west africa observer - oecdwest africa remains one of the poorest and most vulnerable regions of the...
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West Africa
SWAC/OECD, No. 1, January - March 2009 > www.westafricaclub.org
Responding to the global •economic crisisA high cost of living despite •record agricultural productionInternational negotiations•Challenges for democracy•
Observer
The Sahel and West Africa Club
The OECD has considerably deepened its relationship with Africa. The
OECD’s policy dialogue is also developing at a regional level, in particular
through the work of the Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC) which plays
a bridging role as an interface between West African actors and OECD
member countries. Administratively attached to the OECD, the SWAC is
led by a Secretariat based in Paris, which is supported by a network of
partners and experts from West Africa and OECD countries.
Its specificity lies in its approach, which combines direct field-involvement
with analyses of West African realities. Together with regional institutions,
governments, business and civil society organisations, the SWAC
promotes the regional dimension of development, supports the formulation
and implementation of joint or intergovernmental policies and thereby
contributes to mobilising and strengthening West African capacities.
If you wish to contribute to SWAC activities, build on its expertise or implement new initiatives:
• Economicanalysis,prospectivethinking:[email protected] (Director)
• Regionalco-operation,localdevelopment:[email protected] (Deputy Director)
• Ruralenvironment,agriculture,foodsecurity:[email protected] (Head of Unit)
• Governance,peace,security:[email protected] (Head of Unit)
West Africa Observer - SWAC/OECD, No. 1, january – march 2009
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Summary
Responding to the global economic crisis
WILL THE CRISIS SPEED UP REGIONAL INTEGRATION? 6•
THE STOCK AND BANK MARKETS IN TROUBLED WATER 6•
REACTIVENESS AND DETERMINATION TO REDUCE GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION 7•
THE FEAR OF DOMESTIC DEBT WITHIN THE UEMOA ZONE 7 •
ARE LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS UNDER THREAT? 7•
CONCERNS REGARDING DIASPORA REMITTANCES 8•
MONETARY INTEGRATION TRUDGES ALONG, WHILE BANK INTEGRATION SPEEDS UP 8•
A high cost of living despite record agricultural production
RESPONSES TO SOARING FOOD PRICES 11•
International negotiations
MIGRATION: NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENTS 12 •
REGIONAL EPA: WILL THE JUNE 2009 TARGET BE MET? 14•
Challenges for democracy
THE RESURGENCE OF COUPS D’ÉTAT & RENEWAL OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 15•
FRAGILITY OF THE STATE & SPREAD OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 16 •
CRIMINAL INTRUSION OF TERRORISM AND THE DRUG TRADE 17 •
In brief
Contents
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West Africa Observer - SWAC/OECD, No 1, january – march 2009
While an increasing number of OECD countries are facing
demographic decline and an ageing population, West Africa’s
population is growing rapidly. From 315 million inhabitants in 2007, the
population should reach 480 million by 2030 and between 650 and 700
million by 2050. The population is mostly young, indeed very young (60%
are under 25 years of age) and will remain so until 2050. Certainly, the
growing number of young people could be a valuable resource but it will
also increase pressure on the environment and social services.
This demographic trend will have a structural impact on all sectors
including agriculture, education, labour, etc. This analysis of current
trends needs to be placed into perspective within this structural
context.
Despite decades of crises and conflict, much has changed. Democracy
has progressed more than regressed and decentralisation policies overall
underway. The urban network is increasingly dense; the informal economy
and the private sector have demonstrated a remarkable capacity to adapt.
Civil society organisations and the media have significantly developed
over the last years.
West Africa remains one of the poorest and most vulnerable regions of
the world. With the exception of Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire,
GhanaandNigeria,themajorityofWestAfricancountriesareclassified
as “Least Developed Countries” (LDC). Nigeria (over 50% of the region’s
GDPwithUSD228billionin2007)istheregion’seconomicleader.
>> learn more : http://www.oecd.org/swac
West Africa, a dynamic region
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SummaryIn the face of the global economic crisis, West Africa is reacting. The
three main central banks – the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Central
Bank of West African States (BCEAO) and the Central Bank of Central
African States (BCEAC) – are injecting cash, while most governments are
adopting measures to reduce State expenses. Clouds are massing on the
horizon of foreign trade, investments, domestic debt and remittances from
emigrants. With a view to overcoming these problems, some economists
are advocating an increase in public borrowing, but without falling into
the debt trap. Despite this gloomy context, regional banking integration
is moving ahead.
High food prices despite an excellent harvest are giving rise to fears for
the food security of the poorest people, while offering opportunities for
producers. The memory of the 2008 “hunger riots” is leading governments
to reduce pressure on purchasing power in the short term. At the same
time they continue to support programmes to increase production and
productivity. The balance between these two goals depends on regional
regulation of the market. Hence the importance of the common external
tariff (CET), the terms of which continue to impede negotiations of the
regional Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the European
Union and West Africa. The West African common market is the
cornerstone of the EPA, but cannot exist if the free movement of people
is not facilitated. While increasing numbers of bilateral agreements to
manage migration are being made between European and West African
countries, the impact of these bilateral agreements on intra-regional
mobility is not adequately addressed. ECOWAS is calling for regional
consistency in this matter.
Lastly, the political situation combines some encouraging signs (the
changeinleadershipinGhana,thelocalelectionsinSenegal)withvarious
challenges fordemocracy (thedoubleassassination inGuinea-Bissau,
Tuareg irredentism). Cross-pollination between terrorism and the traffic
in narcotics, arms and human beings is blurring the line between political
and criminal violence. In the face of a social demand exacerbated by the
crisis, new political figures are emerging, whether or not they are brought
to the fore by elections.
Normand Lauzon, SWAC Director
The West Africa Observer
This quarterly review analyses West African news on major
political, economic and social trends from a regional point
of view. It summarizes and puts into perspective important
events and developments. Topics are chosen according
to the concerns of those with whom the SWAC team works:
leaders of West African regional or government organisations,
development partners, NGOs and associations, local actors
and researchers, civil society, etc. The “In brief” section
examines other significant developments which have occurred
during these three months.
Our work draws on many existing information sources. We
believe: “The more information is available, the more it needs
to be synthesised”. The West Africa Observer is intended to
become a tool that provides easy and quick access to key
information on the region.
About the West Africa Observer
Your comments
This section belongs to you! We will publish selected
comments and suggestions in our next issue. We hope
that you will provide suggestions which will refine this concept
and help us prepare forthcoming issues.
Contact: >> [email protected]
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West AFrica is responding to the Crisis...
Facing-up to the global economic crisis
Africa had already entered the crisis in the first half of 2008 following
therise in foodandfuelprices.Giventhedownturn in theglobal
economy, the IMF estimates that the growth rate of sub-Saharan Africa
will be 3.25% in 2009, as against an estimate of 5.25% some months
earlier.
The contagion occurs through the reduction in capital flows and a
decrease in the prices of mineral raw materials (oil1, gas, metals) as well
as of certain food and plant products since the autumn of 2008, especially
coffee, cotton and timber. According to the World Bank, Nigeria will be
themostseverelyaffected,followedbyChad,Guinea-Bissau,Cameroon,
Côted’Ivoire,GhanaandGuinea.Thepresentsituationismorefavourable
to fuel importing countries, which suffered from high global prices and
the impact on inflation in 2007 and 2008.
After the structural adjustment policies focusing on the balancing of public
accounts, some economists are advocating a reasonable increase in
public borrowing in order to implement a countercyclical policy. “Public
demand must supplement private demand; African administrations and
public enterprises must thus be financed by two heterodox but classic
methods: putting the State into debt and providing it with money facilities.
Putting States into debt is again possible thanks to the spectacular debt
relief of the 2000s, which reduced African external debt to a quarter
ofGDP–a situationmuchbetter than that of all themajordeveloped
countries.”2
Will the crisis speed up regional integration? Recent interventionsby theBCEAOand theBCEACdemonstrate that
joint responses are possible. The meeting organised by the IMF in Dar-
es-Salaam in March placed regional integration on the list of priorities
for the continent, alongside agriculture and infrastructure: “Regional
integration can sharpen regional economic opportunities through trade
and movement of goods and people which could become a major
motor for African economic development in the future. This is especially
important as developed country markets are likely to remain relatively
closed for the foreseeable future. African states should look beyond
narrownational interestand theAfricanUnionandRegionalEconomic
Communities need to be strengthened.”3
1 Oil prices remain relatively high: at more than USD 50 a barrel, the current price of oil is higher than the historical average..2 “Lever les tabous”, advocating a plan for an African revival, by Lionel Zinsou, Chairman of the Advisory Council of CAP Afrique, http://www.capafrique.org3 Intervention by Mr. Trevor Manuel, South African Finance Minister.
The stock and bank markets in troubled water
In Nigeria, market capitalisation of the Nigeria Stock Exchange
(NSE) has fallen by 60% over the past 12 months, decreasing from
12 600 billion naira to 4 520 billion naira by the end of March 2009. In
January alone, investors lost about 2 800 billion naira – enough to force
the NSE’s managers to resign.
The global crisis comes at a very particular moment for Nigeria, whose
banks, now restructured and boosted by South African and Chinese
investors, are embarking on the conquest of new markets. It is hard to
get a clear picture of the situation. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)
ordered an audit at the beginning of April. The fall in the stock exchange
would appear to have caused a loss of 900 billion naira (USD 6 billion) for
the banks (although without threatening their liquidity ratio). According to
Mr. Lamido Sanusi, First Bank of Nigeria’s Chief Executive and Managing
Director, “The bulk of the problems that we are facing are self-inflicted.”
(Financial Times, 2 April 2009). If the banks are experiencing liquidity
problems, it is less because of “toxic assets” (which undoubtedly exist)
than because of the collapse of the stock exchange, the drop in oil prices
(with fewer cash deposits) and the weakening of the national currency
(withdrawal of investments in naira) as well as the repatriation of the
capital of European and American banks. In March, the CBN announced
the injection of about 955 billion naira to compensate for the reduction
in the banks’ liquidity. There are regular calls for the creation of a new
financial supervisory authority.
The Nigerian economy therefore has a shortfall of US dollars, reserves of
which were 47 billion in March 2009, as against 64 billion in August 2008.
The naira lost 28% of its value against the US dollar between November
2008 and March 2009. On 21 March, the CBN announced a set of
measures to reduce the gap between the official and parallel markets.
On the same day, the CBN proposed a reduction in interest rates, which
should not exceed 22%.
The Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) and the UEMOA Regional Stock
Exchange(BRVM,Abidjan)arealsoindecline.However,Ghanaandother
countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA)
are less connected to the international financial market.
6
The situation of the UEMOA banking system seems relatively
good, and the region possesses exchange reserves. According to
Mr. Hamza Ahmadou Cissé, Director of the UEMOA Commission
President’s Cabinet, “The Union has formidable foreign exchange
reserves. The cover rate of the monetary base was greater than 125%
at the end of October 2008. Similarly, the evolution of lending to the real
economy was relatively favourable despite crowding out which took
place in the second half of 2008 by public loans issued to deal with the
effects of the food and energy crisis. As of September 2008, banks have
been rather tepid regarding the issuing of long-term credit, but that is
related to the wariness of international bank branches located in the zone
fearing the effects of the crisis on the parent entity. Of course, we have
to worry about the recessionary effects of a slowdown of financial flows
from the international financial market as well as parent entities of some
banks draining bank liquidity in the zone. Such changes will compromise
production capacities in the medium-term through their impact on
investment.”1
1 Interview published in the SWAC Newsletter, March 2009 (Original version: French).
The fear of domestic debt within the UEMOA zone At the Ministerial meeting in Abidjan on 27 March, the UEMOA
Council noted that the situation of public finances is characterised by
accumulations of arrears in domestic payments, affecting the situation
of the banking system in some member States. The ministers asked
the BCEAO to carry out an assessment of the various States’ domestic
arrears. Although this situation cannot be linked to the onset of the global
crisis, the latter could hamper governments’ capacity to honour debts to
their suppliers. In January, the Department of Forecasting and Economic
Studies of the Senegalese Ministry of Economy and Finance commented,
“Business leaders are forecasting cash-flow problems caused by
difficulties in recovering debts, although they do place great hope on the
settling of domestic debt as announced by the authorities.”1
1 Monthly note on the economic situation, January 2009: http://www.dpee.sn
Reactivity and determination to reduce government consumption
The regional institutions of the CFA franc zone are reacting. The
BCEAO is setting up a supervisory unit to monitor the banking system
and is determined to maintain an optimal liquidity level. On the part of
the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), a
ministerial meeting took a series of steps at the beginning of March:
lowering of the key interest rate of the Bank of Central African States
(BEAC), tax relief for businesses in the timber sector, reduction in import
duties on industrial equipment for mining companies, a proposal to create
a fund within the Central African States Development Bank (CASDB) to
support sectors affected by the crisis, and mechanisms providing access
to credit for small and medium-scale enterprises and industries.
In addition, most of the governments are pursuing retrenchment
policies to reduce State spending. Faced with growing inflation (20.5%
inMarch, the highest in five years), a deficit of 14% inGDP, growing
debt, the Ghanaian cédi depreciated against the US dollar, the new
PresidentofGhana,JohnAtta-Mills,hasprunedthenumberofministries
(from 27 to 23) and is promoting a “modest State” in an effort to reverse
trends. On 10 March, the Nigerian President, Umaru Yar’Adua, signed
– “with reservations” – a 2009 budget with a major deficit and the
borrowing of USD 300 million to cover this deficit and ensure payment
of debt servicing. He also promulgated some restrictive measures: a
50% reduction in travel allowances for officials, suspension of foreign
training for civil servants, a freeze on purchases of new office sites and
vehicles and the creation of a presidential committee to monitor budget
implementation. Similar measures were announced by the Burkina Faso
Prime Minister Tertius Zongo (for example, improved management of the
State’s 23 000 vehicles).
Are long-term investments under threat?According to the most recent World Bank estimates, worldwide flows of
foreign direct investments (FDIs) decreased by more than 20% in 2008.
Contrary to this trend, FDI inflows into Africa increased and reached
more than USD 60 billion in 2008, which is due to the continuation of
many mining projects. There should be no question of shelving ongoing
projects, especially in Nigeria. Despite the economic downturn, oil prices
remain relatively high. The viability of off-shore projects, combined with
international companies’ need for access to oil, makes these companies
hesitate to withdraw, for fear of not being able to return later. In the mining
sector,theArevaGroupsignedanagreementinJanuary,allowingit to
exploit the uranium deposits at Imouraren in Niger, the largest deposits
in Africa and the second largest in the world. China Union, a Chinese
company, is about to sign a contract to exploit the Bong iron mines in
Liberia (up to USD 2.6 billion, the largest investment in Liberian history).
Arcelor Mittal’s iron exploitation project in eastern Senegal has been
deferred.
The interest of Arab capital (sovereign funds) in Africa had increased in
recent years. These investors, who have little interest in raw materials,
have made their presence felt in West Africa, with the building of
housing, dams, cement works and a tourist complex in Senegal. Dubai
Ports World is already managing the port of Dakar. The Zain (ex-Celtel)
telecommunications group is present in 16 African countries and has
been acquired by KSC of Kuwait. Sovereign funds now account for part
ofthecapitalofseveralbanksinNigeriaandGhana.Sincethestartofthe
crisis, these sovereign funds have been moving their investments to less
risky placements and/or their domestic markets. Sovereign funds from
Qatar,KuwaitandRussiathusintervenedtopropuptheirowncountries’
stock markets in October.
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West AFrica is responding to the Crisis...
Concerns regarding Diaspora remittances
According to recent World Bank forecasts, Diaspora remittances
to developing countries will decrease by between 5 and 8%
(USD 305 billion to USD 280–290 billion) between 2008 and 2009. Flows
to sub-Saharan Africa could also decrease by about 5% to USD 19 billion
in 2009.
Some observers are worried. According to Mr. Abdoulaye Diop,
Senegalese Minister of Economy and Finance, “The persistence of
the crisis will bring with it a loss of jobs in host countries. Already some
emigrants who were doing two jobs in order to send money home have
started to lose one of them. It is estimated that remittances from Senegalese
emigrants will fall by close to 10%.” The impact of the decrease in
remittances will be particularly significant for Senegal and Nigeria; Cape
Verde is even more vulnerable as remittances from its Diaspora account
foralmost10%ofGDP.TheimpactofthecrisisonDiasporaremittances
will be further examined at the International Conference on “Diaspora
for Development”, organised by the World Bank in Washington, DC on
13 and 14 July.
Riding high on petrol revenue and increased capital from China and
South Africa, these groups are now spearheading a strategy to conquer
the West African market.1 Even if the world crisis seems to have shaken
confidence momentarily and reduced the financial base of these groups,
Diamond Bank, one of the largest Nigerian banks and already present in
Benin, announced in the first weeks of 2009 the opening of branches in
Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and Togo. The cost of setting up Diamond
Bank Senegal in Dakar (opening at the end of March) is estimated at CFA
francs 25 billion. Another Nigerian group, United Bank for Africa (UBA),
already well established in Côte d’Ivoire, announced plans to expand its
presence in the UEMOA zone.
1 Following the example of Asia and the Middle East, the federal government’s Financial System Strategy 2020 aims to make Nigeria an “international financial centre” by conquering the West African and African markets.
Learn more
Revised Outlook for Remittance Flows 2009-2011: Migration and •Development Brief 9, World Bank, 23 March 2009
http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances
In December 2008, the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria,Mr. Chukwuma Soludo, stated, “The second common currency of
ECOWAS, the eco, could come into circulation by 1 December 2009.”
At the close of the first quarter of 2009, there was no concrete indication
that this ambition would be achieved. As a first step toward a common
currency for all ECOWAS countries, the West African Monetary Zone
(WAMZ)unitestheGambia,Ghana,Guinea,Liberia,NigeriaandSierra
Leone. Postponed year after year, this goal is still more theoretical than
practical. The impact of the crisis on national economies over forthcoming
years is likely to move the prospect still further into the future.
While the project of a common currency is at a standstill, the regional
banking scene seems to be in an accelerated process of integration,
partly as a result of the restructuring of the Nigerian banking system,
initiated by the federal government four years ago. The number of banks
has been reduced from 89 in 2004 to 24 today, resulting in the emergence
of powerful groups.
Monetary integration trudges along, while bank integration speeds up
8
West AFrica is responding to the Crisis...
Ecobank1 secured an increase of USD 1.5 billion in its capital through
an appeal to public savings launched simultaneously on the Abidjan
RegionalStockExchange, theGhanaStockExchangeand theNigeria
Stock Exchange. Lastly, the West African Development Bank (BOAD),
a joint institution to finance development in the UEMOA countries,
announced that it was doubling its activities and opening its capital to
new operators, particularly Nigerians.
1 Created with the support of ECOWAS, Ecobank was intended as a regional banking institution that would be an instrument for the promotion of regional economic integration. ECOBANK has branches in 25 African countries, including all ECOWAS member countries.
A high cost of living despite record agricultural production
West African banks are not the only ones seeking to exploit the potential
of the regional market. South African and particularly Moroccan groups
have joined in. In March, the Moroccan Attijariwafal Bank became the
leader of the Senegalese market when it purchased 79% of the capital
of the Banking Company of West Africa (CBAO). Acquisition projects are
also being negotiated in Niger and Mauritania.
This movement towards integration led by the private sector has the
advantage of creating financial channels and regional transaction
instruments, between Nigeria and Ghana on the one hand, and the
CFA franc zone on the other. It thus brings about increased exchanges
and will facilitate the development of region-wide enterprises.
The definitive assessment for the 2008/09 cereal harvest indicates a
regional production of 56 million tonnes, meaning an increase of 17%
over 2007/08 There have been substantial increases in rice production
(44% on average) in almost all the Sahelian countries. Favourable climatic
conditions, attractive prices and public policies promoting production
explain this remarkable performance.
However, the cost of basic commodities is still very high in almost all the
countries. The regional consultative meeting on the food and nutritional
situation in the Sahel and West Africa, held by the CILSS in Cotonou from
11 to 13 March 2009, noted that the prices of millet, sorghum and maize
had reached exceptionally high levels during the first quarter of 2009.
Increases of between 15% and 35% over the same period of the previous
year were seen in all markets. In January, the price of millet was 25%
higher in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) and 41% higher in Niamey (Niger).
In some cases, the 2005 records were broken (see graph).
It appears that the trauma of 2008 is leading some producers to keep a
large part of their production, while traders are buying in order to stockpile
grain, which will then be sold during lean months when prices will be
higher. Lastly, many countries have embarked on the task of replenishing
national stocks after the many calls on them in 2008. Moreover, some of
Nigeria’s states have been building up new stocks since 2008.
After falling during the last months of 2008, world cereal and oilcrop prices
started to rise again in January and February. Wheat and maize surpluses
countered this trend in March, while rice prices kept rising. This is partly
due to the fact that three major rice-producing countries (China, Thailand
and Vietnam) have maintained restrictions on rice exports. In January,
imported rice was selling at 50% to 60% more than a year previously in
Burkina Faso and Niger. This rise has continued, despite measures by
governments to support local agricultural production
The main issue in West African agriculture is demographic. In 1960, the region had 90 million inhabitants, 20% of whom were urban. Today, there are about 320 million and nearly half of them are urban dwellers. The age pyramid (65% under 25, compared with less than 30% in developed countries) increases the challenge. The volume of agricultural production is not an adequate indicator. The situation at the beginning of this year confirms the seriousness of the price-linked problem of access to food.
A high cost of living despite record agricultural production
9
These high prices at the beginning of the marketing period raise the
fear of much greater inflationary trends during the lean period, which
starts in June. The grain-livestock terms of trade could reach disastrous
levels for livestock breeders, especially those in the Sahelian zone and
north-eastern Nigeria. A food crisis comparable to that of 2005 could
then arise, affecting the same vulnerable groups: low-income urban
households and livestock breeders in the northern Sahel.
The decreasing global agricultural harvests forecast for 2009 could
aggravate the already tense situation on West African markets. In its
February 2009 report “Crop Prospects and Food Situation”, FAO states
that 2009 world cereal production will be less than in 2008, mainly due to
the reduction in major producer countries (Europe and the United States).
This reduction is a result of the higher cost of inputs and anticipated lower
prices. In Asia (especially China and India), half the areas dedicated
to maize are affected by drought (especially in northern China) and
inadequate rains (in India). The decrease in world cereal production
could aggravate existing tension in West African agricultural markets, in
particular by increasing the risk of stockpiling. Does Africa hold the future for rice farming?
“I am convinced that Africa holds the future for rice farming. Because this continent, unlike Asia, has
a great untapped potential, which is benchmarked by its large land distribution and its barely used water resources (Zambia, DRC, Sierra Leone, Mali, Senegal, etc.). In sub-Saharan Africa, there are 130 million hectares of lowlands including the 3.9 million only under cultivation. Meanwhile in Asia, the challenge is not about increasing rice areas but rather about maintaining them. The competitiveness of local rice production in sub-Saharan Africa is now a fact. This can be demonstrated by comparing yields achieved in Thailand and Vietnam with yields recorded in Senegal, Mali and Niger. Stereotypes regarding our cost and quality competitiveness are rather beside the point.
Africa needs to turn things around by overriding the emergency management logic to favour a genuine rationalization of its thought on the future and by taking concrete recovery steps. Viewed in this way, this crisis is rather an opportunity to think out of the box and act differently to feed ourselves on an indigenous and sustainable basis.”
Papa Abdoulaye Seck Director General, Africa Rice Center (WARDA)
Source : http://www.pambazuka.org/fr/category/comment/47625
Initiatives promoting food security and the regional market
The beginning of 2009 launched an intense process of
formulation of National Agricultural Investment Programmes
(NAIPs) and the RegionalInvestmentProgrammeforAgriculture
(PRIA).
As a major tool of the ECOWAS Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP)
and the NEPAD Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development
Programme(CAADP),PRIAiscomposedofsixfocusareas:
Improved water management1.
Sustainable development of farms 2.
Improved management of other shared resources 3.
Development of agricultural value chains & promotion 4.
of markets
Prevention and management of food crises and other 5.
natural calamities
Institutional capacity-building6.
Framework papers (for each member country and the region as
a whole) will be developed and made available by June, so that
discussions can be held with technical and financial partners in
November.
Guidelines on livestock development prospects and the
transformation of the livestock chain, adopted by ECOWAS
Ministers of Livestock, Trade and Security in February 2009, are
also an important component in the region’s campaign to ensure
food security.
A high cost of living despite record agricultural production
10
A high cost of living despite record agricultural production
Impact of bio-fuels
The volume of cereals used to produce bio-fuel is estimated at
104 million tonnes – 22% more than in 2007/08. However, this
growth is lower than previously forecast, because of the slowing down in
global economic activity. In 2009, 4.6% of world cereal production will be
devoted to bio-fuel.
West African governments are continuing their efforts to deal with
the rise in prices, either in the form of fiscal measures (suspension
of customs duties and value added tax) or in the form of targeted social
activities (subsidies for basic commodities). Apart from these short-
term responses, some countries have formulated medium-term plans to
boost production: subsidies and/or free distribution of agricultural inputs,
facilitated access to loans (preferential interest rates) and programmes to
increasericeproduction(forexample,theRiceInitiativeinCôted’Ivoire,
Ghana and Mali; and the Great Agricultural Offensive for Food and
Abundance[GOANA]inSenegal).
In case of a food crisis, countries are often tempted to keep provisions
within the country by closing borders and prohibiting exports. Cereal
stockpiling measures in countries aim above all to soothe the general
public. They have little impact on the veritable flows of goods and stress
the need for a regional approach to this problem.
The ECOWAS Commission is focusing efforts on its “RegionalOffensive
for Food Production and against Hunger”, adopted in June 2008 by
theConferenceofHeadsofStateandGovernment.Thisoffensive,which
also promotes co-ordination of national policies and regional initiatives,
set itself three objectives:
Rapidandsustainablegrowthinfoodproduction1.
Structuring of agro-food value chains and regulation of markets2.
Food and nutritional security for vulnerable groups 3.
Apart from implementation of the Regional Investment Programme for
Agriculture (PRIA > see box, page 10), the most important regional
initiative is undoubtedly the group purchasing project (especially for rice)
on the world market. A working group, comprising the ECOWAS Bank
for Investment and Development (EBID), Ecobank and the International
Trade Centre, is working on financing mechanisms and the setting up of
a joint platform for West African importers and Asian exporters.
Responses to soaring food prices
Although West Africa’s production may be insignificant at this time relative
to the world market and difficult to quantify, the region’s countries seem
determined to benefit from this new and promising market. In almost all
West African countries, large bio-fuel production schemes are being
negotiated with multinational companies.1
1 “Green fuels for development?”, SWAC Briefing Note No. 2, September 2008 http://www.oecd.org/swac/publications
Are there good strategies to make the prices of local or imported food products affordable while stimulating local production?
Last year’s “hunger riots” are still fresh in people’s minds and are
leading governments to carry out short-term actions to reduce
pressure on the purchasing power of the most vulnerable consumers, while
more long-term programmes aim at a steady growth in local production.
These two tactics may clash, not only because of the dilemma of “low
prices for consumers or high prices for producers”, but also because of
the volatility of prices. Very high prices one year, then very low the next
year, in the long term satisfy neither purchasers nor sellers, and neither
productive investment nor the social imperative. The issue is thus that of
“market regulation”. The 2005 food crisis confirmed that the problem is
regional in character.
Learn more
“Crop Prospects and Food Situation”, No. 1, February 2009, FAO •http://www.fao.org/spfs/spfs-home“A paradox: good harvest forecasts and exceptionally high •cereal prices in West Africa”, Food Security Information Note (FOSIN), Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA), February 2009 http://www.food-security.net Review “• Grain de sel”: “High prices: opportunities and challenges for African producers”: http://www.inter-reseaux.org
11
While Algeria, Libya and Morocco indicated their refusal to sign
readmission agreements in the framework of the partnership set
up with the EU1, new bilateral agreements between European and West
African countries were signed in the first quarter of 2009:
Burkina Faso – France• (January): agreement for the joint management
of migratory flows and support for development projects; Benin,
Cape Verde and Senegal have already signed similar agreements;
The Gambia – Spain • (March): collaboration in combating illegal
immigration (training of police and donation of surveillance
equipment such as patrol boats and surveillance equipment); at the
same time, the two countries signed an umbrella agreement on co-
operation, focusing mainly on educational projects;
Nigeria – Italy • (March): letter of agreement and launching of a two-
year pilot programme, with Interpol’s technical support, to combat
illegal immigration, human trafficking and transnational crime.
1 These agreements are intended to send clandestine immigrants arrested on European soil back to their country of origin or transit. They also state that rejected asylum seekers should not be sent back to the European country of entry, as is the case at present, but directly to their country of origin and transit.
Migration: new bilateral agreements
international Negotiations
Learn more
Migration Gateway on Euro-African Dialogue• http://dialogueuroafricainmd.net
International Migration Institute, Oxford University• http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk
Discussions between France and Mali were continued in January, but
have not yet been concluded. On this occasion, the former Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Mali, Mr. Thiébilé Dramé, pleaded for a common African
and West African policy.
It is true that the thickening of the web of bilateral agreements (see
graph) is in itself a call for greater co-ordination. The text on a common
approach on migration adopted by the ECOWAS Heads of State and
GovernmentinJanuary2008advocates“Making the bilateral agreements
linking the various ECOWAS member States and third party countries
consistent with the community texts and protocols of ECOWAS”, while
stressing that any restrictions on intra-regional mobility (which could
possibly result from the implementation of bilateral agreements) would be
harmful to West African regional construction.
The web of bilateral agreements related to readmission between EU member states and African countries
during the 1990s June 2008
The bigger the circle, the denser the Euro-African web of agreements related to readmission in which each country depicted is involved.
Source:Cassarino,J-P (2009), “TheCo-operationonReadmissionand
EnforcesReturnintheAfrican-EuropeanContext”,in“Regionalchallenges
of West African migration : African and European perspectives”,
West African Studies, SWAC/OECD (see page 13)
12
A common visa for the UEMOA zoneAt the UEMOA Heads of State Summit in March 2009, member countries adopted an additional Act to the UEMOA Treaty regarding the free
movement of nationals of third countries. This Act establishes a visa along the same lines as the Schengen visa. A draft proposal will be
submitted to the Council of Ministers in June 2009. The process will be implemented in two steps:
June 2009 - end 2010: mutual recognition of national visas;1.
Beginning 2011: one community visa.2.
ECOWAS member countries and non-UEMOA member countries are not concerned.
Their citizens will continue to travel within the UEMOA zone without a visa.
West African Studies
Regional Challenges of West African Migration African and European Perspectives
Drawing on contributions by African and European experts
on various aspects of West African migration, this publication
provides another perspective to current debates essentially focusing
on security issues. This rather non-institutional approach promotes a
constant dialogue based on analyses of the actual situation: the authors
encourage “win-win” mobility for all parties involved (Europe, North Africa
and West Africa), whether it be a host, transit or departure country.
>> http://www.oecd.org/swac/migration
West African Mobility and Migration Policies of OECD Countries
This publication contributes to the Euro-African dialogue initiated at
theRabatConference inJuly2006: it reviewsmigrationpolicies in
the main OECD countries receiving West African migrants and analyses
the recent discussions within Europe. This report also presents common
approaches undertaken in Europe, Africa and West Africa and aims to
shed light on decision makers’ strategic thinking. It provides the greater
public with an understanding of this recent dynamic.
>> http://www.oecd.org/swac/migration
13
The regional Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the
European Union and West Africa (ECOWAS plus Mauritania) is
depending on an accelerated regional integration process. Its signing
is officially scheduled for the end of June 2009, a date confirmed by the
UEMOAHeadsofStateandGovernmentattheirsummiton18March.The
results of technical negotiations held in Dakar in February 2009 highlight
that while the number of points of convergence is growing, substantive
disagreements remain. In particular, the Dakar meeting stressed that
“Every final offer must take into account the eventual achievement of the
ECOWAS common external tariff (CET)”. The CET as currently proposed
still elicits the strongest reservations on the part of the West African
agricultural world. At its February meeting in Ouagadougou, the Network
of Farmers’ and Agricultural Producers’ Organisations of West Africa
(ROPPA)againrejectedamaximumrateof35%(knownasthefifthtariff
band), stressing that “A rate of less than 50% would not allow the region
to reach the strategic development objectives”.
On 26 March, the European Parliament approved the interim EPAs
signedwithCôted’IvoireandGhana.Thesenationalinterimagreements
demonstrate the difficulty of negotiating regionally for countries lacking a
uniform status. The least developed countries (LDCs – all the countries
ofWestAfricaexceptCôted’Ivoire,Ghana,NigeriaandCapeVerde1)
already benefit from access to the European market with no customs
duties or quotas under the “Everything But Arms” (EBA) initiative. They
therefore feel much less pressure to negotiate an EPA than the non-LDCs,
the vital sectors of whose economies depend on exports to Europe.
1 Cape Verde was promoted to the status of non-LDC on 1 January 2008, but was granted a three-year extension, during which it will continue to benefit from the EBA regime. Cameroon (non-LDC), as a member of the CEMAC, is participating in the negotiations of a regional agreement between the EU and Central Africa.
international Negotiations
Learn more
European Centre for Development Policy Management • http://www.ecdpm.org
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development •http://ictsd.net/news/tniInformation-sharing Gateway on ACP-EU trade •
http://www.acp-eu-trade.org
Regional EPA: will the June 2009 target be met?
What mechanism(s) could the international community, especially the European Union, use to encourage West African countries to act in a more regional manner?
The creation of specific regional funds (i.e. distinct from the European
Development Fund) could be a solution. The idea is still at the
theoretical stage, but has been on the table since May 2008 (EU Council
of Ministers). It seems probable that a regional mechanism compensating
for the temporary disadvantages of integration could overcome the
hesitation of some West African countries. “For EU member States and
the European Commission, wouldn’t such a regional fund offer a real
opportunity to implement aid effectiveness principles and show their
commitment to support the Africa Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries
in the face of EPA adjustment costs?”1 The future will tell if the fear of a
new setback to the regional EPA in June 2009 will move the negotiations
forward.
1 Corinna Braun-Munzinger, “Regionally owned funds: a realistic way to improve Aid for Trade delivery in the ACP?”, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), March 2009.
14
Key events 22 March 2009, Senegal• : Victory of the opposition in local
elections in most of the large towns and cities.
1 and 2 March, Guinea-Bissau• : Double assassination of
PresidentNinoVieraandGeneralTagmeNaWaie.
1 March, Côte d'Ivoire• : France starts to reduce its “Licorne”
military force, which will be reduced from 1 500 to 900 soldiers
by July.
24 February, Nigeria• : The Nigerian justice system annuls the
election of the governor of Ondo State, a member of the party in
power. This was the 12th annulment (out of 35 states) of 2007
elections.
15 February, Chad• :TheEuropeanmilitaryforce(EUFOR),
which was deployed to counter repercussions of the Darfur
conflict, hands over to United Nations Peacekeeping forces.
23 January, Mauritania• :GeneralAbdelAzizannounces
presidential elections to be held on 6 June 2009.
4 January, Ghana• : Presidential election. John Atta-Mills is
officially declared President with 50.23% of the votes.
23 December 2008, Guinea• : Death of President Lansana Conté.
On 24 December, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara announces
thedissolvingofthegovernmentandinstitutionsoftheRepublic
as well as the suspension of the constitution.
24 November 2008, Guinea-Bissau• : Foiled coup d’état.
16 November 2008, Guinea-Bissau• : Legislative elections: the
PAIGCwins67oftheNationalAssembly’s100seats.
6 Augsut 2008, Mauritania• : President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallah
and Prime Minister Yahya Ould Ahmed Waghf are arrested.
A Council of State, led by the former commander of the
Presidentialguard,GeneralAbdelAziztakespower.
Challenges for Democracy
The resurgence of coups d’état
Since Independence, only Cape Verde and Senegal have never
been ruled by a military regime. Following the two coups that took
place in the second half of 2008 (Mauritania inAugust andGuinea in
December), there was then the double assassination of political leaders
at theGuinea-BissauSummit inMarch2009.While thecaseofGuinea
could have been anticipated, the situation in Mauritania was surprising
and somehow paradoxical, as the coup took place only a short while after
the return to democracy.
Is there a resurgence of coups d’état in spite of undeniable advances in democracy?
In some countries, the army is still a politically significant player and is to
varying degrees seen as such. Despite the existence of a democratic
constitutional framework based on the rule of law, power is still directly or
indirectly in the hands of the army, alongside a political class and possibly
other civil servants of the State apparatus (National Assembly, judiciary,
public administration).
In Guinea, the National Council for Democracy and Development, set up
by the army and headed by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, took power
on23December2008.Ratherpopularamongcivilsociety,hedesignated
himself to lead the political transition and promised to hold elections by
December 2009.
In Guinea-Bissau, despite the destabilising effects of the two assassinations
of theArmyChief-of-Staff (1March)and thePresidentof theRepublic
(2 March), the constitutional provisions held firm. The President of the
National Assembly is acting as temporary Head of State until elections.
So, despite the violence of these events, it was not in fact a coup d’état,
and the international community agreed with this view.
On the other hand, the overthrow of the Mauritanian civilian government
that had been formed as a result of elections has led the international
community to impose sanctions in order to encourage the new leaders to
speed up the return to constitutional rule.
The resurgence of coups (welcomed this time by a portion of the
populace) testifies to a malaise affecting democracy. The international
community’s firm stand in defending the rules of respect for democracy
must be accompanied by thinking on the significance and risks of the
current situation for stability, peace and development. Leaders of military
origin seem to be on the way to acquiring legitimacy by adopting the
stance of “drivers of change” in contexts glaringly marked by the need for
changes other than simply institutional ones.
15
Renewal of political leadership
The newly emerging political figures, elected civilians on the one
hand and military officers from a coup on the other, reflect well the
ambivalence of the region’s political situation.
In Mauritania, • democracy had been restored, but reforms and a
response to society’s demands had not been forthcoming. The new
strongman,GeneralAbdelAziz,setshisactionsandlegitimisation
in the context of a response to these expectations. He will be a
candidate in the forthcoming presidential elections in June 2009. The
satisfaction of demands and the support from some parliamentarians
and civil society build the base of this new figure brought in by the
army, which is still a major political force.
In Guinea, • the drive undertaken against the drug trade and the
audits carried out to recover misappropriated public funds have
earned Captain Camara, head of the junta, a major upsurge in
popularity and legitimacy, particularly among young people. Indeed,
on 14 March the latter held a gathering of 25 000 people in a stadium
in the capital offering him their support and encouraging him to
successfully implement the needed reforms.
In Senegal, • tensions between the presidency of the National
Assembly and the executive branch led the former Prime Minister
Macky Sall, to create a new party in December 2008, the Alliance
fortheRepublic(APR-Yakaar),sothathebecameanewopposition
leader. On 22 March, this united opposition gained control of many
municipalities, particularly in most of the large towns.
In Ghana,• after exemplary elections and a close count, Mr. John Atta-
Mills was officially declared President on 4 January. His opponent,
Mr. Nana Akufo-Addo, congratulated him that same day, promising
to play “a constructive role for the future of the nation”.
In Guinea-Bissau, • the clear parliamentary majority obtained by
theAfricanPartyfortheIndependenceofGuineaandCapeVerde
(PAIGC)intheDecember2008electionsconsolidatedtheposition
ofthenewPrimeMinister,CarlosGomesJúnior.
Fragility of the State
The case of Guinea-Bissau illustrates the paradoxical coexistence of
electoral regularity and transparency on the one hand, and instability
punctuated by upsurges of political violence on the other. All observers
were delighted with the running and outcome of November’s legislative
elections. The terrible blow of the double assassination represents a
major threat to this progress. Leaving aside the hypothesis of drug-trade
involvement in these events, there is the problem of the conflictual relations
between these key State leaders. “It is not possible to build a solid future
on the basis of vengeance and mutual reprisals,” stated President Pedro
Pires of Cape Verde in this connection.
Challenges for Democracy
The peaceful, lasting resolution of the Guinea-Bissau crisis is an
important objective for the country’s post-conflict stabilisation mobilising
ECOWAS, the African Union, the European Union, the Community of
Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) and the United Nations (the
UnitedNationsOfficeforWestAfrica[UNOWA]andtheUnitedNations
Peace-BuildingSupportOffice inGuinea-Bissau[UNOGBIS]),andalso
many actors in bilateral co-operation. Guinea-Bissau is now moving
towards new presidential elections scheduled for end June 2009. Under
the constitution, the presidency is assured in the interim period by Mr.
RaimundoPereira,PresidentoftheNationalAssemblyandamemberof
thePAIGC.Thepoliticalcompetitionanticipatedentailsrisksbyupsetting
the balance between the various forces. Exploitation of ethnicity runs the
risk of feeding certain political strategies and playing on the position of
the army, which is predominantly Balante. (The Balante are the largest
ethnic and linguistic group in the country, comprising 25% to 30% of
the population, according to various sources.) The democratic arrival
inpowerofthePartyforSocialRenewal(PRS–whichispredominantly
Balante) in 2002 with President Kumba Yalla acted as a catalyst for the
development of an ethno-political lever within the army.
The political influence of the army and its relations with the civil powers
are brought into play each time the leadership of the State is at stake. This
influence also springs from its role in the historical process of national
liberationandState-buildingaroundthePAIGC,whichwasformedasa
national liberation army.
ECOWAS and its various bodies (whose Committee of Chiefs of Defence
Staff met in Praia on 5 March) took on board the urgency of the need
tosupportGuinea-Bissau in reforming itssecuritysectorsoas tohelp
depoliticise its defence and security forces, and reduce armed violence
in the country.
Spread of political violence
InGuinea,thedeathofPresidentContéledtoanon-violentmilitarycoup
and a peaceful transition, while many forecast a chaotic post-Conté period
of succession struggles and political rivalries. However, if the region has
experienced a non-violent coup d’état, it is still suffering political violence
without coups d’état, in some cases combined with criminal activity.
In November 2008, following impeccable elections in Bissau, there were
two failed assassination attempts; President Nino Viera was the first target
andthenChief-of-StaffGeneralTagmeNaWaie.Bothwerethenkilledat
the beginning of March.
On 20 December, attacks by Tuareg rebels in northern Mali resulted in a
bloody death toll, straining both national and regional peace initiatives. On
17 February, despite the disarming of hundreds of rebel Tuareg rejoining
the ranks in Kidal in Mali, armed dissidence was still active. On 23
February, the Bamako customs mobile intervention brigade intercepted
a truckcarryinga loadofweapons fromGuinea.This isonlyoneofa
number of signs of intense cross-border arms trafficking linked to criminal
and/or political activities.
16
Challenges for Democracy
Among the latterarepiracy in theGulfofGuinea,and theactivitiesof
the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in Nigeria
and the Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BKF) in Cameroon. Over the past six
months, a series of incidents and mutinies in Côte d’Ivoire demonstrates
the difficulties of implementing any real disarmament based on the Fourth
Supplementary Accord to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, known
as Ouaga IV.
Criminal intrusion of terrorism and the drug trade
Infiltrating social, political and economic spheres, the drug trade is a
major challenge, involved in the revival and growth of terrorism, arms
trafficking and kidnapping. In December 2008, the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that 50 tonnes of South American
drugs transit West Africa each year, 98% of which are re-exported to
Europe. The region is used as a transit zone for drugs trade. While visiting
Sierra Leone on 4 February, the UN Secretary-General emphasised
the risks that the phenomenon represents for the stability, security and
precarious equilibrium of post-conflict countries. It is a new source of
instability and violence, exacerbating political and ethnic tensions and
social discontent caused by rising prices of staple products and, more
generally, poor socio-economic conditions.
Alittlelater,high-rankingofficersintheGuineanarmy(includingasonof
the deceased President) were arrested for complicity in international drug
trafficking. In earlyMarch, somevoices inGuinea-Bissauaccused the
drug tradeof involvement in theassassinationofChief-of-StaffGeneral
Tagme Na Waie.
A growing trend towards depoliticisation combined with criminal
activity leads to a hybradisation of dangers. What were once political
actions related specifically to a rebellion becoming now in some situations
the means for economic and financial bargaining. This opens up the door
to the drug trade and all forms of criminal activity such as trafficking of
humans, arms and contraband. Current events in the Mali/Niger zone and
theGulfofGuineaaswellas the recentkidnappings in theMali/Niger
zoneandtheGulfofGuinea,forwhichAlQuaedaMaghreb(QMI)claimed
responsibility, underscore this situation. These criminal activities could
be “sub-contracted” out to shadowy peripheral rebel groups. Thus there
seems to be a trend in manipulating such rebel groups towards revenue-
generating activities that will indirectly have political gains for criminal
and terrorist groups. Hence by sub-contracting out certain activities, the
main terrorist groups could distance themselves having greater protection
in these areas. This phenomenon of complementarity and the supply of
criminal services is a threat to the entire northern ECOWAS zone border
area.
17
Ministerial Council of the Mano River Union (MRU)•
Abidjan, 19 March
TheCouncil’sintentionwastoorganiseanoperatingbudget.Createdin1970byLiberiaandSierraLeone,theMRUwasjoinedbyGuinea
in 1980 and Côte d’Ivoire in 2008. It remained a “phantom organisation” for a long time (with civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone), but is
being reconstituted today around the shared goals of peace and security.
RegionalConferenceontheagriculturalandfoodsituationandtradeopportunitiesinWestAfrica•
Abuja, 16 - 18 March
Organised by the Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) in collaboration with ECOWAS, this regional
Conference was organised to take stock of the agricultural and food situation while encouraging regional trade.
UEMOA celebrates 15 years of existence •
Ouagadougou, 15 March
Meeting at their 13th Summit, Heads of State decided to create a community anthem and flag, without fixing any firm date. The UEMOA
flag could therefore fly one day alongside that of ECOWAS.
1stInternationalTransportExhibitioninWestAfrica•
Bamako, 12 - 15 March
OrganisedbytheGovernmentofMaliandtheUEMOACommission,thisexhibitionintendedtoopenthedebateontransportissuesinMali
and West Africa: http://www.sitrao.com
Subsidy for the Niger Basin Authority •
Ouagadougou, 20 February
UEMOAgrantedasubsidyofCFAfrancs3billion(aboutEUR4.6million)foradredgingprogramme.
2ndECOWASBusinessForum•
Ouagadougou, 12 - 14 February
The idea of regional agricultural product stock exchanges and the potential for investment in agriculture were discussed and promoted at
this meeting.
ECOWASMeetingagainsttheProliferationofLightArms•
Ouagadougou, 10 - 13 February
Objective: to design a mechanism to co-ordinate member States in combating major banditry and the burgeoning proliferation of light arms.
MeetingofUNPeaceMissionsLeadersinWestAfrica• Dakar, 5 - 6 February
The meeting’s aim was to improve co-ordination of UN peace and security activities in the subregion.
MeetingonClimateChangeAdaptationCapacitiesintheSahel• Ouagadougou, 2 - 4 February
Organised by the Agrhymet Centre of CILSS, the workshop drew lessons from a programme financed by the Canadian co-operation
(evaluation of the impact on water resources and agricultural production, training of experts, pilot schemes for adaptation, etc.).
InvasionofcaterpillarsinLiberia•
Monrovia, 26 January
Liberiadeclaredastateofemergencybecauseofaninvasionofmillionsofcaterpillars.TheAgricultureMinistersofCôted’Ivoire,Guinea,
Liberia and Sierra Leone set up a joint technical committee. Fortunately, food crops (in particular corn, rice, sorghum and millet) were not
attacked.
EstablishmentofanECOWAShumanitariandepotinBamako•
Bamako, 10 January
TheMalianGovernmentconfirmeditsagreementtotheestablishmentofadepot,fromwhereemergencyaidcouldbedistributedtogroups
suffering as a result of political crises or natural disasters. The depot will be built near the international airport of Bamako, with the support
of UNOCHA.
In Brief
18
AnewattempttocreateaWestAfricanregionalairlinecompany•
Lomé, 16 January
A new private company, African Sky, signed an agreement with Ethiopian Airlines. The aim is to make Lomé a regional hub serving all of
WestAfrica.In2000,AirSenegalInternational(ASI)enteredintoasimilarpartnershipwithRoyalAirMaroc(RAM).Afterapromisingstart,
ASI has been suffering from serious financial difficulties in the past two years, aggravated by a disagreement between the Senegalese State
andRAM,whichnowwantstowithdraw.
UEMOA–FranceagreementtosupportDiasporainitiatives•
Ouagadougou, 10 January
This three-year agreement is intended to support the Diaspora of UEMOA member countries in France. The idea is to mobilise the capacities
of the Diaspora in order to support community development projects. An annual forum on “Migration and Development” will be organised.
In Brief
19
Sahel and West Africa Club/OECDPostal Address: 2 rue André Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - France
Office:LeSeineSaint-Germain,12bddesIles,BuildingB,92130Issy-les-Moulineaux-France
Phone: +33 (0)1 45 24 89 87 - Fax: +33 (0)1 45 24 90 31
E-mail: [email protected] / www.westafricaclub.org
West Africa Observer - Contact: [email protected]