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Welcome to the NAYGN Professional Development

Workshop 2013

May 12-14, 2013

Grand Hyatt Washington

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Welcome & Opening Remarks

Kristin Zaitz President NAYGN

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Happy Mother’s Day

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2013 Conference Theme: Securing the Future of Nuclear: Safety, Technology, and Leadership

NAYGN Vision: Developing Leaders to Energize the Future of Nuclear

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#5 - Diversity

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#4 - Energy

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#3 - Opportunities

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#2 - Relationships

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#1 – Relax!

Thank You

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Nuclear Safety and Security: How We Got Here, What We’re Doing and Where We’re Going

Brent Tolan

PD Committee Manager NAYGN

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Securing Nuclear

Michael Weber Deputy Executive Director for Operations

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Overview – Securing Nuclear

• NRC Mission

• Early Days

• Current Framework

• Securing Nuclear

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Early Days – Ending World War II

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Atoms for Peace - 1953

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International Atomic Energy Agency - 1957

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Early Safeguards

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NUMEC – 1965

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Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty – 1968

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U.S. Voluntary Offer – 1977

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Current Framework

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Securing Nuclear

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9/11 Physical Security

9/13 Cyber Warfare

Herb Richardson

Vice President, Security and Loss Prevention

AREVA North America

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Physical Security Protection (Why We Do It – to protect our people and our infrastructure)

• Evaluate and improve upon facility

access protocols that may impact safety and protection of personnel and make recommendations for improvement

• Evaluate building and site security and recommend possible improvements

• Evaluate and improve structural integrity of Nuclear Facilities

• Harden security protocols

Office of Security and Loss Prevention-

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Protecting Facilities Here and Abroad

• Security for U. S. Enriched Uranium Plants and India Solar

and possible Nuclear projects, by developing security site-plans access controls, and protection protocols against electronic intrusion, physical intrusion, kidnappings and terrorism.

Office of Security and Loss Prevention

View of the completed facility in 2017

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Facility and Access Security Controls

• Establish and implement a uniform color coded

structured badge access policy, and throughout North America:

– Employee access

– Escorted visitor access

– Unescorted visitor access

– Foreign national access

– Facilities management access (i.e. contractors and maintenance)

• Administer oversight procedures for Access Control and Fit for Duty requirements

Office of Security and Loss Prevention-

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Crisis Management

• Evaluate site evacuation plans and all emergency

protocols identifying and implementing best practices

• Identify and/or establish Continuity of Operation Plans

• Establish emergency response protocol

– Coordinate with AREVA Communications re: Emergency Communications Protocol

– Coordinate with appropriate emergency operations centers, first responders and appropriate federal and state agencies

– Coordinate with Crisis Management and Emergency response center in France

Office of Security and Loss Prevention-

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Investigate and Protect Against Loss of Property and

Information • Continue to review and enhance inventory controls in

place to prevent property loss

• Continue to review security protocols in place designed to protect proprietary information and intellectual property

Office of Security and Loss Prevention

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300,000 stolen documents from Boeing in 2008 resulting in 2 Billion in lost revenue

A DIGITAL WAR

• Cyber warfare is the new terrorism.

-FBI Director Robert S. Mueller

• The United States is at risk of a cyber Pearl Harbor.

-Former Secretary of Defense

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• There is no such thing as perfect security

• Companies who have made responsible and sustainable investments continue to be compromised

The Facts

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• Different Threat Actors Have Different Motivations... And Tactics

• To combat advanced attackers you need to know what they are looking for and how they operate.

Threats and Motivations

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Top 3 Threats for 2013

• Phishing

• Mobile Malware

• Malicious Code

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Cyber Attacks are On the Rise

• Malicious attacks by cyber criminals increased by 81% in 2011

• The average number of successful attacks per week continues to increase year after year

– 2010 to 2011: +44%

– 2011 to 2012: +42%

• Organizations reported an average loss of $8.9%

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• A surprise attack on energy infrastructure could cause widespread blackouts, cripple power plants, knock out the transmission grid

• Malicious software infecting the computers of electric utilities could cause turbines at power plants to spin out of control, potentially destroying them

Corporate Attacks Hint of a Potential ‘Cyber Pearl Harbor’

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Cyber Security

• Support the effort to prevent cyber security breaches and make recommendations for improvement

• Coordinate federal and state sponsored initiatives that may impact or support improved cyber protection

• Liaison with FBI, DHS, NSA and DOD on Intel related state sponsored attacks

• Establish and maintain international working relationships

Office of Security and Loss Prevention- March 2012

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Prevention is Our Responsibility

• Educate

– Stay current of potential malware, spam, and phishing schemes

• Protect

– Home and Office

• Identify

– Potential problems and bad players

• Report

– Any areas or reason for concern

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Impact of Fukushima on Improving Safety Margins

Joseph Pollock Vice President

Nuclear Energy Institute

© 2007 Dominion

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Introduction / Overview

• U.S. Nuclear Industry Response

• NRC - Regulator Actions

• U.S. Industry Major Accomplishments

• Major Work in Progress / Challenges

• FLEX Initiative

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U.S. Nuclear Industry Response

• Confirm safety of U.S. reactors

– Verify operability and usability of portable mitigation equipment (B.5.b) already on site

• Establish communication focal point

– NEI, INPO, EPRI, U.S. nuclear utilities

• Establish factual basis for action based on understanding of the events in Japan

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U.S. Nuclear Industry Response (cont’d)

• INPO Initiatives

– Performed in-depth examination of accident mitigation with no AC power

– Calculated time to used fuel pool boiling

– Implemented stronger fuel pool equipment protections

– Performing Review Visits initially now performing assist visits

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NRC – Regulator Actions

• NRC actions are broken into 3 tiers

– Tier 1: without unnecessary delay

• Completed by 2016

– Tier 2: require critical skill sets or further technical assessment

• To be evaluated

– Tier 3: require further long-term study/ scoping

• To be evaluated

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U.S. Industry’s Major Accomplishments

B.5.b equipment readiness affirmed by inspection and test

Initial inspections completed for flooding and seismic vulnerabilities

Station blackout procedures and equipment readiness validated

Periodic maintenance and drills verified to exist or established for B.5.b equipment

NRC endorsed the FLEX strategy

Spent fuel pool monitoring enhanced

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U.S. Industry’s Major Accomplishments

FLEX equipment specified, purchased, arriving at sites

RRC (regional response centers) approved

RRC Equipment being ordered

Event investigation with TEPCO completed

Flooding guidance established, walk-downs completed

Seismic guidance established, walk-downs completed

Flooding hazards—scope and methodology approved first set of 22 plants performed

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Major Work in Progress

• Seismic hazards—alternate methodologies in approval process with NRC

• Developing site-specific FLEX strategies

• Developing integration of EOPs, SAMGs, EDMGs and FLEX

• Reliable spent fuel pool wide-range level instrumentation in design

• Land contamination / containment pressure

• Regional Response Center / Industry Infrastructure

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Flex Strategy

• Origins from B.5.b

• Provides a Means to Respond to Extreme Events Known and Unknown

• Sites Have Already Improved Safety Margins as a Result

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Flex Strategy

• Provides Diverse and Flexible Means to Protect Fuel

– Provide Cooling for the Core

– Protect the Containment

– Provide Water Makeup to the Spent Fuel Pool

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Three Phase Approach

• Initial Coping Relying on Installed Equipment

• Transition from Installed to Onsite FLEX Equipment

• Obtain Additional Capabilities and Redundancy from Offsite

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Flex Onsite Equipment Staging

• N+1 Provides Redundant Equipment

• Diverse Storage Locations

• Reasonable Protection of Equipment

• Deployment of Equipment

• Common Electrical and Mechanical Connections

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Diverse Options

• Provide Emergency Response Organization a multitude of Options

• Allows deployment of additional mitigation capabilities in a swift and efficient manner

• Provides Preplan responses for a wide range of Beyond Design Basis Events

• Symptom base procedures allows training to be used in any event.

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Flex Redundancy

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Consideration of Potential Failure Modes

of Baseline FLEX Strategies

Functional

Failure Mode

Failure Cause Leading

to Core Damage

Relevant Contingency

Provisions of NEI 12-06 Early Reactor Core Cooling

Fails

RCIC/AFW fails to start Procedural direction to locally

initiate RCIC/AFW

RCIC/AFW fails to operate until

portable FLEX equipment can be

deployed

Procedures for manual operation

of RCIC/AFW

Procedural direction to align

portable pump, even if transition

is not yet planned

DC control power lost Procedural direction to manually

initiate RCIC/AFW

RCIC/AFW water source

unavailable

Robust source of water initially

required

Essentially indefinite supply of

water

Instrumentation inadequate Plant-specific reference source

required to identify all available

sources for required parameters,

including self-powered instrument

readings (w/o DC power)

LOCA occurs Margin provided in BWR

RPV/RCS makeup capabilities

Margin in PWR SG makeup rates

to support cooldown

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Consideration of Potential External Hazard Impairments to FLEX

Hazard

Hazard-induced

Impairment

Relevant Contingency

Provisions of NEI 12-06 Seismic

(applicable to all plants)

Seismic damage to electrical equipment,

e.g., DC control power

Procedural direction to manually initiate

RCIC/AFW

Plant-specific reference source required

to identify all available sources for

required parameters, including self-

powered instrument readings (w/o DC

power)

Seismic damage to portable on-site

FLEX equipment

Structure provides reasonable protection

or storage outside

Portable equipment secured

Seismic interactions considered

Impairment to onsite transportation Transportation equipment reasonably

protected

Review transportation route for soil

liquefaction potential

Capability to open electric doors without

normal AC power

Seismic damage to plant structures At least one connection point and

associated deployment location requires

access to only robust structures

Seismic-induced internal flood Connection and access consider

potential for failure of non-qualified

water sources

Seismic-induced groundwater intrusion Water removal provision without AC

power

Seismic-induced loss of downstream

dam required for water supply

Strategies for providing water assuming

unqualified downstream dam fails

Impairment of delivery from regional

response center

Identify plant-specific strategies for

delivery accounting for potential seismic

damage to the surrounding

infrastructure

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Training

• On-site staff will be trained on the deploying and utilization of the equipment including timed drills

• Emergency Response Leadership including Senior Reactor Operators, Emergency Duty Directors and facilities leads will be trained on strategies and deployment

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Industry Coordination & Sharing

• Established RRC to provide additional equipment and resources from outside of the utility involved in the event

• Expanded current sharing practices between utilities to include emergency equipment

• Expand current parts database ( Rapid) to include emergency equipment

• INPO improved Emergency Response Center to coordinate industry response and support

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Offsite Support

• 2 Regional Response Centers

– Provide Additional Capability and Redundancy of Equipment and Supplies

– Ability to Mobilize and begin delivery of equipment

• 65 Commercial Nuclear Power Sites

– Complete list of Equipment Available at each Site

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Regional Response Center Locations

U.S. Industry Post-Fukushima Actions

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Plus Industry

Response Capability

and Filtering Strategy

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Break 10 to 10:30 a.m.

Constitution Ballroom