Bad Faith, Authenticity, and Responsibilities to Future Generations: A Sartrean Approach

to Authentic Relationships with Future Persons

Kimberly S. Engels*

AbstractThis article offers a Sartrean existentialist ethics of authenticity model as an alternative to traditional approaches to the issue of moral responsibilities to future generations. I begin by demonstrating how traditional utilitarian and rights-based positions fall short when addressing the future persons concern, highlighting both their technical problems and their failure to show our interconnectedness with other generations. I then show how the Sartrean concepts of freedom, responsibility, and authenticity can offer an alternative approach which focuses on interpersonal adoption of the Other’s projects. Lastly I demonstrate the bad faith present in the typical discussion about future generations, and suggest how we can rid ourselves of this bad faith in order to engage in authentic relationships with humans of the past, present, and future.

Introduction

Discussion about whether or not we should be morally concerned about future

generations is more important now than ever. Scientists are predicting that climate change,

pollution, and overpopulation are going to leave the planet uninhabitable for future humans. The

main difficulty that arises in the discussion about responsibilities to future generations is that we

are discussing potential responsibilities we have to people who do not exist. This leaves open

the question of how or in what manner we should be concerned for people who do not exist and

may never exist. Popular arguments in the literature are either rights-based or utilitarian

approaches that, among other problems, estrange the present generation from those before and

after them. These approaches also fail to emphasize the elements of freedom and responsibility

that are imperative for any changes to be made with regard to general policies and individual

* Department of Philosophy, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI, 53233. Email: kimberly.engels@marquette.edu. Engels specializes in Contemporary French philosophy as well as in applied ethics. She worked in health care for several years before becoming interested in some of the more foundational issues that undergird our way of thinking about human welfare. She is particularly interested in the application of existentialism and phenomenology to contemporary ethical problems in health care, the environment, and social welfare. The author extends thanks to Dr. Susanne Foster and Cheryl Abbate for their insightful suggestions with regard to this manuscript.

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actions that are leaving the planet uninhabitable. A satisfactory approach to the problem will

include an acknowledgement of the detrimental effect our actions are inflicting on the

habitability of the planet, a recognition that we are free to change these actions, and an

acceptance that we are always in relationship with future and past generations. Satisfactorily

meeting these three goals requires refocusing the discussion on what it means to be a human

being, how we interact with the world around us, and how we are interconnected with other

humans in the future and in the past. Traditional utilitarian or rights-based approaches to the

issue do not provide the tools necessary for such an assessment.

Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialist thought introduces an ethics of authenticity that involves

humans taking responsibility for their existence and accepting themselves as meaning-givers to

the world. It further includes authentic relationships with other human beings and a call to assist

them with their projects and goals. While an ethics of authenticity may not be able to provide a

universal formula we can use to calculate moral actions, it has important contributions to make to

the discussion about human existence and human relationships that are not present in traditional

utilitarian or deontological theories. I will argue that adopting an existentialist viewpoint of

human beings as projectors of meaning upon the world, dispelling what Sartre refers to as bad

faith, and seeing an interconnectedness of humans in the past, present, and future provides a

convincing framework for developing a call of concern towards future persons.

Part I: Utilitarian and Rights-based Approaches

There are typically three questions that arise in discussion about future generations. First,

there is a debate as to whether or not we have a moral duty to continue the human race. Second,

if we do have such an obligation, does this mandate that we have moral duties towards these

future persons? Lastly, if we do have moral obligations to future generations, of what would such

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obligations consist? Of course, all of these questions are interrelated. Even if we decide we have

no reason to continue the human race, this does not mean that future humans are not going to

exist anyway. We generally have to assume that there will be future persons and that they will be

similar to us. This means they will likely have relatively similar physical and social needs.

The typical arguments for establishing the proper conduct with regard to future persons

are either utilitarian or rights-based approaches. Utilitarian approaches are taken by authors such

as Narveson1, Bennet2, Scott3, Sumner4, Sikora5, and Warren.6 Since utilitarianism focuses on

pleasure or satisfaction versus suffering and pain as the criteria for moral actions, these

arguments all seek to minimize the suffering and increase the happiness of future persons. Most

problematic with utilitarian approaches are their failure to give proper attention to human

relationships. Approaches that simply seek to maximize happiness and minimize suffering fail to

focus on the development of interpersonal relationships between present and future generations.

Further, utilitarian approaches fail to demonstrate how future persons will affect the present

generation after we have died, and how our own well-being is intertwined with theirs.

There are other technical problems that arise within utilitarianism that further

demonstrate the shortcomings of such an approach. One problem is the question of whether we

should seek to maximize the total happiness of future persons or the average happiness. This

distinction is not important when applied to existing people today because average happiness and

total happiness amount to roughly the same thing. However when applied to persons who do not

exist, this distinction becomes much more significant.7 Accepting the total happiness view

suggests that we should increase the population because the more people who are alive, the more

total happiness there will be. This implies that we should create a world with billions of

marginally happy people, rather than a smaller population of happier people. Or, if we wanted to

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minimize total suffering, this could amount to arguing that it is better that there be no future

humans, because then there would no suffering at all. If we adopt a policy of increasing future

average happiness, this places an unreasonable ethical restriction on the birth of future people. It

suggests that people ought not to be born unless their life in the future will be a relatively happy

one. Such a stance could also lead to arguments that third world countries populate less, and first

world countries populate more. Additionally, a utilitarian calculus that focuses only on pleasure,

such as Bentham’s, suggests that certain and immediate pleasures count more than uncertain or

remote ones.8 This principle suggests that much more emphasis should be put on maximizing

happiness for present persons as these pleasures will be certain and immediate, while future

persons’ happiness cannot be predicted. The happiness of future persons is therefore put at a

considerable disadvantage in comparison to that of present persons.

Deontological rights-based approaches offer alternative perspectives, yet present no real

solutions. Like utilitarian approaches, they fail to acknowledge an interconnectedness between

past, present and future persons. Rights-based approaches attempt to grant rights to distant,

estranged Others who are not directly connected to us. The further problems that result from

such an approach are symptomatic of this bigger issue. Within deontological rights-based

approaches two questions usually arise. First, can future generations be said to have rights? If so,

what rights would these people have? It does not make sense to say that future humans have

rights now, because someone who does not exist cannot have rights. Alternatively, we can think

of rights in terms of their function. The function of rights is to limit certain behavior in order to

protect the rights of right holders. Thus we could talk about protecting the rights of future

persons by putting limits on the behavior of present persons.9 But spelling out what these

limitations on our behavior entail is not so simple. For example, should we stop using

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nonrenewable energy sources, so that immediately future generations have a right to them? But

if they use up these nonrenewable resources, they will be preventing the next generation from

having them. The rights of future persons with respect to climate change are explored in a recent

article by FitzPatrick.10 His article displays the various manners in which the rights of present

people conflict with the rights of those in the future with regard to the issue of climate change

and the release of greenhouse gases. The identification of these conflicts further demonstrates the

shortcomings of a rights-based approach. Another recent article by Attfield suggests taking

future persons seriously,11 pointing out that the Earth Charter12 (a declaration by a global society

initiative of fundamental ethical principles for building a just, sustainable and peaceful global

society in the 21st century) fails to clearly spell out what responsibilities should be taken towards

future generations.

These approaches ultimately fall short because the issue of future generations is truly a

unique one that traditional moral theories cannot solve. Attempting to maximizing the happiness

of future persons, or attributing rights to them further suffers from the problems of our inability

to predict how happy people will be, what kind of rights would be relevant to them, or how we

could even conceive of someone having a right when that person does not exist. I argue that

speaking of the “duties to” or “rights of” future generations is the wrong approach, as it views

future humans as estranged Others who are not interconnected with us. What is needed is a

framework that can account for our shared past and future, and demonstrates how our own future

projects and the meaning of our own existence are interwoven with the lives of future

generations. I argue that Sartre’s existential thought provides the necessary tools for producing

such a framework. Sartre’s existentialism enables us to construct an intergenerational

community in which we understand ourselves as in relationship with both past and future

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generations. A brief introduction to his existentialist thought and the ethical implications of his

worldview will be the subject of the next section.

Part II: Sartrean Existentialism, Bad Faith, and Authenticity

Sartre’s philosophy is useful for the topic at hand because the ethical thought drawn from

it offers the humanistic element that is needed for an adequate approach to this issue. Sartre’s

emphasis on human freedom and responsibility, his assertion that it is human beings who project

meaning upon the world, and his ethical concept of authenticity together create the framework

that can give rise to the answer we need. An area that needs further development in his thought is

an ethic that takes place between past, present, and future persons, which I will offer in the next

section. At this point, I will briefly recount the main tenants of Sartre’s thought that are useful in

the discussion about future generations.

An understanding of Sartre’s ethical thought requires a general comprehension of his

ontology. Sartre’s position in Being and Nothingness13 divides reality into two distinct separate

categories. The first, being in-itself, is something that simply is what it is, such as a physical

object. The second, being for-itself, is something that can change what it is, or human

consciousness. Human consciousness is distinct from all other being because it alone has the

ability to reflect, question, doubt, and choose. The For-itself does not have a fixed or static

identity like physical objects, rather it creates its essence and nature as it lives. The For-itself is

described as spontaneous consciousness that is able to transcend its current situation. Because

human identity is constituted through the decisions of the conscious subject, a human being is

only the sum of what she makes herself to be through her choices and her actions.14 Freedom is

an unconditional characteristic of a human being because she is able to reflect and choose, in

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contrast to being in-itself. “Man does not exist first in order to be free subsequently; there is no

difference between the being of man and his being-free.”15

An important concept within Sartre’s theory is “bad faith,” or a state of lying to oneself.

This happens when one both knows the truth and yet does not know it, which is a complex

process that takes place within the human consciousness. This is pertinent because bad faith

pervades discussion about future generations. For example, in a recent article by Sandberg, he

critiques what he refers to as the argument from inconsequentialism.16 This argument states that

because the actions I perform as an individual have an inconsequential or even non-existent

effect on the threat of climate change, it cannot be considered wrong if I take my car or refuse to

recycle. This is not an uncommon line of reasoning and almost everyone in the first world is

guilty of arguing on these grounds, at least occasionally. However, this type of justification for

our actions is an example of Sartrean bad faith, in which we lie to ourselves about certain aspects

of our existence or about the responsibility we share for our actions.

Sartrean bad faith occurs when the human being either denies his freedom, or denies

elements of facticity. Facticity can be defined as the limits that are imposed on human beings by

their concrete situations. It is the immediate necessary connection of the For-itself with the In-

itself. For example, a person’s birth, race, nationality, class, living conditions or past are all

facets of his being that contribute to his identity. Facticity also includes natural facts about the

world established by the sciences that are not things that human consciousness can transcend.

Bad faith arises when someone either denies elements of facticity, or denies that he has a free

consciousness capable of transcending certain facets of facticity.17 Sartre’s famous example of

bad faith is a waiter in a café. In one sense he is a waiter because it is a part of his facticity.

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However, because of the waiter’s free consciousness, he does not exist as a waiter in a permanent

state like a physical object.

…the waiter in the cafe cannot be immediately a café waiter in the sense that this inkwell is an inkwell or the glass is a glass…it is not that I do not wish to be this person or that I want this person to be different. But rather there is no common measure between his being and mine…But if I represent myself as him, I am not he; I am separated from him as the object from the subject…Yet there is no doubt that I am in a sense a café waiter—otherwise could I not just as well call myself a diplomat or a reporter? But if I am one, this can not be in the mode of being in-itself. I am a waiter in the mode of being what I am not.18

The waiter exists in bad faith if he considers himself simply a waiter—because his consciousness

can transcend his situation as a waiter. But he is also in bad faith if he denies that he is in some

way a waiter—it is a role he plays and part of his social situation.

David Detmer provides an exceptional analysis of bad faith in his book Sartre

Explained,19 and I will draw off of his interpretation to demonstrate how bad faith is present in

our attitudes towards future humans. Detmer points out that there are several strategies that are

generally present when one is deceiving another. First, it is easier to use misleading statements

that are partially true rather than telling outright lies. Such misleading statements are

instrumented through omission and emphasis. Further, vagueness and ambiguity aid deception

far more than succinct or precise communication.20 These same tools that are used to deceive

others are also used to deceive ourselves.

For while I cannot believe a blatant lie that I might tell myself…I can perhaps learn to avert my gaze, scrupulously and consistently, from certain unpleasant matters, while keeping uppermost in my mind others, and thereby convince myself of misleading partial-truths. 21

Sartre’s waiter in bad faith either averts his gaze from his role as a waiter, or conversely from his

free consciousness. At the same time he keeps in mind the opposite elements of himself. Sartre

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argues that authentic ethical relationships with others are not possible if one is in a state of bad

faith. Being and Nothingness is notorious for portraying human relationships as consisting of

conflict and struggle. This is often the product of individual human beings existing in a state of

bad faith that stifles ethical interaction with others.

Another important element of Sartre’s existentialist thought relevant to the topic at hand

is that being in-itself has no meaning or value except that which is projected upon it by the

freedom of the For-itself. “It follows that freedom is the unique foundation of values and that

nothing, absolutely nothing, justifies me in adopting this or that particular value.”22 Humans give

meaning not only to objects, tools, nature, etc., but also to values.

…I discover myself suddenly as the one who gives its meaning to the alarm clock, the one who by a signboard forbids himself to walk on a flower bed or on the lawn, the one from whom the boss’s order borrows its urgency, the one who decides the interest of the book which he is writing, the one finally who makes the values exist in order to determine his action by their demands.23

In a Sartrean conception of the world there is no universal moral code that can serve as a

foundation for our moral values. Consciousness alone can determine what meaning or value

things have. It is important to note that Sartre still advocated for ethical conduct, but denied that

the standards for this behavior are derived from universally valid moral rules. Although Sartre’s

thought does not include a structured moral theory, it still maintains that ethical relationships

with others are possible within this conception of human consciousness, freedom, and the

meaning or value of things. His claim that our lives and the world we inhabit are completely

meaningless except for the meaning we give them is a strong one that a reasonable person may

reject. However Sartre’s existentialist ethic is still a viable approach if we accept that we

contribute to the meaning and value of our lives and the world.

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The ethical thought necessary for an existentialist approach is found in Sartre’s Notebook

for an Ethics,24 which is known as his “ethics of authenticity.” While this vision of ethics can be

viewed as problematic as a traditionally structured ethical theory, it is still useful for formulating

the attitude of concern that we should foster towards future generations. Authenticity does not

tell us what values to choose, but rather how we should choose them. Further it focuses on

authentic reciprocal relationships and emphasizes an interpersonal ethical bridge. In order for

authentic human relationships to be possible, individuals must first rid themselves of bad faith.

If I deny my free consciousness in an attempt to sediment myself with a static essence like an

object, I will inevitably engage in a relationship of struggle with the Other.25 So the first mandate

for authenticity is that I accept myself as having a free consciousness that is different from other

being. Second, I must not only accept my unconditional freedom, but I should also intentionally

will it. This is what Sartre refers to sporadically in different texts as an ontological

“conversion.”26 It is through a process of accepting myself as a free consciousness and as a

meaning-giver of the world, that I am “converted” from a state of bad faith or self-deception into

a state of authenticity.

The key to ethical relationships with others is not only to accept this freedom, but also to

intentionally will it. Further I must extend this will to Others and will their freedom as well. For

ethical relationships with Others to be possible, humans must accept their freedom as an

unconditional aspect of their existence and not look to use the Other as a means to become self-

grounding. Once this ontological conversion has taken place, there is no reason that our

interaction with the Other must consist of struggle or conflict. Relationships with others can

become a positive enhancement of our existence. We can accept the free consciousness of the

Other and her presence and projects need not be a threat to me or my own projects. The authentic

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person also accepts and intentionally wills herself as a meaning-giver to the world. She accepts

and wills her own creativity to give value and meaning to being. The authentic person is

generous towards other human beings and working alongside other authentic humans can enter

into mutual relationships of trust and enhancement of the Other’s projects.27 In authenticity, all

of our projects and creations, and everything we project value upon is also given to others to

freely respond to.28 Therefore as much as we give meaning to our projects, Others give meaning

to them as well. Thus an additional reason we should be concerned about Others is that they,

too, interact with our personal projects. Further, the authentic person will offer her creations for

the Other and assist others in accomplishing their goals.29 “I am not transcended by this freedom

since I freely adopt this end.”30 When the authentic person chooses her freedom, she proposes an

image of what other human beings should be; individuals who choose to fully accept and value

their freedom while fostering this in Others through interaction with them. Actions can be

considered ethical to the extent that they contribute to a society of authentic persons in which

meaningful relationships are possible through adoption of the Other’s projects. This is pertinent

in the discussion about future persons because building an ethical relationship between

generations requires that we adopt the projects of both past and future persons. Achieving this

objective through authenticity requires first ridding ourselves of bad faith about the situation. In

the remainder of this article, I will discuss the bad faith that pervades our attitudes towards future

persons, and suggest how we can overcome this bad faith in order to achieve authentic

relationships with them.

Part III: Bad Faith and Our Relationships with Past and Future Persons

Bad faith is present in various facets of our existence, but it is especially prominent in the

discussion about and attitudes we take towards future persons and the future of our world. For

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example, bad faith occurs when people deny that they share some responsibility for the

continued devastation of our habitat. He may argue that if he had authority over the issue, we

would use only renewable energy resources, recycle all the time, use minimal electricity, ride our

bikes, or drive electric cars. However, since he is not in control of the situation he cannot be

considered responsible for the depletion of resources, global warming, etc. But Sartrean

authenticity mandates we acknowledge and take responsibility for our actions, and further, for

the systems or social collectives in which we participate. Sartre gives a radical example in Being

and Nothingness when he states that a soldier who fights in a war must take responsibility for

participating in that war, and is in bad faith if he claims otherwise. He writes,

If I am mobilized in a war, this war is my war; it is in my image and I deserve it. I deserve it first because I could always get out of it by suicide or by desertion…Any way you look at it it is a matter of a choice…Of course others have declared it, and one might be tempted perhaps to consider me as a simple accomplice. But this notion of complicity has only a juridical sense, and it does not hold here…There was no compulsion here, for the compulsion could not have gotten ahold of freedom.31

This extreme example can be rejected if we interpret it to mean that the soldier is responsible for

starting and sustaining the war, but this is not Sartre’s point. Rather, he is demonstrating that

even though the soldier is participating in a war that he did not start and is not solely sustaining,

he is in bad faith if he fails to acknowledge that there is still some element of choice in his

participation. Analogously, one can argue in bad faith that it is the government that makes

energy policies, and therefore he should be relieved of responsibility. However, the Sartrean

response is that there is still a component of choice in his contribution to a society that is making

the planet uninhabitable. Authenticity mandates he recognize that he could choose to resist this

contribution. He could, for example, choose to walk or ride his bike, use limited electricity in his

home, petition to his congressional representatives, or organize rallies for the environment.

Although he solely cannot be wholly blamed for all of the harm being done to the planet, he must

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admit that his involvement at least makes him complicit. For those living in first-world

countries, it is all but impossible not to participate in a society that is damaging our habitat.

However, bad faith arises when we deny responsibility for our role and position in society and

our actions that contribute to these overall societal systems. To this extent, authenticity mandates

that we must accept some degree of guilt. To refuse to accept accountability is bad faith through

a denial that our actions contribute to the damage of the planet, or a denial of our freedom that

still chooses to participate in society.

Bad faith also occurs when we refuse to accept evidence of climate change and the

energy crisis. For every study that confirms the effects of global warming, we may point to the

one study that says global warming is a hoax. The media fails to report the increase in forest

fires or to acknowledge that this increase in fires has been predicted by scientists as an effect of

climate change. It is bad faith through emphasis and omission. It is a denial of the facticity of

scientific studies that demonstrate the contribution of our collective actions to the destruction of

the environment.

But the most tragic form of bad faith present in discussions about future persons is a

failure to recognize our connection with past and future generations. This instance of bad faith is

a denial of our facticity. After our deaths, there is no longer any way for us to contribute to the

meaning of our lives or the development of our projects. The only meaning that our lives and

projects will have is that which is determined by those who are still alive. This is key to showing

our interconnectedness with past and future generations. Sartre is clear in Being and Nothingness

that when we are gone, it is future persons who will give our lives meaning. Since we can not

construct our identity through our actions and choices, it is those who are still alive who will

determine our essence. He writes,

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At the moment of death, we are; that is, we are defenseless before the judgment of others. They can decide in truth what we are; ultimately we have no longer any chance of escape…By death the For-itself is changed forever into an In-itself in that it has slipped entirely into the past.32

Also, “To be dead is to be prey for the living.”33 Further, Garcin, one of Sartre’s fictional

characters in his play No Exit who has discovered that he is in Hell, says, “I’m locked out;

they’re passing judgment on my life without troubling about me, and they’re right, because I’m

dead. Dead and done with.” 34 When we die, we no longer have any control over the meaning of

our lives. Those who are still alive are the ones who will give our lives and projects meaning. In

the same manner we project meaning upon the lives and projects of people in the past.

Thus from this point of view we can clearly see the difference between life and death: life decides its own meaning because it is always in suspense; it possesses essentially a power of self-criticism and self-metamorphosis which cause it to define itself as a “not-yet” or, if you like, makes it be as the changing of what it is…[But in death] there is a radical transformation: nothing more can happen to it inwardly; it is entirely closed; nothing more can be made to enter there; but its meaning does not cease to be modified from the outside.35

What this paragraph illustrates is that as long as we are living, we create who we are and who we

will be. When we are alive, the self is always changing, in a process of metamorphosis, and still

has the possibility of becoming something else. However upon death all of the possibilities of

self-transformation are eliminated. The only meaning our lives and projects will have after death

is that which is determined by others. Sartre’s theory demonstrates that our meaning after death

is still not fixed or stable; however, we no longer have any opportunity to contribute to that

meaning through our actions and choices.

Upon our death we will be incapable of engaging in our projects or fulfilling possibilities.

This means that the projects that we have contributed to the world will be in the hands of those

alive. Not only will future people give meaning to who we were, they will also give meaning to

our accomplishments. For example, when Charles Dickens was alive, he contributed to the

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meaning of his novels. Not only did he write Great Expectations, he could explain it to others, he

could be interviewed about it, and he could suggest how it be viewed in light of his other books.

Further, as long as he was able to write new books, he had the possibility of Great Expectations

being his pinnacle work, or of it being surpassed by future accomplishments. He projected value

and meaning upon his book and his work. However after his death, the novel is only valued and

given meaning by those who are still alive.

It is not only literary works or projects that meaning is projected upon, but we also

project meaning upon the deeds or the suffering of people in the past. For example, our portrayal

and view of the Holocaust gives meaning to the lives of the millions of Jews who were

murdered. The meaning of the actions of the Nazis is now also determined by us. If Himmler

were still alive he could denounce his earlier actions, apologize for his role in the Holocaust, and

work to change the meaning of his life before he was gone. However after his death this is no

longer an option and he is at the mercy of his accusers. Like Garcin, he is dead and done with;

he no longer has any chance of escape.

Just as we project meaning onto the lives of past persons, future generations will project

meaning onto us. Therefore while our actions in the present can affect them, their actions in the

future can affect us. The meaning of our lives, accomplishments, sufferings, and failures are all

in the hands of future persons. The fairly common view that future persons are distant Others to

which we have no immediate connection is a form of bad faith. It denies the element of our

facticity that the meaning of our lives and projects are in the hands of future persons. Similarly,

we fail to recognize that we are responsible for the meaning of the lives of past persons, and that

authenticity mandates we continue to give their projects and lives meaning.

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John O’Neill’s article “Future Generations: Present Harms” contends that approaches

which view future generations as estranged Others rely on the assumption that we can affect

future generations, but that they cannot affect us. O’Neill argues, on the contrary, that future

generations can indeed benefit or harm us, and we can benefit or harm persons of the past.

O’Neill asserts that we have lost a connection with the future that past generations understood.

People in the past engaged in scientific discovery, civil rights movements, or the development of

land with the intention of passing these things on to future generations, and for future generations

to appreciate, utilize, and continue these projects. We harm people in the past if we fail to

appreciate their accomplishments, utilize the rights they fought for, or further their discoveries.

In this same manner people in the future can do harm to us if they do not further our

accomplishments or give meaning to our projects. For this reason, it is important that we pass on

discoveries, practices, values and resources that will be meaningful and beneficial for future

persons.36 I suggest that O’Neill is advocating for the correct path when it comes to shaping our

attitude towards future generations. I also assert that the existential authenticity model can help

further develop his argument of how we should feel towards future persons, and why we should

care how they will feel about us.

Part IV: Authentic Relationships with Past and Future Persons

Rather than argue that bad faith with regards to future persons is inevitable, I argue that

we should engage in authentic relationships with them. This requires several steps. First, we

must rid ourselves of bad faith about the situation. This mandates recognition that our lives are

interconnected with those of both future and past persons. If we remain in bad faith, we put

selective emphasis on only our current situations while failing to acknowledge the reciprocal

relationship we have with past and future persons. This is illustrative of Detmer’s take on bad

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faith. For a person lies to herself if she emphasizes the present meaning of her projects but fails

to focus on the meaning her projects will have after she is gone. It is also bad faith to fail to

recognize that you are a meaning giver of the world, including the past and potentially the future.

She may focus on only giving meaning to the present, while failing to be concerned about giving

meaning to those in the past, or providing future generations with the resources necessary to give

meaning to their own lives and projects. She may tell herself that she can do no harm to

someone who is not aware of it, and therefore she should not care about anyone who is not alive

now. Authenticity requires an abandonment of such thinking, and an acknowledgment of how

the meaning of the projects of past, present, and future persons are interdependent on each other.

Sartre’s ethics of authenticity generally focuses on relationships with persons who are

alive. What needs further attention and development is an ethic between past, present, and future

persons. Many of the conflicts with others that Sartre describes in Being and Nothingness are not

applicable to people who are dead or who will exist in the future. The subject/object conflict that

often results from interaction with the Other does not arise in our engagement with past and

future persons. This means there are fewer possibilities for interaction, but also fewer stumbling

blocks to engaging in authentic relationships with them.

Recall that in the Notebooks, Sartre writes that all of our projects are present for others to

interpret and project meaning upon. Authentic relationships with the dead involve projecting

positive meaning onto their lives and their projects. This can be accomplished both by having

relationships with individuals and with groups. An example of an authentic relationship with an

individual past person would be engaging with an author like Dickens. If I share Great

Expectations with my family and friends, if I suggest they read it and point out how the themes

of the book are pertinent in our lives today, I am continuing Dickens’ projects and projecting

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positive meaning on them. Moreover, I am furthering the work that I feel Dickens would have

wanted the fruits of his labor to have. This would be an authentic relationship with Dickens

through assisting him with his projects.

However, if an English teacher assigns her students to read Great Expectations, then

insults the book and calls it depressing, irrelevant, and a complete failure, and suggests the

students never read another word that Dickens wrote; this is not helping him further his projects

or develop his intended goals as a writer. It is using Dickens as an object to promote the

teacher’s own self-interest. The teacher is in bad faith if she denies the fact that her actions and

words have effects on the meaning of Dickens’ projects now that he is gone. She is turning

Dickens into an object through her own desire to be self-grounding and refusing to recognize that

Dickens’ projects are now in her hands.

Authentic relationships with past persons can also take place on the level of groups. For

example, I can engage authentically with the women of the women’s suffrage movement by

exercising my right to vote, encouraging others to vote, helping people get registered to vote, or

driving people to the polls on Election Day. This is not maintaining a relationship with a specific

past person such as Dickens, rather continuing the projects and values of the group as a whole.

Failing to take advantage of rights that they fought hard for in order to make them available

would be a failure to engage in authentic relationships with the women of the suffrage

movement. Another example would be to engage in authentic relationships with sufferers of the

Holocaust by giving their suffering a meaning and a voice. For example, Elie Wiesel sought to

give meaning to the sufferers of the Holocaust by writing accounts that made the world aware of

their suffering.

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This does not mean that we should strive to have all of the projects of past individuals or

groups continued or project them with meaning. We certainly do not want to further the projects

or goals of a group such as the Nazis. Moreover, now that the Nazis are dead, a continuation of

their projects would be destructive to those they harmed. It would also be detrimental to those

who are still alive because it fosters an attitude of prejudice and hatred. If I hang a swastika

outside of my window, I am giving positive meaning to the Nazis that should not be given to

them, as they were inauthentic people who denied freedom and were responsible for so much

wrongdoing. Moreover, this would be giving a negative meaning to the suffering of Holocaust

victims. Attempting to engage in an authentic relationship with Nazis would be a form of bad

faith by omitting or failing to emphasize the harm such a relationship would have to past,

present, and future persons. Though authentic relationships with past people are not the same as

they are with present people, they certainly can exist. We can and should engage in authentic

relationships with persons of the past, provided that continuing their projects does not foster

inauthentic, damaging relationships with Others in the past, present, or future.

This description of how we can interact authentically with people of the past illuminates

how we can engage in authentic relationships with people in the future. Through an acceptance

of our relationship and interdependence with others, we realize that upon our death, the meaning

of our world will be in the hands of future generations. This should concern every authentic

person who desires both the furthering of her own projects and the projects of others. For

example, if I write a book on philosophy and wish it to be viewed favorably and have a positive

influence on others, I have to will that we produce persons capable of appreciating philosophy.

If I want the ideas that I write in the book to continue to be developed, to have meaning, and to

be passed on, I must will that future persons will be able and willing to further the development

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of philosophical work. If I see philosophical inquiry in general as a worthwhile human project, I

should will that there will be a future environment in which philosophical inquiry is continued.

This implies that we should strive for the education and well-being of future persons, which

includes access to food, shelter, healthcare, schooling, and positive life experiences.

We generally cannot engage in an authentic relationship with a specific future person

except, perhaps, with our direct descendants. My grandchild or great-grandchild might give my

life meaning in a way that I might have a directly authentic relationship with him or her after my

death. Further, I may be able to directly pass on certain values that will foster the development of

their goals. However it is an extremely small number of people alive today who will actually be

specifically remembered by a significant number of people. Typically, the meaning of our lives

that will be continued through future generations is the meaning of our projects, values, or

groups that we belonged to or supported. For example, if I support the charity and mission of

Amnesty International, my projects and values will be continued if the projects and values of this

group are continued, such as a further development of human rights. Many times it is the things

we believed morally or philosophically important that we wish to see passed on. If we want our

philosophical values to be extended beyond our death, we must rely on future generations to

continue to them. This concern should not be viewed as purely self-centered, but should stem

from a genuine, authentic desire for future persons to enjoy the fruits of our labor.

Authenticity also mandates we realize that not only will future humans assist us with our

projects, but we are required to assist them with theirs. In addition to assisting their development

through education and proper life care, it also requires leaving them an inhabitable planet in

which to interact. This mandates that clean air, water, plants, eco-systems, energy resources, and

a tolerable climate be available to them. It means that we must provide them with an

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environment that allows the development of their goals and possibilities. Additionally, a failure

to produce future generations who can appreciate the projects of past people is a failure to

continue the projects of those who are dead. In this manner refusing to be concerned with future

generations is to fail to engage in authentic relationships with both future and past persons. It is

also a failure to ourselves because we will have no further development of our lives and projects.

Through a recognition of our shared humanity with Others of both the past and the future,

authenticity enables, and further requires, an intergenerational adoption of other humans’

projects, and a desire to share the things we find valuable and meaningful with people to come.

Conclusion

I have shown that utilitarian and rights-based approaches to the future generations

problem are impersonal and structurally problematic. Further, I have demonstrated that Sartre’s

existential thought creates a framework through which we can build authentic relationships with

the living and the dead. Such an approach requires recognizing some things that make us uneasy

or uncomfortable. It requires an acceptance of responsibility for who we are and who we choose

to be. It requires that we acknowledge that we are both facticity and transcendence, and that we

cannot be solely one or the other. It also mandates an understanding of human beings as unique

beings because of our ability to make choices, and our capacity and obligation to project

meaning and value upon the world.

An ethics of authenticity cannot provide a moral formula or calculus through which we

can determine all of the actions we should take when we consider future persons. What it does

provide is a call of concern to recognize our humanity and our relationship to Others in the

world. It requires acceptance of our interconnectedness with our future and our past. It also

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mandates that we accept responsibility for our choices and our actions that we take towards

Others and to the world around us. We cannot shift the blame, or say that we are forced to

contribute to the detriment of our environment, without recognizing that there still exists some

element of choice. Additionally, accepting that we share responsibility should inspire us to

demand collective action from our leaders who are in a position to change the effects of our

society as a whole. If we rise out of bad faith and take an authentic perspective towards future

human beings, the actions we must take to engage in authentic relationships with them will

become clear. Rather than try to utilize a utilitarian calculus or struggle to attribute rights to non-

existent persons, a general care and concern for authentic relationships with future people will

provide the proper framework for fostering their well-being.

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1 Jan Narveson,"Future People and Us," in R. Sikora and B. Barry, eds., Obligations to Future Generations. (Philadelphia: Templeton University Press, 1978), pp. 38-60. 2 Jonathan Bennett, “On Maximizing Happiness,” in Sikora/Barry, Obligations, pp. 61-73. 3 Robert Scott, “Environmental Obligations to Future Generations” In Sikora/Barry, Obligations, pp. 74-90. 4 L.W. Sumner, “Classical Utilitarianism and the Population Optimum.” In Sikora/Barry, Obligations, pp. 91-111. 5 R. Sikora, “Is it Wrong to Prevent the Existence of Future Generations?” In Sikora/Barry, Obligations, pp. 112-166. 6 Mary Anne Warren, "Future Generations," in Tom Regan and Donald VanDeVeer, eds., And Justice for All: New Introductory Essays in Ethics and Public Policy (N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), pp. 139-168. 7 J.R. DesJardins, Environmental Ethics, (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing, 2003), p. 77. 8 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2000) pp. 31-34. 9 M.P. Golding, "Obligations to Future Generations," The Monist 56 (1972): 85-99.10 William J. Fitzpatrick "Climate Change and the Rights of Future Generations: Social Justice Beyond Mutual Advantage," Environmental Ethics 29 (2007): 369-388.11 Robin Attfield, "Beyond the Earth Charter: Taking Possible People Seriously," Environmental Ethics 29 (2007): 359.12 The Earth Charter Initiative, “Values and Principles to Foster a Sustainable Future,” Accessed June 30, 2014, http://www.earthcharterinaction.org/content/pages/Read-the-Charter.html. 13 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: an Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel Barnes, (New York: Washington Square Press, 1953). 14 Ibid., pp. 56-60. 15 Ibid., p. 60. 16 Joakim Sandberg, "My Emissions Make No Difference," Environmental Ethics 33 (2011): 229-248.17 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 127-133. 18 Ibid., pp. 102-103. 19 David Detmer. Sartre Explained: From Bad Faith to Authenticity (Chicago: Open Court Press, 2008). 20 Ibid.,pp. 76-77. 21 Ibid., p. 77. 22 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 76. 23 Ibid., p. 77.24 Jean-Paul Sartre, Notebooks for an Ethics, trans. D. Pellauer, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 25 Ibid., p. 105.26 Ibid., p. 479. Also Being and Nothingness, p. 798.27 Sartre, Notebooks, pp. 126-129, 141, 280-282. 28 Thomas Anderson, Sartre’s Two Ethics: From Authenticity to Integral Humanity, (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1993), p. 66.29 Sartre, Notebooks, p. 507.30 Ibid., p. 28031 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 709. 32Ibid., 169. 33 Ibid., 695.34 Jean-Paul Sartre, No Exit and Three Other Plays. trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: New Directions, 1989), p. 40. 35 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 155. 36 John O’Neill, “Future generations: Present harms,” Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, 68 (1993): 35-51.