U.S. Supreme CourtDent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889)Dent v. West VirginiaNo. 119Submitted December 11, 1888Decided January 14, 1889129 U.S. 114ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALSOF THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIASyllabusThe statute of West Virginia ( 9 and 15, chapter 93, 1882) which requires every practitioner of medicine in the State to obtain a certificate from the State Board of Health that he is a graduate of a reputable medical college in the school of medicine to which he belongs, or that he has practiced medicine in the State continuously for ten years prior to March 8, 1881, or that he has been found upon examination to be qualified to practice medicine in all its departments, and which subjects a person practicing without such certificate to prosecution and punishment for a misdemeanor, does not, when enforced against a person who had been a practicing physician in the State for a period of five years before 1881, without a diploma of a reputable medical college in the school of medicine to which he belonged, deprive him of his estate or interest in the profession without due process of law.The State, in the exercise of its power to provide for the general welfare of its people, may exact from parties before they can practice medicine a degree of skill and learning in that profession upon which the community employing their services may confidently rely, and, to ascertain whether they have such qualifications, require them to obtain a certificate or license from a board or other authority competent to judge in that respect. If the qualifications required are appropriate to the profession and attainable by reasonable study or application, their validity is not subject to objection because of their stringency or difficulty.Legislation is not open to the charge of depriving one of his rights without due process of law if it be general in its operation upon the subjects to which it relates, and is enforceable in the usual modes established in the administration of government with respect to kindred matters; that is, by process or proceedings adapted to the nature of the case, and such is the legislation of West Virginia in question.Cummings v. Missouri,4 Wall. 277, andEx parte Garland,4 Wall. 333, examined and shown to differ materially from this case.Page 129 U. S. 115The Court stated the case as follows:This case comes from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. It involves the validity of the statute of that State which requires every practitioner of medicine in it to obtain a certificate from the state board of health that he is a graduate of a reputable medical college in the school of medicine to which he belongs, or that he has practiced medicine in the State continuously for the period of 10 years prior to the 8th day of March, 1881, or that he has been found, upon examination by the board, to be qualified to practice medicine in all its departments, and makes the practice of, or the attempt by any person to practice, medicine, surgery, or obstetrics in the State without such certificate, unless called from another State to treat a particular case, a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, in the discretion of the court. The statute in question is found in 9 and 15 of an act of the State, c. 93, passed March 15, 1882, amending a chapter of its Code concerning the public health. St. 1882, pp. 245, 246, 248. These sections are as follows:"SEC. 9. The following persons, and no others, shall hereafter be permitted to practice medicine in this State,viz.:""First. All persons who are graduates of a reputable medical college in the school of medicine to which the person desiring to practice belongs. Every such person shall, if he has not already done so and obtained the certificate hereinafter mentioned, present his diploma to the State Board of Health, or to the two members thereof in his congressional district, and if the same is found to be genuine, and was issued by such medical college, as is hereinafter mentioned, and the person presenting the same be the graduate named therein, the said Board, or said two members thereof, (as the case may be) shall issue and deliver to him a certificate to that effect, and such diploma and certificate shall entitle the person named in such diploma to practice medicine in all its departments in this State.""Second. All persons who have practiced medicine in this State continuously for the period of ten years prior to thePage 129 U. S. 1168th day of March, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-one. Every such person shall make and file with the two members of the State Board of Health in the congressional district in which he resides, or if he resides out of the State in the district nearest his residence, an affidavit of the number of years he has continuously practiced in this State; and, if the number of years therein stated be ten or more, the said Board, or said two members thereof, shall, unless they ascertain such affidavit to be false, give him a certificate to that fact, and authorizing him to practice medicine in all its departments in this State.""Third. A person who is not such graduate, and who has not so practiced in this State for a period of ten years, desiring to practice medicine in this State, shall, if he has not already done so, present himself for examination before the State Board of Health, or before the said two members thereof in the congressional district in which he resides, or, if he resides out of the State, to the said two members of the State Board of Health in the congressional district nearest his place of residence, who, together with a member of the local board of health, who is a physician (if there be such member of the local board) of the county in which the examination is held, shall examine him as herein provided, and if, upon full examination, they find him qualified to practice medicine in all its departments, they, or a majority of them, shall grant him a certificate to that effect, and thereafter he shall have the right to practice medicine in this State to the same extent as if he had the diploma and certificate hereinbefore mentioned. The members of the State Board of Health in each congressional district shall, by publication in some newspaper printed in the county in which their meeting is to be held, or, if no such paper is printed therein, in some newspaper of general circulation in such district, give at least twenty-one days' notice of the time and place at which they will meet for the examination of applicants for permission to practice medicine, which notice shall be published at least once in each week for three successive weeks before the day of such meeting; but this section shall not apply to a physician or surgeon who is calledPage 129 U. S. 117from another State to treat a particular case, or to perform a particular surgical operation in this State and who does not otherwise practice in this State.""SEC. 15. If any person shall practice, or attempt to practice, medicine, surgery, or obstetrics in this State without having complied with the provisions of 9 of this chapter, except as therein provided, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and fined for every such offense not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned in the county jail not less than one month nor more than twelve months, or be punished by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court. And if any person shall file, or attempt to file, as his own, the diploma or certificate of another, or shall file, or attempt to file, a false or forged affidavit of his identity, or shall willfully swear falsely to any question which may be propounded to him on his examination, as herein provided for, or to any affidavit herein required to be made or filed by him, he shall, upon conviction thereof, be confined in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than three years, or imprisoned in the county jail not less than six nor more than twelve months, and fined not less than one hundred nor more than five hundred dollars, at the discretion of the court."Under this statute, the plaintiff in error was indicted in the State Circuit Court of Preston County, West Virginia, for unlawfully engaging in the practice of medicine in that State in June, 1882, without a diploma, certificate, or license therefor, as there required, not being a physician or surgeon called from another State to treat a particular case or to perform a particular surgical operation. To this indictment the defendant pleaded not guilty, and, a jury having been called, the State by its prosecuting attorney, and the defendant by his attorney, agreed upon the following statement of facts, namely:"That the defendant was engaged in the practice of medicine in the town of Newburg, Preston county, West Virginia, at the time charged in the indictment, and had been so engaged since the year 1876 continuously to the present time, and has during all said time enjoyed a lucrative practice,Page 129 U. S. 118publicly professing to be a physician, prescribing for the sick, and appending to his name the letters, 'M.D.;' that he was not then and there a physician and surgeon called from another State to treat a particular case or to perform a particular surgical operation, nor was he then and there a commissioned officer of the United States army and navy and hospital service; that he has no certificate, as required by 9, chapter 93, acts of the Legislature of West Virginia, passed March 15, 1882, but has a diploma from the 'American Medical Eclectic College of Cincinnati, Ohio;' that he presented said diploma to the members of the Board of Health who reside in his congressional district, and asked for the certificate as required by law, but they, after retaining said diploma for some time, returned it to defendant with their refusal to grant him a certificate asked, because, as they claimed, said college did not come under the word 'reputable,' as defined by said Board of Health; that, if the defendant had been or should be prevented from practicing medicine, it would be a great injury to him, as it would deprive him of his only means of supporting himself and family; that, at the time of the passage of the act of 1882, he had not been practicing medicine ten years, but had only been practicing six, as aforesaid, from the year 1876."These were all the facts in the case. Upon them, the jury found the defendant guilty, and thereupon he moved an arrest of judgment on the ground that the act of the legislature was unconstitutional and void so far as it interfered with his vested right in relation to the practice of medicine, which motion was overruled, and to the ruling an exception was taken. The court thereupon sentenced the defendant to pay a fine of $50 and the costs of the proceedings. The case being taken on writ of error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State, the judgment was affirmed, and to review this judgment the case is brought here.Page 129 U. S. 121MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.Whether the indictment upon which the plaintiff in error was tried and found guilty is open to objection for want of sufficient certainty in its averments is a question which does not appear to have been raised either on the trial or before the Supreme Court of the State. The Presiding Justice of the latter Court, in its opinion, states that the counsel for the defendant expressly waived all objections to defects in form or substance of the indictment, and based his claim for a review of the judgment on the ground that the statute of West Virginia is unconstitutional and void. The unconstitutionality asserted consists in its alleged conflict with the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which declares that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; the denial to the defendant of the right to practice his profession without the certificate required constituting the deprivation of his vested right and estate in his profession, which he had previously acquired.It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business, or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition. This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here, all vocations are open to everyone on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate," acquired in them -- that is, the right to continue their prosecution -- is often of great value to the possessors, and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any morePage 129 U. S. 122than their real or personal property can be thus taken. But there is no arbitrary deprivation of such right where its exercise is not permitted because of a failure to comply with conditions imposed by the State for the protection of society. The power of the State to provide for the general welfare of its people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity, as well as of deception and fraud. As one means to this end, it has been the practice of different States, from time immemorial, to exact in many pursuits a certain degree of skill and learning upon which the community may confidently rely; their possession being generally ascertained upon an examination of parties by competent persons, or inferred from a certificate to them in the form of a diploma or license from an institution established for instruction on the subjects, scientific and otherwise, with which such pursuits have to deal. The nature and extent of the qualifications required must depend primarily upon the judgment of the State as to their necessity. If they are appropriate to the calling or profession, and attainable by reasonable study or application, no objection to their validity can be raised because of their stringency or difficulty. It is only when they have no relation to such calling or profession, or are unattainable by such reasonable study and application, that they can operate to deprive one of his right to pursue a lawful vocation.Few professions require more careful preparation by one who seeks to enter it than that of medicine. It has to deal with all those subtle and mysterious influences upon which health and life depend, and requires not only a knowledge of the properties of vegetable and mineral substances, but of the human body, in all its complicated parts, and their relation to each other, as well as their influence upon the mind. The physician must be able to detect readily the presence of disease, and prescribe appropriate remedies for its removal. Everyone may have occasion to consult him, but comparatively few can judge of the qualifications of learning and skill which he possesses. Reliance must be placed upon the assurancePage 129 U. S. 123given by his license, issued by an authority competent to judge in that respect, that he possesses the requisite qualifications. Due consideration, therefore, for the protection of society may well induce the State to exclude from practice those who have not such a license, or who are found upon examination not to be fully qualified. The same reasons which control in imposing conditions, upon compliance with which the physician is allowed to practice in the first instance, may call for further conditions as new modes of treating disease are discovered, or a more thorough acquaintance is obtained of the remedial properties of vegetable and mineral substances, or a more accurate knowledge is acquired of the human system and of the agencies by which it is affected. It would not be deemed a matter for serious discussion that a knowledge of the new acquisitions of the profession, as it from time to time advances in its attainments for the relief of the sick and suffering, should be required for continuance in its practice, but for the earnestness with which the plaintiff in error insists that, by being compelled to obtain the certificate required, and prevented from continuing in his practice without it, he is deprived of his right and estate in his profession without due process of law. We perceive nothing in the statute which indicates an intention of the legislature to deprive one of any of his rights. No one has a right to practice medicine without having the necessary qualifications of learning and skill, and the statute only requires that whoever assumes, by offering to the community his services as a physician, that he possesses such learning and skill shall present evidence of it by a certificate or license from a body designated by the State as competent to judge of his qualifications.As we have said on more than one occasion, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to give to the terms "due process of law" a definition which will embrace every permissible exertion of power affecting private rights, and exclude such as are forbidden. They come to us from the law of England, from which country our jurisprudence is to a great extent derived, and their requirement was there designed to secure the subject against the arbitrary action of the Crown, and place him under the protection of the law. They were deemed to bePage 129 U. S. 124equivalent to "the law of the land." In this country, the requirement is intended to have a similar effect against legislative power -- that is, to secure the citizen against any arbitrary deprivation of his rights, whether relating to his life, his liberty, or his property. Legislation must necessarily vary with the different objects upon which it is designed to operate. It is sufficient, for the purposes of this case, to say that legislation is not open to the charge of depriving one of his rights without due process of law if it be general in its operation upon the subjects to which it relates and is enforceable in the usual modes established in the administration of government with respect to kindred matters -- that is, by process or proceedings adapted to the nature of the case. The great purpose of the requirement is to exclude everything that is arbitrary and capricious in legislation affecting the rights of the citizen. As said by this court inYick Wo v. Hopkins,speaking by Mr. Justice Matthews:"When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power."118 U. S. 118U.S. 356,118 U. S. 369.See also Pennoyer v. Neff,95 U. S. 714,95 U. S. 733;Davidson v. New Orleans,96 U. S. 97,96 U. S. 104, 107;Hurtado v. California,110 U. S. 516;Railroad Co. v. Humes,115 U. S. 512,115 U. S. 519.There is nothing of an arbitrary character in the provisions of the statute in question. It applies to all physicians, except those who may be called for a special case from another State. It imposes no conditions which cannot be readily met; and it is made enforceable in the mode usual in kindred matters -- that is, by regular proceedings adapted to the case. It authorizes an examination of the applicant by the Board of Health as to his qualifications when he has no evidence of them in the diploma of a reputable medical college in the school of medicine to which he belongs, or has not practiced in the State a designated period before March, 1881. If, in the proceedings under the statute, there should be any unfairPage 129 U. S. 125or unjust action on the part of the Board in refusing him a certificate, we doubt not that a remedy would be found in the courts of the State. But no such imputation can be made, for the plaintiff in error did not submit himself to the examination of the Board after it had decided that the diploma he presented was insufficient.The cases ofCummings v. State of Missouri,4 Wall. 277, and ofEx parte Garland,4 Wall. 333, upon which much reliance is placed, do not, in our judgment, support the contention of the plaintiff in error. In the first of these cases, it appeared that the Constitution of Missouri, adopted in 1865, prescribed an oath to be taken by persons holding certain offices and trusts, and following certain pursuits within its limits. They were required to deny that they had done certain things, or had manifested by act or word certain desires or sympathies. The oath which they were to take embraced 30 distinct affirmations respecting their past conduct, extending even to their words, desires, and sympathies. Every person unable to take this oath was declared incapable of holding in the State"any office of honor, trust, or profit under its authority, or of being an officer, councilman, director, or trustee, or other manager of any corporation, public or private,"then existing or thereafter established by its authority, or"of acting as a professor or teacher in any educational institution, or in any common or other school, or of holding any real estate or other property in trust for the use of any church, religious society, or congregation."And every person holding, at the time the constitution took effect, any of the offices, trusts, or positions mentioned was required, within 60 days thereafter, to take the oath, and, if he failed to comply with this requirement, it was declared that his office, trust, or position should,ipso facto,become vacant. No person, after the expiration of the 60 days, was allowed, without taking the oath, "to practice as an attorney or counselor at law," nor after that period could"any person be competent as a bishop, priest, deacon, minister, elder, or other clergyman of any religious persuasion, sect, or denomination to teach or preach, or solemnize marriages."Fine and imprisonmentPage 129 U. S. 126were prescribed as a punishment for holding or exercising any of the "offices, positions, trusts, professions, or functions" specified without taking the oath, and false swearing or affirmation in taking it was declared to be perjury, punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary. A priest of the Roman Catholic Church was indicted in a circuit court of Missouri and convicted of the crime of teaching and preaching as a priest and minister of that religious denomination without having first taken the oath, and was sentenced to pay a fine of $500, and to be committed to jail until the same was paid. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State, the judgment was affirmed, and the case was brought on error to this Court. As many of the acts from which the parties were obliged to purge themselves by the oath had no relation to their fitness for the pursuits and professions designated, the Court held that the oath was not required as a means of ascertaining whether the parties were qualified for those pursuits and professions, but was exacted because it was thought that the acts deserved punishment, and that, for many of them, there was no way of inflicting punishment except by depriving the parties of their offices and trusts. A large portion of the people of Missouri were unable to take the oath, and, as to them, the court held that the requirement of its constitution amounted to a legislative deprivation of their rights. Many of the acts which parties were bound to deny that they had ever done were innocent at the time they were committed, and the deprivation of a right to continue in their offices if the oath were not taken was held to be a penalty for a past act, which was violative of the Constitution. The doctrine of this case was affirmed inPierce v. Carskadon,16 Wall. 234.In the second case mentioned -- that ofEx parte Garland-- it appeared that, on the 2d of July, 1862, Congress had passed an act prescribing an oath to be taken by every person elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit under the United States, either in the civil, military, or naval departments of the Government, except the President, before entering upon the duties of his office, and before being entitled to hisPage 129 U. S. 127salary or other emoluments. On the 24th of January, 1865, Congress, by a supplemental act, extended its provisions so as to embrace attorneys and counselors of the courts of the United States. This latter act, among other things, provided that, after its passage, no person should be admitted as an attorney and counselor to the bar of the Supreme Court, and, after the 4th of March, 1865, to the bar of any Circuit or District Court of the United States, or of the Court of Claims, or be allowed to appear and be heard by virtue of any previous admission, until he had taken and subscribed the oath prescribed by the act of July 2, 1862. The oath related to past acts, and its object was to exclude from practice in the courts parties who were unable to affirm that they had not done the acts specified; and, as it could not be taken by large classes of persons, it was held to operate against them as a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion.Mr. Garland had been admitted to the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States previous to the passage of the act. He was a citizen of Arkansas, and when that State passed an ordinance of secession which purported to withdraw her from the Union, and by another ordinance attached herself to the so-called "Confederate States," he followed the State, and was one of her representatives, first in the lower house, and afterwards in the senate of the congress of the Confederacy, and was a member of that senate at the time of the surrender of the Confederate forces to the armies of the United States. Subsequently, in 1865, he received from the President of the United States a full pardon for all offenses committed by his participation, direct or implied, in the rebellion. He produced this pardon, and asked permission to continue as an attorney and counselor of this Court without taking the oath required by the act of January 24, 1865, and the rule of the Court which had adopted the clause requiring its administration in conformity with the act of Congress. The Court held that the law, in exacting the oath as to his past conduct as a condition of his continuing in the practice of his profession, imposed a penalty for a past act, and in that respect was subject to the same objection as that made to the clauses of the Constitution of Missouri, and was therefore invalid.Page 129 U. S. 128There is nothing in these decisions which supports the positions for which the plaintiff in error contends. They only determine that one who is in the enjoyment of a right to preach and teach the Christian religion as a priest of a regular church, and one who has been admitted to practice the profession of the law, cannot be deprived of the right to continue in the exercise of their respective professions by the exaction from them of an oath as to their past conduct respecting matters which have no connection with such professions. Between this doctrine and that for which the plaintiff in error contends there is no analogy or resemblance. The Constitution of Missouri and the act of Congress in question in those cases were designed to deprive parties of their right to continue in their professions for past acts, or past expressions of desires and sympathies, many of which had no bearing upon their fitness to continue in their professions. The law of West Virginia was intended to secure such skill and learning in the profession of medicine that the community might trust with confidence those receiving a license under authority of the State.Judgment affirmed.

G.R. No. L-24119 August 8, 1925FELIX MARQUEZ,petitioner,vs.THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS and THE SECRETARY-TREASURER OF THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS,respondent.M.H. de Joya for petitioner.Acting Attorney-General Reyes for respondents.STREET,J.:This is an original proceeding in this court by which the petitioner, Felix Marquez, seeks to obtain a writ ofmandamusagainst the respondents, the Board of Medical Examiners, requiring them to admit the petitioner to the physicians' examinations conducted, or to be conducted by the respondents in the City of Manila. To the original complaint the respondents answered, and to the answer a demurrer was interposed in behalf of the petitioner.It appears that petitioner is a graduate of the Chicago Medical College, having received the degree of M.D. from said institution on June 8, of the year 1922. No question appears to have been made by the respondents with respect to the petitioner's qualifications of the physician's examinations in other respects, but they have denied him admission to the examinations on the grounds that the Chicago Medical College, where the petitioner was graduated, has been classified as a Class C medical college by the National Medical State Board of the United States. For this reason the respondents, in accordance with the regulations of the board now in effect, have denied the requisite standing to said institution and excluded petitioner.It is not denied by the respondents that prior to the adoption of the present regulations, and prior to the date when the Chicago Medical School was classified as a Class C medical college, the Board of Medical Examiners for the Philippine Islands had accepted diplomas of graduation from said medical college as sufficient proof of proficiency in medical knowledge to admit a graduate to the examinations held in these Islands; and as late as October 29, 1923, said board accepted favorably upon the application of one Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, who was graduated from said school in the year 1921. At the time said candidate was admitted, however, the regulations denying the requisite status to the Chicago Medical College had not been made effective, and they had been made effective by proper authority before the present petitioner had submitted his application.In the argument for the petitioner it is admitted that under Act No. 3111, and the regulations now in force, the petitioner is disqualified to take the examinations; but it is pointed out that at the time he began and even when he conducted his course in the Chicago Medical School, said institution was still recognized as a reputable medical institution; and the question submitted is whether the petitioner's case should be governed by the law and regulations in force at the time of his enrollment in and graduation from the Chicago Medical School, or by those in force at the time he filed his application for admission, on or about September 26, 1924. It is submitted for the petitioner that his case should be governed by the law and regulations at the time of his graduation. To hold otherwise, it is insisted, is to make the law retroactive in effect and to do irreparable damage to the petitioner, who has pursued his work in the institution referred to in good faith, believing that said school had the status necessary to qualify him from examination.The position taken by the petitioner is, we think, untenable. The question whether a medical institution is "a reputable medical school," in the sense intended by the law, is vested in the Board of Medical Examiners, and although the action taken by them may conceivably, in isolated cases, result in hardship, nevertheless the interests of the public require that the board should be free to exercise its judgment and discretion without reference to the effect of the determination of the question in particular instances. There can in the nature of things be no vested right in an existing law, which would preclude its change or repeal. No one who has commenced preparation in a particular institution has any inchoate right on account of that fact. If the law were otherwise upon this point, it would be impossible for the Board of Medical Examiners to give effect to the knowledge which they from time to time acquire as to the standing of medical schools; and an intending physician, upon matriculating in a particular college, takes upon himself the risk of changes that may be made in the standing of the institution by the board.The demurrer to the answer is not well taken. The answer is therefore declared sufficient, and the petition dismissed, with costs, So ordered.Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-25135 September 21, 1968PHILIPPINE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,Petitioner, vs.BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS and JOSE MA. TORRES,Respondents.Seva-Albert-Vergara and Julio V. Presbitero for petitioner.Regino Hermosisima, Jr., for respondent Jose Ma. Torres.Solicitor General for respondent Board of Medical Examiners.CONCEPCION,C.J.: Original action forcertiorariandmandamus, against the Board of Medical Examiners and Jose Ma. Torres, to annul a resolution of the former and a certificate issued by the same authorizing the latter to practice medicine in the Philippines without examination. The facts are not disputed. Jose Ma. Torres - hereinafter referred to as respondent - is a Spanish subject and a member of the Missionary Sons of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, otherwise known as the Claretian Missionaries. Having graduated from the University of Barcelona, Spain, with the degree of Licentiate in Medicine and Surgery, he is entitled, under the laws of Spain, to practice medicine and surgery throughout the territory thereof. On January 21, 1955, respondent was granted special authority to practice medicine in Lamitan, Basilan City, where he resides, pursuant to Section 771(e) of the Revised Administrative Code reading: SEC. 771.Persons exempt from registration.- Registration shall not be required of the following classes of persons: . . . (e) In cases of epidemic or in municipalities where there is no legally qualified practicing physician, or when the circumstances require it, in the interest of the public health, the Director of Health may issue special authorizations, to all medical students who have completed the first three years of their studies, or to persons who have qualified in medicine, and to graduate or registered nurses, who may request it. This authority was revoked, on November 8, 1960, by the then Secretary of Health, upon the ground that "the conditions under which it was granted no longer obtained in Lamitan Basilan City, there being enough practising physicians in that locality." Said officer restored the authority on December 19, 1960, to be revoked again, on January 22, 1963. It was renewed once more, on September 1, 1963, and, once again, it was revoked on February 10, 1964, upon the recommendation of the Board of Medical Examiners - hereinafter referred to as the Board. On motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, the Board issued, on April 6, 1965, its Resolution No. 25, series of 1965, which was approved by the President, granting respondent a certificate to practice medicine in the Philippines without the examination required in Republic Act No. 2882, otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959. The resolution relied therefor upon The Treaty on the Validity of Academic Degrees and The Exercise of the Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, signed at Manila on March 4, 1949, and ratified on May 19, 1949.1 Petitioner herein, Philippine Medical Association, is a domestic corporation. On June 14, 1965, it addressed the Chairman of the Board a communication requesting reconsideration of said resolution No. 25, upon the ground that, pursuant to said Medical Act of 1959, respondent has to take and pass the examination therein prescribed, before he can be allowed to practice medicine in the Philippines. This letter was followed by another, dated October 6, 1965, to which said Chairman replied on October 8, 1965, stating "that the final decision on the matter will have to come from the President of the Philippines upon whose authority said resolution has been finally approved and implemented." Thereupon, or, on October 18, 1965, petitioner commenced the present action, for the purpose stated at the beginning of this decision, upon the theory that the Board had violated Republic Act No. 2882 in granting respondent's certificate for the general practice of medicine in the Philippines without the examination prescribed in said Act; that the Board had exceeded its authority in passing said Resolution, because of which the same is null and void; that the Board should, therefore, be ordered to cancel the certificate issued in pursuance of said resolution; and that petitioner has no other plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law. In their respective answers, respondents admit the basic facts, but not the conclusions drawn therefrom by the petitioner and allege that the resolution in question is sanctioned by the provisions of the Treaty above referred to; that petitioner has no cause of action; and that the petition should be dismissed for failure of the petitioner to exhaust the available administrative remedies. Respondents cite the cases ofCostas vs. Aldanese2andAlmario vs. City Mayor3in support of the theory that petitioner herein has no sufficient interest or "personality" to maintain the present case. In the first case, it was held that the President of the Association of Philippine (Marine) Engineers4had no particular "individual" interest, and, hence,no cause of action formandamusto compel the Collector of Customs to implement section 1203(j) of the Administrative Code, providing that steamers making round trips of more than 48 hours or travelling at night shall carry the complement of marine engineers therein specified. In the second case, a citizen of the Philippines, as such, who is not an Applicant for any stall or booth, or the representative of any such applicant, stallholder orany association of personswho are deprived of the right to occupy stalls in said market, "is not the real party in interest who has the capacity, right or personality" to bring an action formandamus, to compel the office of Pasay City to comply with the provisions of Republic Act No. 37, by ejecting, from the public market of said City, stallholders who are not nationals of the Philippines. Said cases are not in point. To begin with, both are actions formandamus, whereas the case at bar is mainly one forcertiorari. Although, petitioner herein, likewise, seeks a writ ofmandamus, directing the Board to cancel the certificate of registration issued to the respondent, this would be a necessary consequence of the writ ofcertiorariannulling the disputed resolution. Moreover, said two (2) cases were commenced by individuals, who, as such, had no special interest in the relief therein prayed for. Indeed, in theAlmariocase it was intimated that the result might have been otherwise had it been brought by an "association" whose members have an interest in the subject matter of the action. This was confirmed byPHILCONSA vs. Gimenez,5in which we sustained the right of the Philippine Constitution Association to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836, insofar as it allowed retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to members of Congress and to elective officials thereof. Further authority in favor of petitioner herein is supplied byNacionalista Party vs. F. Bautista Angelo6in which the Nacionalista Party successfully impugned the validity of the designation of the then Solicitor General as Acting Member of the Commission on Elections. It is our considered opinion that the view adopted in the last three (3) cases should be maintained and that, in line therewith, petitioner herein has sufficient interest to prosecute the case at bar and a cause of action against respondents herein. As regards their objection based upon petitioner's failure to appeal to the President, suffice it to say that the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is concededly subject to exceptions, among which are cases involving only questions of law or when jurisdiction is in issue7or the action complained of bears the approval of a department secretary, as the disputed resolution, which was approved by the Executive Secretary "by authority of the President," or as analter egoof the Executive.8The case at bar falls under these exceptions to said rule. The main issue herein hinges on the interpretation of Article I of the Treaty aforementioned, reading as follows: The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degrees or diplomas to practice the liberal professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by competent national authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the Other,subject to the laws and regulations of the latter. When the degree or diploma of Bachelor, issued by competent national authorities allows its holder without requiring further evidence of proficiency to pursue normally higher courses of study, he shall also be deemed qualified to continue his studies in the territory of either Party in conformity with the applicable laws and regulations of the State which recognizes the validity of the title or diploma in question, and with the rules and regulations of the particular educational institution in which he intends to pursue his studies. This Treaty provision was the subject matter of our resolution of August 15, 1961, in connection with the petition of Arturo Efren Garcia for admission to the Philippine Bar without taking the Bar Examinations. After completing, in Spain, the course prescribed therefor, Garcia had been graduated from the College of Law of the Universidad Central de Madrid with the degree of "Licenciado en Derecho", which entitled him to practice law in Spain. Having invoked the provisions of said treaty in support of his claim of exemption from the requisite bar examinations, this Court denied his petition upon the ground, among others ". . . that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippines he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations; . . ."chanrobles virtual law library We find no plausible reason to depart from this view. On the contrary, we reiterate the same, inasmuch as the theory of respondent herein cannot be accepted without placing graduates from our own educational institutions at a disadvantagevis-a-visSpanish graduates from Spanish schools, colleges or universities. Indeed, the latter could - under respondent's pretense - engage in the practice of medicine in the Philippines without taking the examination prescribed in Republic Act No. 2882, whereas the former would have to take and pass said examination. Worse still, since - as we ruled in theGarciacase - the benefits of the aforementioned Treaty cannot be availed of in the Philippines except bySpanishsubjects, the result would be - should respondent's contention be sustained - that graduates from Spanish schools of medicine would be entitled to practice medicine in the Philippines without examination,if they were Spanish subjects, butnotif they are Filipinos. Surely said treaty was not made to discriminate against Philippine schools, colleges or universities, much less against nationals of the Philippines. WHEREFORE, we hold that said Treaty merely extended to diplomas issued or degrees conferred by educational institutions of Spain the same recognition and treatment that we accord to similar diplomas or degrees from local institutions of learning; that holders of said Spanish diplomas or degrees must take the examination prescribed by our laws for holders of similar diplomas or degrees from educational institutions in the Philippines; that resolution No. 25, series of 1965, of respondent Board is violative of Republic Act No. 2882 and hence, null and void; and that, respondent Board of Medical Examiners should be, as it is hereby ordered to cancel the certificate of registration, for the practice of medicine in the Philippines, issued in favor of respondent Jose Ma. Torres, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B. ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in their behalf and in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges during the school year 1987-88 and future years who have not taken or successfully hurdled tile National Medical Admission Test (NMAT).petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVII of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region with seat at Manila, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT (CEM),respondents.FELICIANO,J.:The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with this Court to set aside the Order of the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:Section 1.Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a)thestandardization and regulation of medical education(b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. (Underscoring supplied)The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education which is composed of (a) the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly authorized representative, as Chairman; (b) the Secretary of Health or his duly authorized representative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or his duly authorized representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical Board or his duly authorized representative; (e) a representative of the Philippine Medical Association; (f) the Dean of the College of Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a representative of the Council of Deans of Philippine Medical Schools; and (h) a representative of the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges, as members. The functions of the Board of Medical Education specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:(a) To determine and prescribe equirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine;(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical facilities of colleges of medicine, to wit: buildings, including hospitals, equipment and supplies, apparatus, instruments, appliances, laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating and delivery rooms, facilities for outpatient services, and others, used for didactic and practical instruction in accordance with modern trends;(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimum qualifications of teaching personnel, including student-teachers ratio;(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculum leading to the degree of Doctor of Medicine;(e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical curriculum in a medical school that has exceptional faculty and instrumental facilities. Such an experimental curriculum may prescribe admission and graduation requirements other than those prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only exceptional students shall be enrolled in the experimental curriculum;(f)To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments of the hospitals for training which comply with the minimum specific physical facilities as provided in subparagraph (b) hereof; and(h)To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations for the proper implementation of the foregoing functions. (Emphasis supplied)Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any studentwho has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude andwho presents(a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b)a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education;(c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.x x x x x x x x x (Emphasis supplied)MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that:2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country.The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges.The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of elegibility for admission into the medical colleges.3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical Education,each medical college may give other tests for applicants who have been issued a corresponding certificate of eligibility for admissionthat will yield information on other aspects of the applicant's personality to complement the information derived from the NMAT.x x x x x x x x x8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA), or admitted for enrollment as first year student in any medical college, beginning the school year, 1986-87, without the required NMAT qualification as called for under this Order.(Underscoring supplied)Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center conducted NMATs for entrance to medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April 1987, respondent Center conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges during the school year 1987.1988.1avvphi1Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed statute and administrative order. We regard this issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely needs documentation that a court would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when the petitioner assailing a statute or administrative order has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing a clear legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is of course the constitutionality of the statute or order assailed.1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their assertion, violated by the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked read as follows:(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect of human rights. "(b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs."(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress and to promote total human liberation and development. "(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. "(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies" which the government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the administrative order they assail collide with the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words, discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden is heavy enough where the constitutional provision invoked is relatively specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in behavioral or operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier where the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second portion of Article II is cast, in language descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy and therefore highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made their case, even aprima faciecase, and we are not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulation impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional provisions pointed to by the petitioners.Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On the contrary we may note-in anticipation of discussioninfra that the statute and the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at the level of professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education " accessible toallwho might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessibleto all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. "2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education. The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows from the reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three great departments of government,1must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical education and the practice of medicine in our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago inPangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission:2One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim ofdelegatus non potest delegare or delegate potestas non potest delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3)has beenmade to adapt itself to the complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly,with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation and theincreased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendencytoward the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval of thepractice by the courts."3The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando inEdu v. Ericta4The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met.The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.5We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due process. Again, petitioners have failed to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when added on top of the admission requirements set out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission requirements established by internal regulations of the various medical schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus appear to relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of power or authority: this Court has neither commission or competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or administrative regulation. Those questions must be address to the political departments of the government not to the courts.There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote an the important interests and needs in a word, the public order of the general community.6An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.7Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that theregulation of the practice of medicinein all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.8That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine firstto take and pass medical board examinationshave long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.9Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements i.e.,the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.10What we have before us in the instant case is closely related:the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known.We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT]11and quite probably in other countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that that portion of the MECS Order which provides thatthe cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT,shall be determined every-yearby the Board of Medical 11 Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. (Emphasis supplied)infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that students seeking admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score than that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious." The force of this argument is more apparent than real. Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year; the number of places available in medical schools during the current year; the average score attained during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may wen result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change.We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 88259 August 10, 1989THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION and the HON. LOURDES R. QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and Chairman, Board of Medical Education,petitioners,vs.HON. DANIEL P. ALFONSO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, Fourth Judicial Region, Antipolo, Rizal, and the PHILIPPINE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE FOUNDATION, INC.,respondents.Carpio, Villaraza & Cruz for private respondent.Anatolio S. Tuazon, Jr. for intervenors.NARVASA,J.:Petitioners, the Board of Medical Education, the government agency which supervises and regulates the country's medical colleges, and Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, as Chairperson of the Board, pray for a writ ofcertiorarito nullify and set aside the order issued by respondent Judge Daniel P. Alfonso, Regional Trial Court, Antipolo, Rizal, in Civil Case No. 1385 restraining the enforcement of petitioner Quisumbing's order of closure of the respondent Philippine Muslim-Christian College of Medicine Foundation, Inc. (hereafter simply the College).lwph1.tThe, College, a private educational institution, was founded in 1981 for the avowed purpose of producing physicians who will "emancipate Muslim citizens from age-old attitudes on health." The, unstable peace and order situation in Mindanao led to the establishment of the College in Antipolo, Rizal, which granted it a temporary permit to operate in the municipality, instead of in Zamboanga City where the school was first proposed to be located. It has since adopted Antipolo as its permanent site and changed its name to the Rizal College of Medicine.In 1985, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and the Board of Medical Education (BME) authorized the Commission on Medical Education to conduct a study of all medical schools in the Philippines. The, report of the Commission showed that the College fell very much short of the minimum standards set for medical schools.1The, team of inspectors, composed of Doctors Florentino Herrera, Jr., Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Horacio Estrada, Jose V. Silao, Jr. and Andres L. Reyes, recommended the closure of the school2upon the following findings, to wit:(a) the College was not fulfilling the purpose for which it had been created because of its inappropriate location and the absence in its curriculum of subjects relating to Muslim culture and welfare;(b) its lack of university affiliation hindered its students from obtaining a "balanced humanistic and scientific" education;(c) it did not have its philosophy base hospital for the training of its students in the major clinical disciplines, as required by the DECS;(d) more than 60% of the college faculty did not teach in the College full-time, resulting in shortened and irregular class hours, subject overloading, and in general, poor quality teaching.The, school disputed these findings as biased and discriminatory. At its request, the Board of Medical Education, in May, 1987, sent another team of doctors3for a re-evaluation of the College. After inspection, the team confirmed the previous findings and recommended the phase-out of the school.4The, first two reports were verified on June 23, 1987 by a third team of inspectors.5A year thereafter, the College failed another test what was in effect the fourth evaluation of its fitness to continue as a medical school conducted on March 4 and 5, 1988 by a team from the Board of Medical Education determining the eligibility of medical schools for government recognition. The, College was adjudged "inadequate" in all aspects of the survey, to wit, college, curriculum, facilities, teaching hospital, and studentry.6The, inspectors, Doctors Nilo Rosas, Macario Tan and Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, accordingly recommended denial of government; recognition.Accordingly, the Board of Medical Education recommended to the DECS the closure of the College, effective the end of the school year 1988-1989. The, College however succeeded in having the Board form yet another team to review the previous findings. Doctors Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Alberto Romualdez, Artemio Ordinaria Joven Cuanang and Nilo L. Rosas conducted their inspection on June 18, 1988. Their findings: although there had been a "major effort to improve the physical plant for classroom instructions and the library, serious deficiencies remain(ed) in the areas of clinical facilities and library operations;" "faculty continue(d) to be quite inadequate with no prospects for satisfactory growth and development;" "student profile ... (was) below par from the point of view of credentials (NMAT and transfer records) as well as level knowledge and preparedness at various stages of medical education," and "the most serious deficiency ... (was) the almost total lack of serious development efforts in academic medicine i.e., seeming lack of philosophy of teaching, no serious effort to study curricula, almost non-existent innovative approaches." Again, the recommendation was to close the College with provisions for the dispersal of its students to other medical schools.7In her letter of June 23, 1988, Secretary Quisumbing informed the Chairman of the College's Board of Trustees, Mr. Victor Sumulong, of the decision of the Board of Medical Education to close the College. Mr. Sumulong instead proposed a gradual phase-out starting the school year 1989-1990 in order not to dislocate the students and staff and to minimize financial loss.8The, Board subsequently allowed the College to continue its operations but only until May, 1989, after which it was to be closed, this decision being "final and unappealable." The, College was, however, assured of assistance in the relocation of its students and in its rehabilitation as an institution for health-related and paramedical courses.9The, College appealed the decision to the Office of the President, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the Secretary.10On February 16, 1989, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., finding "no reason to disturb" the contested decision, affirmed it.11On March 2, 1989, the College went to court. It filed Civil Case No. 1385 in the court of respondent Judge Daniel P. Alfonso against Secretary Quisumbing in her capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, questioning the decision as illegal, oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain its implementation.The, writ issued as prayed for by order of the respondent Judge dated May 10, 1989.12His Honor ruled that the inspection of June 18, 1988 was the principal basis of the closure order, and on such basis sustained the claim of the College that the inspection was done in an "arbitrary and haphazard manner" by a team of inspectors who had already prejudged the school. Judge Alfonso held that there was no evidence supporting the findings in the report of June 18, 1988, and declared that his philosophy ocular inspection of the College disclosed that the deficiencies mentioned in the report were non-existent, and that on the contrary, the laboratory and library areas were "big enough," and in the operations of the proposed base hospital were going on smoothly at the time of the ocular inspection."The, school thereupon promptly advertised in major newspaper dailies for enrollees in all levels of the medical college and in its pre-board review classes.13Hence the present petition, assailing the order of injunction dated May 10, 1989 as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, and praying for a restraining order against its enforcement as well as for the dismissal of the action instituted in the courta quo. The, Court on June 1, 1989 ordered the respondent College to desist from advertising and admitting students, and the respondent judge to refrain from enforcing his injunction order.The, College in its Comment would justify its entitlement to the questioned injunction on the ground that the closure order against which it was directed was issued without factual basis and in violation of the right of the College to due process of law, and that it violates MECS Order No. 5 (Series of 1986) to the effect that the penalty of closure cannot be imposed earlier than three (3) years from the last evaluation, which in this instance was made, on June 18, 1988.Resort to the Courts to obtain a reversal of the determination by the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports that the College is unfit to continue its operations is in this case clearly unavailing. There is, to begin with, no law authorizing an appeal from decisions or orders of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports to this Court or any other Court. It is not the function of this Court or any other Court to review the decisions and orders of the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an educational institution meets the norms and standards required for permission to operate and to continue operating as such. On this question, no Court has the power or prerogative to substitute its opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is obviously not expected that any Court would have the competence to do so.The, only authority reposed in the Courts in the matter is the determination of whether or not the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports has acted within the scope of powers granted him by law and the Constitution. As long as it appears that he has done so, any decision rendered by him should not and will not be subject to review and reversal by any court.Of course, if it should be made, to appear to the Court that those powers were in a case exercised so whimsically, capriciously, oppressively, despotically or arbitrarily as to call for peremptory correction or stated otherwise, that the Secretary had acted with grave abuse of discretion, or had unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, or excluded another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled it becomes the Court's duty to rectify such action through the extraordinary remedies ofcertiorari, prohibition, ormandamus, whichever may properly apply. Yet even in these extreme instances, where a Court finds that there has been abuse of powers by the Secretary and consequently nullifies and/or forbids such an abuse of power, or compliance whatever is needful to keep its exercise within bounds, the Court, absent any compelling reason to do otherwise, should still leave to the Secretary the ultimate determination of the issue of the satisfy action or fulfillment by an educational institution of the standards set down for its legitimate operation, as to which it should not ordinarily substitute its over judgment for that of said office.In any case, the recorded facts quite clearly fail to support the College's claim of grave abuse of discretion containing the order of closure, and on the contrary convincingly show the challenged decision to be correct. From 1985, no less than five (5) surveys were conducted of respondent institution to determine its compliance with the minimum standards established for a medical college. The, first survey, that undertaken by the Commission on Medical Education, disclosed such various and significant deficiencies in the school as to constrain the inspectors to recommend its closure. Four (4) other surveys were thereafter made by as many different committees or teams, at the school's instance or otherwise, all of which basically confirmed the results of that first survey. Moreover, the findings of all five (5) surveys were affirmed by the Office of the President. Indeed, the petitioner, through the Chairman of its Board of Trustees, to all intents and purposes accepted the validity of the findings of those five (5) survey groups when it proposed, in 1988, a gradual phase-out of the school starting in 1989. The, respondent College knew that the recommendation for its closure was made, as early as 1986, that recommendation was reiterated and reaffirmed four (4) times thereafter until it was finally approved and acted upon by the Secretary, whose action was confirmed by the Office of the President. Said respondent was given notice in June 1988, that in consequence of all these, the time for its definite closure had been unalterably set at May, 1989, a notice which was accompanied by assurances of assistance in the relocation of its students before June, 1989 and in its rehabilitation as a school for other courses. After having resorted to the whole range of administrative remedies available to it, without success, it sought to obtain from the respondent Court the relief it could not obtain from those sources, and what can only be described as a deliberate attempt to frustrate and obstruct implementation of the decision for its closure as of June, 1989 openly solicited, by newspaper advertisements or otherwise, enrollment of new and old students.Given these facts, and it being a matter of law that the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports exercises the power to enjoin compliance with the requirements laid down for medical schools and to mete out sanctions where he finds that violations thereof have been committed, it was a grave abuse of discretion for the respondent judge to issue the questioned injunction and thereby thwart official action, in the premises correctly taken, allowing the College to operate without the requisite government permit. A single ocular inspection, done after the College had been pre-warned thereof, did not, in the circumstances, warrant only the findings of more qualified inspectors about the true state of the College, its faculty, facilities, operations, etc. The, members of the evaluating team came from the different sectors in the fields of education and medicine,14and their judgment in this particular area is certainly better than that of the respondent Judge whose sole and only visit to the school could hardly have given him much more to go on than a brief look at the physical plant and facilities and into the conduct of the classes and other school activities. Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in substituting his judgment for theirs. It is well-settled doctrine that courts of justice should not generally interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions; that courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government; involving the exercise of judgment and findings of facts, because by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction, the latter are in a better position to pass judgment on such matters andn their findings of facts in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts.15There are, to be sure, exceptions to this general rule but none of them obtains in this case.The, claim of denial of due process likewise holds no water, as the record clearly shows that the College was given every opportunity to so improve itself as to come up to requirements, but remained sadly sub-standard after the inspections conducted by the evaluating teams. It had, in fact, admitted its failure to have up to the desired standards when it proposed its gradual phase-out in its letter dated June 27, 1988 to Secretary Quisumbing. It was also precisely because of its complaints of bias and prejudice that the Board of Medical Education dispatched new teams to survey and re-evaluate its performance. It had even gone all the way up to the Office of the President to seek a reversal of the order of closure. There is thus no reason for it to complain of a lack of opportunity to be heard and to explain its side as well as to seek reconsideration of the ruling complained of.There is also no merit in respondent College's argument that the closure violated NMCS ORDER No. 5, Series of 1986, because it was sought to be effected before the lapse of the three-year period therein snowed, which in this case is sought to be counted from June 18, 1988, or the date of the last evaluation. The, provision referred to reads:The following sanction shall be applied against any medical school, for failure to comply with the specific requirements of the essentials, viz.:x x xc. Withdrawal or cancellation of the school's government; authority to operate, for failure to fully comply with the prescribed requirementsafter three (3) years from the last evaluation conducted on the school.It must at once be obvious from a reading of the provision, paragraph c, that the situation therein contemplated where a school is found to have failed to "fully comply with the prescribed requirements," i.e., has not complied with some requirements and has failed to do so within three (3) years from the last evaluation is quite distinct from that obtaining in the case at bar where respondent school was found to have deficiencies so serious as to warrant its immediate closure. Said paragraph c should not be construed to prohibit absolutely the withdrawal or cancellation of government; authority to operate until after three (3) years from the last evaluation conducted on the school; or, stated otherwise, it does not unexceptionally prescribe a three-year waiting period before authority to operate may be withdrawn. Rather, it should be read as giving the Secretary of Education the discretion, depending on the seriousness of the discovered deficiencies, to afford an educational institution which has failed to comply with some requirement or other, time not exceeding three (3) years to correct the deficiencies before applying the sanction of withdrawal or cancellation of the government; authority to operate. The, circumstances in the case at bar are far from nominal and, to repeat, are different from those obviously envisioned by the paragraph in question. There had never been a recommendation that the College be granted an opportunity to comply with certain requirements. From the outset, the proposal had been that it be forthwith closed, its discovered deficiencies as a medical college being of so serious a character as to be irremediable. The, other four (4) surveys were conducted, not to determine if in the course of time the petitioner school had already fully complied with all the prescribed requisites, but rather, whether or not the original recommendation for its closure was correct and should be sustained. And, as already mentioned, the subsequent surveys, over a period of more than three (3) years, served but to confirm the validity of that initial proposal for its closure. Under these circumstances, therefore, even if it be assumed that the provision, paragraph c, applied to petitioner school, it must be held that there has been substantial compliance therewith.Having thus disposed of the issues raised by the facts of the case, the Court sees no useful purpose to be served by remanding the case to the Trial Court for further proceedings. The, only acceptable reason for such a remand would be so that the Trial Court may determine whether or not the petitioners' first have acted within the scope of their powers or grossly abused them, a matter that this Court has already passed upon here. Such a remand cannot be justified on the theory that the Trial Court will make its philosophy independent determination of whether or not respondent medical institution has complied with the minimum standards laid down for its continued operation, since, as here ruled, it has not that power.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court is made, permanent. The, questioned writ of preliminary injunction dated May 10, 1989 is set aside and respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 1385.SO ORDERED.Fernan, (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Gri;o-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.Melencio-Herrera, and Sarmiento JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT,petitioners,vs.ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172,respondents.Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.CRUZ,J.:The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.But first the facts.The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times.1When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition.2In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.3We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.In Tablarin v. Gutierrez,4this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully a