Ukraine Aff – HKMM Lab – Wave 1

Notes

Thank you to Aida Ruan, Alex Huang, Christopher Cheek, Alex Swanson, Claire Park, Emilyn Hazelbrook, Emma Gavriliuc, John Ji, Karthik Satish, Mohul Aggarwal, Nikko Haroldson and Sam Kahan-Harth for their exceptional work in this file!

There is a ton of overlap between the Russia War Advantage and the answers to the Russia Appeasement/Expansionism DA. There is some overlap between this and the AT: Deterrence CPs section as well.

1AC

Advantages

Russia War AdvU.S. arms sales to Ukraine will increase now—procurement reform proves that new arms sales are coming now.Ponomeranko 02/07 [Illia; He covers national security issues, as well as military technologies, production, and defense reforms in Ukraine. Besides, he gets deployed to the war zone of Donbas with Ukrainian combat formations. He has also reported from the Middle East, namely from the Palestinian Autonomy, the Golan Heights, and Jerusalem. He graduated from the Mariupol State University in 2015, with a specialist degree in International Relations and Foreign Policy. He made his first steps in war journalism by writing short feature-stories for a local newspaper in his hometown of Volnovakha while being embedded with Ukrainian Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) groups. After moving to Kyiv in spring of 2016, he continued with his career in war journalism. Before joining Kyiv Post, Illia worked as a news editor at Ukraine Today, another English-language media outlet based in Kyiv. Feel free to shoot him a message on Facebook and follow him on Twitter, or just send him emails; 02/07/2019; “New opportunities for Ukrainian military as arms import rules liberalized”; https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/new-opportunities-for-ukrainian-military-as-arms-import-rules-liberalized.html; Kyiv Post; accessed: 07/01/2019; MohulA]

Now in its fifth year of war against Russian-backed militants, the Ukrainian military has gained long-awaited approval to purchase and import new gear and weapons for its soldiers, free from the oversight of third-party

state mediators. A new bill signed into law by President Petro Poroshenko on Jan. 31 removed the exclusive rights of UkrOboronProm – a state-run defense production monopoly – to control and regulate all foreign arms deals in the country and skim the cream off of the top of such deals. The new legislation has resurrected hopes for deals to be struck with the United States on an array of modern, high-tech weaponry that Ukraine says it needs to defend itself. The document finally recognized 14 Ukrainian public defense customers, particularly the Defense Ministry and the General Staff of the Armed Forces , as import/export entities entitled to procure weapons, equipment and services from abroad for their needs. Some lawmakers

say that the new legislation will optimize and accelerate the purchase of advanced military hardware from foreign partners, giving the Ukrainian armed forces a much-needed boost amid ongoing war and stumbling defense reforms. Many say that removing UkrOboronProm from the equation as a broker will also save money. But it took Ukraine’s lawmakers years to finally approve

this simple liberalization of the arms procurement process, natural and usual for Western militaries. In many ways, the new law has only seen the light of day thanks to pressure from the United States, who has reportedly been keen to strengthen ties . A young Ukrainian soldier and a woman hug each other after the Independence Day parade rehearsal in central Kyiv on

Aug. 20. (Volodymyr Petrov) Potential concerns The new law also allows the military to procure from abroad with classified contracts, but only if the items in the deal cannot be procured in Ukraine. In such cases, the Ministry of Defense or the Armed Forces can even strike deals with a single seller, without going through a competitive tender — but only “based on substantiated and document-confirmed results of marketing studies of defense equipment and services market.” Even so, the prospect of

private, shady deals has raised some concerns, with many worrying about how the nation’s defense budget will be spent. If a foreign sale exceeds 5 million euros in total value, the legislation can also now demand extra offset obligations and conditions on a foreign entity exporting its military-purpose goods to Ukraine. Such conditions are ambiguous, however, with the law allowing different offset obligations to be imposed. The law was filed to the Verkhovna Rada back in January 2018, but its roots can be traced for years prior to that. As far back as 2016, the RAND Corporation – an influential, U.S.-based global policy think-tank – acknowledged in its comprehensive report, “Security Sector Reform in Ukraine”, that among numerous problems impeding far greater Western arms exports to Kyiv was UkrOboronProm’s “sole ability to import defense items for the use by the Ukrainian military.” Until this week, there was a strong feeling in the U.S. that UkrObornProm was not an ideal to stakeholder to deal with, with Washington usually preferring to strike deals on a government to government basis. “In (the) case of the United States…foreign military sales can only be concluded with a procurement authority under the (Ministry of Defense) of the receiving country, not a state-owned enterprise,” the RAND report also noted. “While direct commercial

sales of military items from U.S. defense companies are possible, U.S. firms in the short term would likely only consider selling weapons or military equipment to Ukraine through foreign military sales given the significant political and economic risks, as well as concerns about fulfilling strict U.S. regulations about the transfer of high-tech equipment abroad. Hence, under current circumstances, most transfers of U.S. equipment and weapons are limited to assistance, rather than sales.” A Ukrainian soldier gets on top of a infantry fighting vehicle during drills at the Honcharivskiy firing range on July 1, 2016. (Ministry of Defense of Ukraine ) Moreover, the RAND report added that UkrOboronProm, in this regard, was marked with a conflict of interest, since it was not interested in importing items that could be produced by its own subsidiaries. “UkrOboronProm has a reputation for excessively marking up import costs by 5–20 percent or more,” the think tank wrote. However, as one source close to Ukraine’s defense sector said, requesting not to be named as he’s not authorized to speak with the press, UkrOboronProm’s subsidiary that’s engaged in licensing foreign sales, the UkrSpetsEksport company, would sometimes commission up to 40 percent of a deal price for its mediation. “By making it more difficult to import items, UkrOboronProm may hope to develop Ukraine’s own defense industry. While this may be understandable, if not strategically optimal, prioritization during peacetime, during wartime it prevents Ukraine from acquiring needed equipment,” the Rand report notes. In this regard, RAND recommended the Ukrainian government to eliminate “UkrOboronProm’s exclusive control of imported defense items and giving the (Defense Ministry’s) explicit, streamlined authority to conduct foreign procurement in an expedited process for all items that are immediately needed (including armaments), within a specified budget.” Such a measure would enable the military to buy critical military equipment and weapons it needed from abroad, such as secure radios and equipment for improved reconnaissance, without delays or “surcharges” to UkrOboronProm, RAND report authors also noted. Ukrainian soldiers ride on a armoured personnel carrier (APC) in the town of Maryinka, Donetsk region, located on the front line with Russian-backed separatists on Jan. 18, 2019. (AFP) Decision overdue But, as years went by amid grueling war in the Donbas and defense reforms slowly taking place in Kyiv, UkrOboronProm, led by its late head and president Poroshenko’s former business partner Roman Romanov, showed no signs of its intention to drop its control over arms imports. The situation somewhat changed when the United States upped the pressure on Kyiv, urging the Rada to push this Soviet enterprise aside and to let them talk directly to the military regarding defense aid and imports. As sources in the defense production industry told Kyiv Post, even though

Ukraine is definitely not a major arms customer to the U.S., American officials are interested in having closer ties with Ukraine’s military, seeing it as an effective deterrent to Russian expansionism, and also aiming to prevent China, its global competitor, from further penetration of Ukraine’s defense market. Moreover, the American stance was the biggest premise for reform advocates in Ukraine’s official circles, according to sources. But even when registered in early 2018, the draft law No. 9122 on amendments in foreign defense procurement seemed to go through all nine circles of hell throughout the following 12 months. On at least three occasions, the bill failed to even be placed on the agenda in parliament due to frantic resistance by lawmakers lobbying for UkrOborobProm’s interests. In late December 2018, the Rada’s security and defense committee even received a letter signed by Pamela Tremont, the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy to Ukraine, urging the Rada to finally come to a decision so that Ukraine in 2019 could join the U.S. Department of Defense’s Foreign Military Sales program and receive American military items without any problems. Washington, which has spent over $1 billion on military aid to Ukraine, including lethal weaponry, since the outbreak of Russia’s war in 2014, also planned to allocate an extra $250 million in 2019 for Kyiv, including $125 million on weapons. “The United States is making themselves absolutely clear that if we’re not passing this law, they won’t be able to render the military aid to us to the full extent,” said the committee’s chairman Serhiy Pashinskiy on Dec. 19 regarding the embassy’s message. The letter obviously overcame the last remnants of resistance in Ukraine’s Rada – throughout the next month or so, up until Jan. 17, the law sustained two readings and later entered force. Ukrainian paratroopers board IL-76 plane in Ozerne air base, prior to their dispatch to the east of the country, Zhytomyr region in northern Ukraine, on December 6, 2018. (Photo by SERGEI SUPINSKY / AFP) New opportunities? Meanwhile, after years of delays and deferrals that seemed to only benefit UkrOboronProm, Ukrainian officials are now praising the new regulation as a widening window of opportunities for strengthening the defense. As Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, Ukraine’s vice prime minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, asserted on Feb. 1, Ukraine is now interested in launching “a large-scale acquisition of advanced defense hardware from the United States,” including an additional quantity of JGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missiles, which had been provided to Ukraine for free in the spring 2018. Moreover, Klympush-Tsintsadze

added, Ukraine now also hopes to become an active recipient of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF ) program and therefore receive even more defense aid from Washington.

The new law now also opens up hopes for resurrecting negotiations on Ukraine’s procurement of U.S.-produced Patriot air defense systems , long wanted to protect the country’s now barely-defended skies from Russian air superiority. As Ukrainian ambassador to Washington Valeriy Chaliy asserted in August 2018, Kyiv had reportedly requested to purchase at least three Patriot units to the total sum of over $2 billion . Later, however, the American side showed no explicit enthusiasm regarding the deal. Viktor Plakhuta, the chief executive officer with the Ukrainian Freedom Fund and one of the authors of the new procurement law, remains somewhat less optimistic about the long-awaited victory in crippling UkrOboronProm’s excessive control of foreign arms sales. “That was clearly a positive step,” he told the Kyiv Post. “But this is only the beginning of a far greater process. The Ministry of Defense and all other state customers now need specialists with a deep understanding of global arms markets and experience in international deal-making. It will surely take a certain time.” “After all, only time will tell whether our government will be successful in taking advantage of becoming a more reliable customer and therefore getting advanced weapons from abroad.” “So far, statements remain statements,” he concluded.

But they won’t solve the conflict - increasing sales ensures Russian retaliation, undermines U.S. strategic interests and ensures nuclear war Saradzhyan ’15 David, Director, Russia Matters Project; Assistant Director, U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. February, Harvard University, “Weapons won’t End the Conflict,” https://perspectives.carnegie.org/us-russia/arming-ukraine-risky-escalation/

The last several days have seen the once dormant debate—whether or not the U.S. should start supplying weapons to Ukraine—reignite. The debate was revived by the release of a joint report by a group of ex-U.S. officials affiliated with three prominent American think tanks, which recommended that Washington urgently supply anti-tank missiles, counter-battery radars, and other military hardware to the Ukrainian armed forces so that the latter can deter Russia from escalating the conflict in Donbass.

I don’t dispute that the Ukrainian army would become stronger if the U.S. delivers the recommended weapons. But the truth is these weapons would not end the conflict . Moreover, these deliveries may actually prompt Russia to increase its involvement in the conflict, dragging the U.S. into a vicious cycle of escalating commitments . Chances that the U.S. would prevail in such an escalation are quite low. Whatever U.S. authorities would be realistically willing to do to help Ukraine militarily can be matched, if not exceeded, by Russia , which is much more interested in the outcome of the current stand-off and has resources on the ground. In addition to escalating in Ukraine, Russia could also respond to the U.S. arming of Ukraine by adopting a more aggressive posture vis-à-vis the U.S. in the realm of strategic nuclear deterrence, as well as acting as a spoiler to undermine U.S. vital interests in such spheres as countering proliferation of nuclear weapons and managing China’s rise . Even some of Putin’s critics in

Western Europe admit that the consequences of arming Ukraine will not be limited to the conflict there . “It

could lead to a nuclear war,” Polish statesman Lech Walesa said last year when asked whether the Europeans should send weapons to Ukrainians.

The report now argues that a better-armed Ukrainian army would be able to inflict greater casualties on Russian “volunteers” in Ukraine and that, therefore, prospects of such casualties should help to deter Russia. Not really. Yes, Vladimir Putin will remain sensitive to casualties among active-duty Russian personnel in the conflict, but only as long as he maintains that Russia is not a party to the conflict. The delivery of U.S. arms could eventually give Putin a pretext to send troops to Ukraine openly in order to accomplish what the Kremlin would describe as a just cause of protecting ethnic Russian compatriots from the Ukrainian army that the Russian president has already described as a “NATO legion.”

Once (and if) the Russian army gets officially involved in the conflict, the Russian population might actually become more tolerant toward casualties , and so will Putin . The experience of the second Chechen war

shows that while the Russian public’s tolerance for casualties is not limitless, it can be quite high as long the Russians believe their army is fighting to defend the country’s interests and stands a fair chance of prevailing in the conflict . That the Russian army will be able to win the military phase of the conflict in Ukraine with relative ease is clear from Ukrainian commanders’ own confessions that they took a beating when Russian regular forces allegedly joined the fighting last summer. Ukraine will be destroyed militarily if the West supplies weapons to Kiev , according to an article penned by a member of Russia’s Security Council’s Advisory Board for the next issue of the Russia in Global Affairs journal. The secretary of that council, Nikolai Patrushev, warned on February 10 that supplies of U.S. arms to Ukraine would make the United States a “direct participant” in the conflict and lead to “further escalation” even though he insisted Russia would respond to such supplies through “diplomatic methods” only.

Arms sales ensure a conflict spiral – deterrence can’t work and only ensures escalationWalt 2015 – [Stephen M. Walt – is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University., Foreign Policy, 2/9/2015, “Why Arming Kiev Is a Really, Really Bad Idea” https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/09/how-not-to-save-ukraine-arming-kiev-is-a-bad-idea/] KS

Should the United States start arming Ukraine, so it can better resist and maybe even defeat the Russian-backed rebels in its eastern provinces? A lot of seasoned American diplomats and foreign policy experts seem to think so; a task force assembled by the Brookings Institution, the Atlantic Council, and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs wants the United States to send Ukraine $1 billion in military assistance as soon as possible, with more to come. The Obama administration is rethinking its earlier reluctance, and secretary of defense nominee Ash Carter told a Senate hearing he was “very much inclined” to favor this course as well. Unless cooler heads prevail, therefore, the United States seems to be moving toward raising the stakes in Ukraine. This decision is somewhat surprising, however, because few experts think this bankrupt and

divided country is a vital strategic interest and no one is talking about sending U.S. troops to fight on Kiev’s behalf. So the question is: does sending Ukraine a bunch of advanced weaponry make sense? The answer is no. One reason to be skeptical of the report from the three think tanks is the track record of its like-minded members. The task force wasn’t made up of a diverse set of experts seeking to explore a wide range of options and find some creative common ground. On the contrary, its members were all people who have long backed NATO expansion and have an obvious desire to defend that policy, which has played a central role in creating the present crisis. After all, these are the same people who have been telling us since the late 1990s that expanding NATO eastwards posed no threat to Russia and would instead create a vast and enduring zone of peace in Europe. That prediction is now in tatters, alas, but these experts are now doubling down to defend a policy that was questionable from the beginning and clearly taken much too far. As the critics warned it would,

open-ended NATO expansion has done more to poison relations with Russia than any other single Western policy. Those who favor arming Ukraine are also applying “deterrence model” remedies to what is almost certainly a “spiral model” situation. In his classic book Perception and Misperception in International Politics, political scientist Robert Jervis pointed out that states may undertake what appear to be threatening actions for two very different reasons. Sometimes states act aggressively because their leaders are greedy, seeking some sort of personal glory, or ideologically driven to expand, and are not reacting to perceived threats from others. The classic example, of course, is Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany, and in such cases accommodation won’t work. Here the “deterrence model” applies: the only thing to do is issue warnings and credible threats so that the potential aggressor is deterred from

pursuing its irrevocably revisionist aims. By contrast, the “spiral model” applies when a state’s seemingly aggressive policy is motivated primarily by fear or insecurity. Making threats and trying to deter or coerce them will only reinforce their

fears and make them even more aggressive, in effect triggering an action-reaction spiral of growing hostility. When insecurity is the taproot of a state’s revisionist actions, making threats just makes the situation worse. When the “spiral model” applies, the proper response is a diplomatic process of accommodation and appeasement (yes, appeasement) to allay the insecure state’s concerns. Such efforts do not require giving an opponent everything it might want or removing every one of its worries, but it does require a serious effort to address the insecurities that are motivating the other side’s objectionable behavior. The problem, of course, is that responses that work well in one situation tend to fail

badly in the other. Applying the deterrence model to an insecure adversary will heighten its paranoia and fuel its defensive reactions, while appeasing an incorrigible aggressor is likely to whet its appetite and make it harder to deter it in

the future. Those who now favor arming Ukraine clearly believe the “deterrence model” is the right way to think about this problem. In this view, Vladimir Putin is a relentless aggressor who is trying to recreate something akin to the old Soviet empire, and thus not confronting him over Ukraine will lead him to take aggressive actions elsewhere. The only thing to do, therefore, is increase the costs until Russia backs down and leaves Ukraine free to pursue its own foreign policy. This is precisely the course of action the report from the three think tanks recommends: in addition to “bolstering deterrence,” its authors believe arming Ukraine will help “produce conditions in which Moscow decides to negotiate a genuine settlement that allows Ukraine to reestablish full sovereignty.” In addition to

bolstering deterrence, in short, giving arms to Kiev is intended to coerce Moscow into doing what we want. Yet the evidence in this case suggests the spiral model is far more applicable. Russia is not an ambitious rising power like Nazi Germany or contemporary China ; it is an aging, depopulating, and declining great power trying to cling to whatever international influence it still possesses and preserve a modest sphere of influence near its borders, so that stronger states — and especially the United States — cannot take advantage of its growing vulnerabilities. Putin & Co. are also genuinely worried about America’s efforts to promote “regime change ” around the world — including Ukraine — a policy that could eventually threaten their own positions. It is lingering fear, rather than relentless ambition, that underpins Russia’s response in Ukraine. Moreover, the Ukraine crisis did not begin with a bold Russian move or even a series of illegitimate Russian demands; it began when the United States and European Union tried to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and into the

West’s sphere of influence. That objective may be desirable in the abstract, but Moscow made it abundantly clear it would fight this

process tooth and nail. U.S. leaders blithely ignored these warnings — which clearly stemmed from Russian insecurity rather than territorial greed — and not surprisingly they have been blindsided by Moscow’s reaction. The failure of U.S. diplomats to anticipate Putin’s heavy-handed response was an act of remarkable diplomatic incompetence, and one can only wonder why the individuals who helped produce this train wreck still have their jobs. If we are in a “spiral model” situation, arming Ukraine will only make things worse. It certainly will not enable Ukraine to defeat the far stronger Russian army; it will simply intensify the conflict and add to the suffering of the Ukrainian people. Nor is arming Ukraine likely to convince Putin to cave in and give Washington what it wants. Ukraine is historically linked to Russia, they are right next door to each other, Russian intelligence has long-standing links inside

Ukraine’s own security institutions, and Russia is far stronger militarily. Even massive arms shipments from the United States won’t tip the balance in Kiev’s favor, and Moscow can always escalate if the fighting turns against the rebels, as it did last summer. Most importantly, Ukraine’s fate is much more important to Moscow than it is to us, which means that Putin and Russia will be willing to pay a bigger price to achieve their aims than we will. The balance of resolve as well as the local balance of power strongly favors Moscow in this conflict. Before starting down an escalatory path, therefore, Americans should ask themselves just how far they are willing to go. If Moscow has more options, is willing to endure more pain, and run more risks than we are, then it makes no sense to begin a competition in resolve we are unlikely to win. And no, that doesn’t show the West is irresolute, craven, or spineless; it simply means Ukraine is a vital strategic interest for Russia but not for us. Efforts to resolve this crisis are also handicapped by the U.S. tendency to indulge in “take-it-or-leave it” diplomacy. Instead of engaging in genuine bargaining, American officials tend to tell others what to do and then ramp up the pressure

if they do not comply. Today, those who want to arm Ukraine are demanding that Russia cease all of its activities in Ukraine, withdraw from Crimea, and let Ukraine join the EU and/or NATO if it wants and if it meets the membership requirements. In other words, they expect Moscow to abandon its own interests in Ukraine, full stop. It would be wonderful if Western diplomacy could pull off this miracle, but how likely is it? Given Russia’s history, its proximity to Ukraine, and its long-term security concerns, it is hard to imagine Putin capitulating to our demands without a long and costly struggle that will do enormous additional

damage to Ukraine. And let’s not forget the broader costs of this feckless policy. We are pushing Russia closer to China, which is not in the long-term U.S. interest. We have brought cooperation on nuclear security with Russia to an end, even though there are still large quantities of inadequately secured nuclear material on Russian soil. And we are surely prolonging the suffering of the Ukrainian people. The solution to this crisis is for the United States and its allies to abandon the dangerous and unnecessary goal of endless NATO expansion and do whatever it takes to convince Russia that we want Ukraine to be a neutral buffer state in perpetuity. We should then work with Russia, the EU, and the IMF to develop an economic program that puts that

unfortunate country back on its feet. Arming Ukraine, on the other hand, is a recipe for a longer and more destructive conflict . It’s easy to prescribe such actions when you’re safely located in a Washington think tank, but destroying Ukraine in order to save it is hardly smart or morally correct diplomacy.

And selling weapons while Trump tries to butter up Putin creates discrepancies with Russia over foreign policy – causes miscalculation and warHeer 17 [Jeet; contributing editor at the The New Republic; 12/23/2017; “The Dangerous Incoherence of Trump’s Russia Policy”; https://newrepublic.com/article/146397/dangerous-incoherence-trumps-russia-policy; New Republic; accessed: 06/26/2019; MohulA]

In 2014, the Republican Congress passed the loftily named Ukrainian Freedom Support Act, which permitted the sale of lethal weapons to Ukraine. President Barack Obama signed the bill into law, but as The Washington Post reported, he

“never authorized large commercial or government sales, a move widely seen as a de facto decision not to provide lethal

weapons to the Ukraine military.” That policy has now changed, as President Donald Trump has approved a large commercial sale of weapons to the former Soviet state, where the fight against Russia-backed militants in the east has intensified lately. “The move was heavily supported by top Trump national security Cabinet officials and Congress,” the Post reported,

“but may complicate President Trump’s stated ambition to work with Russian President Vladimir Putin.” A senior

congressional official told the paper, “We have crossed the Rubicon, this is lethal weapons and I predict more will be coming.” Some conservatives are arguing that the arms sale proves that Trump didn’t collude with the Russian government to interfere in last year’s

presidential election. “NO PUPPET” ran an exultant Twitchy headline. In reality, the decision on arming Ukraine illustrates

something different: The United States has two wildly divergent foreign policies toward Russia. Trump is pursuing a policy of conciliation, while the national security establishment, including Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, have pursued a policy of aggressive containment. Trump sees Russia as a potential ally, while many in his cabinet and in Congress consider Russia a

rival that is actively threatening American democracy. This contradictory policy could send mixed signals, leading to war. On

Monday, the Trump administration released its national security strategy, which portrayed Russia and China as rival superpowers. The document made the argument shared by centrist Democrats and Republicans, that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s government tried to subvert American democracy: A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work

together to defend our way of life. And yet, in a speech introducing this document, Trump veered off of his prepared remarks and spoke about the need to “build a great partnership” with Russia and China . Trump also described a friendly conversation he had with Putin, who thanked the United States for recently helping to thwart a planned terrorist attack against Russia by the Islamic State. “That’s a great thing, and the way it’s supposed to work,” Trump said. As Thomas Wright, director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, told Politico, there was a “surreal” disjunction between the explicit strategy and the president’s gloss. “The National Security Strategy and the president’s speech to launch it were worlds apart,” Wright observed. “The strategy described the Russian and Chinese challenge in great detail, but Trump barely mentioned them. Instead he made an impassioned plea for partnership with Putin, demanded allies directly reimburse the United States for protection provided, and blamed the country’s ills on immigrants and trade deals.” A White House spokesman acknowledged that he couldn’t say if Trump had read the National Security Strategy.

Must-reads. 5 days a week. Sign Up The divide between Trump and his own administration grows out of Trump’s failure to staff his administration with ideological loyalists. The figures who might have pursued Trump’s America First foreign policy—Michael Flynn, Steve Bannon, Sebastian Gorka—were all pushed out of the White House,

leaving administrative power in the hands of more conventional Republicans. But Trump seems to be wedded to

parts of his original foreign policy agenda, including the push for a partnership with Russia. The divergence between Trump and his national security staff could lead both sides to become even more extreme. To balance Trump’s conciliatory words

toward Putin, Mattis and Tillerson might feel the need to take more hardline positions, if only to reassure America’s European allies. And Trump, to counter this, might praise Putin even more effusively. Because many Democrats are so

invested in the Russia collusion narrative, they haven’t really taken note of Trump’s two-faced foreign policy. Former

Hillary Clinton adviser Zac Petkanas, for instance, has welcomed the new aggressiveness towards Ukraine: The wisdom of selling lethal weapons to Ukraine can be disputed. But having two foreign policies toward Russia is inherently destabilizing. One risk

is that Putin, faced with this confusion, bets that Trump’s conciliatory approach is dominant. Putin is an adventurist, as seen in the Russian invasion of Crimea. Given Trump’s campaign grousing about protecting “countries that most of the people in this room have never even heard of and we end up in world war three,”

Putin may feel he can continue to bully Ukraine to leave the western alliance—perhaps, as in Crimea, using covert

aid to local insurgents. Such a move would be reckless, but Putin is inclined to take advantage of any opening he

sees. And yet, if Putin did so in Ukraine, he’d likely discover that Trump is all talk and that U.S. policy is guided by the more hawkish national security establishment. Another tinderbox is Syria, where again, Putin’s adventurism clashes with American military strategy . As CNN reported on Thursday, “The Pentagon has accused Russia of intentionally violating an agreement intended to prevent accidents in the skies over Syria, following a recent unsafe encounter between US F-22s and Russian Su-25 jets.” This near-miss between fighter jets is only one of a series of incidents showing Russia’s disregard for its air-sharing “deconfliction” agreement with the United States in Syria. “Amid these multiple alleged Russian crossings of the

deconfliction boundary,” CNN continued, “the U.S. military has expressed concern it might have to shoot down a Russian aircraft over Syria if the Russian plane is seen as a threat to U.S. or coalition forces fighting ISIS.” This

tension over airspace takes place as the Trump administration, in a national security strategy document, officially

declares Russia as a rival, and Trump continues to assuage Putin. If a crisis erupts, there’s no clarity as to which of these two policies

will govern. But it’s clear that such uncertainty will only make the crisis worse.

Nuclear war – we’re on the brink nowBurns 19 [Robert Burns, National Security Writer at The Associated Press, 4-14-2019, "The chill in US-Russia relations has some worried about stumbling into a military conflict," Military Times, https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2019/04/14/the-chill-in-us-russia-relations-has-some-worried-about-stumbling-into-a-military-conflict/ - CC]

WASHINGTON — It has the makings of a new Cold War, or worse. The deep chill in U.S.-Russian relations is stirring concern in some quarters that Washington and Moscow are in danger of stumbling into an armed confrontation that, by mistake or miscalculation, could lead to nuclear war. American and European analysts and current and

former U.S. military officers say the nuclear superpowers need to talk more. A foundational arms control agreement is being abandoned and the last major limitation on strategic nuclear weapons could go away in less than two years. Unlike during the Cold War, when generations lived under threat of a nuclear Armageddon, the two militaries are barely on speaking terms. "During the Cold War, we understood each other's signals. We talked," says the top NATO commander in Europe, U.S. Army Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, who is about to retire. "I'm concerned that we don't know them as well today." Scaparrotti, in his role as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, has met only twice with Gen. Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the Russian general staff, but has spoken to him by phone a number of other times. "I personally think communication is a very important part of deterrence," Scaparrotti said, referring to the idea that adversaries who know each other's capabilities and intentions are less likely to fall into conflict. "So, I think we should have more communication with Russia. It would ensure that

we understand each other and why we are doing what we're doing." He added: "It doesn't have to be a lot." The United States and Russia, which together control more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons , say that in August they will leave the 1987 treaty that banned an entire class of nuclear weapons. And there appears to be little prospect of

extending the 2010 New Start treaty that limits each side's strategic nuclear weapons. After a period of post-Cold War cooperation on nuclear security and other defense issues, the relationship between Washington and Moscow took a nosedive, particularly after Russian forces entered the former Soviet republic of Georgia in 2008. Tensions spiked with Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in 2014 and its military intervention in eastern Ukraine . In response, Congress in 2016 severely limited military cooperation with Russia. The law prohibits "military-to-military cooperation" until the secretary of defense certifies that Russia "has ceased its occupation of Ukrainian territory" and "aggressive activities." The law was amended last year to state that it does not limit military talks aimed at "reducing the risk of conflict." Relations frayed even further amid U.S. allegations that Russia interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, although President Donald Trump has doubted Russian complicity in what U.S. intelligence agencies assert was an effort by Moscow to boost Trump’s chances of winning the White House. After a Helsinki summit with Putin in July, Trump publicly accepted the Kremlin leader’s denial of interference. Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in an interview Friday that Russian behavior is to blame for the strained relationship. "It's very difficult for us to have normal relationships with a country that has not behaved normally over the last few years," Dunford said. "There are major issues that affect our bilateral relationship that have to be addressed, to include where Russia has violated international laws, norms and standards." Dunford said he speaks regularly with Gerasimov, his Russian counterpart, and the two sides talk on other levels. "I'm satisfied right now with our military-to-military communication to maintain a degree of transparency that mitigates the risk of miscalculation," he said. "I think we have a framework within to manage a crisis, should one occur, at the senior military-to-military level." James Stavridis, a retired Navy admiral who was the top NATO commander in Europe from 2009 to 2013, says the West must confront Russia where necessary,

including on its interventions in Ukraine and Syria. But he believes there room for cooperation on multiple fronts, including the Arctic and arms control. "We are in danger of stumbling backward into a Cold War that is to no one's advantage, " he said in an email exchange. "Without steady, political-level engagement between the defense establishments, the risk of a true new Cold War rises steadily." No one is predicting a

deliberate Russian act of war in Europe, but the decline in regular talks is a worry to many. Moscow says it is ready to talk. " Russia remains open for interaction aimed at de-escalating tension, restoring mutual trust, preventing any misinterpretations of one another's intentions, and reducing the risk of dangerous incidents," the Russian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement last week in response to NATO's 70th anniversary celebration. Sam Nunn, who served in the Senate as a Democrat from Georgia from 1972 to 1997, argues that dialogue with Russia is too important to set aside, even if it carries domestic political risk. "You can't call time out," he said in an interview. "The nuclear issues go on, and they're getting more dangerous." Nunn co-wrote an opinion piece with former Secretary of State George Shultz and former Defense Secretary William Perry arguing that the U.S. and its allies and Russia are caught in a "policy paralysis" that could lead to a military confrontation and potentially the first use of nuclear weapons since the

U.S. bombed Japan in August 1945. "A bold policy shift is needed," they wrote in the Wall Street Journal on Thursday, "to support a strategic re-engagement with Russia and walk back from this perilous precipice. Otherwise, our nations may soon be entrenched in a nuclear standoff more precarious, disorienting and economically costly than the Cold War." A group of U.S., Canadian, European and Russian security experts and former officials in

February issued a call for talks with Russia on crisis management. "The risks of mutual misunderstanding and unintended signals that stem from an absence of dialogue relating to crisis management ... are real," the Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group said in a statement. It said this could lead to conventional war with Russia or, in a worst case scenario, “ the potential for nuclear threats, or even nuclear use, where millions could be killed in minutes.”

Ratcheting up military sales to Ukraine also causes Russian retaliation via escalation in the Baltics, Syria or AfghanistanBowen, 18

Andrew S. Bowen, PhD candidate in political science at Boston College and an associate at the Initiative for the Study of Emerging Threats (ISET) at New York University., 2-2-2018, "Analysis," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/02/the-u-s-will-send-antitank-weaponry-to-ukraine-here-are-4-big-questions/ #CCCool

The Trump administration last week announced updated sanctions on Russian individuals and companies, a reminder that the conflict in

eastern Ukraine remains unresolved. In late December, the administration decided to begin supplying antitank missiles to Ukraine, a reversal of an Obama-era decision not to provide lethal weapons to this conflict . Since 2015, the conflict in eastern Ukraine has continued to simmer, with no apparent political solution on the horizon. The seizure of territory has largely ended, leaving both sides vexed at their failure to achieve their objectives. The U.S. decision in late 2017 to provide the Ukrainian government advanced Javelin antitank missiles — a move applauded by a number of former policymakers and think tanks — opens up a few big questions: 1) What’s the backstory on the lethal weaponry decision? Tanks initially weren’t in play in 2014 when Russia annexed the strategically important Crimean Peninsula after popular protests drove Ukraine’s pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych from power. Speed was the decisive factor, and Russia was able to take over Crimea before Ukraine could muster any defense. Shortly thereafter, Russia used covert action — an attractive option with lower political and economic costs, along with a limited risk of escalation to outright war — to instigate and foster a rebellion in the eastern parts of Ukraine. Moscow used proxy actors and limited injections of its own troops, . When Russia’s covert foray escalated into a conventional conflict, defined by tanks and artillery support, many in the United States urged that Ukraine be supplied with Javelin missiles, which are designed to defeat tanks. Bumping up Ukraine’s defensive capabilities to counter the supply of

Russian tanks would even the playing field, the argument held. The Obama administration decided not to supply Javelins to Ukraine, due to concerns over escalation and entangling the United States in a deeper conflict with Russia. Even without the Javelins, Ukraine was able to seize back much of the territory it had lost, but direct Russian intervention prevented a total Ukrainian victory. In the end, the Minsk II agreements in the fall of 2014

laid out a cease-fire plan. But the guns never fell fully silent , and there has been little progress toward a permanent peace settlement. 2) How do the Javelins change the picture? Since 2015, the United States has provided Ukraine with $750 million in nonlethal aid, including Humvees, night-vision equipment and short-range radar systems. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and administration officials had urged President Trump to include lethal weaponry in the U.S. military assistance program. Yet the decision is not simply a military one — there are also significant risks. Some analysts argue that the U.S. Javelins support Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. The risk of escalating the conflict remains low because Russia can distinguish Javelins as a defensive weapon, not an offensive one. While some political scientists agree that being able to differentiate between offensive and defensive weapons lowers the risk of war, others question the ability to understand an adversary’s intentions by the type of weaponry they acquire. In the event of further Russian offensives, Javelins ensure Russian costs increase (although those costs would largely be in the form of proxy casualties, a limited disincentive for Russia). U.S. Javelins —

an advanced system, and expensive, at $246,000 a pop — are quite effective but aren’t the only option to bolster Ukraine’s antitank capabilities. Ukraine’s own defense industry produces capable antitank missiles for a portion of that price, for instance. And there’s an added concern that the Javelins could fall into enemy hands. Current reports state they are to remain in central Ukraine, under the watchful eyes of U.S. trainers. Even if they were to be deployed to stop any Russian breakout, it’s questionable they could be deployed fast enough or in great enough numbers to change the tide of the conflict. Not to mention that the current conflict is largely fought with artillery. 3) What does the U.S.

lose by sending this weaponry to Ukraine? Ultimately, knowing when to use your tools and options is as important as having them. Sending Ukraine advanced weaponry today gains little military advantage, and sacrifices political leverage. In fact, supplying arms is as much political as it is military . Sending weaponry is a signal of support and commitment . Just how committed the United States would be in the face of further Russian aggression is unclear, as there are few further actions to demonstrate support beyond becoming directly involved. But weapons also can be powerful bargaining chips. In any future negotiations, the United States could have pressured Russia by threatening to send Ukraine lethal weaponry. And the United States has likely lost any leverage to push Ukraine to make long-promised domestic changes, like

fighting rampant corruption. 4) How is Russia likely to respond? Russia retains escalation dominance in not only Ukraine but also the region. In simple terms, Moscow can deploy more troops faster than the West. One rationale during the Obama administration not to send lethal weapons was that the time to send, train and deploy the Javelins would pressure Russia to gamble even further and act to obtain key objectives, such as the port city of Mariupol. However, my research has demonstrated Russia’s main goal was to create a mechanism to influence Ukraine internally. Invading and occupying eastern Ukraine would extinguish that goal and leave Russia supporting another economically depressed region. This year is an election year, and the Kremlin can ill afford large numbers of its young conscripts returning in

body bags. That is why Russia relied so heavily on proxy forces. Thus, an obvious recourse for Russia is to simply restart the fighting and use its proxy forces to inflict even more chaos and destruction on an already impoverished area. However, the most likely scenario, should Russia chose to escalate, may not necessarily play out in Ukraine. Russia is adept at using unconventional actors — such as organized crime networks — in unexpected places. Leveraging its role in Syria, ratcheting up pressure on the Baltics or hatching some new plan in Afghanistan are all options available to Russia . For U.S. policymakers, this gives an added reason to consider all the angles — and all possible Russian responses. Sending U.S. Javelins to Ukraine currently brings little military benefit, while heightening the risk of escalation with Russia. Unlike 2014, however, the risk of escalation is not confined to Ukraine, giving Russia the advantage of choosing exactly where and how it responds.

US-Russia accidents in the Baltics or Syria escalates to full scale nuclear warCohen 16 (Foreign Policy Columnist at Reuters & Former USAID Project Officer in the former Soviet Union, COMMENTARY, Thursday, Nov 10, 2016, The number one reason to fix U.S.-Russia relations, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nuclear-commentary-idUSKBN1351SD)

The danger from the erosion in nuclear arms control is exacerbated by the fact that the American and Russian militaries are no longer in regular contact. Without proper communication channels, even a small military incident in a place like the Baltic Sea or Syria could rapidly escalate into a full-scale conflict between the two sides –

with the threat of a nuclear exchange lurking in the background.

The possibility of accidental nuclear exchanges should not be discounted , either. Substantial numbers of American

and Russian nuclear missiles remain on so-called "hair trigger alert," a security posture adopted by both sides during the Cold War to allow the launch of nuclear warheads within 15 minutes or less in order to show the other side that no advantage could be gained by a surprise first strike.

The problem with a hair trigger alert policy is that it increases the risk of mistakes . Many incidents involving nuclear near-misses

related to technical or human error occurred during the Cold War – and this threat still exists. In 1995 Russian radar operators

interpreted the launch of a Norwegian science rocket as a possible nuclear strike on Russia from an American Trident submarine, and in response Russian President Boris Yeltsin actually activated the keys on his "nuclear briefcase.” Likewise, in 2010 an American launch control center in Wyoming lost contact with 50 Minuteman III ICBMs under its control for nearly an hour.

Ending arm sales is key – only then can we take further steps towards peaceBrendan Chrzanowski 18 (Navy veteran and a student in the NYU Global Affairs graduate program, "Arming Ukraine: Practicalities and Implications", No Publication, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/09/05/arming_ukraine_practicalities_and_implications_113769.html, 9-5-2018, accessed 6-24-2019 //SKH)

America’s recent decision to authorize the sale and delivery of Javelin anti-tank missile systems to Ukraine was shortsighted and dangerous to all parties involved.[1] The provision of the Javelin weapons system, in particular, serves as little more than a symbolic gesture. In the end, the authorization will likely prove a maneuver in optics, not strategy. Furthermore, recent developments suggest the Ukrainian government, in an effort to secure the deal, may have interfered with the ongoing special counsel investigation in the United States.[2] The following delineates the reasoning behind this conclusion, puts forward some of the stronger arguments in favor of the authorization, and describes why they are

misguided. Amid the fraught U.S.-Russia relations of late, it is vital for American policymakers to consider each geopolitical decision with the utmost care, ensuring the best interests of the United States and her allies are always kept in mind.[3] An appropriate policy would include forgoing any further sale of lethal weaponry, replacing it instead with increased funds and non-lethal materiel such as counter-electronic warfare (EW) technology and the

deployment of additional troops on a strictly train-and-advise basis. The conflict in Eastern Ukraine has claimed over 10,000 lives and forced over a million more to flee their homes.[4] Taking these figures into consideration, it is evident that decisive action is necessary; thus far, however, the United States has taken the wrong approach. Arming Ukraine with Javelin anti-tank missiles runs the risk of reigniting what has become a relatively static engagement between the Ukrainian Army and Russian-backed separatists.[5] Skirmishes occur on a daily basis, and casualties continue to accrue, but a sudden injection of Western munitions into the hands of the Ukrainian Army is likely to prompt a disproportionate response from the side of the Russians, a reaction not without historical precedence.[6] Assuming the Russians respond not in kind, but with asymmetric force, where does that leave the United States? Is the United States to perpetually provide bigger and better arms as the process persists in some sort of vicious iteration of Robert Jervis’s spiral model?[7] For now, Russia has far more at stake in this conflict. With his population’s support and at least six more years at the helm, Vladimir Putin can and will broaden his country’s efforts in the region if need be.[8] Even if the United States were committed to meet every response with more firepower, the Russians have the overwhelming advantage of geography. Russia’s shared border with Ukraine, one that is reportedly near-impossible to effectively monitor, enables expedited resupplies.[9] Putin’s relative autonomy in terms of foreign policy decisions also adds to the potential for a rapid response. Furthermore, it is prudent to consider how Ukrainians may interpret the signaling of receiving lethalarms from America. Inspired by the renewed and augmented support of the Americans, this move

could embolden Ukrainians to begin launching assaults, thus producing an avoidable escalation scenario. Many like to frame the conversation as providing so-called defensive weapons rather than offensive, but in reality, there is no logical distinction between the two.[10] The Ukrainians using these weapons to go on an offensive, making the U.S. an indirect accomplice in violating the Minsk Agreement, remains a real possibility and a real concern of those monitoring the situation closely.[11] From a purely practical standpoint, providing Ukraine with Javelins makes little sense . While the provision of such weapons would certainly generate substantial repercussions due to the symbolism of the action, their usefulness on the battlefield would be virtually imperceptible. In fact, former commander of U.S. Army Europe remarked in 2015 that the Ukrainian Army having Javelin missiles “would not change the situation strategically in a positive way.”[12] Ukraine has no need for Javelin missiles, as it already produces its own comparable varieties of anti-tank weaponry.[13] The Ukrainian Army is well-equipped for situations that require anti-tank capabilities, thus it is redundant to provide them with more. Furthermore, the conflict has largely steered away from tank warfare, further highlighting the

superfluity of Javelin sales.[14] The provision of other lethal arms in general is similarly excessive. Since the outbreak of the conflict, the Ukrainian Army has improved its capabilities in almost every aspect of warfare by orders of magnitude. Ukraine’s current air, land, and sea means are unrecognizable in comparison to those of 2014.[15] If anything, the United States should be increasing support to help Ukraine counter the innovative electronic warfare the Russian-backed separatists are waging in the east.[16] An electronic warfare package would be immensely more advantageous to the effort in Ukraine. The package could include products such as the THOR III, CREW jammer, or MODI II systems, as well as a contingent of U.S. electronic warfare specialists to train Ukrainian soldiers using a strategy akin to the one released by the Pentagon in 2017.[17] This recent Department of Defense approach lays emphasis on the integration of burgeoning electronic

warfare capabilities throughout the gamut of military operations, the use of cost-effective technology in lieu of conventional arms, and the coordination of preparedness training for the rigors of conflict in the electromagnetic spectrum.[18] These systems, among others, could make a genuine difference in an electronic warfare space currently dominated by the Russians.[19] As an added benefit, Ukrainian troops could later be debriefed by their American counterparts on how the technology fared in real-world application against the current leader in electronic warfare tactics, providing valuable insight to be used in future strategic planning. To further assist, the United States could take the advice of a February 2018 Carnegie report, which suggests the problem the Ukrainian Army faces now is not one of hardware, but of structure, and a key component of successful reform is the expansion of Western training efforts.[20] It is also imperative to acknowledge the likelihood of American-made weapons systems winding up in the hands other than those for whom they were intended. Time and again, U.S.-supplied weapons are either stolen from the anticipated beneficiary or never make it there in the first place. In just the last decade, this happened in Libya, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, and Mexico.[21] In Ukraine, the worry would be that the Javelins provided by America could make their way into the arms of either some sort of extremist Ukrainian militia such as the Azov Battalion or the very same Russian-backed separatists the weapons were meant to combat.[22] The Ukrainian Army has lost control of countless weapons that have then found their way onto the streets and online marketplaces.[23] In one instance, Ukrainian Army vehicles were taken by separatists in broad daylight and subsequently paraded about.[24] More importantly, non-lethal U.S. military equipment, such as mortar-tracking radar technology given to Ukraine in 2015, was stolen by the separatists not long after delivery.[25] Assuming such a risk with lethal weaponry is needless and should, under present circumstances, be avoided. The advocates of arming Ukraine cite a number of well-intentioned, yet nebulous and, in some cases, erroneous motives for their position. The primary argument is that the United States must support the independence of a democratic, potential future NATO member.[26] The problem with this particular belief is that the United States is and has been supporting the independence of Ukraine for years.[27] Since the outset of the conflict, the United States has provided over $1.3 billion in monetary assistance, training, and non-lethal materiel such as radar, surveillance, and vehicles.[28] As argued above, there is no practical need for the provision of lethal arms, so the support for Ukrainian independence is, in effect, being realized. Another argument for arming Ukraine is that doing so strengthens NATO; however, one can argue persuasively that Ukraine is doing just fine without American anti-tank missiles.[29] In the same vein as the strengthening NATO argument, champions for the arming of Ukraine insist that lethal arms from America will enhance European security. European allies of the United States tend to have a different opinion.[30] Representatives of countries located within Europe, such as the former president of France, Francois Hollande; German Chancellor, Angela Merkel; and U.K. national security official, Mark Sedwell, have publicly stated their qualms with a U.S.-provided lethal arms package, echoing the concerns outlined above.[31] Also coming from within Europe, the European Council on Foreign Relations has published objections to the idea.[32] In a broader sense, current French president Emmanuel Macron has recently called for Europe to achieve greater defense autonomy and rely less on the United States. In his remarks, he

suggested a move towards security cooperation with the Russian Federation if the situation in Donbas deescalates.[33] There is no rational basis for providing Ukraine with Javelin missile systems, or any other lethalweaponry. Such a move has no positive effect for the Ukrainians on the battlefield. Instead, the United States is undertaking several wholly preventable risks with the

prospect of realizing zero strategic ends. The Ukrainian armed forces are capable of sustaining their mission domestically. Arming Ukraine

is symbolically moral, but chances an increase in hostilities that could devolve into a tit-for-tat proxy war, or worse. An entirely new U.S. policy towards Ukraine is unnecessary. Rather, the existing policy of supporting Ukraine is in need of amending, which can be achieved by a collaborative approach on the part of Congress and the executive branch. A three-pronged strategy is the best means of modifying the current U.S. strategy. First and foremost, the U.S. must transition from the provision of lethal means, to non-lethal aid paired with an advisory presence

focused on countering Russian electronic warfare capabilities. Next, in lieu of any further weapons deals, Congress should author and pass a bill that allocates increased funds to be used in providing Ukraine with non-lethal materiel, surveillance drones, and, most importantly, counter-electronic warfare technology. Finally, Congress should petition the president to authorize not only the aforementioned equipment-provision bill, but also the deployment of additional troops, with a non-combat mandate, to assist the Ukrainian military with training and structural reforms.

And the US won’t intervene to protect Ukraine but limiting US support facilitates political change --- that’s the only chance of solving the crisis peacefullyCharap & Mylovanov 15 (Samuel Charap is a Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Tymofiy Mylovanov is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh and Member of the Editorial Board of VoxUkraine, 1-21-2015, "For Ukraine, Weakness Could Be Its Greatest Strength", National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/ukraine-weakness-could-be-its-greatest-strength-12073, accessed 7-1-2019) ar

The United States and the EU have demonstrated significant commitment to Ukraine’s success since the Maidan revolution. However, no Western leader has ever suggested that Ukraine has a blank check—that the Western commitment is without limits.

Instead, as evidenced by the measured extent of financial and military assistance to Ukraine, this commitment is both limited and conditional. In particular, if Kyiv’s promises to implement meaningful reforms are not fulfilled

soon, then Western support might evaporate. Russia has also demonstrated significant commitment to achieving its objectives in

Ukraine. The Kremlin has shown willingness to incur significant costs—international sanctions, political isolation and economic and human losses from the military conflict—since the crisis broke out a year ago.

Thus, in contrast to the West, Russia’s actions demonstrate that its commitment in this conflict is essentially unconditional and unlimited. Thankfully, Ukraine’s circumstances have not deteriorated to the point of the U.S. big banks in 2008, when the federal bailout demonstrated that they were in fact too big to fail. But the threat of a dramatic deterioration in Ukraine’s security or economic conditions looms large in 2015. Policy makers in Kyiv certainly need to prepare for the worst. After a year of nearly every Western leader proclaiming firm commitments to Ukraine, some of those policy makers might well believe that they can still take certain risks; after all, they might reassure themselves, the West will never allow Ukraine to fail. While we cannot say with certainly that such a

reassurance is baseless, there is strong evidence to suggest precisely that. Take, for example, Washington’s recent passage of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, which observers in both Kyiv and the West have characterized as a major step forward in the U.S. commitment to the security and prosperity of Ukraine. But the way it changed as it

evolved from bill to law runs counter to this narrative. In the initial draft that passed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ukraine was classified a “major non-NATO ally” (MNNA). The term has a largely technical meaning that

relates to arms export procedures and security cooperation; it is not the same as a mutual defense treaty. But both in Ukraine and beyond, many, including President Petro Poroshenko, seemed to believe that MNNA implies just that . For

Washington, regardless of the technical meaning of the term, granting MNNA status to Ukraine would have represented a much firmer commitment to Ukraine’s security, since violations of it would have undermined the credibility of all U.S.

alliances. But, in the end, the MNNA provision was removed from the final version of the bill. Further, essentially all other measures in the legislation—including both military assistance and sanctions on Russia—grant authorities to the executive branch, but do not compel it to act. In short, the new law does demonstrate U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s security, but its transformation shows the

profound limits of that commitment. It should be a cautionary tale to President Poroshenko and the Ukrainian elite as a whole. They can rely on the United States for support, but the United States will not guarantee Ukraine’s security. In the short term, that means Kyiv will be largely on its own if Moscow decides to break the tenuous ceasefire and push deeper into Ukrainian territory. Some argue that if the security situation deteriorates dramatically, the United States and its allies will be compelled to intervene, because they could not countenance the permanent dismemberment or occupation of a European state. In fact, they did just that in the case of Cyprus. Since its 1974 invasion of the island, Turkey has illegally occupied the sovereign state of the Republic of Cyprus. Following the north’s 1983 declaration of independence as the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC), Turkey recognized it, and it remains the only state to have done so. To this day, Turkey maintains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the one-third of the island controlled by the TRNC despite numerous UN Security Council resolutions since its initial invasion calling for immediate withdrawal. The UK, as a guarantor of the treaty granting Cyprus its independence, had a legal obligation to “undertake to prohibit . . .any activity aimed at promoting . . . partition of the Island.” Despite the presence of UK servicemen at its two bases on the island, London did not act militarily to stop Turkey’s invasion. The United States had no treaty obligation, but beyond the UNSC, its response was restrained: a three-year embargo on U.S. military grants and arms sales to Turkey was the most severe measure adopted.

Ukraine faces an acute economic crisis that represents no less a threat to its survival than Russia does . Kyiv has come to rely on assistance from the International Monetary Fund and Western donors to survive; yet the Western commitment to support Ukraine financially is limited. Indeed, Moody’s has recently warned that Ukrainian default is very likely, pointing out that the country’s current bailout package provided by the IMF, EU and other donors is not sufficient to cover $10bln external debt repayments that come due this year. The Economist suggests that Ukraine needs an additional bailout of $20bln, noting that despite chatter about a “donors conference,” no government seems willing to put up the money. Earlier this month, the Ukrainian prime minister visited Germany, but came home without any major pledges, securing just a 500-million-euro loan for redevelopment of the eastern Ukraine. Last week, the U.S. Treasury announced up to another $2bln in loan guarantees in addition to the $1bln guarantee made last year. But this new package has been explicitly linked to the Ukrainian government’s following through on its reform pledges and sticking to the IMF program. Meanwhile, the IMF mission arrived back in

Kyiv on January 8, but will the Fund pay and will it pay enough? If Ukraine cannot secure a bailout, it will have to restructure its debt obligations after default or under its shadow . Under the current international laws, sovereign bankruptcy is extremely messy and unpredictable, which motivates all involved parties—the creditors and the sovereign—to avoid default. Perhaps it is this consideration that gives the Ukrainian authorities confidence that the IMF and the West will continue to pay. This, too, is an

illusion, as history has demonstrated creditors’ goodwill does not last forever. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Argentina, Russia and Pakistan defaulted on their sovereign debt, while Ecuador and Ukraine itself were forced to restructure to avoid default. But what about charitable and strategic considerations of the West vis-a-vis Russia? George Soros has recently made a passionate case for the importance of supporting Ukraine in face of the Russian aggression and building a coalition of donors above and beyond the IMF package. The

evidence suggests that even if such pledges were to materialize, there is no guarantee that the donors will honor them. A case in point is Haiti. A devastating earthquake there in 2010 killed 300,000 people and left 1 million homeless. International sovereign donors were quick to pledge $5.37bln for the recovery effort between 2010 and 2012. (These numbers exclude pledges for humanitarian relief efforts and pledges by private donors.) The UN Office of the Special Envoy to Haiti reports that by the end of 2012, only 56

percent of the pledged aid was disbursed and that out of fifty-five donors, only eighteen donors delivered 100 percent of promised funds. All this suggests that Kyiv should not comfort itself that the West will guarantee Ukraine’s security or solvency if push comes to shove . Ukraine’s situation today is made even more dire by the differences in relative levels of Western and Russian commitment in Ukraine. As we have learned from the past year, in Ukraine, Russia is willing to do severe damage to its international standing; absorb the economic body blows of U.S. and EU sanctions; and spend significant treasure and blood to prevent the

Ukrainian military from achieving victory in the East. President Vladimir Putin seems ready to take his country down in flames to pursue his goals. Clearly, on the global level, Russia is no match for the West—in terms of its conventional military or its

economy. But on the level of Ukraine, Russia’s significantly higher level of commitment more than compensates for its weakness. Ukraine’s leaders, therefore, should not overestimate the degree of Western support, and at the same time, they should not underestimate the Kremlin’s resolve. Unfortunately, Western support alone is unlikely to be enough to

counterbalance Russian aggression. Nevertheless, the West’s limited commitment is actually a good thing for the Ukrainian people; it avoids creating a moral hazard trap for their leaders, who might well be tempted to avoid tough reforms if Western commitment were unlimited and unconditional . Indeed, the limited and conditional nature of Western commitment imposes pressure on the government to carry out politically painful but urgently needed changes in the governance of the country. The weakness of Ukraine and the existential threat of the twin security and economic crises have created an opportunity to break the long-standing barriers to reform. Absent today’s dire circumstances, there would be no chance for Ukraine to free itself from the grabbing hands of the oligarchs , who brought the country to its current state. In the words of Thomas Schelling, sometimes weakness is a strength.

Relations AdvRusso-American Relations at all time low because of Ukraine – but Trump wants to resetFinnegan, 18

CONOR FINNEGAN, 3/1/2018, " US announces sale of anti-tank missiles to Ukraine over Russian opposition ," ABC News, https://abcnews.go.com/International/us-announces-sale-anti-tank-missiles-ukraine-russian/story?id=53450406 #CCCool

The U.S. has announced it will sell Ukraine 210 Javelin anti-tank missiles and 37 launchers, worth $47 million. The sale marks a significant increase in U.S. military support for Ukraine — the first lethal weapons sale of its kind since Russian-backed separatists launched a war against the central government in Ukraine's eastern provinces. ABC News first broke news of the sale in December when President Trump approved the plan and began informal notifications with Congress about it. With Thursday's formal notification, Congress now has 30 days to sink the deal or it will go through, which is expected.

The Trump administration has touted the sale as evidence it is "tougher" on Russia than President Barack Obama, although its Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations sought to downplay the significance on Monday. "There is what I view as an artificial distinction between lethal and non-lethal military equipment," Ambassador Kurt Volker said in Washington on Monday, comparing anti-tank missiles to a counter-battery radar that improves targeting to attack and kill an enemy firing mortars. "That's non-lethal and an anti-tank missile, which sits in a box and doesn’t get used unless you have a tank coming at you, is lethal. Both are clearly defensive weapons." The sale is intended to boost Ukrainian military forces as they continue to fight Russian-backed separatists, according to U.S. officials, who argue the U.S. is only supporting Ukraine's right to self-defense. "The Javelin system will help Ukraine build its long-term defense capacity to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity in order to meet its national defense requirements," the Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Agency said in a statement Thursday. U.S. personnel will travel to Ukraine to train their military on its use, the agency added. Russia has not yet

commented on the official notification, but Sergei Ryabkov, Russia's deputy foreign minister, responded harshly in

December when news of the sale first broke. "The United States in a certain sense crossed the line, announcing the intention to transfer weapons of direct damaging action to Ukraine," the statement said, translated from Russian. "American weapons can lead to new victims in our neighboring country, to which we cannot remain indifferent." Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said then that the sale "will once again motivate the hotheads" in the Ukrainian government and "unleash bloodshed again." But since then, there has not been a major escalation in the conflict, despite concerns about Russian retaliation. That could be in part because, "the prospect for increasing the conflict is just too costly for Russia even if you are talking about asymmetric warfare," according to Volker. Fighting in Ukraine rages on with multiple ceasefire violations and some fatalities each week, according to monitoring groups with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe, or OECD. Ukraine loses a soldier every three days, Volker said Monday. More than 10,000 people have been killed since the start of the conflict four years ago, but the battlefield's lines have been frozen for years now, with a diplomatic solution still out of reach. In July, the Trump administration appointed Volker, who served in the George W. Bush administration, including as U.S. ambassador to NATO, at the request of Russia, Germany, and France, who wanted a direct American counterpart with whom they could negotiate peace talks. In recent months, he has been advocating for United Nations peacekeepers to take over in the east and secure the areas for local elections while the government in Kiev would take on reforms — all of which is spelled out in the Minsk agreements, peace deals that Russia and Ukraine signed. "We’ve been at this for about seven months, and I have to say that I'm very pleased with the positioning, but I am not pleased with the results because there are no results," Volker said. While the incentive of lifting U.S. sanctions on Russia has not changed their calculus, Volker said the new weapons are a sign to Russia that they will not change the battlefield through force. The Obama administration and European Union worked in tandem in 2014 to sanction top Russian officials for the country's incursion into eastern Ukraine and seizure of Crimea, and the Trump administration has pledged repeatedly to keep those sanctions in place until Russia meets its commitments under the Minsk agreements. Trump's approval of the arms deal was a major shift from the Republican party platform, which was amended when Trump was the party's nominee for president, from supporting "lethal defensive arms" to Ukraine to

the more vague "appropriate assistance” — language that ran counter to traditional Republican foreign policy. Trump himself promised a reset with Russia, but since taking office, relations with Moscow have not improved.

Arms sales to Ukraine poison any chance of cooperation across the board – only ending them can get us to a baseline for some bilateral relationshipDePetris 18 (Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense News. It is a mistake to arm Ukraine. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2018/03/12/it-is-a-mistake-to-arm-ukraine/ 3/12/18)

After a lengthy policy review and a considerable amount of discussion, the White House decided in December to overturn the previous

administration’s position on U.S. weapons sales to Ukraine, an arms exporter. Washington would now approve lethal defensive weapons systems to Kiev ostensibly in order to improve Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russian-backed separatists operating in the east of the country. The State Department announced the first significant sale March 1 of 210 Javelin anti-tank missiles and 37 launchers with an estimated value of $47 million. Some leaders in Washington have advocated for the sale of missiles to damage or destroy Russian tanks in eastern Ukraine ever since Moscow intervened in its neighbor’s affairs. These weapons, however, will have no impact on the fighting

beyond a front line that has been mostly static for years. Beyond the battlefield, however, this will further poison whatever bilateral relationship the U.S. has left with Russia — and that is bad for America. Sending arms to Ukraine is far more likely to escalate a conflict whose outcome is vital to Russia’s national security interest and, at best, peripheral to America’s.

While deterring more violence in eastern Ukraine may be the stated objective, shipping advanced weapons into a conflict zone is bound to end up badly for Ukrainians — who simply want the violence to end — and

for the United States, a country that should not be plunging into another tangential foreign policy commitment. At every point in the conflict when Kiev’s army was advancing on the ground, Russian President Vladimir Putin responded by pouring more military equipment, money and Russian military personnel into the Donbass on behalf of the separatists. The reason Moscow has responded in such a way to prevent a complete separatist collapse is realpolitik, plain and simple: Ukraine’s political loyalties are immensely important to Russia. It is simply inconceivable for Putin to allow a large neighboring state — that has historically been a connective tissue to the old Russian empire and the Soviet Union — to drift closer to Europe and act antagonistic toward Moscow. This is a strategic vulnerability for Russia, and one that he relies on as a buffer from perceived encroachment by liberal

internationalists. Moscow, like Washington, wants to be the dominant power in the region. Weapons shipments to Kiev, in the view of the Kremlin, are a hostile act designed to jeopardize Moscow’s national security and pressure Russia. To the extent that this view continues to prevail, the Kremlin will react forcefully and retaliate. This fundamental truth must factor into Washington’s decision-making. In many respects, the Trump administration’s decision to send anti-tank missiles to Kiev is a perfect example of Washington’s reactionary, rather than strategic, foreign policy. Sometimes it is appropriate for the United States to respond harshly to Russian behavior, notably when the malignant behavior conflicts with our vital interests — our security, prosperity and our republic. When no vital interests are at stake, however, it is more appropriate to collaborate with Moscow in an attempt to

resolve a dispute diplomatically. And in still other areas — strategic arms control, for instance — the U.S. and Russia have a responsibility to work together in order to promote mutual understanding between the two nations . The

bipartisan foreign policy establishment in Washington ought to adopt a page out of the realist textbook: Intervening in peripheral conflicts that are separate from America’s core national security interests is a drain on America’s limited resources and a dangerous step toward unnecessary confrontation. It’s past time to start taking advice from those who counsel more restraint in national security decision-making.

Specifically Ukraine is preventing cooperation on terrorismFoy 2018 – [Henry Foy – manages the FT's coverage from Moscow, focusing on the politics and personalities of Vladimir Putin's Kremlin and the administration's foreign and diplomatic strategies, amid souring relations between Russia and the west., Financial Times, 12/26/2018, “Russia warns of risk to global antiterrorism efforts,” https://www.ft.com/content/2cb20a7a-0769-11e9-9fe8-acdb36967cfc] KS

Western states’ refusal to deepen collaboration with Russia on antiterrorism issues threatens global efforts to combat extremists, Moscow’s top diplomat for international anti-terror co-operation has warned. A collapse in western relations with Russia over the past few years has meant that progress on anti-terror collaboration is “frozen,” Ilya Rogachev, director of the Department for New Challenges and Threats at Russia’s foreign ministry said, which was hampering efforts to exchange information.“This is how ideology and politics have been used in the field of antiterrorism, and that is

wrong . . . it has direct damage on societies, citizens and people,” he added. “There is no logic in this action.”Russia’s role as the key military actor in Syria and the closest major ally to the regime of Bashar al-Assad has put it in proximity to terror groups that have participated in the country’s civil war. Some of the perpetrators of the major terror attacks in Paris and Brussels in recent years had fought in

Syria. “Our intelligence agencies know the names of everyone who travelled to Syria to fight,” Mr Rogachev said. “Everyone agrees that

terrorism is a global threat and should be addressed by joining efforts .” Advocates of better relations between Moscow and the west often cite military and anti-terror co-operation — particularly relating to Syria — as an

achievable goal, and a starting point from which to build more complex areas of collaboration. Information supplied by the US helped Russian authorities prevent a terror attack in St Petersburg in December 2017, while foreign governments liaised with Moscow before and during the Fifa World Cup this summer. But a series of meetings between the EU and Russia to enhance co-operation in this space have foundered, according to Mr Rogachev, as relations between Brussels and Moscow have soured. The last EU-Russia

consultations on counter-terrorism took place in February 2018.“Things are frozen, I would say,” he said. “It is not how it used to be, due

to politics. The situation with Crimea and eastern Ukraine are cited directly.” Recommended Andrew Wood Russia celebrates the assertion of might over right in Ukraine The US, EU and other western allies imposed sanctions on Moscow in 2014 in the wake of its annexation of Crimea, the Ukrainian peninsula. Since then, allegations of Russia’s attempted meddling in the 2016 US election, the attempted murder of a former spy in the UK this year using a banned nerve agent and efforts to hack into the international chemical weapons

watchdog have seen relations deteriorate.“People who say this [ terrorism] is a depoliticising issue and a unifying agenda, and that counter-terrorism is a better, more promising area for Russia and the west to agree, I say why do you think that?” Mr Rogachev said. “This is, to a certain degree, irrational. This is a highly politicised area.”Mr Rogachev, a career diplomat, cited British prime minister Theresa May’s statement following the 2017 London Bridge terror attack that the UK would “work with allied democratic governments to reach international agreements” to combat terrorism.“

Nuclear terrorism causes extinction—misattribution errors, miscalc and high tensions spark global nuclear conflict Hayes 18 (Peter Hayes, Director of the Nautilus Institute and Honorary Professor at the Centre for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney, January 18, 2018. “NON-STATE TERRORISM AND INADVERTENT NUCLEAR WAR.” https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/non-state-terrorism-and-inadvertent-nuclear-war/)

We now move to our conclusion. Nuclear-armed states can place themselves on the edge of nuclear war by a combination of threatening force deployments and threat rhetoric. Statements by US and North Korea’s leaders and supporting amplification by state and private media to present just such a lethal combination. Many observers have observed that the risk of war and nuclear war, in Korea and globally, have increased in the last few years—although no-one can say with authority by how much and exactly for what reasons. However, states are restrained in their actual decisions to escalate to conflict and/or nuclear war by conventional deterrence, vital national interests, and other institutional and political restraints, both domestic and international. It is not easy, in the real world, or even in fiction, to start nuclear wars.[19] Rhetorical threats are standard fare in realist and constructivist accounts of inter-state nuclear deterrence, compellence, and reassurance, and are not cause for alarm per se. States will manage the risk in each of the threat relationships with other nuclear armed states to stay back from the brink, let alone go over it, as they have in the past. This argument was powerful and to many, persuasive during the

Cold War although it does not deny the hair-raising risks taken by nuclear armed states during this period. Today, the multi-polarity of nine nuclear weapons states interacting in a four-tiered nuclear threat system means that the practice of sustaining nuclear threat and preparing for nuclear war is no longer merely complicated, but is now enormously complex in ways that may exceed the capacity of some and perhaps all states to manage , even without the emergence of a fifth tier of non-state actors to add further unpredictability to how this system works in practice. The

possibility that non-state actors may attack without advance warning as to the time, place, and angle of attack presents another layer of uncertainty to this complexity as to how inter-state nuclear war may break out . That is, non-state

actors with nuclear weapons or threat goals and capacities do not seek the same goals, will not use the same control systems, and will use radically different organizational procedures and systems to deliver on their threats compared with nuclear armed states. If used tactically for immediate terrorist effect, a non-state nuclear terrorist could violently attack nuclear facilities, exploiting any number of vulnerabilities in fuel cycle facility security, or use actual nuclear materials and even warheads against military or civilian targets. If a persistent, strategically oriented nuclear terrorist succeed in gaining credible nuclear threat capacities, it might take hostage one or more states or cities. If such an event

coincides with already high levels of tension and even military collisions between the non-nuclear forces of nuclear armed states, then a non-

state nuclear terrorist attack could impel a nuclear armed state to escalate its threat or even military actions

against other states, in the belief that this targeted state may have sponsored the non-state attack, or was

simply the source of the attack, whatever the declared identity of the attacking non-state entity. This outcome could trigger these states

to go onto one or more of the pathways to inadvertent nuclear war, especially if the terrorist attack was on a high value and high risk

nuclear facility or involved the seizure and/or use of fissile material. Some experts dismiss this possibility as so remote as to be

not worth worrying about. Yet the history of nuclear terrorism globally and in the Northeast Asian region suggests

otherwise. Using the sand castle metaphor, once built on the high tide line, sand castles may withstand the wind but eventually succumb to the tide once it reaches the castle—at least once, usually twice a day. Also, theories of organizational and technological failure point to the coincidence of multiple, relatively insignificant driving events that interact or accumulate in ways that lead the “metasystem” to fail, even if each individual component of a system works perfectly. Thus, the potential catalytic effect of a nuclear terrorist incident is not that it would of

itself lead to a sudden inter-state nuclear war; but that at a time of crisis when alert levels are already high, when control systems on nuclear forces have already shifted from primary emphasis on negative to positive control, when decision making is already stressed , when the potential for miscalculation is already high due to shows of force indicating that first-use is nigh, when rhetorical threats promising annihilation on the one hand, or collapse of morale and weakness on the other invite counter-vailing threats by nuclear adversaries or their allies to gain the upper hand in the “contest of resolve,”

and when organizational cybernetics may be in play such that purposeful actions are implemented differently than intended, then a terrorist nuclear attack may shift a coincident combination of some or all of these factors to a threshold level where they collectively lead to a first-use decision by one or more nuclear-armed states . If the terrorist attack is timed or happens to coincide with high levels of inter-state tension involving nuclear-armed states, then some or all of these tendencies will likely be in play anyway—precisely the concern of those who posit pathways to inadvertent nuclear war as outlined in section 2 above. The critical question is, just as a catalyst breaks some bonds and lets other bonds form, reducing the energy cost and time taken to achieve a chemical reaction, how would a nuclear terrorist attack at time of nuclear charged inter-state tension potentially shift the way that nuclear threat is projected and perceived in a four or five-way nuclear-prone conflict, and how might it affect the potential pathways to inadvertent nuclear war in such a system? Such a pervasive incremental effect is shown in Figure 6 below. Any one or indeed all of these starting nuclear control profiles may be disputed, as might the control profile at the end of the response arrow. (In Figure 6, each nuclear state responds to a terrorist nuclear attack by loosening or abandoning negative controls against unauthorized use, and shifts towards reliance mostly on positive procedural controls biased towards use). But each nuclear armed state will make its moves in response to the posited terrorist nuclear attack partly in response to its expectations as to how other nuclear armed states will perceive and respond to these moves, as well as their perception that an enemy state may have sponsored a terrorist nuclear attack—and considered together, it is obvious that they may not share a common image of the other states’ motivations and actions in this response, leading to cumulative potential for misinterpretation and rapid subsequent action, reaction, and escalation. It is also conceivable—although intuitively it would seem far less likely–that a terrorist nuclear attack at such a conjuncture of partly or fully mobilized nuclear armed states might induce one or more of them to stand down, slow down its decision making or deployments, establish new communication channels with potential nuclear enemy states, and even make common cause to hunt down and eliminate the non-state nuclear terrorist entity, or coordinate operations to respond to the threat of a second terrorist nuclear attack—the credibility of which would be high in the aftermath of a successful initial non-state nuclear attack. As Robert Ayson concluded: In considering

the ways in which a terrorist nuclear attack could (wittingly or unwittingly) spark off a wider nuclear exchange government leaders are entitled to be just as worried about their own actions—how they would respond to a terrorist nuclear attack and how

that response might get very catastrophically out of control—as about the terrorist act per se. If so, states need to do more than consider the best ways to prevent terrorists from acquiring, deploying and then detonating a nuclear weapon. They also need to think about how they can control themselves in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack (even if some might suggest this risks handing the terrorist a premature and unnecessary victory by giving them indirect influence over the choices states make).[20]

Black Market Adv Trump has approved millions of dollars of SALWs to Ukraine.Cone 17 (Allen Cone, Breaking News Writer — United Press International (UPI) Business and Finance, Crime and Justice, U.S., World, 12-21-2017, "Trump approves light arms sale to Ukraine", UPI, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2017/12/21/Trump-approves-light-arms-sale-to-Ukraine/1961513872077/, accessed 6-27-2019) ar

Dec. 21 (UPI) -- President Donald Trump has approved the export of weapons to Ukraine against Russian-backed separatist rebels, as fighting in the country intensified, the U.S. State Department announced Thursday. Spokeswoman Heather Nauert

said the department notified Congress on Dec. 13 that an export license was approved, allowing Ukraine to buy certain light weapons and small arms from American manufacturers. "The U.S. government is not selling the Ukrainian government these weapons," she said. "Under the previous two administrations, the U.S. government has approved export licenses to Ukraine,

so this is nothing new." The sale includes sniper rifles , ammunition and other associated parts and materials worth $41.5 million , two U.S. congressional sources told ABC News. In late 2014, President Barack Obama signed legislation to send weapons to Ukraine but he never followed through on the transaction. What's different this time is Trump has attempted to improve relations with Russia and President Vladimir Putin, including working with the nation to resolve the Ukraine crisis. Monday, however, Trump unveiled his

National Security Strategy that says Russia is creating "an unstable frontier in Eurasia, where the risk of conflict due to Russian miscalculation is growing." "Russia and its proxies are the source of violence in eastern Ukraine, and the Russian government continues to perpetuate an active conflict and humanitarian crisis through its leadership and supply of military forces on the ground," Nauer said Tuesday. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe said there have been more than 16,000 ceasefire violations and up to eight Ukrainian soldiers killed in fighting. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said the arms decision would push Ukraine "towards reckless new military decisions." Earlier, the Treasury Department announced sanctions against five individuals for alleged human rights abuses in Russia under the Magnitsky Act. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson last month said the United States would maintain sanctions on Russia. U.S. Sen.John McCain, R-Ariz, applauded the Trump administration's decision to help Ukraine's government. "This decision is years overdue, but nonetheless, it comes at a pivotal moment," the chairman of the Senate Armed Serves Committee said in a statement. "Ukrainians are enduring some of the worst fighting in several months as Russia has withdrawn its officers from a key ceasefire implementation mechanism and Russian-led forces have escalated their attacks in eastern Ukraine. At every turn, Vladimir Putin has chosen war instead of peace in Ukraine.

So long as he makes this choice, the United States and the Free World should give Ukraine what it needs to fight back." He also urged Trump to approve additional sales of defensive lethal weapons , including anti-tank munitions "to fully utilize security assistance funds provided by the Congress to enable Ukraine to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity." McCain urged a budget deal that supports the $350 million in security assistance for Ukraine as authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act signed this month.

US sold arms end up on the black market – we might as well be selling directly to our opponentsAndrey Polevoy 15 (international policy analyst based in Moscow, "Where will the US arms for Ukraine actually end up?", OrientalReview.org, https://orientalreview.org/2015/02/11/where-will-the-us-arms-for-ukraine-actually-end-up/, 11-2-2015, accessed 6-25-2019 //SKH)

The real suspense of the Ukrainian crisis centers on the legalization of the US lethal weapons supply to Kiev

“to protect it against Russian aggression.” However, it is unclear precisely what sort of weapons would be needed to give Kiev an advantage. In the war against Novorossia, Kiev has been using small arms and armored vehicles, multiple launch rocket systems, artillery, cluster and phosphorus ammunition, tactical missiles and, until recently, aircraft (as of last fall the militia had destroyed almost all of Ukraine’s airworthy military aircraft). We are using the word

“legalization” deliberately. Because in fact, NATO has long been supplying Kiev with illegal weapons through Poland, Lithuania, and other countries. There is no shortage of evidence (watch e.g. a video below). Bizarrely, the odious Senator McCain is arguing that only because the Ukrainian army lacks conventional weapons is it being forced to use these banned weapons of mass destruction

against the citizens of the Donbass. However, even if Kiev receives the most modern weapons, that does not at all guarantee that they will be fired in the right direction. Unmotivated Ukrainian soldiers and officers,

more interested in making money than war, often simply sell arms and ammunition to their opponents.

Many weapons find their way onto the “black market” – in the past year the price of weapons in Ukraine has fallen by one-

half to two-thirds. An AK-47 can be picked up nowadays in Kiev for $500-600, and a grenade for $8-10. And this buying and selling also takes place outside of Ukraine’s borders. During the years of Ukraine’s independence, arms from Ukrainian depots have mushroomed across the globe, from time to time “cropping up” in hot spots. The most memorable incident was in September 2008, when Somali pirates captured the MV Faina, a ship carrying approximately 30 Ukrainian tanks, as well as grenade launchers, small arms, MANPADS, and ammunition. Although the Ukrainian government hastily persuaded Kenya to accept the cargo, few doubted that the payload’s original destination were the rebels in then unrecognized South Sudan. On Feb. 6, 2015, reports surfaced claiming that the weapons Kiev was getting from its Western partners were being resold to Syria. Ukraine’s deputy defense minister, Petro Mehed, and the Syrian Brigadier General Talal Makhlouf (a crony of Bashar al-Assad as well as his closest relative on his mother’s side) were behind that deal. One juicy tidbit – the money obtained from selling arms to Syria ended up in personal accounts belonging to Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Interior

Minister Arsen Avakov. According to a CyberBerkut leak dated Nov 25, 2014, Ukraine requested Pentagon for 400 sniper rifles and 2,000 assault rifles, 720 grenade launchers, about 200 mortars, missile systems, and also various types of military equipment and ammunition. The American weapons that were listed in a letter from the Ukrainian deputy minister of defense to the Syrian general are almost identical to the arms that officials in Kiev had requested for the Ukrainian armed forces. This means that shipping weapons to Ukraine is no different from putting them on the global black market or providing them to the Syrian government that is battling the pro-Western opposition.

Terrorists access illicit firearms and attack the EU. Buscemi et. al 18 (Francesco Buscemi is a Seminar Tutor in History, University of Warwick (2017-2018), Nils Duquet is a senior researcher at the Flemish Peace Institute. He has been working at the Flemish Peace Institute since 2006 and has authored more than 40 policy-oriented and academic publications on illicit firearms trafficking and gun violence in Europe, domestic gun policies and European arms export controls, Ekaterina Golovko studies African languages, International Relations, and Peace and Conflict Studies. Independent writer and researcher, and Eric Woods is a contributor at the investigative journalism outlet Bellingcat and a researcher focusing on non-state actors and weapons proliferation, 4-17-2018, "Read more about Project SAFTE's research findings and policy recommendations", Project Safte, https://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/safte/publications, accessed 6-25-2019) ar

As the second-largest country in Europe, with a history of firearms stockpiles and an active conflict zone, Ukraine presents one of the most complex firearms proliferation cases in Europe. The barrier for access to firearms in Ukraine is low, creating easy access in both the licit and illicit spheres. It is impossible to estimate the current number of illegally held firearms in Ukraine in a reliable and detailed way. Yet experts agree that this number is very high and significantly surpasses the number of

legally held firearms in the country. The Small Arms Survey estimates that Ukraine is currently home to around 2 million registered and at least 2 to 3 million unregistered firearms. The Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior affirmed the presence of 3-4 million guns in the illicit sphere, while others have spoken of up to 5 million illegal weapons in the country.1 While difficult to quantify, the armed conflict in the Donbass and the persistence of hostilities have clearly exacerbated the state’s already tenuous control over firearms

and accelerated illicit weapons flows in the country. Uncertainty as to the scale of illicit firearms proliferation is exacerbated by the lack of a comprehensive legal framework for legal firearms possession in Ukraine. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been no primary law regulating the circulation of firearms in Ukraine’s civilian sphere. This legal vacuum was filled with a main bylaw issued by the Ministry of the Interior and a series of other bylaws.2 Under this kind of fragmented regulation, many grey areas remain within licit firearms supply chains that not only facilitate illicit circulation, but also make for unclear lines around legal and illegal ownership. One of the major loopholes in Ukraine’s firearms control regime relates to the acquisition of firearms components. Until recently this remained completely unregulated.3 In addition, permits for firearms can be easily forged, as was the case when a Chinese national in Odessa pretended to be a member of the Ukrainian armed forces in an attempt to access firearms.4 Compounding these

issues is the lack of central registries for civilian firearms at both the national and regional levels.5 While much of the firearms trafficking in Ukraine currently takes place within its borders, fears of criminal cross-border smuggling and of terrorists accessing weapons from Ukraine to commit terrorist attacks in the European Union

(EU) were fanned in 2016 when a 25-year-old French national, Grégoire Moutaux, was arrested for trying to bring five Kalashnikov-type assault rifles, 5,000 bullets, two anti-tank grenade launchers, detonators,

and 125 kg of TNT across the Polish border. According to Ukrainian officials, Moutaux was planning to carry out 15 attacks on synagogues, mosques, public buildings, and key infrastructure just before and during the European football championship a couple of months later.

Terrorism kills the European economy --- uncertainty, defense spending, and infrastructure damage. Bakowskiwouter & Ballegooij 18 (Piotr Bakowskiwouter, Research Analyst (EP Research Service), Wouter Van Ballegooij LLM PhD, is a Policy Analyst at the Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added Value of the European Parliamentary Research Service, 5-25-2018, "The fight against terrorism", No Publication, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2018)621817, accessed 6-28-2019) ar

Economic impacts As previous research suggests, there is a potential relationship between terror risk and economic growth. However, while the effect of terrorist incidents on economic output has been investigated before, including for a sub-sample of Western European countries,157 a recent and comprehensive analysis covering the EU-28 has not been carried out. The annexed research paper aims to bridge that gap, as well as to identify the corresponding pathways through which terrorism affects growth. In addition, the attached paper reviews the impact on specific sectors. Finally, greater detail on how terrorism affects economic integration in the form of trade

and foreign direct investment(FDI) flows are also provided. On economic growth Terrorist attacks may destroy factors of production. Crucial capital such as transport infrastructure may be destroyed , and individuals of working age killed or injured. These labour and capital inputs are crucial to producing goods and services, their loss therefore affects Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Terror also tends to divert public resources away from economic production to national security. Unsurprisingly, the share of government expenditure grows when terror attacks occur, as public spending on defence and security increases in response. In

order to spend more on security, countries either raise taxes or shift their budget spending to potentially less growth-enhancing defence and security expenditures, which may harm long-term growth . However, no empirical evidence for such a relation with economic growth is found, nor does the literature provide a clear answer. Terrorist attacks slightly increase consumption. Although there is no clear indication of the mechanisms behind this increase, it is believed that terrorist attacks may heighten awareness of individual mortality. The psychological impact may trigger an impulse individuals to save less and consume more in the

presenttime.158 Terrorism also induces a higher level of fear and uncertainty affecting society more widely. This uncertainty distorts consumers' choices regarding investment, savings and consumption. Inflow of resources from other countries may also be diverted to countries that are considered safer. This impacts foreign direct investments, as discussed in the section on economic integration. The annexed research paper agrees with other

studies,159 that terrorism has a tangible but relatively small and short-term negative effect on growth across EU Member States. [chart omitted] On economic integration By harming trade and levels of foreign direct investment (FDI), terrorism also has a negative effect on

economic integration. Previous research has identified that terrorism is detrimental to FDI at a country-level, but the effects

may be more relevant for countries with a persistent and large-scale terrorism and conflict problem. In a country suffering from terror, the increased uncertainty reduces the expected returns on investment . This is important, since

multinational companies tend to have a wide panel of countries in which they can choose to implant their subsidiary firms should they wish to move away from terrorism threats. As a result, higher levels of terrorist risks are associated with lower levels of (net) FDI positions. The effects of terrorism on trade depends heavily on the specific product or sector. As an example, the effect on the trade of primary products is rather small, while the effect on trade in manufacturing goods tends to be substantive. Trade is affected most by disrupted trade flows due to heightened security measures at borders and transport hubs. This includes, an increase in frictional costs, e.g. delays, and increased insurance charges.161

EU collapse would destroy international trade and increase protectionism --- that causes global economic retraction. Wright 12 (Thomas Wright, Director - Center on the United States and Europe Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Project on International Order and Strategy, 7-26-2012, "What if Europe Fails?", Brookings, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/twq12SummerWright.pdf, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-if-europe-fails/, accessed 7-1-2019) ar

The most immediate and obvious impact would be on the European and global economy . The two scenarios

under consideration are bad, but one is much worse than the other. It is the overwhelming view of senior economists, financial institutions, and international organizations that the disorderly collapse of the Eurozone, resulting

in a return to national currencies, has a high probability of causing a new depression and ending the period of economic integration which has characterized world politics since the Cold War. For instance, the OECD’s Economic Outlook in November 2011 warned:

The establishment and likely large exchange rate changes of the new national currencies could imply large losses for debt and asset holders, including banks that could become insolvent . Such turbulence in Europe, with the massive wealth destruction, bankruptcies and a collapse in confidence in European integration and cooperation, would most likely result in a deep depression in both the exiting and remaining euro area countries as well as in the world economy.7In the private sector, Citi’s chief economist William Buiter wrote that disorderly defaults and eurozone exits by the five periphery states Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy would drag down not just the European banking system but also the north Atlantic financial system and the internationally exposed parts of the rest of the global

banking system. The resulting financial crisis would trigger a global depression that would last for years, with GDP likely falling by more than 10 per cent and unemployment in the West reaching 20 per cent or more. Emerging markets would be dragged down too.8Other analysts have reached similar conclusions about the consequences of a Euro break up. HSBC predicted, ‘‘A euro break-up would be a disaster, threatening another Great Depression; ’’UBS

estimated that a breakup would cost each peripheral economy up to 40 percent of their GDP in year one; ING estimated that the Eurozone as a whole (including Germany) could see a9 percent drop in the first year following break up, while

inflation in the periphery would soar to double digits; IMF chief Christine Lagarde warned that the global economy faces the prospect of ‘‘ economic retraction , rising protectionism , isolation and...what happened in the 30s.’’9Following a disorderly breakup, it is highly likely that it would be every state for itself as governments sought to do everything possible to insulate their countries against the greatest economic shock in the West since World War II. A return to national currencies would result in tremendous fluctuations, uncertainty, and volatility following redenomination, including a redenomination of complex international contracts.10It would also mean that countries with a weak currency would immediately be bankrupt, as their assets would have depreciated while their debts would be denominated in the currency of the creditor state . These states would introduce capital controls to prevent capital flight and the collapse in value of the new currencies. Strong states would introduce tariffs to protect against competitive devaluations and cheap imports. The European single market would not likely survive. Globally, governments would try to save

what they could and would likely replicate some of the protectionist measures introduced in Europe. The net effect could jeopardize global economic integration and open the door to neo-mercantilism and protectionism . In a bare survival scenario, the Eurozone muddles through intact but never properly addresses the root causes of the crisis. Sovereign debt continues to be costly and peripheral states are forced into new bailouts or some form of default. As economists Simon Johnson and Peter Boone put it, ‘‘At the least, we expect several more sovereign defaults and multiple crises to plague Europe in the next few years. There is simply too much debt, and adjustment programs are too slow to prevent it.’’11Widespread austerity would suppress demand and cause a deep

and prolonged recession with low growth and high unemployment. Europe’s problems would fester in the markets and prevent confidence from returning. Berkeley University economist Barry Eichengreen has argued, ‘If Europe fails to grow, it will not be able to dig its way out of its debt hole and restore the confidence necessary for the euro to remain a significant source of

internationalliquidity.’’12The destruction of the European growth engine would drag down international trade, damaging both the United States and China, although U.S. borrowing costs are likely to remain low as it stays a safe

haven for capital. The overall picture from a Europe barely hanging on is one of a lost decade .

Economic decline causes global nuclear war Stein Tønnesson 15, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the

review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right.

Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014;

Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the

value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either

side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on

external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or

credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly , i.e. under the instigation

of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either

China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present

circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter- state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war

could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon , and unreliably so . Deterrence could lose its credibility : one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

And European collapse causes multiple scenarios for global warWright 12 (Thomas, fellow with the Managing Global Order at the Brookings Institution, Summer 2012, “What if Europe Fails?” The Washington Quarterly, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerWright.pdf)

Yet, verbal warnings from nervous leaders and economists aside, there has been remarkably little analysis of what the end of European integration might mean for Europe and the rest of the world. This article does not predict that failure will occur it only seeks to explain the geopolitical implications if it does. The severity and trajectory of the crisis since 2008 suggest that failure is a high-impact event with a non-trivial probability. It may not occur, but it certainly merits serious analysis. Failure is widely seen as an

imminent danger.¶ Would the failure of the Euro really mean the beginning of the end of democracy in Europe? Could the global economy survive without a vibrant European economy? What would European architecture look like after the end of European

integration? What are the implications for the United States, China, and the Middle East? Since the international order has been primarily a

Western construction, with Europe as a key pillar, would the disintegration of the European Union or the Eurozone have lasting and deleterious effects on world politics in the coming decade? ¶ Thinking through and prioritizing the consequences

of a failed Europe yield five of the utmost importance. First, the most immediate casualty of the failure of the European project would be the global economy. A disorderly collapse (as opposed to an orderly failure, which will be explained shortly)

would probably trigger a new depression and could lead to the unraveling of economic integration as countries introduce protectionist measures to limit the contagion effects of a collapse. Bare survival would drag down Europe’s economy and would generate increasing and dangerous levels of volatility in the international economic order. ¶ Second, the geopolitical consequences of an economic crisis depend not just on the severity of the crisis but also

the geopolitical climate in which it occurs. Europe’s geopolitical climate is as healthy as can be reasonably expected. This would

prevent a simple repeat of the 1930s in Europe, which has been one of the more alarming predictions from some observers, although certain new and fragile democracies in Europe might come under pressure. ¶ Third, failure would cement Germany’s rise as the leading country in Europe and as an indispensable hub in the European Union and Eurozone, if they continue to exist,

but anti-Germanism would become a more potent force in politics on the European periphery. ¶ Fourth,

economic downturn as a result of disintegration would undermine political authority in those parts of the world where the

legitimacy of governments is shallow, and it would exacerbate international tensions where the geopolitical climate is relatively malign. The places most at risk are the Middle East and China. ¶ Fifth, disintegration would weaken Europe on the world stage–it would severely damage the transatlantic alliance, both by sapping its resources and by diverting Europe’s attention to its internal crisis–and would, finally, undermine the multilateral order. ¶ Taking these five implications in their totality, one thing is clear. Failure will badly damage Europe and the international order, but some types of failure–most notably a disorderly collapse–are worse than others. Currently, the pain is concentrated on the so-

called European periphery (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Ireland). Disorderly collapse would affect all European countries, as well as North America and East Asia. If a solution to the Eurocrisis is perceived as beyond reach, leaders of the major powers will shift their priorities to managing failure in order to contain its effects. This will be strenuously resisted on the periphery, which is already experiencing extremely high levels of

pain and does not want to accept the permanence of the status quo. Consequently, their electorates will become more risk-acceptant and will pressure Germany and other core member states to accommodate them through financial transfers and assistance in exchange for not deliberately triggering a break-up. This bitter split will divide and largely define a failing Europe. Absent movement toward a solution, EU politics is about to take an ugly turn.

ExtinctionFisher 15 – Fisher, Vox Foreign Affairs Editor (Max, “How World War III Became Possible”, 6-29, http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war)

Europe today looks disturbingly similar to the Europe of just over 100 years ago, on the eve of World War I. It is a tangle of military commitments and defense pledges, some of them unclear and thus easier to trigger . Its leaders have given vague signals for what would and would not lead to war. Its political tensions have become military buildups. Its nations are teetering on an unstable balance of power, barely held together by a Cold War–era alliance that no longer quite applies. If you take a walk around Washington or a Western European capital today, there is no feeling of

looming catastrophe. The threats are too complex, with many moving pieces and overlapping layers of risk adding up to a larger danger that is less obvious. People can be forgiven for not seeing the cloud hanging over them, for feeling that

all is well — even as in Eastern Europe they are digging in for war. But this complacency is itself part of the problem, making the threat more difficult to foresee, to manage, or , potentially, to avert . There is a growing chorus of political analysts, arms control experts, and government officials who are sounding the alarm, trying to call the world's attention to its drift toward disaster. The prospect of a major war, even a nuclear war , in Europe has become thinkable, they warn, even plausible. What they describe is a threat that combines

many of the hair-trigger dangers and world-ending stakes of the Cold War with the volatility and false calm that preceded World War I — a comparison I heard with disturbing frequency. They describe a number of ways that an unwanted but nonetheless major war, like that of 1914, could break out in the Eastern European borderlands. The stakes, they say, could not be higher: the post–World War II peace in Europe, the lives of thousands or millions of

Eastern Europeans, or even, in a worst-case scenario that is remote but real, the nuclear devastation of the planet.

Plan + Solvency

PlanThe United States federal government should substantially reduce the Direct Commercial Sales and Foreign Military Sales of lethal arms from the United States to Ukraine.

SolvencyThe plan solves – the US needs to shift its attitude towards involvement in Ukraine, arms sales is a logical place to startTed Galen Carpenter 18 (senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, "Washington Quietly Increases Lethal Weapons to Ukraine", Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/washington-quietly-increases-lethal-weapons-ukraine, 9-10-2018, accessed 6-25-2019 //SKH)

For all of the loose (frequently hysterical) talk in Congress, the foreign policy community, and the news media about President Donald Trump’s alleged eagerness to appease Vladimir Putin, U.S. policy remains as confrontational as ever toward Russia. Among other actions, the Trump administration has involved U.S. forces in NATO military exercises (war games) in Poland and other East European countries on Russia’s border, as well as in naval maneuvers in the Black Sea near Russia’s sensitive naval base at Sevastopol. Washington has even sent U.S. troops as participants in joint military exercises with Ukrainian forces—an act that Moscow considers especially provocative, given its tense relations with Kiev. On no issue is the administration’s risky course more evident than its military policy toward Ukraine. Recent measures are certain to provoke Moscow further, and entangle the United States to an unwise extent with an extremely murky, ideologically troubling Ukrainian

regime. Secretary of Defense James Mattis acknowledges that U.S. instructors are training Ukrainian military units at a base in western Ukraine. Washington also has approved two important arms sales to Kiev’s ground forces in just the past nine months. The first transaction in December 2017 was limited to small arms that at least could be portrayed as purely defensive weapons. That agreement included the export of Model M107A1 Sniper Systems, ammunition, and

associated parts and accessories, a sale valued at $41.5 million. A transaction in April 2018 was more serious. Not only was it larger

($47 million), it included far more lethal weaponry, particularly 210 Javelin anti-tank missiles—the kind of weapons that

Barack Obama’s administration had declined to give Kiev. Needless to say, the Kremlin was not pleased about either sale. Moreover,

Congress soon passed legislation in May that authorized $250 million in military assistance, including lethal weaponry, to Ukraine in 2019. Congress had twice voted for military support on a similar scale during the last years of Obama’s administration, but the White House blocked implementation. The Trump

administration cleared that obstacle out of the way in December 2017 at the same time that it approved the initial small-weapons sale. The passage of the May 2018 legislation means that the path is now open for a dramatic escalation of U.S. military backing for Kiev. On September 1, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker disclosed during an interview with The

Guardian that Washington’s future military aid to Kiev would likely involve weapons sales to Ukraine’s air force and navy as well as the army. “The Javelins are mainly symbolic and it’s not clear if they would ever be used,” Aric Toler, a research scholar at the Atlantic Council, asserted. One could well dispute his sanguine conclusion, but even

Toler conceded: “Support for the Ukrainian navy and air defence would be a big deal. That would be far more significant.” Volker’s cavalier attitude about U.S. arms sales to a government locked in a crisis with Russia epitomizes the arrogance and tone-deaf nature of the views that too many U.S. foreign policy officials exhibit regarding the sensitive Ukraine issue. “We can have a conversation with Ukraine like we would with any other country about what do they need. I think that there’s going to be some discussion about naval capability because as you know their navy was basically taken by Russia [when the Soviet Union dissolved]. And so they need to rebuild a navy and they have very limited air capability as well. I think we’ll have to look

at air defence.” One suspects that Americans would be incensed at comparable actions by Moscow if the geo-strategic situations were reversed. Imagine if Russia (even a democratic Russia) had emerged from the wreckage of the Cold War as the undisputed global superpower, and a weakened United States had to watch as the Kremlin expanded a powerful, Russian-led military alliance to America’s borders, conducted alliance war games within sight of U.S. territory, interfered in Canada’s internal political affairs to oust a democratically elected pro-American government, and then pursued growing military ties with the new, anti-U.S. government in Ottawa. Yet that would be disturbingly similar to what Washington has done regarding NATO policy and U.S. relations with Ukraine. Moreover, although Kiev’s cheerleaders in the Western (especially U.S.) media like to portray Ukraine as a beleaguered democracy that plays the role of David to Russia’s evil Goliath, the reality is far murkier. Putin’s government overstates matters when it alleges that Ukraine’s 2014 Maidan revolution was a U.S.-orchestrated coup that brought outright fascists to power in Kiev. Nevertheless, that version contains more than a little truth. Prominent, powerful U.S. figures, most notably the late Senator John McCain and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland, openly sided with demonstrators seeking to unseat Ukraine’s elected government. Indeed, Nuland was caught on tape with U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt scheming about the desired composition of a new government in Kiev. It is unfair to portray Ukraine’s current administration led by President Petro Poroshenko as a neo-fascist regime. Post-revolution elections appear to have been

reasonably free and fair, and there are major factions that are committed to genuine democratic values. But Ukraine also is hardly a model of Western-style democracy. Not only is it afflicted with extensive graft and corruption, but some extreme nationalist and even neo-Nazi groups play a significant role in the “new” Ukraine. The notoriously fascist Azov Battalion, for example, continues to occupy a prominent position in Kiev’s efforts to defeat separatists in Ukraine’s eastern Donbass

region. Alexander Zakharchenko, prime minister of the self-declared Donetsk People’s Republic in the pro-Russia rebel-occupied city of Donetsk, was assassinated on September 1 and officials there and in Russia are blaming Kiev. The Ukrainian government has denied involvement. Other ultranationalist factions act as domestic militias that attempt to intimidate more moderate Ukrainians. Even the Poroshenko government itself has adopted troubling censorship measures and other

autocratic policies. Officials in both the Obama and Trump administration have taken a much too casual attitude toward U.S. cooperation with extremist elements and a deeply flawed Ukrainian government . Both the danger of stoking tensions with Moscow and becoming too close to a regime in Kiev that exhibits disturbing features should caution the Trump administration against boosting military aid to Ukraine . It is an unwise policy on strategic as well as moral grounds. Trump administration officials should refuse to be intimidated or stampeded into forging a risky and unsavory alliance with Kiev out of fear of being portrayed as excessively “soft” toward Russia. Instead, the president and his advisers need to spurn efforts to increase U.S. support for Ukraine. A good place to start would be to restore the Obama administration’s refusal to approve arms sales to Kiev. Washington must not pour gasoline on a geo-strategic fire that could lead to a full-blown crisis between the United States and Russia.

Russia War Adv

UQ

UQ – Sales Coming Now Ext.The brink is now – US will sell more weapons to UkraineKheel 19 (Rebecca Kheel is a staff writer for The Hill, The Hill, “US considering providing more weapons for Ukraine, general says,” 3/5, https://thehill.com/policy/defense/432659-general-us-considering-more-weapons-for-ukraine)

The United States is considering providing Ukraine with more weapons on top of the anti-tank missiles it has already sent, a top general said Tuesday. U.S. European Command chief Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti said any shipments still have to go through “policy deliberations,” but that weapons under consideration include naval systems to help Ukraine respond to incidents such as what happened in the Kerch Strait last year. “As recommendations for Ukraine, particularly on the lethal side, work its way, it has to go through the policy deliberations that provide authority to deploy those kinds of weapon systems,” he told the Senate Armed Services Committee. “There are other systems, sniper systems, ammunition and, perhaps looking at the Kerch Strait, perhaps consideration for naval systems, as well, here in the future as we move forward.” Asked by Armed Services Committee Chairman James Inhofe (R-Okla.) whether there needs to be language in

this year’s defense policy bill to allow that to happen, Scaparrotti said he “will have recommendations for that.” In November, Russia fired on three Ukrainian ships as they tried to transit the Kerch Strait, which links the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea. Several crew members were injured, and Russia seized the ships and their sailors. Russia has been detaining 24 Ukrainian sailors since, with Russian courts ruling several times to continue their detention. Last year, the United States sold Ukraine the Javelin anti-tank missile system to help bolster its fight against Russian-backed separatists. Before that, the United States had limited its support to Ukraine to nonlethal aid. The sale happened after contentious debate that dated back to the Obama administration over whether injecting such weapons into the conflict would make an already volatile situation worse. On Tuesday, Scaparrotti, who is also the supreme allied commander of NATO, said the Ukrainians have been “responsible” in their use of the anti-tank weapons. “The Ukrainians, in my view, have trained very well for the use of that,” he said. “They’ve been responsible in the security and the deployment of it, and we watch that closely. So they’ve handled that well.”

IL

I/L – SymbolismTrying to send a signal of strength to Moscow INCREASES the risk of retaliationKofman, 17 [Michael Kofman, global fellow at the Wilson Center and a nonresident fellow at the Modern War Institute, 8-25-2017, "For the U.S., Arming Ukraine Could Be a Deadly Mistake ," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/opinion/united-states-arm-ukraine-missiles.html -CC]

ARLINGTON, Va. — On his visit to Ukraine this week, the American defense secretary, Jim Mattis, confirmed that he favors providing “defensive weapons” to the former Soviet republic. According to recent reports, this military aid would involve sending Javelin anti-tank guided missiles to

Ukraine, which has been fighting Russian-backed separatists in the eastern Donbass region for more than three years. The Trump administration’s plan to arm Kiev is a serious political decision that could have far-reaching strategic consequences. The United States is walking into a proxy war with Moscow — one that it is unprepared to win. Notionally, helping Ukraine is admirable, but the lack of public discussion and suddenness of this announcement are worrisome. While arming Kiev may seem like an easy political win, it is poor policy. The idea of providing Ukraine with $50 million-worth of anti-tank missiles is eerily reminiscent of Washington’s halfhearted efforts to train and arm the moderate Syrian opposition. That plan was ill-conceived

and ended in defeat after Russia escalated its military backing of the government of President Bashar al-Assad in 2015. Russia’s interests in Ukraine are far greater and its military superiority is well established. In contrast, the United States’ coercive credibility in the region is close to nonexistent. The proposal to send arms to Kiev is also untimely. Ukraine has not seen a Russian offensive, or lost significant territory to Russia, in more than two years. Of all the possible ways to help the country improve its armed forces, dumping missiles on an unreformed military hardly seems the smart way forward. This is the time to help the country transform, not play geopolitical checkers with missiles. Leading American generals in the region, like the commander of the U.S. Army in Europe, Lt. Gen.

Ben Hodges, have long arguedthat providing Ukraine with arms, specifically Javelins, would “not change the situation strategically in a positive way.” There is no indication of a forthcoming Russian attack, but in any case, the asymmetry of power between the two countries is so great that no sensible analyst would argue that a few portable antitank missiles could tip the balance. Given the nature of the conflict, there is little chance of exhausting Russia in Ukraine. The Javelin is also an expensive and impractical choice to give a country with a large military that already has anti-tank guided missiles, and makes its own. For $50 million, which will equip only a fraction of Ukraine’s armed forces with Javelins, Kiev could obtain a much larger number of comparable weapons from other countries or manufacture more at home. Most of the casualties in eastern Ukraine have been, and continue to be, from artillery and small-arms fire. The conflict has seen very few tank battles; those that did occur were among small units. Despite the vaunted number of Russian tanks in Ukraine — a figure that is likely exaggerated — this has never been a war of major tank offensives. Ukraine’s armed forces did employ anti-tank guided missiles and inflicted losses on the separatists during the battles of August 2014 and February 2015. Yet Kiev failed to achieve victory, and the losses had little discernible deterrent effect on Russia, which was always fighting for strategic leverage rather than territory. The push to supply Javelin missiles to Ukraine is really a political decision that would turn the conflict between Russia and Ukraine into a proxy war between the United States and Russia. Ukrainians may understandably dream of Washington’s joining the conflict, but American policy makers should remember that their obligation is to their own national interest.

Washington should focus its attention instead on its NATO allies. If the Trump administration’s intent is to send a signal to Moscow, then American officials should remember that there are many in the Kremlin willing to send a signal back. Have they considered the balance of interests, and the capabilities both sides can bring to bear? Don’t bet on it. The United States should also exercise caution in the signals it sends Ukraine. There is moral hazard for Washington in belligerently proclaiming support for a nation when it has zero intention to fight on that nation’s behalf. Syria is a recent case study of how not to win a proxy war that merits closer examination before the United States embarks on another impulsive venture. To threaten arming Ukraine would make sense as part of a hard-nosed negotiation with Moscow, or as a way to deter Russia from arming insurgent groups in other conflict zones where the United States is involved militarily, like Afghanistan. But there seems to be no such strategic purpose here; senior administration officials simply want to give Ukraine missiles. Should the Javelin plan go through, the United States will have wasted its potential future leverage against a geopolitical

adversary by burning one of the few cards it holds for a political gesture of limited value. If the Trump administration sees the conflict in Ukraine as part of a new Cold War, it should think harder about how it plans to win it. Empty signals or a few missiles will not prevail against this kind of adversary, and they’re not a smart way to help Ukraine, either.

I/L – Russia Increase Rebel SupportSelling Arms Hurts Ukraine and sparks acrimony with Russia – risks Putin beefing up support for rebelsDavis, 18

Daniel L. Davis, senior fellow for Defense Priorities and a former lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army who retired in 2015 after twenty-one years, including four combat deployments., 3-14-2018, "What Does America Gain by Arming Ukraine?," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/what-does-america-gain-by-arming-ukraine-24901 #CCCool

On March 1, the State Department authorized the sale of 210 Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine. Sen. Joni Ernst (R-IA), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, applauded the sale because she said it shows the United States is “serious about

protecting the interests of our nation,” and will help Kiev “push back against growing Russian aggression.” It is more likely, however, that this sale will accomplish the opposite. The official press release from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) in regards to the sale claimed that the weapons “will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the

United States by improving the security of Ukraine.” Yet it is no small distinction to point out that Ukraine is not an ally of the United States, and we must question why improving their security is worth degrading our relations with a nuclear-armed Russia. A military alliance is a commitment to another party that we will sacrifice American sons

and daughters for their benefit. To make such a significant sacrifice, there must be a vital national interest at stake for America. As important, entering into an alliance requires that the other side be willing to sacrifice for our security, and that the ties result in a benefit to the United States. None of those factors exist in this case. The benefit is all to Kiev—and America absorbs risk without the potential for reward. Not only will the sale of lethal arms not materially help Ukraine, but also it will likely increase Russian and separatist opposition, worsening the situation. A change in the methodology of how the government engages internationally is needed. Whether in Ukraine or another international engagement, if an honest analysis reveals that the United States has merely a secondary or tertiary interest—rather than a core national interest—yet commits itself to expending valuable political or military capital, the chances are high that such engagement would end up costing more than would be gained. Why should Washington spend money and risk the lives of our troops for a mission that

would leave the country at a net loss? In the current standoff in the Ukraine, Washington would certainly prefer to see a peaceful resolution to the violence. For Moscow and Kiev, however, the matter is existential, meaning each is willing to expend considerable capital and take significant risks to resolve the conflict in their favor. The 210 anti-tank missiles the State Department authorized is enough to equip four or five mechanized or infantry battalions for a short period of time. These missiles could provide a momentary tactical advantage, but strategically, the quantity is insufficient to tilt the balance of power with Russia and its allied forces. In the latter stages of the Cold War, I was an officer in the 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2-2 ACR), a heavily armored unit composed of large numbers of tanks and armored infantry carriers. In 1991, 2-2 ACR was sent to Iraq to fight Saddam Hussein’s armored divisions, which had invaded Kuwait. At the Battle of 73 Easting, my squadron (a battalion-sized armored unit), fought

against a brigade of an Iraqi armored division. During that battle, three cavalry troops of 2nd ACR—approximately the size of one mechanized battalion—fired 125 tank rounds and eighty anti-tank missiles. In the span of less than six hours, one battalion-sized unit fired the equivalent of 38 percent of the entire missile sale to Ukraine. Thus, no matter how it is billed in Washington, this sale will not “push back” against Russian aggression, nor is it in the “interests of our nation.” But while sending these missiles isn’t enough to tip the military balance in Ukraine, it is more than enough to convince Russia to increase its involvement. Those missiles represent a clear increase in the risk to Russia and their proxy forces within eastern Ukraine because it

signals that Washington may be willing to provide even greater lethal support to their opponent. It is therefore likely Moscow will take stronger action to counter the threat to discourage even greater American engagement. This support could take the form of Putin sending more armor, anti-armor missiles of his own, more unofficial Russian troops, greater intelligence support for allied forces, or some other response that brings more violence and destruction to the Donbas region—the people we’re ostensibly trying to help. It is reasonable and appropriate for the United States to promote the good of others abroad and to champion our values as an exemplar, a shining city on a hill. But we should only use, or threaten to use, military power when American security,

economic prosperity, or our way of life are directly threatened. Washington’s intention with the missile sale may be to increase the pain felt by Putin to drive him to a negotiated settlement, but the actual result will almost certainly be a further militarization of the situation and an increase in the potential for an expansion of the conflict. Far from improving American security, this sale will undermine it. Far from protecting Ukrainians, sending these missiles will place them at increasing risk.

I/L – Russia Retaliation I/LArming Ukraine is bad – ensures Russian retaliation and the use of WMDMearsheimer 15, (John J. Mearsheimer, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, is the author of “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.”, The New York Times, “Don't Arm Ukraine,” February 8, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/opinion/dont-arm-ukraine.html)

The Ukraine crisis is almost a year old and Russia is winning. The separatists in eastern Ukraine are gaining ground and Russia’s president,

Vladimir V. Putin, shows no signs of backing down in the face of Western economic sanctions. Unsurprisingly, a growing chorus of voices in the United States is calling for arming Ukraine . A recent report from three leading American think tanks endorses sending Kiev advanced weaponry, and the White House’s nominee for secretary of defense, Ashton B. Carter, said last week to the Senate armed services committee, “I very much incline in that direction.” They are wrong. Going down that road would be a huge mistake for the U nited S tates, NATO and Ukraine itself . Sending weapons to Ukraine will not rescue its army and will instead l ead to an escalation in the fighting. Such a step is especially dangerous because Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons and is seeking to defend a vital strategic interest. There is no question that Ukraine’s military is badly outgunned by the separatists, who have Russian troops and weapons on their side. Because the balance of power decisively favors Moscow , Washington would have to send large amounts of equipment fo r Ukraine’s army to have a fighting chance . But the conflict will not end there. Russia would counter-escalate, taking away any temporary benefit Kiev might get from American arms. The authors of the think tank study concede this, noting that “even with enormous support from the West, the Ukrainian Army will not be able to defeat a determined attack by the Russian military.” In short, the U nited S tates c annot win an arms race with Russia over Ukraine and thereby ensure Russia’s defeat on the battlefield. Proponents of arming Ukraine have a second line of argument. The key to success, they maintain, is not to defeat Russia militarily, but to raise the costs of fighting to the point where Mr. Putin will cave. The pain will supposedly compel Moscow to withdraw its troops from Ukraine and

allow it to join the European Union and NATO and become an ally of the West. This coercive strategy is also unlikely to work, no matter how much punishment the West inflicts. What advocates of arming Ukraine fail to understand is that Russian leaders believe their country’s core strategic interests are at stake in Ukraine; they are unlikely to give ground , even if it means absorbing huge costs. Great powers react harshly when distant rivals project military power into their neighborhood, much less attempt to make a country on their border an ally. This is why the United States has the Monroe Doctrine, and today no American leader would ever tolerate Canada or Mexico joining a military alliance headed by another great power. Russia is no exception in this regard. Thus Mr. Putin has not budged in the face of sanctions and is unlikely to make meaningful

concessions if the costs of the fighting in Ukraine increase. Upping the ante in Ukraine also risks unwanted escalation. Not only would the fighting in eastern Ukraine be sure to intensify , but it could also spread to other areas. The consequences for Ukraine, which already faces profound economic and social problems, would be disastrous. The possibility that Mr. Putin might end up making nuclear threats may seem remote, but if the goal of arming Ukraine is to drive up the costs of Russian interference and eventually put Moscow in an acute situation, it cannot be ruled out. If Western pressure succeeded and Mr. Putin felt desperate, he would have a powerful incentive to try to rescue the situation by rattl ing the nuclear saber. Our understanding of the mechanisms of escalation in crises and war is limited at best, although we know the risks are considerable.

Pushing a nuclear-armed Russia into a corner would be playing with fire. Advocate s of arming Ukraine recognize the escalation problem, which is why they stress giving Kiev “defensive,” not “offensive ,” weapons. Unfortunately, there is no useful distinction between these categories: All weapons can be used for attacking and defending . The West can be sure, though, that Moscow will not see those American weapons as “defensive ,” given that Washington is determined to reverse the status quo in eastern Ukraine. The only way to solve the Ukraine crisis is diplomatically, not militarily. Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, seems to recognize that fact, as she has said Germany will not ship arms to Kiev. Her problem, however, is that she does not know how to bring the crisis to an end.

She and other European leaders still labor under the delusion that Ukraine can be pulled out of Russia’s orbit and incorporated into the West, and that Russian leaders must accept that outcome. They will not. To save Ukraine and eventually restore a working relationship with Moscow, the West should seek to make Ukraine a neutral buffer state between Russia and NATO. It should look like Austria during the Cold War. Toward that end, the West should explicitly take European Union and NATO expansion off the table, and emphasize that its goal is a nonaligned Ukraine that does not threaten Russia. The United States and its allies should also work with Mr. Putin to rescue Ukraine’s economy, a goal that is

clearly in everyone’s interest. It is essential that Russia help end the fighting in eastern Ukraine and that Kiev regain control over that region. Still, the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk should be given substantial autonomy, and protection for Russian language rights should be a top priority. Crimea, a casualty of the West’s attempt to march NATO and the European Union up to Russia’s doorstep, is surely lost for good. It is time to end that imprudent policy before more damage is done — to Ukraine and to relations between Russia and the West.

Impact

Trump Miscalc MagnifierTrump makes miscalc more dangerousWard, 12/26

Alex Ward, 12-26-2018, "This is exactly how a nuclear war would kill you," Vox, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/19/17873822/nuclear-war-weapons-bombs-how-kill #CCCool

Matthew Kroenig has witnessed firsthand the growing fear that nuclear war is imminent. A professor at Georgetown University, he’s taught an undergraduate course on nuclear weapons and world politics for the past decade. He always asks the same question on the last day: How many of his students think they’ll see nuclear weapons used in their lifetime? For many years, no more than one student would raise their hand. That made sense, he told me, because in those days, “talking about nuclear war was like talking about dinosaurs — it’s just something from the past that won’t be something in our future.” But the past couple of years have been different. When he asked that question again this spring, roughly 60 percent of his students raised their hands. What’s more, he agrees with them. “If I had to bet at least one nuclear weapon would be used in my lifetime,” says the 40-year-old Kroenig, “my bet would be yes.” Kroenig and his students are not alone. A January 2018 World

Economic Forum survey of 1,000 leaders from government, business, and other industries identified nuclear war as a top threat. The widespread concern is understandable. Last year, it seemed a nuclear conflict between the US and North Korea was on the

horizon. India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed enemies, could restart their decades-long squabble at any time. And the US and Russia — the world’s foremost nuclear powers — have had warheads pointed at each other since the earliest days of the Cold War. President Donald Trump’s presence in the Oval Office has increased worries of a potential nuclear war. In January, a poll showed about 52 percent of Americans — many of them Democrats — worried that the president would launch a nuclear attack without reason. So what is the risk of a nuclear war, really? After speaking with more than a dozen experts familiar with the horrors of nuclear conflict, the answer is that the chances are small — verysmall. But that may not be too comforting,

says Alexandra Bell, a nuclear expert at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. “The chance is not zero because nuclear weapons exist,” she says. And the damage would be incalculable; all it takes is just one strike to conceivably kill hundreds of thousands of people within minutes and perhaps millions more in the following days, weeks, and years. What’s more, that first strike could trigger a series of events, leading to a widespread famine caused by a rapidly cooling climate that could potentially end civilization as we know it. Below, then, is a guide to who has nuclear weapons, how they might be used, where they could drop in the future, what happens if they do — and if humanity could survive it. Two countries have nearly all the world’s nuclear weapons Nations typically want nuclear weapons for two reasons: self-defense — why would anyone attack a country that could respond with the world’s most destructive bombs? — and global prestige. Not every government can afford them because nukes take billions of dollars to build, maintain, and launch properly. The proliferation process is also risky, MIT nuclear expert Vipin Narang told me, because seeking a nuke makes a country a potential target. A nuclear bomb-seeking country is typically vulnerable to attack. Today, only nine countries own the entirety of the roughly 14,500 nuclear weapons on Earth. That’s down from the peak of about 70,300 in 1986, according to an estimate by Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris of the Federation of

American Scientists. [Graph Omitted] Two countries account for the rise and fall in the global nuclear stockpile: Russia and the United States. They currently possess 93 percent of all nuclear weapons, w ith Moscow holding 6,850 and Washington another 6,450 (which is smaller than the 40,000 that Russia, then known as the Soviet Union, had in the 1980s and the roughly 30,000 the US had in the mid-1960s through mid-70s). During the Cold War, each side built up its arsenal in a bid to protect itself from the other. Having the ability to attack any major city or strategic military position with a massive bomb, the thinking went, would make the cost of war so high that no one would want to fight. But two developments in particular led to the precipitous drop, Alex Wellerstein, a nuclear historian at the Stevens Institute of Technology, told me. First, Russia and the US signed a slew of treaties from the 1970s onward to reduce and cap parts of their nuclear programs. Second, both sides learned to hit targets with extreme precision. That negated the need for so many bombs to obliterate a target. [Graph Omitted] The US and Russia, though, still maintain thousands of nuclear weapons while the other seven countries — the UK, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea — have no more than a few hundred. Still, every country has more

than enough weapons to cause suffering on a scale never seen in human history. Six easy steps to nuclear war The question, then, is not just who might actually use the weapons they own, but how? It turns out it’s a lot easier to launch than you might want to believe. The way leaders could launch their nuclear weapons vary. For example, North Korean leader Kim

Jong Un could likely order one without any checks on his authority. Russian President Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, would put the country’s forces on high alert if it detected an incoming nuclear-tipped missile, Russian forces

expert Pavel Podvig told me. The Russian military could respond in kind if troops noted a loss of communication with Putin and it confirmed nuclear detonations elsewhere in the country, Podvig added. While we can’t say for certain what Putin would do, it is definitely possible that he would order a nuclear strike first if he felt he needed to. Still, he says Moscow would only respond to being attacked. “Only when we become convinced that there is an incoming attack on the territory of Russia, and that happens within seconds, only after that we would launch a

retaliatory strike,” Putin said during a conference in Sochi on October 18. And if Trump decided to attack, say, North Korea with a

nuclear bomb, it would be hard to stop him from doing so because he has complete authority over the launching process. “The president can order a nuclear strike in about the time it takes to write a tweet ,” Joe Cirincione, the president of the Ploughshares Fund, a foundation that works to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, told Vox’s Lindsay

Maizland in August 2017. Here’s how the American system works: 1) The president decides a nuclear strike is necessary It’s unlikely that the United States would turn to nuclear weapons as a first resort in a conflict. There are plenty of nonnuclear options available —

such as launching airstrikes to try to take out an adversary’s nuclear arsenal. But the United States has consistently refused to adopt a “no first use” policy — a policy not to be the first one in a conflict to use a nuclear weapon, and to use them only if the other side uses them first. That means Trump could theoretically decide to launch a nuclear strike before an adversary’s nukes go off in America. In the heat of battle, the US military might detect an incoming nuclear attack from North Korea and the president could decide to respond with a similar strike. Either way, the president is

the one who ultimately decides to put the process of launching a nuclear strike in motion — but he still has a few steps to complete. 2) A US military officer opens the “football” Once the president has decided the situation requires a nuclear strike, the military officer who is always by the president’s side opens the “football.” The leather-clad case contains an outline of the nuclear options available to the president

— including possible targets, like military installations or cities, that the US’s roughly 800 nuclear weapons ready to launch within minutes can hit — and instructions for contacting US military commanders and giving them orders to launch the missiles with warheads on them. 3) Trump talks with military and civilian advisers The president is the sole decision-maker, but he would consult with civilian and military advisers before he issues the order to launch a nuclear weapon. A key person Trump must talk to is the Pentagon’s deputy director of operations in charge of the National Military Command Center, or “war room,” the heart of the Defense Department that directs nuclear command and control. The president can include whomever else he wants in the conversation. He would almost certainly consult Gen. John Hyten, commander of US Strategic Command, since Hyten is responsible for knowing what the US can hit with its nuclear weapons. But Trump would likely also include Defense Secretary James Mattis, National Security Adviser John Bolton, and Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in that conversation as well. The chat also doesn’t have to be held in the White House’s Situation Room; it can happen anywhere over a secured phone line. If any of the advisers felt such an attack would be illegal — like if Trump simply wanted to nuke Pyongyang despite no apparent threat — they could advise the president

against going ahead with the strike. Last November, Hyten publicly said he wouldn’t accept an illegal order from Trump to launch a nuclear attack. “He’ll tell me what to do, and if it’s illegal, guess what’s going to happen?” Hyten told an audience at the Halifax International Security Forum last year. “I’m gonna say, ‘Mr. President, that’s illegal.’” He continued by outlining what the military could consider an illegal order: if a nuclear attack isn’t proportional to the actual threat, for instance, or if the attack would cause unnecessary suffering. However, what does and doesn’t constitute a

“legal” order is still up for debate and was the focus of a congressional hearing last November. Either way, if Hyten refused to follow the order, Trump could fire him and replace him with someone who would carry it out. 4) The president gives the official order to strike After the conversation, a senior officer in the “war room” has to formally verify that the command is coming from the president. The officers recite a code — “Bravo Charlie,” for example — and the president must then respond with a code printed on the “biscuit,” the card with the codes on it. Then members of the “war room” communicate with the people who will initiate and launch the attack. Depending on the plan chosen by the president, the command will go to US crews operating the submarines carrying nuclear

missiles, warplanes that can drop nuclear bombs, or troops overseeing intercontinental ballistic missiles on land. 5) Launch crews prepare to attack The launch crews receive the plan and prepare for attack. This involves unlocking various safes, entering a series of

codes, and turning keys to launch the missiles. Crews must “execute the order, not question it,” Cirincione told Maizland. 6)

Missiles fly toward the enemy It could take as little as five minutes for intercontinental ballistic missiles to launch from the time the president officially orders a strike. Missiles launched from submarines take about 15 minutes . And then the president waits to see if they hit their target. The three main risks of nuclear war — and one wild card Those that have nuclear weapons, many have argued, will never use them. The destruction and human devastation is so unimaginable that it’s hard to believe a world leader will launch them again, they say. But no one can guarantee they won’t be used at least once more — and that possibility keeps most nuclear experts up at night. They disagree wildly as to what the next nuclear use might look like or how it might happen, but they almost

unanimously cite the same three risks. 1) US vs. North Korea war The potential nuclear conflict between the United States and North Korea worries most experts — and likely most people on Earth. That makes sense: Trump and Kim, the North Korean premier, spent most of 2017 threatening to bomb each other with nuclear weapons. Kim actually gained a missile capable enough of reaching the entirety of the United States, although questions remain about whether it could make it all the way with a warhead on top and detonate. Still, there remains a genuine fear — perhaps slightly allayed now following Washington and Pyongyang’s diplomatic thaw — that the leaders might escalate their public squabble into a nuclear conflict. In February, Yochi Dreazen wrote for Vox that “a full-blown war with North Korea wouldn’t be as bad as you think. It would be much, much worse,” in part because “millions — plural — would die.” As Dreazen recounts, the US would likely have to send in around 200,000 troops to destroy Kim’s nuclear arsenal. Seoul, South Korea’s capital, would soon — if not already — lie in ruins due to North Korea’s large artillery capabilities. None of that may even be the worst part: Bruce Klingner, a 20-year veteran of the CIA who spent years studying North Korea, told me that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein had stood by in 2002 as the US methodically built up the forces it used to invade the country — and oust Hussein — the following year. He said there was little chance that Kim would follow in Hussein’s footsteps and patiently allow the Pentagon to deploy the troops and equipment it would need for a full-on war with North Korea. “The conventional wisdom used to be that North Korea would use only nuclear weapons as part of a last gasp, twilight of the gods, pull the temple down upon themselves kind of move,” said Klingner, who now works for the conservative Heritage Foundation. “But we have to prepare for the real possibility that Kim would use nuclear weapons in the early stages of a conflict, not the latter ones.” In effect, any attempt to overthrow the Kim regime would prompt North Korea to launch nukes at the United States. Washington would almost certainly respond in kind, leading to one of the worst wars

in world history. 2) US vs. Russia war Few experts discounted the idea that the US and Russia could yet engage in a nuclear war despite a decades-long standoff. After all, they’ve come close a few times. Here are just two examples: In September 1983, a missile attack system made it seem like the US had launched weapons at the Soviet Union. One man, Soviet Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, decided it was a false alarm and didn’t report the alert. Had he done so, Moscow likely would’ve responded with an actual nuclear strike. Two months later, a too-real NATO war game — Able Archer 83 — made the Soviets believe Western forces were preparing for an actual attack. Moscow put its nuclear arsenal on high alert, but ultimately, neither side came to nuclear blows. Today, two main reasons

explain why a US-Russia nuclear fight is a major concern. The first is the most obvious: Moscow just has so many nuclear weapons. Russia is the only country that could match the US bomb-for-bomb in any conflict. The longer Moscow has its weapons, the thinking goes, the higher the chance it uses them on the US — or vice versa. The second reason is the most troublesome: Washington and Moscow may be on a collision course. Russia is expanding further into Europe and encroaching on NATO territory. There’s even fear that Putin might authorize an invasion of a Baltic country that once was a part of the Soviet Union but is now in NATO. If that happens, the US would be treaty-bound to defend the Baltic country, almost assuredly setting up a shooting war with Moscow. Experts disagree on what would happen next. Some, including the Trump administration , claim Russia would use nuclear weapons early in a fight as a way to “escalate to deescalate” — do something so brash at the start of a conflict that it has to end before it gets even worse. Others say Russia would use the weapons only if its forces are on the brink of defeat . But Olga Oliker

and Andrey Baklitskiy, experts on Russia’s nuclear strategy, wrote at War on the Rocks in February that Moscow’s “military doctrine clearly states that nuclear weapons will be used only in response to an adversary using nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction,” or if the country’s survival is in doubt. In other words, they say Russia would only use nukes in retaliation or to avoid certain extinction. Washington, of course, would likely respond with its own nuclear strikes after Moscow dropped its bombs. At that point, they’d be in a full-blown nuclear war with the potential to destroy each other and much of the world (more on that below ). 3) India vs. Pakistan war India and Pakistan have gone to war four times since 1947, when Britain partitioned what had been a single colony into Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan. The worry today, though, is that a fifth conflict could go nuclear. After decades of testing, India officially became a nuclear power in 1998. Islamabad, which had started a uranium enrichment program in the 1970s, soon joined New Delhi in the nuclear club. Two of their fights — the 1999 Kargil War and the 2001-’02 Twin Peaks Crisis — happened with fully functioning nuclear arsenals, but ultimately, neither country chose to use them. But the opportunity keeps presenting itself. Each side claims the other has violated an ongoing ceasefire in the contested, but India-administered, Kashmir region. The region continues to be roiled by violence; for instance, six people were killed in separate instances on September 27. The dispute over Kashmir is a key reason for current India-Pakistan tensions — and has the potential to spiral out of control. Some fear that India and Pakistan may reach for the proverbial nuclear button sooner rather than later. Here’s just one reason why, according to an April report by Tom Hundley for Vox: The Pakistan navy is likely to soon place nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on up to three of its five French-built diesel-electric submarines. ... Even more disturbing, Pakistani military authorities say they are considering the possibility of putting nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on surface vessels. ... Pakistan says its decision to add nuclear weapons to its navy is a direct response to India’s August 2016 deployment of its first nuclear submarine, the Arihant. A second, even more advanced Indian nuclear submarine, the Arighat, began sea trials last November, and four more boats are scheduled to join the fleet by 2025. That will give India a complete “nuclear triad,” which means the country will have the ability to deliver a nuclear strike by land-based missiles, by warplanes, and by submarines. In effect, India and Pakistan are in a nuclear arms race, and historical enemies will soon patrol

dangerous waters in close proximity with nuclear weapons aboard their vessels. While there’s no real indication a fifth India-Pakistan war is on the horizon, it’s possible one flare-up puts both countries on the path to a nuclear crisis. Wild card: Trump’s temperament Cirincione, the head

of the Ploughshares Fund, told me the risk of nuclear war is increasing because of one factor: Trump. “He is the greatest nuclear risk in the world, more than any person, any group, or any nation,” he said. “The policies he is pursuing are making most of our nuclear risks worse, and he is tearing down the global institutions that have reduced and restrained nuclear risks over the last few decades.” Here’s what he means: The administration’s Nuclear Posture Review , released in February, lowered the threshold for dropping a bomb on an enemy. Basically, the US said that it would launch low-yield nuclear weapons — smaller, less deadly bombs — in response to nonnuclear strikes, such as a major cyberattack. That was in contrast with previous US administrations, which said they would respond with a nuke only in the event of the most egregious threats against the US, like the possible use of a biological

weapon. The document also calls for more, smaller weapons on submarines and other platforms to attack enemies. Many experts worry that having tinier nukes makes them more usable, thereby increasing the chance of a skirmish turning into a full-blown nuclear war. (Think, for example, of the US-China trade war escalating to the point that Trump thinks his only option is to launch a smaller nuke, or how Trump could respond to Beijing after a devastating cyberattack on US infrastructure.) Plus, increasing the arsenal in this way would partially undo decades of the US’s work to stop nuclear proliferation around the world. Some experts, like Georgetown’s Kroenig, say having smaller tactical weapons is actually a good idea. Our current arsenal, which prioritizes older and bigger nukes, leads adversaries to think we would never use it. Having smaller bombs that America might use, then, makes the chance of a nuclear conflict less likely. “It gives us more options to threaten that limited response,” Kroenig told me. “We raise the bar with these lower-yield

weapons.” But the Trump risk may have less to do with what kinds of bombs he has and more to do with his temperament. Take his tweet from January 2 toward the end of his spat with Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader: [Tweet Omitted] While tensions with North Korea were high early on in Trump’s presidency, he has yet to face a situation, like his predecessors did, where it seemed nuclear war was likely. The 13-day Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, where the Soviet Union had secretly placed missiles in Cuba — just 90 miles from the US mainland — comes to mind. Members of President John F. Kennedy’s team, especially his military advisers, called for airstrikes on Cuba and even an invasion. But Kennedy decided to set up a blockade of the island and try to work out a diplomatic settlement with the Soviets, in part because a military confrontation might turn nuclear. Ultimately, the situation ended when they agreed on a deal: The Soviets would withdraw the missiles from the island, and the US would take out its missiles in Turkey. Before that conclusion, both sides came

as close to nuclear war as ever. How would Trump handle himself in a similar situation? Would he resist the urges of some in his military brass to strike an enemy — perhaps with a lower-yield nuke — or would he

simply tweet out a threat in a hair-trigger moment? The fact is we don’t know — but what we do know about Trump makes his demeanor in such a situation a potential, even if very small, nuclear risk . Here’s what happens in a nuclear attack The theory around whether someone might drop a nuclear bomb takes away from the most serious matter in these discussions: the human and physical toll.

US-Russia War = ExtinctionUS Russia War most likely to cause extinctionFarquhar et al, 17

Sebastian Farquhar John Halstead Owen Cotton-Barratt Stefan Schubert Haydn Belfield Andrew Snyder-Beattie, 23-01-2017, " Existential Risk Diplomacy and Governance," Global Priorities Project 2017, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf #CCCool

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter. According to one model 9 , an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to

lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns. It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the EXAMPLES OF RISKS CATEGORISED ACCORDING TO SCOPE AND SEVERITY Damaging Catastrophic Fatal SEVERITY SCOPE Local Increase in regional air pollution A severe regional epidemic Genocide of entire nation Personal Broken arm Paralysed by car crash Death Global Ozone layer depletion Global warming of 6°C Asteroid causes human extinction 8 EXISTENTIAL RISK: DIPLOMACY AND GOVERNANCE GLOBAL PRIORITIES PROJECT 2017 next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively

modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.

Russia Relations Adv

UQ

UQ – Arms Sales – Ext.Trump is raising tensions with Russia by arming UkraineDarius Shahtahmasebi, 1-9-2018, (Darius Shahtahmasebi is a practicing attorney with an interest in human rights, international law, and journalism. He is a graduate of the University of Otago, where he obtained degrees in Law and Japanese. "Trump Continues Obama-Era Saber Rattling With Russia By Arming Ukraine," MintPress News, https://www.mintpressnews.com/trump-continues-obama-era-saber-rattling-russia-arming-ukraine/236101/ //EH

KIEV, UKRAINE (Analysis) — Despite the mainstream media’s insistence that U.S. President Donald Trump is some sort of compromised Russian lackey, the fact is that at the end of last year, his administration approved the largest U.S. commercial sale of lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine since 2014 . This is a move that clearly infuriates and angers Russia, souring relations between the two countries even more so than they already had been under the Obama administration (and in various stages throughout Trump’s first year in

office). According to The Washington Post, administration officials confirmed that in December the State Department had approved a commercial license authorizing the export of Model M107A1 Sniper Systems, ammunition, and other associated parts and accessories to Ukraine — a package valued at $41.5 million. At first, it was reported there had not yet been approval to export the heavier weaponry the Ukrainian government had

been asking for, such as anti-tank missiles. However, by the end of December, reports began surfacing that the Trump administration was in fact going to provide 35 FGM-148 Javelin launchers and 210 anti-tank missiles. The Javelin is allegedly one of the most advanced anti-tank systems on the market. The total package is now valued at $47 million, and it wouldn’t be surprising if this figure continues to rise in the weeks to come.

Even under the 2014 Ukraine Freedom Support Act, the Obama administration never authorized large commercial or government arms sales, thereby making the recent announcement the first time that the U.S. will provide “lethal” weapons to the Ukraine military. One senior congressional official said that he predicted this would be just the beginning, stating that the U.S. had “crossed the Rubicon; this is lethal weapons and I predict more will be coming,” according to the Post.

Foreign Policy’s Michael Carpenter suggested that NATO countries should follow suit and also provide Ukraine with the arms it needs to counter the so-called threat of Russia. Considering that in September 2017 Russia proposed that UN peacekeepers be deployed to Ukraine, it should be clear that the U.S. is more bent on escalating this conflict than on resolving it. Russia has already responded in kind, with Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stating that the U.S. has become an accomplice in the war and that these developments make it impossible for Russia to remain “indifferent,”

thereby forcing Russia to consider retaliation measures in response. The U.S. is the world’s largest arms dealer. The U.S. arms so many countries so much of the time that most of us barely blink. And yet, even taking at face value America’s stated goals of spreading democracy and promoting human rights, the facts on the ground appear to run contrary to those ideals and the U.S. is well aware of these contradictions . In reality,

the United States intervened covertly in Ukraine in 2014 because Russia and Europe were growing far too close to each other for America’s comfort, with Russia supplying at least 30 percent of Europe’s gas supply. This was an issue particularly in relation to Germany’s growing fondness for Russian gas, as Germany is set to become the EU’s major player. This is a deal-breaker for Washington, which would rather support known neo-Nazis and anti-Semites in order to install a right-wing government capable of opposing Russia as close to the Russian border as one can get. On February 7, 2014, the BBC published a transcript of a bugged phone conversation between Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Geoffrey Pyatt. In this phone call, the U.S. officials were openly discussing who should form Ukraine’s government even before the president, Viktor Yanukovych, had

been successfully ousted from power. In other words, the U.S. was actively doing to Russia’s neighbour what the corporate media and various elements of the intelligence communities have accused Russia of doing to the U.S. during the 2016 elections. As The Nation explained: “In the intercepted phone call between U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Victoria Nuland and U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt, the two were, as Russian expert Stephen Cohen put it to Democracy Now, ‘plotting a coup d’état against the elected president of Ukraine.’” [emphasis added] “Good. I don’t think Klitsch

[opposition leader Vitaly Klitschko] should go into the government. I don’t think it’s necessary, I don’t think it’s a good idea,” Nuland said in the call, as transcribed by the BBC. Pyatt responded: “Yeah. I guess… in terms of him not going into the government, just let him stay out and do his political homework and stuff. I’m just thinking in terms of sort of the process moving ahead we want to keep the moderate democrats together. The problem is going to be Tyahnybok [Oleh Tyahnybok, an opposition leader] and his guys and I’m sure that’s part of what [President Viktor] Yanukovych is calculating on all this.” Nuland added: “I think Yats [opposition leader Arseniy Yatseniuk] is the guy who’s got the economic experience, the governing experience. He’s the… what he needs is Klitsch and Tyahnybok on the outside. He needs to be talking to them four times a week, you know. I just think Klitsch going in… he’s going to be at that level working for Yatseniuk, it’s just not going to work.” Oleh Tyahnybok, who had met with Senator John McCain one year prior, is the leader of the right-wing nationalist party Svoboda. When Svoboda was founded in 1995, the party had a swastika-like logo. As Business Insider explains, Tyahnybok is also a known anti-Semite: “Tyahnybok himself was expelled from the Our Ukraine parliamentary faction in 2004 after giving a speech demanding that Ukrainians fight against a ‘Muscovite-Jewish mafia’ (he later clarified this by saying that he actually had Jewish friends and was only against to ‘a group of Jewish oligarchs who control Ukraine and against Jewish-Bolsheviks [in the past]’). In 2005 he wrote open letters demanding Ukraine do more to halt ‘criminal activities’ of ‘organized Jewry,’ and, even now, Svoboda openly calls for Ukrainian citizens to have their ethnicity printed onto their passports.” When the protests broke out in Ukraine in 2014, the entire movement was hijacked by these racist elements. “You’d never know from most of the reporting that far-right nationalists and fascists have been at the heart of the protests and attacks on government buildings,” reported Seumas Milne of The Guardian. Just days ago, thousands marched in Kiev to celebrate the anniversary of far-right nationalist Stepan Bandera’s birthday. It is revealing that, when the U.S. decided to make a choice between a president they viewed as a Russian ally and the various ultra-right nationalist elements of Ukraine, Washington decided to help oust the former for the benefit of the latter. Eventually, it was reported that

a man named Petro Poroshenko would be taking up the reins after Yanukovych’s abdication. According to a cable obtained by WikiLeaks, Poroshenko previously worked as a mole for the U.S. State Department. The State Department even referred to Poroshenko as “our Ukrainian insider.” For those who truly believe the U.S. protects and promotes democracy while challenging tyranny and dictatorships across the globe, the truth about Washington’s support for puppet regimes that fail to garner the support of their own people is even worse than any anti-imperialist commentator could ever have imagined. In March last year, Foreign Affairs reported that Poroshenko had an approval rating as low as 17 percent. In September last year, the Japan Times reported that his approval rating had dropped to a single digit. Some reports say it was as low as 2 percent. October last year saw his approval rating grow to its highest in recent times, reaching a stratospheric 14 percent. In other words, the Trump administration is actively propping up a failed administration in Europe, which does not have the support of 15 percent of its people. Even the far-right militias in Ukraine seem to have more support than the current government. Meanwhile, the U.S. has done nothing but its utmost to tear apart the respective democratically elected governments in Syria and Iran, both of which have far greater approval ratings than do Poroshenko and his administration. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said Washington’s recent decision to arm Ukraine will only make the conflict more deadly and suggested that Russia could be forced to

respond. “[The U.S. is] not a mediator. It’s an accomplice in fueling the war,” Ryabkov said in a statement. Clearly, Russia has a vested interest in not seeing another NATO ally on its borders, capable of pointing American missiles in its face on a daily basis. As The National Interest learned at the end of last year from recently declassified material, the U.S. did indeed break a promise at the end of the Cold War that NATO would expand “not one inch eastward.” George Washington University National Security Archives researchers Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton wrote in the National Security Archives: “The [recently declassified] documents show that multiple national leaders were considering and rejecting Central and Eastern European membership in NATO as of early 1990 and through 1991. That discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of East German territory, and that subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion, were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels.” The documents appear to confirm Russia’s assertion that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev accepted the proposal for German reunification (which Gorbachev could have vetoed) only in reliance upon these assurances from its American counterparts that NATO would not expand into Eastern Europe. This history is reminiscent of how Russia was further duped out of using its veto power on a U.N. Security Council Resolution in Libya in 2011, after having received assurances that the coalition would not pursue regime change. “I believe that your thoughts about the role of NATO in the current situation are the result of misunderstanding,” then-British Prime Minister John Major told Gorbachev, according to British Ambassador Rodric Braithwaite’s diary entry of March 5, 1991: “We are not talking about strengthening of NATO. We are talking about the coordination of efforts that is already happening in Europe between NATO and the West European Union, which, as it is envisioned, would allow all members of the European Community to contribute to enhance [our] security.” The documents also show that Russia had received these assurances from a number of other high-level officials. These officials included then-Secretary of State James Baker; President George H.W. Bush; West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher; West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl; former CIA Director Robert Gates; French leader Francois Mitterrand; Margaret Thatcher; British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd; and NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner. U.S. Army soldiers representing units participating in the the Anaconda-16 military exercise, attend the opening ceremony, in Warsaw, Poland, Monday, June 6, 2016. Poland and some NATO members launched their biggest ever exercise, involving some 31,000 troops in a show of force to neighboring Russia. U.S. Army soldiers representing

units participating in the the Anaconda-16 military exercise, attend the opening ceremony, in Warsaw, Poland, Monday, June 6, 2016. Poland and some NATO members launched their biggest ever exercise, involving some 31,000 troops in a show of force to neighboring Russia. Since that time, NATO has clearly expanded into Europe to the detriment of Russia. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has grown to include the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, Albania and Croatia, and Montenegro. These developments are crucial because, when one is honest about America’s infamous history since World War II, it is clear that NATO exists as an entity only to counter and contain Russian influence. Its sole purpose is to oppose Russia at every corner and this is no secret even in the corporate media. According to the Telegraph, NATO was formed in “Washington on 4th April, 1949 after the end of the Second World War, largely to block Soviet expansion into Europe.” This can be seen clearly in the complete rejection of the Soviets’ attempt to join NATO itself after Joseph Stalin’s death. In a 2016 interview with The New Yorker, Douglas Lute, a former three-star general and then-U.S. Ambassador to NATO also patently admitted that: “…NATO was founded on the premise of preventing an attack by the Soviet Union in Central Europe, where the U.S. would have to come to the aid of Europe … For the first forty years, nato focussed on its greatest risk—the threat that the Soviet Union posed to Western European security.” At the time the unrest broke out in 2014, then-NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s comment that the proposed IMF-EU package presented to Ukraine would have been “a major boost for Euro-Atlantic security” suggested that NATO had set its sights on bringing Ukraine into the military alliance. In July of this year, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg met with Poroshenko in Kiev to further discuss this prospect, already pledging

support to Ukraine on some level. Now Ukraine’s bid to join NATO seems almost irrelevant, as the U.S. is formally involving itself deeper in the Ukrainian conflict and providing arms to a regime that has flirted with an approval rating lower than 10 percent, all the while provoking Russia to take further measures in response . What could possibly go wrong? Meanwhile, the Russia-obsessed corporate media continues to peddle the narrative that Donald Trump has turned the United States into a client-state of Russia, even while he directly provokes the former Soviet Union by providing lethal assistance to a country

on its border. Not only is Trump maintaining an Obama-era policy, he is aggravating and converting Obama’s Ukraine policy into a much more dangerous one — ultimately aimed at provoking an aggressive response from Russia in the weeks or months to come.

UQ – Relations Low – Ext.

Russo-American Relations at all time low Hamilton, 18

Robert E. Hamilton, Colonel (Retired) Robert E. Hamilton, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Eurasian Studies at the U.S. Army War College and a Black Sea Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute., 12-14-2018, "The Reset That Wasn’t: The Permanent Crisis of U.S.-Russia Relations," Foreign Policy Research Institute, https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/12/the-reset-that-wasnt-the-permanent-crisis-of-u-s-russia-relations/ -CC

Donald Trump is the only President of the United States since the collapse of the Soviet Union who has been unable to “reset” the U.S. relationship with Russia. While the Clinton, Bush, and Obama resets didn’t last, they provided periods of respite in the historically tense ties and allowed both sides to achieve important policy goals. Ironically, Trump’s affinity for Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin, is the main reason for his

inability to put the relationship on a more stable footing. Suspicious of his motivations and put off by his chaotic leadership style, Trump’s own administration and the U.S. Congress are essentially running U.S. policy on Russia themselves, with the president’s role reduced to endorsing their decisions . Despite being endowed

with the bully pulpit of the presidency and an itchy Twitter finger, Trump is a loud but often inconsequential bystander to the process of managing the U.S.-Russia relationship. Keir Giles of Chatham House has argued that Russia’s relationship with the West moves through predictable stages: euphoria, pragmatism, disillusionment, crisis, reset. This pattern had held true—with minor variations—in the post-Cold war era. That is, until recently. But the current crisis in the relationship, which dates to Russia’s early 2014 seizure

of Crimea and support for armed separatists in eastern Ukraine, shows no signs of abating. With no reset in the cards and both sides nursing grievances and looking for ways to punish the other, the U.S.-Russia relationship looks set to be stuck in crisis mode for the foreseeable future. Things weren’t always this bad, but the good times never lasted for long. The euphoria of the early 1990s years soon gave way to expectations tempered with pragmatism on both sides. Boris Yeltsin’s bloody 1993 showdown with the Russian parliament tarnished his democratic credentials in the West, and Russia’s ugly early experience with democracy and market economics eroded Russian trust in these Western ideals. Russia’s 1998 financial crisis and default brought about disillusionment on both sides, and NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo threw the relationship into crisis. The 9/11 attacks and Putin’s offer of assistance to the U.S.—over the objections of the Duma and some in his government—marked the first reset in the post-Soviet relationship. The euphoric stage of the relationship is captured in George W. Bush’s remark that he had looked Putin in the eye and “found him very straightforward and trustworthy – I was able to get a sense of his soul.” Bush presumably regretted that remark later since the relationship soon began its predictable slide through pragmatism and disillusionment into crisis. After a period of pragmatic cooperation over Afghanistan, the decline began. The 2003 Iraq War, NATO’s 2004 enlargement into the post-Soviet Baltic Republics, and the “color revolutions” in Georgia

and Ukraine all caused disillusionment in Russia. That disillusionment burst into the open with Putin’s speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, which was a broadside against what he claimed was an out-of-control America: “We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent legal norms are . . . coming increasingly closer to one state’s legal system. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way.” Within 18 months of Putin’s speech, the relationship was once again in crisis—this time over Russia’s August 2008 military intervention in Georgia. Barack Obama’s election in the U.S. offered an opportunity to once again reset the relationship with Russia. The Obama administration was careful to temper expectations, essentially skipping the euphoric stage of the relationship by basing its reset on pragmatic, interest-based calculations. The Obama reset allowed the U.S. and Russia to ink a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), agree on the use of Russian territory to resupply U.S. forces in Afghanistan, strengthen the sanctions regime against Iran, and set the stage for Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Obama reset began to unravel in late 2011 when tens of thousands of Russians gathered in major cities to protest Vladimir Putin’s plan to return to the presidency and ballot rigging

in parliamentary elections. After U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed “serious concerns” about the fairness of the elections, Putin directly accused her of encouraging the protesters. Disagreements over U.S. plans for a European missile

defense system further strained the relationship, and it descended into crisis in early 2014 with the Russian seizure of Crimea and fomenting of armed separatism in eastern Ukraine. No Room for Reset U.S.-Russia relations have been frozen in crisis since then. At almost five years, this marks the longest sustained downturn in relations since the end of the Cold War. In previous cycles, strong personal connections between the U.S. and Russian presidents provided a foundation that allowed for cooperation on issues of mutual importance, at least until the structural contradictions in the relationship caused the predictable erosion of trust. In the 1990s, Russia-watchers spoke of the “Bill and Boris Show” after the close personal relationship between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin. In the post-9/11 reset, Bush’s “I looked into his eyes” remark captured the early personal affinity between presidents. And the Obama reset was marked by a clear preference for Dmitrii Medvedev, seen as more liberal and pragmatic than his predecessor and successor Putin. Despite Putin’s evident preference for Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and Trump’s affinity for Putin, the personal relationship between the men cannot serve as a foundation for a reset in the

bilateral relationship due to Trump’s inability to acknowledge Russian interference in the election and his refusal to criticize Putin. These two sticking points have undermined trust in his instincts on Russia. As a result, Congress and the professional national security bureaucracy are largely managing the U.S. side of the bilateral relationship. Congress imposed sanctions on Russia and restricted Trump’s ability to lift them. The Departments of Defense and State convinced the White House to sell advanced Javelin anti-tank missiles to Georgia and Ukraine despite Trump’s reluctance to go ahead with the sale. Trump was similarly reluctant to expel Russian diplomats from the U.S. as punishment for the use of a nerve agent in the United Kingdom, but was apparently convinced to do so by senior advisors. More recently, the president’s reaction to the Russian seizure of three Ukrainian ships in the Kerch Strait differed

markedly from those of his top advisors. UN Ambassador Nikki Haley condemned Russia’s “outlaw actions,” adding that the incident was an “outrageous violation of sovereign Ukrainian territory” and “another reckless Russian escalation.” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo condemned the “aggressive Russian action” and— like Haley—labelled it a “dangerous escalation.” For his part, President Trump said, “We do not like what’s happening either way. We don’t like what’s happening, and hopefully it will get straightened out.” Later, Trump gave the Kerch Strait incident as the reason for cancelling his scheduled meeting with Putin at the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires, although the two did meet informally during a dinner there.

The Two-Track Presidency The current state of the U.S.-Russia relationship is unprecedented. As an anonymous senior administration official noted in a now-famous New York Times editorial, this is a two-track presidency. On one track, Trump “shows a preference for autocrats and dictators,” complains that senior staff members let him “get boxed into further confrontation with Russia,” and

expresses “frustration that the United States continued to impose sanctions on the country for its malign behavior.” On the other track, Russia is “called out for meddling and punished accordingly” and sanctioned “for its malign behavior” by Trump’s administration and Congress.

I/L

I/L – Relations Ext.Supplying arms to Ukraine creates more tension between the U.S. and RussiaLederman 18 (Josh Leaderman is a writer for the AP. https://www.apnews.com/699b1d01c2914a1da62fc3c11fad014a. US steps up lethal aide to Ukraine: 210 anti-tank missiles. 3/1/2018)

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Trump administration told Congress on Thursday that it plans to sell Ukraine 210 anti-tank missiles to help it defend its territory from Russia, in a major escalation of U.S. lethal assistance to Ukraine’s military. The long-awaited move, which lawmakers of both parties have been urging for years, deepens America’s involvement in the military conflict and may further strain relations with Moscow . It came the same day that Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his country has developed new nuclear weapons he claims can’t be intercepted by an enemy. The $47 billion sale includes the 210 American-made Javelin missiles along with 37 command launch units. In anticipation of the sale, the United States has already started training Ukraine’s forces on how to use them. The missiles will come from existing U.S. Army stockpiles, probably those that are already stationed in Europe, speeding up the process for transferring them to Ukraine’s military. Ukraine has long sought to boost its defenses against Russian-backed separatists armed with tanks that have rolled through eastern Ukraine during violence that has killed more than 10,000 since 2014. Previously, the U.S. has provided Ukraine with support equipment and training, and has let private companies sell some small arms like rifles. The White House initially approved a plan to sell the missiles to Ukraine in December, but no weapons have been delivered because the administration hadn’t completed the formal process. Following the administration’s written notification to Congress on Thursday, lawmakers now have a 30-day window to block the sale if they disapprove. But the top Republican and Democrat on the foreign relations panels in the House and Senate have informally given the green light, so the sale is expected to go through without any significant hurdles. That means the weapons will probably be delivered to Ukraine around mid-April, said several congressional officials, who weren’t authorized to discuss the plan publicly and requested anonymity. “Ukraine will have no difficulty absorbing this system into its armed forces,” the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, part of the U.S. military, said in a

statement. The move is likely to become another sore point between Washington and Moscow, as President Donald Trump contends with questions about whether he’s too hesitant to confront the Kremlin. Ukraine accuses Russia of sending the tanks, and the U.S. says Moscow is arming, training and fighting alongside the separatists.

Heightened U.S.-Russia tensions were on display earlier Thursday in Putin’s speech, when he showed videos and computer simulations and declared that Russia’s newly developed weapons would render NATO’s missile defense systems “useless.” In a message clearly directed at the United States, Putin said: “You have failed to contain Russia.” State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert said the U.S. had watched Putin’s speech “with great

interest.” “It was certainly unfortunate to have watched the video animation that depicted a nuclear attack on the United States,” Nauert said. “We don’t regard that as the behavior of a responsible international player.” Although the portable anti-tank missiles being sold to Ukraine can kill, proponents for granting them have long argued they are considered “defensive” because the Ukrainians would use them to defend their territory and deter the Russians, not to attack a foreign country or seize new territory. Trump had been considering the plan for some time after the State Department and the Pentagon signed off earlier this year. President Barack Obama also considered sending lethal weapons to Ukraine, but left office without doing so. The move comes as the United States and European nations struggle to break a long logjam in the Ukraine-Russia conflict that erupted three years ago when fighting broke out between Russian-backed separatists and government troops in the east. France, Russia and Germany brokered a peace arrangement in 2015 that has lowered violence but not stopped it, and a political settlement outlined in the deal hasn’t been fully implemented. Both the Obama and Trump administrations had expressed concerns in the past that injecting more weapons into the conflict was unlikely to resolve it, especially

considering that Russia is well-equipped to respond to any Ukrainian escalation with an even stronger escalation of its own. Sending lethal weapons to Ukraine also creates the troubling possibility that American arms could kill Russian soldiers, a situation that could thrust the two nuclear-armed nations closer to direct confrontation. The United States, under Obama, also imposed sanctions on Russia for its invasion and annexation of Crimea. The Trump administration has insisted those sanctions will stay in place until Moscow gives up the Crimean Peninsula.

AT: Alt CausesUkraine is the key sticking point in US-Russia relationsRobbie Gramer 17 (diplomacy and national security reporter at Foreign Policy, covering the State Department, "Tillerson: Biggest Snag in U.S.-Russia Relations is Ukraine, Not Election Meddling", Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/07/tillerson-biggest-snag-in-u-s-russia-relations-is-ukraine-not-election-meddling-secretary-of-state-visit-europe-o-s-c-e-trump-moscow-kremlin/, 12-7-2017, accessed 6-25-2019 //SKH)

There’s one thing standing in the way of normal U.S.-Russia relations, says America’s top diplomat: Ukraine. Secretary

of State Rex Tillerson, speaking in Vienna on Thursday, said President Donald Trump’s administration “badly” wants to repair ties with Moscow, which have sunk to their lowest level since the Cold War. But the biggest roadblock, Tillerson said, is the Kremlin’s ongoing role in the war in Ukraine. “The issue that stands in the way is Ukraine,” Tillerson said, speaking at a meeting

of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Vienna, where he also met privately with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. “Russia is arming, leading, training, and fighting alongside anti-government forces ,” he said, in some of the harshest comments on Russia and Ukraine from any Trump administration official. Tillerson did not discuss other bilateral sources of tension —

including, notably, the unprecedented Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. Relations between Moscow and most of the West have been severely strained since early 2014, when Russia threw military support behind separatist forces in eastern Ukraine, sparking fighting that has killed some 10,000 and displaced some 1.7 million so far.

In March 2014, Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula, a part of Ukraine — the first such cross-border land grab in Europe since the bloody wars in the Balkans in the 1990s. “We can have differences in other arenas, in Syria, we can have differences in other areas but when one country invades another, that is a difference that is hard to look past or reconcile,” Tillerson said. “It stands as the single most

difficult obstacle to us re-normalizing a relationship with Russia, which we badly would like to do,” he added. There is another potential obstacle to normalized ties: the drumbeat of revelations of the Kremlin’s meddling in last year’s U.S. election. That includes organizing the release of hacked material harmful to the campaign of Democrat Hillary Clinton and the creation of fake social media accounts to spread false news stories that sowed division in the United States. Most recently, Trump’s disgraced former National Security Advisor Mike Flynn pleaded guilty last week to lying to FBI agents about his efforts to carry out freelance diplomacy with Russia as a private

citizen during the presidential transition. Tillerson has said for months that normalizing relations with Russia has been one of Trump’s top foreign-policy priorities. He has broached the topic of Russian election interference, but not with the rhetoric he leveled against Moscow on Ukraine. “There is clear evidence of Russia meddling in democratic elections in the U.S. and Europe,” Tillerson said

said at a speech in Washington on Nov. 28. “We, together with our friends in Europe, recognize the active threat of a recently resurgent Russia.” Trump, for his part, has repeatedly contradicted U.S. intelligence agencies to belittle their conclusions that Russia interfered in the election. Tillerson was in Vienna during a five-day trip through Europe, which includes stops in Brussels, Vienna, and Paris. Throughout, he has had to grapple with growing frustration from European allies over Trump’s handling of foreign-policy issues, including the diplomatic fallout from Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. He is also dogged by continual rumors that Trump is preparing to fire him. Tillerson said those rumors keep cropping up every six weeks. “You all need to get some new sources,” he told reporters when asked about the issue on Wednesday. “Your story keeps being wrong.”

Black Market Advantage

UQ

UQ – Stockpiles Increasing

Ukrainians have an export license.

RFE 17 (Rfe, journalists report the news in 26 languages in 22 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established. We provide what many people cannot get locally: uncensored news, responsible discussion, and open debate, 12-21-2017, "U.S. Approves License For Ukraine To Buy Light Weapons", RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-us-approves-export-license-small-arms/28930667.html, accessed 6-25-2019) ar

The U.S. State Department says it has approved an export license for Ukraine to buy certain types of light weapons and small arms from U.S. manufacturers. Spokeswoman Heather Nauert said on December 20 that Congress was notified of the decision on December 13. The license covers weapons in categories such as semiautomatic and automatic firearms up to .50 caliber weapons, combat shotguns, silencers, military scopes, flash suppressors, and parts. It does not allow the sale of heavier weapons, such as Javelin antitank missiles, that Ukraine has urged Washington to provide in order to strengthen its capabilities against the Russia-backed separatists it is fighting in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. There are conflicting reports about the significance of the development. An article in The Washington Post described the State Department decision as approval of "the first-ever U.S. commercial sale of lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine" and a "clear break" with past policy. But the State Department and other media reports contradicted that. "Under the previous two administrations,

the U.S. government has approved export licenses to Ukraine, so this is nothing new," Nauert said. According to Reuters, State Department records show that Ukraine has bought small amounts of light weapons and small arms for several years, both before and after Russia's seizure of Ukraine's Crimea region in March 2014.

New memorandum of understanding will enhance Ukraine stockpiles.

RFE 6-26 (Rfe, RFE/RL journalists report the news in 26 languages in 22 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established, 6-26-2019, "U.S. To Give $4 Million Toward Explosives Depots In Ukraine", RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, https://www.rferl.org/a/us-to-contribute-4-million-for-construction-of-six-explosive-storehouses-in-ukraine/30020716.html, accessed 6-27-2019) ar

The U nited S tates says it has signed a memorandum of understanding with Ukraine to enhance the safety of the country’s stockpiles of conventional munitions . "The memorandum sets out a $4 million U.S. contribution toward construction of six explosive storehouses over the next two years for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense," the State Department said in a statement on June 25. The document was signed by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs R. Clarke Cooper and the acting director of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's Directorate of International

Security, Ruslan Nimchynskyi. The statement said that the project will "enhance the safety and security of Ukraine’s munitions stockpiles, as well as advance Ukraine closer to its goal of meeting NATO and international standards for physical security and stockpile management." It said the U.S. Conventional Weapons Destruction program had invested more than $40 million from 2004 to 2018 "in support of Ukraine’s effort to address the legacy of the large quantities of conventional arms and ammunition inherited" after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. In recent years, there have been several explosions and fires at arms depots in Ukraine, a country mired in a simmering war with Russia-backed separatists. Blasts at a munitions depot near the town of Ichnya in October last year prompted the evacuation of about 12,000 people.

I/L

I/L – No Ukraine Weapons RegsEspecially when it comes to gun control – the war in the east, no government intervention, and demand from civilians means the country has practically become a supermarket for gunsYaffa ’17 Joshua Yaffa, a Moscow correspondent for The New Yorker, was a fellow at the American Academy in Berlin this past fall. Jan 17th, the New Yorker, https://www.newyorker.com/culture/photo-booth/ukraine-a-supermarket-for-guns

Ukraine has long had a tricky relationship with guns. In the course of its post-Soviet history, it has been the only country in Europe without legislation governing the civilian possession of firearms. More than a dozen laws have been proposed, but none have been passed by parliament. Instead, Ukrainian gun ownership is regulated by ordinances overseen by the interior ministry. Officially, the only legal way to own a firearm in Ukraine today is to acquire a rifle for hunting or sporting purposes; handguns are banned, available only to security guards and certain categories of state officials.

Those, at least, are the rules on paper. But the war in Ukraine’s east—a grinding conflict between pro-Kiev forces and Russia-backed separatists that has left ten thousand people dead—has made an absurd mockery of these regulations. In the conflict’s early days, when the Ukrainian military was in disarray after the Maidan Revolution and Russia’s annexation of Crimea, much of the fighting was carried out by members of hastily assembled volunteer battalions. Those battalions had an unclear legal status and were not always well equipped; their weapons and supplies came from donations, private supplies, and

the black market . Since 2014, when war broke out in the Donbass region, huge caches of firearms have poured into the conflict zone. Today, after numerous shaky ceasefires and direct incursions of Russian soldiers and artillery, a tense, often-deadly stasis has taken hold, and the military weapons are increasingly flooding out of the conflict zone and into the hands of civilians.

According to the Ukrainian photographer Andrey Lomakin, who photographed civilian gun owners in their homes, in 2014 and 2015, the insecurity and trauma of the war have made firearms in Ukraine a kind of “modern amulet,” awarding their owners “an extra power.” “Not everyone is comfortable to point it at the aggressor and shoot,” he has written. “But

everyone feels safer having one.” Lomakin, who is forty-three years old, grew up in Kiev, and remembers his schoolboy lessons in

how to assemble a Kalashnikov rifle with his eyes closed, part of mandatory Soviet-era military training. Back then, Lomakin recalls, guns had

a foreboding mystique—yet these days, he says, they have become alarmingly ordinary. He has seen a growing number of

otherwise law-abiding citizens looking to buy guns, both legally and on the black market . Last year, the head of

a Ukrainian association of gun owners told the Associated Press that the country contained as many as five million illegal firearms. “Ukraine has turned into a supermarket for illegal weapons,” he said.

Lomakin’s project, titled “Amulet,” documents the magnified role of the gun in today’s Ukraine. In one image, a father stands at home, cradling his young child, while his wife and three other children sit on the couch. It’s a bucolic family scene, made visually dissonant only by fact that in the father’s other arm is a black assault rifle. In another image, a woman poses in her bedroom, an ironing board resting against the pastel-colored walls; her face is stern and her arms are folded across her chest, holding a pistol in domestic repose. Ukraine to date has no functioning national registry of gun owners, and so the issue remains—like the marketplace that fuels it—in the shadows. Lomakin’s portraits provide a visual record of how Ukrainians have been changed over the past three years, becoming at once wounded and disoriented, inured to the spectre of violence while trying to remain vigilant against it.

They frequently lie and are secretive about their firearm regulationsAlpers & Wilson 14 (Philip Alpers is founding director of GunPolicy.org, a global project of the Sydney School of Public Health which compares armed violence, firearm injury prevention and gun law across 350 jurisdictions world-wide. Accredited to the United Nations small arms Programme of Action since 2001, he participates in the UN process as a member of the Australian government delegation and Marcus Wilson is managing director at Conflict Armament Research in London. He has been engaged in small arms policy since 2008, when he worked as research director at GunPolicy.org. 2014. Ukraine — Gun Facts, Figures and the Law. Sydney School of Public Health, The University of Sydney. GunPolicy.org, 1 October. Accessed 28 June 2019. at: https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/cp/ukraine

Regulation of private firearms in Ukraine is ranked as permissive, rather than restrictive.15 Rifles and shotguns are

allowed for hunting, target shooting, collection, protection of person or property and private security.5 Although Ukraine reported to the

United Nations that civilian possession, import and export of handguns is prohibited for any use,5 ‘revolvers and pistols’ — and in one example,

‘sporting revolvers and pistols’ — are subject to regulation, but apparently not banned in Ukrainian firearm legislation.16 In December 2001, in response to a spate of attacks on reporters, the Interior Ministry allowed some investigative journalists to carry handguns that fire rubber

bullets.17

According to a report presented by its government to the UN in 2003,18 'Ukraine has enacted adequate legislation and has put in place appropriate structures and procedures to exercise effective control over the small arms and light weapons.’ Since 1996, a series of presidential

edicts and decrees19 have regulated licensing bodies, controlled goods, interagency processes and enforcement.20 Although Ukraine involves eleven different ministries and agencies in this process, very few individuals are engaged in the control of small arms. 21

Ukraine inherited the Soviet civilian gun control system, which provides for restrictive gun owner licensing and the registration of all firearms.

Yet in December 2003, the nation still had no legislation to control or limit civilian gun ownership. 22 A draft law ‘On Weapons’ to regulate all firearms was introduced in 1995, 5 but politicians in Ukraine have since failed to agree on which weapons private citizens may legally possess, and even ‘whether or not private ownership would increase crime or improve security.’ 22 At the time of writing, this lack of consensus persists.

Ukraine also reported to the UN that since independence all the nation's laws and procedures for small arms control have been reviewed, and that a new import/export law was enacted in 200318 (see Trade Control). In 2006, a joint

NGO report to the UNPoA23 acknowledged Ukraine’s progress in adopting some international norms and policies to regulate firearms.24 But in the same year, a UN Human Rights Council report on small arms noted that of 38 nations surveyed, only Ukraine left unanswered each question regarding civilian firearm regulation and law.25

Gun Owner Licensing

Firearm licences are available in Ukraine for hunting, target shooting, collection, protection of person or property and private security. A 1997-99 UN survey reported 640,615 licensed gun owners, with 7.6 per cent of households holding at least one firearm.26 The minimum age to obtain a gun licence was 21, and non-citizens, applicants with a criminal record, a history of domestic violence or mental illness could be denied possession of a firearm. In the same UN survey, Ukraine did not respond to questions relating to licensing requirements, including any need for identification, references, training certification, fees, waiting period, background check, genuine reason for obtaining a licence, permits to purchase, photograph, curriculum vitae, planned storage or regulation variations for firearm classification.5

Separate hunting law in Ukraine suggests a minimum age for firearm possession of 18, though this could refer to hunting under the supervision of an older, licensed gun owner.13 5 Although no law requires proof of gun safety or proficiency training, Cabinet Decree #576 does require practical training, followed by an exam before issuing a permit to hunt with a firearm.5

A special permit is also required to carry a gun, with restrictions varying on the class and type of firearm.5 The number of civilians licensed to carry a concealed handgun in a public place is not known.

Weapon Storage and Transport

Civilian firearms must be stored unloaded and dismantled ‘in a hard metal or wooden safe with a solid lock. Ammunition must be kept in another place. If there are more than three firearms, the corresponding room or safe must be equipped with an alarm.’ In some cases trigger locks are required.27

A permit must be obtained before guns are transported in any way. All firearms must be unloaded, dismantled, and trigger-locked in transit.28

Record Keeping

Although Ukraine claims a centralised national firearm registry, this does not follow the international law enforcement norm, which is to keep updated records of guns from first sale, through subsequent transfers of ownership (see Marking and Tracing).

Marking and Tracing

Instead of a centralised register of firearms, Interior Ministry criminologists at the Centre for Criminal Research maintain a library of cartridge

cases provided by gun owners. This could allow limited forensic matching and tracing of spent ammunition found at a crime scene. The ammunition registry is not open to the public, and Ukraine gave no response to a UN survey question asking if it is computerised. 5

In 1999, Ukraine reported that authorities did not employ firearm and ammunition tracing technology.5 In the absence of a computerised

register linking each firearm to its current civilian owner, law enforcement officers in Ukraine seem restricted in their ability to trace crime guns.

I/L – Ukraine k2 EU

Ukraine is a growing supermarket for illicit arms trafficking --- they’re smuggled through military personnel and stolen. Karmanau 16 (Yuras Karmanau, Independent Writing and Editing Professional, Belarus, 8-6-2016, "War turns Ukraine into 'supermarket' for illegal weapons", AP NEWS, https://www.apnews.com/16ffe979bc2947ce9373079264232406, accessed 6-24-2019) ar

Since the armed conflict broke out in 2014, the number of crimes involving firearms has more than doubled in Ukraine, a country where gun ownership was previously very rare. Some of the weapons are also being smuggled out of the country, destined for conflict zones in the Middle East or for Europe, adding to fears of more attacks. Andriy, the arms dealer, fought with the nationalist Right Sector volunteer battalion for more than a year against the separatists. He agreed to discuss the illegal weapons trade on the condition he be identified only by his first name for fear of being arrested. If convicted of illegal weapons sales, he could be sent to prison for five years. With

the worst of the fighting in eastern Ukraine now over, Andriy said a used handgun can be purchased there for as little as $20. “But from the east, the road is long and dangerous,” he said, explaining the significant markup he gets in the capital, Kiev. The scale of the smuggling is difficult to judge because Ukraine has made all data about the illegal arms trade classified. Ukrainian border guards, however, regularly report thwarting attempts to transport weapons out of the country illegally. In one of the more high-profile cases, a Frenchman was arrested in May after trying to cross into Poland with an

entire arsenal. The Ukrainian Security Service said he was planning a series of terror attacks in France. Each week, the security services and police uncover illegal arms caches with Kalashnikovs, explosives and even rocket launchers

brought from the combat zone in eastern Ukraine. Transport police almost daily remove passengers from trains for transporting weapons in their baggage. Most are military personnel or members of volunteer battalions that have been fighting on the government side. Heorhiy Uchaikin, who heads the Ukrainian association of gun owners, estimated that Ukrainians now illegally possess as many as 5 million firearms. “Ukraine has turned into a supermarket for illegal weapons,” he said. “In Ukraine, a gun is like shoe polish in a shoe polish factory.” The only legal market for firearms in Ukraine is for hunting rifles, the sales of which are tightly regulated. Security companies can obtain licenses for guards to carry small arms. Uchaikin is advocating changing the laws to make ownership of handguns and Kalashnikovs legal as a way to regulate the market and address gun crime. Some of the weapons sold illegally were seized from separatist fighters and are believed to have been supplied by Russia. In June, Ukraine’s security services seized more than 200 rocket

launchers, 3,000 grenades and two Shmel flamethrowers that are not part of the Ukrainian arsenal. But most of the weapons on the black market come from the Ukrainian military and the around 40 volunteer battalions , which for most of the

fighting remains outside the military chain of command. Nadiya Savchenko, a Ukrainian military pilot who fought with a volunteer battalion, blames corrupt military leaders for the flourishing black market . Savchenko, who became

a national hero after being captured and jailed in Russia for two years, alleges that weapons that should have been given to Ukrainian soldiers who were called up to fight have ended up on the black market instead. “I remember how

it all began: The guys were mobilized but not given automatic rifles,” she told The Associated Press. ”(But) they understood that an automatic rifle is the only thing that can protect their life. And then automatic rifles became worth their weight in gold. They bought them and hid them.” Dmytro, a Ukrainian soldier speaking on condition of anonymity for fear of criminal charges, said when he was called up in 2014 he received nothing but food. “Everyone who was mobilized brought home at least two or three guns,” he said. “For my family it was like hard currency.” He has since signed a military contract and now receives a monthly salary of $320. Over the past two years, about 250,000 Ukrainians were called up in six mobilization waves. Since the armed conflict began in April 2014, at least 9,500 people have been killed. A cease-fire agreement signed in 2015 greatly reduced the fighting, but this summer has seen an uptick in casualties. International monitors have accused both sides of violating the cease-fire by using heavy weaponry that was supposed to have been withdrawn. Government efforts to persuade people to voluntarily surrender their weapons have had limited success. An appeal by the national police force in March yielded 4,500 firearms, more than 300 shells, about 250 grenades and even a grenade launcher. Police Col.

Kostyantyn Zhuk said the result was extremely disappointing. “This is just a drop in the ocean,” he said.

Those arms are smuggled into the EU. Duquet 18 (Nils Duquet, a Senior Researcher at the Flemish Peace Institute, an independent research institute affiliated to the Flemish Parliament (Belgium). He has authored more than 50 policy-oriented and academic publications on topics such as illicit arms trafficking, terrorist access to illicit weapons markets, arms export control and domestic gun control policies, 11-1-2018, "The 2018 EU SALW Strategy: Towards an integrated and comprehensive approach", No Publication, https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/eu-non-proliferation-and-disarmament-papers/2018-eu-salw-strategy-towards-integrated-and-comprehensive-approach, accessed 6-25-2019) ar

Not surprisingly, most attention is given to the Western Balkans, which is the prime source region for firearms trafficked into the EU. The

firearms smuggled into the EU are often surplus weapons, firearms stolen from government stockpiles or weapons that in one way or another ended up in the hands of a wide range of non-state actors during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The cross-border smuggling from the Western Balkans usually takes place by road, and

these weapons are generally destined for criminal markets across Europe.82 To counter this cross-border

smuggling, the EU has committed to continue its support for efforts to reduce illicit firearms possession and surplus stocks of SALW and ammunition in the region; and to counter diversion and arms trafficking by increasing awareness, strengthening law enforcement capacities, improving border controls and enhancing marking, record-keeping and the tracing of SALW. These actions are primarily carried out in partnership with UNDP SEESAC. The 2018 SALW Strategy also addresses its support for the ‘Roadmap for a sustainable solution to the illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition in the Western Balkans by 2024’.83Importantly, Council Decision 2018/1788 on EU support for the Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans also explicitly mentions that the EU will support countering illicit arms

trafficking in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. The 2018 SALW Strategy notes that current instability in Eastern Europe has increased illicit firearms trafficking in various countries in the region. The actions mentioned in the Strategy with regard to countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood, however, are mainly focused on curbing the illicit proliferation of firearms and SALW in Ukraine , which Europol and various national law enforcement agencies consider a significant security threat to the EU . Millions of firearms are currently illegally held in Ukraine. While most of the arms trafficking in Ukraine currently occurs within its borders, many observers fear that these weapons will increasingly be smuggled into the EU. 84The EU therefore recognized that

the current arms proliferation in Ukraine represents a significant long-term security threat to both Ukraine and the EU. Bilateral cooperation with Ukraine on illicit firearms proliferation and trafficking is therefore seen as of mutual interest. More concretely, the 2018 SALW Strategy includes: (a) increased awareness-raising of the issue of illicit SALW proliferation in Ukraine; (b) the establishment of channels of communication between EU and Ukrainian experts; (c) the sharing of best practices and expertise; (d) the development of a permanent technical roundtable with Ukraine to address the issue; (e) the identification of a contact point to enhance operational cooperation; and (f) the mapping of training needs and other support measures to strengthen Ukraine’s capacities in the field. The 2018 SALW Strategy is less detailed on cooperation with other countries in the Eastern

Neighbourhood and only mentions that the EU will pursue bilateral engagements and systematically integrate the issue of illicit SALW flows into security dialogues on these.

Ukrainian arms are trafficking in Europe. Down 18 (Aisha Kehoe Down, Investigative Journalist, Daily News Reporter at The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, 10-23-2018, "Ukraine Sees Jump In Illegal Weapons Sales", No Publication, https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/8785-ukraine-sees-jump-in-illegal-weapons-sales, accessed 6-25-2019) ar

Sales of illegal weapons have doubled in Ukraine in the past year, according to the national police, many of them smuggled from the east of the country where a war against Russia-backed separatists still simmers. “This year, we held two operations, ‘weapons’ and ‘explosives,’” said Vyacheslav Abroshkin, the first deputy head of Ukraine’s National Police, as he spoke to reporters about the

rising tally of police seizures. “During one of these operations, 913 items of firearms, 804 grenades and 266 explosives from illicit trafficking were seized. Also, almost 100,000 units of ammunition and 195 kilograms of explosive substances were seized,” he said. Abroshkin said that a primary challenge for Ukraine’s national police is finding and eliminating supply channels for the traffic, especially those from Ukraine’s

troubled east to the west of the country, where there are no hostilities. Ukraine has long been a hotspot in the global arms trade , a situation that has intensified since the beginning of Russia-backed conflict in the

east in 2014. Experts worry that more arms in Ukraine could lead to more arms being trafficked to and within Europe , much as the war in the Balkans in the 1990s led to an estimated 6 million guns now circulating on the continent. There is also

evidence that many of the arms now in the control of non-state groups in Ukraine fall into the hands of organized crime groups selling arms to the Middle East, often through Odessa, Reuters reports.

I/L – Middle East Smuggling

Organized crime groups smuggle arms into the Middle East. Prentice & Zverev 16 (Alessandra Prentice is a Reuters Correspondent, West and Central Africa, Anton Zverev, 7-25-2016, "Ukraine, after war, becomes a trove for black market arms trade", U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-arms-insight-idUSKCN1050ZE, accessed 6-25-2019) ar

But there is evidence too of criminal intent to smuggle weapons out for sale to organized crime groups. “Of course, anyone who has the will and the means can get into the business - organized criminal groups have always traded weapons,” said Olena Hitlyanska, a spokeswoman for Ukraine’s State Security service, or SBU. “Now the channel for buying these illegal weapons has widened ,” she said. “In past years we seized pistols and rifles that people had in their own collections or for hunting. Now grenade launchers are seized, and blocks of TNT.” Igor, the rebel fighter, said there was now a well-organized trade in illegal weapons from eastern Ukraine into Russia. “If before they shipped whatever came to hand, now it happens in a more orderly fashion, practically by appointment,” said Igor, who asked to be identified only by his first name for fear of reprisals for speaking about the trade. In one rebel unit “they practically keep a list of who will take the iron across the border and when,” he said, using a slang term for weapons. He said

the weapons were smuggled from rebel-controlled eastern Ukraine into Russia via illegal border crossings. He said much of the smuggling was done by rebel fighters from Chechnya and Ingushetia, in Russia’s volatile North Caucasus region, who ship the weapons back home. A spokesman for the rebel administration in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk region, Eduard Basurin, said about arms smuggling: “Maybe at one point it was present, but that this is being done in an orchestrated way, that’s rubbish.” DESTINATION: MIDDLE EAST So far, there is little evidence of where the weapons smuggled out of the Ukraine conflict zone end up. In May, Ukrainian border guards detained a 25-year-old Frenchman with ties to far-right groups in France who was trying to cross from Ukraine into Poland with weapons including rocket launchers and Kalashnikov assault rifles in his Renault van. Ukraine’s SBU said the man had made contact with armed militias in Ukraine and inquired about buying arms from them. When they found out about this, the SBU said its agents sold the man deactivated weapons. But that case appears to be an outlier. The illegal arms trade in western Europe — where the items most in demand are small quantities of light firearms — is dominated by supplies from ex-Yugoslavia, and it is unlikely Ukrainian weapons would be able to break

into that market. Instead, most of the weapons from Ukraine will be destined for other conflict zones in places such as Iraq , Syria and Libya where there is a demand for heavy weapons in large enough quantities to make it worthwhile for black market arms dealers. Mark Galeotti, an expert on ex-Soviet organized crime, said some of those Ukrainian weapons would be transported through the Ukrainian Black Sea port of Odessa, then into the Mediterranean, some south through the Balkans, and some through Russia’s North Caucasus region. “Usually it is relatively easy to get a pistol or anything up to an assault rifle,” said Galeotti, senior research fellow at the Institute of

International Relations Prague. “But it is much harder to get an RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) or a machine gun or the boring things like spare parts for the above. You actually need to have a proper war for these sorts of things to become available and, lo and behold, you have a proper war ,” he said. “At the moment you have, from the criminals’ point of view, a wonderful opportunity.”

These weapons are sold into the unreliable hands of local organized criminals, Russia, and even to middle eastern terrorist groupsPrentice ’16 Allesandra, July 25, Ukrain, After War, becomes a trove for black market arms trade, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-arms-insight-idUSKCN1050ZE

On Feb. 12 last year, the same day that a ceasefire ended the worst of the fighting in eastern Ukraine between rebels and government forces, a former rebel fighter seized a chance to turn his inside knowledge of the conflict into hard cash. He traveled to a spot on the Russian-Ukrainian border where he retrieved a cache of weapons hidden there earlier by his comrades in the pro-Russian rebel movement. Four days later,

shortly before 6:00 p.m., he and a friend showed up in a taxi at a fuel station in western Russia where they had

arranged to meet a contact ready to buy the arms, according to Russian court documents. He and the friend opened the trunk of the taxi, and began transferring the cargo into the buyer’s vehicle. Concealed in a sports bag and a rucksack were three automatic weapons, 1,258 bullets, 20 grenades, and 20 detonators for the grenades. The buyer was an undercover police officer and the former rebel, identified in

the court documents as Y.V. Mikhailov, was sentenced this year to two and a half years in jail. The fighting in eastern Ukraine between the Moscow-backed separatists and Ukraine’s pro-Western government killed hundreds of people, displaced thousands of residents and created a Cold War-style stand off between Moscow in the West. It also had another consequence that is less visible but could in time prove equally dangerous:

the conflict took huge amounts of arms out of government arsenals and put them in the hands of irregular units unable to properly control them. Interviews by Reuters with

security officials and rebels, as well as study of law enforcement data and court documents have shown that weapons are being channeled out of the conflict zone in eastern Ukraine in significant numbers, in some cases as part of an organized underground trade . “Of course, they have moved arms across, and they’re moving them across now,” Igor, a fighter with a pro-Russian rebel unit in eastern Ukraine told Reuters in an interview. “Mainly they take Kalashnikovs,” he said. When, in the spring of 2014, the armed rebellion started in Ukraine’s Russian-speaking regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, police and soldiers abandoned their bases. That left the rebel militias to pillage the stores where Ukraine — one of the world’s biggest arms manufacturers - kept its sizable arsenal. Meanwhile on the pro-Ukrainian side, because the army was in near-collapse, irregular militias were formed, some of them only loosely part of the chain of command, and they were given, or

scavenged, weapons from official supplies. While the fighting raged, the weapons stayed in the conflict zone. In February 2015, the sides in the conflict agreed a ceasefire. The fighting did not stop, but the intensity subsided, and weapons started leaking out of the battlefield. Official data is patchy but what figures there are indicate the problem is getting

worse. The number of prosecutions for weapons offences so far this year in Ukraine is double the amount for the whole of 2015, according to the general prosecutor’s office. In many cases, the cause is negligence. Irregular units often do not keep proper control of the weapons in their inventories or fail to make soldiers surrender their guns when they go on leave. It’s mostly people taking them home for the sake of it,” said

Serhiy Alyoshin, the chief of police in the town of Sloviansk, which is on the edge of the conflict zone and controlled by Kiev. “Some say ‘I forgot’, some say ‘It’s for fishing’ or ‘It’s a present for a friend’ and then we hear about these things blowing up in apartments, in yards and on the street. It’s a threat to national security.” In some cases, Ukrainian security officials said, irregular pro-government units set up private weapons caches to avoid surrendering their arms to the authorities in Kiev, whom they do not trust. In March this year, the police force in Sloviansk uncovered a cache of weapons and explosives in the back of a garage filled with cardboard boxes and household junk. In police footage seen by Reuters, officers laid the weapons and explosives out on the ground. There were at least three anti-tank rocket launchers, several rockets, hundreds of bullets, around 15 hand grenades and two anti-tank mines. But there is evidence too of criminal intent to smuggle weapons out for sale to organized crime groups. “Of course, anyone who has the will and the means can get into the business - organized criminal groups have always traded weapons,” said Olena Hitlyanska, a spokeswoman for Ukraine’s State Security service, or SBU. “Now the channel for buying these illegal weapons has widened,” she said. “In past years we seized pistols and rifles that people had in their own collections or for hunting. Now grenade launchers are seized, and blocks of TNT .” Igor, the rebel

fighter, said there was now a well-organized trade in illegal weapons from eastern Ukraine into Russia. Slideshow (4 Images)“If before they shipped whatever came to hand, now it happens in a more orderly fashion, practically by appointment ,” said Igor, who asked to be identified only by his first name for fear of reprisals for speaking about the trade. In one rebel unit “they practically

keep a list of who will take the iron across the border and when,” he said, using a slang term for weapons. He said the weapons were smuggled from rebel-controlled eastern Ukraine into Russia via illegal border crossings. He said much of

the smuggling was done by rebel fighters from Chechnya and Ingushetia, in Russia’s volatile North Caucasus region, who ship the weapons back home. A spokesman for the rebel administration in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk region, Eduard Basurin, said about arms smuggling: “Maybe at one point it was present, but that this is being done in an orchestrated way,

that’s rubbish.” So far, there is little evidence of where the weapons smuggled out of the Ukraine conflict zone end up. In May, Ukrainian border guards detained a 25-year-old Frenchman with ties to far-right groups in France who was trying to cross from Ukraine into Poland with weapons including rocket launchers and Kalashnikov assault rifles in his Renault van. Ukraine’s SBU said the man had made contact with armed militias in Ukraine and inquired about buying arms from them. When they found out about this, the SBU said its agents sold the man deactivated weapons. But that case appears to be an outlier. The illegal arms trade in western Europe — where the items most in demand are small quantities of light firearms

— is dominated by supplies from ex-Yugoslavia, and it is unlikely Ukrainian weapons would be able to break into that market. Instead, most of the weapons from Ukraine will be destined for other conflict zones in places such as Iraq, Syria and Libya where there is a demand for heavy weapons in large enough quantities to make it worthwhile for black market arms dealers. Mark Galeotti, an expert on ex-Soviet organized crime, said some of those Ukrainian weapons would be transported through the Ukrainian Black Sea port of Odessa, then into the Mediterranean, some south through the Balkans, and some through Russia’s North Caucasus region. “Usually it is relatively easy to get a pistol or anything up to an assault rifle,” said Galeotti, senior research fellow at the Institute of International Relations Prague. “But it is much harder to get an RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) or a machine gun or the boring things like spare parts for the

above. You actually need to have a proper war for these sorts of things to become available and, lo and behold, you have a proper war,” he said. “At the moment you have, from the criminals’ point of view, a wonderful opportunity.”

I/L – k2 TerrorismSmuggled weapons are used for terror operations.Nemtsova 17 (Anna Nemtsov is a correspondent for Newsweek and The Daily Beast based in Moscow. Her work has also appeared in The Washington Post, Politico, PRI, Foreign Policy, nbcnews.com, Marie Claire, and The Guardian, 7-12-2017, "Ukraine’s Out of Control Arms Bazaar in Europe’s Backyard", Daily Beast, https://www.thedailybeast.com/ukraines-out-of-control-arms-bazaar-in-europes-backyard, accessed 6-25-2019) ar

Putting aside for a moment the moral and legal issues, confessions extracted with torture are notoriously unreliable, and whatever the truth of

Moutaux’s case, there’s little question the country has become a thriving arms bazaar for just about anyone with money to buy right in the back yard of Europe. The ideological and ethnic conflict that has torn Ukraine apart over the last two years has attracted radical nationalists from different countries, some of them involved in weapon smuggling. Among these, notably, were a few French volunteers, ideological supporters of pro-

Russian forces who were fighting in eastern Ukraine two years ago. Poland had to increase security measures last year to try to prevent criminals attempting to transport weapons from Ukraine into its territory. If in 2013 Polish police seized only three firearms smuggled from Ukraine, last year law enforcement arrested smugglers with 53 guns, and there are many,

many more where those came from. “There are over 200,000 people involved in anti-terrorist [anti-rebel] operations in Ukraine; if 10 percent of the militia sold weapons or committed some crime, that would be 20,000 incidents,” Kiev-based Belarusian journalist and dissident Pavel Sheremet told The Daily Beast. News reports of law enforcement

officials discovering underground arsenals have grown commonplace. Former volunteer militia and regular military often smuggle weapons from the war-torn Donbas region to Kiev. Last week police discovered a big underground arsenal of hand grenades, guns, explosives, and other weapons in a garage on the outskirts of Kiev. “Most

probably these weapons were brought to Kiev from the zone of anti-terrorist operations ,” the head of Kiev National police Andriy Krischenko suggested on Saturday. In July 2014 The Daily Beast interviewed Ukrainian volunteers in eastern Ukraine

about the prices for Kalashnikov. At the time one Kalashnikov could be purchased in the combat zone for less than $500 and sold in Kiev for more than $2,000. But not many in eastern Ukraine would dare to report to the SBU about military violations, since people are afraid to end up in one of the secret detention centers. Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International report that SBU officers systematically break Ukrainian law. "Legally, SBU is not even supposed to have detention facilities and torturing detainees is prohibited by both domestic and international law," says

Tatyana Lokshina, senior researcher at Human Rights Watch. “There is evidence that interrogators hang up their victims and torture them by beating them with sticks or giving them electric shocks.” Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International recently sent a joint request to the SBU asking “about concrete facilities, concrete victims,” as Lokshina told The Daily Beast.

Impact

Impact – Terror k2 Econ

Terrorism is a huge hit to the European economy.RAND 18 (Rand is an independent not-for-profit research institute whose mission is to help improve policy and decision making through research and analysis, 6-6-2018, "Terrorism Cost the EU €180 Billion Between 2004 and 2016", European Parliament Think Tank, https://www.rand.org/randeurope/research/projects/the-cost-of-terrorism-in-europe.html, accessed 7-1-2019) ar

The study used econometric modelling techniques to quantify the impact of terrorism on the economy by looking at the effect on GDP growth per capita during the 12-year period between 2004 and 2016. The human cost of terrorism was calculated using the Institute for Economics and Peace's cost-of-violence methodology, which includes lost life-time earnings and cost of medical treatments from incidents of terrorism. The wider psychological effects of terrorism were explored through investigating the associations

between terrorism activity within a country and the average levels of self-reported life satisfaction, happiness and trust among the populations of the EU member states. Findings Terrorism is negatively associated with economic growth in Europe. The 28 EU member states have lost around €180 billion in GDP terms due to terrorism between 2004 and 2016. The UK (€43.7 billion) and France (€43 billion) were the nations that suffered the highest economic losses in GDP terms due to terrorism. This was closely followed by Spain (€40.8 billion) and then Germany (around €19.2 billion). The extensive coverage of terrorist attacks through the multiple media and social media channels has led to an exponential growth of eyewitnesses of terror attacks. This means

that even those not directly involved in attacks may be psychologically affected. The psychological impacts of witnessing terror attacks

can lead to people and companies changing their behaviours, which has a direct impact on the economies of EU nations. For example, EU citizens are likely to consume more and save less, with this leading to an increase in

consumption; however, there is also likely to be a decrease in savings and investment rates by companies. Despite the economic losses in GDP terms, consumer purchasing habits remained relatively stable across the EU and sometimes even increased in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. There is also no significant change in the share of government expenditure from EU member states relative to their GDP in light of terrorism. The negative effects on EU economic growth following terrorism tend to be short-lived and only apply within the year of the terrorist incident. For example, the tourism sector, despite taking a significant economic hit initially, seems to return to

normal within one to three months following a terrorist attack. The human and physical capital costs of terrorism in the EU were estimated to be an additional €5.6 billion between 2004 and 2016. These include the costs of homicides through lost life-time earnings, injuries through medical treatment costs and property damage costs. More terrorist attacks are associated with lower levels of life satisfaction and happiness among the EU population. Terrorist

attacks also lower EU citizens' trust in fellow citizens, national political institutions, the legal system and the police. The cost estimates presented in the report are likely to be an underestimation of the overall costs of terrorism, as some factors have not been quantified due to a lack of data. Moreover, the study has not included a number of recent terrorist attacks in late 2016 and 2017 due to the lack of evidence on costs at this moment in time.

AT: EU Econ Low Now EU growth is expanding. Petroff 18 (Alanna Petroff, 1-30-2018, "Europe's economy grew faster than the U.S. last year", CNNMoney, https://money.cnn.com/2018/01/30/news/economy/gdp-europe-economy-2017/index.html, accessed 7-1-2019) ar

Sure, the United States is growing at a nice clip. But Europe's economy is expanding at an even faster rate . Economic growth in the 19 countries that use the euro currency was 2.5% in 2017, according to official data published

Tuesday. Growth in the 28-member European Union also reached 2.5% last year. It's the best period of growth for both groupings since 2007, putting Europe just ahead of the 2.3% expansion posted by the U.S. in 2017. Europe, which has suffered years of anemic growth caused by a series of debt crises, is part of a global economic resurgence that could continue in 2018 . "Anything the U.S. economy can do the eurozone economy can do, slightly better it seems," said Jacob Deppe, head of trading at online currency broker Infinox Capital. "With both the U.S. and eurozone growing in tandem and with Asian economies on a roll, the hope is that 2018 delivers continued growth, further confidence and economic stability for the first time in a

decade," he added. The improving economic picture in Europe helped boost the euro to $1.25 this month, an increase of 21% from its low of $1.03 at the start of 2017.

AT: Past Efforts fail

Past efforts failed only from non-compliance – aff changes thatSchmidt 16 – Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (Hans-Joachim, “The Link between Conventional Arms Control and Crisis Management,” OSCE Yearbook, April 2016, https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/15/Schmidt-en.pdf)//cpark

During the current crisis, it was only possible to carry out CFE inspections on Ukrainian territory, as Russia had suspended the implementation of the CFE Treaty in December 2007. As a result, this regime could not be used for early warning or transparency measures relating to Russian forces operating nearby the border of eastern

Ukraine. If the adapted CFE Treaty had been ratified by all States Parties and had entered into force, it would have offered a further 30 inspections per year on Russian territory . Unfortunately, Kyiv has not complied with all of its CFE obligations since March 2014.13 This has further weakened the outdated CFE regime. After Ukraine started its offensive against separatist forces in eastern Ukraine in April 2014, the separatists soon stopped all regular international verification activities in this area, by taking hostage a VD inspection team, led by Germany, together with its Ukrainian escort team, whom they held from 26 April to 3 May. The separatists feared that, after the outbreak of fighting, the verification measures would be used to conduct reconnaissance against their forces. In addition, since the illegal annexation of the Crimea in March 2014, the peninsula has been completely excluded from arms control and CSBMs for status reasons . Nor are Open Skies observation flights well-suited for enhancing transparency and accountability in situations such as the present crisis. Observation flights over areas of military concern using parallel flight paths are currently not permitted, and the time for national evaluation and interpretation of the flight pictures is based on peacetime needs and not on the much more rapidly moving needs in a crisis.14 In addition, the downing of a Malaysian civil passenger plane (flight MH17) demonstrated very clearly the high risks of Open Skies observation flights over

an active conflict area. Because of the growing tensions, both sides misused some inspections in order to make one-sided, politicized statements that were to their own advantage. This could undermine the validity and integrity of arms control and CSBM measures.15 It is therefore necessary not only to discuss future im- provements of the means, but also new procedures and rules that would lower the risk of possible misuse in future crises. 13 Since March 2014, Ukraine has stopped the regular notification of military changes, and the information exchange at the end of the year 2014 (for 2015) mostly contained the previous years’ figures. There may be several reasons for this behaviour: Kyiv wanted to show that the Crimean peninsula and the Luhansk and Donetsk regions are still part of Ukraine, while also avoiding giving Russian and separatist forces further information about their actual strength and restructuring. Another reason could be that Ukraine is currently unable to provide up-to-date figures.

Corruption Add-on

Trump Corruption Add-On

2ACTrump pressuring Ukraine to help him win the election – it’s corruption, he just needs to find bargaining chipsVogel, 19

Kenneth P. Vogel, Based in The Time's Washington bureau, Ken Vogel covers the confluence of money, politics and influence. He is the author of “Big Money: 2.5 Billion Dollars, One Suspicious Vehicle, and a Pimp — on the Trail of the Ultra-Rich Hijacking American Politics” (PublicAffairs, June 2014), which chronicles the characters and motivations behind the explosion of unlimited money in American politics after the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United decision. He has covered politics and government at all levels, from small-town cop shops and school boards to statehouses, Congress and the presidential campaign trail. Mr. Vogel previously reported for Politico, The News Tribune in Tacoma, Wash., The Times Leader in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., The Center for Public Integrity in Washington, D.C. and The Journal Inquirer in Manchester, Conn. He spent most of 2006 learning about the U.S. Congress from the inside through an American Political Science Association fellowship that allowed him to work on the staffs of two House committees. Mr. Vogel is from Cheltenham Township, Pa., graduated from the University of Wisconsin–Madison and lives in Washington, 5-9-2019, "Rudy Giuliani Plans Ukraine Trip to Push for Inquiries That Could Help Trump," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/us/politics/giuliani-ukraine-trump.html #CCCool

WASHINGTON — Rudolph W. Giuliani, President Trump’s personal lawyer, is encouraging Ukraine to wade further into sensitive political issues in the United States, seeking to push the incoming government in Kiev to press ahead with investigations that he hopes will benefit Mr. Trump. Mr. Giuliani said he plans to travel to Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, in the coming days and wants to meet with the nation’s president-elect to urge him to pursue inquiries that allies of the White House contend could yield new information about two matters of intense interest to Mr. Trump. One is the origin of the special counsel’s investigation into Russia’s interference in the 2016 election. The other is the involvement of former Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.’s son in a gas company owned by a

Ukrainian oligarch. Mr. Giuliani’s plans create the remarkable scene of a lawyer for the president of the United States pressing a foreign government to pursue investigations that Mr. Trump’s allies hope could help him in his re-election campaign. And it comes after Mr. Trump spent more than half of his term facing questions about whether his 2016 campaign conspired with a foreign power. “We’re not meddling in an election, we’re meddling in an investigation, which we have a right to do,” Mr. Giuliani said in

an interview on Thursday when asked about the parallel to the special counsel’s inquiry. “There’s nothing illegal about it,” he said. “Somebody could say it’s improper. And this isn’t foreign policy — I’m asking them to do an investigation that they’re doing already and that other people are telling them to stop. And I’m going to give them reasons why they shouldn’t stop it because that information will be very, very helpful to my client, and may turn out to be helpful to my government.” Mr. Giuliani’s planned trip, which has not been previously reported, is part of a monthslong effort by the former New York mayor and a small group of Trump allies working to build interest in the Ukrainian inquiries. Their motivation is to try to discredit the special counsel’s investigation; undermine the case against Paul Manafort, Mr. Trump’s imprisoned former campaign chairman; and potentially to damage Mr. Biden, the early front-runner for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination. The investigations had been opened by Ukrainian prosecutors serving during the term of the country’s current president, Petro O. Poroshenko. He lost his re-election bid last month to Volodymyr Zelensky, a comedian and political newcomer. Mr. Zelensky has said he would like to replace the prosecutor who oversaw some of the matters, Yuriy Lutsenko, who has met multiple times with Mr. Giuliani to discuss the issues. Mr. Zelensky is set to take office on June 3. Mr. Giuliani said he had been planning for

several weeks to travel to Kiev to deliver a paid speech to a Jewish group about Middle East policy. But intermediaries for Mr. Giuliani worked to organize meetings with people who they believed would have insights into the incoming Zelensky administration and the investigations in which Mr. Giuliani was interested. And in recent days, Mr. Giuliani reached out through intermediaries to request a meeting with Mr. Zelensky,

he said, adding, “It’s not confirmed yet.” If the meeting does occur, Mr. Giuliani said, “I am going to tell him what I know about the people that are surrounding him, and how important it is to do a full, complete and fair investigation.” He said his efforts in Ukraine have the full support of Mr. Trump . He declined to say specifically whether he had briefed him on the planned meeting with Mr. Zelensky, but added, “He basically knows what I’m doing, sure, as his lawyer.” The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Thursday. Mr. Trump has called attention to the scrutiny of Mr. Biden’s son Hunter Biden, and to questions about the former vice president’s involvement in the removal of a Ukrainian prosecutor whose office had authority over investigations of the oligarch whose company paid Hunter Biden. Mr. Trump has also sought to stir up interest in claims that Ukrainian officials tried to benefit Hillary Clinton in 2016 by focusing attention on Mr. Manafort’s business in Ukraine. The attention forced Mr. Manafort to resign from the Trump campaign, but allies of the Ukrainian officials involved have denied that they acted improperly to benefit Mrs. Clinton’s campaign. Mr. Trump has recently suggested he would like Attorney General William P. Barr to look into the material gathered by the Ukrainian prosecutors. Mr. Giuliani has been working on the effort with other allies of Mr. Trump whose involvement has not been previously reported, including Victoria Toensing, a lawyer who was named last year, along with her husband, as part of the legal team representing the president in the special counsel’s investigation. The appointment was rescinded less than one week later amid concerns about conflicts of interest, but Mr. Trump’s legal team suggested that Ms. Toensing and her husband, Joseph E. diGenova, would assist the president “in other legal matters.” On social media and in regular appearances on Fox News, the couple advanced the theory that the special counsel’s investigation was the result of a Justice Department effort to frame Mr. Trump. They increasingly began pushing the claim that “the real collusion began in @Ukraine,” as Ms. Toensing put it in a post on Twitter in March. The tweet spotlighted a story in the conservative media in which Mr. Lutsenko, Ukraine’s top prosecutor, announced he was opening an investigation into whether Ukrainian officials tried to help Mrs. Clinton during the 2016 presidential election by disseminating documents related to Mr. Manafort’s work in Ukraine before 2014. Ms. Toensing has also met with Mr. Lutsenko, the Ukrainian prosecutor who has pushed the investigations, Mr. Giuliani said. (Mr. Giuliani had previously said that Ms. Toensing was representing Mr. Lutsenko, but after this article published, he said that he had been mistaken.) Ms. Toensing will accompany Mr. Giuliani to Ukraine, he said, explaining that she was “concerned” for Mr. Lutsenko and wanted the incoming president to “promptly understand what he’s trying to do.” Asked about the trip and her interactions with of Mr. Lutsenko, which have not been previously disclosed, she responded,

“I’m not going to talk to you about this matter.” Also involved in planning the trip and pushing the investigations is Lev Parnas, a Ukrainian-American businessman who knows Mr. Giuliani well. Mr. Parnas turned up in Kiev, presenting himself as a representative of Mr. Giuliani seeking information about Mr. Lutsenko’s claims, and about Hunter Biden’s involvement in the Ukrainian gas company, according to people familiar with Mr. Parnas’s activity. He organized a phone call between Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Lutsenko, as well as a separate call between Mr. Giuliani

and Mr. Lutsenko’s predecessor in the Ukrainian prosecutor general’s office, according to Mr. Giuliani. He said Mr. Parnas also helped arrange a trip to the United States for Mr. Lutsenko in January. During it, the prosecutor met for hours with Mr. Giuliani in New York. Mr. Parnas is an executive of an energy company that donated $325,000 to a pro-Trump super PAC last year, prompting a Federal Election Commission complaint by a nonpartisan campaign finance watchdog accusing Mr. Parnas, his business partner and the company of violating campaign finance laws. A lawyer for Mr. Parnas, who had previously defended the contribution, did not respond to a request for comment about his client’s work with Mr. Giuliani in Ukraine. Mr. Giuliani has done work in Ukraine before, having been hired in 2017 by the Ukrainian-Russian developer Pavel Fuks. Mr. Giuliani described that work as related to emergency management consulting, but Mr. Fuks said in an interview that he hired Mr. Giuliani as “a lobbyist for Kharkiv and Ukraine” to lure American investors. “This is stated in the

contract.” Mr. Giuliani said that work had ended, and that Mr. Fuks had nothing to do with his current efforts. “My only client is the president of the United States,” he said. “He’s the one I have an obligation to report to, tell him what happened.”

They’ll use weapons as a bargaining chip – empirics proveGreenwood, 18

Max Greenwood, Reporter, 5-2-2018, "Ukraine froze Manafort probes amid US weapons sales: report," TheHill, https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/385827-ukraine-freezes-manafort-probes-amid-us-weapons-sales-report #CCCool

Ukraine's chief prosecutor froze four pending investigations into President Trump 's former campaign chairman Paul Manafort as the U.S. finalized a weapons sale to the Eastern European country. Those cases were put into the "long-term box," one Ukrainian lawmaker, Volodymyr Ariev, told The New York Times , so as to avoid upsetting President Trump, who has bristled publicly and privately at special counsel Robert Mueller 's investigation into Russian meddling in the 2016 election. "In every possible way, we will avoid irritating the top American officials," Ariev told the Times. "We shouldn’t spoil

relations with the administration." The decision to halt the investigations came shortly after the U.S. approved the sale of 210 Javelin anti-tank missiles and 35 launching units to the Ukrainian government, the Times reported. The move shows how Ukraine, a country heavily reliant on U.S. assistance, has sought to avoid activities that could irritate Trump. The country receives about $600 million annually in direct aid from the U.S. The four investigations involving Manafort were initially among roughly 3,000 cases opened by special

prosecutor Serhiy Horbatyuk, who is probing alleged corruption in the administration of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, who was ousted in 2014. The investigations involving Manafort hinged on his consulting work

for Yanukovych and his political party. In April, however, shortly after the Pentagon gave final approval for the weapons sale, an order was issued to effectively halt the Manafort investigations . Horbatyuk told the Times that

the order did not end the probes, but barred him from issuing subpoenas or conducting witness interviews. "We have no authority to continue our investigation," he said. In the U.S., Manafort has emerged as a key figure in Mueller's investigation into possible collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia. He is facing charges of money

laundering, tax evasion and failing to register as a foreign agent in that probe. Trump has blasted Mueller's investigation as a "hoax" and a "witch hunt," and has insisted that no one on his campaign conspired with Moscow to help sway the result of the 2016 election. Mueller is seeking to interview Trump as part of the probe. The Times

previously obtained a list of questions Mueller's team is hoping to ask the president in a potential interview. One of those questions touches on what Trump may have known about Manafort's outreach to Russia during the campaign.

Trump Corruption destroys democratic norms Feffer 18

John Feffer, author of the dystopian novel Splinterlands (a Dispatch Books original) and the director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies. His new book, Aftershock: A Journey into Eastern Europe’s Broken Dreams (Zed Books), has just been published. He is a TomDispatch regular, 9-24-2018, "Donald Trump’s War on Democracy," Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/donald-trumps-war-on-democracy/ #CCCool

During a lifetime of make-believe, Donald Trump has never pretended to be a conventional politician . When he finally decided to make a serious bid for office, he built his presidential aspirations on the flimsiest of foundations: a wild conspiracy theory about Barack Obama’s birthplace. His leadership bona fides were equally laughable, having presided over bankrupt casinos and failed

real-estate projects, fabricated the persona of a lady-killer, and created a reality TV show about a tin-pot entrepreneur. It wasn’t difficult to predict how all this would end up politically. Plenty of oddballs had run for president , from Jello Biafra to

Roseanne Barr, and gotten nowhere. The guardrails of American democracy were set up to prevent just such outsiders from making it anywhere near the Oval Office. Donald Trump’s three presidential qualifications—money, name recognition, and unbounded arrogance—were obviously not enough to overcome his lack of sway with party bosses. Seasoned politicians and backroom operators, the putative “adults in the room,” had spent years ridiculing the blowhard with the bad hair banging on the door and demanding red-carpet treatment. And then, of course, he won. In the 2016 presidential election, the guardrails of democracy collapsed. The Electoral College, designed to weed out all those with what Alexander Hamilton had once called “talents for low intrigue and the little arts of popularity,” delivered a victory to a candidate who had talents for little else. As Jeff Greenfield wrote at Politicoimmediately after the elections, “The blunt fact is that many of the guardrails that were supposed to protect the world’s oldest functioning democracy have been shown to be perilously weak, as vulnerable to assault as the Maginot Line was in the face of the German army some 75 years ago.” In the wake of The Donald’s upset victory, journalists and pundits hastened to recommend a slate of advisers who could inject some gravitas into the new administration and restore an approximation of that Maginot Line. Under counsel from such grey eminences as former national security advisors Henry Kissinger and Condoleezza Rice, the new president brought a bevy of such “adults” into his administration, including ExxonMobil oil executive Rex Tillerson as secretary of state and active duty Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster as national security advisor. Two “adults,” Republican Party grandee Reince Priebus and retired Marine Corps General John Kelly, have similarly tried, as White House chiefs of staff, to manage Trump. Recently, a New York Times op-ed written by an anonymous “senior administration official” suggested that a “steady state” of “adults in the room” has been covertly ensuring that President Trump doesn’t blow up the country or the world. In response, President Trump has done his best to fire or at least ignore all such adult supervisors. After the departures of Tillerson, McMaster, and economic adviser Gary Cohn, the New Republic lamented that Trump was “systematically removing the guardrails in his cabinet” (which proved no more effective than the electoral ones). In fact, after the latest “crazytown” revelations in the bestselling new book by veteran Washington Postjournalist Bob Woodward, perhaps it’s time to retire those creaky metaphors of American politics. No more “guardrails,” no more “adults.” They represent thinking that has proven woefully inadequate for understanding Donald Trump’s rise to power or the America of this moment. Forget Donald Trump for a second and just think to yourself: Who’s responsible for the last 17 years of never-ending American wars that have convulsed the planet? Babies? Teenagers? Grown men acting like babies? Let’s face it: perfectly sober adults, including the man who left ExxonMobil to become secretary of state, have long seemed intent on ensuring the flooding, burning, and general destruction of this planet. And don’t forget that the adults in the Republican Party, backed by their deep-pocket funders, were responsible for getting Donald Trump over the hump and into the Oval Office. Ultimately they, and not the policy-ignorant president, are to blame for the devastation that followed. As for those guardrails, they represent, at best, the most imperfect of

metaphors. Despite all the actual guardrails on American highways, traffic fatalities have risen to more than 40,000 a year and cars are now the top killers of Americans between the ages of 15 and 24. Guardrails may prevent the occasional drunk from driving into a ravine, but they obviously don’t stop a significant portion of the population from committing autocide. The truth is: those guardrails of democracy were faulty long before Trump came along and some of the adults in the room are scarier than the squalling infant. Such metaphors, in fact, make it increasingly

difficult to see what Trump and his babysitters are really doing: not just destroying a culture of civility or undoing the accomplishments of the Obama administration but attacking the very pillars of democracy. MOVING THE GUARDRAILS Donald Trump, The Washington Post concluded a year after his election, had

broken through “the guardrails of presidential behavior.” Given the sheer number of lies he’s spewed in his tenure in office—more than eight mistruths a day and rising—the Post’s conclusion seems incontrovertible. However, when it comes to wrongdoing, Trump has plenty of presidential precedents, from the high crimes and misdemeanors of Richard Nixon to the torture policies of George W. Bush. Trump is as crude as Lyndon Baines Johnson, as ill prepared as Ronald Reagan, as sexually predatory as Bill Clinton. All of these presidents prepared the American public for a leader who, like some super villain in a comic strip, would combine the worst qualities of his predecessors in one explosive package. Trump broke through no guardrails (a feature of highway safety that he once disparaged in a Wall Street Journal interview as the “worst crap”). Rather, generations of politicians and operatives incrementally moved them to such a degree that his behavior became acceptable to enough Americans to elect him. Admittedly, his actions are now breaking

new ground. He’s elevated family members—daughter Ivanka and son-in-law Jared Kushner—to senior policy positions, while ensuring that his business empire profits from his presidency in unprecedented ways. Still, to understand the more lasting impact of the Trump administration requires a look at how his crew is transforming the underlying structures of American democracy, whether it’s the influence of money on politics, the hijacking of the judiciary, or the undermining of media watchdogs. Trump grabs the daily headlines with his loose tweets and outrageous acts. The savvy operators and implementers lurking in his shadow use the cover of scandal to move those guardrails in a big league fashion. The defenders of today’s Maginot Line will wake up some morning to discover that the enemy never had to storm the battlements. They just uprooted the fortifications and shoved them out of the way. BOOSTING THE RICH Many democratic countries wouldn’t tolerate the way the rich and corporations call the shots in American elections. To win a House seat, for example, now costs, on average, $1.5 million; a Senate seat, nearly $20 million. By contrast, in Canada, where neither corporations nor unions can make campaign contributions and individuals are restricted to a very modest $1,500 cap on party donations, a typical campaign for parliament costs in the tens of thousands of dollars and nearly half of the biggest spenders lose. In 2010, the situation in the United States became incomparably worse when the Supreme Court decided, in the Citizens United case, that campaign contributions are constitutionally protected free speech. Super PACs can now spend unlimited amounts of money on elections, giving rich individuals unparalleled impact and a way to cover their tracks through “dark money” contributions. Former president Jimmy Carter has accurately labeled that decision “legalized bribery.” Meanwhile, money has come to play a remarkable role in policymaking, too. Where other countries struggle to expunge bribery and corruption from their political systems, the United States has simply institutionalized it under the rubric of lobbying. As Michael Maiello wrote in Forbes back in 2009: “[I]n an open society like the U.S., our brightest minds are unable to draw meaningful distinctions between handing someone an envelope full of cash and flooding a senator’s campaign war chest, except to

point out that lobbying is far more effective. A briber wants to circumvent the law. A lobbyist wants to change it.” Trump famously declared his independence from donors and lobbyists. He told the Koch brothers, for instance, that he didn’t “need their money or bad ideas.” In the end, however, he would prove just as beholden to big donors as any conventional politician. He rode to power with the backing of casino magnate Sheldon Adelson, Home Depot co-founder Bernard Marcus, World Wrestling Entertainment co-founder Linda McMahon, hedge fund operator Robert Mercer, and philanthropist Betsy DeVos. After the election, he immediately rewarded McMahon and DeVos with administration positions, then pushed through a tax reform bill that was a bonanza for his billionaire buddies and transformed Middle East policy to reflect the demands of Adelson, Marcus, and Mercer. And though he promised to clean out the Washington swamp, his appointees have been embroiled in one scandal after another . The Trump team is also making structural

changes to restrict the ways that ordinary citizens can, in the future, challenge such a plutocratic form of government. Building on successful Republican Party efforts in, for instance, Florida leading up to the 2000 presidential election , the Trump administration is going all out to suppress the electoral participation of minorities and the poor. New voter ID laws helped him win key states like Wisconsin, so no surprise that he wants to make such a voter ID system a nationwide one. Leading up to the midterms, the Republican Party has also been rushing to purge voter rolls and put in place racial gerrymandering , even using the Americans with Disabilities Act as an excuse to close polling places in rural Georgia to tamp down the African-American vote. In a team effort by the Justice Department and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the president has also directed federal agencies to gather voting records in areas of North Carolina with large Latino populations in order to keep likely Democratic Party voters away from the polls. In this way, Trump is working to return America to its glory days—when only well-off white men had the right to vote. TILTING THE COURTS Trump controls (if that’s the term for it) the White House; the Republicans, in part through voter suppression and gerrymandering, control Congress. But pollsters predict that the Democrats are likely to win back at least the House in the coming midterm elections and the 2020 presidential election is clearly still up for grabs. So, in its quest to move the political guardrails more permanently, the Trump administration has focused on the third branch of government: the courts. There, it can not only neuter one of the most powerful checks on Trump’s 1 percent agenda, but have an impact that will last for decades. With the Supreme Court, the Republicans in Congress proved both lucky and strategic. President Trump was immediately able to fill a vacancy, thanks to the Republican Party’s successful Hail Mary decision to block Merrick Garland’s nomination in the waning months of the Obama administration. Then, by nominating Neil Gorsuch to fill the vacancy created by Antonin Scalia’s death, the Trump team began to make a play for the retirement of swing-voting justice Anthony Kennedy. Gorsuch had clerked for Kennedy and so had the two key candidates (Brett Kavanaugh and Raymond Kethledge) that Trump fingered for his seat, should it become vacant. The president then played up his business relationship with Kennedy’s banker son, while Ivanka worked her charms on the judge over lunch.

Administration officials swore that they would honor Kennedy’s legacy, as long as he resigned quickly enough to squeeze in another confirmation before those midterms threatened Republican majorities in Congress. Meanwhile, the Trump team barreled along making judicial appointments to the lower courts at a time when it could barely be bothered to fill key positions in the State Department. The new president came into office with 105 unfilled judicial vacancies, a legacy of Republican congressional foot-dragging during the Obama years. While conservative allies supplied himwith a wish list of judicial ideologues, Trump acted with all deliberate haste by appointing 22 appeals court judges and 20 district judges (all lifetime positions). These new judges—in the 12 federal judicial circuits with regional jurisdiction—have already made their mark in cases involving campaign finance, presidential authority, and abortion, among other issues. “After just 18 months, Trump has ‘flipped’ two circuits—the Sixth and Seventh—from what Trump’s supporters in the conservative legal movement consider ‘liberal’ to more properly conservative,” writes Jason Zengerle in The New York Times Magazine, pointing out that other circuits are also now nearing the tipping point. This judicial transformation extends to federal agencies. Administrative law judges are basically civil servants who handle a varied caseload from Social Security benefit claims to regulatory enforcement. After making a broad interpretation of a recent Supreme Court decision, the Trump administration is now transforming these 1,900 judges into the equivalent of political appointees. It also argues that it can fire judges and hire new ones to pack such administrative courts, which will then help push a Republican anti-regulatory revolution from within. At one point, Donald Trump casually remarked that he thought the United States should try out the Chinese system of “president for life.” While that’s not likely to happen any time soon, with his judges for life, the president is institutionalizing

the 1 percent ideology of the adults in that room of his before the voters can kick him out of office. SIDESTEPPING THE WATCHDOGS After a lifetime using the media to build his brand, Donald Trump is now systematically trying to blow up one of the cornerstones of American democracy. He has called the press the “enemy of the American people,” repeatedly labeled reputable media outlets as “fake news,” and legitimized far-right sources by parroting their claims . Trump didn’t create such a climate. The rise of Fox News, the spread of websites like Infowars, and the persistent popularity of right-wing radio shock jocks have all contributed to the demonization of the “liberal” media. As a result, for a significant number of Americans, trying to gather facts—as opposed to expressing opinions at top volume—has become a suspect occupation. According to the 2018 Edelman Trust Barometer, when it comes to the general population, trust in the media has dropped five points since 2017 and an astounding 22 points for the “informed public”

(defined as college-educated and in the top 25 percent of household income). The mainstream media have long aspired to serve a watchdog role. Reporters are supposed to fact-check the powerful, sniff out corruption, and peel away government propaganda to expose the hidden histories behind it. Granted, journalists have blind spots and the economically powerful often don’t receive the sort of scrutiny that the politically powerful do, but media operations with budgets for investigative journalists and fact-checkers are an integral part of any democratic society. Donald Trump hasn’t just disparaged the mainstream media, he’s done an end run around it. He feels little need to hold press conferences—only one in his first year of office ( compared to Obama’s 11)—because he communicates with the America he wants to reach directly through his Twitter account. The news media then have to play catch-up reporting on his tweets. In doing so, he creates the appearance of candor, since he speaks his mind without PR specialists getting in the way—but not to the entire American population. Typically, he avoids making speeches in blue states (places that his administration’s policies are deliberately crafted to harm). His strategy is to preach to the choir 24/7 in a communications universe free of the mainstream media. When it comes to reporters, the president’s supporters follow his lead and pay them little attention. Indeed, 72 percent of Republicans trust Trump over the media and nearly half believe that “the president should have the authority to close news outlets engaged in bad behavior.” His attacks on the media, deliberately designed

to distract attention from his various scandals, are undermining the entire institution. In effect, Trump has cultivated a constituency that lies outside the democratic conversation, building on the 22 percent of Americans who believe autocracy to be superior to democracy and the slightly larger percentage who would support a military coup to combat crime or corruption. Independent media wouldn’t last long in either scenario. THE NEW NORMAL The most dangerous part of Trump’s onslaught on democracy is the cynicism it’s likely to generate, which will only reinforce the goals of the Trumpistas if a significant chunk of the 99 percent decide that voting isn’t worth it, politics is a game best avoided, and Twitter is superior to a newspaper. Democracy doesn’t just die in darkness. It can die of indifference—not with a bang or a whimper, that is, but with a yawn. Of course, there’s nothing like a famously corrupt politician to reinvigorate civic action. In the aftermath of the Watergate scandals, a new wave of reformers won places in Congress, immediately launching investigations into covert operations, establishing new rules for campaign finance, and attempting to rein in the power of the presidency through measures like the War Powers Act. In other words, after the scandals of the early 1970s, reformers surveyed the wreckage of the political landscape and attempted to repair the infrastructure of American democracy. At best, they offered quick fixes, while during the Reagan years that followed, the putative adults in the room returned to their favorite activity: moving the guardrails to favor the wealthy and the powerful. After the midterms in November, new voices like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaib will be in Congress and there will undoubtedly be renewed energy to stop, if not roll

back, Trumpism. All those whom the president has insulted—and it’s an ever-lengthening list—may join hands in an effort to break the vicious circle of ignorance, apathy, and anger Trump has encouraged. This will be no easy task. But it would be poetic justice if what’s left of the mechanisms of democracy—voting, the courts, and the press—can still be used to defeat a potential autocrat, his family, and all the putative adults he’s brought into the room to implement his profoundly anti-democratic program. The question is: Will it already be too late?

Liberal democracy solves every impact but American credibility is vital Kasparov 17 — Garry Kasparov, Chairman of the Human Rights Foundation, former World Chess Champion, 2017 (“Democracy and Human Rights: The Case for U.S. Leadership,” Testimony Before The Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 16 th, Available Online at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/021617_Kasparov_%20Testimony.pdf, Accessed 07-13-2017)

As one of the countless millions of people who were freed or protected from totalitarianism by the United

States of America, it is easy for me to talk about the past. To talk about the belief of the American people and their leaders that this country was exceptional, and had special responsibilities to match its tremendous power. That a nation founded on freedom was bound to defend freedom everywhere. I could talk about the bipartisan legacy of this most American principle, from the Founding Fathers, to Democrats

like Harry Truman, to Republicans like Ronald Reagan. I could talk about how the American people used to care deeply about human rights and dissidents in far-off places, and how this is what made America a beacon of hope, a shining city on a hill. America led by example and set a high standard, a standard that exposed the hypocrisy and cruelty of dictatorships around the world.

But there is no time for nostalgia. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War, Americans, and America, have retreated from those principles, and the world has become much worse off as a result. American skepticism about America’s role in the world deepened in the long, painful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their aftermaths. Instead of applying the lessons learned about how to do better, lessons about faulty intelligence and working with native populations, the main outcome was to stop trying.

This result has been a tragedy for the billions of people still living under authoritarian regimes around the world, and it is based on faulty analysis. You can never guarantee a positive outcome— not in chess, not in

war, and certainly not in politics. The best you can do is to do what you know is right and to try your best . I speak

from experience when I say that the citizens of unfree states do not expect guarantees. They want a reason to hope and a fighting chance. People living under dictatorships want the opportunity for freedom, the opportunity to live in peace and to follow their dreams. From the Iraq War to the Arab Spring to the current battles for liberty from Venezuela to Eastern Ukraine, people are fighting for that opportunity, giving up their lives for freedom. The United States must not abandon them.

The United States and the rest of the free world has an unprecedented advantage in economic and military strength today. What is lacking is the will. The will to make the case to the American people, the will to take risks and invest in the long-term security of the country, and the world. This will require investments in aid, in education, in security that allow countries to attain the stability their people so badly need. Such investment is far more moral and far cheaper than the cycle of terror , war , refugees , and military intervention that results when America leaves a vacuum of power. The best way to help refugees is to prevent them from becoming refugees in the first place.

The Soviet Union was an existential threat, and this focused the attention of the world, and the American people. There

existential threat today is not found on a map, but it is very real . The forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world order. Terrorist movements in the Middle East , extremist parties across Europe , a paranoid tyrant in North Korea threatening nuclear blackmail , and , at the center of

the web, an aggressive KGB dictator in Russia . They all want to turn the world back to a dark past because their survival is threatened by the values of the free world, epitomized by the United States. And they are

thriving as the U.S. has retreated. The global freedom index has declined for ten consecutive years. No one like to talk about the United States as a global policeman, but this is what happens when there is no cop on the beat . American leadership begins at home , right here. America cannot lead the world on democracy and human rights if there is no unity on the meaning and importance of these things. Leadership is required to make that case clearly and powerfully . Right now, Americans are engaged in politics at a level not seen in decades. It is an opportunity for them to rediscover that making America great begins with believing America can be great.

The Cold War was won on American values that were shared by both parties and nearly every American .

Institutions that were created by a Democrat, Truman, were triumphant forty years later thanks to the courage of a Republican, Reagan. This bipartisan consistency created the decades of strategic stability that is the great strength of democracies. Strong institutions that outlast politicians allow for long-range planning. In contrast, dictators can operate only tactically, not strategically, because they are not constrained by the balance of powers, but cannot afford to think beyond their own survival. This is why a dictator like Putin has an advantage in chaos, the ability to move quickly. This can only be met by strategy, by long-term goals that are based on shared values, not on polls and cable news.

The fear of making things worse has paralyzed the United States from trying to make things better. There will always be setbacks, but the United States cannot quit. The spread of democracy is the only proven remedy for nearly every crisis that plagues the world today. War, famine, poverty, terrorism–all are generated and exacerbated by authoritarian regimes. A policy of America First inevitably puts American security last.

American leadership is required because there is no one else , and because it is good for America. There is no weapon or wall that is more powerful for security than America being envied , imitated , and admired around the world. Admired not for being perfect , but for having the exceptional courage to always try to be better . Thank you.

1AR – More Corruption ComingTrump is Pressuring Ukraine to assist him in corruption – Backslides DemocracyChait, 5/10

Jonathan Chait, 5-10-2019, "Trump Is Pressuring Ukraine to Smear Clinton and Biden," New Yorker, http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/05/trump-giuliani-ukraine-smear-biden-russia.html #CCCool

In 2016, Donald Trump’s campaign learned Russia was working to help him win, and many of its members actively sought to exploit that

assistance. In 2020, now possessing the powers of the Executive branch, it’s pressuring a foreign government to assist Trump’s reelection campaign. The effort consists of Trump’s agents lobbying Ukraine to smear his political rivals. The smear campaign is being run by Rudy Giuliani, who — perhaps operating on the theory that a massive scandal boasted about in the media by its perpetrators is less damaging than one uncovered by investigators — is broadcasting his scheme. “There’s nothing illegal about it,” he tells the New York Times. “Somebody could say it’s improper.” Well, yes, they could. It’s grossly, terrifyingly improper. Giuliani is trying to get Ukraine to pursue two investigations: one against the last Democratic presidential nominee, and another against the leading candidate to be the next one. The first is based on murky charges that have circulated on the right that Hillary Clinton’s campaign conspired with Ukraine to gin up the Russia investigation. (This presumes that without Clinton starting it, there was no

serious evidence to investigate Trump’s connections to Russia, which is absurd on its face.) The second is based on charges that, during his time as vice-president, Joe Biden improperly used his power to benefit his son, Hunter. The Times laid out this accusation in a lengthy report last week. The charge is that Hunter Biden was working for a Ukrainian energy company that was being threatened with prosecution, and Joe Biden demanded Ukraine fire the prosecutor. But Bloomberg News investigated this claim and thoroughly debunked it. Bloomberg reveals that the prosecution of Hunter Biden’s client had already been shelved at the time Joe Biden was calling for the prosecutor to be removed. And, as the Times acknowledges, the prosecutor Biden called on to be fired was widely considered to be corrupt, and the Obama government supported the prosecution of Hunter Biden’s client anyway. There is no quid, no pro, no quo in this story. Biden acted completely in line with

administration policy, and his actions had no bearing on his son’s interests. So why would Ukraine pursue baseless charges? Because its government has a strong interest in mollifying Trump. The Times reported last year that Ukraine halted its cooperation with the Mueller probe because it couldn’t risk provoking Trump. “The cases are just too sensitive for a government deeply reliant on United States financial and military aid, and keenly aware of Mr. Trump’s distaste for the investigation by the special counsel, Robert S. Mueller III, into possible collusion between Russia and his campaign, some lawmakers say.” Having used that leverage defensively to get Ukraine to withhold cooperation into the probe of his campaign, Trump is now using it offensively, to gin up charges against his targets. His involvement and interest in the effort is transparent. During one of Giuliani’s meetings with Ukrainian officials, he “called Mr. Trump excitedly to brief him on his findings.” Giuliani tells the Times that his work has Trump’s “full support,” and he is making the president’s interest extremely clear to Ukraine’s government. “I’m going to give them reasons why they shouldn’t stop [the investigation] because that information will be very, very helpful to my client,” he says. Trump is already burbling excitedly about the project. “I’m hearing it’s a major scandal, major problem,” Trump said on Fox News. “I hope for [Biden] it is fake news. I don’t think it is.” Unlike the Russia scandal, this episode is one that Trump’s reelection campaign can undertake with the benefit of advance planning and some lawyering (Giuliani being at least

technically a lawyer, or at least having the benefit of legal counsel he can consult). On its face, there is nothing illegal here. Trump is leveraging his power as president to compel a dependent foreign government to smear the opposition party. It’s just something no president has ever thought to do before. The powers legally available to a corrupt president and a party that has turned a blind eye to his violations of governing norms may be more terrifying than anybody has considered.

1AR – Yes Arms QPQUkraine Traded Weapon Sales for Collusion CoverupKeating, 18

Joshua Keating, a staff writer at Slate focusing on international affairs and author of Invisible Countries, 5-2-2018, "Ukrainians Stop Investigating Manafort After Trump Sells Them Missiles. A Win-Win for All Involved.," Slate Magazine, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/05/ukrainians-stop-investigating-manafort-after-trump-sells-them-missiles-a-win-win-for-all-involved.html #CCCool

The New York Times reports that the government of Ukraine has put the brakes on its investigation into former Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort. Manafort allegedly received millions of dollars in cash through an “illegal off-the-books system” used by former President Viktor Yanukovych’s pro-Russian political party. Manafort’s Ukrainian activities were a major factor leading to his resignation from the campaign in 2016. Manafort is currently facing a wide array of federal criminal charges in both D.C. and Virginia. Yanukovych fled Ukraine amid mass protests in 2014, and the new government has been investigating corruption in his

administration, including the links to Manafort. The Ukrainian prosecutor investigating Manafort says he had reached out to special counsel Robert Mueller’s office in January with an offer to cooperate but that the offer is now moot, since his own investigation is on hold. Ukraine’s decision to halt its Manafort investigation—the cases against Manafort are technically still open, but the government has ordered the prosecutor to refrain from issuing subpoenas or interviewing witnesses—came at a time when the U.S. was finalizing the sale of Javelin antitank missiles to Ukraine. The Ukrainians are surprisingly open about the connection between the decision and the importance of staying on Trump’s good side, with one legislative ally of President Petro Poroshenko telling the Times, “In every possible way, we will avoid irritating the top American officials. We shouldn’t spoil relations with the administration.” The question of whether to arm the Ukrainian government in its ongoing fight against Russian-backed separatists in the country’s east has been a significant subplot of the Trump-Russia drama. Barack Obama refused, despite pressure from both Congress and his own National Security Council, to

provide lethal weapons to Ukraine, fearing that it would just give Vladimir Putin pretext to escalate the conflict. During the 2016 GOP convention, when Manafort was still running the Trump campaign, it was reported that the campaign had worked behind the scenes to remove language from the party platform calling for providing weapons to Ukraine—contradicting the near-unanimous stance of Republican foreign policy leaders. Trump, not normally one to shy away from overturning a controversial Obama policy, remained reluctant to arm the Ukrainians. He eventually approved the sale of antitank missiles to Ukraine last December but delayed the decision for months and reportedly wasn’t happy about it. The Washington Post has reported that Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, U.N.

Ambassador Nikki Haley, and then–CIA Director Mike Pompeo lobbied for the sale , arguing that it would deter Russian aggression and that Ukraine could become a reliable customer for U.S. military hardware . Trump wanted the

decision kept quiet and was reportedly furious when it leaked and was praised by Russia hawks like John McCain. The Manafort story casts Trump’s reversal in a different light: The Ukrainian government is not just a potential weapons customer; it also eliminates a potentially damaging line of inquiry in the Russia investigation . There’s no evidence to confirm Ukraine’s helpful move directly caused Trump to change his mind on the weapons—this is, after all, something many leading national security figures wanted to do long before he became president. Similarly, it’s quite possible that Trump’s strong support for the Saudi-led blockade of Qatar last year had nothing to do with the Kushner family business being rejected for financing by the Qataris. It could be that China’s decision to approve trademarks for Ivanka Trump’s companies on the same day her father was having “great chemistry” with Xi Jinping at Mar-a-Lago was just a coincidence, and that the most powerful people in India are genuinely interested in Donald Trump Jr.’s

geostrategic insights. The problem is that with Trump and his family’s web of conflicts of interest and their legal vulnerabilities, it’s hard to take any of his foreign policy decisions—or foreign leaders’ actions toward him—at face value

Revisionism/Realism

2AC – Not RevisionistRussia’s actions are defensive—it’s not revisionist

- Russia trails the US and Chinese economies and will be passed by India- Role in conflict is defensive- Answers election hacking warrant for revisionism

Stephen M. Walt, 3-1-2018, (Stephen M. Walt is a Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs; a Faculty Chair in the International Security Program and a Member of the Board at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. "I Knew the Cold War. This Is No Cold War.," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/i-knew-cold-war-no-cold-war //EH

For starters, the Cold War was a bipolar competition in which the United States and the Soviet Union were far and away the two most powerful countries in the world. Although other factors contributed to their rivalry (see below), each was the other’s greatest potential threat and by necessity each kept a wary eye on the other. To a large extent the Cold War was structurally determined by the global distribution of power among states, and some sort of rivalry was probably inevitable (even if other factors were involved and helped determine its intensity). Moreover, the two superpowers stood in rough parity with each other, although the United States was, on balance, in a much better position. The United States’ economy was about twice as large as the Soviet Union’s and its allies were far more capable and reliable than theirs. After all, the United States had West Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, Israel, and a number of other powerful states on its side; the USSR had the likes of South Yemen, Cuba, Angola, and a bunch of restive satellites in the Warsaw Pact. China was Moscow’s junior partner at first, but the two communist giants soon had a nasty falling out and Beijing tacitly realigned with the United States in the 1970s (as did Egypt, another Soviet client state). The United States had vastly greater power-projection capabilities, a superior navy and air force, more sophisticated technology, and better training. But the Soviet Union did have a large and well-equipped army that was designed for offensive warfare and its forces lay close to Western Europe and not that far from the Persian Gulf. And it eventually acquired a large arsenal of nuclear weapons. On balance, the United States was ahead, but never by a big enough margin to relax.

So, the two superpowers competed constantly for additional influence, and did whatever they could to weaken the other without provoking World War III. At the same time, the Cold War also featured an intense competition between rival political ideologies: liberal capitalism and Marxism-Leninism. Both were inherently universalist ideologies, insofar as their proponents believed that each provided a model for organizing society that was broadly applicable everywhere in the world. Liberal capitalism rested on claims about basic rights that all humans were said to possess, while Marxism-Leninism rested on “scientific” laws of social and economic development that Marx and his followers had supposedly discovered. Because each ideology saw itself as universally valid, proponents felt obliged to try to spread them far and wide. Even worse, given each side’s universalist pretensions, the mere existence of one posed a fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of the other. For both ideological and power-political reasons, therefore, “live and let live” was never a

serious option. Finally, as my colleague Arne Westad has shown clearly, the Cold War was a global competition waged on every continent in the world. The rivalry between Moscow and Washington shaped much of the agenda of world politics from the 1940s onward, and had far-reaching (and frequently negative) effects in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. That was the real Cold War , ladies and gentlemen, and let’s not forget that it was punctuated by several intense nuclear crises, an arms race in which each side accumulated tens of thousands of

powerful hydrogen bombs, and proxy wars in which millions died. While regrettable and maybe even dangerous, what is happening today is a very different animal. First, and most obviously, the world today is not bipolar. It is either still unipolar or some sort of heavily lopsided multipolar system, with the United States still No. 1 and the other major powers trailing behind. If bipolarity eventually returns, as many believe it will, China, not Russia, will be the other pole. And in a striking reversal of the early Cold War, Russia is now China’s junior partner and will be far weaker than its Asian neighbor for decades to come. (Russia will likely fall well behind India too, but that’s another story.) Second, there was a certain rough parity during the Cold War, but today the United States is vastly stronger on

nearly every dimension that matters. The U.S. economy is about $20 trillion, while Russia’s is less than $2 trillion . America is technologically sophisticated and highly innovative, while Russia’s wealth, such as it is, relies mostly on energy exports whose value is likely to decline as mankind gradually weans itself off fossil fuels. In the meantime, hardly anybody is saving up pennies (or rubles) to buy the

latest Russian smartphone. The U.S. population is comparatively young and still rising; Russia’s population is aging rapidly and projected to decline sharply in the decades to come. Compared to the Cold War, today’s United States vs. Russia matchup is Godzilla vs. Bambi. Third,

there is no serious ideological rivalry at play today. America’s liberal brand may have been tarnished of late, but Russia’s ideological appeal outside its borders is minimal. Marxism-Leninism captured the imaginations and

loyalties of millions of adherents around the world, but Putinism has appeal only to a handful of oligarchs or would-be autocrats. Donald Trump is probably the only person in America who truly believes strongman rule is preferable to democracy, but he won’t

be president-for-life no matter how much he might want to be. Fourth, the real Cold War was a global competition, whereas the geopolitical issues that divide the United States and Russia today are confined to areas close to Russia’s borders, like Ukraine, or to a small part of the Middle East. And for all the hot air that has been spouted about Putin’s “revisionism,” Russia’s role in most of these conflicts is essentially negative and defensive and very much the spoiler. Moscow may be able to keep Ukraine from moving toward the West or joining NATO, and it may be able to keep Bashar al-Assad in power in what remains of Syria, but like George W. Bush, Putin is discovering that clients are hard to control and getting into quagmires is easier than finding one’s way out. Moscow has shown little capacity to achieve positive ends on the world stage or to bring other nations together to work toward the goal of mutual betterment. When compared to Soviet leaders’ lofty dreams of world

revolution, Putin’s “global agenda” is watered-down vodka. But wait: What about those dastardly Russian attempts to manipulate the 2016 U.S. election, and to sow discord and disunity via bots, internet trolls, phony Facebook accounts, hacked emails, and other misdeeds? We still don’t know the full extent of Russian interference in our democracy, but Americans have every reason to be angry about it and should be demanding that the Trump administration take active measures to limit and or deter such behavior in the future. At the same time, our moral outrage ought to be tempered just a bit by the recognition that Washington has repeatedly interfered in other countries’ politics and used both overt and covert means to dispatch of

governments we didn’t like. As far as we know, no Americans died as a result of Russia’s meddling, but there are hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who lost their lives because of our well-intentioned efforts to “liberate” them. Equally important, Russia’s various activities were possible only because Americans had already allowed our democratic institutions to be seriously corrupted long before Moscow got involved . I’m not

happy about whatever Putin, Fancy Bear, and other Russian agents may have done, but Newt Gingrich, Fox News, Breitbart, and the Drudge Report have done far more to fill American heads with claptrap than Moscow’s minions ever did. Furthermore, we shouldn’t be at all surprised that someone like Putin — deeply resentful of repeated U.S. encroachments on Russian vital interests — saw this opportunity and seized it. Even a casual knowledge of American history would tell you that it only takes a little bit of foreign interference to get us to freak out completely. Remember

McCarthyism, the Palmer Raids, or the “one percent doctrine”? No wonder Putin saw us as a fat target. But my point is that we mostly did this to ourselves. Lastly, thinking of the current conflict between the United States and Russia as a new Cold War exaggerates its significance and distracts us from the far more serious challenge we face from a rising China. Even worse, it encourages us to take steps that are actively harmful to our own interests. Instead of trying to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing (as realpolitik 101 would prescribe), the “new Cold War” mindset implies that U.S.-Russian rivalry is overdetermined and makes us less likely to look for ways to resolve our differences over time. Even worse, it will encourage us to fall back on the confrontational approaches we employed during the real Cold War, which will merely drive Beijing and Moscow closer together. None of this is to deny that U.S.-Russian relations are in a bad state. It is also hard to imagine someone as compromised as Donald Trump doing much to fix it. But instead of embracing the language and imagery of the Cold War, we would do better to think seriously about the missteps and blunders that have brought the United States and Russia to the present impasse, and look for creative new ways to unwind them. And step one is to discard a lazy label that can only get in the way.

Not Revisionist – Supports LIORussia isn’t revisionist—it benefits far too much from its involvement in the international order

- Only contests universal human rights practices- Reaffirms parts of international order like the UNSC, UN convention, and non-prolif treaties

Jeanne L. Wilson, 6-11-2019, (Jeanne L. Wilson is a Shelby Cullom Davis professor of Russian studies at Wheaton College. She is also a Research Associate at the Davis Center of Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge MA, USA. “Are Russia and China revisionist states?," Asia Dialogue, https://theasiadialogue.com/2019/06/11/are-russia-and-china-revisionist-states/ //EH

In the past few years, Russia and China have increasingly been referred to as revisionist powers. For example, both the United States’ 2017 National Security Strategy and the United States’ 2018 National Defence Strategy identify Russia and China as revisionist states. The concept of revisionism encompasses various meanings that typically distinguish between states that accept the status quo distribution of power in the international system and those which seek to alter it to their advantage. Here, I am primarily concerned with

the extent to which Russia and China challenge the implicit assumptions that underpin the norms and values of what might be referred to as the international community in the English School sense of the term. I argue that Russia and China are not revisionist but rather neo-revisionist states. However, it is China rather than Russia that is more likely substantively to challenge the status quo and assume the position of a full-blown revisionist power in the future. Both Western analysts and policymakers have identified a litany of Russian and

Chinese behaviour that indicates nonconformance to what is portrayed as universal norms and values. In fact, Russia and China contest a set of neoliberal practices that have evolved in the post-World War Two international order. Foremost amongst these is the evolution of human rights as a universal value that legitimizes intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state (although Russia has made use of the rhetoric of the “responsibility

to protect” to justify its activities in the post-Soviet space). Russia and China similarly view the West’s elevation of liberal democracy as a universal ideal as a subterfuge for the fomenting of Colour Revolutions that seek regime change in noncompliant targeted states. At the same time, Russia and China accept and in fact continuously reaffirm their commitment to a number of fundamental precepts of the international order . These include the primacy of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, the importance of international law, and the centrality of the United Nations,

particularly with respect to the key role of the United Nations Security Council . It must be acknowledged that Russian and Chinese promotion of these concepts does not necessarily provide a reliable guide to their foreign policy behaviour (although the

same criticism can be lodged against countless other states). Russia and China also actively participate in aspects of global governance, placing an emphasis on the United Nations as the ultimate source of international authority. Both states have signed a number of United Nations Conventions and Covenants including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They are members of a number of multilateral and regional structures (although Russia has been suspended from participation in the G-7). The two states stress their commitment to the maintenance of global and regional security supporting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the non-militarization of space, and the need to fight terrorism. Critically, Russia and China act

as rule takers rather than challengers in their participation in the global financial institutions. China, in particular, has emerged as a vocal supporter of globalization and free trade in conspicuous contrast to the United States in the Trump administration.

Russia and China’s view of the operation of the international system conforms in a large part to Westphalian precepts, while rejecting the West’s more recent adoption of humanitarian and individualistic norms and values (which in fact exist in a state of uneasy tension with the traditional assumptions of the Westphalian order).

The dominant Western narrative about Russia is wrong—it’s not revisionist and is open to cooperating within the international order

- Doesn’t have econ resources to steer global order- Contributed to establishment of current order after ww2- Perceived revisionism is just Russian uncomfortability with cold war institutions like NATO

Nini Arshakuni, 3-8-2018, (Nini Arshakuni is a master’s student at the Davis Center. "Russia's Approach to the Global Order: Revisionist or Not?," Eurasianet, https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-russias-approach-to-the-global-order-revisionist-or-not //EH

Rethinking Russia’s approach to the global order could spur Moscow and Washington to cooperate , says a policy analyst at one of Russia’s top schools for international relations. Speaking March 7 at Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian

Studies, Igor Istomin of MGIMO critiqued the dominant Western narrative about Russia: that it is a power trying to rewrite international norms to suit its particular interests. To illustrate, Istomin referred to America’s most recent National Security Strategy, which was unveiled in December. The document presents Russia and China as revisionist powers – that is, powers trying to shape the world in a way that is antithetical to

American values. Yet Russia does not and cannot steer global rules because it does not have the economic resources. “It is important to go beyond a simple and misleading dichotomy between dominant and emerging or between revisionist and status-quo powers because Russia fits none of these categories. We need to think about Russia as a restoring or recovering power,” he said. Discussions of the global liberal order often fail to acknowledge that the Soviet Union also contributed to the establishment of that order after World War II, he pointed out. The USSR helped found the United Nations and led in the creation of other institutions and norms (today’s non-proliferation regime and international pacts on human rights, for example) fundamental to the current international order . Russian official discourse still emphasizes the importance of international institutions. The central role for the UN and international law has been acknowledged in every Foreign Policy Concept adopted in Russia since 2000. To explain Russia’s adherence to existing international institutions such as the UN, Istomin claimed that with the rise of new powers – such as China, India, and even the EU, which have their own agendas regarding the shape of international institutions – Russia has less ability to affect international norms, especially when compared to the position the USSR enjoyed in a bipolar world. The United States, of course, faces a similar challenge

because it also must consider the interests of rising powers. Thus, new institutions will be less reflective of Russian and American interests – giving the once-dominate superpowers a reason to cooperate. Istomin conceded that the existing discourse on

Russia as a revisionist power is not completely out of touch with reality. “There are institutions in the international system which Russia does not feel comfortable with,” he said, citing NATO as an example. Now that Russia has recovered from the crises of the 1990s, it has pushed back against those institutions in which Russia’s voice was not heard. Another reason Russia tries to shape new rules and institutions in the international system is strategic. “Russia understands that the rising powers will continue to rise, and it thus tries to accommodate the interests of other rising powers in order to secure a better bargaining position until they get stronger,” Istomin said. The BRICS – a forum of countries with very diverse agendas – exemplify Moscow’s accommodation.

“Russia embraced the idea proposed by the rising powers about the reform of international financial institutions despite it not being Russia’s priority.” Istomin concluded that the notion Russia is a recovering power is crucial for reassessing relations between Moscow and Washington. The U.S. is not as strong as it was in the last decade. Nowadays, both Russia and the U.S. try to accommodate rising powers while protecting their own interests, but they do this in a

competitive context. Tensions between Russia and the U.S. encourage Russia to cooperate more closely with

the emerging powers. Istomin argued that Russia and the U.S. stand to gain by cooperating, as together they can increase their bargaining position with rising powers.

Not Revisionist – Regime SurvivalRussia’s not revisionist—acts in the name of regime survival

- Survival drives Russian behaviors- Doesn’t like NATO- Traditional state according to IR scholars, declining power

Andrew Natsios 2018-05-15 (Andrew Natsios is the Director of the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government at Texas A&M University. "Putin’s New Russia: Fragile State or Revisionist Power?," John Hopkins Press, https://www.press.jhu.edu/news/blog/putin%E2%80%99s-new-russia-fragile-state-or-revisionist-power //EH

For the first six years of Putin’s Presidency when he was regarded as a economic reformer, Russia was treated as a great power and was one of the select countries included in G-8 meetings, but after the invasion of Ukraine Russia was expelled. Beginning in the mid-2000’s, Putin abandoned his economic reform agenda and shifted the direction of his government, ending Russia’s integration into the world economy, crushing civil society, gaining virtual control of the Russian electronic news media, and seizing the territory of neighboring states such as Georgia and Ukraine, while aggressively rearming . Russia has had a history of surprising naïve outsiders who do not understand why the country and its leaders act as they do on the world stage or how the country functions internally. At his confirmation hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 9,

2015, Major General Joseph Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked to identify the greatest global threat to the United States. He provided a one-word answer: Russia. At the time his observation surprised many in Washington whose focus had been on the

radical Islamist State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or on China. Putin’s Russia as an Outlier Nation As the articles in this journal demonstrate, Putin’s Russia is an outlier nation in that it does not fit into the existing categories of other countries which make up the world order. Many of its unique characteristics are weaknesses, not strengths. Russia is not an advanced democratic capitalist state, nor does it have much in common with Brazil, India or China , with which it is often

grouped as one of the so-called BRIC countries. These countries have growing industrially and technologically-based economies, and two are evolving democracies. Brazil, India, and China are all experiencing aggressive and very public anti-corruption

campaigns, while the Russian government represents the embodiment of systemic corruption on a kleptocratic scale. If Putin loses power and a reform-minded government succeeds him, he, his circle of KGB agents and the Oligarchs who run the country, could end up in jail or worse. An article in the January/February 2018 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, Julia Ioffe reports that Putin, obsessed with the violent demise of Libyan leader

Muammar Gaddafi, watched over and over again a video of his brutal lynching by his own people. It is the Russian people who Putin most fears, and thus ensuring his own survival may be driving his aggressive external behavior which has played on the Russian people’s nationalist impulses to boost his popularity . Thus, the Russian foreign policy riddle may in fact be better explained, per some essays in this issue, as a response to the power dynamics within the country rather than by any particular national security doctrine . These dynamics are internal, not external threats to Putin’s rule, certainly not to Russia as a nation-state. Moscow’s policies may be driven by the insecurity and illegitimacy of the small circle of Oligarchs and former KGB agents surrounding Putin who fear their own people more than they fear any outside threat, a fear

which is evidence of profound, if disguised, weakness. Understanding Putin’s Foreign Policy John Mearsheimer, the international relations scholar, argues Russia’s aggressiveness towards its neighbors stems from western efforts to extend NATO membership to former members of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe and the Balkans . According to this view, traditional national interest drives Russia’s behavior, and NATO extension has been seen by Putin as a threat to Russia’s vital national security interests. From this perspective, the

western democracies helped create Vladimir Putin’s Russia by impinging on its “sphere of influence” along its borders; thus, Russia is not what international relations scholars call a “revisionist power” —one which seeks to overthrow the existing international order—but a traditional state protecting what it sees as its equities and vital national interests. Other analysts, such as Anne Applebaum, argue Putin’s policies are not part of a grand strategy, but are evidence of an improvised foreign policy. Thus, Russia’s aggression in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and its threats to the Baltic States, may be seen not as a carefully designed and executed strategy of conquest,

but as symptomatic of Putin’s ad hoc, opportunistic foreign policy. He probes for Western weakness, irresolution, and indecision, and then, if there is no resistance, he intervenes to extend Russia’s reach by absorbing more territory. Putin has sought to return Russia to great power status by weakening other competing powers or annexing neighboring states rather than risking reforms that could be destabilizing in the short term, but would strengthen Russia as a nation state over the long term. The immediate objectives of Russian foreign policy are not mysterious if one examines Putin’s government’s public rhetoric, its published documents, and its actions. One of Putin’s greatest strengths has been the aggressive and systematic pursuit of these strategic objectives which include: efforts to regain military parity with the United States (they are nowhere near achieving this) the neutralization of the NATO alliance the end of the European Union as one of the most powerful economic blocs in the world the creation of an alternative anti-liberal, authoritarian, reactionary governance model of statehood for which Russia is trying to gain adherents among far right and far left parties wing in Europe the reconstruction of the historic Russian sphere of influence through annexation of parts of neighboring states and the projection of Russian power to other regions of the world such as the Middle East and Afghanistan If Putin’s strategic objective was to minimize or reduce external threats to Russia, the invasion of Ukraine was a major strategic blunder as it has slowly begun to mobilize the previous docile and distracted Western Alliance to counter the new threat. NATO officials have now begun publicly raising the alarm bells. Sweden and Finland, which never joined NATO, are now engaged in a public discussion about joining the Alliance, which has broad public support. Putin’s Grand Bargain with the Russian People: Surrendering Freedom for Guns, Butter, and the dream of lost Russian Grandeur Putin’s legitimacy as a ruler has been based on a tacit agreement with the Russian people that trades individual freedom, democracy, and the rule of law for economic security. Since the severe economic contraction after mid-2014, that tacit agreement ended. Putin has now reformulated the grand bargain with the Russian people. He is promising to bring back the glorious days of the Soviet Union and earlier Tsarist Empires in exchange for the Russian public’s acceptance of his autocratic rule and a lower living standard. Since the drop-in oil prices beginning in the summer of 2014 when they peaked at $128 a barrel, the central government has been shoring up the fragile banking system. Despite the balance sheet’s visual appeal, Russia under Vladimir Putin faces a much greater risk of internal implosion than many in Western capitals understand. This is due to the cuts in public services and pensions, growing unrest among the Russian elites with Putin’s policies, and the Russian military’s discomfort with Putin’s strategic gambling in Ukraine and earlier in Georgia. Anne Applebaum argues in her essay that Putin has either infiltrated, co-opted, corrupted, intimidated, or shut down most of the nascent institutions of Russian democratic pluralism that developed during the 1990’s and early 2000’s such as non-governmental organizations, religious institutions such as the Russian Orthodox Church, think tanks, and universities. Russia has neither rule of law nor an independent court system, and its police are corrupt and a tool of repression rather than law enforcement. Russia has evolved into what Russians call a “managed democracy,” a democracy in appearance, not reality. Russian institutional weakness may be found in the retarded level of internal development and the dysfunctional characteristics of its governance structure. Russia’s current social, health, demographic, and economic indicators show a country in what could be permanent and irreversible decline, as documented in Nick Eberstadt’s essay.

These weaknesses suggest Russia is a declining power, and certainly not a rising power such as China.

Not Revisionist – Domestic IssuesNo Russian revisionism – even if Putin wants to expand he’s too weak and afraid of pushback

- Not capable of being revisionist (domestic problems, weak military, low defense budget)- Scared of/cant handle EU/NATO pushback

Dimitar Bechev 19 (Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, "Resurgent Russia: Myth and reality", No Publication, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/resurgent-russia-myth-reality-190217060009723.html, 2-14-2019, accessed 7-1-2019 //SKH)

Make Russia Great Again. That is the mission Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to have adopted in international politics. Following his return to the Kremlin in 2012, he took up a more assertive foreign policy, seeking to secure a seat at the top table of global diplomacy. The

effort has paid off. Thanks to its military intervention in Syria, Russia has graduated from a bystander to a leading powerbroker in the Middle East. Showing off this newly acquired status, Putin recently hosted the presidents of Turkey and Iran, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Hassan Rouhani, to coordinate a joint response to US President Donald

Trump's decision to pull US troops out of northeast Syria. The summit marked the two-year anniversary of the so-called

Astana Process whose professed goal is to bring the bloodshed in the embattled Middle Eastern country to an end. Conspicuously enough, the US is not part of the forum. Astana, therefore, might be a harbinger of a new global order to come: One in which emergent non-Western powers, such as Russia, China, India and others run the show. Over the past few years, Putin has

not shied away from confronting the West. In his early days as leader, he wholeheartedly sided with the US in the aftermath of 9/11 and even touted the prospect of Russia joining NATO. But by the time he delivered his oft-quoted speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, Putin had become convinced that the US and its allies were seeking to dethrone him by fomenting "colour revolutions" across the post-Soviet space. The Arab uprisings in 2010-2011 only confirmed his fears and, as a prime minister, he publicly denounced then-President Dmitry Medvedev's decision not to block a UN Security Council resolution authorising a no-fly zone over Libya, which precipitated the British and French air raids and the ultimate downfall of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. But the rift with the West became

permanent when Russia annexed Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula in the spring of 2014. Since then, Putin has defied both the US and its European allies, who imposed sanctions in response to the annexation as well as to Moscow's invasion of Eastern Ukraine,

where fighting continues until the present day. Perceptions of Russia have shifted as a result. Up until 2014, the US and the EU

considered it a difficult partner but not a full-fledged adversary. Now, the Pentagon's national defence strategy casts Russia as a military threat on a par with rising China. NATO has deployed troops in Eastern Europe in order to dissuade Moscow from pursuing aggressive action beyond its borders. There are, moreover, mounting fears that Russia is using a variety of tools, ranging from economic blackmail to cyberattacks and from disinformation to support for populist right-wing and radical leftist parties to undermine its Western competitors from within. The ongoing controversy over Russian meddling in the 2016 US presidential elections, along with the pro-Kremlin rhetoric of anti-immigration politicians in Europe such as Hungarian President Viktor

Orban and Italian Interior Minister Matteo Salvini, never ceases to generate headlines. The EU has started talking about "resilience" against external influence campaigns, with its eastern neighbour in mind. But Russia is not that powerful after all. Its GDP of $1.57 trillion is barely 8 percent of the US' and comparable to that of a mid-sized European

country like Spain. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which Putin finally managed to create in 2014 after years-long efforts, is no match for the economic juggernaut that is the EU. Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal, inherited from the once-mighty Soviet

Union, is at the same level as the US'. Yet, despite the ambitious military reform over the past decade, the Russian conventional forces lag far behind the US army's in terms of capability and technological sophistication. At $63bn, Russia's defence budget is far behind that of the US and China, which stand at $643bn and $168bn respectively.

Moscow has become better at fighting limited wars such as those in Ukraine and Syria but is not in a position to project military power globally. Despite its relatively close ties to China and India, Russia cannot rely on a stable network of alliances similar to the ones the US enjoys in Europe, East Asia and beyond. In short, the Russian Federation cannot and will not replace the US as the leading power or hegemon in the Middle East or any other part of the world. Even its

dominance in post-Soviet Eurasia is a tall order. Countries in Eastern Europe, such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova are oriented

economically and politically towards the West. In Central Asia, China is becoming increasingly the dominant centre of gravity. In a post-American world, Russia, too, would likely end up as Beijing's junior partner rather than an equal stakeholder. The essence of Russia's strategy is, to quote the late Russian politician Yevgeny Primakov, to "play a weak hand well". In some cases, this involves exploiting an opponent's vulnerabilities. Polarised domestic politics in the West have strengthened Russia's hand. This has allowed Putin to play more

effectively a "divide and conquer" game. In other cases, Russia has benefited from being flexible. In the Middle East, for

instance, it has been successfully cooperating with all mutually antagonistic powers: Iran, Israel, the Gulf, Turkey, the Kurds, etc. Nonetheless, Putin's foreign policy record remains mixed. Sometimes his gambles pay off, sometimes not. Russia's fighter jets, together with Iran's ground troops, saved the Assad regime in Syria. Crimea, too, was a coup. It sent the Russian president's popularity ratings at home to 80 percent or more. If Nicolas Maduro survives in Venezuela, that will give Russia a further international boost. In Europe, oil and gas endow Moscow with geopolitical leverage; Germany, for example, has been going out of its way to push for the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline, to the dismay of the US. Balkan countries, too, have been eager to host an extension of the Turk Stream pipeline. But then again,

there are limits to Moscow's power. NATO is enlarging, despite pushback from Russia. This year North Macedonia is set to join the alliance, following in the footsteps of Montenegro. At the same time, Putin is not making much headway in Ukraine. The conflict in the Donbas has long been in a state of deadlock while

Kyiv is not accepting a Russian proposal for a power-sharing constitution which would effectively give Russia veto

power over its foreign policy. Furthermore, international success has come at a cost. The sanctions imposed by the EU and the US are still there. Despite - or perhaps because of - Donald Trump's friendly overtures towards the Kremlin, the US Congress has been ramping up punitive measures against Russia. The Mueller investigation and the alleged collusion between the Trump

campaign and the Kremlin have made a rapprochement even more unlikely. For much of the past decade, this pursuit of greatness abroad was paying off domestically, giving Putin legitimacy and solidifying his grip on power. That appears to be less and less the case, however. Foreign exploits are no longer able to boost his rating. Gains in Syria, the Central African Republic or Venezuela are not buying the regime popularity. Russian society is increasingly focused on immediate challenges at home, like anaemic growth, the projected rise of the pension age, and debilitating corruption. Trust in institutions is low, with only Putin retaining popularity as an individual. Social discontent is on the rise and the

Western sanctions, in conjunction with volatile oil prices, are adding to the pain. Certainly, these domestic pressures won't force the Kremlin to undertake a U-turn and sue for peace. But they come as a healthy reminder that the idea that Russia is a revisionist power capable of upending the world order and Putin is a leader endowed with superhuman abilities is a far cry from reality.

AT: Rebuild Russian EmpireRussia’s belief in Ukraine as the sine-qua-none of their security creates fear of western expansion in Eastern EuropeKistilina 16 [Natalia; CUNY City College Fellow; 2016; “RUSSIA’S INTERVENTIONS IN POST-SOVIET STATES ON BEHALF OF RUSSIAN MINORITIES”; https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1661&context=cc_etds_theses; CUNY Academic Works; 06/26/2019; MohulA]

Traditionally, alliance literature has mainly focused on two questions: Why do al- liances form? And, what keeps alliances together?3 There is a

gap in the literature on how alliance enlargement affects nonmember states. Expansion of a military alliance next to the borders of a non-member-state is a sign of future unrest. This is likely even if the lat- ter is a great power. My research will attempt to address this gap within alliance litera- ture. I derive my argument from Walt. Walt changed

Waltz's balance-of-power theory, according to which states align with (or against) the most powerful states by balancing against countries that are not only powerful, but threatening .4 His theory became known as the balance-of-threat theory, and many political scientists have further developed this (Schweller,5 He,6 Sprecher,7 Kimball,8 Bock and Henneberg9).

Randall Schweller, in line with Walt's balance-of-threat theory, suggests that "bal- ancing means the creation or aggregation of military power through internal mobilization or the forging of alliances to prevent or deter the territorial occupation or the political and military domination of the state by a foreign power or coalition.10" However, Kai

He points out that military alliances and arms buildups are not the only balancing strategies states can use.11 Andreas M.

Bock and Ingo Henneberg agree with He’s points, defining balancing as "a state strategy designed to counter a perceived external threat by either military or nonmilitary means that are internal or external and that aim to reduce threat and maintain security."12 The current project narrows the focus on balances and alliances between Russia and NATO. The balance-of-threat theory can be used to explain Russia's balancing strat- egy towards the Alliance's enlargement. Most of the Western literature on Russia's for- eign policy blames the Kremlin for the Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia in 2008 and the current Russian-Ukrainian crisis, calling Russian actions aggressive (King,13 Budjerun,14 Galeotti15). However, some literature calls the Kremlin's foreign pol- icy rational, explainable, and logical

(Roberts,16 Mead,17 Gibler,18 Steff and Khoo19). Ac- cording to Mearshimer, the West, not Russia, is responsible for the Ukrainian crisis. Spe- cifically, he argues that the root of this conflict is NATO enlargement.20 The author de- clares great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their borders. NATO tried to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border, threatening Moscow's core strategic interests . Mearshimer asks the reader: "Imagine the outrage in Washington if China built a military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico in it?"21 Hence, Moscow's balancing strategy towards NATO enlargement should come as no surprise. The view of literature published in Russia is that

Moscow is protecting its na- tional interests against NATO's aggression. In the beginning of the 21st century, there was hope that NATO and Russia could become equal partners (Golubeva22, Kalachev and Polulyakh23). Yet, the illusion quickly vanished.

Today, the Russian government per- ceives NATO as a direct and immediate threat to security, particularly in light of NATO deploying an antimissile system right next to Russia's ( Kozin24 and Giniyatov25).

Sergei Voronin26 and Elena Garbuzarova27 claim that, for the last five hundred years, it has been the Western mission to "kill the Russian bear."28 In Voronin's eyes, it has been a long-standing dream of Western politicians, such as Halford Mackinder, Henry Kissinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, to organize and provoke a war in the Slavic world, in order to, for example "by the hands" of Ukraine, start a confrontation with Rus- sia.29 These political scientists believe that the current Ukrainian crisis is just the latest attempt of this Western mission. Elena Garbuzarova joins Voronin's argument by adding that there is a substantial growth of activity of NATO near the Russian borders, giving Moscow the right to protect its national security.30 Angelina Ivashkina's work focuses on military bases of NATO, which are gradually

surrounding Russia.31 Except maintaining NATO presence in the tra- ditional areas of the Alliance's influence, such as Western Europe, the bases are increasing NATO presence in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. One of the latest works devoted to Moscow's policies towards the Russian dias- pora abroad is Agnia Grigas' Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire. The author de- clares that "Russian history is a history of empire,"32 and the Russian diaspora abroad has become the instrument of Moscow's new-imperial aims and a

tool to challenge the sover- eignty of post-Soviet states.33 In Grigas' eyes, Moscow's hold on Russian minorities abroad serves as a pretext for the Kremlin's expansionist foreign policy .34 Furthermore, the aim of the latter is to "opportunistically grab land and gradually rebuild its historic empire when domestic and international conditions are favorable."35 This project

disagrees with her main argument about aggressive imperialist poli- cies of the Russian Federation. The main argument here is that states

closely monitor their surrounding territories. When a military block expands its membership to include countries

next to a rival state's borders, those rivals feel threatened and tend to respond. One of the ways states respond to losing influence over their border-states, which are not only their direct spheres of influence but serve as a protective buffer zone, is by declaring that their national or ethnic minorities who live in these territories are in danger. The likely result is that states will interfere in these border nations

on behalf of ethnic minori- ties. Thus, Russia's interference in Ukraine and Georgia are rather caused by Russia's fear of NATO expansion and self-preservation than desire to rebuild the Russian Empire. The Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia in 2008 and the current Russian-Ukrainian crisis took place only after Georgia and Ukraine made concrete steps towards NATO membership and served as a balancing strategy for Russia towards the Alliance's enlarge- ment.

2AC – Defensive RealismPutin’s a defensive realist – he’s just trying to preserve his rulePerson 16, (Robert Person is a professor in the Department of Social Sciences, ScienceDirect, “Balance of threat: The domestic insecurity of Vladimir Putin,” November 11, 2016, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1879366516300239#!)

Recalling the key distinction between the classical and offensive realists on the one hand and defensive realists on the other, I argue that Putin's ultimate objective is to maximize his security, not his power . While the slow creep of authoritarianism in Russia over the last 15 years has, of course, been characterized in a steady increase in the Kremlin's power, I argue that the underlying motivation has not been the insatiable drive for maximum power that appears in the “power-hungry autocrat” narrative that dominates much discourse on Putin. Rather, the underlying motivation is that which has been found in autocrats for most of history: the desire to survive in power . According to the domestic defensive realist argument, Putin's authoritarian march has not been the result of a proactive drive to expand power but has instead been a defensive reaction to perceived threats to his political security and survival. It is also worth noting that Putin very likely sees his political security as synonymous with Russia's security and survival : in 2014, Kremlin deputy chief of staff Vyacheslav Volodin famously declared to an audience of western analysts that “ any attack on Putin is an attack on Russia …There is no Russia today if there is no Putin,” a sentiment that Volodin's boss no doubt shares (The Moscow Times, 2014). To say that these policies have been defensive reactions is not to seek to justify them or excuse them in any way, as the result is still the same: they have resulted in the drastic erosion of democracy and political liberties in Russia. But the defensive realist argument produces an important set of implications distinct from those based on the assumption of offensive power maximization. I will return to this topic in the concluding section of the article. At this point it is useful to integrate Walt's balance of threat theory and its four elements of threat into the theoretical framework. Doing so leads me to the assertion that Putin has not reacted simply to the power held by other actors in the Russian domestic sphere; rather, he has reacted against those actors that pose a perceived threat to his control. The two are not synonymous, and there are instances described below where Putin has tolerated the former while acting against the latter. To sum up this part of the argument, it is not political or economic power alone that makes a potential rival threatening to Putin. What is determined to be a threat depends on the amount of power an actor possesses, what kind of power he possesses, where that power resides, and – crucially – what the actor's intentions are. Aggregate Power. When considering aggregate power in the domestic context, I return to Dahl's elegantly simple definition of political power as a relation among people wherein “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957, 202–203). Political, economic, and social forms of capital can all be utilized to coerce, convince, or cajole an actor to take an action that he would otherwise prefer not to take. Those who possess such capital (A) can thus be understood to possess “aggregate power,” and thus pose at least some threat to Putin's (B) security if they are able to leverage that power to cause Putin to act in ways that he would not otherwise do. Offensive Power. It is more challenging to distinguish offensive power from aggregate power in the domestic context than it is in the international context. However, if we understand the term to mean the ability to launch some sort of offensive attack on an actor's interests, we can begin to draw the necessary distinctions. An offensive attack in the domestic sphere would be any deliberate action by actor A that is meant to increase A's power at the expense of B's power. First and foremost, offensive domestic power (A) must be independent of the object of that power (B). Cast in Russian terms, a political–economic elite's sources of power must be independent of the Kremlin in order for it to be used offensively against the latter's interests. Thus, political elites with independent bases of support among the public and elite subgroups pose a greater risk of acting against the center's interests than do political elites who owe their position to Putin's apparatus. Similarly, private owners of capital in sectors of the economy that remain outside state control pose greater risk than those whose wealth is directly dependent on the good will of the Kremlin. In this regard, asset specificity is also a relevant consideration: owners of specific assets pose less offensive threat than do owners of non-specific assets because specific assets can more easily be seized by the state if necessary. The mass media with its ability to shape public opinion and influence mass mobilization can also be understood as an exemplar of potential offensive power and thus a significant potential threat to Putin's security in office. Geographic Proximity. There is an obvious way to translate's Walt's statement on geographic proximity to the domestic context: the closer that A is to B, the greater the threat that A poses to B. In the Russian context, challenges to Putin's authority (B) will be the most threatening if taken by actors (A) in Moscow, the seat of Russia's highly-centralized political and economic system. Lesser threats will be those in St. Petersburg and other major Russian cities, while more distant threats spread across Russia's vast territory will pose a greatly reduced threat. However, we can also interpret “proximity” in terms of a threat's centrality to the state's core strategic interests. Certain domestic industries like oil and gas, mineral, metals, and weapons manufacturing have been deemed strategically significant. Risks to those industries, many of which are controlled by the state itself, will be considered more threatening than risks to peripheral or non-strategic sectors of the economy. Aggressive Intentions. Finally, when considering the threat posed by A's power to make B do something that B does not wish to do, we must consider A's intentions. In the abstract and in reality, there are powerful and proximate players in the political, economic, and social spheres who are perceived as posing a limited threat because they have signaled benign intentions to the Kremlin and do not seek to challenge Putin's authority. This does not mean that such actors pose no threat, as their intentions could always change. But the most serious threats posed to the Kremlin emanate from powerful actors who have expressed aggressive intentions against Putin's system of rule. Again, it is worth remembering that one cannot speak of intentions without noting the role of perception and misperception. Since perception often generates its own reality, it is perhaps more accurate to think in terms of “perceived aggressive intentions” as a key driver of threats. It is also worth noting that there is a special place in Putin's pantheon of threats for those who have or are perceived to have the financial support of foreign actors. Domestic political actors, parties, or NGOs that receive financial support from western NGOs or western governments (especially the United States) are seen as especially threatening because they potentially combine offensive capabilities with perceived aggressive intentions. That some of these foreign actors and

governments are thought to support regime change in Russia makes them an intolerable – and highly dangerous – threat in Putin's eyes. Summarizing the Argument. To sum up, the domestic defensive realist explanation of Putin's authoritarianizing policies rests on the following principles . 1.Political competition in Russia today is perceived by Putin as a zero- sum struggle for security . 2. In this environment, Putin's policies are motivated by an imperative to maximize security of his rule and survival in office . 3.Putin's authoritarianizing policies have been defensive responses to perceived threats to his security, not an offensive will to maximum power.

1AR – Defensive RealismRussia’s a defensive realist -- hostility is due to a difference in traditional values and normsLaguerre 16, (Corentin Laguerre has a M.A. in War Studies from King’s College London, Center for International Maritime Security, “RUSSIA’S SELF-INFLICTED SECURITY DILEMMA,” December 12, 2016, http://cimsec.org/russias-self-inflicted-security-dilemma/29977)Russia’s hostility toward NATO seems to be due to two sets of reasons. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia sees NATO as a threat not only for its security because of NATO expansion and missile defense system, but also for its desire for great power status because NATO expansion reduced Russia’s influence in the region and promulgated political and strategic values in contention with its own . In regards to the security dilemma, Moscow feared that NATO would try to use colored revolutions to bring democratic change in the country, deploy U.S. troops on its borders , isolate Russia, and thus prevent it from supporting its own allies in the region. However, before Russia’s annexation of Crimea, NATO tried to reassure Russia about its missile defense program and expansion.26 It seems clear that NATO does not pose a direct threat to Russia, but that Moscow’s hostility is due to the different values the Alliance represent and the perceived insensitivity for the Federation’s fears. Indeed, since his first election as President, Putin reaffirmed the need for Russia to defend Russia’s traditional values and norms , which are, in his mind incompatible with those defended by NATO members. It seems that Russia’s hostility is more psychological and reflects a deep sense of political insecurity and vulnerability that fuels its efforts to balance NATO . Thus, it makes Russia’s perceived insecurity become real, and reinforces its own hostility and the dynamics of the security dilemma in Europe.27

DA Answers

Russian Expansionism DA

2AC – Can’t Deter RussiaArms sales can’t deter Russia in UkraineThompson 17 (Julie Thompson, policy and research analyst at the Charles Koch Institute, Master of International Affairs from the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. 8-30-2017, "Why Lethal Aid Can't Help Ukraine," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-lethal-aid-cant-help-ukraine-22114)

U.S. aid has come through the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), which was launched in 2014 in response to the Russian incursion into Ukraine. In fiscal year 2015, ERI included a $175 million transfer fund that was shared among Ukraine and the three Baltic States. Similarly, the fiscal year 2017 ERI request included $5.6 million “to develop a sustainable Ukraine (UKR) Special Operations Force Generation model.”

ERI spending is unlikely to stop there—the latest ERI proposal requests $150 million for Ukraine “to continue train, equip and advise efforts to build Ukraine’s capacity to conduct internal defense operations.”

And what advancements has Ukraine made with millions of dollars in U.S. benevolence? Not much. U.S. assistance often has been of little utility.

Reuters reported in December that $12 million worth of Raven RQ-11B drones were hacked by Russian equipment, rendering them useless and even dangerous for Ukrainian troops. Hackers even used the drones to spy on Ukrainian military positions. Despite

these shortcomings, U.S. troops were still training Ukrainian soldiers to use these drones as of this spring.

The United States also sent Humvees to Ukraine in 2015, but the vehicles dated from the 1980s and 1990s. Some arrived with plastic doors and windows, providing almost zero protection to soldiers. Others broke down after being driven a few hundred kilometers, reportedly “the result of sitting in a warehouse too long.”

Sending more weapons would not improve the situation. Relations between the United States and Russia are already at a low point. Sending new weapons to Ukraine would only escalate tensions—an all risk, no reward proposition for the United States.

What’s more, Russia remains a powerful, nuclear-armed state, and disturbing one of its core strategic interests is unwise and could make the conflict bloodier. In other words, Russia boasts what scholars call “ escalation dominance ” over Ukraine , meaning Moscow always will possess a stronger, larger military than Ukraine. New weapons are unlikely to change the calculus in the conflict.

Moreover, Russia always will have a greater interest in Ukraine than the United States. Ukraine is not only in Russia’s backyard, but was historically part of the Russian Empire, and later the Soviet Union . Given that

“Russian leaders believe their country’s core strategic interests are at stake in Ukraine; they are unlikely to give ground,” even if the United States tries to bleed Russia by attrition.

Of course, some supporters of the Trump administration’s plan say it is “meant to deter aggressive actions by Moscow,” but deterrence already has failed. The Ukrainians could not keep the Russians out of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk. Thus, the Russian and “separatist” presence there is already an accomplished fact.

What supporters really mean is that they want to compel Russia, but we don’t know exactly what they want to compel Russia to do.

To be sure, the departure of Russian troops would not solve the myriad problems Ukraine still must overcome; for example, what to do about Crimea or how to placate dissatisfied eastern provinces. There is no military solution in Ukraine, as these sorts of problems are best solved by

diplomacy. Moreover, Ukraine is not a member of NATO, and the United States is not obligated to come to its aid. Ukraine must consider other solutions.

1AR – Can’t Deter RussiaCurrent arms sales have no impact on Russian aggression and actively harms US national security interest – only reducing sales can solve. Depetris 17 (Daniel Depetris is a writer for Reuters. Commentary: Why the U.S. shouldn’t send arms to Ukraine. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-depetris-ukraine-commentary/commentary-why-the-u-s-shouldnt-send-arms-to-ukraine-idUSKBN1DS1XZ. 11/28/2017)

The National Security Council is reported to be on the verge of recommending the export of $47 million worth of defensive arms to Ukraine.

The package will reportedly include a cache of Javelin anti-tank missiles, weapons that would reliably and efficiently disable the hundreds of tanks that the Russian-supported separatists in the country’s east have acquired since the conflict began. To advocates who believe that sending weapons to the Ukrainian government will bloody Russia’s nose and send President Vladimir Putin a message, this pending decision couldn’t have come soon enough. Arming Kiev is a popular

prescription supported by top military officers and many lawmakers in both parties. Popular, however, doesn’t mean smart. Opening up America’s stockpile to Ukraine is not in Washington’s national security interest. In fact, it is bound to make a conflict that is mostly frozen into a more deadly one and it complicates any reasonable chance of a diplomatic resolution. While it may be uncomfortable to admit, the political orientation of Ukraine and how Ukrainians choose to

manage (or mismanage) their economy and political system doesn’t directly affect the United States. As Rajan Menon and William Ruger wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine last month, “Ukraine matters more to Russia than it does to the United States.” To Washington, Ukraine is a post-Soviet state whose oligarchic politics and systemic corruption have severely handicapped the country’s economic outlook. U.S. security interests in Europe are not wedded to whether Kiev succeeds in establishing a more democratic and accountable form of government. At best, Ukraine is a peripheral country that the United States doesn’t have a treaty obligation to defend

if its territory is invaded. To Putin, however, Ukraine is an integral puzzle in his grand strategy of making Russia as relevant a global player as it was during the Cold War. A wholesale Westernization of Ukrainian politics, from associations with the European Union (EU) to a possible membership in NATO, would destroy that ambition and ruin a significant portion of Putin’s political legacy. Indeed, the possibility of Ukraine increasing its trade relationship and political direction with the United States and Europe was enough of a national security threat to Putin that he was willing to deploy Russian soldiers, paratroopers, and special forces on

Ukrainian territory to carve out a zone of influence there. Putin’s belief that a Russian-friendly Ukraine is a national security imperative for Moscow won’t be changed by a couple dozen anti-tank missiles from the United States. The second concern for the Trump administration is how Putin might respond to any escalation. As former National

Security Council official Charles Kupchan argued in the Washington Post: “The notion that Russian President Vladimir Putin would give up his hold on Donbass [Eastern Ukraine] if a few more Russians come home in body bags is to dramatically misread the Kremlin.” Yet this false assumption is what undergirds the arguments from proponents of lethal

assistance to the Ukrainians. It’s impossible to understand why some U.S. legislators are so confident that Moscow will react in the way they expect. The three-and-a-half year long war has shown that Russia is ruthless in escalating its involvement and investment in the conflict to prevent a military victory for Kiev. In fact, to expect that Moscow would respond to more Russian casualties by suing for a peace settlement is to ignore completely how Putin has behaved since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. When separatist units in Donetsk and Luhansk were losing ground to pro-Kiev forces early in the war, Russia came to their rescue. In the summer of 2014, when pro-Ukrainian troops were retaking towns that Kiev previously lost, columns of Russian tanks, artillery, heavy weapons, and soldiers crossed the border into Ukraine to ensure that there were no more Ukrainian territorial advances in strategic areas. When the stalemated battle in the city of Ilovaisk was slowly moving Kiev’s way, conventional Russian soldiers and weapons were fast-tracked to the frontline in what would turn out to be one of the deadliest days for Ukrainian troops in the war. Months later, when the separatists were in jeopardy of retreating from the strategic town of Delbatseve, Russian tanks were deployed and quickly

forced an undermanned, disorganized, demoralized, and tired contingent of Kiev forces to withdraw. There’s no reason to think that Putin would respond less violently now if Washington sent defense shipments to Ukraine . The most negative impact of additional U.S. involvement is that it will likely spoil Moscow’s willingness to cooperate on a Ukrainian peacekeeping proposal. While Moscow has insisted that the 2014 and 2015 Minsk protocols are the only way the war in Ukraine can end peacefully, Putin has openly acknowledged that there may need to be greater international involvement if that peace is to be sustainable. He broached the subject of deploying U.N. troops along the contact line this September and even

agreed to explore greater access to peacekeepers in separatist-controlled territory after a call with German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The concept is now being discussed within the Trump administration and between the U.S. and Russian special envoys to the conflict, suggesting sincerity on the Russian side. A White House authorization to send equipment to Kiev could stop that dialogue. It’s difficult to understand why the United States would escalate the war when there may finally be an opening to explore a U.N.-enforced cessation of hostilities that could lead to a political settlement to the conflict. Slideshow (2 Images) The Russians could respond to increased U.S. involvement in Ukraine in other ways too. Moscow could, for example, use its veto power in the U.N. Security Council to block U.S.-led efforts to stop North Korea’s nuclear program. Putin could expand military and intelligence cooperation with Iran to undermine the Trump administration’s policy of containing Iranian expansionism. The costs to the U.S. of turning Ukraine into a proxy war against Russia overshadow the benefit of increasing Moscow’s

casualty count. Sending arms to Kiev will do very little to help resolve the conflict. Sometimes the best course of action for the White House is not to get more involved on issues peripheral to American grand strategy.

2AC – Link Turn – RetaliationIncreasing arms ensures Russia pours more resources into the conflictDaniel Depetris, a fellow at Defense Priorities, and a columnist for the Washington Examiner and the American Conservative, 3-8-2018, "It is a mistake to arm Ukraine," Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2018/03/12/it-is-a-mistake-to-arm-ukraine/ E.G.

After a lengthy policy review and a considerable amount of discussion, the White House decided in December to overturn the previous

administration’s position on U.S. weapons sales to Ukraine, an arms exporter. Washington would now approve lethal defensive weapons systems to Kiev ostensibly in order to improve Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russian-backed separatists operating in the east of the country. The State Department announced the first significant sale March 1 of 210 Javelin anti-tank missiles and 37 launchers with an estimated value of $47 million.

Some leaders in Washington have advocated for the sale of missiles to damage or destroy Russian tanks in eastern Ukraine ever since Moscow

intervened in its neighbor’s affairs. These weapons, however, will have no impact on the fighting beyond a front line that has been mostly static for years.

Beyond the battlefield, however, this will further poison whatever bilateral relationship the U.S. has left with Russia — and that is bad for America.

Sending arms to Ukraine is far more likely to escalate a conflict whose outcome is vital to Russia’s national security interest and, at best, peripheral to America’s. While deterring more violence in eastern Ukraine may be

the stated objective, shipping advanced weapons into a conflict zone is bound to end up badly for Ukrainians — who simply want the violence to end — and for the United States, a country that should not be plunging into another tangential foreign policy commitment.

At every point in the conflict when Kiev’s army was advancing on the ground , Russian President Vladimir Putin responded by pouring more military equipment, money and Russian military personnel into the Donbass on behalf of the separatists. The reason Moscow has responded in such a way to prevent a complete separatist collapse is

realpolitik, plain and simple: Ukraine’s political loyalties are immensely important to Russia.

It is simply inconceivable for Putin to allow a large neighboring state — that has historically been a connective tissue

to the old Russian empire and the Soviet Union — to drift closer to Europe and act antagonistic toward Moscow. This is a strategic vulnerability for Russia, and one that he relies on as a buffer from perceived encroachment by liberal internationalists.

1AR – Link Turn – Retaliation

An increase in casualties only expands the warSteve Chapman, Columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, appears in some 50 papers across the country. Chapman has been a member of the Tribune editorial board since 1981. A native Texan, he has a bachelor's degree from Harvard. 2-4-2015, "Why we shouldn't arm Ukraine," chicagotribune, https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/steve-chapman/ct-ukraine-putin-obama-russia-arms-perspec-0205-20150204-story.html E.G.

Justin Logan, a foreign policy analyst at the libertarian Cato Institute in Washington, also notes, "Historically, Russia has been probably the least casualty-averse country on Earth ." The Soviets stayed in Afghanistan a decade despite losing more than 14,000 lives — six times more than we have lost there. And Afghanistan was a country that, unlike Ukraine, had no large populace of ethnic Russians pining to rejoin the motherland.

Nor does an increase in casualties necessarily cause outsiders to look for the exit. More often, it spurs them to plunge deeper. That was the case for the Soviets in Afghanistan, as well as the U.S. in Iraq. Turning Ukraine into a struggle against American imperialism would make it easier, not harder, for Putin to justify the sacrifice.

The belief that we can force him to sue for peace is one of those fetching delusions that often overcome our policymakers and pundits. Political

scientist Lionel Beehner noted recently in The Washington Post, "Scholarship generally finds that third-party intervention on the side of rebel forces makes conflicts longer, bloodier and more difficult to resolve through peaceful means."

There is no reason to think intervening on behalf of the Ukrainian government would yield a different result. Often, all you get from expanding a war is an expanded war. In this one, we might ensure more dead Russians — but also a lot more dead Ukrainians.

The problem is that the U.S. has neither the means nor the motivation to stop Putin. Ukraine is always going to be a lot closer to Moscow than to Washington, and its fate is always going to matter a lot more to the Russians than to us.

When the Soviets invaded Hungary in 1956, President Dwight Eisenhower, who was not weak or indecisive, refused to send U.S. troops or weapons to help the pro-democracy Budapest government. "Eisenhower knew that there were limits to his power," wrote biographer Stephen Ambrose, "and Hungary was outside those limits."

NATO/Allies DA

2AC – Link TurnEngaging in trade of lethal weapons to Ukraine would cause a rift between the U.S. and European allies Charles Kupchan, Senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), professor of international affairs in the Walsh School of Foreign Service and Department of Government at Georgetown University. 8-7-2017, "Opinion," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/08/07/why-giving-ukraine-lethal-weapons-would-be-a-massive-mistake/ E.G.

Sending lethal weapons to Ukraine has one further downside — it would cause a rift between the United States and its main European allies. Germany and France have been leading diplomatic efforts to find a diplomatic solution for Donbass — and both have long opposed sending lethal weapons to Ukraine because of its potential to escalate the conflict.

The United States and Europe have moved in lock step since the beginning of the conflict, closely coordinating non-lethal military assistance to Ukraine as well as economic sanctions against Russia. Transatlantic solidarity has arguably been the West’s strongest suit, confronting Putin with a united front and keeping Russia in the penalty box despite pressure from parties on both sides of the Atlantic to drop sanctions and reap the accompanying commercial benefits.

Europeans are already on edge due to Congress’s recent sanctions legislation, which imposes measures not coordinated with the European Union and that have the potential to cause undue harm to European companies. If Washington decides to head off on its own and send lethal weapons to Ukraine, solidarity on Ukraine may well come to end.

1AR – Link TurnGiving lethal aid to Ukraine adds tension to U.S. and NATO relationsJulie Thompson, policy and research analyst at the Charles Koch Institute, Master of International Affairs from the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. 8-30-2017, "Why Lethal Aid Can't Help Ukraine," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-lethal-aid-cant-help-ukraine-22114 E.G.

Giving lethal aid to Ukraine could also put the United States in an awkward position vis-à-vis its NATO allies. Importantly, NATO allies like France and Germany acknowledge the Russian point of view about arming

Ukraine, and have previously said that providing Ukraine with lethal weaponry would constitute a “dangerous, permanent escalation” against Russia . Indeed, France and Germany are still calling for a negotiated solution as

of last month, and “German, French, and other Western European defense ministers did not attend” events during Mattis’s trip to Ukraine. It is unclear how lethal aid would accelerate a diplomatic outcome. Although the conflict in Ukraine is a tragedy, the

United States can do little. Furthermore, Ukraine’s security has little to do with the fundamental safety of the United States. President Trump should not send lethal aid to Ukraine, and should avoid further entangling the United States into this conflict.

Escalated conflict due to arms sales would divide US and NATODoug Bandow, 12-29-2017, "Arming Ukraine Likely to Escalate Fruitless Conflict and Risk Needless Confrontation with Russia," HuffPost, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/arming-ukraine-likely-to-escalate-fruitless-conflict_b_5a46420de4b0d86c803c7639 E.G.

At the same time, transferring lethal arms would divide the U.S. from European nations, many of which oppose further confrontation with Russia, especially over Ukraine. Brussels already bridled at Congress’ new sanctions legislation, which passed without consulting the Europeans and targeted European firms. If Moscow responds with escalation, Washington may find no one behind it.

Providing lethal weapons would almost certainly encourage the Ukrainians to press for even heavier arms and escalate the fighting, as well as discourage them from negotiating a settlement. U.S. officials refer to the

weapons as defensive, but their capabilities are not so easily compartmentalized. Said Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said the “ability to stop armored vehicles would be essential for them to protect themselves.” True, but the ability to

disable tanks is useful on offense as well as defense. There has been little movement in the battle line over the last couple of years. New U.S. weapons aren’t necessary to preserve the status quo. Rather, they would most help Ukraine press harder for a military solution.

CP Answers

Deterrence CP

2AC – Can’t Win WarArming Ukraine expands destruction – Russia won’t negotiateSteve Chapman, Columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, appears in some 50 papers across the country. Chapman has been a member of the Tribune editorial board since 1981. A native Texan, he has a bachelor's degree from Harvard. 2-4-2015, "Why we shouldn't arm Ukraine," chicagotribune, https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/steve-chapman/ct-ukraine-putin-obama-russia-arms-perspec-0205-20150204-story.html E.G.

It could expand the destruction of the fighting without changing the outcome. And it's likely to eventually present the U.S. with a choice between accepting defeat and having to use our own forces to save Ukraine.

No one really doubts that Putin can prevail in this fight. The think-tank report concedes, "Even with enormous support from the West, the Ukrainian army will not be able to defeat a determined attack by the Russian military."

Despite all the martial rhetoric in Washington, we are not going to turn the tide of the war. All the U.S. government can hope to do is raise the price Putin has to pay.

Chicago Council on Global Affairs President Ivo Daalder, who was Obama's ambassador to NATO, told NPR that "the one

thing Mr. Putin is most concerned about is Russian casualties." He said, "We know from the history in Afghanistan and other places that when Russian soldiers die, then the cost and the debate in Moscow and in the rest of Russia will go up." The hope is that Russia would retreat or negotiate a settlement.

But the aid might come too late to boost the Russian body count, since Putin would have plenty of time to pre-empt it. The Russians can beat us to any punch, and they would hit harder.

2AC – Can’t Deter RussiaArms sales can’t deter Russia in UkraineThompson 17 (Julie Thompson, policy and research analyst at the Charles Koch Institute, Master of International Affairs from the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. 8-30-2017, "Why Lethal Aid Can't Help Ukraine," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-lethal-aid-cant-help-ukraine-22114)

U.S. aid has come through the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), which was launched in 2014 in response to the Russian incursion into Ukraine. In fiscal year 2015, ERI included a $175 million transfer fund that was shared among Ukraine and the three Baltic States. Similarly, the fiscal year 2017 ERI request included $5.6 million “to develop a sustainable Ukraine (UKR) Special Operations Force Generation model.”

ERI spending is unlikely to stop there—the latest ERI proposal requests $150 million for Ukraine “to continue train, equip and advise efforts to build Ukraine’s capacity to conduct internal defense operations.”

And what advancements has Ukraine made with millions of dollars in U.S. benevolence? Not much. U.S. assistance often has been of little utility.

Reuters reported in December that $12 million worth of Raven RQ-11B drones were hacked by Russian equipment, rendering them useless and even dangerous for Ukrainian troops. Hackers even used the drones to spy on Ukrainian military positions. Despite

these shortcomings, U.S. troops were still training Ukrainian soldiers to use these drones as of this spring.

The United States also sent Humvees to Ukraine in 2015, but the vehicles dated from the 1980s and 1990s. Some arrived with plastic doors and windows, providing almost zero protection to soldiers. Others broke down after being driven a few hundred kilometers, reportedly “the result of sitting in a warehouse too long.”

Sending more weapons would not improve the situation. Relations between the United States and Russia are already at a low point. Sending new weapons to Ukraine would only escalate tensions—an all risk, no reward proposition for the United States.

What’s more, Russia remains a powerful, nuclear-armed state, and disturbing one of its core strategic interests is unwise and could make the conflict bloodier. In other words, Russia boasts what scholars call “ escalation dominance ” over Ukraine , meaning Moscow always will possess a stronger, larger military than Ukraine. New weapons are unlikely to change the calculus in the conflict.

Moreover, Russia always will have a greater interest in Ukraine than the United States. Ukraine is not only in Russia’s backyard, but was historically part of the Russian Empire, and later the Soviet Union . Given that

“Russian leaders believe their country’s core strategic interests are at stake in Ukraine; they are unlikely to give ground,” even if the United States tries to bleed Russia by attrition.

Of course, some supporters of the Trump administration’s plan say it is “meant to deter aggressive actions by Moscow,” but deterrence already has failed. The Ukrainians could not keep the Russians out of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk. Thus, the Russian and “separatist” presence there is already an accomplished fact.

What supporters really mean is that they want to compel Russia, but we don’t know exactly what they want to compel Russia to do.

To be sure, the departure of Russian troops would not solve the myriad problems Ukraine still must overcome; for example, what to do about Crimea or how to placate dissatisfied eastern provinces. There is no military solution in Ukraine, as these sorts of problems are best solved by

diplomacy. Moreover, Ukraine is not a member of NATO, and the United States is not obligated to come to its aid. Ukraine must consider other solutions.

1AR – Can’t Deter RussiaCurrent arms sales have no impact on Russian aggression and actively harms US national security interest – only reducing sales can solve. Depetris 17 (Daniel Depetris is a writer for Reuters. Commentary: Why the U.S. shouldn’t send arms to Ukraine. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-depetris-ukraine-commentary/commentary-why-the-u-s-shouldnt-send-arms-to-ukraine-idUSKBN1DS1XZ. 11/28/2017)

The National Security Council is reported to be on the verge of recommending the export of $47 million worth of defensive arms to Ukraine.

The package will reportedly include a cache of Javelin anti-tank missiles, weapons that would reliably and efficiently disable the hundreds of tanks that the Russian-supported separatists in the country’s east have acquired since the conflict began. To advocates who believe that sending weapons to the Ukrainian government will bloody Russia’s nose and send President Vladimir Putin a message, this pending decision couldn’t have come soon enough. Arming Kiev is a popular

prescription supported by top military officers and many lawmakers in both parties. Popular, however, doesn’t mean smart. Opening up America’s stockpile to Ukraine is not in Washington’s national security interest. In fact, it is bound to make a conflict that is mostly frozen into a more deadly one and it complicates any reasonable chance of a diplomatic resolution. While it may be uncomfortable to admit, the political orientation of Ukraine and how Ukrainians choose to

manage (or mismanage) their economy and political system doesn’t directly affect the United States. As Rajan Menon and William Ruger wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine last month, “Ukraine matters more to Russia than it does to the United States.” To Washington, Ukraine is a post-Soviet state whose oligarchic politics and systemic corruption have severely handicapped the country’s economic outlook. U.S. security interests in Europe are not wedded to whether Kiev succeeds in establishing a more democratic and accountable form of government. At best, Ukraine is a peripheral country that the United States doesn’t have a treaty obligation to defend

if its territory is invaded. To Putin, however, Ukraine is an integral puzzle in his grand strategy of making Russia as relevant a global player as it was during the Cold War. A wholesale Westernization of Ukrainian politics, from associations with the European Union (EU) to a possible membership in NATO, would destroy that ambition and ruin a significant portion of Putin’s political legacy. Indeed, the possibility of Ukraine increasing its trade relationship and political direction with the United States and Europe was enough of a national security threat to Putin that he was willing to deploy Russian soldiers, paratroopers, and special forces on

Ukrainian territory to carve out a zone of influence there. Putin’s belief that a Russian-friendly Ukraine is a national security imperative for Moscow won’t be changed by a couple dozen anti-tank missiles from the United States. The second concern for the Trump administration is how Putin might respond to any escalation. As former National

Security Council official Charles Kupchan argued in the Washington Post: “The notion that Russian President Vladimir Putin would give up his hold on Donbass [Eastern Ukraine] if a few more Russians come home in body bags is to dramatically misread the Kremlin.” Yet this false assumption is what undergirds the arguments from proponents of lethal

assistance to the Ukrainians. It’s impossible to understand why some U.S. legislators are so confident that Moscow will react in the way they expect. The three-and-a-half year long war has shown that Russia is ruthless in escalating its involvement and investment in the conflict to prevent a military victory for Kiev. In fact, to expect that Moscow would respond to more Russian casualties by suing for a peace settlement is to ignore completely how Putin has behaved since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. When separatist units in Donetsk and Luhansk were losing ground to pro-Kiev forces early in the war, Russia came to their rescue. In the summer of 2014, when pro-Ukrainian troops were retaking towns that Kiev previously lost, columns of Russian tanks, artillery, heavy weapons, and soldiers crossed the border into Ukraine to ensure that there were no more Ukrainian territorial advances in strategic areas. When the stalemated battle in the city of Ilovaisk was slowly moving Kiev’s way, conventional Russian soldiers and weapons were fast-tracked to the frontline in what would turn out to be one of the deadliest days for Ukrainian troops in the war. Months later, when the separatists were in jeopardy of retreating from the strategic town of Delbatseve, Russian tanks were deployed and quickly

forced an undermanned, disorganized, demoralized, and tired contingent of Kiev forces to withdraw. There’s no reason to think that Putin would respond less violently now if Washington sent defense shipments to Ukraine . The most negative impact of additional U.S. involvement is that it will likely spoil Moscow’s willingness to cooperate on a Ukrainian peacekeeping proposal. While Moscow has insisted that the 2014 and 2015 Minsk protocols are the only way the war in Ukraine can end peacefully, Putin has openly acknowledged that there may need to be greater international involvement if that peace is to be sustainable. He broached the subject of deploying U.N. troops along the contact line this September and even

agreed to explore greater access to peacekeepers in separatist-controlled territory after a call with German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The concept is now being discussed within the Trump administration and between the U.S. and Russian special envoys to the conflict, suggesting sincerity on the Russian side. A White House authorization to send equipment to Kiev could stop that dialogue. It’s difficult to understand why the United States would escalate the war when there may finally be an opening to explore a U.N.-enforced cessation of hostilities that could lead to a political settlement to the conflict. Slideshow (2 Images) The Russians could respond to increased U.S. involvement in Ukraine in other ways too. Moscow could, for example, use its veto power in the U.N. Security Council to block U.S.-led efforts to stop North Korea’s nuclear program. Putin could expand military and intelligence cooperation with Iran to undermine the Trump administration’s policy of containing Iranian expansionism. The costs to the U.S. of turning Ukraine into a proxy war against Russia overshadow the benefit of increasing Moscow’s

casualty count. Sending arms to Kiev will do very little to help resolve the conflict. Sometimes the best course of action for the White House is not to get more involved on issues peripheral to American grand strategy.

2AC – Causes RetaliationIncreasing arms ensures Russia pours more resources into the conflictDaniel Depetris, a fellow at Defense Priorities, and a columnist for the Washington Examiner and the American Conservative, 3-8-2018, "It is a mistake to arm Ukraine," Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2018/03/12/it-is-a-mistake-to-arm-ukraine/ E.G.

After a lengthy policy review and a considerable amount of discussion, the White House decided in December to overturn the previous

administration’s position on U.S. weapons sales to Ukraine, an arms exporter. Washington would now approve lethal defensive weapons systems to Kiev ostensibly in order to improve Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russian-backed separatists operating in the east of the country. The State Department announced the first significant sale March 1 of 210 Javelin anti-tank missiles and 37 launchers with an estimated value of $47 million.

Some leaders in Washington have advocated for the sale of missiles to damage or destroy Russian tanks in eastern Ukraine ever since Moscow

intervened in its neighbor’s affairs. These weapons, however, will have no impact on the fighting beyond a front line that has been mostly static for years.

Beyond the battlefield, however, this will further poison whatever bilateral relationship the U.S. has left with Russia — and that is bad for America.

Sending arms to Ukraine is far more likely to escalate a conflict whose outcome is vital to Russia’s national security interest and, at best, peripheral to America’s. While deterring more violence in eastern Ukraine may be

the stated objective, shipping advanced weapons into a conflict zone is bound to end up badly for Ukrainians — who simply want the violence to end — and for the United States, a country that should not be plunging into another tangential foreign policy commitment.

At every point in the conflict when Kiev’s army was advancing on the ground , Russian President Vladimir Putin responded by pouring more military equipment, money and Russian military personnel into the Donbass on behalf of the separatists. The reason Moscow has responded in such a way to prevent a complete separatist collapse is

realpolitik, plain and simple: Ukraine’s political loyalties are immensely important to Russia.

It is simply inconceivable for Putin to allow a large neighboring state — that has historically been a connective tissue

to the old Russian empire and the Soviet Union — to drift closer to Europe and act antagonistic toward Moscow. This is a strategic vulnerability for Russia, and one that he relies on as a buffer from perceived encroachment by liberal internationalists.

1AR – Causes Retaliation

An increase in casualties only expands the warSteve Chapman, Columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, appears in some 50 papers across the country. Chapman has been a member of the Tribune editorial board since 1981. A native Texan, he has a bachelor's degree from Harvard. 2-4-2015, "Why we shouldn't arm Ukraine," chicagotribune, https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/steve-chapman/ct-ukraine-putin-obama-russia-arms-perspec-0205-20150204-story.html E.G.

Justin Logan, a foreign policy analyst at the libertarian Cato Institute in Washington, also notes, "Historically, Russia has been probably the least casualty-averse country on Earth ." The Soviets stayed in Afghanistan a decade despite losing more than 14,000 lives — six times more than we have lost there. And Afghanistan was a country that, unlike Ukraine, had no large populace of ethnic Russians pining to rejoin the motherland.

Nor does an increase in casualties necessarily cause outsiders to look for the exit. More often, it spurs them to plunge deeper. That was the case for the Soviets in Afghanistan, as well as the U.S. in Iraq. Turning Ukraine into a struggle against American imperialism would make it easier, not harder, for Putin to justify the sacrifice.

The belief that we can force him to sue for peace is one of those fetching delusions that often overcome our policymakers and pundits. Political

scientist Lionel Beehner noted recently in The Washington Post, "Scholarship generally finds that third-party intervention on the side of rebel forces makes conflicts longer, bloodier and more difficult to resolve through peaceful means."

There is no reason to think intervening on behalf of the Ukrainian government would yield a different result. Often, all you get from expanding a war is an expanded war. In this one, we might ensure more dead Russians — but also a lot more dead Ukrainians.

The problem is that the U.S. has neither the means nor the motivation to stop Putin. Ukraine is always going to be a lot closer to Moscow than to Washington, and its fate is always going to matter a lot more to the Russians than to us.

When the Soviets invaded Hungary in 1956, President Dwight Eisenhower, who was not weak or indecisive, refused to send U.S. troops or weapons to help the pro-democracy Budapest government. "Eisenhower knew that there were limits to his power," wrote biographer Stephen Ambrose, "and Hungary was outside those limits."

2AC – AT: US Troops to Ukraine CPDeterrence failure in the Ukrainian proxy war is inevitable—bad intelligence, misinterpretation of signals, and irrational and nationalist leaders all prove miscalculationThompson 14 [Loren; Forbes Contributor from Washington; April 24, 2014; “Four Ways The Ukraine Crisis Could Escalate To Use Of Nuclear Weapons”; https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/04/24/four-ways-the-ukraine-crisis-could-escalate-to-use-of-nuclear-weapons/#454b4cf6232a; Forbes; accessed: 07/01/2019; MohulA]

In 1983, the ABC television network broadcast a movie called The Day After about how a superpower nuclear exchange devastated the lives of

typical Americans in two midwestern cities. The conflict began with a Russian troop buildup in Eastern Europe

(which Moscow initially claimed to be a military exercise), and then gradually escalated to a point where both sides launched their nuclear missiles for fear of losing them in a preemptive attack . Coming as it did during a period of U.S.-Soviet tensions and controversy surrounding Reagan Administration nuclear policies, the broadcast attracted a huge audience of over 100 million viewers; it is still the highest rated made-for-television movie in U.S. history. Americans haven't thought much about such scenarios since the Cold War ended, because the Soviet Union dissolved and the

ideological rivalry between Washington and Moscow ceased. However, this year's crisis over Ukraine is a reminder that Russia remains a nuclear superpower, and that the geopolitical sources of its security concerns have not vanished. In fact, Moscow may have greater reason for worrying today, because it has lost the buffer of allies that insulated it from Western attack during the Cold War, and now finds its capital only a few minutes from the eastern border of Ukraine by jet (less by missile). If you know the history of the region, then it is easy

to see why Moscow might fear aggression. Although the Obama Administration is responding cautiously to Moscow's annexation of

Ukraine's province of Crimea in March, its credibility is on the line with regional allies and Russian leader Vladimir Putin has not been helpful in defusing the fears of his neighbors. Having fomented revolt in eastern Ukraine, Moscow now says it might be forced to come to the aid of ethnic Russians there (it has massed 40,000 troops on the other side of

the border, in what was first called an exercise). Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence in the neighborhood, reiterating security guarantees to local members of NATO. So little by little, tensions are ratcheting up. One facet of the regional military balance that bears watching is the presence of so-called nonstrategic nuclear weapons on

both sides. Once called tactical nuclear weapons, these missiles, bombs and other devices were bought during the Cold War to

compensate for any shortfalls in conventional firepower during a conflict. According to Amy Woolf of the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. has about 200 such weapons in Europe, some of which are available for use by local allies in a war.

Woolf says Russia has about 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads in its active arsenal -- many of them within striking distance of Ukraine -- and that successive revisions of Russian military strategy appear "to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons" to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons .

A 2011 study by the respected RAND Corporation came to much the same conclusion, stating that Russian doctrine explicitly

recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression . Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict. This isn't just Russian saber-rattling. The U.S. and its NATO partners too envision the possibility of nuclear use in a European war . The Obama Administration had the opportunity to back away from such thinking in a 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, and instead decided it would retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons in

Europe under a doctrine known as extended deterrence. Eastern European nations that joined NATO after the Soviet collapse have been especially supportive of having U.S. nuclear weapons nearby. This mobile intercontinental ballistic missile launcher is emblematic of Moscow's continuing investment in nuclear weapons, reflecting a doctrinal emphasis that includes potential nuclear use in response to conventional aggression. (Retrieved from http://blogs-images.forbes.com/lorenthompson/files/2014/04/19-03-2012-parade-rehearsal_-_topol-m.jpg) This mobile intercontinental

ballistic missile launcher is emblematic of Moscow's continuing investment in nuclear weapons, reflecting a doctrinal emphasis that includes potential nuclear use in response to conventional aggression. (Retrieved from http://blogs-images.forbes.com/lorenthompson/files/2014/04/19-03-2012-parade-rehearsal_-_topol-m.jpg) YOU MAY ALSO LIKE So

improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear use in a confrontation over Ukraine. Here are four ways that what started out as a local crisis could turn into something much worse. Bad intelligence . As the U.S. has stumbled from one military mis-adventure to another over the last several decades, it

has become clear that Washington isn't very good at interpreting intelligence. Even when vital information is available, it gets filtered by preconceptions and bureaucratic processes so that the wrong conclusions are drawn. Similar problems exist in Moscow. For instance, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 arose partly from Soviet

leader Khrushchev's assessment that President Kennedy was weaker than he turned out to be , and the U.S. Navy nearly provoked use of a nuclear torpedo by a Russian submarine during the blockade because it misjudged the enemy's likely reaction to

being threatened. It is easy to imagine similar misjudgments in Ukraine, which Washington and Moscow approach from very

different perspectives. Any sizable deployment of U.S. forces in the region could provoke Russian escalation. Defective signaling. When tensions are high, rival leaders often seek to send signals about their intentions as a

way of shaping outcomes. But the meaning of such signals can easily be confused by the need of leaders to address multiple

audiences at the same time, and by the different frames of reference each side is applying. Even the process of translation can change the apparent meaning of messages in subtle ways. So when Russian foreign minister Lavrov spoke this week (in English) about the possible need to come to the aid of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, Washington had to guess whether he was stating the public rationale for an invasion, sending a warning signal to Kiev about its internal counter-terror campaign, or trying to accomplish some other purpose.

Misinterpretation of such signals can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the "ladder of escalation" quickly, to a point where nuclear use seems like the logical next step. Looming defeat. If military confrontation between Russia and NATO gave way to conventional conflict, one side or the other would

eventually face defeat. Russia has a distinct numerical advantage in the area around Ukraine, but its military consists mainly of conscripts and is poorly equipped compared with Western counterparts. Whichever side found itself

losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Moscow would have to contemplate the possibility of a permanent enemy presence near its heartland, while Washington might face the collapse of NATO, its most important alliance. In such circumstances, the use of "only" one or two tactical nuclear warheads to avert an outcome with such far-reaching consequences might seem reasonable -- especially given the existence of

relevant capabilities and supportive doctrine on both sides. Command breakdown. Strategic nuclear weapons like intercontinental ballistic missiles are tightly controlled by senior military leaders in Russia and America,

making their unauthorized or accidental use nearly impossible. That is less the case with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which at some point in the course of an escalatory process need to be released to the control of local commanders if they are to have military

utility. U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads against enemy targets . Moscow

probably doesn't trust its allies to that degree, but with more tactical nuclear weapons in more locations, there is a greater likelihood that local Russian commanders might have the latitude to initiate nuclear use in the chaos of battle. Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence. When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint in wartime -- poor intelligence, garbled communication, battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and a host of other influences -- it seems reasonable to consider that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control, even to the point

of using nuclear weapons. And because Ukraine is so close to the Russian heartland (about 250 miles from Moscow) there's no telling what might happen once the nuclear "firebreak" is crossed . All this terminology -- firebreaks, ladders of escalation, extended deterrence -- was devised during the Cold War to deal with potential warfighting scenarios in Europe. So if there is a renewed possibility of tensions leading to war over Ukraine (or some other former Soviet possession), perhaps the time has come to revive such thinking.

Sanctions CP

2AC – Sanctions FailSanctions against Russia are ineffective at inhibiting Putin adventurism. Instead, reducing arm sales ease Soviet tensions, making it easier for Ukraine to join NATO.

- Sanctions are bad because Russian economy adapted- Less arm sales means more likely to join NATO because less tension- [Claire Edit] – This card should be in the 1AC and only second portion of the tag should be

present and can be used to answer the CP later in the debate- There’s two ways to go about this – either joining NATO is good or how there will be no war

once Russia realizes that Ukraine doesn’t want to join Western countries, it will back down – arms = join western countries.

Lupton et al 03/04 [Danielle; Assistant Professor of Political Science at Colgate University; Valerie Morkevicius; Political Science at Colgate University; James Paterson; New York Times author; 03/04/2019; “Choosing an Ethical and Effective Response to Russian Aggression in Ukraine”; http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2019/03/04/choosing-an-ethical-and-effective-response-to-russian-aggression-in-ukraine/; Political Violence at a Glance; accessed: 06/26/2019; MohulA]

It’s been over two months since the crisis between Ukraine and Russia escalated with the Kerch Strait incident in November 2018. Since then, the global news media has devoted little attention to the conflict and references to the dispute from senior

American and European policy makers have grown increasingly sparse. Despite an immediate public condemnation of Russia’s actions by the EU and NATO, European and American leaders have yet to coordinate a significant response. In short, the reaction has been underwhelming. This is problematic for three reasons. First, Russia’s latest act of aggression has been interpreted by many as a test of Western resolve and America’s commitment to its European allies. A failure to present a united front carries reputational consequences for the United States, the EU, NATO, and other European

powers as well as their leaders. Second, the conflict in Ukraine is ongoing and the humanitarian consequences for civilians of

this “forgotten” war—not to mention for Ukrainian democracy itself—are dire. Third, a lack of response to such acts of aggression could further embolden Putin, not just in Ukraine, but also in the Baltics and Eastern Europe. How the West Could Respond

Western powers have a variety of measures at their disposal, including economic, political, and military-strategic options. Economically, the West could punish Russia by imposing new limits on Russian banking (such as cutting SWIFT), imposing broader sanctions on Russian exports, preventing ships that call in Crimean ports from unloading anywhere in NATO countries or the EU, and temporarily freezing or

even cancelling the lucrative Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project. Politically, the US and its allies could increase the domestic political costs of Russia’s invasion and continued intimidation of Ukraine. This could include placing increased restrictions on the ability

of Russian nationals to purchase property or open bank accounts abroad, introducing a fracture between Putin and his supporting cast of oligarchs. Additional sanctions could be placed on Russian officials directly involved in the planning and execution of the Kerch Strait incident or on officials involved in the show trials of captured Ukrainian soldiers. Alternatively, and more drastically, the West could open an information warfare campaign against Putin within Russia,

using Russian social media outlets such as VK to amplify critiques of Putin’s government and sow dissension amongst Russian social groups. Symbolically, the US, EU, and NATO could employ military-strategic measures that signal their support for Ukraine . One such option is a naval guest visit from NATO allies into the Black Sea and Ukrainian ports. The Kerch strait issue could even be pressed by an attempt to pass through to

Mariupol. Alternatively, the US, NATO, and its allies could increase the number of military advisers on the ground in Ukraine. Alternatively, the US and NATO could be more assertive and focus on altering the military-strategic calculus of Russia’s actions against Ukraine. Offering NATO membership would be the holy grail for Ukraine and a thorn in Russia’s side—particularly as NATO itself has argued that “a

sovereign, independent, stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security.” Increasing arms sales or even NATO military hardware transfers to Ukraine would also alter the strategic calculus . At the extreme, US and

NATO troops could be put on the ground in a non-advisory capacity. Choosing a Response None of these options is a panacea. Economic sanctions can demonstrate the West’s resolve, but are unlikely to lead to significant change in Russian policy. After all,

Russia is already heavily sanctioned by the West, and its economy has had time to adapt. However, new sanctions might abrogate some of the worries that unchecked Russian behavior will lead to future aggression. To generate such an effect, the sanctions regime needs to be extensive, both to show Western resolve and to make Putin

take notice. Yet the more extensive the sanctions, the more likely innocent Russians will bear the costs. Information warfare might sound like turnabout’s fair play, given Russia’s penchant for such tactics—and it would cause little physical harm to civilians. But it is unlikely to work. Russia’s information campaigns against the West draw on decades of careful research into the social and political lives of Western democracies—but this depth of insight into Russia is lacking in the US (and most NATO members). Furthermore, even if an information warfare campaign challenged Putin’s popularity, it is hardly likely to lead to democratic reform within Russia or even foreign policy change. Ethically, information warfare is deeply problematic—it may kill no one directly, but its pernicious social effects can be unpredictable. A naval guest visit to the Black Sea would not actually change the material realities on the

ground, but it could send a message that the US and its NATO allies are willing to impose higher costs. Similarly, increasing the number of US and NATO military advisors on the ground carries symbolic weight, yet lacks significant military consequences. Still, miscalculation is always a risk — and multiplied in this case by a military willing to engage in daredevil activities

with aging hardware. Military support to Ukraine, such as increasing arms sales, might have more success. It would

demonstrate Western resolve but risk escalation. Likewise, accelerating NATO membership might appear like a trump card, but it’s a dangerous move. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty requires a collective responsive if one individual member is attacked. In an expanded conflict innocent civilians—Ukrainian and Russian—will end up bearing the costs. Realistically , the risk of a direct NATO conflict with Russia means that current NATO members are likely to block any attempt to bring Ukraine into NATO. At the very least, the West should present a robust critique of Russian policy in Ukraine. A clear condemnation would signify Western unity and the basis of resolve. Without a clear critique, the West gives the impression of condoning or ignoring Russian aggression. This in turn sends a signal to other states with territorial desires, including China. Ultimately, the ongoing situation in Ukraine presents a scenario in which there is no best option. Instead, the US and its allies must choose the least-worst response. A clear and united condemnation of Russia’s actions in the Kerch strait case, coupled with expanded sanctions on officials and oligarchs close to Putin, are unlikely to force

Russia to drastically change its policy in Ukraine. Although sanctions are less effective at signaling resolve than more militaristic measures, an increased sanctions regime could still demonstrate a united front and discourage Russian policymakers from assuming that future aggressive acts will go unanswered. In addition, delaying Nord Stream 2 until Russia alters its behavior would send a clear message. Such actions are costly for NATO and the EU, but it is precisely this increased cost that would make such an action a clear signal of Western resolve. When nearly every policy option has the potential to expand the conflict, such political actions may be the most strategically sound—and ethically wise—choice.

1AR – Sanctions FailSanctions to isolate Russia are ineffective – boosts Putin’s legitimacy Jenkins 15 – graduated University of Oxford in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics(Simon Jenkins, “Cuba has shown us that sanctions don’t work – so why keep using them?,” 4//15/15, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/15/cuba-sanctions-dont-work-iran-russia-default-western-diplomacy)//cpark

For Britain (and France), nuclear bombs are to foreign policy what Olympics are to proper sport: chauvinism bereft of intellectual justification or

value for money. But what of weapons that actually hurt people? This week the United States was still refusing to lift economic sanctions on Cuba, even while admitting their failure for half a century to bring down the Castro regime. Indeed, the effect of sanctions is Cuba’s chief tourism appeal. At the same time America and Britain are resisting Iran’s demand for sanctions to be lifted following the inspection of its nuclear plants this summer. In the case of Russia, pressure is on for sanctions to be tightened in response to Putin’s constant provocations along his western flank. They are the “something” that can always “be done”. Sanctions remain in place against North Korea, Burma, Zimbabwe, Syria, Libya, Somalia, Congo and other weak and vulnerable states, irrespective of whether they achieve any policy goal. They

have become the default mode of western diplomacy , the acceptable face of aggression, a casual flick of contempt by the rich against the poor . Surveys of economic sanctions always equate “hurting” with “working”. Lots of things hurt, such as torture, but that doesn’t make them work. The studies by the Chicago academic Robert Pape in the 1990s on the futility or counter-productivity of almost all the century’s 115 uses of sanctions have never been

seriously challenged. Yet sanctions’ supporters persist in rosy-tinted language about their “signalling”, their “pressure mixes” and their “changing the calculus of repression”. They all assume dictators think like democrats. Sanctions can be briefly effective against democracies (against Britain during Suez), yet tend to make democracy less effective through isolation (as probably in Russia and Iran) . The BBC’s Bridget Kendall has just returned from a determined search for critics of Vladimir Putin across Russia. She can hardly conceal the fact that sanctions have bolstered support for the regime . They have entrenched a siege economy, silenced criticism of Putin and encouraged his chauvinist belligerence. They have also divided and weakened Europe. They are the most dangerously counter-productive policy imaginable, and all because “something must be done about Ukraine”. None of the countries targeted by sanctions threaten the safety or survival of Britain. All are based on the “economic fallacy” that money is what motivates power in a modern state. Attack the money, especially of a regime’s “cronies”, and policy must change. Yet years of business articles about the Russian economy “facing collapse” (along with the

Cuban, Iranian and Syrian ones) must make Putin laugh. So a babushka freezes and an oligarch’s daughter can’t shop at Harrods? Big

deal. It is like Harold Wilson pledging that sanctions against Rhodesia would work in “weeks not months”. They lasted 14 years.

Sanctions don’t work and are worse than the aff – 5% effectiveness rate and leads to repression – Haiti and Iraq proves- even if the counterplan solves the entirety of the aff, it makes things worse to innocent people and doesn’t solve the net benefit

Krain 17 – Professor of Political Science and Global International Studies at College of Wooster (Matthew Krain, “The Effect on Economic Sanctions on the Severity of Genocides or Politicides,” 1/2/17, http://discover.wooster.edu/mkrain/files/2014/01/SanctionsGP1.pdf)//cpark

The primary assumption in the extensive literature on sanctions is that the logic of sanctions is “to generate costs for a state that is judged to be in violation of international law and, thereby, to induce policy change” (Binder 2009, 339). Sanctions have also been analyzed as a result of states’ desire to satisfy demands of domestic constituents (Baldwin 1985; Dorussen and Mo 2001) and as signals that states send regarding their preferences, the degree to which they disapprove with target behavior, 3 and the current and future costs senders are willing to impose (Schwebach 2000; Hart 2000; Addis 2003; Lektzian and Sprecher 2007; Peterson and Drury 2011). Regardless, the goal is to yield policy change by the target regime. While still debated, evidence seems to indicate that more often than not sanctions do not accomplish that goal (Galtung 1967; Doxey 1971; Pape 1997). On the whole research with varying definitions of success finds that sanctions work, at best, roughly one third of the time, and at worst only 5% of the time (Pape 1997; Weiss 1999; Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott 2000; Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott and Oegg 2007). Explanations of ineffectiveness range from the target’s ability to shift or avoid the costs of sanctions to the sender’s inability or unwillingness to impose them, to the type of regime imposing or receiving the sanction, to the strength of the sanctions regime itself, and the sender’s ability to monitor and enforce the sanctions (Doxey 1971; Drury 1998; Weiss 1999; Hart 2000; Lopez 2000; Li and Drury 2004; Allen 2005; 2008a; 2008b; Hufbauer, et al. 2000; 2007; Lektzian and Souva 2007). One reason may be that leaders or states use sanctions for political or strategic reasons – as “cheap talk” – so as to be able to claim that they acted without actually having to do anything, or for other domestic political reasons (Weiss 1999; Dorussen and Mo 2001; Power 2002a). This is a familiar pattern of behavior by the international community in the face of ongoing mass murder, illustrated all too powerfully by the less than adequate response by potential sanctioning bodies in the face of atrocities in Rwanda and Darfur (Des Forges 1999; Lopez 2000; Power 2002a; Totten 2008, 174). Additionally, a target’s domestic political institutions affects how likely sanctions are to work against perpetrator states. Sanctions can compel leaders to change behavior by raising the economic and political costs they face, often by encouraging rifts among elites or domestic political dissent (Marinov 2005; Wood 2008; Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010). Closed regimes with more centralized 4 control are better able to resist sanctions as a result (Allen 2008b). As democracies rarely engage in genocide or political mass murder, most sanctions against perpetrators target authoritarian states or mixed political systems, or those most likely to be insulated from extensive domestic political challenges. Against such perpetrators, “political costs needed to alter behavior must be generated internationally, rather than domestically” (Allen 2008a, 916; see also Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010). Yet scholars suggest that such pressure is not typically costly enough to generate policy shifts from rights abusing target states more generally, or atrocity-committing ones specifically (Lopez 2000; Straus and Valentino 2007, 8). It is also possible that even if perpetrator regimes choose to scale back or terminate their campaign of genocide or politicide as a result of pressure from economic sanctions, the principals may be unable to control the agents actually doing the killing sufficiently to slow or stop ongoing atrocities (Mitchell 2004; Hafner-Burton 2008). However, using a more formalized principal-agent model, DeMeritt (2009) demonstrates that sanctions have the potential to simultaneously discourage principals and agents from engaging in instances of mass killing. This remains an untested proposition in larger campaigns of genocide or politicide. Sanctions not only have little ameliorative effect on a state’s human rights conditions and behavior, they may actually make things worse. Weiss et al. (1997) detail the extensive harm to civilians in cases such as Haiti and Iraq as a result of sanctions. Wood (2008) and Peksen and Drury (2009) both find that sanctions lead to a significant increase in the use of repression and political terror by target regimes in order to stabilize the political environment and suppress dissent. Sanctions lead to a decrease in overall physical integrity rights, increased economic and political discrimination against minority ethnic groups, and a deterioration of public health conditions in target states (Weiss 1999; Peksen 2009; 2011; 2013; Allen and Lektzian 2013).

2AC – Minsk Not KeyNeither side will follow the Minsk agreements – Russia scared of emboldened UkraineCohen 16 – M.A. and B.A. in philosophy in Yale and Ph.D. at Harvard, Professor of political science, philosophy, and law at Stanford, head of philosophy workshop at Berkeley (Joshua Cohen, “Why Russia and Ukraine Won’t Implement the Minsk Agreement,” 3/7/16, CGI, http://globalinterests.org/2016/03/07/why-russia-and-ukraine-wont-implement-the-minsk-agreement/)//cpark

Ukraine already took the first step in implement the Minsk agreement, as last March Kyiv passed the law mandated by Clause 4 of the accord, “On Temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.” Russia, meanwhile, is supposed to withdraw troops and heavy weapons from the Donbass, as well as make the area available to OSCE inspectors. It has manifestly not done so to date, and and Kyiv possesses a strong argument that it should not be expected to take the next step while Russian troops and equipment remain on Ukraine’s sovereign territory. Going forward, the most important requirements for Russia under Minsk II are for Moscow to end all military support for the separatists and restore full control over the Russian-Ukrainian border to Kyiv. On the other side, Minsk II requires Kyiv to create a new constitution decentralizing power to its regions and pass what Minsk II calls “approval of permanent legislation on the special status of particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast.” I am not optimistic that either side will take any of these key steps in the near future. Ukrainian politics make it difficult for either President Poroshenko or the Rada to take decisive steps to decentralize power. When the Rada passed an initial bill to enact required by Minsk II, Ukrainian ultranationalists rioted, and in the ensuing violence three people were killed and 140 wounded. Finalizing changes to the constitution requires the support of at least 300 MPs in a second vote, and the threat from Poroshenko’s right flank undoubtedly makes him reluctant to push this forward. Moreover, granting substantial autonomy to the “DNR” and “LNR” is already deeply unpopular with Ukrainian voters, and after the recent political turmoil in Kyiv—which may result in new elections this year—Ukrainian politicians will be even more reluctant to take any unpopular steps. Moscow is even less likely than Kyiv to implement the key points required of it by Minsk II . Once it became clear that Russia’s so-called “Novorossiya Project”—under which Moscow envisioned most of southern and eastern Ukraine seceding—had failed, President Putin narrowed his goals. Putin now seeks to use the DNR and LNR as “Trojan Horses” to prevent Ukraine from moving decisively West. Accordingly, in negotiations last May, Russia’s proxies in Donbass demanded formal non-bloc status for Ukraine, proposing that “Ukraine shall not be a member of any military bloc or alliance, maintain neutrality and refrain from participation in hostilities outside its territory,’ and/or bring out a law of Ukraine to enshrine the non-bloc, neutral status for Ukraine .” Putin understands that once Moscow withdraws support for its proxies and turns control of the border over to Ukraine, all his leverage over Kyiv disappears . Given that Moscow considers Ukrainian membership in NATO an existential issue, Putin is extremely unlikely to abandon the fight until he receives guarantees that Ukraine will not join Western institutions . Accordingly, if Putin cannot succeed in “neutralizing and federalizing” Ukraine, he will continue to keep the Donbass on a low boil, turning the pressure on Kyiv up or down as events dictate. In the meantime, Moscow clearly hopes that if it continues to stall for time and blame Kyiv for undermining Minsk II, eventually sanctions will collapse on their own. Unfortunately for Kyiv, Putin’s strategy may well work. Many of Ukraine’s European partners are increasingly eager to end the sanctions regime against Russia, and leading European Union states will therefore continue to apply equal pressure on both Moscow and Kyiv to implement the key points in Minsk II. Europe’s refugee crisis—which many argue Moscow purposely promotes by bombing civilians in Syria—only further serves to weaken European unity and brings Putin closer to his goal of seeing sanctions collapse.

NATO CP

2AC – NATO Says NoNATO will not accept Ukraine – ongoing disputes prove

AT: Ukraine wants to say yes AT: Solves deterrence or security dillemma

Belkin, et al, 14 [Paul; Coordinator who is an analyst in European Affairs; Derek E. Mix; Analyst in European Affairs; Steven Worhel; Specialist in European Affairs; July 31, 2014; “NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe”; https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43478.pdf; Congressional Research Service; accessed: 07/01/2019; MohulA]

Russian actions in Ukraine have prompted some U.S. observers and Members of Congress to call for a more

concerted NATO effort to enlarge the alliance, particularly to the east.38 Among other things, they argue that continued enlargement would send an important signal to aspiring members that NATO’s “open door” policy will not be scaled back in the face of Russian opposition. Some proponents of enlargement add that Russia would be less willing and less able to take the aggressive actions it has in Ukraine,

Georgia, and elsewhere in its near-abroad if these countries were members of the alliance. Despite these calls, most analysts consider NATO unlikely to make any significant progress toward expanding over the next several years . They point to

a perception in some Western European countries that NATO has enlarged too quickly and that the alliance should agree on how to resolve a complex range of issues, including managing relations with Russia, before taking in new members. For some allied governments, ongoing territorial disputes with Russia in countries such as Georgia and Ukraine could be a strong deterrent to extending membership invitations to these countries. Four countries are currently considered formal aspirants for NATO membership: Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Georgia. Montenegro has had a Membership Action Plan (MAP) since December 2009. Although it is considered the candidate with the most advanced membership prospects, NATO officials have cautioned that Montenegrin security agencies and the defense sector require reforms to meet NATO standards and that further efforts need to be made to fight corruption and organized crime in the country. Some have also questioned the level of public support for NATO membership in Montenegro. Bosnia was formally invited to join the MAP in April 2010, but was told that its Annual National Program under the MAP would not be accepted until the country resolved the issue of immovable defense property (mainly former military bases and barracks) on its territory. The country’s leaders have agreed in principle to resolve the issue, but many doubt whether Bosnia can agree on whether to join NATO, as Bosnian Serb leaders have given mixed signals on the issue and public opinion polls have shown very strong opposition to membership among the Bosnian Serb population. NATO agreed that Macedonia met the qualifications for membership in 2008, but its candidacy has been stalled due to a protracted dispute with NATO ally Greece over the country’s official name. The two sides have been unable to resolve the issue during talks sponsored by the United Nations. Representatives of Ukraine’s current government have said the country is not seeking NATO membership. This reflects long-standing indifference, if not opposition, to NATO membership in the country. Under former President Yanukovych, the country renounced previously asserted ambitions to join NATO. According

to one March 2014 opinion poll, 34% of Ukrainians were for NATO membership, and 44% opposed, with a regional

split of 74% for membership in western Ukraine and 67% opposed in the east.39 As the conflict in Ukraine has persisted, there has been some indication that public support for NATO membership has increased to some degree, though not significantly . Some observers assert that the Ukrainian government could be cautious about expressing ambitions to join NATO for a number of reasons, including sensitivity to public opinion and possible

opposition to membership from countries within the alliance that would be reluctant to further antagonize Russia. In early April, in response to NATO Secretary General Rasmussen’s assertion that the door to NATO membership for Ukraine remained open, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier reportedly countered that “NATO membership for Ukraine is not pending.”

No membership for Ukraine – lack of public support, diverging opinions, and need for reform provesKriendler 7 [John; Professor of NATO and Security Studies in George Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany; July 2007; “Ukrainian Membership in NATO: Benefits, Costs and Challenges” Vol 12;

https://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/mcdocs/files/College/F_Publications/occPapers/occ-paper_12-en.pdf; accessed: 07/01/2019; MohulA]

In conformity with Article 51 of the UN Charter, the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, recalls that it is, “the inherent right of all states to choose and to implement freely, their own security arrangements, and to be free to choose or change their security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve.”3 In the case of both NATO and Ukraine, each must determine whether membership is in their interest. For NATO, the primary requirements are spelled out in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty4 and further addressed in the 1995 Study of Enlargement and the Membership Action Plan.5 In addition, NATO and Ukraine have agreed to specific objectives for Ukraine which are spelled out in detail in the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, and since 2002 these specific objectives have been implemented in accordance with

Annual Target Plans. Starting in 2002, Ukraine has also sought participation in the Membership Action Plan, which is seen as an essential step towards membership, but progress has been limited to an Intensified Dialogue, launched in April

2005. At the moment, the issue of Ukrainian membership in NATO is on hold for a number of reasons including: (1) radically divergent opinions within the government (between the President and the Prime Minister) on the desirability of Ukraine seeking NATO integration (among many other issues), (2) lack of public support in Ukraine, (3) the need for considerable further reform , (4) the continuing complexity, fractiousness and uncertainty of the Ukrainian political process and disagreement over foreign policy prerogatives,6 (5) differing views among allies about Ukrainian membership in NATO and (6) Russian pressure. Looking to the evolution of these issues, I address in this paper the benefits that Ukraine could expect to derive from NATO integration as well as the costs of membership and some misconceptions, usually advanced by critics of Ukraine’s NATO aspirations. For completeness, I also highlight some of the key challenges that Ukraine is facing regarding NATO membership. Key benefits would include, collective defense guarantees, defense at lower cost, participation in cooperative security arrangements, decision making in NATO, continuing impetus to reform, a possible boost for EU membership, strengthening Ukraine’s position vis-a-vis Russia and increased economic growth and

foreign direct investment. The issue of Ukraine’s integration in NATO is an important one. It involves the question of how far NATO will go in enlarging into the former Soviet space and what security arrangements Russia will develop to assure its own security. In addition the issue is one of the determining factors in NATO-Russia relations.

1AR—NATO CP—Say NoNo membership—countless reforms and fear of extensive immigration provesMilanovic 15 [Branco; leading scholar on income inequality; February 9, 2015; “Between the two chimeras and a world war”; http://glineq.blogspot.com/2015/02/between-two-chimeras-and-world-war.html; GlobalInequality; accessed: 07/01/2019; MohulA]

As the world slowly slides towards the war in Ukraine, a war which will inevitably, like in a Greek drama, become, in a year or two, a nuclear and possibly a World War , one has to ask himself or herself how and why this has all happened.

The main victim so far is Ukraine, but soon it will be the world as a whole. Ukraine was victim because, she, a divided country, was forced to choose between the western Europe and Russia. It fully belongs to neither. But moreover it was offered the two chimeras: nothing real by either side, but just sufficient to annoy the other side. What precipitated the Maidan demonstrations, that were started by a peaceful and “nice” pro-European urban crowd and ended by being led by violent groups of neo-Nazis bent on “regime change”, was Yanukovich’s postponement (sic!) of the signing of EU association agreement. That agreement was as substantive for Ukraine’s European ambitions as was a similar agreement signed with Morocco almost twenty years ago.

(Have you heard of Morocco being part of the EU?) No one can imagine that Ukraine has a chance of becoming even a candidate, much less a full EU member. Not only because it is poor and disorganized country, with declining national income, falling behind both Poland and Belarus (see the graph), and thus requiring enormous financial transfers Europe is clearly unwilling to make. It is also a country with corruption ingrained in all pores of society with non-existent real political parties (except those created on an ad hoc basis by oligarchs,

including the current president Poroshenko, or UDAR, party created by a boxing champion), with no semblance of independent judiciary. The amount of negotiations and changes that the EU would have to impose on Ukraine to bring it to something even resembling the ever higher requirements EU demands from prospective candidates (itself a reflection of EU unwillingness to admit new members) is mindboggling. It is on a scale far greater than what was required from Turkey, the country which since 1963 was an associate member and opened “accession negotiations” with the Union 15 years

ago. They have progressed at snail’s pace. Moreover, Ukraine is home (or was home) to almost 45 million people. It would be the fifth or sixth (ex aequo with Spain) most populous country in the EU. Europe which is already paranoid about receiving immigrants, even from within the EU members-states (witness the British scare a year ago about being deluged by “millions” of Bulgarians and Romanians) will surely not accept 45 million impoverished Ukraine roaming the streets in search of jobs. It is thus with an exquisite hypocrisy that the British foreign secretary can speak about Ukraine being welcomed to its European “home” while, in the meantime, another part of his government makes sure that no Ukrainian (unless he be an oligarch) makes it to England. (Just try,

for exercise, filling British visa forms.) The same is true for France and Germany. So, what Europe offered Ukraine was neither money, nor free movement of people, nor membership in the Union, but a mirage .

1AR—NATO CP—Say No: No ReformThe CP does not solve lack of incentive for Ukraine to reform structures to gain entry into NATO – takes out CP solvency

No EU membership and EU membership might be tied to NATO membership

Kriendler 7 [John; Professor of NATO and Security Studies in George Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany; July 2007; “Ukrainian Membership in NATO: Benefits, Costs and Challenges” Vol 12; https://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/mcdocs/files/College/F_Publications/occPapers/occ-paper_12-en.pdf; accessed: 07/01/2019; MohulA]

Impetus to Reform The impetus to reform which derives from the conditionality of seeking NATO membership is also a significant benefit. As President Yushchenko has correctly recognized, NATO membership “is a powerful incentive for the

transformation of society, aimed at deepening democracy, strengthening human rights and freedoms,” and a way to move Ukraine into the European mainstream.14 Concerning defense reform, in the White Book 2006, he notes that striving “to achieve the best international standards. ... is one of the main motives for Ukraine’s integration policy towards the European Union and NATO.”15 Ronald Asmus, responsible for NATO enlargement in the State Department during the Clinton administration, described how the “golden carrot” of membership worked, “it was striking how often the need to take certain steps in order to qualify for NATO or the EU was used by Western governments or invoked by governments in the region to justify painful or controversial steps.”16 And the reform requirements are both extensive and intrusive enhancing the significance of the conditionality which seeking membership brings with it.17 EU Membership There is no official link between NATO enlargement and EU enlargement, and the prospects of further EU enlargement are now considerably dimmer due to the impasse over the constitutional treaty and enlargement fatigue. And some EU members have also indicated their reservations about

Ukrainian EU membership. Nevertheless all Ukrainian parties are united in support of EU membership, there is widespread public support, and NATO membership has been perceived, arguably, as a factor that would boost Ukraine’s chances for EU membership. Some consider that since most EU members are also NATO members, they would

be more likely to support Ukraine’s EU aspirations if Ukraine were an ally. Nevertheless, prospects for EU membership do not seem bright. On the eve of the 18 May 2007 EU-Russia Summit, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana reportedly said in an interview to Novyee Izvestia that “The Republic of Moldova as well as Ukraine and Georgia have no chances of

becoming EU members.”18 14 Associated Press Newswires, “NATO secretary general says Ukraine must carry out reforms before joining alliance ,” 19 October 2005. 15 Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, “White Book 2006, Defence Policy of Ukraine,” Kyiv 2007, p. 3. 16 Ronald D. Asmus, “A Strategy for Integrating Ukraine into the West,” Conflict Studies Research Center, Central and Eastern Europe Series, 06/06, April 2004, p. 3. 17 Areas included in the NATO-Ukraine Annual Target Plan include: internal political issues, foreign and security policy, defense and security sector reform, public information, information security and economic and legal issues. 18 Reported, MD, “Javier Solana says Moldova has no chances of joining the EU,” http://www.azi.md/print/44396/ En; accessed 2 June 2007.

1AR—NATO CP—Say No: High CostNATO membership is too economically burdensome for Ukraine – takes out long term benefits of NATO

High Costs Hard to use other countries examples

Kriendler 7 [John; Professor of NATO and Security Studies in George Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany; July 2007; “Ukrainian Membership in NATO: Benefits, Costs and Challenges” Vol 12; https://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/mcdocs/files/College/F_Publications/occPapers/occ-paper_12-en.pdf; accessed: 07/01/2019; MohulA]

Economic Growth and Foreign Direct Investment In light of Ukraine’s rapid GDP growth (6.8 % in 2006) and rapid increase in industrial

production, the impact of membership on economic growth and increased foreign direct investment is less significant than would be the case for other aspirant countries. In any case, it is difficult to establish a causal relationship

between NATO membership and economic growth or increased foreign direct investment, among other reasons because it is so difficult to isolate the impact of NATO membership from the many other factors involved . Nevertheless, it is

widely believed that, reflecting greater stability and security resulting from the process of joining the alliance and then membership, there is a resulting increase in investor confidence and in economic growth and foreign direct investment following becoming an ally. The three tables

at annex appear to support this view.19 Costs Obviously NATO membership is not free of risks and costs. Some of these are

directly related to the benefits already described above. Shared Risks and Burdens Sharing risks and burdens and alliance solidarity are key principles on which NATO is based. As an ally, Ukraine would share risks and burdens in a qualitatively and quantitatively different way than it does in its current status of strategic partner. Burdens include collective defense commitments (referred to above) and the expectation that allies will take an active part in non- Article 5 NATO-led operations (where for the most part allies pay the costs of the deployment, engagement and support of their forces),20 Ukraine is already a significant contributor to NATO- led operations and is the only

partner that actively supports all four current NATO operations/missions. Sharing Costs Sharing burdens also includes financial costs. This includes a share of NATO’s common civilian and military budgets and commonly funded NATO Security

Investment Program (NSIP), which total about $2 billion per year. Cost shares are based on relative gross national income (GNI) taking into account the average of market rates and purchasing power parities. Ukraine would also have to participate in the costs of the new headquarters building in Brussels and probably the running costs of NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW). There would also be costs associated

with maintaining Ukraine’s mission to NATO headquarters in Brussels (which might be larger than the current mission)

and at SHAPE and in paying the costs of assigning Ukrainian military personnel to NATO military headquarters. As noted above, however, overall defense costs could be expected to decrease. 19 The tables are simplified versions, which I have drawn from EU statistics for all European countries. I have added an additional column with a subjective evaluation of the degree of change. 20 In general terms, the principle is that costs lie where they fall; that is, the nation providing forces for an operation pays all costs. There are some exceptions concerning theater level enabling costs and initial short notice deployment of the NATO Response Force.

2AC – NATO Deterrence FailsTrump plans to pull out of Nato make it unable to deter RussiaBarnes and Cooper, 19

Julian E. Barnes, national security reporter for The New York Times covering the intelligence agencies. Before joining the Times Washington bureau in 2018, he wrote about security matters for the Wall Street Journal, based in Brussels and Washington. He has more than 17 years experience covering U.S. national security, the military and related matters for the Journal, the Los Angles Times and U.S. News & World Report, and Helene Cooper, Pentagon correspondent with The New York Times. She joined the paper in 2004 as assistant editorial page editor, before becoming diplomatic correspondent in 2006 and White House correspondent in 2009. In 2015, she was part of the team that won the Pulitzer Prize for international reporting, for her work in Liberia during the Ebola epidemic. She is also the winner of of the George Polk award for health reporting (2015) and the Overseas Press Club Award (2015). She is the author of the New York Times bestseller “The House at Sugar Beach: In Search of a Lost African Childhood” (Simon and Schuster, 2008), a memoir of growing up in Monrovia, Liberia, as well as “Madame President: The Extraordinary Story of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf” (Simon and Schuster, 2017), 1-14-2019, "Trump Discussed Pulling U.S. From NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concerns Over Russia," No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html #CCCool

WASHINGTON — There are few things that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia desires more than the weakening of NATO, the military alliance among the United States, Europe and Canada that has deterred Soviet and Russian aggression for 70 years. Last year, President Trump suggested a move tantamount to destroying NATO: the withdrawal of the United States . Senior administration officials told The New York Times that several times over the course of 2018, Mr. Trump privately said he wanted to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Current and former officials who support the alliance said they feared Mr. Trump could return to his threat as allied military spending continued to lag behind the

goals the president had set. In the days around a tumultuous NATO summit meeting last summer, they said, Mr. Trump told his top national security officials that he did not see the point of the military alliance, which he presented as a drain on the United States. At the time, Mr. Trump’s national security team, including Jim Mattis, then the defense secretary, and

John R. Bolton, the national security adviser, scrambled to keep American strategy on track without mention of a withdrawal that would drastically reduce Washington’s influence in Europe and could embolden Russia for decades. Now, the president’s repeatedly stated desire to withdraw from NATO is raising new worries among national security officials amid growing concern about Mr. Trump’s efforts to keep his meetings with Mr. Putin

secret from even his own aides, and an F.B.I. investigation into the administration’s Russia ties. A move to withdraw from the alliance, in place since 1949, “would be one of the most damaging things that any president could do to U.S. interests,” said Michèle A. Flournoy, an under secretary of defense under President Barack Obama. “It would destroy 70-plus years of painstaking work across multiple administrations, Republican and Democratic, to create perhaps the most powerful and advantageous alliance in history,” Ms. Flournoy said in an interview. “And it would be the wildest success that Vladimir Putin could dream of.” Retired Adm. James G. Stavridis, the former supreme allied commander of NATO, said an American withdrawal from the alliance would be “a geopolitical mistake of epic proportion.” “Even discussing the idea of leaving NATO — let alone actually doing so — would be the gift of the century for Putin ,” Admiral Stavridis said. Senior Trump administration officials discussed the internal and highly sensitive efforts to preserve the military alliance on condition of anonymity. After the White House was asked for comment on Monday, a senior administration official pointed to Mr. Trump’s remarks in July when he called the United States’ commitment to NATO “very strong” and the alliance “very important.” The official declined to comment

further. American national security officials believe that Russia has largely focused on undermining solidarity between the United States and Europe after it annexed Crimea in 2014. Its goal was to upend NATO, which Moscow views as a threat. Russia’s meddling in American elections and its efforts to prevent former satellite states from joining the alliance have aimed to weaken what it views as an enemy next door, the

American officials said. With a weakened NATO, they said, Mr. Putin would have more freedom to behave as he wishes, setting up Russia as a counterweight to Europe and the United States. An American withdrawal from the alliance would accomplish all that Mr. Putin has been trying to put into motion, the officials said — essentially, doing the Russian leader’s hardest and most critical work for him. When Mr. Trump first raised the possibility of leaving the alliance, senior administration officials were unsure if he was serious. He has returned to the idea several times, officials said increasing their worries. Mr. Trump’s dislike of alliances abroad and American commitments to international organizations is no secret. The president has repeatedly and publicly challenged or withdrawn from a number of military and economic partnerships, from the Paris climate accord to an Asia-Pacific trade pact. He has questioned the United States’ military alliance with South Korea and Japan, and he has announced a withdrawal of American troops from Syria without first consulting allies in the American-led coalition to defeat the Islamic State.

NATO had planned to hold a leaders meeting in Washington to mark its 70th anniversary in April, akin to

the 50-year celebration that was hosted by President Bill Clinton in 1999. But this year’s meeting has been downgraded to a foreign ministers gathering, as some diplomats feared that Mr. Trump could use a Washington summit meeting to renew his attacks on the alliance. Leaders are now scheduled to meet at the end of 2019, but not in Washington. Mr. Trump’s threats to withdraw had sent officials scrambling to prevent the annual gathering of NATO leaders in Brussels last July from turning into a disaster. Senior national security officials had already pushed the military alliance’s ambassadors to complete a formal agreement on several NATO goals — including shared defenses against Russia — before the summit meeting even began, to shield it from Mr. Trump. But Mr. Trump upended the proceedings anyway. One meeting, on July 12, was ostensibly supposed to be about Ukraine and Georgia — two non-NATO members with aspirations to join the alliance. Accepted protocol dictates that alliance members do not discuss internal business in front of nonmembers. But as is frequently the case, Mr. Trump did not adhere to the established norms, according to several American and European officials who were in the room. He complained that European governments were not spending enough on the shared costs of defense, leaving the United States to carry an outsize burden. He expressed frustration that European leaders would not, on the spot, pledge to spend more. And he appeared not to grasp the details when several tried to explain to him that spending levels were set by parliaments in individual countries, the American and European officials said. Then, at another leaders gathering at the same summit meeting, Mr. Trump appeared to be taken by surprise by Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO secretary general. Backing Mr. Trump’s position, Mr. Stoltenberg pushed allies to increase their spending and praised the United States for leading by example — including by increasing its military spending in Europe. At that, according to one official who was in the room, Mr. Trump whipped his head around and glared at American officials behind him, surprised by Mr. Stoltenberg’s remarks and betraying ignorance of his administration’s own spending plans. Mr. Trump appeared especially annoyed, officials in the meeting said, with Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and her country’s military spending of 1 percent of its gross domestic product. By comparison, the United States’ military spending is about 4 percent of G.D.P., and Mr. Trump has railed against allies for not meeting the NATO spending goal of 2 percent of economic output. At the summit meeting, he surprised the leaders by demanding 4 percent — a move that would essentially put the goal out of reach for many alliance members. He also threatened that the United States would “go its own way” in 2019 if military spending from other NATO countries did not rise. During the middle of a speech by Ms. Merkel, Mr. Trump again broke protocol by getting up and leaving, sending ripples of shock across the room, according to American and European officials who were there. But before he left, the president walked behind Ms. Merkel and interrupted her speech to call her a great leader. Startled and relieved that Mr. Trump had not continued his berating of the leaders, the people in the room clapped. In the end, the NATO leaders publicly papered over their differences to present a unified front.

But both European leaders and American officials emerged from the two days in Brussels shaken and worried that Mr. Trump would renew his threat to withdraw from the alliance. Mr. Trump’s skepticism of NATO appears to be a core belief, administration officials said, akin to his desire to expropriate Iraq’s oil. While officials have

explained multiple times why the United States cannot take Iraq’s oil, Mr. Trump returns to the issue every few months. Similarly, just when officials think the issue of NATO membership has been settled, Mr. Trump again brings up his desire to leave the alliance. Any move by Mr. Trump against NATO would most likely invite a response by Congress. American policy toward Russia is the one area where congressional Republicans have consistently bucked Mr. Trump, including with new sanctions on Moscow and by criticizing his warm July 16 news conference with Mr. Putin in Helsinki, Finland. Members of NATO may withdraw after a notification period of a year, under Article 13 of the Washington Treaty. Such a delay would give Congress time to try blocking any attempt by Mr. Trump to

leave. “It’s alarming that the president continues to falsely assert that NATO does not contribute to the overall safety of the United States or the international community,” said Senator Jeanne Shaheen, a New Hampshire Democrat who is among the lawmakers who support legislation to stop Mr. Trump from withdrawing from the military alliance. “The Senate

knows better and stands ready to defend NATO.” NATO’s popularity with the public continues to be strong. But the alliance has become a more partisan issue, with Democrats showing strong enthusiasm and Republican support softening, according to a survey by the Ronald Reagan Institute. Kay Bailey Hutchison, Washington’s ambassador to NATO and a former Republican senator, has sought to build support for the alliance in Congress, including helping to organize a bipartisan

group of backers. But even if Congress moved to block a withdrawal, a statement by Mr. Trump that he wanted to leave would greatly damage NATO. Allies feeling threatened by Russia already have extreme doubts about whether Mr. Trump would order troops to come to their aid. In his resignation letter last month, Mr. Mattis specifically cited his own commitment to America’s alliances in an implicit criticism of Mr. Trump’s principles. Mr. Mattis originally said he would stay through the next NATO meeting at the end of February, but Mr. Trump pushed him out before the new year. Acting Defense Secretary Patrick

M. Shanahan is believed to support the alliance. But he has also pointedly said he thinks that the Pentagon should not be “the Department of No” to the president. European and American officials said the presence of Mr. Mattis, a former top NATO commander, had reassured allies that a senior Trump administration official had their back. His exit from the Pentagon has increased worries among some European diplomats that the safety blanket has now been lost.

1AR – NATO Deterrence FailsLack of Trump and US commitment unraveling NATO detterenceTechau, 19

JAN TECHAU, SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR OF THE EUROPE PROGRAM AT THE GERMAN MARSHAL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES ,1-31-2019, "Judy Asks: Is NATO Deterrence a Paper Tiger?," Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/78254 #CCCool

It increasingly seems so. Let’s leave the militarily weak Europeans aside for a moment. For NATO’s deterrence to be credible, only one question really matters: Is the United States fully behind its commitments? This depends on two factors. First, how much of a military footprint does the United States have in the countries it has vowed to defend? Only troops on the ground give real-life meaning to the stipulation that “an attack on one is an attack on all.” Second, how much confidence do the allies have in the U.S. president’s strategic reliability? The commander in chief matters because only he (or she) can commit troops to combat or trigger America’s nuclear arsenal. The first metric is the smaller problem. America’s footprint in Europe is much smaller than it was twenty years ago. But Washington has recently reinvested in Europe;

troop numbers are slightly up. It is the second factor that causes the headache. The current U.S. president has publicly questioned NATO’s usefulness and has had to be talked out of leaving the alliance altogether. Few people are convinced that he would go to war for Europe if need be. This lack of trust in Donald Trump is hugely corrosive for NATO’s credibility. It makes the allies nervous, and it emboldens the adversaries .

Should Trump’s unreliability become a full certainty, NATO’s deterrent could soon look like a paper tiger indeed.

NATO is too slow and ineffective to be a deterrent – Russia knows thisLindley-French, 19

JULIAN LINDLEY-FRENCH, GEORGE C. MARSHALL CENTRE-MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE U.S.-GERMAN LOISACH GROUP, SENIOR FELLOW AT THE INSTITUTE FOR STATECRAFT IN LONDON, DIRECTOR OF EUROPA ANALYTICA IN THE NETHERLANDS, DISTINGUISHED VISITING RESEARCH FELLOW AT THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY IN WASHINGTON, AND A FELLOW OF THE CANADIAN GLOBAL AFFAIRS INSTITUTE ,1-31-2019, "Judy Asks: Is NATO Deterrence a Paper Tiger?," Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/78254 #CCCool

Paper tiger? No, more cardboard elephant. Thomas Schelling said that deterrence is the power to hurt as bargaining and best held in reserve. NATO has become a collective deterrent rather than a collective defender. On the eve of a short but violent war NATO would be the last place the Americans would turn to. Rather, as NATO continued to talk deterrence, Washington would put together a high-end coalition under its command to do the fighting. NATO is too slow of thought, decision, and foot to fight a contemporary war. The conduct of war will become far faster with new technologies appearing in a battlespace that will stretch across air, sea, land, cyber, space, information, and knowledge. The Russians understand this and have built a thirty-day “wham, bam, thank you Vlad” war machine that would exploit NATO’s slowness of force generation and military mobility. NATO assumes at least thirty days of warning. Adaptation is thus buttressing deterrent value by accelerating NATO’s speed of response and extending its power to hurt. NATO could fight a short war if it had the warning, or a long war if it was given the chance.

US Only Willing to Intervene in most extreme circumstances – undermines deterrenceFranke, 19

ULRIKE FRANKE, POLICY FELLOW AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ,1-31-2019, "Judy Asks: Is NATO Deterrence a Paper Tiger?," Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/78254 #CCCool

NATO deterrence is suffering for two reasons: a lack of European capabilities, and a diminishing trust in the United States’ willingness to defend its allies. Because of the latter, the former is needed more than ever. It is easy to blame Donald Trump for NATO’s weakness, as he openly entertains the idea that the United States could pull out. However, this is not only about Trump’s dislike of alliances. After all, he does not undermine all alliances equally. The Japanese are showing little concern that the United States could turn its back on them. The difference is that the U.S.-Japan

alliance is based on shared interests, most notably with regard to China. NATO, on the other hand, these days predominantly relies on a belief in shared values, an insufficient motivation for Trump. Of course, for the foreseeable future it remains in the U.S. interest to make sure Europe does not go up in flames or is occupied by a rival power. This is why it is

highly unlikely that Washington would withdraw completely. But if a European ally is threatened in a less extreme scenario, the United States may not see its interest affected sufficiently for it to act. Hence, the United States is currently providing only a safety net—and deterrence—for the most extreme scenario; not a particularly reassuring thought for allies such as the Baltics. For less extreme scenarios, the Europeans need to build up their capabilities to bolster deterrence.

NATO can’t justify deterrence, makes it unsustainableCornish, 19

PAUL CORNISH, INDEPENDENT ANALYST AND CONSULTANT, AND DIRECTOR OF CORACLE ANALYSIS LTD ,1-31-2019, "Judy Asks: Is NATO Deterrence a Paper Tiger?," Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/78254 #CCCool

NATO’s deterrence posture lacks both substance and conviction. The first of these is attributable to the desultory levels of defense spending in much of NATO’s European member countries over the past few decades. This might be corrected by promised increases in defense budgets across the alliance. The second is more serious and more structural.

Deterrence is at best thinly understood and, bizarrely, is too often considered to be an unwelcome reminder of the Cold War confrontation. Deterrence suffers from a crisis of skepticism, at best. As a former

chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff observed, “As an alliance we’ve taken deterrence for granted for twenty years now, but we can’t do that anymore.” NATO needs a revived and fully integrated deterrence posture, and it also needs to explain convincingly to the public that deterrence is the main purpose of the alliance’s promised defense expansion. A revived deterrence posture must not be seen as another “offset” strategy, compensating for some defense deficiency or another. Defense and deterrence work together, not separately. Instead, deterrence should be made the focus of a “reset” strategy—a

coordinated effort to rediscover the fundamental goal of deterrence: the maintenance of stability, even in an adversarial environment.

Negotiations/Peacekeeping CP

2AC – Negotiations FailThe aff is a prerequisite to negotiations – as long as lethal weapons are on the table nothing can get doneLiana Semchuk 19 (PhD candidate in politics at the University of Oxford, "U.S. arms sales to Ukraine keeping the conflict alive", UPI, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/Voices/2019/03/27/US-arms-sales-to-Ukraine-keeping-the-conflict-alive/3381553687739/, 3-27-2019, accessed 6-24-2019 //SKH)

March 27 (UPI) -- Selling lethal weapons to Ukraine is the equivalent of pouring kerosene onto a flame . But ongoing hostilities between Ukraine and Russia -- including the Kerch strait crisis, which began late last year when Russia intercepted three Ukrainian vessels and took 24 crew members captive -- are also a major business opportunity for the world's largest defense contractors. Despite the risk of serious escalation, these companies continue to provide Ukraine with lethal aid so it can defend itself against Russia -- for a price, of course. The U.S. special representative for Ukraine negotiations, Kurt Volker, stated recently that Washington remains committed to providing support to Ukraine and its military, including anti-tank systems. He even hinted that the United States is considering expanding the types of lethal aid that it could begin selling to Ukraine, saying: "We also need to be looking at things like air defense and coastal defense." This is a troubling prospect. In March, U.S. Army Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti said that the United States could also bolster the Ukrainian military's sniper capabilities. Speaking to the Senate Armed Services Committee, he said: "There are other systems, sniper systems, ammunition and, perhaps looking at the Kerch Strait, perhaps consideration for naval systems, as well, here in the future as we move forward." This comment has been widely underreported and has not received nearly as much attention as it deserves considering the potential consequences. At worst, more lethal aid could escalate the conflict further. At best, it will continue to keep alive a conflict that has killed more than 10,000. Finding a straightforward policy alternative is difficult, but sending more lethal aid to achieve the unattainable goal of Ukraine defeating Russia is certainly no solution. Impact Despite attempts by Volker and Scaparrotti to market the proposition as a way to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia, the immediate benefits seem clearer to America's weapons manufacturing sector than to Ukrainian civilians, who will undoubtedly get caught in the cross-fire. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported that the United States is home to five of the world's 10 largest defense contractors. Lockheed Martin, by far the largest in the field, in 2017 had an estimated $44.9 billion in arms contracts globally. The company was also contracted (with Raytheon) in 2018 to provide Ukraine with Javelin anti-tank missiles. The U.S. Pentagon said: "The Javelin system will help Ukraine build its long-term defense capacity to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity in order to meet its national defense requirements." But Lockheed Martin likely profited handsomely from the deal. Meanwhile, the company's financial reports showed fourth quarter 2018 net sales of $14.4 billion, compared to $13.8 billion in the fourth quarter of 2017. This year, the company is expecting sales to grow by as much as 6 percent. This is unlikely to be the case if the number of conflicts around the world declines. It's clear why Washington wants to sell more weapons to Ukraine. But whether Ukraine remains receptive and willing to continue buying them

may hinge on the outcome of the upcoming presidential election, which is scheduled for Sunday. Presidential candidate Volodymyr Zelensky, who is leading in the polls, seems to offer hope that Ukraine may change its current strategy. This is reflected in a statement Zelensky made in March in which he emphasized the need to negotiate with Russia in order to "save people's lives." Is there a solution? As well as better diplomacy, Zelensky also sees direct democracy as a way to resolve the crisis. Rather than pursuing the same ineffective policy, which has achieved

absolutely nothing except for a greater death toll and growing human misery, he proposed a referendum on the outcome of his negotiations with Russia on the conflict in eastern Ukraine. This approach might not lead to a quick fix or

immediately restore peace in the region -- but it is more likely to succeed than simply supplying more weapons with

which to prolong the fighting. The West should not abandon its rhetoric of support for Ukraine's territorial integrity. But policymakers and society more broadly should be careful not to assume that simply selling more weapons to Ukraine will yield a definitive victory over Russia and its separatist allies. While the ongoing war in the the eastern Donbas region and the recent Kerch incident offer an opportunity for big businesses to make a profit, it's ordinary people who will

pay the price. The current approach to de-escalating the conflict needs to be dramatically re-evaluated -- and lethal weapons must be taken off the negotiating table.

1AR – Negotiations FailNegotiation can’t solve for the warFriedman and Burton 17, (Fred Burton is one of the world's foremost authorities on security and terrorism. George Stratfor leads the field in global forecasting and consulting, providing geopolitical analysis to individuals, he received his Bachelor's degree from the City College of the City University of New York and holds a Ph.D. in Government from Cornell University, Stratfor, “Hints of a Shift in the Ukraine Conflict,” November 17, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/hints-shift-ukraine-conflict)

It's been an action-packed week for negotiations over the conflict in Ukraine. On Monday, Kurt Volker, the U.S. special envoy to Ukraine, met with Russian presidential aide Vladislav Surkov in Belgrade, Serbia, to discuss Moscow's proposal for a U.N. peacekeeping force in eastern Ukraine. Two days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin called the leaders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics to discuss a prisoner swap between the separatist territories and Ukraine. Then on Thursday, a spokeswoman for the Ukrainian security services confirmed that Kiev was ready to engage in such an exchange.

In and of themselves, these developments don't portend a major breakthrough in the nearly four-year-old conflict in eastern Ukraine. Prisoner swaps with separatist forces have occurred several times before, and meetings between U.S. and Russian officials over the struggle are hardly uncommon. Nevertheless, the context and timing of these events suggest that they may be more than just business as usual.

Let's start with the meeting between Surkov and Volker — their third in four months. The discussion was the first time the United States and Russia exchanged proposals on U.N. peacekeepers in Donbas since Putin floated the idea in September. Volker and the U.S. delegation reportedly presented 29 proposals on the force, though Surkov and the Russian side responded that only three were acceptable to the Kremlin. The details of the plans are not yet available to the public, but each side's position is well-known by now. Moscow believes that a U.N. peacekeeping force should be limited to the line of contact between Ukrainian and separatist forces. Washington, on the other hand, agrees with the Ukrainian government that peacekeepers should have access to all of Donbas, including the border between the separatist territories and Russia.

The lingering disagreements over the scope and scale of the mission probably explain why the Russian side rejected most of the U.S. proposals. Notwithstanding their diverging views, however, Russia and the United States have increased the pace and intensity of their consultations over the Ukraine conflict in recent months. Volker and Surkov, moreover, both confirmed that they would continue their discussions to try to come up with "ways to address this challenge."

One possible solution could be the latest prisoner swap. The prospective trade would be the largest to date in the conflict: Kiev would hand over 304 people from Donbas in exchange for 74 people from Ukraine. Furthermore, Putin's phone call with the heads of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics — his first officially acknowledged communication with the rebel leadership — suggests that the Russian president is taking on a more prominent role in negotiations. His involvement in the exchange also indicates that the latest meeting between Volker and Surkov should not be seen as a failure, but rather as a prelude to more meaningful talks in the future.

Combined with the uptick in diplomatic engagement over the conflict, the discussions of another prisoner swap could indicate that Russia is rethinking its position in Ukraine. But that doesn't mean Moscow is about to concede. Agreeing to the conditions that the United States and Ukraine have laid out for U.N. peacekeepers in Donbas would require Russia more or less to abandon its campaign in the region. The supplies and personnel crossing the border between Russia and the separatist territories, after all, are key to sustaining the rebels against Ukrainian forces.

Instead, Moscow is probably taking the opportunity to present itself as a more constructive participant in negotiations with Ukraine and the West. Being more cooperative on issues such as prisoner swaps affords Moscow leeway to work around the edges in the negotiations, while possibly laying the groundwork for a compromise down the line. At home, meanwhile, the strategy could not only help stave off further economic sanctions from the United States and European Union, but it could also give the Putin administration more room to maneuver as Russia's next presidential election approaches. More important, it will buy Russia time in the Ukraine conflict as Moscow builds leverage against the West in other areas of mutual interest, such as Syria and North Korea.

Despite the glimmers of progress in the negotiations over Ukraine, the war probably won't come to an end anytime soon, nor will the enduring standoff between Russia and the West. The forces driving both conflicts are still in place. Yet as the events of the past few days demonstrate, Russia's approach to the issues is shifting, perhaps making way for more serious negotiations in the future.

2AC – Peacekeeping CPNo genuine Russian support for peacekeeping – the negs cards are wishful thinking based on tactical lies told to legitimize Russian military presence in the DonbasJames J. Coyle No Date (nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and the author of Russia’s Border Wars and Frozen Conflicts, "Russia’s Peacekeeping Proposal in Ukraine Is a Sham", Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?view=article&id=37189:russia-s-peacekeeping-proposal-in-ukraine-is-a-sham, No Date, accessed 7-1-2019 //SKH)

Russia has introduced a United Nations draft resolution for peacekeepers in Ukraine amid acclaim by German

Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel and the chairman of the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE). On its face, this would appear to meet a long-standing demand of the government in Kyiv and mark a reversal of Russia’s previous position. As recently as April 25, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov rejected the concept of peacekeepers as contrary to the Minsk peace process. The resolution follows comments by Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 5 following a meeting of the BRIC countries.

Putin’s support was more tepid , however , than noted by most commentators. As soon as he used the term peacekeeper, Putin immediately backtracked and said he supported “not even peacekeepers, but those who provide security for the OSCE mission.” He hedged this support even further, stating that this new group of bodyguards should be located only on the demarcation line between Ukrainian and rebel forces, “and on no other territories.” The rebel-controlled sections of the Ukrainian-Russian border would remain opaque to international observers, and thus remain a conduit for rebel resupply. On September 11, he told German Chancellor Angela Merkel that UN peacekeepers

might be deployed in other parts where OSCE monitors work, but even this concession still leaves Russians to decide where monitors can go. Putin said that before peacekeepers could be deployed , the warring parties had to disengage and remove heavy equipment from the contact line. He opined that such moves could only be accomplished by direct contact with representatives of the self-proclaimed People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. Putin avoided mentioning reasons why the two sides had repeatedly tried and failed to disengage since 2015, including numerous separatist ceasefire violations. He also neglected to point out his calls for

contact with the rebels would bestow a form of de facto recognition on them that the world community has withheld. His calls for “peacekeepers” are therefore a cynical attempt to procure a diplomatic advantage for rebel forces without surrendering any tactical advantages. A review of recent history indicates the Russian president may have a more strategic goal in mind. In December 1991, Transnistrian rebels began a series of raids on Moldovan police stations, and the Russian 14th Army sided with the rebels. By March 1992, the Russians were openly in combat with the armed forces of Moldova. The fighting ended when 400 Russian peacekeepers (supplemented by 2,100 Russian troops in Transnistria) were deployed to protect OSCE observers in a security zone. The Russian troops also blocked the internationally recognized government of Moldova from exercising its

sovereignty over the Russian-backed rebel Transnistria region. Much the same story can be told about Georgia. In 1992, Russian paratroopers landed in Sukhumi to protect Russian tourists caught in a separatist struggle. Russian troops intervened frequently on the side of

Abkhaz rebels, both overtly and covertly. Russia then legitimated its military presence when the UN approved its membership in mixed monitoring groups. By 1994, this had evolved into a 1,600 member Russian peacekeeping force to police a ceasefire “witnessed” by Russia, the UN, and the OSCE. In South Ossetia, Russia deployed interior troops who monitored a Russian-sponsored ceasefire. In 2008, when NATO heads of state considered membership for Georgia and Ukraine, Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin threatened to renew the Georgian conflict. “As soon as Georgia gets some kind of prospect from Washington of NATO membership, the next day the process of real secession of these two territories from Georgia will begin,” he said. As for Ukraine, Putin told US President George W. Bush that it was not a real country and that Ukraine would “cease to exist as a state” if it joined NATO. Putin hinted that Russia would encourage secession of Crimea and the Donbas. When Georgia decided to respond militarily to separatist

shelling of ethnic Georgian villages, Russia used the incident to justify the intervention of its 58th Army to “protect” the peacekeeping force. In the light of the Kremlin’s previous use of peacekeepers to perpetuate its military presence in the former republics of the Soviet Union, Putin’s calls to protect OSCE peacekeepers in eastern Ukraine should be seen as an attempt to perpetuate the control of Russian-backed rebels protected by a screen of

Russian peacekeepers. The West should ignore Putin’s UN Resolution. Russia does not have a history of supporting legitimate peacekeeping troops in the former Soviet Union. If international politics demands the West accept the Kremlin’s proposal, then the West should stand firm against the presence of Russian troops in any force deployed along the contact line.

1AR – Peacekeeping CPNobody can agree on how the peacekeeping force will work – it’s been tried beforeMichael Nienaber 18 (Foreign policy writer for Reuters specializing in Russian affairs, "Ukraine, Russia fail to agree on U.N. peacekeeping mission", U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis/ukraine-russia-fail-to-agree-on-un-peacekeeping-mission-idUSKBN1J726I, 6-12-2018, accessed 7-1-2019 //SKH)

BERLIN (Reuters) - The foreign ministers of Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France met in Berlin on Monday to discuss the implementation of a fragile ceasefire for Ukraine and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission in the country’s conflict zone. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said after the four-way talks that Russia and Ukraine agreed in principle on a UN peacekeeping mission, but their ideas about how to implement it were still “very much apart.” “Regarding the parameters of a possible UN mission for Eastern Ukraine, we agreed to instruct our political directors to continue negotiations not about if but how such a mission could happen and discuss this in the coming weeks,” Maas said. It was the first meeting of the foreign ministers since February 2017, though lower level officials have met regularly in the past four years in the so-called Normandy format to try to resolve the separatist conflict in Eastern Ukraine, in which more than 10,000 people have been killed.

Relations between Moscow and Kiev have been tense since a popular uprising drove a pro-Russian president from power

in 2014. Russia went on to annex Crimea from Ukraine and backed a pro-Russian separatist insurgency in the

country’s east. A ceasefire agreement that was signed in February 2015 in Minsk has failed to end the violence, with

fighters from both sides violating the peace plan on a nearly daily basis. “We know that there was a lack of will to implement

these commitments in the past,” Maas said in a joint news conference with his French counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian. Maas said all sides agreed that they should stick to the Minsk peace plan from now on, including the removal of heavy weaponry from combat zones and a further exchange of prisoners. France and German also offered Ukraine and Russia logistical help for the securing of minefields in the combat zones, he added. “I am firmly convinced that the political negotiations today are also exerting pressure on the ground,” Maas said, despite the apparent lack of progress in the negotiations.

K Answers

Security K

2AC – Aff Epistemology ProdictBalance of power theories prove the aff is right – Russian actions are based on perceived U.S. aggression – the aff attempts to correct that Bock et al 15 (Dr. Andreas M. Bock is a professor of political science at the Akkon University of Applied Science Berlin (Germany). Ingo Henneberg is a research associate at the Chair of Multi-Level Governance, Department of Political Science, University of Freiburg (Germany). Friedrich Plank is a lecturer and research fellow at the International Politics Unit, Department of Political Science, University of Mainz (Germany). “"If you compress the spring, it will snap back hard": The Ukrainian crisis and the balance of threat theory.” International journal (Toronto, Ont.) 70(1):101-109 · March 2015. ResearchGate. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273699287_If_you_compress_the_spring_it_will_snap_back_hard_The_Ukrainian_crisis_and_the_balance_of_threat_theory)

Western news coverage of the Ukrainian crisis has been dominated by an excessively simple explanatory narrative. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which undoubtedly violated international law, has been interpreted in general terms as a neo-

imperialist or even neo-Soviet response. Russian foreign policy has been portrayed as aiming to re-establish imperial control of the “near abroad2 (i.e. the newly independent republics that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet

Union)—and in particular of Ukraine. This narrative of aggressive Russian intentions has often been personalized by a focus on Putin

himself.2 We suggest that such a critical narrative has been politically motivated and we therefore propose to investigate how the Ukrainian crisis might be managed, and indeed deescalated, so that all parties involved will benefit.

We hold that the transformation of the Ukrainian crisis requires a dispassionate analysis of the global and regional context, which must include Moscow’s perception of threats to its interests —a factor that has largely been missing until now.

In this brief paper, we argue that Russia’s behaviour can be explained through the lens of Stephen M. Walt’s “balance of threat” theory,3 which complements balance of power theory by not only focusing on power units (e.g. military, or offensive, capabilities) but also on threats. According to balance of threat theory, state behaviour is determined by the threat perceived by other states or alliances. Walt argues that states will not balance against other states that are increasing in power (as balance of power theory predicts) but rather against those that are perceived as a threat. For instance, during the Cold War, US nuclear weapons did not threaten Western European states. The latter states perceived the US as neither aggressive nor hostile. It was therefore not a threat.

In his March 2014 speech to the Duma, Putin paraphrased Walt’s core argument in a sentence that deserves greater scholarly and public attention: “If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard.”4

We interpret this remark as an indicator that Moscow perceives Western political and military expansion (i.e. the

admission of East European states into the EU and especially into NATO), as well as defence measures taken by NATO allies

(i.e. missile defence), as clear, immediate, and vital threats to Russia’s national security . Our guiding thesis is that balancing exacerbates the dynamic of the security dilemma and makes the perceived threat real, thereby making the balancer an even greater threat than before. The current Ukrainian crisis also shows that, when it comes to security challenges, states tend to resort to balancing against any perceived threat.

The Cuban missile crisis and the ongoing Iranian nuclear crisis support Walt’s theory; in both cases the perception of a threat resulted in balancing. The US balanced against the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles into Cuba, which could have reached and destroyed Washington. From Washington’s perspective, the Soviet move was an unprecedented provocation and a threat. The missiles were indeed a provocation, but they were not unprecedented; in 1959, the US had begun to install nuclear missiles in several NATO partner states, including Turkey. The Soviets had perceived Washington’s move as a threat and balanced against it by deploying missiles to Cuba. The US and Israel are currently balancing against a much weaker Iran (measured in terms of military capabilities and economic data to which Walt refers as “aggregate power”) 5 for similar reasons, i.e. both perceive the prospect of a nuclear armed Iran as threatening to regional and world security.

These examples indicate that, because the image of a state as aggressive and perceptions of its intentions as aggressive are mutually

reinforcing, perception matters; the image influences the perception, and the perception fosters the image. With respect to policy against a perceived threat, whether the state under suspicion really does have aggressive intentions is irrelevant; what matters is how those intentions are perceived and evaluated. As John J. Mearsheimer rightly

notes, this also works the other way around. No matter what NATO’s intentions might be, “it is the Russians, not the West, who ultimately get to decide what counts as a threat to them.”6

In this context, Walt’s balance of threat theory appears to be a convincing explanation of state behaviour. It is therefore worth applying such a theoretically driven analytical framework to the Ukrainian crisis.

Sources of threat

To distinguish threatening from non-threatening states, Walt describes four different sources of threat:

Aggregate power refers to “a state’s total resources”; the greater the aggregate power, the greater the threat a state can pose.

Geographic proximity refers to the distance that lies between the potential competitors; the greater the distance, the more limited “the ability to project power” and the more limited the potential threat.

Offensive power refers to the extent of “offensive capabilities”; the greater the offensive power, the greater the threat a state can pose. Offensive power is closely related to aggregate power and geographic proximity.

Aggressive intentions refer to how states perceive a potential enemy.7

Although Walt regards all four dimensions as equally important, we hold that intentions most strongly influence the image that state A has of

state B. From the Russian perspective, Moscow is not only influenced but also dominated by the Western hemisphere (i.e. the US, the EU, and NATO). When considering three of Walt’s material sources of threat, the United States in particular

becomes extremely threatening. The combined aggregate and offensive power of the US, the EU, and NATO is unprecedented. However, Russia is only the successor of the former Soviet Union, i.e. a superpower in decline. Western

superiority has been reflected in concrete policy decisions toward Russia, which can easily be perceived as threats or even violations of Russian security concerns. Examples include:

The Kosovo intervention: it was executed against the explicit objections of Russia and carried out against Serbia, an ally of Russia;

The Iraq war: the new members of the European Union (i.e. Eastern European states) united with the US to illegally intervene in spite of the objections of France, Russia, and Germany;

The Libya intervention: another example of Western military interventionism using NATO as a tool to extend the UN mandate;

The support of pro-Western actors in Eastern Europe (e.g. the Rose Revolution in Georgia) and criticism of the human rights situation and Caucasus policy of Russia;

The eastward expansion of the EU and primarily of NATO;

The US national missile defence (NMD) project and the NATO missile defence system.

From a Western perspective, none of these policy decisions constitutes a threat to Russia. All of them can be interpreted as peaceful, pro-democratic, or defensive, just as they can be understood as aggressive, interventional, or threatening. Indeed, an old statement by the former US secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, resonates half a century later: “Khrushchev,” Dulles wrote with reference to the Soviet leader of the time, “does not need to be convinced of our good intentions. He knows we are not aggressors and do not threaten the security of the Soviet Union.”8 As we now know, Khrushchev saw the US as a severe threat to the Soviet Union, which was one of the reasons he deployed nuclear

missiles to Cuba. Fifty years later, although neither offensive nor aggressive motivations might be driving Western expansion toward Russia or Western military interventions and defence investments , Moscow may, and likely does, perceive otherwise.