week 9 2006 levitsky mainwaring organized labor in la

Organized Labor and Democracy in Latin AmericaAuthor(s): Steven Levitsky and Scott MainwaringSource: Comparative Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Oct., 2006), pp. 21-42Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New YorkStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20434019Accessed: 24/03/2010 15:32

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Organized Labor and Democracy in Latin America

Steven Levitsky and Scott Mainwaring

Although the relationship between organized labor and democracy in Latin America has long been considered to be important, it remains the subject of substantial dis

pute. Several influential scholars, most notably Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, have argued that organized labor is a consistent champion of democracy

and that, consequently, strong labor movements make democratic outcomes more

likely.1 However, evidence from Latin America calls this argument into question. Although Latin American labor movements have often played a leading role in strug

gles against dictatorships, their record with respect to democracy has been mixed. In

several countries, including Argentina, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru, labor move

ments actively backed nondemocratic regimes during the latter half of the twentieth

century. In other cases, unions either supported coups against elected governments (Argentina, Bolivia) or engaged in maximalist strategies that put democratic regimes

at risk (Chile, Bolivia, Peru).

This article seeks to explain variation in labor support for democracy in Latin America since 1945. Based on a comparative analysis of the seven most populous

countries in Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, Peru, Venezuela,

and Chile), as well as two smaller countries in which labor movements have had a

major impact on regimes (Bolivia and Nicaragua), it argues that labor movements'

regime orientation hinged on two factors: the nature of their partisan alliances and

the perceived regime alternatives. Although a few Latin American labor movements

aligned themselves with solidly democratic parties after 1945, most were aligned

with Marxist or populist parties that held instrumental views toward democracy.

These labor movements fought for democracy when no better alternative existed or

when their leaders believed that democracy would further their material and organi

zational interests. However, where inclusionary nondemocratic regime alternatives

existed or were perceived to be viable alternatives, they often failed to fight for

democracy and sometimes fought against it. In other words, Latin American labor

movements were contingent democrats.2 These findings not only challenge arguments that organized labor is a consistent

champion of democracy, but they also call into question the essentialist assumption

underlying those claims: that labor's political behavior can be reduced to the defense

21

Comparative Politics October 2006

of the material interests of the working classes. This analysis thus lends support to

approaches that treat labor movements as organizations and define labor's interests

more broadly to include the political, organizational, and career goals of union lead

ers. The issue of organized labor's orientation toward democracy is important. During

much of the twentieth century, labor movements were powerful actors in many Latin

American countries, and their political alliances had a substantial impact on regime

outcomes.3 Where labor is strong, its behavior can be critical to the survival of

democratic regimes. Yet the question of why and when labor movements push for,

oppose, or remain indifferent to democracy has received little attention.4

Under a stringent procedural definition of democracy, a regime is democratic if

four conditions are met. There must be free and fair competitive elections for the

legislature and, in presidential systems, the executive. Virtually the entire adult popu lation must have the right to vote. There must be broad protection of civil and politi

cal liberties, including the rights of free speech, press, and association. And elected

officials must have the power to govern; if the military exercises veto power, the

regime is not a full democracy.

Organized Labor, Working Class Interests, and Democracy

A prominent line of work in political science and sociology views labor movements

as consistent champions of democracy. Goran Therborn, for example, argued that in

Europe "the labor movements sought almost everywhere not only for higher wages

and better working conditions, but also for political democracy."5 Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens' relative class power model of democratization hinges on the

claim that, of the major social classes, the working class is "the most consistently

pro-democratic force."6 Carles Boix's recent work on democracy and redistribution similarly treats the working class as a uniformly prodemocratic actor.7

These arguments rest on three key assumptions: that working classes can be treat

ed as politically homogeneous actors; that labor movements' regime preferences are

driven exclusively by the material concerns of the working classes; and that democ

racy is almost always in the material interest of the working class, because its more

inclusionary nature affords greater possibilities of redistribution than other regime types. Thus, according to Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, because the work ing class consistently gains from democracy, and because "those who have only to

gain from democracy will be its most reliable promoters and defenders," the working

class will be consistently prodemocratic.8 This article breaks with these essentialist assumptions. Organized labor's interests

can not be reduced to the material well-being of workers. Although the initial raison

d'tre of labor organizations is to protect and advance the material interests of work

22


ers, the reasons for their support for political parties and regimes are rarely limited

to this realm. For example, union members may respond to social and cultural

appeals that are only loosely or temporarily tied to material payoffs. Political move

ments such as Argentine Peronism that challenged traditional class hierarchies in the social and cultural realms and incorporated working classes into politics created union loyalties that can not be explained by material exchange alone. In some cases,

leaders' political style, especially their symbolic identification with the poor, was as important as their economic program in winning and retaining working class sup port. Although these symbolic and sociocultural appeals were frequently combined with material appeals, they often helped cement allegiances that endured long after parties or governments had abandoned prolabor policies.9

The disjuncture between workers' material interests and labor's political orienta tions is widened further by union leadership autonomy. As a long tradition of schol arship dating back to Michels has shown, most labor leaders enjoy considerable

autonomy from rank-and-file demands.10 Although the degree of union democracy varies across cases, many labor organizations exhibit low levels of internal competi

tion and rank-and-file participation. They are particularly low where state-labor rela

tions have historically been structured along corporatist lines, as in much of Latin

America. In many Latin American countries institutional arrangements that protect ed union leaderships from competitive challenges, heightened their dependence on state resources, and created mechanisms of state intervention into union affairs pro

duced union leaderships that were more responsive to state leaders than to rank-and

file workers." Although union leaders in corporatist systems can not afford to neglect rank-and-file demands entirely, they generally enjoy substantial discretion in terms of which demands they take up and how quickly and strenuously they push

those demands. Autonomy from the rank and file allows union leaders to pursue a diversity of

goals, some of which are individual rather than collective, and many of which extend

well beyond the material welfare of workers. Frequently, these goals are organiza

tional. Labor organizations benefit from government policies that facilitate union ization, extend or protect monopolies over worker representation, or provide unions

with new sources of revenue. Although these organizational resources may benefit

workers in the long run by strengthening unions, their pursuit is rarely driven by

rank-and-file demands. In some cases, unions have pursued or defended them at the

expense of those demands.12

Union leaderships also pursue political goals-such as placing their members or

partisan allies in public office-that are only loosely related to workers' material

demands. Access to public office and other positions of power may benefit orga

nized labor collectively by allowing unions to influence and even implement public policy. However, it may also serve as a selective incentive for individual union lead

ers seeking to advance their careers in ways that have little to do with rank-and-file

23


interests.13 In addition, labor leaders may pursue ideological commitments that are not necessarily or fully shared by rank-and-file workers. For example, Marxist union leaders have at times supported political forces that, for a variety reasons (including deference to strategies dictated by the Soviet Union), treated workers' material

demands as secondary, at best.

In short, whereas Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens and others assume that labor movements focus almost exclusively on maximizing workers' material gains, labor interests can be defined more broadly to include organizational, political, ideo logical, and career benefits. Two implications follow from this discussion. First, ide ological commitments and political, organizational, and sociocultural payoffs may

induce labor movements to support parties or governments that do not deliver sub stantial material benefits to the working class. Notable examples include labor

movements' support for the Mexican PRI after 1982 and the Sandinista government

during the latter half of the 1980s. Second, labor movements may pursue their inter

ests successfully within various political regimes. Although democracies are the only political regimes that guarantee voting rights and civil liberties for workers, they are

not the only ones under which oligarchic power may be weakened, union organiza

tions strengthened, union leaders given positions of political power, and wages and

other worker benefits increased. Historically, a variety of inclusionary authoritarian regimes have offered union leaders avenues for achieving their collective and indi vidual goals. In twentieth century Latin America, for example, revolutionary and

populist governments offered unprecedented material, organizational, and symbolic benefits to workers and unions. Many of these governments strengthened labor

movements, expanded worker rights and benefits, created new channels of union

access to the state, and placed union leaders in important positions of power. Some

of the region's most important labor movements-including those in Argentina,

Bolivia, Brazil, and Mexico were incorporated politically and granted legal status by nondemocratic governments. There is no reason to treat labor support for such

regimes as exceptional. Where inclusionary authoritarian regimes do a better job of

satisfying union leaders' material, organizational, political, ideological, or career

interests, labor's indifference (and even opposition) to democracy may be entirely rational.

Explaining Labor's Orientation toward Democracy: Partisan Alliances and

Regime Alternatives

If labor movements pursue a variety of material, political, organizational, and ideo

logical goals, and if many of those goals may be met under both democratic and

nondemocratic regimes, then organized labor's support for democracy is likely to

24


vary according to the historical and political context. In other words, labor, like other organized interests, is a contingent democratic actor. Under what conditions will labor movements support or oppose democracy? Two factors are of critical impor tance: labor's dominant partisan linkage and available regime alternatives.

Partisan Linkages In part, labor orientations toward democracy hinge on their partisan alliances. Most peak-level labor leaders in Latin America have historically aligned themselves with one political party or another.14 For unions, the party-union "exchange" often brought new channels of access to the state, key organizational

resources, and a variety of prolabor socioeconomic policies. For parties, they brought critical electoral and mobilizational support.15 Many party-labor alliances became institutionalized over time. Political careers, overlapping leaderships, and deeply rooted political identities created vested interests in maintaining the alliance, such that many union leaders came to value the party for its own sake.16 Thus, insti

tutionalized alliances became "sticky," in that unions remained committed to it despite important changes in the party's program or strategy.17

Labor's political alliances vary considerably. Unions have historically supported governments, parties, and candidates whose programs included higher wages, the extension of worker benefits, and other policies aimed at income or wealth redistrib ution. Yet such policies have come in a variety of ideological packages, including

social democracy, Marxism in its many variants, and distinct forms of populism.

These political projects differ considerably in their orientation toward democracy. Some labor-based political movements, such as the British Labour Party and postwar

European social democracy, are fully committed to liberal democracy. They are the

only ones that unequivocally match Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens' analysis

of the impact of organized labor on democracy.

Other party-labor alliances maintain an instrumental orientation toward democra

cy. They support democratic regimes to the extent that such regimes are seen as the

best means of advancing their material, organizational, and political interests. Two

types of instrumentalist party-labor alliance were common in Latin America after

1945: Marxist and populist parties. Marxist parties were committed to the long-term overthrow of capitalism. Although they frequently fought for democracy when exclusionary authoritarian regimes were in power, and although they often worked

within democratic regimes for decades (for example, in mid-century Chile), Marxist parties nevertheless viewed democracy as a means of achieving broader socioeco

nomic or ideological goals. When democratic institutions were perceived to be an obstacle to those goals, Marxist parties often proved indifferent and even hostile to

democracy. Populist parties mobilized labor from above, often from positions in the state.

Although they generally espoused prolabor policies and often sought to open up

25


exclusionary political regimes, many populist parties in Latin America have histori

cally displayed a weak commitment to liberal democracy. Populist movements tend ed to be weakly institutionalized, personalistic, and highly majoritarian, often to the point of disregarding the rights of political minorities and other institutional features of liberal democracy. Populist governments in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and other

countries demonstrated little tolerance for opposition parties or respect for basic civil liberties, and the populist American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) in Peru routinely engaged in violence against elected governments.

Available Regime Alternatives Labor strategies with respect to democracy also hinge on the regime context. The type of regime, its stability, and the perceived via

bility of alternative regime types play crucial roles in shaping the strategies of instru

mentalist labor movements. In consolidated democracies, in which nondemocratic alternatives are off the table, even instrumentalist labor movements can be expected

to support democracy. Likewise, under exclusionary authoritarian regimes, such as the right-wing bureaucratic authoritarian regimes of the 1960s and 1970s, unions are

likely to support even conservative transitions to democracy. In other regime contexts, however, labor movements with dominant linkages to

Marxist and populist parties may be indifferent to democracy and/or support nonde

mocratic alternatives. They may do so in a context of unstable or highly polarized

democracies in which revolutionary outcomes are perceived as possible. In such a

context, Marxist labor movements may pursue maximalist strategies that put democ

ratic regimes at risk. Labor may also be indifferent to (and even oppose) democracy

when inclusionary authoritarian regimes are in power. In Latin America in the twen

tieth century, a variety of nondemocratic revolutionary and populist governments

offered labor movements substantial material, organizational, and symbolic benefits.

Labor movements were particularly likely to support such governments in countries with no history of labor-friendly democratic alternatives (such as postrevolutionary

Bolivia, Mexico, and Nicaragua). This discussion highlights the need to distinguish between opposition to authori

tarianism and support for democracy. Labor movements may play a central role in

opposing authoritarian regimes (and even pushing forward democratization process

es) without being democratic actors. In Argentina (1945-55) and Nicaragua

(1979-90), for example, labor movements helped to bring down authoritarian

regimes but then supported their semiauthoritarian successors. In Bolivia and Peru

labor helped to undermine authoritarian regimes in the late 1970s but then continued

to mobilize in ways that weakened the fragile democracies that replaced them.

Table 1 brings the two variables together to produce four possible outcomes with

respect to labor's orientation toward democracy. Democratic party-labor alliances

can be expected to support democracy in all regime contexts. In the case of instru

26


Table 1 Determinants of Labor Movement Orientations toward Democracy in Latin

America

Perceived Viability of Pro-Labor __ondemocratic Alternative

Regime Orlentation of High Low Partisan Allyv

Liberal Democratic Labor Supports Democracy Lsbor Supports Democracy

Instrumental Labor Works Against Labor Supports Democracy Democracy

~~~~~~~~~~~~~........................ ....... ....... ,..... .................... .

mentalist (Marxist or populist) party-labor alliances, labor support for democracy

depends on the regime context. To the extent that inclusionary nondemocratic alter

natives are perceived to be feasible (for example, when such regimes were in power

or revolutionary alternatives are taken seriously), instrumentalist party-labor

alliances may be expected to be indifferent, ambivalent, or even opposed to democ

racy. If the party-labor alliance is democratic or if there is no viable inclusionary

authoritarian alternative, labor will be prodemocratic. If the party-labor alliance is

instrumentalist and attractive nondemocratic alternatives are perceived to exist, then

labor may well work against democracy. Whereas Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and

Stephens treat cases in the lower left box as exceptional, in this framework they are

just as theoretically plausible as any other outcome. In fact, cases that fell in the

lower left box were widespread in Latin America between 1945 and 1989.

Latin American Party-Labor Linkages after 1945

Why did some Latin American labor movements consistently favor democracy, while

others did not? Four major patterns of party-labor linkage existed in Latin America

27


after 1945: democratic, Marxist, populist, and no dominant linkage. Most Latin American labor movements contain competing ideologies and orientations toward democracy.18 The focus in classifying cases here is on the dominant political force

within labor movements. In a few cases, particularly Brazil and Peru, majority con

trol of labor movements shifted over time from one party to another. In most cases,

however, the dominant partisan linkages remained stable.

Dominant Linkage to Populist Parties In Argentina, Mexico, and Peru, labor move

ments aligned themselves with populist parties. In Argentina the General Workers Confederation (CGT) was overwhelmingly Peronist from 1945 to 2000. Union support for populist leader Juan Peron was rooted in a vast array of material, organizational, and

symbolic benefits that he provided first as labor secretary (1943-45) and later as presi

dent (1946-55).19 The alliance survived Peron's conservative turn in the early 1950s, his

overthrow in 1955, and his death in 1974, as well as the market-oriented turn of Peronist

President Carlos Menem during the 1990s. Peronism was a near-prototypical populist movement. For most of its history, Peron and his top supporters demonstrated an

ambiguous and highly instrumental attitude toward democracy.20 In Mexico the bulk of the labor movement aligned itself with the Institutional

Revolutionary Party (PRI) and its precursor from 1945 to 2000.21 Although Mexican

labor was always fragmented into competing confederations, the Mexican Workers Confederation (CTM) was usually predominant. The state-labor alliance was consoli

dated during the presidency of Lazaro Catrdenas (1934-40). C'ardenas mobilized the

labor movement from above, offering it unprecedented material, political, and organiza tional benefits.22 In 1938 this corporatist alliance was formalized through the creation

of the Party of the Mexican Revolution (later renamed the PRI), in which labor was

incorporated as an organized "sector." Given its central role in Mexico's hegemonic

party authoritarian regime, the PRI's weak commitment to democracy is clear.

In Peru organized labor was initially mobilized by APRA, a populist party created by

Rauil Haya de la Torre. The Peruvian Labor Congress (CTP), which was created by

APRA in 1944, was Peru's largest labor confederation until the late 1960s, when

APRA's shift to the right eroded the CTP's position within the labor movement. APRA

demonstrated an ambiguous commitment to democracy. Although it never installed an

authoritarian regime, in the 1930s and 1940s it employed violence and insurrectionary

tactics in pursuit of power.

Dominant Linkage to Marxist Parties In Bolivia, Chile, Nicaragua, and post-1968

Peru, the dominant wing of labor movements aligned itself with Marxist parties. The

Bolivian labor movement, which was among the most militant in Latin America, was

led by Marxists for most of the post-1945 period.23 Although the Bolivian Workers'

Central (COB) was initially forged out of an alliance with the populist Nationalist

28


Revolutionary Movement (MNR) in the aftermath of the 1952 revolution, these ties eroded over the course of the 1950s. In 1963 the COB broke with the MNR govern

ment. After the 1964 coup Marxists gained the dominant position in the labor move

ment, including the powerful miners' confederation.24 They retained this position until the late 1980s, when the weakened fragmented labor movement ceased to have any

dominant party linkage. The Chilean labor movement, which was organized into the Unified Workers

Confederation (CUT) beginning in 1953, was pluralist, in that it contained competing Socialist, Communist, Christian Democratic, and Radical groups. However, the confed eration was usually dominated by the Socialist (PSCh) and Communist (PCCh) parties. Although the Communists and Socialists worked within Chile's democratic institutions, they remained committed to the goal of socialist revolution, and much of the PSCh accepted the legitimacy of armed struggle.25

In Nicaragua the labor movement aligned itself with the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) from the late 1970s through 2000. Organized labor supported the FSLN in the insurrection against dictator Anastasio Somoza, and the dominant

postrevolutionary labor confederation, the Sandinista Workers' Central (CST), remained a faithful ally of the FSLN throughout its rule. The FSLN was a revolutionary leftist

party inspired by the Cuban revolution. Most Sandinista leaders were Marxist and

demonstrated a weak and instrumental commitment to liberal democracy. Finally, the bulk of the Peruvian labor movement aligned itself with Marxist parties

beginning in the early 1970s. APRA's shift to the right during the 1950s and 1960s led

many unions to abandon the CTP, and by the early 1970s the Peruvian General Labor

Confederation (CGTP) had become Peru's dominant labor confederation. The CGTP leadership was dominated by the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) and, to a lesser

extent, other Marxist parties. Few of these parties were committed to liberal

democracy.26

Dominant Linkage to Democratic Parties In Brazil, Venezuela, and post-1989

Chile, dominant labor organizations were affiliated with democratic parties. In Brazil

labor's partisan linkages have always been fragmented and have changed over time, but

they have generally been democratic. During Brazil's first period of democracy (1946-64), the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) and the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB)

competed for dominance within the labor movement. Although the PTB was divided between liberal democrats and instrumental populists, most party leaders were commit ted democrats. The PCB (which was banned in 1947 but functioned in a semiclandes

tine manner) was an instrumental Marxist party. In the context of a fragmented labor

movement, moderate PTB leaders held a dominant position through 1960. Between 1960 and 1964, and particularly after the formation of the General Workers Command

(CGT) in 1962, radical leftists from the PCB and PTB gained ascendance within the

labor movement.27 Labor's ideological orientation during this period was mixed. The

29


labor movement reorganized under military rule in the 1970s. It remained divided, but

the largest confederation to emerge during the 1980s was the United Workers' Central

(CUT), which was aligned with the leftist Workers' Party (PT). Although the PT's lead

ership was divided between Marxist instrumentalists and committed democrats, the lat ter generally held the upper hand.28

Venezuela is perhaps the clearest case of a stable democratic party-labor linkage.

From the time of its creation in 1947 until 1998 the Venezuelan Workers Confederation

(CTV) was the only major labor confederation in Venezuela. Various parties competed

for the CTV leadership during the postwar period, but the confederation was almost

always dominated by unionists with ties to Democratic Action (AD).29 AD played a

major role in establishing Venezuela's first democratic regime and was a consistently

democratic actor in the decades after 1948.30

Finally, the post-1989 Chilean labor movement was democratic. Although the labor

movement remained aligned with the Socialists and Communists after the 1973 coup,

the Socialists' regime orientation changed considerably during the subsequent period of authoritarian rule. During the 1980s the PSCh abandoned Marxism and fully embraced

liberal democracy.31

Colombia: A Case of No Dominant Party-Labor Linkage Colombia is the only

case of no dominant partisan affiliation among labor organizations. During the 1930s

and 1940s the dominant Confederation of Colombian Workers (CTC) maintained close ties to the Liberal Party.32 During the 1950s, however, the Union of Colombian Workers

(UTC), which declared itself apolitical, emerged as the country's largest labor confeder

ation. According to Urrutia, the UTC "did not commit itself to any political party," which made the "Colombian experience.. .radically different from that of other Latin

American nations."33 Beginning in the 1970s, the labor movement fragmented, as sever

al labor confederations competed alongside many unaffiliated unions. In this context,

existing partisan linkages eroded, and no new dominant party-labor alliance emerged.34

Table 2 summarizes the linkages between labor and parties that prevailed in these

nine cases between 1945 and 2000. In most cases dominant labor organizations were

affiliated to either Marxist (Bolivia, Nicaragua, pre-1973 Chile, post-1968 Peru) or pop

ulist (Argentina, Mexico, pre-1968 Peru) parties. Hence the vast majority of party-labor

alliances were characterized by instrumental attitudes toward democracy. Consistently

prodemocratic labor movements were the exception, not the rule.

Labor Support for Democratic and Nondemocratic Regimes

Labor support for democracy depended on both the dominant party-labor linkage and

on the regime context. This framework, can be used to examine organized labor's sup

port-or lack of support for democracy in these nine Latin American countries

30


Table 2 Dominant Linkages between Labor Movements and Political Parties in

Nine Latin American Countries

Country Years Dominant Partisan Linkage

Argentina 1945-2000 Populist (Peronism)

Bolivia 1946-52 Marxist

1952-63 Mixed MaistPopulist (MNR)

1963-1985 Marxist Brazil 1945-62 Deniocratic (PTB)

1962-64 Mixed MarxistDemocratic (PCB-PT3)

1979-2000 Democratic (PT) Chile 1945-73 Marxist (Socialist/Communist parties)

1.989-2000 Democratic (Socialist .Communist) Colombia 1947-2000 No dominant partisan linkages

Mexico 1945-2000 Onrginally Populist (PRI)

Nicaragua 1979-2000 Marxist (FSLN)

Peru 1945-68 Populist (APRA)

1968-92 Marxist (Comlmunist Party Venezuela 1945-98 Democratic (AD)

between 1945 and 2000. The case analysis suggests a clear relationship among partisan linkage, regime context, and labor practice. In cases of democratic partisan linkage,

labor movements did not support authoritarian regimes, back coups against elected gov

ernments, or engage in regime-threatening mobilization under democracy. In cases of

Marxist and populist partisan linkages, labor behavior hinged on the regime context.

Where democracy was the predominant regime or the only feasible alternative to right

wing dictatorship, Marxist and populist-led labor movements supported democracy. But

where inclusionary nondemocratic regimes were either in power or perceived to be viable alternatives, they routinely worked against democracy.

Organized labor may work against democracy in three ways. First, it may support

the extraconstitutional removal of an elected government. Second, it may actively

support a nondemocratic regime, which may entail opposing efforts to democratize

the regime. Third, politically polarizing union mobilization in pursuit of revolution

ary goals may-perhaps inadvertantly destabilize democratic regimes.

31


Two phenomena limited Marxist or populist labor movements' support for democra cy during the post-1945 period. The first was the political polarization created by the

Cuban Revolution. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Cuban Revolution increased both

the attractiveness and the perceived viability of socialist revolution. This development encouraged Marxist-led labor movements to pursue maximalist strategies that, though not directly antiregime, threatened economic and military elites and thereby increased the likelihood that those elites would support a military coup. The emergence of a revo

lutionary option put Marxist labor movements' commitment to "bourgeois" democracy to the test. A prioritization of revolutionary goals over democratic stability in such a

context indicates an instrumental orientation toward democracy.

Another phenomenon that induced instrumentalist labor movements to work against democracy was the spread of inclusionary authoritarian regimes that sought to mobilize

the support of organized labor, peasants, and other nonelite groups. Three types of

inclusionary authoritarian regimes existed in Latin America after 1945: revolutionary regimes such as those founded in Mexico after 1917 and Nicaragua after 1979; populist

military regimes such as those in Peru (1968-75) and Panama (1968-81); and populist

electoral authoritarian regimes such as the one created by Per6n in Argentina. Most of

these regimes offered labor movements substantial material, organizational, and sym bolic benefits, as well as unprecedented access to political power. Governments such as

those of Peron, the PRI, and the FSLN incorporated the working class into the political

system, created new channels of union access to the state, encouraged the spread of

unionization, provided unions with substantial organizational resources, and expanded

worker rights and benefits. These policies often won deep union loyalties. Hence it is

not surprising that labor movements supported them.

Argentina The Argentine labor movement's record with respect to support for democ

racy is mixed. Argentine unions backed Peronism throughout the 1945-2000 period, but

Peronism was not always democratic. Whereas labor mobilization on behalf of

Peronism had a democratizing impact in some instances, in other instances it did not.

Labor mobilization helped create the political opening that enabled Peron to win demo

cratic elections in 1946, but the resulting regime was inclusionary authoritarian, not

democratic.35 Peron's government delivered material benefits to labor, including mas

sive wage increases and an expansion of health and social security benefits. Union

membership nearly tripled during this period.36 However, civil liberties were routinely violated, and Peron's reelection in 1951 was marred by repression and fraud.

The overthrow of Peron in 1955 ushered in nearly three decades of unstable civilian

and military rule, during which labor's behavior remained ambiguously democratic. In

1964 and 1965 Peronist unions engaged in massive mobilizations that placed the elected

government of Arturo Illia at risk, and key labor leaders supported the coup that toppled

Illia in 1966.37 Labor protest played an important role in bringing down the post-1966

32


dictatorship, and the CGT strongly supported the elected Peronist government between 1973 and 1976. However, union mobilization and violence helped trigger the 1976 coup.38

Labor and Peronism were more solidly prodemocratic after 1976, in part because regime options narrowed. Peronist unions played a major role in mobilizing opposition to the 1976-83 bureaucratic authoritarian regime.39 After 1983, as democracy became consolidated and inclusionary nondemocratic alternatives lost viability, Peronist and labor leaders consistently defended democracy. For example, the CGT unambiguously opposed military uprisings in 1987 and 1990.

Bolivia The Bolivian labor movement maintained an instrumental attitude toward democracy from the 1940s through the mid 1980s. The COB initially supported the

inclusionary semiauthoritarian regime that emerged from the 1952 revolution.40 However, when the MNR government moderated over the course of the 1950s, the COB

moved into opposition. The radical wing of the labor movement celebrated when a mili

tary coup deposed elected president Victor Paz Estenssoro in 1964.41 The labor movement actively opposed most of the military dictatorships that gov

erned Bolivia between 1964 and 1982. However, union leaders maintained an instru

mental attitude toward democracy, as was seen in their support for the leftist military

government of General Juan Jose Torres (1970-71).42 This instrumental orientation per sisted after the 1982 transition to democracy. During the mid 1980s, the COB's "domi

nant view toward representative democracy was reductionist and instrumental," and

most COB leaders viewed democracy as an "instrument for establishing a dictatorship

of the proletariat."43 Unions mobilized against the democratic government of Hernan

Siles Suazo (1982-85) almost as vigorously as they had against earlier dictatorships.

Even as Bolivia's fledgling democracy crumbled in the face of hyperinflation, the COB

played a maximalist game. Devastated by the closing of the tin mines in 1985, labor has

been a much less powerful actor in the subsequent two decades.

Brazil Between 1946 and the early 1960s the Brazilian labor movement consistently

backed the democratic regime, notwithstanding the significant Communist influence in

its leadership. In part, it did so because there was no viable alternative to democracy

that offered labor better benefits and greater access to power. In the polarized context of

the early 1960s, however, the movement became radicalized. Although the CGT contin

ued to back Goulart's government from 1962 to 1964, its mobilization and maximalist

demands were factors in triggering the 1964 coup.4

The bulk of the Brazilian labor movement opposed the 1964-85 military regime,

and the "new unionism" that rose to the forefront of the movement in the late 1970s

played a leading role in pushing for a transition to democracy.45 Notwithstanding the

presence of instrumentalist Marxist tendencies, the CUT and its PT allies remained

solidly prodemocratic throughout the post-1985 democratic period.

33


Chile Although Chile's Marxist-dominated labor movement worked within the liberal democratic regime throughout the 1945-1973 period, it adopted an increasingly maxi malist position as Chilean politics polarized during the 1960s and 1970s. Despite their commitment to constitutional rule, the Marxist parties that controlled the CUT during this period sought a socialist transformation of society. The Socialist Party was divided over the "electoral game." The party's radical wing, which gained ascendance during the

1960s, disavowed the electoral road to socialism and openly espoused armed struggle. Socialist leaders declared that their participation in democratic institutions was "merely a prelude to an eventual institutional rupture."46 The left's revolutionary push accelerat

ed with the election of Socialist President Salvador Allende in 1970. Leftist and labor

mobilization under Allende, which included an unprecedented level of strikes and facto ry occupations, heightened the perceived threat to the economic and military elite,

which countermobilized with a brutal coup in 1973.47

Organized labor strongly opposed Pinochet's dictatorship from 1973 to 1989 and played a leading role in antiregime protests during the 1980s.48 Due in part to the

Socialist Party's transformation into a social democratic force, the CUT emerged as a

solidly prodemocratic actor after the 1989 democratic transition. Under Christian

Democratic and Socialist leadership through 1996 and Socialist and Communist leader

ship thereafter, the CUT maintained a moderate posture. It engaged in limited mobiliza

tion and generally cooperated with the center-left Democratic Concertation govern ments.49

Colombia The Colombian labor movement has been characterized by a weak pres ence in national politics, organizational fragmentation, and a lack of a dominant parti san orientation. Within this context, the bulk of the labor movement has backed democ

racy since 1945. Most labor leaders opposed the dictatorship of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla

(1953-57) and maintained a consistently prodemocratic orientation after the 1958 tran

sition. Although unions frequently opposed the Liberal and Conservative governments in power during the 1958-74 National Front, the dominant sectors within the labor

movement supported the existing democratic regime.50 They continued to do so during

the 1980s and 1990s, despite the growth of more radicalized left-wing unions and the

resurgence of leftist guerrilla movements.

Mexico From the 1920s until 2000 the bulk of the Mexican labor movement backed

the inclusionary authoritarian regime that emerged out of the 1910 revolution.51 The

postrevolutionary regime mobilized labor support and offered extensive material and

organizational benefits, particularly during the presidency of Cardenas (1934-40). At

no time, however, was it a democracy. The regime allowed regular elections, but the

electoral playing field was tremendously uneven, and the regime resorted to violence,

fraud, and vote buying where necessary. The CTM and other major labor confederations

were unwavering in their support for the PRI, even during the 1980s and 1990s, when

34


economic austerity brought a steep decline in workers' incomes. When the democracy movement took hold beginning in the late 1980s, the CTM became notoriously identi

fied as one of the pillars of the PRI's authoritarian, antireform wing.52 Mexico is thus

one of the few cases discussed here in which the dominant faction of the labor move

ment actively opposed a democratic transition.

Nicaragua As in Mexico, Nicaragua's dominant party-labor linkage was forged in the

context of a revolutionary hegemonic party regime. Organized labor participated active ly in the overthrow of dictator Anastasio Somoza, and the CST strongly supported the

Sandinista government that emerged in 1979. The postrevolutionary regime was inclu

sionary and prolabor. The Sandinistas strengthened the labor movement and provided it

with unprecedented access to the state.53 Yet the regime fell short of democracy.

Although elections were held in 1984, civil and political liberties were frequently violat ed. Strike activity was restricted; government opponents were subject to harassment and

arrest, and the leading opposition newspaper, La Prensa, was closed for substantial peri

ods of time.

The CST remained a pillar of the Sandinista regime throughout the 1979-90 peri

od, despite the steep decline in workers' living standards triggered by the post-1984

economic collapse. Between 1985 and 1990, real per capita income in Nicaragua fell

by 30 percent, and real wages fell by more than 75 percent.54 Nevertheless, CST

leaders remained solidly pro-Sandinista, and they staunchly opposed the democracy movement that emerged in the late 1980s. They did so because they enjoyed

unprecedented access to political and organizational resources and because the lead

ing opponents of the regime were not viewed as a labor-friendly alternative.

Peru Under its populist (1944-68) and Marxist (post-1968) leaderships, the Peruvian labor movement maintained an instrumental attitude toward democracy. In 1948 the CTP backed APRA as it engaged in conspiracies and violent mobilizations

against the elected government of Jose Luis Bustamente. Its actions ultimately

helped trigger a coup.55 During the 1970s the CGTP backed the populist military

regime led by General Juan Velasco (1968-75). Velasco's government undertook a

variety of prolabor reforms and actively supported non-Aprista labor organizations,

particularly the Communist-led CGTP. CGTP leaders "concluded that no viable

more-leftist alternative to the military government existed" and that their interests

were best served by cooperating with the government.56 Thus, after initially oppos

ing the 1968 coup, the CGTP embraced the military government beginning in 1969,

backing it even after Velasco's successor, General Francisco Morales Bermuidez, shifted to the right in 1975. Not until the massive wave of popular sector mobiliza

tion of 1977 did the CGTP join antigovernment protests.57

Although labor mobilization during 1977-78 played an important role in pushing

35


forward Peru's democratic transition, the CGTP retained an instrumental attitude toward the democratic regime that emerged after 1979.58 Many of the leftist parties

that constituted the CGTP-backed United Left rejected liberal democracy in favor of popular insurrection and revolutionary struggle.59 Polarization and guerrilla violence helped justify Alberto Fujimori's autogolpe in 1992.

Venezuela The CTV was a consistently democratic actor between 1948 and 1998.

After the 1948 coup the CTV played a central role in the struggle against the Perez

Jimenez dictatorship during the 1950s and strongly supported the 1958 democratic tran sition. During the first four decades of the new democratic regime, CTV leaders exer

cised a moderating role in politics and labor relations, pushing policies that protected the

democratic regime and their party over more aggressive efforts to secure benefits for

rank-and-file workers.60 They did so despite the emergence of a significant leftist guerril la movement in the radicalized political climate of the early 1960s. Indeed, the CTV's

cooperation with AD governments during the 1960s helped to avoid the regime-threaten

ing polarization that hit many other Latin American countries during this period.61

The CTV's relationship to democracy became more ambiguous after the election of former coup leader Hugo Chavez in 1998. Chavez's revolutionary rhetoric and autocrat

ic governing style-which included efforts to engineer a government-sponsored takeover of the CTV-convinced many Venezuelan elites that he sought to install an

authoritarian regime. In this context, the CTV actively mobilized in an effort to remove

Chavez by extraconstitutional means, and in April 2002 it supported a failed coup

against Chavez.

Table 3 provides a summary of the nine cases. As it shows, labor action against

democracy was widespread in the post-1945 period. In Mexico (1945-2000), Nicaragua

(1979-90), Peru (1968-75), and Argentina (1946-55) labor movements actively sup

ported nondemocratic regimes. In Chile during the early 1970s and in Bolivia and Peru

during the 1980s they pursued revolutionary goals in ways that undermined democratic

regimes. Nondemocratic behavior was particularly frequent during the 1960s and 1970s, when inclusionary authoritarian alternatives appeared most viable. Labor move

ments became more consistently prodemocratic during the 1980s and 1990s, but this

change was largely due to the disappearance of inclusionary alternatives.

Conclusion

Contrary to Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, labor is not a consistent champion

of democracy, at least not in Latin America after 1945. Rather, it is a contingent democ

ratic actor, and it is necessary to explore the conditions under which labor movements

do or do not support democratic regimes.

36


Table 3 Partisan Linkage, Regime Alternatives, and Labor Behavior, 1945-2000

Case Type of Perceived Viable Labor Behavior

Party-Labor Alternative to Linkag Democracy?

Argentina Populist 1945-1976: Yes 1946-55: Backed authoritaran regime 1955-76: Regime-threatening behavior

1976- No 1976- : Democratic Bolivia Marxist Yes Opposed dictatorship

1946-52 _ _

Bolivia Mixed Yes 1952-63: Supported revolutionary 1952-64 Marxis semi-democratic regime

-i - - - - - --------------1963-4: Backed 1964 coup

Bolivia Marxist Generally yes 1964-70, 1971-80: Anti-authoritarian 1964-85 1970-7 : Backed leftist military rule

__________ ___________1982-85: ReJime threatening behavior

Brazil Democratic No Democratic 1945-62 _

Brazil Mixed Ambipous Regiime threatening behavior 1962-64 . . . . ........... .. . . . ........................

Brazil Democratic No Democratic 1979-2000

Chile Marxist 1945-64: No 1945-69: Democratic 1945-85 1964-1973: Yes 1970-73: Regime-threatening behavior

1973-85: No 1973-85: Opposed dictatorship Ch}ile Democratic No Democratic 1986-2000 . ......... . . . . . _ _ .... ...................... _

Colombia No dominant Ambiguous in early Democratic affiliation 1960s

Mexico Populist Yes Backed authoritarian regime

Nicaragua Marxist 1979-90: Yes 1979-90: Backed revolutionary regime 1990-: Ambiguous 1990-20%: Regime-threatening

behavior ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~........................... ........,,,. .

Peru Populist Yes 1 947-48: Regime threatening violence 1945-68 1 1948-68: Generally pro-democratic Peru Marxist Yes 1969-77: Backed military regime 1968-92 _ 1980-92: Regime threatenng beavior

Venezuela Democratic Yes in 1945-48 and Democratic 1,945-1998 1962-65; none after

Organized labor's support for democracy hinged on two political factors: partisan

alliances and the regime context. Although a few Latin American labor movements

were affiliated with liberal democratic parties during the 1945-2000 period, most

aligned themselves with Marxist and populist parties with instrumental attitudes toward

democracy. These labor movements supported democracy when it was predominant

37


and/or when inclusionary authoritarian alternatives were deemed nonviable, but when inclusionary authoritarian regimes existed or were perceived as viable alternatives, they often worked against democracy.

This analysis calls into question an important element of Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens' theory about the relationship between capitalist development and democ racy. Their balance of class power argument rests on the assumption that labor move

ments' regime orientations hinge on the material interests of the working class. Such an

assumption ignores the relative autonomy of most labor leaders, the multiple and

diverse nature of those leaders' interests, and the fact that many of those interests may

be satisfied in ways that bring few material benefits for workers.

The fact that Latin American labor movements have not consistently championed

democracy also challenges Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens' argument that strong labor movements have historically played a critical role in achieving democra

tization.62 In Latin America the relationship between labor strength and democracy has generally been weak, and during some periods it may have been negative. In

much of the region labor movements peaked in terms of their size, mobilizational

capacity, and political influence in the 1960s and 1970s. During that period labor

mobilization did not often result in stable democracy but more frequently con

tributed to polarization and democratic breakdown. In the highly polarized context of the cold war, heightened working class mobilization and/or electoral victories by

labor-based parties were often perceived as a threat to the vital interests of economic and state elites, who in many cases led or supported military coups.63

Organized labor weakened throughout most of Latin America during the 1980s

and 1990s. Due to the economic crisis of the 1980s, the neoliberal economic reforms

that followed it (including, in some cases, the dismantling of corporatist labor laws), and the rapid growth of the urban informal sector, most Latin American labor move

ments were smaller and weaker in the 1990s than they had been in the 1970s.64 At

the same time, Latin America underwent an unprecedented wave of democratization.

Although labor movements played an important role in some of these transitions,

given labor's decline in most of the region, it is difficult to argue that labor strength

was an important cause of Latin America's democratic turn. If anything, democratic

stability during the 1980s and 1990s was facilitated by labor's weakness, for the

elimination of any serious working class "threat" almost certainly enhanced the

Right's commitment to democratic rules.65 As Kenneth Roberts argues, the surpris ing durability of contemporary Latin American democracies may, in part, be "an

artifact of the diminished capacity of popular sectors to challenge elite interests."66

Labor's weakness was not necessary for (or even a major cause of) the recent

wave of democratization in Latin America. Indeed, the weakening of labor move

ments may well have important negative implications for the quality of

democracy.67As numerous studies, particularly of western Europe, have shown, strong labor movements and labor-based parties have often played a central role in

38


creating more egalitarian societies and inclusionary polities.68 As Latin American labor movements weakened during the 1980s and 1990s, many of the region's democracies were characterized by increasing socioeconomic inequality. Nevertheless, the contrast between the 1960s and 1970s, when strong and often radi

calized labor movements were often met with right-wing coups, and the contempo rary period of unprecedented democratic stability amid growing labor weakness

makes it clear that there is little relationship between labor strength and regime out comes in Latin America.

At a broader theoretical level, organized labor's interests are not always best satis

fied under democratic regimes. This argument is consistent with theories of democ ratization that emphasize actors' contingent and interactive preferences.69 It chal lenges theories that see labor as immutably and consistently prodemocratic.

NOTES

We are grateful to Mauricio Archila, Claudia Baez Camargo, Frances Hagopian, Ren? Antonio Mayorga, James McGuire, Guillermo O'Donnell, and Ken Roberts for helpful comments. Alejandra Armesto,

Claudia Baez Camargo, and Annabella Espa?a provided research assistance.

1. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). For similar arguments, see Goran

Therborn, "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy," New Left Review, 103 (May-June 1977); Goran Therborn, "The Travail of Latin American Democracy," New Left Review, 113 (January-April

1979), 71-109; Glenn Adler and Eddie Webster, "Challenging Transition Theory: The Labor Movement,

Radical Reform, and Transition to Democracy in South Africa," Politics and Society, 23 (March 1995),

75-106; Gretchen Bauer, Labor and Democracy in Namibia (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1998); Ellen

Meiksins Wood, Democracy against Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 2. We borrow this phrase from Eva Bellin, "Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and

Democratization in Late Developing Countries," World Politics, 52 (January 2000), 175-205. Several

other analyses have cautioned against treating Latin American labor movements as uniformally prodemo cratic actors. On variation in labor movements' roles in democratic transitions, see Ruth Berins Collier,

Paths toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Labor Movements in Transitions

to Democracy: A Framework for Analysis," Comparative Politics, 21 (July 1989), 445-72. On labor sup

port for authoritarian regimes, see Bellin; Kevin J. Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the

State, and Authoritarianism in Mexico (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Claudia

Baez Camargo, "From Silent Acquiescence to Active Resistance: Labor Leaders' Responses to Market

Oriented Economic Reform in Mexico" (Ph.D. diss., University of Notre Dame, 2002). 3. Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1991). 4. One exception is Bellin, although her analysis is limited to labor movements under authoritarian

regimes. 5. Therborn, "The Rule of Capital and Rise of Democracy," p. 34.

6. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, p. 8, recognize that organized working classes may support nondemocratic regimes when they are "initially mobilized by a charismatic but authoritarian leader or a hege

monic party linked to the state apparatus." However, they explicitly treat such instances as exceptions.

39


7. Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.

13. For a similar assumption, see Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, "A Theory of Political

Transitions," American Economic Review, 91 (September 2001), 938-63. For a classic alternative view, see Seymour Martin Lipset's analysis of working class authoritarianism, Political Man: The Social Bases

of Politics (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1960), pp. 87-179.

8. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, p. 57.

9. This theme is developed by James P. Brennan, The Labor Wars in C?rdoba, 1955-1976: Ideology, Work and Labor Politics in an Argentina Industrial City (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,

1994); and Daniel James, Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Argentine Working Class,

1945-1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 14-40.

10. Roberto Michels, Political Parties (New York: The Free Press, 1962). 11. See Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, "Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating

Corporatism," American Political Science Review, 73 (December 1979), 967-86; Collier and Collier,

Shaping the Political Arena; Kenneth S. Mericle, "Corporatist Control of the Working Class:

Authoritarian Brazil since 1964," in James M. Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin

America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 303-38; Amaury de Souza, "The Nature

of Corporatist Representation: Leaders and Members of Organized Labor in Brazil" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell

University, 1978). 12. Maria Victoria Murillo, Partisan Coalitions and Labor Competition in Latin America: Trade

Unions and Market Reforms (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Katrina Burgess, Parties and

Unions in the New Global Economy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004). 13. BaezCamargo. 14. Robert J. Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin America (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp.

13-23; Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena.

15. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena; J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Labor Movements and

Political Systems: Some Variations," in Marino Regini, ed., The Future of Labor Movements (London:

Sage, 1992), pp. 53-101.

16. James W McGuire, Peronism without Per?n: Unions, Parties, and Democracy in Argentina

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). 17. Burgess; Steven Levitsky and Lucan A.Way, "Between a Shock and a Hard Place: The Dynamics

of Labor-Backed Adjustment in Argentina and Poland," Comparative Politics, 30 (January 1998), 171-92;

Valenzuela, "Labor Movements and Political Systems." 18. Valenzuela, "Labor Movements in Transitions to Democracy," p. 446.

19. Juan Carlos Torre, La Vieja Guardia Sindical y Per?n: Sobre los or?genes del peronismo (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1990).

20. McGuire.

21. Baez Camargo; Middlebrook, pp. 255-87.

22. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, pp. 232-50; Middlebrook.

23. Rene Antonio Mayorga, ?De la anomia pol?tica al orden Democr?tico? Democracia, estado y movimiento sindical en Bolivia (La Paz: Centro Boliviano de Estudios Multidisciplinarios, 1991); Steven

S. Volk, "Class, Union, Party: The Development of a Revolutionary Union Movement in Bolivia

(1905-1952)," Science and Society, 39 (1975), 26-43, 180-98.

24. See James Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh

Press, 1970). 25. Paul Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-52 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,

1978), pp. 309-10; Ignacio Walker, Socialismo y Democracia: Chile y Europa en Perspectiva Comparada

(Santiago, Chile: Cieplan-Hachette, 1990), pp. 136-71.

26. See Carmen Rosa Balbi, Identidad clasista en el sindicalismo: Su impacto en las f?bricas (Lima:

DESCO, 1989); Nigel Haworth, "Conflict or Incorporation: The Peruvian Working Class, 1968-79," in

40


David Booth and Bernardo Sorj, eds., Military Reformism and Social Classes: The Peruvian Experience, 1968-80 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 97; Kenneth M. Roberts, Deepening Democracy? The

Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). 27. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, pp. 549-55; Lucilia de Almeida Neves Delgado,

PTB: Do GetulismoAo Reformismo (1945-1964) (S?o Paulo: Editora Marco Zero, 1989), pp. 217-90.

28. See Margaret E. Keck, The Workers' Party and Democratization in Brazil (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1992); William R. Nylen, "The Making of a Loyal Opposition: The Workers' Party and

the Consolidation of Democracy in Brazil," in Peter R. Kingstone and Timothy J. Power, eds., Democratic

Brazil: Actors, Institutions and Processes (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), pp. 126-43;

David J. Samuels, "From Socialism to Social Democracy? The Evolution of the Worker's Party in Brazil,"

Comparative Political Studies, 37 (November 2004), 999-1024.

29. Steve Ellner, Organized Labor in Venezuela, 1958-1991: Behavior and Concerns in a Democratic

Setting (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1993). 30. Daniel H. Levine, Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1973); John D. Martz, Acci?n Democr?tica: Evolution of a Modern Political Party in Venezuela

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Jennifer McCoy, "Labor and the State in a Party-Mediated

Democracy: Institutional Change in Venezuela," Latin American Research Review, 24 (1989), 35-67.

31. Roberts, pp. 118-40.

32. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, pp. 299-308.

33. Miguel Urrutia, The Development of the Colombian Labor Movement (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1969), pp. 207, 213, 224. See also Jonathan Hartlyn, The Politics of Coalition Rule in

Colombia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 34. Roci? Londo?o Botero, "Problemas laborales y reestructuraci?n del sindicalismo," in Francisco

Leal Buitagro and and Le?n Zamosc, eds., Al filo del caos: Crisis pol?tica en la Colombia de los a?os 80

(Bogot?: Instituto de Estudios Pol?ticos y Relaciones Internacionales, Universidad Nacional de Colombia

and Tercer Mundo, 1991), pp. 275-305; Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, pp. 467-68,

673-81 ; Hartlyn, pp. 183-87.

35. Torre.

36. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, p. 341; McGuire, p. 53.

37. Brennan, p. 105; McGuire, pp. 114-20, 145-50.

38. William Smith, Authoritarianism and the Crisis of the Argentine Political Economy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 228-31.

39. Gerardo Munck, Authoritarianism and Democratization: Soldiers and Workers in Argentina, 1976-1983 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998). 40. Malloy, pp. 185-86, 223-35.

41. Alexander, p. 62; Guillermo Lora, A History of the Bolivian Labour Movement 1848-1971

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 301; John H. Magill, Labor Unions and Political

Socialization: A Case Study of Bolivian Workers (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 32.

42. Alexander, "The Labor Movement during and since the 1952 Revolution," pp. 65-67; Lora, pp. 361-66.

43. Mayorga, pp. 161, 181.

44. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, pp. 552-55; Delgado, pp. 260-89.

45. Margaret E. Keck, "The New Unionism in the Brazilian Transition," in Alfred Stepan, ed.,

Democratizing Brazil (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 252-96.

46. Roberts, p. 92. See also Walker, pp. 136-71.

47. Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1978), pp. 61-80; Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, pp. 560-65.

48. Jaime Ruiz Tagle, "Trade Unionism and the State under the Chilean Military Regime," in Edward

C. Epstein, ed., Labor Autonomy and the State in Latin America (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

41


49. Roberts, pp. 149-53.

50. Urrutia.

51. Middlebrook; Baez Camargo. 52. Ruth Berins Collier, "The Transformation of Labor-Based One-Partyism at the End of the

Twentieth Century: The Case of Mexico," in Herman Giliomee and Charles Simkins, eds., The Awkward

Embrace: One-Party Domination and Democracy in Industrializing Countries (Amsterdam: Harwood

Academic Publishers, 1999). 53. Richard Stahler-Sholk, "Stabilization, Destabilization, and the Popular Classes in Nicaragua,

1979-1988," Latin American Research Review, 26 (1990), 55-88; Richard Stahler-Sholk, "The Dog That

Didn't Bark: Labor Autonomy and Economic Adjustment in Nicaragua under the Sandinista and UNO

Governments," Comparative Politics, 28 (1995), 77-102.

54. Stahler-Sholk, "Stabilization, Destabilization, and the Popular Classes in Nicaragua," p. 83.

55. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, pp. 328-30.

56. Evelyne Huber Stephens, p. 70. See also Balbi, pp. 59-67; Haworth, pp. 106-13; Cynthia

Sanborn, "The Democratic Left and the Persistence of Populism in Peru: 1975-1990" (Ph.D. diss.,

Harvard University, 1991), pp. 105-10.

57. Sanborn, pp. 104-28.

58. Roberts, pp. 213-14.

59. Ibid., pp. 250-53.

60. McCoy, pp. 39-40.

61. Ellner; Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena.

62. According to Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, p. 46: "It is the growth of a counter-hegemo

ny of subordinate classes and especially the working class... that is critical for the promotion of democra

cy." 63. Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South

American Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1973); Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reflections

on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," Latin American Research Review, 12

(Winter 1978), 3-38; David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

64. Labor movements in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico,

Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela lost between 25 and 70 percent of their memberships between 1985 and

1995. See International Labor Organization, ILO World Labor Report: Industrial Relations, Democracy and Stability (Geneva: ILO, 1998); John Weeks, "Economic Integration in Latin America: Impact on

Labor" (Geneva: International Labor Office Employment and Training Paper No. 18, 1998). Brazil was an

exception to this trend.

65. Exceptions include Bolivia and Peru in the early and mid 1980s.

66. Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, "The Paradoxes of Contemporary

Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions," Comparative Politics, 29 (April 1997), 332;

and Marcus Kurtz, Free Market Democracy and the Chilean and Mexican Countryside (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2004), make similar arguments. 67. Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens; Roberts; Kurtz.

68. Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens; Walter Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle (London:

Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983); John D. Stephens, The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism

(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979). 69. Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Re-Equilibration

(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986)

42

week 9 2006 levitsky mainwaring organized labor in la

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