Cabinet of Getúlio Vargas of Brazil, 1937

HACIA Democracy XXIV Summit of the Americas

Committee Chair: David Gevarter

Director of English Committees: Benjamin Schafer

Prezados Delegados,

Hello! It is my pleasure to welcome you to HACIA XXIV and to the Cabinet of President

Getúlio Vargas in 1937. My name is David Gevarter, and I have the honor of being your director.

I am very excited to see how we will redefine history together, and I hope that you are also

excited to take part in this momentous period in Brazilian and Latin American history.

Originally from Baltimore, Maryland, I am a junior at Harvard College concentrating in

Romance Languages and Literatures with a Secondary in Government. However, for the duration

of the conference, you may refer to me as President Vargas. I began competing in Model United

Nations (MUN) when I was a freshman in high school, and upon starting college, I also joined

the competitive team at Harvard. I have staffed various crisis committees at different MUN

conferences, such as HMUN—Harvard’s high school level conference—and HNMUN—

Harvard’s college level conference. This will be my second year staffing HACIA; last year, I

directed the Junta Suprema Central del Imperio Español de 1808 in Spanish-language

committees. Outside of MUN, I write for the Harvard International Review, where I specialize in

interviews. I also am an administrative assistant for the Harvard International Office, which

assists international students with matters relating to visas. Lastly, I am on leadership at Harvard

Hillel, the center for Jewish life on campus.

This committee aims to simulate one of the most interesting periods in 20 th century

Brazilian history: the beginning of the Estado Novo and a slide towards authoritarianism. During

Vargas’ rule, Brazil addressed a variety of extremely important social, political, and economic

issues that would set the stage for political developments in the following decades. From

relations with the old landed oligarchy to the price of coffee to Brazil’s involvement with a

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brewing conflict in Europe, this period is one in which the government must address dynamic,

multifaceted problems, and your choices will determine not only Brazil’s prestige on the world

stage, but also its internal stability.

I hope that through your research and debate in committee, you will come to appreciate

this important period in Brazilian history with regards to power, democracy, human rights, and

more, and I hope it will also illuminate Latin American history as a whole. Much of the trials and

tribulations of the present can be explained by the failures of the past, and perhaps with a bit of

luck, we will be able to change the course of history for the better. The guide below is meant to

serve as a base for individual research and will give you a general idea of Brazilian history and

the situation in which the committee will start. However, it is advisable to delve more deeply into

the topics and conduct further research, especially regarding specific character assignments.

I look forward to seeing you in March, and please do not hesitate to contact me if you

have any questions.

Até então,

David Gevarter

dgevarter@college.harvard.edu

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Introduction

It is the 13th of November of 1937. President Getúlio Vargas has summoned you, the

members of his new Cabinet, to the Presidential Palace in Rio de Janeiro in the early hours of the

morning. It would be a gross understatement to say that the political climate of the country has

become tense; just three days ago, President Vargas addressed the Brazilian nation, decrying the

supposed communist forces that conspired to remove him from power and dismantle the

institutions Vargas had worked so hard to create. For years, Vargas had publically addressed the

communist threat and had indicated privately to his confidants his worries regarding threats to

his regime. These threats came to a boil on November 10 th, when Vargas declared a state of

emergency and dissolved the legislature, taking control of emergency executive powers to

address the situation. Citing extenuating circumstances and a grave threat against Brazilian

democracy, Vargas declared null and void the previous constitution, dating back to 1934. He

then announced the promulgation of a new constitution that would, in his words, “maintain the

democratic form, the representative process, and the autonomy of the states within the traditional

lines of the organic federation.”1 While President Vargas has made clear his intention to preserve

democracy, whispers abound in the capital regarding his true intentions, and many believe that

President Vargas merely invoked the specter of the “communist threat” to justify his nefarious,

autocratic intentions.

In the year 1937, Brazil finds itself in a unique position. Just seven years before,

President Vargas came to power in a stunning turn of events that forever altered the Brazilian

political landscape and signaled the emergence of the first cracks in the old oligarchy’s hold over

society. Inheriting an economy that dangled over the precipice of the Great Depression and a

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population with few educational or occupational prospects, Vargas sought to stabilize the

Brazilian economy and incorporate many of the groups that had been excluded under previous

regimes. As the world economy spiraled into chaos at the beginning of the 1930s, the Brazilian

economy threatened to collapse as the markets for Brazilian goods began to dry up.

Simultaneously, workers with few job protections or social insurance faced a potentially

devastating recession that would leave millions with no means for subsistence. It fell to President

Vargas to avoid catastrophe, something he accomplished with rather mixed results. However, as

is frequently the case with upstart politicians, Vargas was unable to truly accomplish all that he

promised the people of Brazil in just one short term. Now that the President’s term has been

extended (perhaps indefinitely), he will demand that his Cabinet find new and innovative ways to

accomplish his policy agenda.

The most important issues facing Brazilian society in this moment range from education

and industrialization to foreign relations, social movements, and the political organization of

lower levels of government. These issues will be explained in more detail later on in this guide,

but rest assured that a diverse set of opinions and approaches regarding these challenges will

ensure that there will be lively debate in committee as you determine what actions the

government will take. As the clouds of war gather over Europe and conflict begins to appear

inevitable, the question remains, will Brazil break its isolation and join the great powers on the

field of battle? How will Brazil, long a power relegated to the developing world, emerge on the

world stage? Will it be a model of development for other post-colonial societies, or will it return

to the old ways of oligarchy and repression? These are the questions that only this committee can

answer, and it will be your responsibility as delegates to set the course of Brazilian history.

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History and Powers of the Committee

Brazil has long had a tradition of executive Cabinets. Now, nearly a century after Dom

Pedro named the first truly “Brazilian” Cabinet following independence from Portugal, this time-

honored role falls to you as members of the new Cabinet. Some of you are continuing on as

ministers from the previous government, but most of you are new to your positions. With the

rules of the game so drastically altered and as a body operating under a completely new

constitution, this committee faces the opportunity to truly establish itself as a core element of

President Vargas’s government. With the Congress effectively suspended for the foreseeable

future, legislative authority falls to the President and his Cabinet, presenting unprecedented

opportunities for cooperation and efficiency. Represented in this Cabinet are the heads of each

ministry as well as several important executive departments and the Catholic Church.

The governing document of this committee will be the newly promulgated Constitution

of 1937. This document, while technically affirming the democratic nature of the Brazilian state

and its representative nature, doubtlessly is designed to extend executive authority, and the new

constitution grants sweeping powers to the President as the primary representative of the people.

As such, members of the Cabinet will enjoy broad authority in conducting their affairs, subject

only to the oversight of the President.

As a committee, it will be your responsibility to bring your ideas to the table through a

combination of research before the conference, collaboration with other members of committee,

and creative and analytical thinking in order to discuss the issues that face Brazil at the present

moment. In addition to addressing topics of concern such as education, industrialization, and

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foreign policy, it is incumbent that the committee resolve crises that periodically arise throughout

conference. All of these tasks will be accomplished through debate and with the ultimate goal of

passing well-written “directives” (explanation to follow) that address each issue.

All directives approved by a majority of votes in committee will be submitted as policy

recommendations to President Vargas, and therefore directives will be considered as non-binding

until receiving the approval of the President. Delegates are welcome to include the use of their

character’s personal assets in these directives (for example, a specific minister could authorize

the use of a certain amount of funds in an operation or other resources available to his/her

ministry), but directives may also request to use the national government’s resources. Unless

such a time arises when President Vargas reinstates the Congress, it should be assumed that no

congressional approval is necessary to implement policy changes.

Delegates will find that even in a system with sweeping executive power, diplomacy and

cooperation will be key to advancing both individual and committee goals. Diverse interests are

represented in this Cabinet, and only through a process of negotiation and compromise will you

be able to succeed. Delegates are invited to interact through crisis with outside parties—within

the Brazilian government, society, and the outside world—when crafting policy and individual

and committee action.

It cannot be emphasized enough that in the Estado Novo, delegates serve at the pleasure

of the President and can be replaced at any time. Therefore, while delegates are encouraged to

interact with parties outside of those represented in the committee, they are reminded that the

President and the nation will be watching, no matter how clandestine delegates may think their

actions are.

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Committee Procedure

The Cabinet of Getúlio Vargas will be directed by the President himself. Therefore, it

should be assumed, unless explicitly stated otherwise, that the word of the Chair is the final

ruling of the President. Failure to comply with such rulings will be sure to draw the President’s

interest, and the culpable members of the Cabinet will face repercussions. Should Vargas get his

hands on disobedient members of the Cabinet, they are likely to be punished with suspension,

ejection, or even imprisonment and execution should the crime warrant such.

The committee will be run in continual crisis. That is to say, there will be no speakers’

list or established agenda. Rather, committee will default to a series of moderated caucuses that

can be interrupted by unmoderated caucuses or a suspension of the rules. Given the small size of

the committee and the advisory nature of the body, President Vargas has indicated that it will

generally be unnecessary to adhere to strict rules of parliamentary procedure. Should the

committee find it necessary, President Vargas will usually support a suspension of the rules so

that the committee can utilize its time in the most efficient manner (round robins, straw polls,

etc.) as called for by the delegates. A round robin is a caucus in which committee goes in a circle

around the table giving each delegate a certain amount of time to speak regarding a subject,

while a straw poll is a non-binding show of hands regarding a certain idea in order to judge

support for the topic. If such laxness in parliamentary procedure or willingness to suspend the

rules results in inefficiency or other problems for the committee, President Vargas reserves the

right to reinstate a strict adherence to formal procedure for as long as he sees fit.

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The general goal of in-committee debate should be to produce a directive. As delegates

will read in HACIA’s guide to delegate preparation and parliamentary procedure, a directive is

similar to a resolution, though generally much more condensed and targeted to address a specific

issue that has arisen in committee. Within the context of this specific committee, directives will

take the form of recommendations to President Vargas. Directives should avoid the long,

flowing, diplomatic language that is a staple of full resolutions; directives are documents that

must be easy for committee staff to interpret and must make clear the course of action that the

committee has decided to take. In order to be debated by the committee, any given directive must

have at least half of the committee as signatories. Acting as a signatory for a directive does not

necessarily indicate support for the document but rather a desire to see it debated in front of the

committee. As previously mentioned, President Vargas reserves the right to strike down

approved directives should he find them destructive to the committee’s goals, or he may require

a larger majority—such as two-thirds or three-fourths—in order to see a controversial document

passed.

Crisis will be an important component of committee and will shape both individual

committee sessions as well as the arc of the committee throughout the conference. In a continual

crisis committee, delegates will have the opportunity to shape the course of committee through

unique paths both in and out of committee. “Crisis notes” should be seen as the opportunity for

each delegate to utilize the powers specific to his or her character. Delegates are invited to

experiment and test the boundaries of their portfolio powers but are requested to keep their

actions within realistic boundaries. For example, in the hypothetical Cabinet of an unspecified

nation, the Minister of Education is assumed to have control over schools, curricula, and other

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resources of the ministry. However, this minister should not expect his or her actions to remain

private—after all, it is difficult for entire ministries to keep their functioning unnoticed.

Delegates are encouraged to experiment with the limits of their individual powers, but they

should pay attention to how the chair responds to crisis notes and respect the limitations that the

chair provides.

Crisis notes should not be written in a vacuum; rather, they should take into account the

current state of affairs in the committee and also fit into a “crisis arc,” which is a series of crisis

notes building up to a final objective. Delegates are encouraged to think of crisis arcs that are

simultaneously creative and pragmatic—arcs that do not simply create chaos for the sake of

chaos, but rather work towards an ultimate goal. The chair is most likely to approve crisis arcs

that will have a direct effect on debate within committee, and delegates will be rewarded for the

ways in which they weave their personal agenda into the common goals of the committee. For

example, the Minister of Education in the aforementioned example may choose to use his or her

power over the Ministry to create an education program that supplies the country with badly

needed engineers for a war, but also uses propaganda within the education system to take out a

rival in committee. Delegates may make the most progress through working to pass directives

through the committee’s parliamentary procedure, but they are encouraged to make an effort to

develop their skills in crisis and to test the limits of their creativity.

As the Cabinet of Getúlio Vargas is an English-language committee, delegates should

expect to be speaking, writing directives, and interacting with crisis in English. However,

HACIA is an organization oriented towards experiential learning, and delegates will not be

judged based on their mastery of the language. While delegates should strive to have most of

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their communications in English, I as a director will be open to answering the occasional crisis

note written in Spanish or speaking informally with delegates in Spanish.

Please read the sections below so that you may be better acquainted with the historical

context in which committee will take place and so that you may understand exactly the situation

this committee finds itself in at the beginning of conference. Please note that this guide is not an

exhaustive summary on all information regarding Brazil at this time. You will find it necessary

to research information regarding specific characters as well as the circumstances of the time. If

you need assistance finding information, I would be glad to help you locate sources.

A History of Brazil

It is difficult to summarize four centuries of history in a single guide, but in order to solve

the problems that Brazil now faces, it is important to understand the foundation upon which the

Brazilian nation rests and the events that have led to this day. Brazil’s colonial and imperial

legacies continue to influence the trajectory of the nation in positive and negative ways, and in

order to change the situation, you must know its roots.

Brazil’s Colonial Heritage: The Roots of Inequality

Brazil largely traces its heritage back to its European colonial power: the Portuguese. The

regime that the Portuguese created would have a significant impact on the future of the Brazilian

nation, long after the last Portuguese flag ceased to wave over Rio de Janeiro. Spurred on by a

spirit of exploration in Europe and a taste for conquest brought on by the wars of the previous

centuries with the Muslims, the Portuguese crown had begun to turn its sight from the Iberian

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Peninsula to far-off lands filled with riches. Only by chance did they find the “New World”

instead of the passage to India that they sought. However, by the time that the first Portuguese

explorers set foot on Brazilian soil, the land had already been inhabited for thousands of years by

native peoples—the Tupi-Guarani and the Tapuia.2 In the decades immediately following the

first contact between the Portuguese and the natives, there was little “colonial” activity. Rather,

short-term expeditions from Portugal sought to trade cheap Portuguese trinkets for brazilwood

and other commodities harvested by the native peoples. Only in 1532 would Martim Alfonso de

Sousa found the first colony, São Vicente. With the establishment of a colonial regime and not

just a system of trade, the need for a consistent source of manual labor became urgent. The large

groups of autochthonous cultures were at first the clear choice, but a few decades following the

arrival of the first settlers, native populations began to collapse. Portuguese policy in Brazil had

little concern for the long-term demographic makeup of the colony, and colonial authorities kept

native groups in check by exploiting feuds between different tribes in order to prevent a unified

uprising.3

Just as is the case with the Spanish colonial possessions in the Americas, violence against

natives (in the form of wars and poor working conditions) as well as the much more catastrophic

disease epidemics caused a dramatic decline in the population of native communities. As a result,

the Portuguese colonizers began importing African slaves to compensate. The importation of

slaves in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies differed from that in the British colonies largely in

that few attempts were made to create a self-sustaining slave population. Rather, efforts were

made to extract the largest possible amount of wealth from each slave, irrespective of the effects

on the overall health of the population. As a consequence, conditions were so poor that the

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childbearing capacity of African slave women was significantly impaired, leading to an

increased dependence on the transatlantic slave trade to continuously refresh the number of

slaves. The exploitation of these slaves was so brutal and their productivity so high that it only

took an average of 13 to 16 months of work to recoup the cost of a slave, and “even after a huge

rise in slave purchase prices after 1700, slaves paid for themselves in 30 months.”4 Naturally,

enough African slaves survived to concretely alter the future demographics of the future

Brazilian nation, so that by the 20th century, over a third of the population was composed of afro-

descendants.5 Besides the changes in the racial breakdown of the territory, the epoch of early

colonialism set down important roots in the realm of socioeconomic issues that would strongly

influence the distribution of wealth in the country for centuries.

The territory that the Portuguese colonized was enormous—far larger than the small

kingdom that they called home in the Iberian Peninsula. Furthermore, as was the case with most

colonial powers, it was incumbent upon the Portuguese Crown to entice adventurous souls in

search of fabulous wealth to depart Portugal and lay down roots far across the Atlantic Ocean.

As such, the Crown began to distribute large land grants to those willing to move to Brazil and

work the land. These grants, known as sesmarias, were gargantuan in size and gave almost

aristocratic status to their holders, known as sesmeiros. However, this transfer of land was not

permanent like the homesteads in the American West or in many of the Spanish colonies. Rather,

sesmarias constituted an arrangement in which sesmeiros paid rent to the Crown for use of the

land, and unused land was devolved to the Crown. As the anthropologist James Holston

describes, the result was “a land without a people and a people without land;” much of the

territory was uninhabited, and the parts that were inhabited were held by a small number of

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people.6 A further consequence of the sesmarias was an underdeveloped system of property

rights; the fact that all land technically belonged to the Crown meant that the system of land

ownership was chaotic and insecure.

Finally, an interesting, gradual change led to a shift in economic power according to

geography. For much of the early period of colonization, the Portuguese extracted wealth from

the colony in the form of sugar. Sugar was the ultimate cash crop in Brazil; its desirability not

only in the wealthy estates of the rich in Europe, but also increasingly the homes of the middle

class, meant that a vast market existed for the Brazilian export. The northeast quickly became the

largest producer of sugar in Brazil, since the topsoil and climate in Pernambuco and Bahia made

them two of the largest sugar producers in the world. As such, the northeast of Brazil became the

economic center of the colony.7 For many years, Salvador, the capital of Bahia, was the only

important city in Brazil, while cities like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo remained insignificant

both in terms of population and economic weight. Salvador was the main port of export for the

crops grown in the northeast and functioned as an important connection between Brazil and the

international economy. For the first two centuries of colonization, sugar made up the majority of

Brazilian exports, with gold constituting the rest.8 This meant that the center of sugar production

grew at a significantly higher rate than the rest of the country both in terms of economic

importance and political power. It would not be until the early 19 th century, when coffee

production in the south became more lucrative than sugar production in the north, that this center

of power would shift, moving the country’s economic and political center southward.9 However,

the importance of gold and other precious minerals in the south, especially in Mato Grosso and

other areas, meant that this process occurred over centuries, and by the end of the 18 th century,

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signs of the movement had already begun to appear.10 This shift had a major impact, not only on

the economy of the future Brazilian nation, but also on the political landscape of the country that

has lasted to this day.

The Rise of a Brazilian Nation

By the late 18th century, Portuguese authority in Brazil had begun to collapse. The Portuguese

Crown had grown increasingly dependent on the British monarchy to defend its interests against

Spain and France. The once great Portuguese fleet that was the pride of the seas several centuries

before was no longer able to assert its dominance over its overseas possessions, and this task fell

to the British.11 Portugal’s dependence on its British allies did not come without a cost—starting

in the beginning of the 18th century, Britain began to impose new terms of trade on Portugal and

its colonial possessions. Beginning with a preferential trade treaty between England and Portugal

regarding English wools and Portuguese wine, the British dictated a series of trade actions that

spelled doom for the Portuguese empire over its economic assets.12 Increased British penetration

into Brazilian markets sapped wealth from the Portuguese mercantilist system, with the British

showing little reciprocity. The British armada imposed trade between the Portuguese colonies

and Britain (a violation of Portuguese mercantilist policy), and high tariffs in the British North

American colonies prevented Brazilian and Portuguese products from selling competitively in

that market.13 This apparent loss of imperial authority, combined with economic downturn in

much of Brazil and an increasing sentiment of political discontent in the colony, set the stage for

the emergence of an autonomous Brazilian nation.

15

Brazil’s story of independence is unique in Latin American and world history. While the

initial circumstances surrounding independence were largely the same as those in Spanish

America, Brazil’s path diverged significantly from that of its neighboring countries. Earlier

demonstrations of colonial discontent, such as the Inconfidência Mineira of the late 18th century

giving rise to the legendary figure Tiradentes, demonstrated an increasing desire for Brazilian

home rule and independence. Uprisings generally met the same end as Tiradentes: their

supporters were hung, drawn, and quartered for the world to see the brutal repression that

awaited any further disobedience. While none of these movements were successful in achieving

their goals, they contributed in a meaningful manner to the development of a Brazilian national

conscience.14

Like Spanish America, it was the Peninsular War in the Iberian Peninsula (part of the

larger Napoleonic Wars in Europe) that proved to be the decisive factor in bringing about

independence. In the first decade of the 19th century, Napoleon Bonaparte, the new Emperor of

France, sought to isolate his chief enemy, the British, and starve them into submission. His

“Continental System” sough to impose a blockade by all of continental Europe against Britain.

The only two countries to refuse this system were Portugal and Russia. As such, Napoleon

turned his eyes towards the Iberian Peninsula and marched his armies to Portugal. Fortunately,

the British evacuated the entire Portuguese royal family—in addition to some 15,000 courtiers—

and relocated them to Rio de Janeiro in Brazil so that they could continue governing the empire

while the British and allied forces fought to retake the Peninsula from Napoleon.15 Queen Maria I

had long since descended into insanity (some say a product of the trauma of the French

16

Revolution) and her son, Dom João, acted as regent and oversaw this evacuation. This transfer of

the Portuguese Court to Brazil had enormous implications for the future of the colony.

For centuries, Portugal had neglected to develop institutions of home rule in Brazil,

instead governing directly from across the ocean. In contrast, the British generally developed

effective institutions for governance in their colonies, creating representative bodies, military

institutions, and other infrastructure (hence the success of the United States immediately

following independence). The Spanish are generally seen as representing the opposite end of the

spectrum, as the central government in Madrid tended to employ heavy-handed tactics while

investing little in the capabilities of the colonies for self-governance (resulting in chaos in the

new Spanish Republics following independence). However, if the Spanish neglected home-rule,

the Portuguese demonstrated an even larger degree of disregard. By the time of the Peninsular

War—despite the lack of representative institutions—universities, printing presses, and other

basic infrastructure had been flourishing in Spanish America for centuries. By contrast, Brazil

lacked nearly all of these services. The first university was not founded until 1808, as opposed to

in 1538 in Spanish America. The Portuguese government had shut down all printing presses and

newspapers until the Portuguese Court moved to Brazil in 1807, when the first officially

sanctioned newspaper appeared.16 Therefore, the arrival of the government in Rio de Janeiro also

brought with it a significant reshuffling and expansion of governance in Brazil; the Banco do

Brasil (Bank of Brazil), Conselho Militar Superior (Supreme Military Council), and medical

schools and universities across the country were just a few of the new developments.17

While the Portuguese Crown ruled its empire from Brazil, the British-led coalition fought

a bloody war in the Iberian Peninsula to push back the French invaders. The British had set up

17

regency in Portugal led by a British officer to govern the nation in the monarchy’s absence.

Therefore, when the British successfully liberated the entire country from Napoleon in 1811,

Dom João refused to return the monarchy to the Peninsula. In Brazil, the Crown exercised

autonomy over its affairs (except of course those regarding Portugal-proper) and was safe from

foreign threats. In 1815, Brazil was raised from its status of colony and declared a kingdom. As

such, when his mother died in 1816, Dom João was declared João I, King of Portugal and

Brazil.18 It did not take long for this decision to cause ripples throughout the Empire. Back in

Portugal, elites keenly felt their status slipping away. Threatened by the continued British

regency in Portugal, the military performed what amounted to a coup and ejected the British

military from the country. In a move that echoed the French Revolution, a meeting of the Cortês

(Parliament) was called in the absence of the King, demanding João’s return from Brazil. In

April of 1821, King João returned to Portugal, leaving behind his son Dom Pedro to rule. 19 In the

subsequent years, Dom Pedro amassed support in Brazil, reaching a dramatic crescendo on 7

September 1822, when he declared independence from Portugal. Unlike the Peninsular War of

the previous decade or even the wars of independence in Spanish America or the British

colonies, the Brazilian war for independence was of a small-scale and did not entail mass

destruction. This is not to say that it was not a bloody conflict; there were heavy losses on both

sides, but it did not parallel the magnitude that was seen in other wars of the same time. The

United States of America was the first country to diplomatically recognize the new Brazilian

nation, doing so in May of 1824.20 Brazil formally gained independence on 29 August 1825,

when Portugal (and Britain) signed a treaty recognizing the country’s independence.

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The Empire of Brazil: Slaves and Immigrants

As is to be expected, the period in Brazil immediately following the country’s

independence from Portugal was complex and had many implications for the future of the nation.

According to most historians, Brazil’s relatively bloodless transition to democracy, coupled with

its unique path to independence, meant that the country did not experience widespread unrest and

political disorder, and the economic means of the nation remained viable, unlike in Spanish

America. That being said, this period, known as the “Empire,” was not without its complications.

During this era, debates raged over economic concerns, the moderating power of the Emperor,

and the emergence of political factions, largely split between Liberals and Conservatives. Several

political crises, such as a period of Regency for Dom Pedro II after his father’s return to

Portugal, put strain on the fledgling nation, as did separatist movements, especially in the

Northeast. Despite these stressors, Brazil stayed unified. However, for the purposes of this guide,

the most important developments to arise during the Empire relate to slavery. Slavery and the

slow transition to abolition in Brazil had important impacts on the racial landscape of the country

until modern times. Another topic of interest for this period is the emergence of Brazil as an

immigrant nation, a fact that would also significantly impact the racial and socioeconomic

demographics of modern Brazil.

By the time Brazil declared independence, enslaved people represented at least 30

percent of the population, putting this figure at well over a million people.21 As previously

mentioned, African slavery in Brazil quickly became integral to the colony’s economy,

beginning even in the 16th century. Easy access to the African slave trade enabled the production

of sugar in the Northeast to expand rapidly, and as such, the industry became dependent on the

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trade of slaves to constantly refresh the labor supply. However, this system was eventually

threatened from the outside. Beginning in the second half of the 18th century, the abolitionist

movement in Great Britain began to gain traction. The Society for the Abolition of the Slave

Trade was established in 1787, lobbying Parliament for legislation to that effect. Though it

would take longer to bring about the actual emancipation of slaves in the Empire, Britain did

outlaw the slave trade in 1807.22 These laws, despite being the acts of a foreign government

across the ocean, had an enormous impact on Brazil. This is largely a product of the fact that the

British took a proactive approach to their newfound position on the Atlantic slave trade. Rather

than simply banning the slave trade within the British Empire, the British government sought to

eliminate the scourge of the slave trade from the face of the Earth entirely. The Royal Navy was

tasked with interrupting the slave trade, and as such “between 1807 and 1860, the Royal Navy,

West Africa Squadron seized approximately 1600 ships involved in the slave trade and freed

150,000 Africans who were aboard these vessels” bound for Brazil and Spanish America (the

United States had already banned the slave trade).23

The British exerted significant pressure on Brazil to end its importation of slaves. The

new nation was economically (and politically) dependent on Britain just as Portugal had been

before it, and this power imbalance was felt keenly both in Rio de Janeiro and in London.

Nevertheless, Brazil resisted for as long as possible. It was generally agreed upon in most sectors

of Brazilian society that abolishing the slave trade would devastate the economy, at least in the

short run.24 Recalling the condition of African slaves in Brazil, it was obvious that the end of the

slave trade would eventually lead to the end of slavery in Brazil. Whereas the slave population in

the United States was robust enough to sustain itself (and grow significantly) for decades after

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the last slaves were imported, Brazilian slaves were simply not fertile enough to achieve the

same end, owing to harsh conditions and little emphasis placed on reproduction. Therefore, the

potential abolition of the slave trade presented a seemingly existential threat to the livelihoods of

plantation owners across the nation.25 That being said, British pressure proved too strong for the

Brazilian government to simply ignore. In March of 1830, a treaty between Brazil and Britain

came into effect banning Brazilian participation in the slave trade, and for good measure, the

Brazilian legislature passed a law in November of 1831 that freed all new slaves that were

brought to Brazil.26 Of course, this action carried little weight behind it. The Brazilian public was

cognizant of the slave trade’s economic importance, and the empty law gave rise to an

expression still used in Brazil today: “para inglês ver” (for the English to see), meaning just for

show or without substance.27 Despite the efforts of the liberal government, the “illicit” slave

trade continued in Brazil for decades after the signing of the treaty, and slaves that entered the

country after this date were not considered free. In fact, especially in times of conservative

governance, the demand for slaves in Brazil increased after the banning of the slave trade.

Despite protests from the British and from within some parts of the Brazilian government, by

1843, the slave traders operated with impunity.28 However, the British did not allow the Brazilian

government’s weakness to perpetuate the slave trade. British naval action became more and more

aggressive, bringing about a significant drop in the number of slaves successfully brought across

the Atlantic. In April of 1850, the British Foreign Office authorized the Navy to expand its anti-

slave trade efforts to Brazilian territorial waters and ports. The Brazilian government was

powerless to resist, and in September of the same year, both chambers of the Legislature passed a

law that definitively banned the slave trade in Brazil.29 Though met with resistance, the move did

21

not cause as much of a crisis as could have been possible. British actions to interrupt the slave

trade had driven up the prices of slaves dramatically, making slave traders, not planters, the main

beneficiary of the trade, and consequently planters had begun to rethink their dependence on the

trade.30 Unlike the situation of the previous decades, the combined action of the new law and

aggressive British enforcement meant that by the mid-1850s, the slave trade in Brazil had

definitively come to an end.

Of course, by this time, powers across the world no longer debated their relationship to

the Atlantic slave trade but rather to the institution of slavery itself. The British had abolished

slavery all throughout the empire in 1833, and by the mid-1850s, the issue of slavery had become

of prime importance in the United States. Just to the south of Brazil, Argentina permanently

banned the institution in 1853.31 In Brazil, despite the elimination of the slave trade, it appeared

that slavery was there to stay. The South—the new economic center of the country—was

dependent on slaves, as were the sugar plantations of the North, and landed interests were not

willing to risk their livelihoods. Even by the 1870s, long after the United States had abolished

slavery and even longer after the Spanish Republics of the region had done so, abolition was

relatively unpopular in Brazil. Liberal politicians and supporters advocated for the end of

slavery, though it appeared that the Conservative government would not oblige. Abolitionism

found itself an unlikely ally: the Emperor, Dom Pedro II. Pedro had long opposed the institution

of slavery, and in 1850, he threatened the General Assembly with his abdication should they not

pass the measure to permanently end the slave trade.32 In the following years, the Emperor threw

his weight behind measures to progressively bring about the end of slavery as an institution in

Brazil. As such, Pedro supported the 1871 Rio Branco Law (named after the Prime Minister who

22

championed it) also known as the “Law of the Free Womb” (Lei do Ventre Livre), which

declared that all children born to slave mothers were henceforth free.33

Especially in the south of the country, the Law of the Free Womb was not particularly

effective. Many slaveholders did not release their slaves as obligated, and a complex system of

debts meant that those born “free” had little choice but to remain enslaved. Nevertheless, the law

did have a significant impact in the North of Brazil, where the economy had already been

steadily migrating towards a wage-based system, instead of one dependent on slavery. This

meant that the population of slaves was largely centered in the South around São Paulo, though

manumission meant that even this population was declining. Slaves freed all over the country

typically migrated to the North, where the wage-based economy offered greater job

opportunities. This fact had a significant impact on the racial makeup of the regions of Brazil for

years to come.34 As support for abolition grew, the government employed more aggressive

measures. In 1885, the Legislature passed the “Sexagenarian Law” (Lei dos Sexagenários),

which freed all slaves over 60 years of age. In 1887, the Emperor fell ill during one of his trips in

Europe, and as such, he left his daughter Isabel, the heir presumptive, as regent. In her time as

regent, Isabel pushed for more aggressive actions to bring about the end of slavery, replacing the

Conservative Prime Minister with one who would bring about a full and unequivocal end to

slavery. On 13 May 1888, just one year before the end of the Empire, Isabel signed the “Golden

Law” (Lei Áurea), freeing all slaves (about 700,000 people by this time) without compensation

for owners. Brazil was the last country in the Western Hemisphere to end slavery.35

An incredibly important consequence of the period of the Empire was a boom in

European immigration to Brazil. By the late 1800s, despite the resistance of many landowners,

23

political and economic developments signaled that slavery was no longer a viable source of

labor. The push towards abolition meant that an alternative form of labor had to be found.

Instability in Europe (especially in Germany, Italy, and the Iberian Peninsula) provided the

perfect source of labor: immigrants. Much like in Argentina at the same time, European

immigration also provided a method to “whiten” the country. Racist theories regarding the

inferiority of those of African and mixed descent took hold in the government, spurring leaders

to attract white Europeans to Brazil.36 Italy was a particularly important supplier of immigrants,

given that the Italian Unification of 1871 had dealt a great economic blow to poor farmers,

forcing them to seek a life elsewhere.37 Brazilians saw much potential in this crisis, and the

government of São Paulo even set up a forward office in Genoa to facilitate Italian immigration

to Brazil. However, this does not mean that Brazil was an economic paradise for immigrants

seeking a better life. Landowners were accustomed to a system of slavery and were intimidated

by the idea of immigrant laborers eventually earning enough money to make it on their own. As

such, the 1850 Law on Land (passed decades before the beginnings of mass immigration), in

addition to attempting to clarify property rights in rural areas (it was unsuccessful), also

prohibited immigrants from purchasing land for three years after their arrival. It also mandated

that public land be sold “at prices high enough to frustrate squatters and poor immigrants,” thus

keeping them in the pockets of the landed gentry.38 In the coming decades, millions of

immigrants would arrive in Brazil—in about 10 years, 100,000 arrived in São Paulo alone—but

they were relegated to the bottom of the economic food chain and prevented from advancing.39

The Old Republic: An Incomplete Democracy

24

When the Monarchy fell to a military-led coup d’état on 15 November 1889, the

institution was not particularly unpopular. In fact, most of the population thought highly of Dom

Pedro II (who had resumed governance) when he was overthrown. The source of the 1889 coup

was an early example of a pattern that would be seen again in Brazil and in Latin America as a

whole: feeling that their interests were threatened, landed conservative elites allied with the

military to bring about regime change. While Brazil was not as politically unstable as would be

seen in the future, the abolition of slavery shook up the established order and cause fear among

the landed elites. Furthermore, conflicts over Dom Pedro’s succession further exacerbated

feelings of instability. Many argued that Isabel as a woman did not have the right to assume the

throne and feared that her husband, a French nobleman, would instead assume power as a

foreigner. By the time of his overthrow, Pedro had grown weary of ruling, and it is said that he

simply stepped aside and spent his remaining days in Paris.

The main political struggle of the Old Republic (República Velha), and one that continues

to this day, was the debate over whether Brazil should have a more centralized or more

federalized form of government (one that gave more power to the states). Brazilian history can

be characterized broadly between periods of centralization and decentralization, with the Empire

being an example of centralization. On the whole, the Old Republic represented a period of

decentralization, in which the states were given significant autonomy over their affairs.

Politics in Brazil at this time generally revolved around the divide between Conservative

and Liberal forces. It cannot be emphasized enough that these terms are not interchangeable with

“Left” and “Right” and cannot be conflated with modern day conceptions of liberal versus

conservative politics, especially in the Western world. To a large degree, the term “Liberal” in

25

Brazil refers to the idea of Classical Liberalism supported by democratic ideals. Liberals were

sympathetic to the idea of the Republic—a representative democracy—and supported laissez-

faire economic policies. Conservatives, on the other hand, were distrustful of representative

democracy and feared the idea of “mob-rule,” in keeping with the philosophy of Edmund Burke.

Therefore, it was the Liberals who spearheaded the transition to the First Republic, seeking to

abolish the Monarchy and devolve power to the state governments. However, it is important to

note that practically no political orientation in the Old Republic was truly democratic; even the

Liberals, who sought to strengthen home rule, wanted to give authority to the powerful state

oligarchies, not to the people. While these oligarchies were “democratic,” they drew on an

extremely limited portion of the population during elections as a result of the so-called Saraiva

Law. This law, passed in 1881, was intended to extend the franchise in provincial elections (a

goal that was initially successful). In the long run, however, the law restricted the vote to literate

citizens, bringing the voting percentage of the population down to one percent.40 This

disenfranchisement continued well into the Old Republic.

It is in this context that the defining feature of the Old Republic political system came to

be: café com leite politics, the sharing of power between São Paulo and Minas Gerais. By the rise

of the Republic, political and economic power had fully migrated to the South of the country,

leaving the North as the periphery. In the South, state oligarchies had long been feuding for

supremacy, both in terms of economic and political influence, and the significant amount of

decentralization during this period only enabled this sub-national competition. Two dominant

powers arose to share power during this time: the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais. The

basis of São Paulo’s economy was the coffee industry while the dairy industry was prevalent

26

(though not dominant) in the Mineiro economy, leading to the term café com leite, or “coffee

with milk.” For several decades, the governments of São Paulo and Minas Gerais alternated

power, rotating control of the presidency of the national government and ensuring favorable

policies for the southern oligarchies. In general, São Paulo used its extensive influence in the

federal government to create favorable conditions for the coffee economy, supporting complex

plans known as coffee valorization to keep the price of coffee high even in the face of dramatic

increases in production.41 The interests of Minas Gerais were more complex, as the dairy

industry did not have a monopoly over the state economy as did coffee in São Paulo. As catchy

as the phrase is, the political reality was slightly less black and white, as other actors influenced

the system. The states of Bahia and Rio Grande do Sul both acted as junior partners in the

arrangement, qualifying the control that São Paulo and Minas Gerais held in the system. In the

early years of the First Republic, Rio Grande do Sul was wracked by political instability, seeing

17 different state governments in 4 years, and was thus unable to match the influence of São

Paulo and Minas. However, the state eventually came to demand a share of power in the

Republic.

The demographics of Brazil also continued to change during this period. As previously

mentioned, European immigration to Brazil became significant in the second half of the 19 th

century, but by the beginning of the 20th century, it reached a peak. In the time from the founding

of the First Republic up until the start of the First World War, 2,740,000 immigrants came to

Brazil, largely from Italy, Spain, and Japan.42 However, unlike the immigrants that arrived in

previous decades, these new immigrants encountered a playing field that was significantly less

stacked against them. While conditions for the new arrivals were typically poor and immigrant

27

workers were mistreated, it was often the case that immigrants could work their way into the

middle and upper classes, sometimes even becoming large landowners—a far cry from the 1850

land law that had prevented immigrants from obtaining land.43

During the First Republic, the military came to play an increasingly important role in

society, and divisions within the military had a large impact on the future of the Brazilian

Republic. As previously mentioned, the military played a large role in bringing about the end of

the monarchy. Ironically, the military, wanting to weaken the influence of the planters in

Brazilian society, supported the transition to a republic—the same goal that the planters

themselves had. In this we see the emergence of the idea of the army as the poder moderador, or

moderating power.44 This idea presents the military as an apolitical guardian of Brazilian values

(and later democracy), in which the military uses its power to keep radical, reactionary, or simply

ineffectual politicians in line. Along these lines, the idea of positivism, imported from Europe,

began to take hold in the Brazilian military. Positivism, or conservative modernization, exalted

technological progress and industrial growth while rejecting what it saw as dangerous social

mobilization.45 It is not a coincidence that the flag of the Brazilian Republic reads Ordem e

Progresso, or “Order and Progress.” For the military, maintaining order while developing the

nation was the top priority, and liberal democracy often conflicted with these goals.

The Old Republic also saw the birth of social movements in Brazil, and some were more

successful than others. A watershed event at this time was the success of the Russian Revolution

in 1917. With the example of a successful communist takeover, the left in Brazil saw a dramatic

reorganization. In 1922, the Communist Party of Brazil was founded, a move that would have

huge implications for the future of the state, even if the chances of Marxist revolution in the

28

nation would always remain slim.46 Also seen was the rise of working-class movements. Though

for the most part unsuccessful, in the early 20th century, the first efforts to organize workers arose

in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Labor strikes were called all over the country involving

thousands of workers, including a particularly large strike of rural workers in 1913. Calls were

made for laws limiting child labor, requiring maternity leave, and mandating worker

compensation. Excepting the latter, these all failed.47 Above all, the most influential movement

of this period was known as Tenentismo, or the Lieutenant’s Movement. It is called such because

it was composed of “middle-echelon army officers—first lieutenants and captains” and was

indicative of the deep conflict arising between the military and the state.48 Tenentismo was

largely opposed to threats to the military’s prestige in the First Republic, such as poor treatment

of military officers (especially the lieutenants and officers themselves), and the general threat of

the oligarchy to freedom and equality in Brazil. A dramatic, well-known event surrounding the

Tenentes was the 5th of July Rebellion at Fort Copacabana in Rio de Janeiro in 1922. While

rebellion itself was unsuccessful and the majority of participants were shot on the beach, it set

off a series of revolts across the country, including a miraculous march of over a thousand

soldiers through rural Brazil, some 27,000 kilometers, to spread their message.49 The movement

itself practically dissolved with the election of Washington Luís in 1926, but in many respects, it

was the sign of the First Republic’s impending collapse.

A dramatic breakdown in the previous agreement regarding café com leite politics

brought about the end of the Old Republic. When President Luís, a politician from São Paulo,

reached the end of his term in 1929, it was expected that he would nominate a Mineiro as per the

established political order. He instead chose to nominate Júlio Prestes, a politician also from São

29

Paulo and in doing so violated the rules of the game. Though outrage spread throughout Brazil,

particularly in Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul, Prestes had little trouble securing a victory

in the 1930 election.50 However, unlike the previous elections of the First Republic, the Election

of 1930 was actually competitive. This is the result of the formation of the Liberal Alliance

(Aliança Liberal) in August of 1929, shortly after President Luís’ nomination of Prestes. The

Alliance had as its president a politician from Minas Gerais and as its vice-president a politician

from Rio Grande do Sul. However, it was the Governor of Rio Grande do Sul, a man by the

name of Getúlio Vargas, who took the party’s nomination for president. As his running mate,

Vargas named João Pessoa, the Governor of the northern state of Paraíba. Vargas ran a highly

substantive campaign: he was the first presidential candidate in Brazilian history to announce his

platform in public, doing so in Rio de Janeiro in January of 1930. Among the things called for in

his platform were a secret vote, improvements to the armed forces, the development of export

infrastructure, and the regulation of labor (including child labor and a minimum wage).51

Included in the supporters of the Liberal Alliance were the Tenentes, the members of the

Lieutenant’s Movement, adding a significant force to Vargas’ power base. On 1 March 1930,

Júlio Prestes won the Presidency of Brazil, defeating Vargas by a margin of 58 percent to 40

percent. However, despite winning a victory that rocked the established political order, Prestes

never assumed the Presidency. Instead, the entire First Republic came crumbling to the ground.

Vargas denounced the result of the election, though he did not call for a revolution.

However, tensions ran high following the election, effectively turning Brazil into a tinderbox.

The spark that brought down the Republic took place on 26 July 1930, when Vargas’ running

mate, Governor João Pessoa, was assassinated in Pernambuco. This act, despite having no

30

connection to the government of Washington Luís, galvanized the North of Brazil against the

federal government, with the public largely blaming Luís. By September, with the election of a

governor in Minas Gerais that was sympathetic to the cause, revolution became inevitable. On 3

October 1930, the Revolution began. It started in the South in Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do

Sul and then spread to the North, with Paraíba acting as the center of command. It appeared that

São Paulo, the source of Washington Luís and Júlio Prestes’s power, was going to resist.

Revolutionary forces made plans to invade the state, but before a showdown could take place

with the federal troops, the military command in Rio de Janeiro deposed President Luís.52 At

first, the military junta attempted to govern, but popular protests forced it out of power. On 1

November 1930, in an effort to avoid a civil war, the military junta handed power over to Getúlio

Vargas, who became the 14th President of Brazil, bringing with him the end of the Old Republic

and the beginning of a new era.

The Vargas Era

The move from the First Republic to the Vargas Era was significantly more dramatic than

the transition from the Empire to the First Republic. The ascent of Getúlio Vargas marked the

destruction of the old oligarchical model of Brazilian politics that had dominated the country for

centuries. Vargas initially governed using a provisional government; he repealed the Constitution

of 1891 and ruled by decree. The Congress was dissolved, state governors were dismissed

(barring the new pro-Vargas governor of Minas Gerais), and new officials were appointed.53

These political changes occurred against a backdrop of incredible instability. One of the key

contributors to the success of the 1930 Revolution was the deepening international economic

31

crisis that plunged Brazil’s economy into chaos. By this time, the Brazilian economy had become

highly dependent on coffee exports for revenue, and coffee, as a luxury item, quickly lost its

market abroad as tightening purse strings caused buyers to cut down on consumption. Therefore,

the Brazil that Vargas inherited was not an economic powerhouse, but instead a country that was

coming dangerously close to the precipice of economic collapse. Vargas was, however, a master

politician, utilizing the power of populism to gain support and using the crisis to his advantage to

bring Brazil out of the shadows.

As previously mentioned, the First Republic was characterized by political

decentralization. By contrast, the Vargas Era was a period of marked centralization in which

state prerogatives were drastically limited and federal oversight expanded enormously. The

Vargas government also abandoned the laissez-faire economics of the First Republic, largely out

of necessity. Vargas recognized that in order to save Brazil’s economy, the coffee industry

needed to be rescued. He faced the dilemma of keeping both the demand for coffee and the price

of the good high, especially in the face of a worldwide crisis that had crippled real demand for

coffee. The steps that he took to solve this problem were extreme. In 1931, the Vargas

government adopted a policy of mass coffee burning, in which the government used its income

from export taxes to purchase coffee from Brazilian growers. However, instead of stockpiling it,

the Vargas government then engaged in massive coffee burnings in order to keep the price high.

The practice continued until 1944, and “during those 13 years, 78,200,000 sacks of coffee beans

were destroyed—an amount equal to the world’s coffee consumption for three years.”54 Unlike

other Latin American nations, the Brazilian government chose to intervene directly in the

nation’s economy in order to fight the effects of the economic downturn.

32

In terms of its economic agenda, the Vargas government also pursued an incredibly

important policy that forever reshaped the Brazilian economy: industrialization. For most of

Brazilian history, the economic engine of the country had laid in agriculture and other raw

materials. Coffee, sugar, rubber, and precious metals were all harvested in Brazil and exported

abroad, the taxes from which funded the government and in turn its programs. Brazil imported

industrial goods from nations that had the capability to produce them cheaply, such as Great

Britain, Germany, or the United States. On the political front, the powerful state oligarchies

(particularly those of São Paulo and the other southern plantation-based states) lobbied the

central government to invest in so-called “export infrastructure” such as constructing railroads

from the internal regions of the country to the coasts and the expansion of ports, all to facilitate

the export of Brazilian goods.55 As indicated, the onset of the Great Depression meant that

markets abroad for Brazilian goods collapsed nearly overnight, and many goods that were

usually imported were no longer available. It became obvious that the Brazilian economy needed

to become more self-sufficient. Thus, industrialists who had long been overshadowed by

plantation owners now had the leverage necessary to convince the government to invest in

industry. The resulting policy, known as Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI), would come

to define Vargas-era economic policy.

The phenomenon of ISI was not particular to Brazil; it was seen across Latin America (to

varying degrees of success) as well as in some East Asian economies, such as South Korea.

Conceptually, ISI is a multi-stage process in which imported goods of increasing complexity are

replaced by goods produced domestically, thus building up industrial capacity in the process.56

For example, in the first stage, imported simple goods, such as beer or shoes, are replaced with

33

domestically produced equivalents, by building the necessary factories and other production

infrastructure. As industry is built up, more complex goods are replaced, ending in highly

complex “consumer durables” such as cars or airplanes. The state subsidizes production (often

taking a loss to stimulate nascent industry), such as by providing cheap utilities, and it

manipulates the national currency in order to make the purchase of capital goods (machinery

used to produce other goods) cheaper. Of course, manipulating the currency is not without

consequences, and this makes the export of goods much less viable, though this is of little

concern given that the industrializing nation no longer cares about the export economy. In total,

ISI is expensive. The Vargas government found it necessary to court huge amounts of foreign

investment in order to purchase pricey capital goods from Great Britain, Germany, and the

United States, and this would be a serious source of debate in the coming years. An interesting

side effect of the ISI model is that it began to sow the seeds of a faulty mass-education system. In

a society based on industrial production (and not necessarily innovation), educated masses are

not needed to operate basic machinery. While Vargas did devote resources to expanding the

Brazilian education system (and particularly higher education at the university level), it laid the

groundwork for a segmented labor system.57

Perhaps the most consequential development of the early Vargas era was the significant

social reorganization that occurred. When Vargas ran in the 1930 election, he promised an era of

workers’ rights and social justice that contrasted starkly with the oligarchy of old. In many

regards, Vargas delivered. However, Vargas’ efforts to organize the working class manifested

themselves in the brutal repression of any labor organization outside of the official state sphere.

In this regard, it is important to note that Vargas, while often a supporter of liberal reforms, was

34

not a leftist. He looked upon the Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro, or

PCB) with disdain and suspicion. Therefore, Vargas sought to disassemble and co-opt the

institutions through which leftist parties were gaining influence: unions. The system that Vargas

introduced instead was sophisticated and supremely bureaucratic. The corporatist system

reimagined the relationship between the working class and state, one in which the state was the

grand organizer of the workers and guarantor of rights. Corporatism is effectively a tiered system

of state-sanctioned and operated unions.58 According to the system decreed by Vargas, each

industry would have its own hierarchy of unions. Local unions (known as sindicatos or

syndicates) fed into a single state federation, which in turn fed into the industry’s national

confederation. Workers belonging to an industry were required to join the state-sponsored unions

and pay the required dues. All other unions were disbanded. Of course, the old unions attempted

to resist, but within a few years, harsh government pressure brought society into compliance.59

The corporatist system was of great use to the Vargas government in exercising control over a

large portion of the working population and avoiding labor-based uprisings. The state had the

final say in the selection of union leaders, and the compartmentalization of unions—local unions

were not in contact with each other, etc.—eliminated the likelihood of any sort of broad

movement.

Another important development closely related to the corporatist model was the

expansion of social welfare. It was during the Vargas Era that the Brazilian state first began to

extend various forms of welfare, such as unemployment insurance, social security (for the

elderly), and health insurance, to its citizens. Nevertheless, only a small portion of the population

ended up receiving the benefits. As much as the corporatist system was inclusionary, extending

35

rights to workers of many industries, it was also exclusionary. The Vargas government made an

important decision in defining who constituted a contributing member of society and therefore

deserved the protection of the state. Ultimately, the demarcation was made so that urban formal

sector workers were incorporated and all others were excluded. The vast population of

agricultural workers in Brazil’s rural areas was left out of the system, as were the informal sector

workers of Brazil’s cities. The informal sector was largely comprised of unofficial employees

who are not registered with the state, such as maids, nannies, street vendors, and others. In this

context, the Carteira de Trabalho, or Work Card, was introduced to govern the distribution of

rights. Only holders of a carteira were authorized to join unions and thus gain access to health

insurance, pensions, and other social welfare benefits.60 The card could only be obtained through

a state-sanctioned employer and needed a current employer’s signature in order to be valid. In

many respects, the Carteira de Trabalho functioned as a passport for citizenship—those

fortunate enough to have one not only enjoyed their social rights, but also gained other unofficial

benefits before the law. For example, simply being the bearer of a card could protect one from

arbitrary arrest, as it was meant to demonstrate that the holder was an upstanding, contributing

member of society. That being said, only a very small percent of the working population—

perhaps between ten and fifteen percent—actually gained access to this system, given the size of

the rural and informal urban sectors.61

It must be mentioned that the initial years of Vargas’ rule were not without their strife.

Just as the consolidation of the First Republic did not come without bloodshed or rebellion, so

too did Vargas’ Republic see conflict. It is important to note that not every state government

supported the overthrow of the Republic. In particular, the state of São Paulo resisted Vargas’

36

coup, and only when the military overthrew the government did the state capitulate.

Nevertheless, from the moment Vargas assumed power, São Paulo was a thorn in his side.

Vargas seriously miscalculated when he decided to rely upon the Tenentes (Lieutenants) to

resolve the situation in São Paulo, given the power of the state’s oligarchy and the public’s

general opposition to Vargas. Given that Vargas had abolished the 1891 Constitution, the

population demanded that a new one be promulgated “based on the principles of liberal

democracy” that would protect the rights that they had come to enjoy.62 As a response, the

government passed the Electoral Code of 1932, fulfilling Vargas’ promise of a secret vote,

including suffrage for women. Nevertheless, discontent continued, particularly regarding the role

of the Lieutenants, and São Paulo broke out in rebellion, in what would become known as the

Revolution of 1932. Although the federal government had a clear advantage in terms of military

force, São Paulo was able to resist for three months before finally being defeated. It became

evident that the Republic needed to be stabilized. As such, a National Constituent Assembly was

elected in May of 1933 with the mandate to write a new constitution for Brazil, which it passed

in July of 1934.

Despite this measure, not all was well in the Republic. For several years, the Communist

Party and other leftist groups had been gaining strength in their conflict against the right-wing

Integralist party. In 1935, the leader of the party called for an uprising against the Vargas

government, which responded by shutting down the party. When the communists attempted their

uprising, it was brutally crushed by the government, but it had sweeping effects on the trajectory

of the nation. In the interest of national security and combating the communist threat, Vargas’

government took a marked swing towards authoritarianism. Vargas took steps to repress

37

communist activities across the country, and an air of paranoia meant that he received broad

support in Congress for his actions.

The Declaration of the Estado Novo

The catalyst for the declaration of the Estado Novo and the overthrow of the democratic

government by Vargas himself lay largely in a government-planned lie. Vargas had been steadily

growing weary of the constraints of the democratic model, especially in combatting the threat of

communism that he saw around every corner. In September of 1937, the army “caught” an

officer in the Ministry of War who had allegedly been plotting a communist uprising. The plan,

known as Plano Cohen—emphasizing the Jewish roots of the threat—was used to secure

emergency executive powers and a state of war granted by Congress.63 Vargas capitalized

immediately on his new leverage and gained support for a coup from the military, state

governors, and other political elites. In a dramatic scene, on 10 November 1937, the military shut

down the Congress, and Vargas announced the dawn of a new age in Brazil: the Estado Novo, or

New State.64 The 1934 Constitution was declared null and void, and a new Constitution was

introduced. The cooperation of the armed forces in these maneuvers was critical—with the aid of

military leaders, Vargas was able to enact a swift blow, leaving little chance of effective

resistance. The Brazilian generals and admirals had good reason to trust Vargas; he had fulfilled

his promise made back in 1930 to improve the armed forces and had taken internal security

seriously, which reassured military leaders whose prime concern was the repression of dissidents

and the ensuring of stability.

38

In theory and according to the new Constitution, the Estado Novo would differ little from

the old state. However, it is almost certain that President Vargas has no intention to let the

quotidian squabbles of the democratic process interfere with his grand plans for Brazil’s future.

No national parliament will be elected, and no judge will dare interfere with the government’s

plans. The future of the nation lies in the hands of President Vargas and the few men who have

his ear.

Discussion and Blocs

Now, just three days after the proclamation of the Estado Novo, this committee will have

to face the transition to a new form of government. Will the nation go quietly, or will President

Vargas have to address a mass uprising as the people resist the downfall of Brazilian democracy?

In many regards, the answer for how to deal with this dilemma is unclear. In countries across the

ocean, dictators have turned increasingly to oppression to achieve their perfect social reality, yet

it remains to be seen if the mainstream elements of the Brazilian political spectrum are willing to

follow this path laden with atrocities. Effectively, barring extreme ideologies that President

Vargas has eschewed, there exist two divergent philosophies regarding the future of Brazil.

President Vargas himself does not fall neatly into either of these paths, which will complicate the

decisions of the cabinet in choosing its direction.

The conservative path seeks minimal alterations to the status quo while ensuring the

largest possible improvements in the country’s economy. Conservatives in Brazil have

traditionally aligned themselves with the landed gentry of the nation—the oligarchy that has held

power for centuries, since the early colonial days.65 The elites are tempting allies; they have

39

massive resources at their disposal and wield significant influence in the politics of each state.

Their ties abroad, especially through commercial connections, can act as a lifeline to the

international economy. On the other hand, President Vargas and his Tenente allies have usually

shown disdain for the oligarchical ways of old, and they made it a top priority to dismantle this

oligarchy in the Election of 1930.66 As such, the oligarchy finds itself in a somewhat weakened

state, and should the cabinet want to work with them, it will find it necessary to make some

concessions in order to reinvigorate this potential ally.

On the economic front, the conservative ideology advocates for a return to what Brazil

knows best: the export economy. For centuries, the Brazilian nation enriched itself off of its

wealth of natural resources, providing sugar, coffee, rubber, precious metals, and other materials

to the world economy. As mentioned before, the onset of the Great Depression meant that this

model was no longer viable. However, as the global economy slowly crawls its way out of

recession, returning to the export economy will become an increasingly viable option. A rapidly

militarizing Germany may perhaps provide a huge market for Brazilian goods, though diverting

resources to new export infrastructure will necessitate the cessation of government support for

industrialization, especially currency manipulation and subsidies. Nevertheless, it would take

serious efforts to convince President Vargas to abandon his plans for industrialization, which he

holds so dear. Finally, in the social aspect, conservatives are generally opposed to any sort of

large social mobilization. In the eyes of conservatives, mass-based movements are often the

breeding ground for dangerous communist insurrections, which fundamentally threaten the

internal security of the nation. On a practical level, many conservatives simply do not see it as

the obligation of the government to provide large-scale social welfare to the working class and

40

are opposed to any sort of mandatory workers’ protections, given their negative impact on the

profitability of businesses. President Vargas himself opposes this idea and considers himself o

pai dos pobres, or the father of the poor, but he is also generally suspicious of mass-mobilization

outside of the aegis of the state.

On the other side of the spectrum, as is natural, the progressive path is largely opposed to

the conservative ideology. Progressive thought in Brazil has taken different forms throughout the

centuries as a response to the issues of the time. Whereas in the Empire this took the form of

opposition to slavery, in the Vargas era it is a general opposition to the oligarchic status quo of

the past. In previous eras, the oligarchy exerted enormous control over every aspect of life in

Brazil—social, economic, and political. Their huge land holdings and propensity to utilize slave

labor meant that much (if not most) of the nation’s wealth was concentrated in their upper

echelons, leaving the working class with a meager slice of the pie. Similarly, the oligarchy

tended to conflict with a strong central government, instead advocating for a system in which

power is devolved to the states. As such, a strong oligarchy is in conflict with President Vargas’

ideas for the future. He has no desire to allow state oligarchies to govern the country’s affairs,

and he certainly will not allow them to interfere with his labor initiatives. On the other hand, it is

unlikely that Vargas will be able to fully dismantle the oligarchies in the rural areas of Brazil,

and even if he could do so, it would likely cause serious strife and anarchy.

Economically, progressive ideology in Brazil now calls for a serious increase in

industrialization in the nation. While Vargas made significant strides during the first years of his

term to save the Brazilian economy in the face of the Depression, there certainly remains a huge

amount of work to be done. Import-substitution industrialization is a complicated process, and

41

should the government wish to continue with its plan to industrialize (which President Vargas

has indicated he intends to do), measures will need to be taken to secure the necessary resources

in order to continue in the process. These include attracting foreign capital and investment,

purchasing capital good machinery from abroad, and creating a business climate that supports

nascent industry. Similarly, the government will need to decide which industries should be

prioritized, such as defense materials or other products.

Socially, the progressive path entails broad social inclusion and incorporation of the

working class, going far beyond even what Vargas’ corporatist system has thus far achieved.

Perhaps a step in this direction would be the drafting and approval of a formalized labor code

that enshrines the rights of workers and extends welfare to more of the population. Of course,

this measure would need to be reconciled with President Vargas’ conceptualization of productive

citizenry, as he is unlikely to permit an expensive, sweeping extension of social welfare and

rights to all workers, including the informal and rural sectors. Furthermore, social mobilization

and the expansion of workers’ rights are sure to carry with them the specter of communism—

something that President Vargas, the military, the Tententes, and conservative sectors of society

will fiercely oppose. Should President Vargas wish to avoid a coup against his government, he

must be sure to prove that he takes security seriously and address the communist threat. Finally,

one cannot ignore one glaring tenet of progressive ideology that would be sure to conflict with

the Estado Novo: liberal democracy. Supporters of social justice and workers’ rights in Brazil

typically also advocate for a democratic form of government, in which one of the rights of

citizenship is the opportunity to participate in political decision-making. However, the

declaration of the Estado Novo was meant to circumvent the constraints of democracy in

42

growing the Brazilian nation and ensuring internal security. Therefore, adopting a progressive

stance for the Estado Novo would also entail reconciling this serious conflict in ideology, at the

local, state, and federal level.

The committee must also take into consideration several other factors important to the

future of the Brazilian nation. First is the relationship of the Catholic Church to the Brazilian

people and government. For centuries now, the Church has been a stalwart of conservative

values in Brazilian society, allying itself with local oligarchies and the government. Social

justice has never been on the agenda of the Brazilian Church. Many members of the church

hierarchy have lived in decadence yet told their parishioners that “to be poor is a blessing” and as

such, that the poor in Brazil should accept their position in society. The Church holds significant

influence in politics, though it was formally cast out of the political system in the 1891

Constitution of the First Republic. As such, Vargas’ new government may come into conflict

with the Church as it seeks to incorporate workers and bring them out of politics. The Church

also has significant influence over values in Brazil, especially as manifested in education.

Therefore, any major shift in these domains must take the Church into account.

Another aspect of the Estado Novo that the committee must address is its relationship

with fascism. President Vargas has thus far indicated that he is a different type of fascist than

those that have recently arisen in Germany, Italy, Spain, and the like. In these nations, the

movements hearken back to past days of greatness, attempting to bring the country out of

ignominy. However, Vargas has not based his rhetoric on looking towards the past. Rather, he

seeks to bring about a modernizing dictatorship that fosters social inclusion and development

43

while suppressing rebellion. What, then, should the Brazilian government’s relationship be with

fascist ideology?

Along these lines lays another incredibly important question: Brazil’s foreign relations.

To many onlookers, it appears that the storm clouds of war are gathering in Europe. A

remilitarized Germany and mobilizing Italy threaten to come into conflict with the well-

established democracies of the continent. To the North, the United States still slumbers,

recovering from the near-death blow of the Great Depression, but as was seen in the Great War,

it is unlikely that the nation would stand on the sidelines if Europe were to plunge into war once

again. How will Brazil react to such a possibility? What sort of allegiance will Vargas feel to

fellow fascist governments in times of crisis? Can Brazil afford to come into conflict with the

United States? Also in question are Brazil’s relations within Latin America. Brazil has not fought

a war with its neighbors since the 1860s. Has the time come, under the aegis of the Estado Novo,

to take a more aggressive stance on the home front? How will the new government manage

relations with Brazil’s tradition rival, Argentina? Will Brazil seek relations with other third-party

powers?

This is only a general outline of the types of discussions and solutions that may come

about, and you as delegates are expected to bring your own creative, well-researched solutions to

address these issues and more.

Framing Position Papers

Every delegate is responsible for writing a position paper to outline his or her views

regarding the issues that face the committee. Given that this is a continual crisis committee, there

44

are no specific topics that the committee must address (i.e., there will be no agenda or speakers’

list), and as such, there is no specific formula for how to format your position papers. A well-

written position paper will address whatever topics that are important to the character as well as

the committee as a whole and will present solutions for these issues. Think about the questions

presented above. What is the future of the Brazilian economy? How should Brazil’s political

system look? What, if anything, should be done to the social order? What should President

Vargas’ philosophy be vis-à-vis Brazilian foreign relations? These are only a few of the

questions that you could consider. Do not regurgitate the information that you find in this guide

or simply give a synopsis of the problems in Brazil. Instead, perform a critical analysis of the

situation that faces the nation, provide innovative solutions, and explain why you think that way.

In order to do this, you must do additional research. It is impossible to truly understand

the nuance and intricacies that surround the Estado Novo by reading the few pages of this guide.

If constrained for time, prioritize research regarding your specific position and how your

character fits in with the goals of the committee as a whole. This is to say, if you are the Minister

of Education, try to discover as much as you can about education in the Vargas period (1930-

1937) and how education played into the declaration of the Estado Novo. Remember that the

starting date of the committee is 13 November 1937. While historical narrative might give you

an idea of what could happen, this committee will not necessarily simply retrace history but will

instead be based on the decisions that you make as individual delegates and as an entire

committee. Be creative! Take risks! No real people were harmed in the making of this committee

(except perhaps for the blood, sweat, and tears that I put into this guide), and this is your

opportunity to experiment with what could have been in Brazil. In crafting your position, keep in

45

mind that collaboration is essential; you will need to work with other members of the committee

in order to advance your goals, and you can be certain that not everyone will agree with what

you want to do. Therefore, be mindful of the plausibility of what you advocate as well as what

various parties would support or oppose it.

That being said, there are a few sources that I recommend as a starting point for your

research. First, I would urge you all to read the Constitution of 1937. It is, after all, the starting

point for the Estado Novo and will be of great help in understanding the framework that

underlies the new government. The document is readily available online (both in English and

Portuguese), but if you have any trouble locating it, feel free to send me an email. I also highly

recommend reading the relevant sections of Boris Fausto’s A Concise History of Brazil. This

book, which is in my opinion the bible of Brazilian history, is a well-written synopsis of all

things regarding Brazil, and will help to fill in the gaps that I was not able to cover. If you are

interested in the entirety of Brazilian history, this book is a good starting point and not a

particularly onerous read, but it is also good resource for the periods relevant to this committee.

Another general resource is the Brazil Country Study by the Library of Congress. This massive

document contains a wealth of information about Brazil, and skimming some of the pertinent

sections will definitely be helpful. The Cambridge History of Latin America is a large

encyclopedic history of the region with several sections devoted to Brazilian history. This

collection contains impressive amounts of data and other interesting information that will help

contextualize the issues that the committee faces. Finally, for those of you who can read

Portuguese, Luthero Vargas, the son of our dear leader, has written a biography entitled Getúlio

Vargas: A Revolução Inacabada, which provides an interesting summary of the life of Getúlio

46

Vargas, if not always painted in the most objective light. If you need help locating other sources,

I would be happy to point you in the right direction. Above all, please remember to follow the

principles of academic integrity and keep in mind that plagiarism is taken very seriously at

HACIA.

Concluding Remarks

In sum, Brazil finds itself at a crossroads in its history, and only you, as the Cabinet of

President Getúlio Vargas, can set the country’s course and determine its future. I hope that

through this guide you are able to better understand the stage that has been set for this

committee. The period that this committee will simulate is one of great importance in Brazilian

history, and many of the developments that took place under the Vargas government continue to

influence the nation to this day. Please keep in mind that the information presented is by no

means exhaustive, and I cannot emphasize enough the importance of conducting outside research

to formulate your own arguments and develop a more nuanced understanding of the issues

relevant to the committee. Delegates will be judged not only on their knowledge of the material

presented in this guide and how they apply it to committee, but also on the quality of their ideas

and the breadth of new knowledge that they bring to committee. This committee is not

necessarily only for delegates with extensive experience in crisis committees. Rather, it is an

opportunity for all motivated delegates to showcase their skills in research, writing, debate, and

negotiation. For those of you who are less experienced with Model United Nations, please

consider utilizing the resources on the HACIA website to help delegates understand MUN and

committee procedure. Remember that as a continual crisis committee, the rules of procedure will

47

be different and not as strict as in other types of committees, but a general knowledge of

parliamentary procedure is fundamental to participating in committee. Of course, committee

procedure will be explained in more detail at the beginning of conference, and I will always be

happy to clarify any procedural matters as they arise. I would love to provide pointers regarding

effective research, so please do not hesitate to reach out to me (in English or Spanish) at any

point in the preparation process. I look forward to reading your position papers and to seeing you

in Cartagena in just a short while.

48

Bibliography

Bethell, Leslie. "Part Four: Brazil After Independence." The Cambridge History of Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985. Print.

Conrad, Robert. “The Contraband Slave Trade to Brazil, 1831-1845.” The Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 49, no. 4, 1969.

Constitution of the Argentine Nation, Article 15. 1853.

Encyclopedia Britannica. “Tenentismo.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 9 Mar. 2007, www.britannica.com/event/Tenentismo.

Encyclopedia Britannica. “Washington Luís.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 20 July 1998, www.britannica.com/biography/Washington-Luis.

Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. Print.

Holston, James. Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2009. Print.

Hudson, Rex A. Brazil: A Country Study, U.S. Government Printing Office- Library of Congress, 1998. Print.

Institute of Historical Research (IHR), University of London and Institute for the Public Understanding of the Past, University of York. "Chasing Freedom: The Royal Navy and the Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave Trade." Chasing Freedom: The Royal Navy and the Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave Trade, an Exhibition Review. University of London, 2007. Web. 22 July 2017.

Lyra, Heitor. "Ascensão." História De Dom Pedro II, 1825-1891. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938. Print.

Martins, Luciano, and Richard P. Momsen. "Independence." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 12 July 2017. Web. 21 July 2017.

Oldfield, Dr John. "British Anti-slavery." BBC. BBC, 17 Feb. 2011. Web. 22 July 2017.

Silva, Raul Mendes and Brigagão, Clóvis, História das Relações Internacionais do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: CEBRI, 2001).

Vargas, Getúlio. Organização Maria Celina D’Araujo. — Brasília: Câmara dos Deputados, Edições Câmara, 2011.

49

Vargas, Luthero. Getúlio Vargas: A Revolução Inacabada. Bloch, 1988.

50

Endnotes

51

1 Getúlio Vargas, Organização Maria Celina D’Araujo. — Brasília : Câmara dos Deputados, Edições Câmara, 2011. 358-367 2 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 7. Print.3 Hudson, Rex A. Brazil: A Country Study, U.S. Government Printing Office- Library of Congress, 1998. 8. Print.4 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 18. Print.5 Hudson, Rex A. Brazil: A Country Study, U.S. Government Printing Office- Library of Congress, 1998. XXXVII. Print.6 Holston, James. Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2009. 119. Print.7 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 35. Print.8 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 39. Print.9 Hudson, Rex A. Brazil: A Country Study, U.S. Government Printing Office- Library of Congress, 1998. 5. Print.10 Ibid11 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 55. Print.12 Hudson, Rex A. Brazil: A Country Study, U.S. Government Printing Office- Library of Congress, 1998. 27. Print.13 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 55. Print.14 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 63. Print.15 Hudson, Rex A. Brazil: A Country Study, U.S. Government Printing Office- Library of Congress, 1998. 33. Print.16 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. ?. Print17 Hudson, Rex A. Brazil: A Country Study, U.S. Government Printing Office- Library of Congress, 1998. 33. Print.18 Martins, Luciano, and Richard P. Momsen. "Independence." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 12 July 2017. Web. 21 July 2017.19 Ibid20 Raul Mendes Silva and Clóvis Brigagão, História das Relações Internacionais do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: CEBRI,2001): 35.21 Bethell, Leslie. "Part Four: Brazil After Independence." The Cambridge History of Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985. 679. Print. The Cambridge History of Latin America.22 Oldfield, Dr John. "British Anti-slavery." BBC. BBC, 17 Feb. 2011. Web. 22 July 2017.23 Institute of Historical Research (IHR), University of London and Institute for the Public Understanding of the Past, University of York. "Chasing Freedom: The Royal Navy and the Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave Trade." Chasing Freedom: The Royal Navy and the Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave Trade, an Exhibition Review. University of London, 2007. Web. 22 July 2017.24 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 105. Print.25 Ibid26 Ibid27 Bethell, Leslie. "Part Four: Brazil After Independence." The Cambridge History of Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985. 696. Print. The Cambridge History of Latin America.28 Conrad, Robert. “The Contraband Slave Trade to Brazil, 1831-1845.” The Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 49, no. 4, 1969. 63629 Bethell, Leslie. "Part Four: Brazil After Independence." The Cambridge History of Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985. 743. Print. The Cambridge History of Latin America.30 Conrad, Robert. “The Contraband Slave Trade to Brazil, 1831-1845.” The Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 49, no. 4, 1969. 63831 Constitution of the Argentine Nation, Article 15. 185332 Lyra, Heitor. "Ascensão." História De Dom Pedro II, 1825-1891. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938. 16. Print.33 Martins, Luciano, and Richard P. Momsen. "Independence." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 12 July 2017. Web. 21 July 2017.34 Hudson, Rex A. Brazil: A Country Study, U.S. Government Printing Office- Library of Congress, 1998. 52. Print.35 Hudson, Rex A. Brazil: A Country Study, U.S. Government Printing Office- Library of Congress, 1998. 54. Print.36 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 115. Print.37 Ibid38 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 109. Print.39 Hudson, Rex A. Brazil: A Country Study, U.S. Government Printing Office- Library of Congress, 1998. 53. Print.40 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 134. Print.

41 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 157. Print.42 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 162. Print.43 Ibid44 Hudson, Rex A. Brazil: A Country Study, U.S. Government Printing Office- Library of Congress, 1998. 344. Print.45 Hudson, Rex A. Brazil: A Country Study, U.S. Government Printing Office- Library of Congress, 1998. 340. Print.46 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 178. Print.47 Ibid48 Ibid49 Encyclopedia Britannica. “Tenentismo.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 9 Mar. 2007, www.britannica.com/event/Tenentismo.50 Encyclopedia Britannica. “Washington Luís.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 20 July 1998, www.britannica.com/biography/Washington-Luis.51 Vargas, Luthero. “Getúlio Vargas: A Revolução Inacabada.” Getúlio Vargas: A Revolução Inacabada, Bloch, 1988, p. 39.52 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 189. Print.53 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 194. Print.54 Ibid55 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 161. Print56 Bethell, Leslie, ed. The Cambridge History of Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008. 484. Print. The Cambridge History of Latin America.57 Ibid58 Hudson, Rex A. Brazil: A Country Study, U.S. Government Printing Office- Library of Congress, 1998. 69. Print.59 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 196. Print60 Holston, James. “Segregating the City.” Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil, Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 191.61 Ibid62 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 199. Print63 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 210. Print64 Ibid65 Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 72. Print66 Hudson, Rex A. Brazil: A Country Study, U.S. Government Printing Office- Library of Congress, 1998. 166. Print.