west point ctc's al-qa'ida's foreign fighters in iraq

7/31/2019 West Point CTC's Al-Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

1


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AlQaidasForeignFightersinIraq:AFirstLookattheSinjarRecordsisthelatestina

seriesofreportsfromtheCombatingTerrorismCenterdrawingonnewly

releasedinformationfromcapturedalQaidadocumentsmaintainedinthe

DefenseDepartmentsHarmonyDataBase.Thereportisapreliminaryanalysis

ofrecordscontainingbackgroundinformationonforeignfightersenteringIraq

viaSyriaoverthelastyear.ThedatausedinthisreportwascodedfromEnglish

translationsoftheserecordsandundoubtedlycontainssomeinaccuraciesdueto

imprecisetranslationaswellasthrougherrorsinthetranscriptionprocess. The

CTCplansfurtherstudiesbasedontheSinjarRecordsandexpectstohoneandimprovetheaccuracyofourdatabaseaswedoso.

TheauthorsthankJamesPhillips,CTCHarmonyProjectManager,forsignificant

assistancecoordinatingandcompilingtheinformationanddocumentsaswellas

CTCStaffmembersSherwetWitherington,VahidBrown,andWarrenPolensky

fortheirresearchandeditorialsupport.WealsothankColonelMikeMeeseand

ColonelCindyJebbHeadandDeputyHeadoftheUSMilitaryAcademy

DepartmentofSocialSciences fortheircontinuedsupportoftheCTCs

HarmonyProject.

TheviewsexpressedinthisreportaretheauthorsanddonotreflecttheU.S.

MilitaryAcademy,theDepartmentofDefense,ortheU.S.Government.

JosephFelterandBrianFishmanCombatingTerrorismCenter

DepartmentofSocialSciences

USMilitaryAcademy

West

Point,

New

York

8459388495

[email protected],[email protected]

2
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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Introduction

OnDecember4,2007AbuUmaralBaghdadi,thereputedEmirofalQaidas

IslamicStateofIraq(ISI),claimedthathisorganizationwasalmostpurelyIraqi,

containingonly

200

foreign

fighters.

1Twelve

days

later,

on

December

16,

2007,

AymanalZawahiriurgedSunnisinIraqtounitebehindtheISI. Bothstatements

arepartofalQaidasongoingstruggletoappealtoIraqis,manyofwhomresent

theISIsforeignleadershipanditsdesiretoimposestrictIslamiclaw.

InNovember2007,theCombatingTerrorismCenteratWestPointreceived

nearly700recordsofforeignnationalsthatenteredIraqbetweenAugust2006

andAugust2007. Thedatacompiledandanalyzedinthisreportisdrawnfrom

thesepersonnelrecords,whichwascollectedbyalQaidasIraqiaffiliates,first

theMujahidinShuraCouncil(MSC)andthentheIslamicStateofIraq(ISI). The

recordscontainvaryinglevelsofinformationoneachfighter,butofteninclude

thefighterscountryoforigin,hometown,age,occupation,thenameofthe

fightersrecruiter,andeventheroutethefightertooktoIraq. Therecordswere

capturedbycoalitionforcesinOctober2007inaraidnearSinjar,alongIraqs

Syrianborder. Althoughthereissomeambiguityinthedata,itislikelythatall

ofthefighterslistedintheSinjarRecordscrossedintoIraqfromSyria.TheSinjar

RecordsexistencewasfirstreportedbyTheNewYorkTimesRichardOppel,

whowasprovidedapartialsummaryofthedata.2

TheCombating

Terrorism

Center

is

pleased

to

make

the

Sinjar

Records

publicly

availableforthefirsttime.EnglishtranslationsoftheRecordscanbeaccessedat

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/FF BiosTrans.pdfandtherecordsintheir

originalArabictextathttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/Foreign_Fighter_Bios

Orig.pdf.3 ThepurposeofthisinitialassessmentoftheSinjarRecordsisto

providescholarsaccesstothisuniquedata,inthehopethattheirscholarshipwill

complementandcompetewithourown. TheCTCplansamore

comprehensivestudyonIraqsforeignfightersforreleaseinearly2008.4

1 Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, For the Scum Disappears Like Froth Cast Out, posted to www.muslm.net on

December 4, 2007.2 Richard Oppel, Foreign Fighters in Iraq Are Tied to Allies of the U.S., The New York Times, November

22, 2007, online at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/22/world/middleeast/22fighters.html3Information recorded from these documents and used to generate the summary statistics is available inspread sheet form on request. Please send request for this data to [email protected] For access to all captured documents released to the CTC and the CTCs previous reports incorporating

this information see: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony

3
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/FF-Bios-Trans.pdfhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/FF-Bios-Trans.pdfhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/FF-Bios-Trans.pdfhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/FF-Bios-Trans.pdfhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/FF-Bios-Trans.pdfhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/Foreign_Fighter_Bios-Orig.pdfhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/Foreign_Fighter_Bios-Orig.pdfhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/Foreign_Fighter_Bios-Orig.pdfhttp://www.muslm.net/http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/22/world/middleeast/22fighters.html?ref=todayspapermailto:[email protected]:[email protected]://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmonyhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmonyhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmonyhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmonymailto:[email protected]://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/22/world/middleeast/22fighters.html?ref=todayspaperhttp://www.muslm.net/http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/Foreign_Fighter_Bios-Orig.pdfhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/Foreign_Fighter_Bios-Orig.pdfhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/FF-Bios-Trans.pdf


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TheCTChasnotalteredtheSinjarRecordsexcepttoformattheminamoreuser

friendlymannerfordistribution. TheCTCcannotvouchfortheauthenticityor

accuracyoftheserecords,excepttoconfirmtheywereauthorizedforreleaseby

theU.Sgovernment,whichiswhytheserecordsarepresentedintheirentirety.

TheCTCdoesnotredactorclassifyinformation.

Readersshouldbeawarethatanalyzingdatacapturedonabattlefieldisfraught

withrisk. Someofthepersonnelrecordswerefilledoutincompletelyor

improperly,somemayhavebeenlostbyalQaidaspersonnelinIraq,andsome

mayhavebeenaccidentallylostordestroyedbyU.S.forces. TheSinjarRecords

areanastoundingtestimonytoalQaidasimportationoffighterstoIraq,but

theyareaninherentlyimperfectrecord. Readersandresearchersshouldbewary

ofconclusionsdrawnsolelyonthebasisoftheserecords.

Background

AlQaidasalliesbeganmovingintoIraqevenbeforeU.S.forcesenteredthe

countryinearly2003. AfterfleeingAfghanistanandtraversingIran,Abu

MusabalZarqawislippedintoNorthernIraqsometimein2002. Atthattime,

ZarqawisorganizationwascalledTawhidwalJihad(MonotheismandStruggle)

andwasbuiltaroundabackboneofJordanians,Syrians,andKurdsthateither

rushedtojoinhiminIraqorhadbeenworkingwiththeKurdistanbasedjihadi

group,AnsaralIslam.

ZarqawididnotjoinalQaidauntilOctober2004,whenhesworeallegianceto

UsamabinLadin. TheneworganizationwascalledTanzimQaidatalJihadfi

BiladalRafidaynwhichwascommonlyknownintheWestasalQaidainIraq

(AQI). TheagreementbetweenZarqawiandhisnewmastersbeliedimportant

disagreementsthatremainedevenafterZarqawiformallyjoinedalQaida.

ZarqawiwassometimescriticalofalQaidaswillingnesstocooperatewith

apostatesagainstotherenemiesand,unlikeBinLadin,ferventlyarguedthat

alQaidasNearEnemyapostatesandtheShiaweremoredangerousthan

itsFarEnemytheUnitedStatesandtheWest.5

AlQaidainIraqworkedhardtorecruitIraqisandbuildcordialrelationships

withnationalistandBaathistinsurgentsinIraq,butitsbrutaltacticsand

5 For more on these and other disagreements within al-Qaidas leadership see the CTCs recent Harmony

report, Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms Within al-Qaida 1989-2006 at

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq3.asp

4
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq3.asphttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq3.asp


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religiousconservatismalienatedmoreIraqisthanitattracted. InJanuary2006,

afterbloodybattleswithnationalistinsurgentgroupsandZarqawisillfated

attackonthreehotelsinAmman,Jordan,AQIsubsumeditselfwithinan

umbrellagroupcalledMajlisShuraalMujahidin(MujahidinShuraCouncil

MSC). AlQaidainIraqstillexisted,buttheMSCwasausefulwaytogiveAQI

aconciliatoryandIraqiface. Zarqawiwasatremendouslysuccessful

propagandist,buthiswantonviolencewasincreasinglycontroversialamong

Iraqissufferingtheravagesofcivilwar.Meanwhile,theMSCwasostensiblyled

byAbdullahRashidalBaghdadi,anamethatimpliesthemanwasIraqi.

AfterZarqawisdeathinJune2006,AQIquicklyreplacedhimwithAbuHamzah

alMuhajir,amantheUnitedStatesidentifiedasanEgyptiannamedAbuAyyub

alMasri. TheSinjarRecordsbeginshortlythereafter,andmanyaredocumented

onMSCletterhead.

InOctober2006,alMuhajirannouncedtheformationoftheDawlatalIraqal

Islamiyya(IslamicStateofIraqISI),andnamedAbuUmaralBaghdadi,another

purportedIraqi,itsEmir. LiketheMSC,theISIwasdesignedtoputanIraqiface

onalQaidaseffortsintheinsurgency,buttheneworganizationwasintended

tobemuchmoresubstantivethanitspredecessor. UnliketheMSC,theISI

totallysupplanteditsconstituentorganizations. Foritsfollowers,alQaidano

longerexistsinIraq,onlytheISI.

TheISI

was

meant

to

unify

resistance

to

U.S.

occupation,

inspire

support

from

al

QaidasglobalsupportersbyimposingIslamiclaw,andensurethatalQaida

waspreparedincaseofaprecipitousU.S.withdrawalfromIraq. Today,theISI

bolstersitsreligiousauthoritybyreleasingreligiousinstructionstofollowersand

hascreatedafacadeofgovernancebyestablishingacabinetthatevenincludesa

MinistryofAgricultureandFisheries.

Despitetheseefforts,theISIwaspoorlyconceivedandislargelyfailing. Asthe

ISItriedtoimposeorder,italienatedtheIraqipopulationandotherSunni

insurgents;meanwhileitsweaknesshasleftitunabletocrediblyprovidesecurity

forIraqisorimposethereligiousstricturesexpectedbyalQaidasglobalsupporters. TheU.S.spokesmaninBaghdad,GeneralKevinBergner,even

claimedtohaveintelligencethatAbuUmaralBaghdadiisafictitiouscharacter

createdtofronttheISIwhilenonIraqispulledthestrings.6

6 Dean Yates, Senior Qaeda Figure in Iraq a Myth: U.S. Military,Reuters, July 18, 2007, online at

http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL1820065720070718?sp=true

5
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL1820065720070718?sp=truehttp://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL1820065720070718?sp=true


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ThesheermagnitudeoffighterslistedintheSinjarRecordschallengesAbu

UmaralBaghdadisreassurancesthathisorganizationisbuiltonalocal

foundation. Althoughtherecordsarenotnecessarilyinconsistentwithhisclaim

thatthereareonly200foreignfightersleftinIraq,thescopeofalQaidas

programtoimportfighterstoIraqbelieshisefforttoconvinceIraqisthattheISI

isaninherentlyIraqiorganization. ThereisnodoubtthatalQaidasIraqi

affiliatessuccessfullyrecruitedmanyIraqis,buttheleadershipofboththeMSC

andtheISIremainlargelyforeign. Thus,theSinjarRecordsexemplifyal

QaidasfundamentalstrategicchallengeinIraq:meldingtheideological

demandsofitsglobalconstituencywiththepracticalconcernsofrelatively

secularIraqis.

MostofIraqsmilitantsdonotsufferthatstrategicproblem. Thevastmajorityof

militantsinIraqhavenothingtodowithalQaida,andtheyarefocusedonIraqiproblems:security,distributionofpowerandmoney,andsectarianism. Those

insurgentsareamixofSunninationalists,Bathists,Shiamilitias,andIslamist

organizations.MistakinganyofthesegroupsforalQaidaisnotsimplywrong,

itisdangerous.

TheISIspoliticalfailureshouldnotobscurethefactthatIraqhasinspired

thousandsofyoungmenfromaroundtheworldtojoinalQaidascause.The

SinjarRecordsareimportantnotjustforwhattheytellusaboutalQaidas

affiliatesinside

of

Iraq,

but

also

for

what

they

reveal

about

its

logistical

and

recruitingcapabilitiesoutside. Thisanalysiswillexploresomeofthose

dynamics. Asstatedabove,theCTCwillreturntothesubjectinearly2008.We

offerthisdataandpreliminaryanalysisnowinthehopethatotherresearchers

willoffertheirowninsightsintothestrengthsandweaknessesofalQaida.

DescriptionoftheData

TheCTCreceivedacacheofmorethan700recordsfromUSSOCOM. After

eliminatingblanksandduplicates,theCTCexamined606translatedrecordsof

fightersthat,webelieve,enteredIraqviatheSyrianborder.Theserecords

containedvaryingamountsofdetailonthefighterspersonalbackground,group

affiliation,traveltoSyria,andintendedroleinIraq.Somerecordshad

considerablymoredetailthanothers.

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Figure1andFigure2belowareexamplesofatypicalrecordinthissamplein

bothoriginalArabicandinEnglishtranslation. Readersmaynotespelling

mistakesintheoriginalandtranslatedversions,andvaryingtransliterations.

Figure1:SampleRecordinOriginalArabic Figure2:TranslatedSampleRecord

Initial Findings

CountryofOrigin

SaudiArabiawasbyfarthemostcommonnationalityofthefightersinthis

sample;41%(244)ofthe595recordsthatincludedthefightersnationality

indicatedthey

were

of

Saudi

Arabian

origin.7

Libyawasthenextmostcommoncountryoforigin,with18.8%(112)ofthe

fighterslistingtheirnationalitystatingtheyhailedfromLibya. Syria,Yemen,

7After recording and comparing the information contained in the translated records, the CTC determinedthat 34 records were likely duplicates of the same individual. These records were deleted from the sample

studied.

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andAlgeriawerethenextmostcommonorigincountrieswith8.2%(49),8.1%

(48),and7.2%(43),respectively.Moroccansaccountedfor6.1%(36)ofthe

recordsandJordanians1.9%(11).8

Figure3:ForeignFightersbyCountryofOrigin

Based on 595 records stating country of origin

Foreign Fighters Country of Origin

Algeria

Egypt

Jordan

Libya

Morocco

Other

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Tunisia

Yemen

250200100 150Number of Records

500

TheobviousdiscrepancybetweenpreviousstudiesofIraqiforeignfightersand

theSinjarRecordsisthepercentageofLibyanfighters. (SeeAppendix1fora

briefsummaryofpreviousforeignfighterstudies.)Nopreviousstudyhas

indicatedthatmorethan4percentoffighterswereLibyan. Indeed,aJune2005

reportbyNBCquotedaU.S.governmentsourceindicatingthatLibyadidnot

makeatoptenlistoforiginnationalitiesforforeignfightersinIraq.9 Aslateas

July15,2007,theLosAngelesTimescitedaU.S.Armysourcereportingthatonly

10percentofallforeignfightersinIraqhailedfromNorthAfrica.10 TheSinjar

Recordssuggestthatnumberismuchhigher. Almost19percentofthefighters

intheSinjarRecordscamefromLibyaalone. Furthermore,Libyacontributedfar

8 The Other category included two fighters from France and one fighter each from Bosnia, Belgium,

England, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Oman, Sudan and Sweden.9 Lisa Meyers, Who are the Foreign Fighters?MSNBC,June 20, 2005, online at

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8293410/10 Ned Parker, Saudis Role in Iraq Insurgency Outlined, The Los Angeles Times, July 15, 2007, online at

http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimesA98.html

8
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8293410/http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8293410/http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimesA98.htmlhttp://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimesA98.htmlhttp://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimesA98.htmlhttp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8293410/


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morefighterspercapitathananyothernationalityintheSinjarRecords,

includingSaudiArabia.

Figure4:ForeignFightersPerCapita

0 5 10 15 20Number of Fighters per One Million Residents in Home Country

Yemen

Tunisia

Syria

Saudi Arabia

Morocco

Libya

Jordan

Egypt

Algeria

Foreign Fighters Per Capita

Theprevious

reports

may

have

collectively

understated

the

Libyan

contribution

tothefightinIraq,buttherelativesynchronizationofearlieranalysessuggests

thatthepatternofimmigrationtoIraqhassimplyshiftedovertime. Inan

admittedlysmallsample,76.9%(30)ofthe39Libyansthatlistedtheirarrival

dateinIraqenteredthecountrybetweenMayandJuly2007,whichmayindicate

aspringsurgeofLibyanrecruitstoIraq. IfthenumberscitedbytheLos

AngelesTimesinJuly2007areanyindication,eventheU.S.Armymayhave

underestimatedtheLibyancontingentinIraq.

TheapparentsurgeinLibyanrecruitstravelingtoIraqmaybelinkedtheLibyan

IslamicFightingGroups(LIFG)increasinglycooperativerelationshipwithal

Qaida,whichculminatedintheLIFGofficiallyjoiningalQaidaonNovember3,

2007.11

11As-Sahab video released November 3, 2007, on the Al-Boraq Islamic Network; see OSC

FEA20071104393586

9


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InMarch2007,theLIFGsseniorideologue,AbuYahyaalLibi,weighedinonal

QaidascontroversialdeclarationofanIslamicStateofIraq. Althoughjihadis

globallyweredividedoverthestrategicwisdomandreligiousacceptabilityof

declaringthestate,AbuYahyacalledforunityinIraq,andencouraged

mujahidineverywheretosupporttheISI:

ourbrothersareinneedofthebackingandaidoftheMuslimpeoples,with

theirbodiesandwealth,withshelterandprayer,andwithincitement.Thereis

nowaytoestablishandpreservestatesotherthanJihadinthePathofAllahand

Jihadalone....Thisisthepath,andanythingelseisfromthewhispersofSatan.12

Whethertherewasaspring2007Libyansurgeornot,theLibyanpipelinetoIraq

seemsfirmlyestablished. Thevastmajority(84.2%)ofLibyansthatrecorded

theirroutetoIraqarrivedviathesamepathwayrunningthroughEgyptandthen

byair

to

Syria.

This

recruiting

and

logistics

network

is

likely

tied

to

LIFG,

which

haslongties(notallpositive)withEgyptianandAlgerianIslamistgroups.

TheannouncementthatLIFGhadofficiallyswornallegiancetoalQaidawas

longexpectedbyobserversofthegroup. BoththeideologueAbuYahyaalLibi

andthemilitaryleaderAbuLaythalLibihavelonghistorieswiththeLIFG,and

areincreasinglyprominentfiguresalongtheAfghanistanPakistanborderandin

alQaidaspropaganda. AbuLaythisnowanoperationalcommanderin

Afghanistan;andin2007,AbuYahyaissecondonlytoAymanalZawahiriasthe

mostvisiblefigureinalQaidaspropaganda.13 Theincreasingprominenceof

LIFGfiguresinalQaidashighcommandmaybeafunctionofthegroups

logisticscapacity,includingitsnowdemonstratedabilitytomovepeople

effectivelyaroundtheMiddleEast,includingtoIraq.

City/TownofOrigin

Of591recordsthatincludedthecountryoforiginofthefighters,440also

containedinformationonthehomecity/townthefightershailedfrom.Themost

commoncitiesthatthefighterscalledhomewereDarnah,LibyaandRiyadh,

SaudiArabia,with52and51fightersrespectively.Darnah,withapopulation

justover

80,000

compared

to

Riaydhs

4.3

million,

has

far

and

away

the

largest

percapitanumberoffightersintheSinjarrecords. Thenextmostcommon

hometowns inrealterms listedintheSinjarrecordswereMecca(43),Beghazi

12 Abu Yahya al-Libi,Iraq Between Stages, Conspiratorial Intrigue, Al Firdaws Jihadist Forums on March

22, 200713 Al-Qaeda Messaging Statistics, IntelCenter, September 9, 2007, online at

http://www.intelcenter.com/QMS-PUB-v3-3.pdf

10
http://www.intelcenter.com/QMS-PUB-v3-3.pdfhttp://www.intelcenter.com/QMS-PUB-v3-3.pdf


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(21),andCasablanca(17). City/townoforiginforSaudiArabia,Libya,Morocco,

Algeria,andSyriaarebrokenoutingreaterdetailbelow.

SaudiHometowns

TwohundredandfiveofSaudiArabianslistedintheSinjarRecordsnotedtheir

hometown.Riyadhwasthemostcommoncityoforiginwith25.6%(51).Mecca

contributed22.1%(44),Jeddah7.5%(15),AlJawf9.0%(18),Medina6.5%(13),

AlTaif5.5%(11),andBuraydah4.5%(9). Theremaining72fightershailedfrom

townsscatteredacrossSaudiArabia.

Figure5:MostCommonSaudiHometowns

25.6%

22.1%

9.0%

7.5%

6.5%

5.5%

4.5%

19.1%Riyadh

Mecca

Al Jawf

Jeddah

Medina

Taif

Buraydah

Other

Based on 204/242 Saudi records with home town information

Saudi Arabia Fighters Home Town

LibyanHometowns

ThevastmajorityofLibyanfightersthatincludedtheirhometownintheSinjar

RecordsresidedinthecountrysNortheast,particularlythecoastalcitiesof

Darnah60.2%(53)andBenghazi23.9%(21).

11


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Figure6:MostCommonLibyanHometowns

Libyan Fighters Home Town

Based on 88/112 Libyan fighters records with hometown information

Darnah

Benghazi

60.2%

23.9%

4.5%

3.4%5.7%

2.3%AOther

Misratah

Sirtjdabiyah

BothDarnahandBenghazihavelongbeenassociatedwithIslamicmilitancyin

Libya,inparticularforanuprisingbyIslamistorganizationsinthemid1990s.

TheLibyangovernmentblamedtheuprisingoninfiltratorsfromtheSudanand

EgyptandonegrouptheLibyanFightingGroup(jamaahallibiyahal

muqatilah)claimedtohaveAfghanveteransinitsranks.14 TheLibyan

uprisingsbecameextraordinarilyviolent. Qadhafiusedhelicoptergunshipsin

Benghazi,cuttelephone,electricity,andwatersuppliestoDarnahandfamouslyclaimedthatthemilitantsdeservetodiewithouttrial,likedogs.15

AbuLaythalLibi,LIFGsEmir,reinforcedBenghaziandDarnahsimportanceto

LibyanjihadisinhisannouncementthatLIFGhadjoinedalQaida,saying:

ItiswiththegraceofGodthatwewerehoistingthebannerofjihadagainstthisapostate

regimeundertheleadershipoftheLibyanIslamicFightingGroup,whichsacrificedthe

eliteofitssonsandcommandersincombatingthisregimewhosebloodwasspilledon

themountainsofDarnah,thestreetsofBenghazi,theoutskirtsofTripoli,thedesertof

Sabha,and

the

sands

of

the

beach.16

14 Elie Austa, Fundamentalist Unrest,Agence France Presse, March 26, 1996.15 Libya Said to Seal Off Area Following Unrest,Agence France Presse, March 25, 1996.16As-Sahab video released November 3, 2007, on the Al-Boraq Islamic Network; see OSC

FEA20071104393586

12


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Likeothergovernmentsintheregion,Libyaappearsconcernedaboutthe

possibilityofjihadiviolencewithinitsborders. InMay2007,theLibyan

governmentarrestedseveralLibyansonthegroundsthattheywereplanninga

carbombattacksimilartoanAprilattackinAlgeria.17 AndinJuly2007,agroup

callingitselfalQaidainEasternLibyaannouncedasuicideattackinDarnah.18

LibyasleaderMuammarQadhafihastakenmeasurestomitigatethethreatfrom

suchgroups,andhasreportedlyreleasedover80MuslimBrotherhoodactivists

inthehopethattheywillmoderatetheviewsofmoreviolentIslamistactivists.19

IfLIFGisfunnelingLibyansintoIraq,itmayexacerbaterumoredtensions

betweenLIFGelementsoverwhetherornottoconcentrateonmilitantactivity

withinLibyasborders.20 Suchdebatesarecommonamongnationaljihadi

movementsshiftingfocustoglobalissues. Thissortofdebatedisruptedboth

EgyptianIslamicJihadandtheEgyptianIslamicGroupinthe1990s.21 Reports

suggestingthatLIFGsdecisiontojoinalQaidawascontroversialmaybeexaggerated,buttheyprobablyreflectacontentiousdebateoverLIFGsfuture.22

LIFGssupportforalQaidasIraqiaffiliatehasprobablyincreaseditsstaturein

alQaidasleadership,butcomplicateditsinternaldynamics.

MoroccanHometowns

Twentysixofthe36Moroccanfighters(72.2%)intheSinjarRecordslistedtheir

hometown. Ofthose,65.4%(17)hailedfromCasablancawhileanother19.2%(5)

werefromTetouan. Thefindingsaresomewhatsurprisingbecauseterrorism

researchershave

focused

on

Tetouan

as

ahotbed

of

recruitment

for

travel

to

Iraq.

Anecdotalreportssuggestthisfocusisappropriate,buttheSinjarRecordsarea

reminderofthelargerpictureofradicalizationandmobilizationinMorocco.

17

Kamil al-Tawil, The Americans Launch Rocket Attack Against Abu al-Layth al-Libi in Afghanistan;Libya: Arrest of Jihadists Amid Fears of Al-Qaida Attacks,Al-Hayah, June 22, 2007.18 Statement on the Free Libya website posted July 11, 2007, online at www.libya-alhora.com19 Gianandrea Gaiani, The Leader in Tripolis Methods to Isolate the Islamists, Sole-24 Ore, March 4,

2006.20

Husayn al-Harbi, Bin Laden and Zawahiri Separated,Al Ray al-Amm, September 6, 2007.21 For more on the debate within LIFG, see Mahan Abedins interview with Noman Benotman, available at:

http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=10122 Ibid.; see also Sami Yousafzi and Ron Moreau, Al-Qaidas Family Feud,Newsweek, July 30, 2007,

online at http://www.mywire.com/pubs/Newsweek/2007/07/30/4074018

13
http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=101http://www.mywire.com/pubs/Newsweek/2007/07/30/4074018http://www.mywire.com/pubs/Newsweek/2007/07/30/4074018http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=101


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Figure7:MostCommonMoroccanHometowns

Teroudant

3.8%Tetouan

19.2%

AlgerianHometowns

Twentytwoof43AlgerianslistedintheSinjarRecordsnotedtheirhometown.

Ofthose,36.4%(8)werefromalWadand22.7%(5)werefromAlgiers.

Figure8:MostCommonAlgerian

36.4%

22.7%

9.1%

9.1%

22.7% El Oued

AlgiersBaraki

Constantine

Other

Based on 22 Algerian records that included hometown information

Algerian Fighters Home Town

65.4%

Casablanca

11.5%

Tangier

Based on 26 Moroccan records that included hometown information

Morrocan Fighters Home Town

14


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SyrianHometowns

Thirtyfiveofthe49SyriansintheSinjarRecordslistedtheirhometown. Syrian

recruitmentwaswidelydispersedexceptforDayralZawr,whichaccountedfor

34.3%(12)oftheSyrianslisted. DayralZawristhecapitalcityofaSyrian

regionalstatebythesamename. ThestatebordersIraq.

Figure9:MostCommonSyrianHometowns

Syrian Fighters Home Town

Based on 49/595 fighters from Syria in the SInjar sample

Other

Dar'a Al Tal

Latakia

Idlib

8.6%

34.3%

Dayr Al-Zawr

11.4%

5.7%

5.7%Al Hasaka

8.6%

11.4%

Al Dayr

14.3%

15


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Age

ThemeanreportedbirthyearoffighterslistedintheSinjarRecordswas1982;the

medianwas1984. ThedatethesefightersarrivedinSyriaontheirwaytoIraq

rangedfromAugust18,2006toAugust22,2007whichindicatesthattheaverage

agewas2425yearsoldandthemedian2223yearsold.

Figure10:BirthYearofForeignFighters

0 20 40 60 80Number of Records

199119901989198819871986198519841983198219811980197919781977

1976197519741973197219711970196919671952

Based on 413 records stating year born

Birth Year of Foreign Fighters

TheoldestfighterintheSinjarRecordswas54whenhecrossedintoIraq. Five

fighterswerebornin1990atleastoneofwhichwasstill16whenheentered

Iraq.23 Sevenfighterswerebornin1989(1617yearsold)andfifteenin1990

manyofwhomhadnotyetturned18bythetimetheycametoSyria. The

youngestfighterinthisgroupwasAbdallahAbidAlSulaymanifromAlTaif,

SaudiArabia,whowasbornJune14,1991andarrivedinSyriaonSeptember23,

2006justthreemonthsafterturning15yearsold.24

Thefightersoverallyouthsuggeststhatmostoftheseindividualsarefirsttime

volunteersratherthanveteransofpreviousjihadistruggles. Iftherewasamajor

23Many records included birth year but not date of birth.

24 Some records included actual date of birth, others year born, and others no data on age of the fighter.

These figures are computed based on the estimated age in 2006. If fighters listed their year of birth in the

Gregorian system, we counted it as January 1 of the record year. Similarly, when fighters listed their birth

year as a Hijri year, we considered it the first day of the year for conversion purposes.

16


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influxofveteranjihadisintoIraq,itmayhavecomeearlierinthewar. The

incitementofanewgenerationofjihadistojointhefightinIraq,orplan

operationselsewhere,isoneofthemostworrisomeaspectsoftheongoingfight

inIraq. TheUnitedStatesshouldnotconfusegainsagainstalQaidasIraqi

franchisesasfundamentalblowsagainsttheorganizationoutsideofIraq. So

longasalQaidaisabletoattracthundredsofyoungmentojoinitsranks,itwill

remainaseriousthreattoglobalsecurity.

Occupation

MostfightersintheSinjarRecordsdidnotindicatetheirprofession,but157of

the606did. Ofthosethatdid,42.6%(67)werestudents. Theremaindervaried

widely. Fiveteacherswererecorded,aswellasthreedoctors,andfour

engineers. Theremainingresponsesvariedwidely,fromtheuseful(military:5)

tothebizarre(massagetherapist:1).

Figure11:OccupationofFighters25

0 20 40 60 80Number of Records

TEACHER

STUDENT

SKILLED WORKER

SELF EMPLOYED

PROFESSIONAL

POLICE

OTHER

MILITARY

MEDICAL

LABORER

BUSINESS

ADMINISTRATIVE

Based on 156 records stating occupation

Foreign Fighters Occupation

25 Student includes high school and university, secondary school, and includes religious schools.

Teacher includes high school, university, and religious schools. Military includes veterans.

Professional includes businessman, NGO, lawyers, and engineers. Administrative includes clerks,

judges assistants, and doctors assistant. Business includes business merchant and weapons merchant.

Other includes free jobs, employee, artist, painter, fitness trainer, massage therapist, bombmaker, and

farmer. Skilled worker includes carpenter, electrician, furniture maker, and welder. Unskilled worker

includes guard and driver. Laborer includes work, work in a factory.

17


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Work

MostofthefightersenteringIraqlistedtheirworkuponarrival,acategory

thatprimarilydistinguishesbetweenfightersandsuicidebombers.26 The

categoryseemstoreflecttherolefightershopedtohaveupontheirarrivalin

Iraq,butitmightindicateanassignmentdeterminedbylocaladministrators.

ThetranslatedversionsoftheSinjarrecordsconverttheArabicwordistishhadiin

avarietyofways:asmartyr,martyrdom,andsuicidebomber. Theword

itselfmeansmartyrdomseeker.Wehavecodedallsuchindividualssuicide

bombersinanefforttoavoidconfusion. AlthoughalQaidasideology

embracestheconceptofbecomingamartyrduringthecourseoftraditional

militaryoperations,thepurposeofthesepersonnelrecordswastoenable

commanderstoefficientlyallocateindividualsforspecifictasks. Insuch

circumstances,istishhadilikelyreferstoindividualsintendedforsuicideattacks.

Ofthe389fightersthatdesignatedtheirworkinIraq,56.3%(217)weretobesuicidebombers. Another41.9%(166)weredesignatedmoretraditionalfighters.

Severalrespondentslistedmorespecializedtasks,includingmediaoperations

(2),doctor(3),andlegalskills(1).Wehavechosentocombinethesuicide

bomberandmartyrdatacategories.

Figure12:WorkofAllFighters

Foreign Fighter Recruited Roles

Based on 389 fighters' records including information on intended work

Other

Fighter

Suicide Bomber

1.8%

41.9%

56.3%

26 Types of work are listed in various ways in the original Arabic and in translation. Listings such as

combatant, and fighters, were counted as fighter. Listings such as martyr, martyrdom, suicide,

and suicide mission are counted as suicide bomber.

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NumerousobservershaveconcludedthatSaudiArabiansareoverrepresented

intheranksofIraqisuicidebombers. Onerecentstudyanalyzed94suicide

bombersinIraqanddeterminedthat44wereSaudi,7Kuwaiti,7European,six

SyrianandtheremainderscatteredacrosstheMideastandNorthAfrica.27

TheSinjarRecordssupporttheconclusionthatthepluralityofsuicidebombers

enteringIraqbetweenAugust2006andAugust2007wereSaudi.However,they

challengethenotionthat,onceinIraq,Saudiforeignfightersaremorelikelythan

theircomradesfromotherlocationstobecomesuicidebombers. Libyanand

MoroccanfightersthatlistedtheirworkintheSinjarRecordsweremuchmore

likelytoregistersuicidebomberthanfightersfromothernations.

Figure13:IntendedWorkofFightersbyNationality

Country SuicideBombers

Fighters Other Total

SaudiArabia 50.3%(76) 48.3%(73) 1.3%(2) 151

Libya 85.2%(52) 13.1%(8) 1.6%(1) 61

Morocco 91.7%(22) 8.3%(2) 0 24

Syria 65.6%(21) 31.2%(10) 3.1%(1) 32

Algeria 13.9%(5) 83.3%(30) 2.8%(1) 36

Yemen 46.1%(18) 53.9%(21) 0 39

Tunisia 41.7%(10) 58.3%(14) 0 24

Ofthe244SaudifightersintheSinjarRecords,61.8%(151)listedtheirwork.

Ofthat151,50.3%(76)plannedtobecomesuicidebombers. Amongthe238non

SaudiswholistedtheirworkintheSinjarRecords,59.2%(141)weredenoted

asfuturesuicidebombers. LibyanandMoroccanjihadistswerefarmorelikely,

asapercentageoffighterswhoarrivedinIraq,tobelistedassuicidebombers.

Ofthe112LibyansintheRecords,54.4%(61)listedtheirwork. Fully85.2%

(51)oftheseLibyanfighterslistedsuicidebomberastheirworkinIraq.

Routeto

Iraq

MostofthefightersintheSinjarRecordsdonotexplaintheroutetheytookto

Iraq. Furthermore,thefightersthatdidenterinformationabouttheirroutewere

veryinconsistentintheirmethodology. Somefightersincludedtheirhome

countryasastop,othersdidnot. SomeincludedIraqasastopontheirwayto

27 Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Terrorism in Iraq: A Preliminary Assessment of the Quantitative Data

and Documentary Evidence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29:6 (2006) 616-19

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Iraq. SomefighterslistedSyriaasastopontheirroutetoIraq,whileothers

seemedtothinkitwasassumedanddidnotmentionSyriadespiteprovidingthe

nameoftheircoordinatorinSyria.28Meanwhile,itisnotclearwhatfighters

consideredastop. Forsome,thatmayhavesimplybeenacountrytransited

onthewaytoIraq;forothers,itmayhaverequiredamoreextensivelayover.

DespitethedataprobleminassessingtheroutefighterstooktoIraq,itisclear

thatroutesdiffereddramaticallyfromcountrytocountry. Ofthe63recordsof

SaudisthatdescribedtheirroutetoIraq,47.6%listedadirectroutefromSaudi

intoSyria,whileanother36.5%(23)notedthattheytraveledfirsttoJordan,then

toSyria. LibyanfightersseemedtofollowanestablishedpathtoSyria. Ofthe52

LibyanfightersthatlistedtheirroutetoIraq,50traveledfirsttoEgypt,while2

flewdirectlytoSyria. FromEgypt,84.2%(43)flewdirectlytoSyriawhile13.4%

(7)wenttoJordanandthenenteredSyria. TheSinjarRecordsalsohintatan

establishedpathwayfromMoroccothroughTurkeyintoSyria. Ofthe12MoroccanfightersthatdescribedtheirroutetoSyria,tenflewdirectlytoTurkey

whiletheothertwocrossedfirstintoSpainbeforetravelingtoTurkey.

Figure14:RoutetoIraq29

0 10 20 30 40

YEMEN-SYRIAYEMEN-SAUDI ARABIA-SYRIA

YEMEN-MALAYSIA-SYRIAYEMEN-EGYPT-SYRIA

YEMEN-EGYPT-JORDAN-SYRIATUNISIA-TURKEY-SYRIA

TUNISIA-SAUDI ARABIA-SYRIATUNISIA-GERMANY-TURKEY-SYRIA

SYRIA-LEBANON-SYRIASYRIA

SWEDEN-EGYPT-SYRIASAUDI ARABIA-SYRIA

SAUDI ARABIA-JORDAN-SYRIASAUDI ARABIA-DUBAI-SYRIA

SAUDI ARABIA-BAHRAIN-SYRIASAUDI ARABIA-BAHRAIN-EGYPT-SYRIA

SAUDI ARABIA-ALGERIA-JORDAN-SYRIAMOROCCO-TURKEY-SYRIA

MOROCCO-SYRIAMOROCCO-SPAIN-TURKEY-SYRIA

LIBYA-SYRIALIBYA-EGYPT-SYRIALIBYA-EGYPT-JORDAN-SYRIA

KUWAIT-SAUDI ARABIA-JORDAN-SYRIAJORDAN-SYRIA

EGYPT-SAUDI ARABIA-SYRIAEGYPT-IRELAND-FRANCE-SYRIA

ALGERIA-TUNISIA-LIBYA-SYRIAALGERIA-SYRIA

ALGERIA-SAUDI ARABIA-SYRIA

Route Taken by Fighters from Country of Origin to Iraq via Syria

50

28AnexampleofthisisBaderShourie,recordnumber90.NMEC2007657770.29 Figure 14, noting the routes fighters took to Iraq lists the country of origin, stopover nations, and Syria.

The Syria category includes mostly Syrian fighters, but includes several others that only listed Syria

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TheSinjarRecordsdonotoffermuchinformationaboutthefighterstravelonce

inSyria. OnecluemaybethedisproportionatenumberofSyrianfightersthat

listedDayralZawr(34.3%)astheirhometown. Thereisanecdotalevidencethat

DayralZawrwasanimportanttransitpointforjihadishopingtoinfiltrateIraq,

atleastuntil2006. ADecember2005reportinAlHayahtrackedagroupof

AlgerianandSaudifighterstryingtocrossfromDayralZawr,throughthe

bordertownofAlbuKamal,andthenintoIraq.30 Likewise,ayoungSaudithat

wascapturedinIraqrecountedhowhearrivedthereafterusingthesame

pathwayfromDayralZawr,viaminibustoAlbuKamalandbyfootacrossthe

bordertoalQaim.31 AbuUmar,aPalestinianfighterwhocrossedintoIraqto

trainalQaidatroopsalsohasdescribedtransitingDayralZawronhiswayto

alQaiminIraq.32 AlMuhajiralIslami,afrequentposteronSyriandissident

webforumsexplainedthattheDayralZawrsectionoftheborderwas

particularlyeasytocrossbecauseofthelinksbetweentribesoneithersideofthe

border.33

TheSinjarRecordswerecapturedfarnorthofAlbuKamalinSyriaandalQaim

inIraq,whichsuggeststhatthesmugglingrouteforfightersintoIraqhasshifted

north. Nonetheless,thecityofDayralZawrmaystillbeanimportantlogistics

hubforfightershopingtoenterIraq. DayralZawrsitsontheroadnorthfrom

DamascusandEastfromAleppo,whichmakesitalogicallocationforalogistics

base,whetherheadingfurthereasttotheIraqicityofalQaimornorthtoSinjar.

30Muhammad Muqaddam, Facts Disclosed by Fundamentalists,Al-Hayah, December 8, 2005.

31 Malfi al-Harbi, Al-Shayi, a Victim that was Lured to Iraq,Al-Riyad, November 21, 2007.32 Interview with Abu Umar,Al Arabiyah 1905, December 7, 200733http://www.globalterroralert.com/pdf/0805/roadtoiraq0805.pdfGlobal Terror Alert does not list the

original website, but it was likely the Syrian Islamic Forum that was hosted at www.nnuu.org during 2005.

21
http://www.globalterroralert.com/pdf/0805/roadtoiraq0805.pdfhttp://www.nnuu.org/http://www.nnuu.org/http://www.globalterroralert.com/pdf/0805/roadtoiraq0805.pdf


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EntryDate

Twohundredandthreeofthe606SinjarRecordsprovidethedatethefighter

enteredIraq. ThemostcommonmonthtoarrivewasNovember2006,when38

fighterswererecorded. ThesecondbusiestmonthwasJuly2007,with32

recordedarrivals. Interestingly,inDecember2006onlyonefighterwasrecorded

anditwassomeonenamedHafid,whostartedhisjourneyinBelgium.

Figure15:DateEnteredIraqbyMonth

0

10

20

30

40

NumberofRecordsof202

Containi

ngArrivalDate

Aug-06Sep-06Oct-06Nov-06Dec-06Jan-07Feb-07Mar-07Apr-07May-07Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07

Number of Foreign Fighters Arriving by Month

TheSinjarRecordsdonotlistanyfightersenteringIraqinMarchorApril2007.

Thisisafascinating,butsuspicious,statistic. Only3fightersarerecorded

enteringinFebruary2007,whichbolstersthenotionthattheISIslogistic

networkwasdisruptedforsomereasoninearly2007,butitisalsopossiblethat

therecordsforthattimeperiodwerelost.

ItispossibletoestimatetheentrydateforfightersintheSinjarRecordsby

trackingthewatermarksandletterheadonthedocumentsthemselves. The

IslamicStateofIraq(ISI)wasestablishedinOctober2006,whichindicatesthat

fightersrecordedonISIstationaryenteredIraqafterthatdate. Apparently,the

alQaidasaffiliatesdidnotexchangetheirstationaryimmediatelyaftertheISI

wasestablished. SomeofthefightersrecordedonMujahidinShuraCouncil

22


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(MSC)stationarylistfightersthatarrivedinNovember2006aftertheISIhad

replacedtheMSC. ThefirstfighterlistedonISIstationaryisHafid,theBelgian

whoarrivedinDecember2006.Ofthe606totalrecords,56.1%(340)areclearly

listedasISIrecruits,while16.8%(102)arelistedonMSCstationary.

TravelingPartners

TheSinjarRecordsdonotprovidemuchinformationabouthowindividual

fighterswererecruited(orselfselected)forthefightinIraq. Thereisinteresting

evidence,however,thatmanyofthefighterssignedupingroupstotravelto

Iraq,ratherthanontheirown. Ofthe202fightersthatrecordedtheirdateof

arrivalinIraq,46.5%(94)ofthemarrivedonthesamedayasanotherindividual

fromtheirhometown. Suchevidencestronglysuggeststhattheindividuals

traveledtogetherasagroupand,insomecases,mayhavebeenrecruited

simultaneously.

OneofthelargergroupsbegantheirjourneyinDarnah,Libyaandarrivedin

IraqonMay9,2007. AbuAbbas,AbualWalid,AbuBakar,AsadAllah,and

AbuAbdalKabirallwereistishhadimartyrdomseekers. Thefivemendidnot

signupthroughthesamelocalcoordinatorinDarnah. AbuAbbas,wholisted

hisoccupationasEmployeesignedupthroughacoordinatornamedQamar,

AbualWalidandAbuBakarastudentandatrafficcopreceivedsupport

fromsomeonenamedSaraj. AsadAllahandAbuAbdalKabirreceivedhelp

fromacoordinatornamedBashar. AsadAllahwasateacher.Noneofthemen

knewtheir

coordinator

before

they

decided

to

go

to

Iraq.

ItisnotclearifthefivementraveledtogetherfromDarnahorinseparate

groups,butallfivewenttoEgyptandthentoSyria. OnceinSyria,thefive

probablyweretogetherasagroup. AllfivelistedamannamedAbuAbbas

(whotheyunanimouslyliked)astheirSyriancoordinator.Whenthefivemen

crossedintoIraqtheyeachcontributedseveralthousandSyrianLiratotheISI,

butdidnotreportanyformofID.

AlQaidasSyriaProblem

TheauthorsofthisreportbelievethatallofthefightersintheSinjarRecordsenteredIraqfromSyria.MostoftheSinjarRecordsofferevidenceoftransit

throughSyria,eitherbecausethecountryislistedasthefinalstoponthewayto

IraqorbecausethefighternamedtheirSyrianCoordinator. Furthermore,

SinjarsitsinNorthwestIraqapproximately10milesfromtheSyrianborder. Ina

locationsoclosetoSyriaandsofarfromotherborders,itwouldbesurprisingto

findrecordsofindividualsthatdidnotcrossintoIraqfromSyria.

23


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Itisnotclear,however,howcomplicitSyriasgovernmentisinthemovementof

personnelthroughitsterritory. TheSyriangovernmentisledbyaBaathist

regimedominatedbymembersoftheAlawitesect,whichisaformofShiaIslam

thatembraceselementssimilartoChristiantheology.

ThehistoryoftheSyriangovernmentsrelationshipwithalienIslamistmilitants

islongandcomplicated,rangingfromopensupporttobrutalsuppressionof

jihadiactivistsoperatingwithinitsborders. Syrianpolicytowardsuchfightersis

likelydrivenbyitsperceptionofnationalinterest,ratherthanideological

kinship. Inthelate1970s,forinstance,Syriasentthousandsoftroopsintosouth

LebanoninsupportofthePLOsguerrillaeffortsthereandprovidedlogistical

supporttoforeignvolunteerswhowantedtojointhe jihad onthatfront,yetat

thesametimeitcarriedoutanextremelyviolentcampaignagainsttheSyrian

MuslimBrotherhoodsuprisinginsideSyria,aninsurgencythatalsoincludedsignificantnumbersofforeignfighters.34

SyriahasaninterestinkeepingtheU.S.backedregimeinIraqoffbalance,butit

mustalsofearabacklashfromjihadigroups,manyofwhichdespiseAlawite

apostasyasmuchormorethantheUnitedStates. Indeed,someofAbu

MusabalZarqawismostimportantearlyrecruitswereveteransoftheMuslim

BrotherhoodsuprisingagainsttheSyriangovernmentinthe1980s.35 ForSyria,

supportingjihadigroupsisatbestadoubleedgedsword.

AnecdotaldatafromSyrianhistoryhintsatSyriasstrategytoday. Formerjihadi

militantAbulWalidMustafaHamidhasdescribedhowheandagroupofjihadi

volunteerstraveledfromAbuDhabitosouthLebanonviaSyriaintheearly

1980s;attheLebaneseSyrianborderheandhisentiregroupwerephotographed

andhadtheirpassportstakentobecopiedbytheSyrianintelligenceservice.36

ThoughthisactionwasostensiblypartofthesupportthattheSyrianswere

providingtothesevolunteersastheymadetheirwaytoLebanon,AbulWalid

learnedanumberofyearslaterthatheandseveralotherofthemenprocessedby

34 For an insider's account of the Muslim Brotherhood insurgency against the Syrian government from the

Harmony Database, see Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, AFGP-2002-600080 and a case study developed using this

and other Harmony documents at Chapter 3 of Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qaidas

Organizational Vulnerabilities available at http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq_syria.asp35 Fuad Husayn, Al-Zarqawi: The Second Generation of Al-Qaida, serialized inAl Quds al-Arabi, May

14, 2005, p. 17.36 AFGP-2002-600087, p. 17; excerpts of this source were also published by Muhammad al-Shafi'i in al-

Sharq al-Awsat on October 26, 2006, and subsequently translated by FBIS, GMP20061026866001.

24


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SyrianintelligenceatthattimeweresubsequentlyplacedonSyriasterrorist

watchlist.37

Syriawouldmuchratherbeatransitpointforjihadisthantheirfinaldestination.

SyriasleadersmaydeterminethataninfluxoffightersintoIraqsupportsits

nationalinterests,butSyriaiscertainlytrackingsuchfightersandlikelyhopes

thattheydonotsurvivetoleaveIraq.

TheSinjarRecordsdooffercluesabouthowalQaidasmugglesitsvolunteers

throughSyria.ManyofthefightersintheSinjarRecordslistedaSyrian

coordinatororcoordinatorsthatpresumablydirectedtheirtraveluponarrivalin

Syria. Ofthe606totalrecords,41.9%(254)listedatleastonecontactinSyria.

Manylistedmultiplecontacts. Giventhemultipledifferenttranslationsand

transliterationsoftheSyriancoordinatorsaswellascommonnameslikelyheld

bymorethanonecoordinator,itisdifficulttoaccuratelymapthenetworkofSyriancoordinatorsandwhotheyhelpedtransitintoIraqafterarrivalinSyria.

Basedonthisinitialassessmentofthedata,severalnamedindividualsarelisted

morefrequentlyasthefighterscoordinatorinSyria.

ThefighterslistedintheSinjarRecordswereaskedtophysicallydescribetheir

Syriancoordinator,divulgehowmuchmoneytheSyriancoordinatordemanded,

andratethefightersoverallexperiencewiththecoordinator. Thesequestions

mayindicatethatalQaidasadministratorsinIraqmistrusttheirSyrian

coordinators.Such

suspicion

is

common

in

al

Qaida.

Numerous

Harmony

documentsrevealalQaidasrigorouseffortstoensureitsagentsareusingfunds

efficiently38.

AlQaidaschallengeincoordinatingtransportationinSyrialikelyrunsmuch

deeperthanminorgraft.Mediareportssuggeststhatmanyofthehuman

smugglersalQaidausesinSyriaarefreelancersworkingformoneyratherthan

alQaidasideologicalallies,whichwouldexplainwhythetravelingfighters

handlersinIraqaresoconcernedabouttheirfees.39Someofthesenetworksare

37 AFGP-2002-600087, p. 17.38 The tradeoffs Al-Qaida must make when balancing security and financial efficiency are described by

CTC Research Fellow Jacob Shapiro in Section I of Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qaidas

Organizational Vulnerabilities. See http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_menu.aspfor the CTCs

previous analyses of Harmony documents and a compilation of all documents released to the CTC by

USSOCOM thus far.39 Hala Jaber and Ali Rafat Suicide Bombers Head to Iraq from Damascus The Sunday Times October 7,

2007

25
http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_menu.asphttp://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_menu.asp


26/31


likelycriminal,butothersmaybelinkedtoIraqiinsurgentfactionsthatwere

operatedfromSyriaaftertheU.S.invasion.40

AsketchofSyrianCoordinatornetworksbasedonthelimiteddatainthisone

yearsampleisprovidedatFigure16.ThecorenetworkofSyrianhandlers

appearstostillbeactivewithacertainAbuUmarandAbuAbbasplayingkey

rolesincoordinatingforeignfightertransitthroughSyria. Theactivitiesofthe

auxiliaryhandlersthatcanbemeasuredusingthisdata,however,appeartobe

largelyinactivenow.

Figure16:ActiveSyrianCoordinatorNetworksOverTime41

IfalQaidasSyrianlogisticsnetworksaretrulyrunbymercenaries,thereare

manypolicyoptionsavailabletocooptormanipulatethem. Itisalmost

inconceivablethatSyrianintelligencehasnotalreadytriedtopenetratethese

networks,but

that

does

not

preclude

American

agencies

from

attempting

the

same. TheUnitedStatesabilitytodestroynetworksinsideofSyriaislimited,

40Muidd Fayyad, Interview With Major General Muhammad Abdallah al-Shahwani, director of Iraq's

National Intelligence Service, al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 5, 2005.41 Network analysis software was used to generate this initial sketch of the Syrian coordinator networks.

The CTCs follow on report due out early next year will incorporate greater amounts of data and more

sophisticated use of this powerful analytical tool.

26


27/31


butitmaybepossibletobribeorotherwisecoercesuchcoordinatorstodisrupt

theiroperationsorrevealinformationaboutalQaidasorganizationinIraq.

OneofthepersistentmysteriesoftheIraqwarisexactlyhowIslamistgroupslike

alQaidawereabletocooperatewithIraqssecularSunniinsurgentsearlyinthe

insurgencyperiod. Sinceearly2007,relationsbetweenalQaidasISIandits

secularcounterpartshavedeteriorateddramatically,tothepointwhere

shootoutsandassassinationsbetweengroupsarenowcommonplace. Itis

conceivablethatdeterioratingrelationsbetweentheISIandsecularinsurgents

haveweakenedtheISIslogisticalchain,particularlyinSyria,whereIraqi

Baathistshavestrongties.

Conclusions

TheSinjarRecordsofferunrivaledinsightintoforeignfightersenteringIraq

betweenAugust2006andAugust2007. Thedatarevealsseveralcritical

findings:

SaudismadeupthelargestcontingentofforeignfightersenteringIraq.

Libyansweresecond(firstifmeasuredinpercapitaterms)andSyriansa

distantthird. Intermsofsheernumbers,Saudisconstitutedthelargest

groupofforeignfightersandcontributedthemostoverallsuicide

bombers,butthepercentageofSaudifighterslistedassuicidebombers

wasactuallylowerthannonSaudis.

RecentpoliticaldevelopmentsinAfghanistanandPakistan,the

prevalenceofLibyanfightersinIraq,andevidenceofawellestablished

smugglingrouteforLibyansthroughEgypt,suggeststhatLibyanfactions

(primarilytheLibyanIslamicFightingGroup)areincreasinglyimportant

inalQaida. TheSinjarRecordsoffersomeevidencethatLibyansbegan

surgingintoIraqinlargernumbersbeginninginMay2007.Mostofthe

LibyanrecruitscamefromcitiesinNorthEastLibya,anarealongknown

for

jihadi

linked

militancy.

Libyan

fighters

were

much

more

likely

than

othernationalitiestobelistedassuicidebombers(85%forLibyans,56%

forallothers).

TheSinjarRecordsreinforceanecdotalaccountssuggestingthatal

QaidasIraqiaffiliatesrelyonsmugglersandcriminalsratherthantheir

ownpersonneltofunnelrecruitsintoIraq.

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ManyoftheforeignfightersenteringIraqarrivedwithagroupfromtheir

hometown,suggestingthatalQaidasrecruiterstrytoattractgroupsof

friendssimultaneously.

ThemajorityoffightersthatlistedtheiroccupationbeforetravelingtoIraq

werestudents. Universitieshavebecomeacriticalrecruitingfieldforal

Qaida.

TheSinjarRecordsrevealseveralweaknessesthattheUnitedStatesandother

governmentscanexploit:

AlQaidasrelianceoncriminalandsmugglingnetworksexposesittothe

greedofmercenaries. Inmanycases,theUnitedStatesshouldtargetwork

todestroythesenetworks,buttheU.S.mustremainflexibleenoughtorecognizeopportunitiestocoopt,ratherthansimplyannihilate,such

systems. TheU.S.maybeabletousefinancialincentivesandcreative

securityguaranteestosecurecooperationfromsomesmugglers.42

TheLibyanIslamicFightingGroupsunificationwithalQaidaandits

apparentdecisiontoprioritizeprovidinglogisticalsupporttotheIslamic

StateofIraqislikelycontroversialwithintheorganization. Itislikelythat

someLIFGfactionsstillwanttoprioritizethefightagainsttheLibyan

regime,rather

than

the

fight

in

Iraq.

It

may

be

possible

to

exacerbate

schismswithinLIFG,andbetweenLIFGsleadersandalQaidas

traditionalEgyptianandSaudipowerbase.

TheIslamicStateofIraqhasfailedpoliticallybecauseithasbeenunableto

balancethepracticaldemandsofitslocalIraqiconstituencyandthe

religiousdemandsofitsforeignsupporters. TheISIsclumsyeffortto

balancethesedemandshasalienateditfromotherSunniinsurgents. The

U.S.shouldnotbecontenttoexploitthisfailureonlyinIraq. TheISIs

politicalfailureexemplifiesthefundamentalbankruptcyofalQaidas

ideology. TheU.S.,itsallies,andmoderatesofallkinds,candiscretelyusetheISIspoliticalfailuretoillustratethatlargerideologicalpoint.

42 See Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qaidas Organizational Vulnerabilities available at

http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_menu.asp

28
http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_menu.asphttp://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_menu.asp


29/31


TheSyrianandLibyangovernmentssharetheUnitedStatesconcerns

aboutviolentsalafijihadiideologyandtheviolenceperpetratedbyits

adherents. Thesegovernments,likeothersintheMiddleEast,fear

violenceinsidetheirbordersandwouldmuchratherradicalelementsgo

toIraqratherthancauseunrestathome. U.S.andCoalitioneffortsto

stemtheflowoffightersintoIraqwillbeenhancediftheyaddressthe

entirelogisticalchainthatsupportsthemovementoftheseindividuals

beginningintheirhomecountriesratherthanjusttheirSyrianentry

points.

TheU.S.maybeabletoincreasecooperationfromgovernmentstostem

theflowoffightersintoIraqbyaddressingtheirconcernsaboutdomestic

jihadiviolence.

29


30/31


Appendix1

ThefirststudyofforeignfightersinIraqwasauthoredinMarch2005byIsraeli

researcherReuvenPaz. Pazstudied154fightersidentifiedonjihadiwebforums

ashaving

been

martyred

in

Iraq

and

used

their

memorial

biographies

to

identifytheirnationality. 43 Pazsdatabreakdownlikethis:

SaudiArabia:94(61%) Algeria:2

Syria:16(10.4%) Morocco:2(onewaslivinginSpain)

Iraq:13(8.4%) Yemen:2

Kuwait:11(7.1%) Tunisia:2

Jordan:4 Palestine:1

Lebanon:3(onewaslivinginDenmark) Dubai:1

Libya:2 Sudan:1(livinginSaudiArabia)

InJune2005,anNBCNewsreportcitedaU.S.Armyofficialwholistedthetop

tencountriesoforiginforforeignfightersinIraq:Egypt,Iran,Jordan,Lebanon,

thePalestinianterritories,SaudiArabia,Sudan,Syria,Tunisia,andYemen.44 The

officialwouldnotprovidethenumberoffightersfromeachcountry.

SeveralmonthsafterthePazreportwasreleased,itwascriticizedbyAnthony

CordesmanandNawafObaidoftheCenterforStrategicandInternational

Studies(CSIS)whoarguedthatPazoverstatedtheSaudipresenceinIraq.45

CordesmanandObaid,whosedatawereprovidedbySaudiintelligence,claimed

thatthereweresome3000foreignfightersoperatinginIraq,butthatonly12

percentwereSaudi. TheCordesman/Obaidestimateslooklikethis:

Algeria:600(20%)

Syria:550(18%)

Yemen:500(17%)

Sudan:450(15%)

Egypt:400(13%)

SaudiArabia:350(12%)

OtherCountries:150(5%)

43 Reuven Paz,Arab Volunteers Killed in Iraq: an Analysis,PRISM Series on Global Jihad, No. 1/3, March

2005, online at http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM_no_1_vol_3_-_Arabs_killed_in_Iraq.pdf44

Lisa Meyers, Who are the Foreign Fighters?MSNBCJune 20, 2005, online at

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8293410/45 Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, Saudi Militants in Iraq: Assessment and Kingdoms Response,

Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 19, 2005.

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/050919_saudimiltantsiraq.pdf

30
http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM_no_1_vol_3_-_Arabs_killed_in_Iraq.pdfhttp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8293410/http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/050919_saudimiltantsiraq.pdfhttp://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/050919_saudimiltantsiraq.pdfhttp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8293410/http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM_no_1_vol_3_-_Arabs_killed_in_Iraq.pdf


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InDecember2005,anotherresearcherusedinformationgleanedfromonline

sourcestoassessthenationalityofalQaidalinkedfightersinIraq. Citingalist

of429slainSalafijihadispostedonajihadilinkedwebforum,Muradal

Shishaniconcludedthat53percentwereSaudi,13percentSyrian,8percentIraqi,

5.8percentJordanian,4percentKuwaitiand3.8percentLibyan.46

CitingstatisticsreleasedbyMultiNationalForcesIraqinlate2005,Alan

KruegerconcludedthatmostfighterswereSyrian,withSudanese,Saudis,and

Egyptiansalsocontributingalargenumberoffighters. Ofthe311fighterswhose

nationalitieswerereleased,onlysevenwereLibyan.47

Twoyearslater,theLosAngelesTimescitedofficialU.S.militaryfigures

statingthat45percentofallforeignfightersinIraqcomefromSaudiArabia.48

Accordingtothearticle,15percentarrivedfromLebanonandSyriaandanother10percentwerefromNorthAfrica. TheLosAngelesTimesarticlealsocited

statisticsindicatingthat50percentofallSaudisarrivedinIraqtobecomesuicide

bombers.

46 Murad al-Shishani, The Salafi-Jihadist Movement in Iraq: Recruitment Methods and Arab Volunteers,

Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, 3:23, December 2, 2005.

http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=236984247 Krueger, Alan What Makes a Terrorist(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) pp. 8348 Ned Parker, Saudis Role in Iraq Insurgency Outlined, The Los Angeles Times, July 15, 2007, online at

http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimesA98.html
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369842http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimesA98.htmlhttp://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimesA98.htmlhttp://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369842

west point ctc's al-qa'ida's foreign fighters in iraq

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