west valley demonstration project vitrification melter

West Valley Demonstration Project Vitrification Melter Waste PackageVitrification Melter Waste PackageNRC Special Authorization and DOT Special Permit

Pre-Application Briefing

Presenters:SRNL: Jeff England, Charles McKeel, Stephen Nathan

CHBWV T dd Pi kiCHBWV: Todd Pieczynski Ameriphysics: Chris Brandjes

June 4 2014

www.energy.gov/EM 1

June 4, 2014

PREDECISIONAL DRAFT Rev. 0, 05/30/2014

Content Description

• The content, the West Valley Melter, is comprised of a stainless steel outer housing with an exterior structural steelstainless steel outer housing with an exterior structural steel frame

• The interior is lined with refractory materials

• The maximum envelope dimensions of the Melter is10’-9¾” wide x 11’-10” long x 10’-5 ½” high

• The Melter weight is 107 500 pounds• The Melter weight is 107,500 pounds

• The Melter was built to ASTM standards and procured under the West Valley NQA-1 programy p g

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West Valley Melter Configuration

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Content Radiological Description

• The Melter was estimated to contain about 4,570 curies, including the surface contaminants in 2004

• All external surfaces of the content are coated with three layers of Bartlett’s PBSTM contamination fixativelayers of Bartlett s PBS contamination fixative

• Surface contaminants fixed on the equipment surface

• Content radioactive characterization is being analyzed using shard data to increase accuracy and reduce uncertainty

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Content Characterization

N lidOct 2004

Sep 2014D d

Sep 2014D d S t

Sep 2014D d H lNuclide

Activity (Ci)Decayed

Activity (Ci)Decayed Spout

Activity (Ci)Decayed HeelActivity (Ci)

GasH‐3 3.35E‐02 1.92E‐02 4.45E‐03 Not Measured

I‐129 5.64E‐03 5.64E‐03 1.48E‐03 Not MeasuredFission Fragments & Metals

C‐14 2.12E‐02 2.12E‐02 5.57E‐03 3.45E‐03K‐40 8.19E‐02 8.19E‐02 2.16E‐02 1.33E‐02

Mn‐54 8.57E‐02 2.76E‐05 1.19E‐06 1.51E‐06Co‐60 8 33E‐02 2 26E‐02 4 44E‐03 3 16E‐03Co 60 8.33E 02 2.26E 02 4.44E 03 3.16E 03Ni‐63 1.01E+0 9.43E‐01 2.44E‐01 1.52E‐01Sr‐90 2.47E+02 1.95E+02 6.32E+01 3.12E+01Zr‐95 1.65E+00 1.52E‐17 6.26E‐22 1.24E‐20Tc‐99 1.11E‐02 1.11E‐02 2.90E‐03 2.01E‐03

C 137 4 31E 03 3 43E 03 8 57E 02 5 42E 02Cs‐137 4.31E+03 3.43E+03 8.57E+02 5.42E+02Lanthanides

Ce‐144 1.40E+00 2.08E‐04 7.63E‐06 Not MeasuredEu‐154 1.21E+00 5.44E‐01 1.20E‐01 8.12E‐02

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Content Radiological Description

NuclideOct 2004Activity

(Ci)

Sep 2014Decayed

Activity (Ci)

Sep 2014Decayed Spout

Activity (Ci)

Sep 2014Decayed HeelActivity (Ci)

ActinidesTh 228 4 09E 02 1 12E 03 1 21E 02 7 56E 03Th‐228 4.09E‐02 1.12E‐03 1.21E‐02 7.56E‐03Th‐230 3.65E‐04 3.65E‐04 9.62E‐05 6.05E‐05Th‐232 4.01E‐04 4.01E‐04 1.05E‐04 7.31E‐03U‐232 5.01E‐02 4.53E‐02 1.17E‐02 1.33E‐02U‐233 2.06E‐02 2.06E‐02 5.43E‐03 3.35E‐03U‐234 9.81E‐03 9.81E‐03 2.59E‐03 1.60E‐03U‐235 3.76E‐04 3.76E‐04 9.89E‐05 6.14E‐05U‐236 1.13E‐03 1.13E‐03 2.96E‐04 3.12E+01U‐238 2.25E‐03 2.25E‐03 5.91E‐04 3.74E‐04

Np‐237 6.20E‐03 6.20E‐03 1.63E‐03 1.03E‐03Pu‐238 6.84E‐01 6.32E‐01 1.64E‐01 1.04E‐01Pu‐239 1.59E‐01 1.59E‐01 4.16E‐02 2.61E‐02Pu‐240 1.21E‐01 1.21E‐01 3.19E‐02 2.01E‐02Pu‐241 3.12E+00 1.93E+00 4.56E‐01 2.99E‐01Am‐241 3.00E+00 2.95E+00 7.85E‐01 4.95E‐01Am‐243 3.50E‐02 3.50E‐02 9.19E‐03 5.97E‐03Cm‐242 7.33E‐02 1.47E‐08 1.24E‐10 3.08E‐10Cm‐243 1.68E‐02 1.33E‐02 3.35E‐03 2.16E‐03Cm‐244 4.35E‐01 2.98E‐01 7.20E‐02 4.70E‐02Totals 4.57E+03 9.20E+02 6.06E+02

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Total Decayed 3.63E+03 1.53E+03

Content Surface Contamination

NuclideOct 2004

Surface Activity (Ci)Sep 2014

Surface Activity (Ci)Actinides

H‐3 7.94E‐06 4.55E‐06I‐129 1.59E‐04 1.59E‐14

Fission Fragments & MetalsC‐14 1.57E‐03 1.57E‐03K 40 2 66E 05 2 66E 06K‐40 2.66E‐05 2.66E‐06Fe‐55 3.84E‐03 3.09E‐04Mn‐54 4.87E‐05 1.57E‐08Co‐60 5.11E‐04 1.39E‐04Ni‐59 2.09E‐04 2.09E‐04Ni‐63 6 75E‐03 6 30E‐03Ni 63 6.75E 03 6.30E 03Sr‐90 1.00E+00 7.87E‐01Zr‐95 8.22E‐03 7.57E‐20Tc‐99 1.27E‐05 1.27E‐05

Cs‐137 4.09E+00 3.25E+00Lanthanides

Ce‐144 8.40E‐04 1.25E‐07Pm‐147 2.84E‐02 2.07E‐03Eu‐154 7.67E‐03 3.45E‐03

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Content Surface Contamination

NuclideOct 2004

Surface Activity (Ci)Sep 2014

Surface Activity (Ci)Actinides

Th‐228 1.71E‐05 4.69E‐07Th‐230 1.19E‐07 1.19E‐07Th‐232 1.30E‐07 1.30E‐07U‐232 4.37E‐04 3.95E‐04U‐233 1.64E‐05 1.64E‐05U‐234 6 61E‐06 6 61E‐06U‐234 6.61E‐06 6.61E‐06U‐235 4.62E‐07 4.62E‐07U‐236 1.16E‐06 1.16E‐06U‐238 3.25E‐06 3.25E‐06

Np‐237 9.11E‐06 9.11E‐06Pu‐238 1.79E‐03 1.66E‐03Pu‐239 4.58E‐04 4.58E‐04Pu‐240 3.22E‐04 3.22E‐04Pu‐241 1.54E‐02 9.54E‐03Pu‐242 2.28E‐05 2.28E‐05Am‐241 1.51E‐02 1.49E‐02A 243 1 18E 03 1 18E 03Am‐243 1.18E‐03 1.18E‐03Cm‐242 3.58E‐04 7.16E‐11Cm‐243 5.56E‐06 4.39E‐06Cm‐244 5.24E‐03 3.58E‐03Cm‐245 1.10E‐02 1.10E‐02Cm‐246 1 79E‐03 1 79E‐03

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Cm 246 1.79E 03 1.79E 03Total 5.20E+00 4.10E+00

Fissile Determination

• The glass in the content contains the following fissile material P 239 P 241 U 233 and U 235 ith a bo ndingmaterial Pu-239, Pu-241, U-233 and U-235 with a bounding content of 175.7 g (2004 Data)

• The approximate total weight of the residual vitrified glass pp g gis 425 kg

• “The consistency of the compositions throughout the (DWPF) M lt f th i t f l t th t lt(DWPF) Melter, from the interface layer to the two melt pool samples to a previously collected pour stream sample, indicate that there is no measurable stratification of actinides or noble metals.” (WSRC-TR-2003-00477, Rev. 0)

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Fissile Determination

• The plugged spout is the bounding case of glass with 47 g and• The plugged spout is the bounding case of glass with 47 g and 99 kg of glass from shard data for the specific batch when plugged

• The heel contains about 30 g over 300 kg of glass based on shard data from the last batch.

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Package Description

• The package is a rectangular shaped made from SA-516, G d 70 b lGrade 70 carbon steel

• The package is 14’-11” long x 12’-6” wide x 12’-6” high with box dimensions of 13’-5” long x 12’-4” wide x 12’-4” highbox dimensions of 13 5 long x 12 4 wide x 12 4 high

• It has a side cover recessed into the package with thirty-two (32) 1½” diameter bolts

• It is sealed with a neoprene rubber gasket



Package Configuration



Package Materials of Construction and Criteria

• ASTM SA516 Grade 70 Carbon Steel for the Package top, g p,bottom, sides, end cover and temporary attachments

• ASTM A36 Carbon Steel for the shock absorbers

• Package side cover bolts are ASTM A193-B7

• American Welding Society (AWS) D1.1• e g Weld electrodes per Structural Welding Code – Steel• e.g., Weld electrodes per Structural Welding Code – Steel

• American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) for shipment of radioactive material under 49CFR173



Packaging DOT Configuration (Cutaway Section)


PREDECISIONAL DRAFT Rev. 0, 05/30/2014Not‐to‐scale

West Valley Melter PackageProposed Fixes

Reinforcement of Bolted Cover for Hypothetical A id C di i (HAC)Accident Condition (HAC)



Packaging Weight and Design Criteria

• The weight of the empty package is approximately 205 000 lb205,000 lbs.

• Content weight is 107,500 lbs.

• The total weight of the packaging including the• The total weight of the packaging, including the radioactive contents, low-density cellular concrete (LDCC) and the package, is approximately 382,000 lbs.

• The packaging was designed, constructed, and procured under a NQA-1 program to provide containment under the normal conditions of transport as defined in 49CFR 173 fornormal conditions of transport as defined in 49CFR 173 for an Industrial Package Type 2 (IP-2)



Packaging Summary

• The combined effect of packaging provides the p g g pcontainment boundary:

• Waste form is resistant to dispersal and is contained in the Melter

• Voids are filled with LDCC in a 4” and 6” thick carbon steel walled• Voids are filled with LDCC in a 4” and 6” thick carbon steel walled container

• Encasing the content with LDCC provides the containment boundaryboundary

• The bolted configuration between the container body and the cover



Packaging Summary

• Closure of all package penetrations (gasketed, bolted, torqued).

• Integral shock absorption system with reinforcement on bolted sidebolted side.



Ongoing Structural Assessment

• 10 Foot Corner Drop Confirmatory FEA• SRNL Evaluation shows 23 G

• Indicates Full Utilization of Absorber Occurs Prior to Absorbing Energy Demand of the 10’ Dropo Due to 382,000 lbs. Model Weight

o Causes Spike in Bolt Demands In latter stage of impact

o Additional Drop Height Invokes Disproportionately Higher Demands in bolts

• Bolts Do Not Break, but at tensile strain limito Thread Failure Still In Question, cannot credit full bolt tensile strains,

since shear failure in non‐ductile



Ongoing Confirmatory Structural Assessment

• 10 Foot Corner Drop Confirmatory FEA

Kinetic Energy HistoryKinetic Energy History During Impact

Energy Plot matches th 2004 l ithe 2004 analysis, once weight diff is

accounted.



Bolt Failure in 30 Foot Side Down Drop

• Bolted Wall Down, Striking on 2004 Added Bumpers

• Steel Container Weight = 205,000 lbs.

• Bolted Wall Weight = 36,800 lbs.

• Grout and Contents = 177,000 lbs.

Impact Capacity of 32 Bolts• Strain Capacity = 16% (ASTM Spec)• Max Stretch = 6 inch * 0.16 = 0.96 inch• Resisting Force = 32 bolts * 142,000 lbs.

Impact Demand on 32 Bolts• Weight = 36,800+177,000 = 213,800 lbs.• Drop Height = 30 feet• Energy Demand = 6,414,000 ft-lbsResisting Force 32 bolts 142,000 lbs.

• Ignore non-ductile nature of failure• Capacity = 0.96 inch * 32 * 142,000 lbs.

• Capacity = 364,000 ft-lbs

Energy Demand 6,414,000 ft lbs• Demand is ~20 times Bolt Capacity• Bolts Fail at 1.5 foot drops, even if full shear

strength of plate threaded hole• Bolts Fail on NCT drops when weakerCapacity 364,000 ft lbs Bolts Fail on NCT drops when weaker

thread shear limit considered.

HAC Impact Demand is 20X the Bolt Capacity




• 30 Foot Corner Drop FEA• 55 G Impact (More than 2X than occurred in 10‐Foot)55 G Impact (More than 2X than occurred in 10 Foot)

• Absorber Fully Utilization During Crush, Package Walls start to Deform

• All Bolts Above Failure Loads• All Bolts Above Failure Loads

• Grout Contents ‐ Only Insignificant Deformation

• Box Walls – Only Insignificant Deformations, damage limited t D Ed Pl t (2” 6 25” W ll t i )to Door Edge Plates (2” x 6.25” Wall extensions)




Nearly All Bolts above Tensile Limit

• Bolt Loads Away from Impact, 30 Foot Corner Drop




All Bolts above Tensile Limit

• Bolt Loads Near Impact 30 Foot Corner Drop


Bolt Loads Near Impact, 30 Foot Corner Drop



• 30 Foot Corner Drop Deformed Shape




• 30 Foot Drop, Bottom Edge92 G I t• 92 G Impact

• All Bolts Along Top Row Fail in Tension

• 2/3 of the Bolts along Side Fail in Tension

• Failure of Bolts in Tension would Result in Remaining Bolts Failing in Thread Shear Out

• Deformation Damage to Container is limited to Wall Edge Extension Plates (2” x 6.25” plates) the surround the Door

• Contents Deformation Insignificant




• 30 Foot Drop CG Over Bottom Edge Deformed Shape


30 Foot Drop, CG Over Bottom Edge, Deformed Shape



• 30 Foot Drop CG Over Bottom Edge Showing Bolt Failure


30 Foot Drop, CG Over Bottom Edge, Showing Bolt Failure



• 30 Foot Drop, Bolted Side Down• 100 G to 150 G Impact, per FEA

• Weight * G Value exceeds Concrete Strength, Crumbling

• All Bolts Fail, 100%

• Grout Containment not assured

• Plastic Flow Strength of Bumpers Dictates Initial Impact Energy

• Internal Weight * G Value exceeds• Internal Weight * G Value exceeds Bolt Capacity by 5X



Structural Assessment Summary

• 30 Foot Drops Result in Bolt FailuresM t t 100% f il• Most cases represent 100% failures

• Other cases have partial initial failures, leading to 100% subsequent

• Bolt Failure Occurs in Select NCT drops

• Thread Shear Strength + Non‐Ductile Failure

• Steel Box Essentially Undeformedy

• Grout Contents Essentially Undeformed• Grout Compressive Failure occurs locally



Reinforcement of Existing Absorbers

Proposed Fixes

i h b bili f• High Probability of Success• Clean, Defensible Analysis Using

Standard Absorption Methods

• No Bolt Failures

• Simple Construction

• Can be clipped into placeCan be clipped into place

• Contents Contained



Thermal

• Application will provide an evaluation of the performance of the WVMP design under the conditions specified inof the WVMP design under the conditions specified in 10 CFR 71.71 for NCT and 10 CFR 71.73 for HAC

• Application will determine the maximum normal operating• Application will determine the maximum normal operating pressure (MNOP) of the package

• Application will analyze the HAC fire test• Application will analyze the HAC fire test

• The package is assumed to develop gaps in the bolted closure near the point of impact during the drop tests so no pressure willthe point of impact during the drop tests so no pressure will develop inside



Thermal

• The package is assumed to be breached during HAC sequence of events and no pressure is expected to buildsequence of events, and no pressure is expected to build up in the package due to the increase in temperature caused by the HAC fire transient

• In the case where the package is not breached, the pressure increase will be analyzed to ensure it is

t blacceptable



Containment

• Plan to use LaCrosse Special Authorization as the model for pcontainment

• Containment system is the container made from SA-516, Grade 70 carbon steel in conjunction with LDCC

• Glass is non-disperable waste form fixed and contained in the Melter

• Exterior surface contamination is fixed by 3 layers of Bartlett’s PBSTMBartlett’s PBS



Containment

• 30 Foot Corner Drop Deformed Shape


30 Foot Corner Drop Deformed Shape


Shielding

• The package contents are normal form radioactive material.

• The package contains the Melter with residual glass inside

• LDCC is used to fill the void space in the Melter and annulusLDCC is used to fill the void space in the Melter and annulus between the Melter and the outer packaging

• The LDCC prevents migration of any remaining surface contamination, component shifting, and dose rate changes during transportation



Criticality

• The package fissile contents are limited to fissile material p gquantities meeting the exemption standards in10 CFR 71.15(c)



Package Operations

• The application will describe the package loading, closure and preparation for transport

• The package will initially be moved by multi-axle hydraulic il il h i ill b f d iltrailer to a rail spur where it will be transferred to rail

conveyance



Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program

• Chapter 8 of the application will describe the acceptance tests already performed on the packagetests already performed on the package

• The package is designed for exclusive use, one-time transportation and disposal of the Meltertransportation and disposal of the Melter

• Acceptance tests and inspections will be performed priorto the transportation of the package in compliance withp p g p10 CFR 71.85

• The fabrication program was in accordance with the West Valley QA Program and the approved design




• Weld examinations were conducted under AWS D1.1.

• The structural integrity of the package is analytically demonstrated.

• No pressure test will be performed.

• No leak testing of the package prior to transport.

• package contains solid radioactive material immobilized in LDCC

• the container system is bolted and the package integrity under NCT provides assurance that radioactive materials will remain containedprovides assurance that radioactive materials will remain contained in the package




• No maintenance procedures are likely since this is a single p y guse package to be used for final disposal of the Melter.



west valley demonstration project vitrification melter

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