now available on the internet existed: [7] A small group of people, none of whom

have ever had access to the classified literature , could possibly design and build a crude nuclear

explosive device … Only modest machine-shop facilities that could be contracted for without

arousing suspicion would be required. This conclusion applied to both gun-type and implosion-type bombs. While an implosion bomb would be significantly more difficult for terrorists to build, it is not out of the question – particularly if they got knowledgeable help, as al Qaeda repeatedly attempted to do. A crude implosion device does not need to be as complex as the bomb

that destroyed Nagasaki. Nuclear material does not have to be “ weapon-grade ” to pose a serious danger that terrorists could use it to make a nuclear bomb. HEU at well below 90 percent U-235 could be used, at the price of using somewhat more material. The U.S. government has declassified the fact that any state or group that could make a bomb from weapons-grade plutonium could also make a bomb from reactor-grade plutonium . The “fizzle yield” – the explosive yield

that would result if the extra neutrons from reactor-grade plutonium set off the chain reaction at the worst possible time – for a design similar to the Nagasaki bomb is in the range of a kiloton, and the probable yield is higher than that.[8] The heat from reactor-grade plutonium can also be managed by a variety of means: it should be remembered, for example, that early U.S. nuclear weapons were designed to have the plutonium core put into the bomb at the last moment, just before use. Although the process of designing and building a crude nuclear bomb would probably be long and difficult, this may not always be the case. Indeed, for facilities with

some types of material, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) internal security regulations require that security plans be based on keeping terrorists out entirely, rather than catching them as they leave the site, to avoid “an unauthorized opportunity … to use available nuclear materials for onsite assembly of an improvised nuclear device” — that is, to prevent terrorists from being able to set off a nuclear explosion while they were still in the building.[9] What would the consequences of a nuclear terrorist attack be? In the city attacked, a huge area might be entirely destroyed, with tens or hundreds of thousands killed and hundreds of thousands more injured. Fires would likely rage out of control, far behind any plausible capability to fight them. With everything from roads to hospitals destroyed, organizing to provide food, water, shelter, and medical care to the survivors would be an immense challenge.[10] The direct economic damage – measured in lives lost and property destroyed – might reach $1 trillion.[11] Terrorists – either

those who committed the attack or others – would probably claim they had more bombs already hidden in other

cities (whether they did nor not), and the fear that this might be true could lead to panicked evacuations, creating widespread havoc and economic disruption . In what would inevitably be a desperate effort to prevent further

attacks, traditional standards of civil liberties would likely be jettisoned , and the country attacked might well

lash out militarily at whatever countries it thought might bear a portion of responsibility .[12] Far

more than after the 9/11 attacks, international politics would be likely to become more brutish and violent, with powerful states taking unilateral action , by force if necessary, in an effort to ensure their security .

2NC – Impact – Iran/Israel War

Miscalculations will lead to an Iran-US war, which also spills over to Israel.Harel 5/13 (Amos Harel, one of Israel's leading media experts on military and defense issues. He has been the military correspondent and defense analyst for Haaretz for the last 12 years. In this role, he has written extensively about Israel's ongoing fight against terrorist organizations, its battles during the Palestinian Intifadah (uprising) and the last war in Lebanon.Prior to his current position, Harel, 41, spent four years as night editor for the Haaretz Hebrew print edition, and from 1999-2005 was the anchorman on a weekly Army Radio program about defense issues. He also frequently appears in the Israeli and foreign media as a military pundit, “Iran and US Perched on Warpath and Israel Will Not o Unscathed”, 13 May 2019, https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium-iran-u-s-perched-on-warpath-israel-will-not-go-unscathed-1.7223411)JewelAs far as is known, neither side wants a war, but a series of misunderstandings and miscalculation s could still lead to a confrontation. This analysis, which has an all-too-familiar ring from recent rounds of fighting between Israel and Hamas, as well as the balance of deterrence that has existed for years between Israel and Hezbollah, refers this time to a different front: the one between the United States and Iran . That’s the conclusion reached by David Ignatius, a foreign affairs columnist for

The Washington Post, in a piece Thursday. This assessment followed the dramatic rise in tensions in the Persian Gulf in the past several days: the claims of Iran’s plans to attack targets of the United States or its allies in the Middle East, the U.S. warnings to Iran, the deployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier to the region, and Tehran’s announcement that it would withdraw from parts of the nuclear agreement. According to Ignatius, who has excellent relations with U.S.

defense officials, the intelligence community in Washington changed its assessment regarding Iran’s intentions some two weeks ago. Until then, the Americans believed the Iranians would try to ride out the economic and political pressure from Washington to remain within the nuclear deal (which the Trump administration pulled out of a year ago), and to wait out the next 20 months in the hope that President Donald Trump would lose his reelection bid. As Ignatius sees it, “the United States concluded that the Iranians had decided to reset their strategy,” either because the U.S. sanctions are biting too hard or because the Iranians “concluded that Trump might be reelected.” In addition to Iran’s doubts about the continued implementation of the nuclear agreement, the Americans receive intelligence about plans for imminent attacks on U.S. targets in the region, either by Iranian forces or their proxies (such as Shi’ite militias in Iraq or Houthi rebel forces in Yemen). Ignatius mentioned the possibility of attacks on the more than 5,000 U.S. troops in Iraq. Other

assessments, reported by Israel’s Channel 13 News, hold that Israel passed along intelligence warnings of Iranian plans to attack installations linked to Saudi Arabia’s petroleum trade, in an indirect act of revenge for the U.S. cancellation of exemptions for eight countries that continued to buy oil from Iran. The Houthis, for their part, fired missiles at a tanker carrying crude oil from Saudi Arabia to Egypt through the Bab El-Mandeb Strait last July. In addition to deploying the aircraft carrier, which according to some reports had been planned in advance, the U.S. announced a new deployment of Patriot anti-aircraft missiles in the region and sent a few B-52 bombers to a U.S. base in Qatar. These moves are not that dramatic because the deployments are limited, but the way the administration announced them and the extensive media coverage they received made them seem like saber-rattling. That raises the questions of whether the Americans are following a written script, and what they hope to accomplish. Does Trump, who is not keen to launch new wars in the Middle East, seek to return the Iranians to the bargaining table, in a bid to reach a new nuclear agreement more favorable to the United States than the one signed by the Obama administration in Vienna in 2015? Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu characterized that one as a “disaster.” (CNN reported Saturday that the White House gave Trump’s private phone number to Iran, via Switzerland.) Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln transits the Suez Canal in Egypt. The aircraft carrier and its strike group are deploying to the Persian Gulf on orders from the White House to respond to an unspecified threat from Iran. Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln transits the Suez Canal, Egypt, May 9, 2019.Mass Communication Specialist Se Or do the hawks in the administration, who include John Bolton, the national security adviser, want to go to war against Iran in order to achieve regime change there? There are plenty of historical examples of governments and intelligence agencies manipulating raw intelligence. The most traumatic of these for Americans in the past few decades came in 2002 when the administration of President George W. Bush claimed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, shortly before invading the country and bringing down the regime of Saddam Hussein. For now, Israel is not at the center of the front between the United States and Iran. If such a military confrontation does happen, which currently seems unlikely, it will have

indirect implications for Israel . That is presumably the reason that nearly every conversation with a high-ranking military official in recent weeks began with the situation in the Gaza Strip but quickly jumped to the events in the Gulf. Iran could go on to use other arenas closer to Israel – Gaza, Lebanon, Syria – as diversions or to damage the interests of Washington and its allies in the region. That may have figured into the calculus behind last week’s decision to end the round of fighting with Hamas and Islamic Jihad quickly, despite the deaths of four Israelis and the firing of 700 rockets into southern Israel.

2NC – A2 No Means/Capabilities

Experts agree ISIS terror is likely – retaliation, online recruitmentTurak 17 [Nicole, CNBC correspondent, “Terror attacks are likely to increase in 2018, with ISIS and al-Qaeda both still dangerous”; published 12/28/17, accessed 08/01/18; https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/28/terror-isis-and-al-qaeda-likely-to-carry-out-more-attacks-in-2018.html]/MRThe "caliphate" may be in ruins, but that doesn't mean ISIS is gone forever . Terror attacks are likely to increase in 2018, as the destruction of the Islamic State's physical stronghold in Iraq and Syria will strengthen its will to strike out abroad, experts say. "ISIS will want to show that they are still in the fight, and their followers remain as fanatical as ever," said Lewis-Sage Passant, a former

British Army intelligence officer and founder of travel security company HowSafeIsMyTrip. "The number of attacks globally will likely increase as the group switches focus from the war in the Middle East to international terrorism." Adam Deen, executive director of counter-extremism think tank Quilliam, makes a similar

argument. "We're going to see without a doubt more attacks in the West," he told UK newspaper the

Independent in October. Deen said ISIS is now more focused on revenge, and warned against the false sense of victory that many expressed after the death of Osama Bin Laden. "They will be less able to mount well-funded operations such as the Paris attacks. But they want to show that they are still in the fight." -Lewis-Sage Passant, former intelligence officer, speaking on ISIS Propaganda will continue online and elsewhere, despite the destruction of its main source in the former ISIS "capital" of Raqqa, Syria. "Threats in the West will persist in the form of people who are still inspired by the propaganda that has been disseminated by ISIS ," Anthony Richards, an assistant professor in Terrorism Studies at the University of East London, told CNBC. "I think in the longer term, the defeat of ISIS and the propaganda defeat that goes with that will actually reduce the threat in the UK and Europe, but ... In the shorter term, we'll still see more terrorist attacks." Some foresee more frequent attacks, accompanied by a decrease in lethality, including a rising number of knife and vehicle attacks. "The loss of ISIS' central coordination and revenue-generating capabilities means that they will be less able to mount well-funded operations such as the Paris attacks," Sage-Passant said, "But they want to show that they are still in the fight."

2NC – A2 K of DAIsrael has the right to use US weapons to become powerful enough to defend itself from dangerous Hamas

French, 5-6-2019, David Austin French is an American attorney, journalist, and a senior fellow at the National Review Institute. He is a veteran of the Iraq War and a major in the United States Army Reserve. He is a past president of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education "The Law of War Permits Israel to Destroy Hamas," National Review, https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/05/the-law-of-war-permits-israel-to-destroy-hamas/

As of this moment, a fragile truce holds in southern Israel. After Hamas volleyed 600 missiles at Israeli civilian targets on Saturday and Sunday, prompting Israel to attack hundreds of targets in Gaza, the air-raid sirens have fallen silent, for now.

But over the weekend, when the rockets fell, we saw all the old arguments against Israel’s acts of self-defens e crop up. The air raids were “disproportionate ,” we were told . There were arguments over individual civilian casualties, as if it would somehow discredit Israel if its precision strikes killed more than a handful of noncombatants. Yes, there were rote condemnations of Hamas’s efforts to kill as many civilians as it could, but once again all too many voices on the left rose at once, demanding that the nation under attack — the nation defending its schools, hospitals, and homes from an indiscriminate rocket barrage — exercise restraint. It’s important, however, to be

very clear about Israel’s legal obligations. When it comes to Hamas, “restraint” is Israel’s choice — one it may make for tactical and strategic reasons of its own. The actual law of war would allow Israel to invade Gaza, utterly destroy Hamas, and occupy Gaza City until Israel’s safety is ensured, even if it burned in the fight. Let’s break this down as simply as possible. First, firing 600 rockets at civilian targets in a neighboring country is an act of war . It’s an attack by an army against a nation-state, and as such it grants the nation-state the authority under the international law of armed conflict not just to disable the specific military assets used to carry it out but to destroy those who carried it out. For example, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, America had the right not just to sink the Japanese fleet but to defeat Japan’s military, invade its sovereign territory, and overthrow its government. The threat to the United States came not just from the Japanese armed forces (which could be rebuilt after defeat) but from the government that built that military and empowered it to attack America. Similarly, when America and its allies launched their war against the ISIS caliphate, they had the right not just to destroy ISIS’s military assets but to take ISIS’s territory. They had the right to fight house to house in Mosul, Raqqa, and elsewhere to eliminate not just ISIS’s ability to fight but also its ability to govern. Second, a terrorist army cannot lawfully protect itself from destruction by blending in with civilian populations, fighting from civilian structures, or using civilians as human shields. As the Department of Defense’s Law of War Manual states, the principle of distinction “enjoins the party controlling the population to use its best efforts to distinguish or separate its military forces and war-making activities from members of the civilian population to the maximum extent feasible so that civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects incidental to attacks on military objectives will be minimized as much as possible.” This means physically separating military and civilian facilities. This means using uniforms, markings, and other measures to make sure that military forces and civilians are “visually distinguished from one another.” And this means refraining from using “protected persons and objects” — civilians or civilian structures — “to shield military objectives.” Hamas violates every single one of these command s . It uses civilian facilities for military purposes, it tries to blend in with the civilian population, and it uses civilians as human shields. This is crucial — under the law of war none of these things in any way limit Israel’s right to defend itself. So long as Israel otherwise complies with the laws of war, the resulting civilian casualties and damages to civilian structures are Hamas’s moral and legal responsibility. It’s that simple. Think of it like this: Nations have a right to defend themselves, and that right of self-defense is not abrogated when an opponent fights dirty. If an army tried to march into Philadelphia behind a wall of women and children, the citizens of Philadelphia would not have to surrender if fighting meant killing those human shields. Instead, they could fight back and then hold war-crimes trials against the attackers for the resulting civilian deaths. Nor does the imbalance of power between Israel and Hamas tie Israel’s hands. The more-powerful nation has the right to use its power to win. It does not have to fight with one hand tied behind its back. Whenever Israel responds to Hamas, you see much misuse of the term “proportionality,” as if there is something inherently wrong with using more-powerful weapons to destroy a less-powerful foe. There is not. Under the law of war, “proportionality” doesn’t mean responding with similar force. It means avoiding attacks when the expected harm “incidental to the attack” would be “excessive in relation to the

military advantage anticipated to be gained.” To take an example, if you know a sniper is in a building, and you can destroy the building without destroying the city block, then you use force against the building, not the entire block. There’s nothing within that principle that grants any immunity to hostile armed forces. The right to defeat the hostile force remains; the response just must be mounted with an economy of force that’s consistent with the dictates of military necessity. What does that look like when a hostile terrorist force embeds itself in a civilian population, disguises itself as civilian, and fights from civilian buildings? The recently finished Battle of Mosul is instructive. There, American forces fought alongside Iraqi allies and rooted out ISIS from the heart of one of Iraq’s largest cities. Here (from the New York Times) is just one before-and-after view of the sheer devastation in the city center. First, this is the Mosul Hotel area in November 2015: And here’s the same area in

July 2017: This devastation is ISIS’s moral and legal responsibility. ISIS occupied Mosul. ISIS fought from civilian spaces. ISIS waged a futile fight from block to block and house to house. I could show you similar scenes of before-and-after devastation from America’s fights in cities such as Fallujah, Najaf, and Raqqa. This is what Hamas courts from Israel, and Israel would be well within its rights to oblige if it so chose. But rather than recognize this legal reality, the international community subjects Israel to two separate anti-Semitic double standards. First, attacks against its civilian population are rationalized and justified to an unprecedented extent. There are still all too many people who see Hamas as heroic freedom fighters facing off against terrible oppressors, rather than evil terrorists with genocidal aims. Second, the world then holds Israel to a standard of military restraint that it applies to no other military force on the planet. If Israel even used American rules of engagement or applied American military doctrine, the devastation in Gaza would be orders of magnitude greater than anything we’ve yet seen. The Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations have been far more aggressive and “kinetic” than Israel in our response to terror. We’ve destroyed far more urban territory, and we’ve inflicted vastly more civilian casualties. Yet, with isolated exceptions, we’ve done so under self-imposed rules of engagement that are stricter than the law of war requires. It’s time to change the terms of the international debate. It’s time for the world community to stop imposing these double standards on Israel, and start doing what international law requires: holding Hamas responsible for the devastation that results from Israel’s legal, necessary, and proper responses to its provocations. Only then will Hamas know that if it sows the wind, it could truly reap the whirlwind, and it will have no powerful international friends come to its aid.

**2020 DA**

1NC – Internal Link – Israel Lobby Key

Israel lobbyists spend a lot of money to influence u.s. elections

Perkins 19." Pro-Israel donors spent over $22m on lobbying and contributions in 2018” 2/15/19, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/feb/15/pro-israel-donors-spent-over-22m-on-lobbying-and-contributions-in-2018]

Pro-Israel lobbyists and donors spent more than $22m on lobbying and campaign contributions during the 2018 election cycle. The same or similar Israel-aligned groups and donors have spent hundreds of millions of dollars in recent decades , and that money poured into American politics through a variety of channels, according to the non-profit, non-partisan Center for Responsive Politics. The CRP uses federal election records to track campaign finance spending and makes its data available on the

OpenSecrets site. The Guardian examined campaign finance data after Muslim Minnesota congresswoman Ilhan Omar ignited a controversy with two tweets claiming pro-Israel lobby money influenced American political policy and discourse. The claim led to broad accusations of antisemitism from Democrats and Republicans. Omar later apologized but also stood her ground when it came to highlighting the influence of lobbyists, comparing influential pro-Israel lobby group, the American Israeli Public

Affairs Committee (Aipac) to the the National Rifle Association and the fossil fuel industry. The data examined by the Guardian suggests that the pro-Israel lobby is highly active and spends heavily to influence US policy, though at levels far below those of many big business sectors. “I haven’t observed many other countries that have a comparable level of activity, at least in domestic lobbying data,” said Dan Auble, a senior researcher at CRP. Omar incorrectly suggested Aipac makes campaign contributions to

candidates. However, records show it did spend about $3.5m lobbying during the 2018 election cycle. In total, pro-Israel lobbying groups spent about $5m in 2018, the highest tally since tracking began in 1998.

2NC – Internal Link – AIPAC Key

Israel spends huge amounts of money to get their interests into American politics-including the government and ngo groups

Reklatis 19[Victor Reklaitis is MarketWatch's Money & Politics reporter and is based in Washington, D.C. Prior to joining MarketWatch, he served as an assistant editor and reporter at Investor's Business Daily. Before IBD, he worked for several newspapers in Virginia. A native of Indiana, he majored in engineering and English at Stanford and received his MBA at UCLA Anderson. " Here’s how the pro-Israel lobby — criticized by Ilhan Omar — stacks up against other Washington influencers 2/14/19, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-how-the-pro-israel-lobby-just-criticized-by-ilhan-omar-stacks-up-against-other-washington-influencers-2019-02-11]

The pro-Israel lobby is a significant player in terms of political donations, contributing $14.9 million in the 2018 election cycle, according to data from OpenSecrets.org, a website tracking money in politics that’s run by a nonpartisan research group, the Center for Responsive Politics. The center ranks this lobby as the 50th-biggest spender in the last cycle — well behind the securities and

investment industry at No. 1 with its $399 million, as well as lagging the electronics industry at No. 19 with its $57 million. Pro-Israel interest groups have definite clout, according to Ben Freeman, author of “The Foreign Policy Auction” and director of the Foreign Influence Transparency Initiative at the Center for International Policy, a think tank. “It would be hard to say that the Israel lobby is not one of the most influential lobbies in D.C.,” Freeman told MarketWatch. “I don’t think anybody would disagree with

that, whether they think it’s a good thing or a bad thing.” The pro-Israel lobby tends to donate more to Democrats than Republicans, having shown higher levels of giving to Democrats In every election cycle since 1990. That’s shown in the center’s chart above. Republicans had been getting a rising share of the contributions in this decade, scoring as much as 47% of pro-Israel interest groups’ money in the 2016 election cycle vs. Democrats’ 53% — up from only 28% for the GOP in 2002. But that trend abated in the 2018 cycle, with Republicans getting just 36% of the outlays. In addition to the spending by pro-Israel interest groups in the U.S., OpenSecrets.org data based on Foreign Agents Registration Act filings show Israel’s government spent $15.8 million on lobbying-related efforts in 2018, while the nonprofit Jewish Agency for Israel spent $8.3 million.

1NC – Link – Plan = Win for Trump

Netanyahu and Trump are flipping Jewish votersKampeas 19 (Ron Kampeas orked previously at The Associated Press, where he spent more than a decade in its bureaus in

Jerusalem, April 8, 2019. " Netanyahu has become an issue in the US presidential campaign," https://www.jta.org/2019/04/08/politics/netanyahu-has-become-an-issue-in-the-us-presidential-campaign)The latest 2020 election fault line between Republicans and Democrats, and to a degree among Democratic presidential candidates, is Benjamin Netanyahu. At least five of the Democratic presidential candidates, ranging from the Israel-critical to the AIPAC-aligned, have rebuked the Israeli prime minister just days ahead of his re-election bid on Tuesday after he pledged to annex Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Beto O’Rourke went so far as to call Netanyahu racist. “The U.S.-Israel relationship is one of the most important relationships we have on the planet,” O’Rourke said while campaigning in Iowa this weekend, “and that relationship, if it is successful, must transcend partisanship in the United States, and it must be able to transcend a prime minister who is racist.” Pete Buttigieg and Bernie Sanders also criticized Netanyahu’s annexation pledge while claiming it doesn’t make them anti-Israel. President Donald Trump, meantime, held up his friendship with Netanyahu as a reason that Jewish voters should leave their traditional Democratic Party home. Democratic presidential candidate Beto O’Rourke speaks in New York City at the National Action Network’s annual convention, April 3, 2019. (Drew Angerer/Getty Images) Netanyahu has also raised liberal ire recently by embracing several authoritarian leaders from other countries and retreating from support for a two-state solution. Many liberals believe his efforts to push Trump to recognize Israeli sovereignty in the Golan Heights have also harmed the Middle East peace process. How the Democrats treat Netanyahu is indicative of the emerging Israel fault line within their party between progressives who have become increasingly bold in denouncing the Israeli leader and his hawkish policies and moderates who do not want to give President Donald Trump any help in his bid to depict Democrats as anti-Israel. Sen. Amy Klobuchar, D-Minn., campaigning in Nevada, a key caucus state, told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency that she was unhappy with Netanyahu’s West Bank announcement but also emphasized her pro-Israel credentials. “I’m for the two-state solution and I don’t favor what Netanyahu did this weekend,” she said. “I don’t favor the annexation; I think we should have a two-state solution.” An older man interrupted her meeting with local Democratic activists in suburban Las Vegas on Sunday, saying “Israel oppresses Palestinians.” But Klobuchar cut him off, saying “We’ve talked about that.” Klobuchar’s impatience with the activist underscored the difficulties moderate Democrats may face in handling the party’s progressive base, which has grown increasingly hostile to Netanyahu, a villain for the Democratic left at least since 2015 when he worked behind the scenes with Republicans to speak in Congress against President Barack Obama’s Iran nuclear deal. MoveOn, the progressive advocacy group, called on Democratic presidential candidates to boycott last month’s American Israel Public Affairs Committee conference, in part because Netanyahu was a featured speaker. Klobuchar, perhaps the Democratic candidate closest to AIPAC, met with a delegation from the Israel lobby that came to her office during the conference. “I met with my local AIPAC group, I was proud to do that, and I was proud to be a strong supporter of Israel, my voting record has shown that,” she said. Sen. Amy Klobuchar campaigns for the Democratic presidential nomination in Independence, Iowa, March 16, 2019. (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images) Trump, appearing here this weekend at the annual conference of the Republican Jewish Coalition, played up his relationship with Netanyahu, noting how the prime minister stood at his side as Trump signed the proclamation recognizing the Golan as Israel’s sovereign territory.

2NC – Link – AIPAC = Win for Trump

AIPAC and Trump campaigning to swing votersVerhovek 19 ( John Verhovek works at ABC, 8, 2019. "Democrats skipping AIPAC confrence," https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/growing-crowd-2020-democrats-skipping-years-aipac-conference/story?id=61844554)President Donald Trump on Friday again accused Democrats of being "anti-Israel" and "anti-Jewish," in response to a question from a reporter on the growing number of the party's presidential candidates skipping a conference put on by a prominent pro-Israel lobbying group. Interested in Democratic Party? Add Democratic Party as an interest to stay up to date on the latest Democratic Party

news, video, and analysis from ABC News. "The Democrats have very much proven to be anti-Israel, there’s no question about that," Trump said as he departed the White House for Palm Beach, Florida. "And it’s a disgrace, I mean, I don’t know what’s happened to them but they are totally anti-Israel. Frankly, I think they’re anti-Jewish.” The comments come after a growing number of Democratic hopefuls for the party's 2020 presidential nomination said they will not attend the annual policy conference put on by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), an influential pro-Israel lobbying group. Thus far the campaigns of eight Democratic presidential candidates have confirmed to ABC News that they will not be attending the conference, which is slated to begin this Sunday in Washington, D.C., and runs through Tuesday. Those not attending the conference include: Sens. Bernie Sanders, Kamala Harris and Elizabeth Warren, former Texas Rep. Beto O'Rourke, Washington State Gov. Jay Inslee, former Housing and Urban Development Secretary Julián Castro, Mayor Pete Buttigieg of South Bend, Indiana and former Maryland Rep. John Delaney. Representatives for the campaigns of Sens. Cory Booker, Kirsten Gillibrand and Amy Klobuchar did not respond to ABC News when asked if they will be attending AIPAC. Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton speaks during the 2016 AIPAC Policy Conference in Washington, March 21, 2016. Even as a growing number of Dermocratic candidates declined to appear, other top Democrats, including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer and House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, are all slated to attend and speak at this year's conference. "Sen. Sanders has no plans to attend the AIPAC conference. He’s concerned about the platform AIPAC is providing for leaders who have expressed bigotry and oppose a two-state solution," Sanders' Policy Director Josh Orton wrote in a statement provided to ABC News. Sanders, who is Jewish, did not attend the conference in 2016 either, while his then-rival for the Democratic nomination, Hillary Clinton, attended the gathering and gave remarks. A spokesman for Delaney said the candidate is "very disappointed," he can not attend the conference due to a scheduling conflict. The decisions come after prominent liberal group MoveOn.org called on all Democratic candidates vying for the party's presidential nomination to boycott the conference. "It’s no secret that AIPAC has worked to hinder diplomatic efforts like the Iran deal, is undermining Palestinian self-determination, and inviting figures actively involved in human rights violations to its stage," Iram Ali, Campaign Director at MoveOn.org, wrote in a statement released earlier this week. The call to boycott the conference also comes after Democrats struggled to respond to the backlash against Minnesota Rep. Ilhan Omar, whose comments about Jewish Americans and dual-loyalty sparked a debate within the party about anti-Semitism led the U.S. House to pass an official resolution condemning "hate." Despite the backlash, many prominent Democrats including Sanders and Harris came to Omar's defense.

AIPAC issue wins votes for trump in swing states in 2020Fouriezos 1/17(Nick honed that curiosity at the University of Georgia. At the student newspaper, Nick covered tennis and football and later became sports editor. He walked out with the rest of the staff after the board of directors attempted a takeover; the protest drew national headlines and he was reinstated, ultimately serving as editor in chief. After almost losing what he loved to do — the freedom to seek the truth and report it — Nick moved toward investigative news. He has interned at the St. Augustine Record and Baltimore Sun (where he once pissed off Michael Phelps). A summer stint with his hometown paper, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, turned into a contract to cover the 2014 elections — at which point Nick was a political junkie. He then spent seven months traveling Indonesia and Australia, writing about corrupt politicians and fledgling Hugh Jackmans, and swimming with whale sharks. Fouriezos, Nick. “How the Debate Over Israel Could Separate 2020 Contenders.” OZY, 17 Jan. 2019, 6 Jul. 2019,

www.ozy.com/politics-and-power/how-the-debate-over-israel-could-separate-2020-contenders/91844. Laura Ni)That ground-up surge in pro-Palestine activity was visible in the recent midterms that led to the election of at least two vocal supporters of the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement aimed at pressuring Israel into addressing Palestinian rights: Ilhan Omar of Minnesota and Rashida Tlaib of Michigan. The first Palestinian-American elected to Congress, Tlaib did not respond to OZY’s requests for comment but has previously told The Intercept that she wants to lead a delegation to Palestine that would counter the annual AIPAC-sponsored trip to Israel. “There is a young generation of American progressives overall who are looking for a rejection of the old way of doing things,” says Simone Zimmerman, a spokeswoman for If Not Now, a Jewish-American activist group building public support to end Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. The former Sanders staffer ties the pro-Palestine movement’s work to the way the Vermont senator was able to normalize progressive ideals such as Medicare-for-all. “Just like how we’re seeing young people push for radical new visions, like the Green New Deal policy” supported by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Zimmerman adds. But the rise of this sentiment is also likely to make Israel — of the countless issues that are likely to be faced by the 2020 candidates — perhaps the most divisive within the Democratic caucus. Once hot-button issues such as gay marriage, a carbon tax and Medicare-for-all have become nearly ubiquitous party positions. American Jews are particularly sensitive toward anti-Semitism as hate acts and White nationalism have risen since the 2016 election, most visibly during the Pittsburgh synagogue shooting in October that left 11 dead. “In this national environment, candidates have to be very careful as to where the line is in denouncing Israel,” says Tyler Gregory, CEO of Wider Bridge, a progressive LGBT organization focused on advocating for Israel. “Deflecting and blaming critics of Israel for that is very cynical,” responds If Not Now’s Zimmerman. But there may be ramifications past the primary, should candidates not toe the traditional line. It looks unlikely the Jewish vote would switch en masse to Donald Trump in the 2020 presidential race. But in a swing state like Florida, particularly if a pro-Palestine presidential candidate becomes the Democratic nominee? “The difference between carrying the Jewish vote 75-25 and carrying it 55-45 could, in theory, be the difference in the election,” Johnson says.

AIPAC influences congress and the defense industry Kotch 2/11( Alex is senior investigative reporter at Sludge. A PhD and campaign finance expert, he and his colleagues at International Business Times won a “Best in Business” award from the Society for Advancing Business Editing and Writing for their coverage of the 2017 Republican tax legislation. Alex’s work has been published by more than two dozen media outlets including The American Prospect, The Nation and Vice.com. Read more about Alex at his personal website. Kotch, Alex. “Here's How AIPAC Spends Money to Influence Congress.” Sludge, 11 Feb. 2019, 6 Jul. 2019, readsludge.com/2019/02/11/heres-how-aipac-spends-money-to-influence-congress/. Laura Ni)While it’s difficult to pin down what motivates the policy decisions of individual members of Congress, it’s relevant to consider the strong influence that AIPAC has over Congress, which Omar did in a follow-up tweet. The congresswoman from Minnesota, who came to the U.S. in 1995 as a Somali refugee, did not allege that AIPAC is the only pro-Israel organization seeking to influence American politicians’ actions regarding Israel. It is, however, one of the most powerful. Does AIPAC directly pay members of Congress to vote for “pro-Israel” policies, something Omar alleged and

Forward opinion editor Batya Ungar-Sargon challenged on Twitter? The short answer is “no,” but the nuanced answer is far more complicated. Here’s how AIPAC spends money to influence American politics. Donations from AIPAC Members AIPAC is not a political action committee and does not donate directly to political candidates, but it requires its members to donate to the campaigns of certain members of Congress in order to receive exclusive membership benefits. Doug Rossinow, an academic and author of a forthcoming book on American Zionism, wrote in the Washington Post

that since the late 1970s, AIPAC “has informally directed substantial campaign contributions toward chosen candidates for Congress.” The New Yorker explained AIPAC’s role in the late 1980s establishing allied pro-Israel PACs, which often had AIPAC leaders in charge and “looked to [AIPAC] for direction” regarding campaign contributions. AIPAC, which has generally been allied with the Republican Party, reportedly recruited individual bundlers, who would collect AIPAC members’ donations to direct them to the

campaigns of senators and representatives. “The goal was to develop people who could get a member of Congress on the phone at a moment’s notice,” wrote the New Yorker’s Connie Bruck. On its website,

AIPAC details its “Congressional Club,” a group of members who commit to donate at least $5,000 per election cycle “in a clearly pro-Israel context” to “pro-Israel politics.” “The Congressional Club is designed to recognize politically active members of AIPAC who support pro-Israel candidates for the House and Senate,” the group says. The influence of AIPAC and other pro-Israel

organizations impacts one of Washington’s biggest special-interest groups: the defense industry. As Sludge previously reported, both defense and pro-Israel interests have donated significant amounts of money to the campaign of Engel, whose committee has jurisdiction of arms exports. The top U.S. weapons manufacturers benefit from Israeli weapons purchases, made possible in part by American financial assistance.

Pro-Palestine stance fractures the dems and loses 2020 – uniquely hurts them in Florida which is key to Trump re-election. Dem candidates haven’t committed yet to an Israel stance for 2020, and Israel’s the largest risk of party disunityToosi and Caputo 2/12/19 [Nahal Toosi is a foreign affairs correspondent at POLITICO. She joined POLITICO from The Associated Press, where she reported from and/or served as an editor in New York, Islamabad, Kabul and London. She was one of the first foreign correspondents to reach Abbottabad, Pakistan, after the killing of Osama bin Laden. Prior to joining the AP, Toosi worked for the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, where she mostly covered higher education but also managed to report from Iraq during the U.S. invasion in 2003, as well as from Egypt, Thailand and Germany. Marc Caputo joined POLITICO Florida from the Miami Herald in January 2015. He writes the Florida Playbook and covers the politics of one of the country’s key swing states. Dems gunning for Trump fear 2020 split over Israel. February 12, 2019. https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/12/democrats-israel-2020-1166291]Democrats hoping for a united front against President Donald Trump in 2020 are trying to avoid

splintering over a n increasingly thorny topic : the Israeli-Palestinian conflict .With an energized progressive base increasingly supportive of Palestinian rights, and a president who is stridently pro-Israel in his policy moves, Democrats are starting to grapple more than ever with the party’s once-reflexive support for Israel.

The 2020 Dem ocratic presidential contenders are saying little publicly as they balance the

competing interests . But in the meantime, pro-Israel Democrats are scrambling behind the scenes to shore up support, providing Holy Land trips to members of Congress and proposing policies they hope can bridge a growing party divide.Against this backdrop, Democratic Rep. Ilhan Omar of Minnesota — one of the first two Muslim women ever elected to Congress — apologized on Monday for what many regarded as anti-Semitic criticisms she leveled on Twitter. The controversy, coupled with the substance of the overall policy debate, has concerned Democratic consultants as much as it encourages Republicans who

hope that Trump’s support of Israel will allow them to peel off Jewish voters , a key Dem ocratic

constituency .“What you have emerging are at least two Democratic views of Israel and a Republican view,” said Aaron David Miller, who has

advised several presidential administrations on the Middle East conflict. “The real question to me is to what

degree the progressive view is going to influence and or shape the mainstream of the

Dem ocratic Party .”Among the questions faced by the party and its growing list of Democratic presidential candidates: Should the United States move its embassy from Jerusalem back to Tel Aviv? Should the Democratic Party platform use the word “occupation” to describe lands claimed by Palestinians? Is the pro-Palestinian “boycott, divestment and sanctions” movement an acceptable form of protest against Israel?That last issue, nicknamed “BDS,” has laid bare the divisions among Democrats.Of at least seven U.S. senators running or considering vying for the Democratic presidential nomination, six of them — Cory Booker, Sherrod Brown, Kirsten Gillibrand, Kamala Harris, Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren — recently voted against a measure from Florida Republican Sen. Marco Rubio that would allow state and local governments to not do business with companies that support boycotting, sanctioning and divesting from Israel.Democratic Sen. Amy Klobuchar — who has declared she is running for the White House — voted with the majority when the legislation passed, 77-23, last week. Klobuchar is known for her strong support of Israel and had a rabbi at the launch of her presidential campaign this past weekend.

In total, Democrats accounted for 22 of the “no” votes and 25 of the “yes” votes on the overall package, which also included other measures related to the Middle East. Middle East watchers say that a decade ago, the anti-BDS aspect would have garnered almost no opposition.The anti-BDS piece of the package may not survive the Democratic-controlled U.S. House, where Omar and fellow Muslim American Democratic Rep. Rashida Tlaib of Michigan have emerged as outspoken supporters of Palestinian rights. The caucus’s freshman sensation, New York Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, has also tweeted remarks perceived as more sympathetic to Palestinians than Israel.Booker of New Jersey made perhaps the biggest pivot; last year, he co-sponsored a similar bill aimed at undermining the boycott movement. But he voted against the recent measure that moved in the Senate.Like many of his potential 2020 Democratic rivals, Booker explained his vote on grounds that the measure could threaten people’s First Amendment rights. “There are ways to combat BDS without compromising free speech, and this bill as it currently stands plainly misses the mark,” Booker said in a statement.Nonetheless, Republicans are using the measure to paint Democrats as weak on Israel, and the vote has added to the unease among pro-Israel groups such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC.Warren also faced critical coverage over Israel recently when The Jerusalem Post noted that she failed to push back on the description of Israel as “an apartheid state” during a question-and-answer moment in New Hampshire.The critical tenor of that question underscores the drift of the Democratic Party over the years. According to a Pew Research poll last year, 79 percent of Republicans sympathize more with Israel than the Palestinians but only 27 percent of Democrats feel that way. The poll also found that Republicans’ support for Israel over Palestinians had increased by 29 percentage points since 2001, while Democratic support of Israel over Palestinians declined by 11 points in that same timespan.Still, a Mellman Group poll taken just before the elections last year found that 68 percent of Jewish voters identify as Democrats, while 25 percent identify as Republicans. And, compared to the population overall, 76 percent of Jewish voters held an unfavorable view of Trump — even though he was the first U.S. president to honor a longstanding commitment to move the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.

But Trump also angered many in the Jewish community when he failed to clearly denounce neo-Nazis after the violent 2017 clashes in Charlottesville, Va., and for running a campaign supported by white nationalists.

Still , the pro-Palestinian drift of the party has increasingly worried some Dem ocratic

activists . That fear is especially pronounced in Florida , home to both a large Jewish

population and Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort. Florida also is the nation’s largest swing state that’s

central to Trump’s re-election hopes .

“As far as that type of rhetoric from Omar and some of the debate driving Jewish people from the party, there is a definite risk if leadership doesn’t reject the promotion of BDS and anti-Semitism,” said Evan Ross, an AIPAC

member and Democratic activist from Miami-Dade, Florida’s most populous county .

Ross noted that the Democrats’ nominee for governor in 2018, Andrew Gillum , took heat from Republican Ron DeSantis over the BDS issue . When DeSantis narrowly won the governor’s mansion, even some Democrats cited his pro-Israel platform as a reason for the victory .

“As a Republican, what’s happening in the Democratic Party is great politically for us. But it’s awful for the Jewish community and anyone who cares about the issues we care about,” said Matt Brooks, executive director of the Republican Jewish Coalition.“This is going to come to a head in the Democratic Party,” he said. “They’re trying to keep a lid on this but they can’t.”The shifting views of Israel among Democrats are in part the result of years of lobbying by activists concerned about Palestinian rights. But the ascent of a hard-right government in Israel has accelerated the trend, making support for the country less reflexively bipartisan.Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s seeming disrespect toward former President Barack Obama upset many in the party, especially its African-American members. Many black Democrats skipped Netanyahu’s March 3, 2015, speech to Congress — in which he urged lawmakers to vote against the nuclear deal Obama negotiated with Iran.Democratic pro-Israel activists have stepped up lobbying since Democrats recaptured the House last November. In January, for instance, a group of national security experts, some of whom may join Democratic campaigns, visited Israel to get a lay of the political landscape, meeting with both Israeli and Palestinian leaders.The weeklong trip was organized by J Street, the left-leaning pro-Israel group that has battled for primacy with the more conservative and established AIPAC.Also last month, a new pro-Israel organization popped up in Washington.The Democratic Majority for Israel, led by several veteran Democrats, aims to combat the waning enthusiasm for Israel among progressives. The group says that it will focus its “education and advocacy efforts first around the 2020 presidential and congressional elections.”Critics are casting the group as an unofficial offshoot of AIPAC, but its founders insist that is not the case. "The Democratic Majority for Israel is a wholly independent organization that exists to promote Democratic values, including a strong U.S.-Israel relationship," said Mark Mellman, the group's president.

A big Democratic concern: how to handle the issue of the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem? Trump moved the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv over Palestinian objections. The Trump administration also has moved to downgrade the status of the U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem, the diplomatic mission that dealt directly with the Palestinians, who did not want to go through an embassy linked to Israel.One campaign platform proposal being floated among Democratic consultants is to keep the embassy in Jerusalem but reestablish a diplomatic mission — possibly something beyond just a consulate general — in a part of East Jerusalem that Palestinians claim for a future capital.“There are discussions taking place about how to recognize the Palestinians’ connection to the East Jerusalem, to rebalance the ledger after Trump’s attempt to take the issue of Jerusalem off the table,” said Dylan Williams of J Street.But more left-leaning activists say that may not be enough.“They should move the embassy back,” said Yousef Munayyer, executive director of the U.S. Campaign for Palestinian Rights. “They should bring U.S. policy in line with international law, which was really what the embassy’s move subverted. That is the least that needs to happen.”

For the most part, the numerous Democrats considering a White House run have not fully fleshed

out their foreign policy ideas , much less their exact views on Israel and the Palestinians .Democratic activists say they expect a more intense fight than usual over the Democratic Party platform, especially on how it describes the plight of the Palestinians and whether it uses the term “occupation.”Supporters of Sanders, the independent senator from Vermont eyeing a second run for the Democratic nomination, are expected to push for a mention of “occupation.” Sanders’ side lost that same battle, and the nomination, when he ran in 2016.More moderate 2020 candidates or those aligned more closely with Israel are likely to argue against language such as “occupation” on grounds that it could offend Israelis, who prefer terms like “contested” or “disputed” and in some cases question any Palestinian claim to the territories.Democratic activists stress that the 2020 election is still a political lifetime away, but acknowledge that when it comes to Israel, Republicans are far more united in offering uncritical support.“The more contentious fight is going to be among Democrats,” said one Democratic strategist not yet affiliated with any campaign. “Our job is to mend the rifts here.”That being said, there’s a strong belief that no matter who wins the Democratic primary, the party will unite behind them regardless of their stand on Israel.After all, for Democrats, the election is about Trump, said Miller, the Middle East expert.

“ If the Democratic Party’s prime directive is defeating Donald Trump ,” he said, “then various elements of

the party would or should go to some lengths to ensure that no issue drives a wedge , least

of all the issue of Israel .”

Florida’s a must win for Trump and he’s losing it nowAdams 11/14/18 [Florida Exit Polls Reveal Tough 2020 Fight for Trump ANALYSIS. By Myra Adams - RCP Contributor. Florida Exit Polls Reveal Tough 2020 Fight for Trump. November 14, 2018. https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2018/11/14/florida_exit_polls_reveal_tough_2020_fight_for_trump_138644.html]This debacle is in effect the first major political battle of the 2020 cycle. Discussed below are exit poll highlights from the Senate and

gubernatorial race illustrating why Florida is now, and will continue to be , the Mother of All Swing

States .But first, for context, let’s establish the four candidates who are engaged in this ferocious recount. The Republican U.S. Senate candidate is term-limited incumbent Gov. Rick Scott, who leads three-term incumbent Democratic Sen. Bill Nelson with 0.2 percent of the vote.Leading in the race for governor by 0.4 percentage points is former three-term Republican Congressman Ron DeSantis, a Trump acolyte. His opponent is Tallahassee Mayor Andrew Gillum, running to be Florida’s first African-American governor and a Bernie Sanders wannabe.Before the midterms there were countless reports that Republican candidates across the nation were in danger of “losing” white college-educated women voters, a key bellwether demographic.So how did the Sunshine State fare with these highly engaged voters? The answer is “crash and burn.”

When compared to Trump’s support in 2016 , both Scott and DeSantis shed 18 percentage

points’ worth of college-educated white women . According to 2016 exit polls, Trump won 60 percent

of these women, while Scott and DeSantis won only 42 percent. That trend spells disaster for the

GOP in 2020 .

Conversely (and noteworthy) in 2016, only 37 percent of white college-educated Florida women voted for Hillary Clinton. But in 2018, Nelson won 58 percent of this politically active demographic while Gillum won 57

percent , a 20-point increase in just two years .Another ominous sign for Florida Republicans revealed in last week’s midterm was that college-educated white women comprised only 13 percent of the electorate, down from 18 percent in 2016. But in 2020 — especially if Democrats nominate a candidate who energizes this bloc and manages to increase their electoral percentage back up to 18 percent or more — President Trump will have difficulty maintaining the 1.2 percent margin of victory with which he won the state in 2016.

Another interesting Florida midterm data point is that women constituted 55 percent of the

total electorate compared to 45 percent for men . This 10-point gender gap is up four

percentage points from 2016 when women bested men by only six points — 53 percent to 47 percent.

Democrats Nelson and Gillum won women by double digits , but both narrowly lost their races (we think

-- stayed tuned). Nelson won women by 56 percent to 43 percent over Scott, and women supported Gillum over DeSantis by essentially the same margin, 55 percent to 43 percent.So how did Rick Scott and Ron DeSantis eke out the slimmest of victories? The answer is men, men, men. (Hat tip to the late Tim Russert, the originator of the now iconic phrase “Florida, Florida, Florida” — his prediction that the state would determine the winner of the 2000 presidential election.)With men, Scott trounced Nelson by 16 points, 58 percent to 42 percent. DeSantis performed even better, winning men by 17 points, 58 percent to 41 percent. Therefore, in 2020 President Trump will be looking to Scott and DeSantis for help in turning out Florida’s men because both candidates increased Trump’s 52 percent winning margin among this group in 2016 by four points.The last Florida midterm demographic that needs discussing is race. Gillum, as an African American, aimed a spotlight on this data point, and race was a contentious issue during the campaign against DeSantis.First, let’s compare the white vs. non-white vote from 2016 to 2018. In 2016, the white vote comprised 62 percent of Florida’s electorate and the non-white vote, 38 percent. In 2018 the white electorate increased by four percentage points to 66 percent while the non-white vote decreased by the same amount to 34 percent.Both Scott and DeSantis won exactly 60 percent of the white vote.Gillum attracted 39 percent of white voters. Surprisingly, he won only 68 percent of the total non-white vote — winning 86 percent of the black vote and 54 percent of the Latino vote.Meanwhile, DeSantis won 30 percent of the total non-white vote with help from 14 percent of blacks and 44 percent of Latinos. (Florida’s unique Cuban vote, which tilts Republican, was obviously a major factor.)For the record, blacks comprised 13 percent of the state’s midterm electorate, and Latinos were 15 percent.In the Senate race, Nelson won 70 percent of the non-white vote compared to only 29 percent for Scott. Nelson won a whopping 90 percent of the black vote, four points higher than Gillum’s share in the governor’s race. Go figure.Gov. Scott did poorly with blacks, winning only 10 percent of their vote but still two percentage points higher than Trump in 2016.What must be disappointing to Scott — who heavily courted the Latino vote in his Senate campaign — is losing that growing demographic to Nelson by nine points, 54 percent to 45 percent.What do these exit poll highlights mean going forward?Answer: Strap yourself in for 2020, both in Florida and nationally.Given that the midterm race for governor and senator are in recount mode with lawsuits aplenty and accusations of impropriety being hurled, one can only imagine what Florida’s state of anxiety will be leading up to Election Day 2020 when President Trump frantically defends his must-win adopted home state .

Pro-Israel groups overwhelmingly support Democrats now, but that’s slightly wavering – the plan cements a trend that puts Trump over the top in every swing state. Networks of donors magnify the linkEvers-Hillstrom 4/9/19 [Karl Evers-Hillstrom joined the Center for Responsive Politics as its money-in-politics reporter in October 2018. A native of Brooklyn, New York, Karl graduated from the State University of New York at New Paltz with a bachelors degree in 2016. Pro-Israel groups overwhelmingly give to Democrats: Will that change in 2020? April 9, 2019.

https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/04/pro-israel-groups-give-to-democrats-will-that-change-in-2020/]Dating back to 1990, pro-Israel groups have given more to Democratic candidates than

Republicans in every election cycle . Conservative groups are laying the groundwork to reverse this longstanding

trend.The Republican Jewish Coalition (RJC), backed by conservative megadonor Sheldon Adelson, reportedly plans to spend $10 million in the 2020 elections to garner support for President Donald Trump from pro-Israel Jewish voters. That kind of spending would lead to an eye-opening increase for RJC, which contributed $496,097 to Republican candidates and made $1.7 million in independent expenditures to aid Republicans in 2018.During the group’s annual summit last weekend, RJC board member Ari Fleischer told Politico that the group hopes to make additional inroads with large Jewish populations in Florida , Ohio , Pennsylvania and

Michigan to put Trump “over the top.” The optimism from RJC comes as Republican groups continue attempts to capitalize on controversial comments from Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-Minn.). They’re also trying to make inroads with pro-Israel

Jewish voters by supporting Trump’s controversial decisions to recognize Golan Heights as

Israeli territory and move the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem . The push comes as Trump reportedly emboldens

Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s vow to annex parts of the West Bank. The majority of money from pro-Israel groups currently goes toward Democratic candidates , but substantial new investment into the RJC from Adelson could amount to a seismic shift in the

realm of pro-Israel groups .

J Street, a liberal advocacy group which supports a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine, has remained the top contributor among pro-Israel groups since the 2014 cycle. J Street distributed more than $4 million in the 2018 cycle, all of which went to Democrats.The PAC functions as a conduit for donors who want to support J Street-endorsed candidates. Donors earmark their contribution toward a specific candidate, then J Street’s PAC distributes the money to the candidate. With this process, individual contribution limits remain in place, but candidates can take in large sums through J Street’s supporters. Combining direct PAC contributions and itemized earmarked contributions, J Street’s top two beneficiaries were Wisconsin Democrats Dan Kohl ($228,983) and Tammy Baldwin ($206,705).Also acting as a conduit for its supporters, NorPAC was the second-highest spender, shelling out $1.1 million. The group is nonpartisan, committing to candidates of both parties that “demonstrate a genuine commitment to the strength, security, and survival of Israel.” But 63 percent of the money went to Democrats. Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) received $205,519 in itemized contributions through the New Jersey-based group, more than any other candidate.Though the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) doesn’t make direct contributions to candidates, its “Congressional Club” program incentivizes American members to contribute thousands toward pro-Israel congressional candidates. It’s difficult to decipher how much AIPAC members contribute toward candidates as they often don’t specify they are contributing as required by the program.Each of the Democratic Presidential candidates declined to speak at AIPAC’s annual conference, drawing criticism from Republicans. AIPAC recently targeted Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) with Facebook ads urging its supporters to tell Sanders that “America stands with Israel.”Still, several high-profile Democrats, including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, spoke at the AIPAC conference.“I stand with Israel, proudly and unapologetically,” Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) said at the conference. “When someone accuses American supporters of dual loyalty I say, accuse me.”

There are some signs that support for Democrats from pro-Israel donors is slightly

wavering . Pro-Israel megadonor Haim Saban , who gave nearly $4.3 million to Democrats and liberal groups in

2018 and just $5,400 to Republicans, recently expressed concern to Politico about 2020 Democrats’

policies on the U.S.-Israel alliance . If influential donors connected to organizations such as

NorPAC and AIPAC decide to shift their contributions from Democrats from Republicans, the

pro-Israel landscape could easily undergo a major shift to the right .

Changes in Israel policy divides dems – it’s the core of Trump’s strategy to exploit cracks to win 2020Parti 3/25/19 [Tarini Parti is a politics reporter for BuzzFeed News and is based in Washington, DC. Donald Trump’s Newest Way To Divide Democrats : Israel . March 25, 2019. https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/tariniparti/donald-trumps-newest-way-to-divide-democrats-israel]Ahead of his 2020 reelection , Trump has been looking to take advantage of any cracks within

the Democratic Party . For the last few months — including in his State of the Union speech — Trump has latched onto a

broad portrayal of all Democrats as socialists swho were out of step with the economic views of the country, bringing up progressive firebrand New York Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s policy priorities as though they were held by all Democrats.

And in recent weeks, as Democrats have continued to deal with shifting views toward Israel within

their own party , following comments made by Omar, Trump is employing the same tactic: He has

attacked the party broadly as “ anti-Jewish ” in his comments and tweets, while taking steps to

bolster his pro-Israel image to draw a contrast whenever possible .“The Democrats have very much proven to be anti-Israel,” Trump told reporters Friday. “There’s no question about that. And it’s a disgrace. I mean, I don’t know what’s happened to them. But they are totally anti-Israel. Frankly, I think they’re anti-Jewish.”During Netanyahu’s visit — weeks before the Israeli leader under corruption charges faces a tough election — Trump signed a proclamation with a key political priority for Netanyahu: recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, a strategically located area along Israel’s northern border that has been long disputed. The move is seen as a major reversal in long-held US foreign policy and a political gift to Netanyahu.“We’re celebrating the Golan Heights,” Trump said Monday. “It’s something that I’ve been hearing about for many years, from many people. I’ve been studying for years. And this should have been done, I would say, numerous presidents ago. But for some reason, they didn’t do it, and I’m very honored to have done it.”Trump has repeatedly spoken about his decision to move the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in a similar way at campaign rallies and official events. So much so that, in a speech at Trump’s Florida club Mar-a-Lago on Saturday, Sen. Lindsey Graham reportedly brought up Trump’s decision to move the embassy with a joke: “There will be a Trump hotel [in Jerusalem] in 10 years.”Trump was expected to spend more than an hour with Netanyahu on Monday and join him for dinner Tuesday night, but Netanyahu, who was also supposed to address the AIPAC conference, had to cut his trip short after a rocket hit central Israel.Republicans have repeatedly pointed out that none of the 2020 Democratic contenders were scheduled to speak at the AIPAC conference. Presidential candidates, however, typically are only invited to address the conference in election years.Trump did not address the conference himself. But while he was emphasizing his cozy relationship with Netanyahu at the White House, Vice President Mike Pence spoke at AIPAC on his behalf, calling the president “the greatest friend of the Jewish people and the State of Israel ever to sit in the Oval Office of the White House.”Pence used the opportunity not just to draw attention to the president’s Golan Heights proclamation, but he also carried the president’s message, stressing the emerging divisions within the opposing party on Israel .“It’s astonishing to think that the party of Harry Truman, which did so much to help create the State of Israel, has been co-opted by people who promote rank, anti-Semitic rhetoric, and work to undermine the broad American consensus of support for Israel,” Pence said, adding falsely that the “party that has been the home of so many American Jews ... struggled to muster the votes to unequivocally condemn anti-Semitism in a resolution.”

House Democrats were united in a recent vote for a resolution condemning anti-Semitism ,

among other racist behavior. Twenty-three Republicans voted against the measure.

It challenges party leadersPrude 2/14/19 [Harvest is a graduate of the World Journalism Institute and a reporter for WORLD. Israel and the Democratic divide. February 14, 2019. https://world.wng.org/content/israel_and_the_democratic_divide]WASHINGTON—Recent provocative comments by freshman congresswoman Ilhan Omar , D-Minn., illustrate a

growing divide in the Democratic Party over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict .The current dust-up escalated Sunday after House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., said Omar and Rep. Rashida Tlaib, D-Mich., should be disciplined for making anti-Israeli statements. Omar and Tlaib, who are Muslim, support the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement that seeks to punish Israel economically for its treatment of Palestinians in the country.

On Sunday night, Omar tweeted that lawmakers’ support for Israel is “all about the Benjamins baby,” meaning money. When a journalist asked who she thought was paying lawmakers to support Israel, Omar tweeted, “AIPAC!” a reference to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, a pro-Israel lobbying group.In 2018, AIPAC spent approximately $3.5 million on lobbying, according to the nonprofit, nonpartisan research group Open Secrets. AIPAC also annually pays for congressional lawmakers to take trips to Israel. It does not have its own political action committee and does not contribute directly to campaigns, though individuals who worked for AIPAC donated $21,350 to candidates in 2018. Nine of 14 candidates that received contributions were Democrats.After Omar’s tweets, Reps. Josh Gottheimer, D-N.J., and Elaine Luria, D-Va., both Jewish, circulated a letter asking the Democratic Party to condemn anti-Semitism from “certain members within our caucus.” House Democratic leadership released a statement Monday, affirming, “We are and will always be strong supporters of Israel in Congress. … Congresswoman Omar’s use of anti-Semitic tropes and prejudicial accusations against Israel’s supporters are deeply offensive. We condemn these remarks and call upon Congresswoman Omar to immediately apologize.”Omar tweeted an apology. But it was not the first time she made waves with anti-Israel comments. She only recently apologized for a 2012 tweet in which she said, “Israel has hypnotized the world, may Allah awaken the people and help them see the evil doings of Israel.” House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., has said that Omar will not lose her spot on the House Foreign Affairs Committee over her remarks.

A growing coalition of Democratic lawmakers has pro-Palestine views , present ing a challenge to party

leaders and 2020 presidential candidates in how they relate to Jewish voters , a traditionally solid bloc

of Democratic support . A 2018 Mellman Group poll found that nearly three-quarters of Jews surveyed would vote for a Democrat for president or for Congress.

2NC – DA Turns Case

Trump dramatically increases violence against Palestinians – reelection doubles the time they have to endure that violence, which is notably worse than normal US policy. Additionally, each of these actions s an alt cause to the aff that vastly outweighs and only beating Trump in 2020 solves – it’s independent offense consistent with their framingAwad 18 [Rev. Dr. Alex Awad is a retired United Methodist Missionary. He and his wife, Brenda, served in Jerusalem and in Bethlehem for more than 25 years. Rev. Awad served as pastor of East Jerusalem Baptist Church, dean of students at Bethlehem Bible College, and director of the Shepherd Society. Awad has written two books, Through the Eyes of the Victims and Palestinian Memories. Rev. Awad is a member of Palestinian Christian Alliance for Peace (PCAP). President Trump’s Vengeful Crackdown on the Palestinians. Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November/December 2018, pp. 16-18. https://www.wrmea.org/2018-november-december/president-trumps-vengeful-crackdown-on-the-palestinians.htmlIT IS AN ACCEPTED fact that U.S. policy in Israel/Palestine has been pro-Israel from the days of Harry Truman’s presidency all the way to Barack Obama’s. Even so, from time to time the United States could be critical of Israeli policies and have threatened to punish Israel for violating international law. Several U.S. presidents followed through on threats, including Republicans George H.W. Bush, who opposed loan guarantees and new Israeli settlements, and Ronald Reagan, who suspended a strategic cooperation agreement

after Israel illegally annexed the Golan Heights in 1981. However, with Donald Trump occupying the White House , a

shift has taken place in U.S. policy toward the Israel-Palestine dispute . Now, U.S. policy is no

longer merely pro-Israel , but rather fully right-wing Israeli . Whatever Binyamin Netanyahu

and his far-right government ask the United States to do for them, Trump complies and hands it to them on a silver platter.

Here is the Israeli wish list that other U.S. administrations refused to grant and Trump ’s administration has handed over, asking nothing in return:

Recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel;

Move the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem;

Declare that the future of Jerusalem is off the negotiating table ;

Call for the dismantlement of U nited N ations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and an end to all U.S. contributions to the U.N. agency. The U.S. was paying more than a quarter of the agency’s $1.2 billion annual budget.

Call for removal of the refugee issue (the right of return of Palestinian refugees ) from future

negotiations;

Support the redefinition of the term “Palestinian refugee” so that children of Palestinian

refugees do not retain refugee status (which is contrary to UNHCR guidelines that refugee dependents “are normally granted refugee status according to the principle of family unity”);

Reduce significantly U.S. annual support to the Palestinian Authority ;

Cut $25 million in U.S. aid to Palestinian hospitals , including those in East Jerusalem;

Consistently withhold criticism of Israel’s human rights violations and brutality against Palestinians, especially in international forums like the U.N. Security Council;

Close the Palestine Liberation Organization’s mission in Washington, DC, leaving the

Palestinians without a formal presence in the U.S. capital .

***COUNTERPLANS***

**Conditions CP**

1NC – Solvency Advocate – Human Rights Conditions

We should impose HR Reform conditions on IsraelAFSC and A GROUP, 10-5-2012, "Condition U.S. military aid to Israel on respect for human rights," American Friends Service Committee, https://www.afsc.org/resource/condition-us-military-aid-israel-respect-human-rights (JC)

Through this direct experience we have witnessed the pain and suffering of Israelis as a result of Palestinian actions and of Palestinians as a result of Israeli actions. In addition to the horror and loss of life from rocket attacks from Gaza and past suicide bombings, we have witnessed the broad impact that a sense of insecurity and fear has had on Israeli society. We have also witnessed widespread Israeli human rights violations committed against Palestinians, including killing of civilians, home demolitions and forced displacement, and restrictions on Palestinian movement, among others. We recognize that each party—Israeli and Palestinian—bears responsibilities for its actions and we therefore continue to stand against all violence regardless of its source. Our stand against violence is complemented by our commitment to the rights of all Israelis, as well as all Palestinians, to live in peace and security. It is this experience and these commitments that lead us to write to you today to express our grave concern about the deteriorating conditions in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories which threaten

to lead the region further away from the realization of a just peace. Unfortunately, unconditional U.S. military assistance to Israel has contributed to this deterioration, sustaining the conflict and undermining the long-term security interests of both Israelis and Palestinians. This is made clear in the most recent 2011 State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices covering Israel and the Occupied

Territories (1), which details widespread Israeli human rights violations committed against Palestinian civilians, many of which involve the misuse of U.S.-supplied weapons. Accordingly, we urge an immediate investigation into possible violations by Israel of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act and the U.S. Arms Export Control Act which respectively prohibit assistance to any country which engages in a consistent pattern of human rights violations and limit the use of U.S. weapons (2) to “internal security” or “legitimate self-defense.” (3) More broadly, we urge Congress to undertake careful scrutiny to ensure that our aid is not supporting actions by the government of Israel that undermine prospects for peace. We urge Congress to hold hearings to examine Israel’s compliance, and we request regular reporting on compliance and the withholding of military aid for non-compliance . Examples of specific, systematic human rights violations related to U.S. military support are included as an annex to this letter. In addition to specific rights violations, we see a troubling and consistent pattern of disregard by the government of Israel for U.S. policies that support a just and lasting peace. Specifically, repeated demands by the U.S. government that Israel halt all settlement activity have been ignored. Since 1967, every U.S. administration has decried Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories as obstacles to peace. Despite this stance, Israel continues to expand its settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, claiming territory that under international law and U.S. policy should belong to a future Palestinian state. The Oslo peace process, which began in 1993, was publicly promoted as leading Israelis and Palestinians to a just peace based on a two-state solution. Instead, since 1993, the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, has more than doubled. Rights violations resulting from Israeli settlement activity include separate and unequal legal systems for Palestinians and settlers, confiscation of Palestinian land and natural resources for the benefit of settlers, and violence by settlers against Palestinians. According to the Israeli human rights group B'Tselem and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, there has been a dramatic rise in settler attacks against Palestinians this year (4). They report that these attacks are often intended to drive Palestinians from areas the settlers wish to take over, and that Israeli authorities have failed to take significant action to stop the violence or hold the perpetrators accountable. We believe that these actions directly undermine peace efforts and threaten, rather than support, Israel’s long-term security interests. We want to be clear that we recognize that Israel faces real security threats and that it has both a right and a duty to protect both the state and its citizens. However, the measures that it uses to protect itself and its citizens, as in the case with any other nation, must conform to international humanitarian and human rights law. As Christian leaders in the United States, it is our moral responsibility to question the continuation of unconditional U.S. financial

assistance to the government of Israel. Realizing a just and lasting peace will require this accountability, as continued U.S. military assistance to Israel -- offered without conditions or accountability -- will only serve to sustain the status quo and Israel’s military occupation of the Palestinian territories. We request, therefore, that Congress hold Israel accountable to these standards by making the disbursement of U.S. military assistance to Israel contingent on the Israeli government’s compliance with applicable U.S. laws and policies. As Israel is the single largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid since World War II, it is especially critical for Israel to comply with the specific U.S. laws that regulate the use of

U.S.-supplied weapons. We also encourage Congress to support inclusive, comprehensive, and robust regional diplomacy to secure a just and lasting peace that will benefit Israelis, Palestinians, and all the peoples of the region, and the world.

2NC – Condition on HR Key

Conditioning the plan on HR reform is keyAmos Harel May 19- 19 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-arms-sales-to-dictators-pariahs-states-alarming-picture-1.7250048Amnesty says Israel ranks eighth among the exporters of heavy weapons around the world. Between 2014 and 2018, Israel’s defense exports comprised 3.1 percent of global sales. Compared with the previous four years, this was a 60 percent increase. The three largest customers of heavy weapons sold by Israel are India, Azerbaijan and Vietnam. But the report says defense industries are not the largest or most lucrative contributors to Israeli exports. According to the Defense Ministry, defense exports comprise 10 percent of Israel’s industrial exports. “Defense-related companies in Israel export to 130 countries around the world,” the report says. “Of these, only a minority are countries designated by the UN and the international community as violators of human rights.” These are mostly poor countries and the scope of defense exports to them is small compared to the rest of Israel’s exports. According to Amnesty, banning exports to the eight countries would not sting Israel’s defense contractors or their profits, and would certainly not have a public impact. “There is no justification – economic, diplomatic, security-related or strategic – to export weapons to these countries,” the report says. Amnesty believes that “the situation is correctable. Israel’s government and the Defense Ministry must increase their monitoring and transparency, similar to what the vast majority of large weapons exporters around the world do except for Russia and China.” According to Amnesty, this should be done by amending the law regulating these exports, adding two main clauses. The first would prohibit the awarding of licenses to export to a country with a risk of serious human rights violations, based on international humanitarian law. The second would set up a committee to examine the human rights situation in any target state. The committee would include people from outside the defense establishment and the Foreign Ministry such as academics and human rights activists, as is customary in other countries. “Monitoring must not only be done, it must be seen, and the Israeli public has every right to know what is done in its name and with its resources, which belong to everyone,” the report says.

**End-Use Counterplan**

1NC – Solvency Advocate – End-Use Monitor CP

Amos Harel May 19- 19 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-arms-sales-to-dictators-pariahs-states-alarming-picture-1.7250048

Amnesty says Israel ranks eighth among the exporters of heavy weapons around the world. Between 2014 and 2018, Israel’s defense exports comprised 3.1 percent of global sales. Compared with the previous four years, this was a 60 percent increase. The three largest customers of heavy weapons sold by Israel are India, Azerbaijan and Vietnam. But the report says defense industries are not the largest or most lucrative contributors to Israeli exports. According to the Defense Ministry, defense exports comprise 10 percent of Israel’s industrial exports. “Defense-related companies in Israel export to 130 countries around the world,” the report says. “Of these, only a minority are countries designated by the UN and the international community as violators of human rights.” These are mostly poor countries and the scope of defense exports to them is small compared to the rest of Israel’s exports. According to Amnesty, banning exports to the eight countries would not sting Israel’s defense contractors or their profits, and would certainly not have a public impact. “There is no justification – economic, diplomatic, security-related or strategic – to export weapons to these countries,” the report says. Amnesty believes that “the situation is correctable. Israel’s government and the Defense Ministry must increase their monitoring and transparency, similar to what the vast majority of large weapons exporters around the world do except for Russia and China.” According to Amnesty, this should be done by amending the law regulating these exports, adding two main clauses. The first would prohibit the awarding of licenses to export to a country with a risk of serious human rights violations, based on international humanitarian law. The second would set up a committee to examine the human rights situation in any target state. The committee would include people from outside the defense establishment and the Foreign Ministry such as academics and human rights activists, as is customary in other countries. “Monitoring must not only be done, it must be seen, and the Israeli public has every right to know what is done in its name and with its resources, which belong to everyone,” the report says.