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8/10/2019 Western Versus Islamic Human Rights Conceptions - A Critique of Cultural Essentialism in the Discussion on Huma

1/33

"Western" versus "Islamic" Human Rights Conceptions?: A Critique of Cultural Essentialism inthe Discussion on Human RightsAuthor(s): Heiner BielefeldtSource: Political Theory, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb., 2000), pp. 90-121Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192285.

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2/33

WESTERN

VERSUS

ISLAMIC

HUMAN

RIGHTS

CONCEPTIONS?

A Critique of Cultural Essentialism

in

the Discussion

on Human

Rights

HEINERBIELEFELDT

University

of

Bielefeld

I.

A

WESTERN

ONCEPT?

HumanRights:

A

Western

Construct

withLimited

Applicability

s

the

polemical

title of

an article

by

Pollis and Schwab,

tworepresentatives

f cul-

tural

relativism

and mostoutspoken

critics

of

universal

human

rights.'Pollis

and Schwab

argue

hat

since

human

rights

originated

historically

n Western

Europe

and

North America,

they

are

essentially

connected-and

indeed

confined-to the culturalandphilosophicalconceptsof theOccidental radi-

tion. Scholars

from various

disciplines

have

expressed

similar

opinions.

The

German

philosopher

Picht,

for

example,

derives

the idea of humanrights

from

ancient

Stoicism that,

in his

opinion,

has

provided

the metaphysical

basis

for the

concepts

of human

dignity

and human

rights.

Assuming

that

the

particular

deas

of Stoic

philosophy-ideas

that

even

in

Europe

arecurrently

losing ground-will

hardly

ever be endorsed

on a

global

scale,

Picht comes

to the

skeptical

conclusion

that the

utopia

of a

global

order

of human

rights

is but an empty illusion. 2Fikentscher,a Germanlawyer and historian,

locates

the

historic

origin

of humanrights

in the sixteenth-century

Nether-

lands,

that is,

in

the

context of

the Dutch

Protestant

iberation

movement

against

the

Spanish

Catholic

occupation.

With

regard

o the

originally

Chris-

tian

motives

underneath

he

Dutch

struggle

for

rights

and

liberties,

Fikent-

scher

asserts

ironically

that

the

mainly

secular-minded

Western'

reform-

AUTHOR'S

NOTE:This

essay

is

largely

based

on

chapter

5

of my

book,

Philosophie

der Men-

schenrechte:

Grundlagen

ines

weltweiten

Freiheitsethos

Philosophy,

of

Human

Rights:

The

Foundationof

an

International

Ethics

of Freedom) Wissenschaftliche

uchgesellschaft,

1998).

I

express

mygratitude

o

the Wissenschaftliche

uchgesellschaftfor

ts

permissionftJr

publica-

tion

of

this English

version

of

the

chapter

POLITICALTHEORY,

Vol. 28 No.

1,February

000 90-121

(?

2000

Sage

Publications,

Inc.

90

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/33

Bielefeldt / CULTURALESSENTIALISM 91

ers

n ThirdWorld

countries

unconsciouslypropagate

Christian

alues: not

knowing

what

they

are

doing, they actually

continue Christian

missionary

work. 3The most prominentcontemporary epresentative f an essentialist

Western

understanding

of human

rights, however,

is

Huntington,

the

prophetof the danger

of a clash

of civilizations.

n

his global political map,

humanrights-as

well

as

democracy, iberalism,

and

political secularism-

belong exclusively

to Westerncivilization.4

Huntington

s

convinced that

universalism

of human

rights

s bound o fail. For

people

from

otherciviliza-

tions,

he

says,

the

only way

in which

to

have full access

to human

rights

is to

adopt essentially

Western alues and

hence to

implicitly

convertto

West-

erncivilization.

The

assumption

hathuman

rights

are

essentially

a

Western

oncept

can

lead to different practicalconsequences. Culturalrelativists,

such as

Pollis

and Schwab

on the left and

Huntington

on the

right, reject

universalhuman

rights

as

a manifestationof Eurocentric

rrogance

r

as an

illusion

doomed

to

collapse.

Other

scholars,

such as

Fikentscher,

eem to defend

the idea that he

West has a

global

mission to fulfill.

Tibi even invokes

Hegel's metaphor

of a

cunning

of

reason o

argue

that

European olonialism,

for

all its

injustice,

might haveyielded some positiveresults as well. Tibi writes, Itwas, as it

were, a byproductof theEuropean onquestof theworld,abyproduct n the

sense

of the

Hegelian 'cunning

of

reason,'

hat he

European

ultural

heritage

has been

disseminated;

and

human

rights

constitutea crucial

component

of

that

heritage. 5

Inopposition o essentialist Western laims of humanrights,alternative

conceptions

meanwhilehave been

brought orward, onceptions

that

explic-

itly

claim

a

non-Western

ulturalor

religious origin.

For

example,

Muslim

authorsororganizationshaverecentlypublisheda numberof Islamicdecla-

rations

of human

rights hat,

n

theirown

way,

reflect

the culturalism nherent

in

essentialist Western

nterpretations ecause these Islamic declarations,

too,

often claim an

exclusive culturaland religious heritageof humanrights.

One of the earliest advocates of this new

tendency

is

Mawdudi,

an

Islamist

author rom

Pakistan,

who

vehemently

attacksWestern

arrogance

n

the con-

text of human

rights. Alluding

to the

history

of Western

colonialism and

imperialism,

Mawdudi

writes,

The

people

in

the

West

have

the

habit of

attributing very good thing

to themselves

and

try

to

prove

hat t is

because

of

them thatthe

world

got

this

blessing. Against

humanrights

standards f

the

United

Nations,

which in

Mawdudi's

opinion

were

one-sidedly shaped by

Western

hilosophy,

Mawdudidrafts

a

specifically

Islamic

conception

of

human

rights

based

primarily

on

the

Qur'an

and the

tradition

Sunna)

of

the

prophet

Muhammad.



4/33


5/33

Bielefeldt

/

CULTURALESSENTIALISM 93

equality before

God

supersedes

social and ethnic difference.

Thus St.

Paul

emphasizes,

There s

neitherJew nor

Greek,

there is neitherbond nor

free,

there is neithermalenor female: forye are all one in ChristJesus Galatians

3:28). Comparable

deas of a

spiritualunity

of all of

humanityalsooccurout-

side

the

Jewish-Christianholy scriptures,

for

example,

in the

writings

of

Stoic

philosophers.

The Roman

emperorAurelius,

one

of the most

prominent

Stoic authors,

eaches

that

he

human

spiritemerges

from

divinity.

He further

points

out

that all

human

beings intimatelybelong together.They

constitute

one

family

united

not

by

physical

bonds

of blood and seed

but

primarilyby

their common participation

in

the

divine

logos.8

Jewish-Christian swell as Stoicandothermotifs havejointlyformedthe

European

natural

aw

tradition

hat

stretches

from

antiquity

to

modernity.

The concept

of

natural

aw has differentconnotations.On

one

hand,

the natu-

ral law tradition

claims an unconditionalauthority

of

some basic normative

principles

hatare

supposed

o be

prior

o human

egislation

and

in

this sense

natural s opposed

to

merely

artificial.

Sophocles'

Antigone provides

an

early example

of such a conviction

by invoking

unwritten

aws of eternal

validity. On the other

hand, the concept of natural

aw also connotes

inde-

pendence from an exclusively theocraticfoundationof society and law. In

this

context,

normative

principles

are

thought

o be

natural

n

the

sense of

being

understandable

without

explicit

reference

to

a divine revelation

and

thus

applicable

to

people

outside

of the dominant

i.e.,

Christian)religious

tradition

as well. Under

this

assumption,

Bartolome

de Las

Casas,

a member

of the

Dominican

order,

became

an

ardent

defenderof the

natural

ights

of

non-Christian ndians

n

South

America. He

charged he

European onquis-

tadores

with

murder,

obbery,

and

genocide,

that

s,

brutalcrimes thatviolate

the

natural aw.9The natural

aw

tradition hereforeoften has been listed as

one

of

the most

important

ources of

human

rights

in

Western radition.

Otherscholarshave located the historic

origin

of

human

rights

n

the

Prot-

estant

Reformation,

an

event that

Hegel praises

as the

very

birthof

modernity

and modernfreedom.

In

his

philosophy

of

history,

he writes that the Refor-

mation

is

the

banner of the free

spirit

around which

the

modern nations

assemble. '

Three

generations

after

Hegel,

Jellinek

(1895)

and

Troeltsch

(191 1) argued

hat

the

Protestant

mphasis

on the individual reeconscience

as

a

precondition

of

authentic

aith

paved

the

way

historically

or

the

recogni-

tion of individualhumanrights.' mportant tepstowardhumanrightsalso

can be seen

in

the Petition

of

Right

of

1628

and

the HabeasCorpusAct of

1679. One

of

the

contributions

of the British common law tradition, t has

been

argued,

s the

insight

that

rightsrequire

remedies

n

order

o be effective

because

wherethere is no

remedy,

there

is no

right. 2



6/33


7/33


lapsarian

immaculate divine order.

In

medieval

cosmology, inequality,

including inequality among

human

beings

in

their social and

legal status,

constitutes hevery beautyof the hierarchical rderof things.It is clearthat n

the

framework f such a hierarchical

worldview,

human

rights,

n

the modern

sense

of

rights

of

equal

freedomand

participation,

re

nconceivable rom the

outset.

This hierarchical

understanding

f creationeven affects the medieval

meaning

of human

dignity.

It is

indeed

noteworthy

hat

n

medieval

philoso-

phy

the term

dignity

s

mostly

used

in

the

plural,

hus

indicating

he

differ-

ent

dignities

of

people

in

accordance

with their different

ranks,

order,

and

estates

in a feudal

society.

One also should avoidoverstating heimpactof the ProtestantReforma-

tion

on the historical

development

of human

rights.

To be

sure,

the Reforma-

tion marks

a

turningpoint

n

theologicalreasoningby challenging

he

clerical

hierarchy

of

the Middle

Ages.

Luther's

emphasis

on

the spiritual reedomof

every Christian

and the

spiritualequality

of

all

believers,

however,

was not

meant

to call into

question

the

given

social and

political

order.

On the

con-

trary,

Luther

was anxiousnot to conflate

spiritual

iberationwith

political

and

legal

demandsbecause

such a

conflation,

he

feared,

would amount o

a new

legalism thatwould undermine heliberating heologicalmessageof thegos-

pel.

Hence

if

there is

any

connection

between the

Reformationand

modern

human

rights,

then it must be

an

indirect

one.

Troeltsch ndeed

emphasizes

that it

was

not

mainstream Protestantism

but rather

the

stepchildren

of

the Reformation

i.e.,

individual dissenters and

marginalized

Protestant

denominations)

who

paved heway

for

theadoptionof religious

liberty

n

the

Anglo-Saxon

countries.

7

Finally,

the

English

common law

tradition

does

not

immediately ead to

human

rights

either.

The

principal

witness in

this regard s Burke,whoplays

off

traditional

ights

of

Englishmenagainst

he

purportedly

bstractuniversal

rights

as

they

were

propagatedby the French Revolution.

Referring o the

1628

Petition

of

Right,

Burke

points out that

n

the English

tradition, ights

were considered a

particularheritage

to be

passed

on from

generation

to

generation:

In

the

famous aw of the

[thirdyear]

of

CharlesI, called the Petition

of

Right, the

parlia-

ment says

to the

king,

Your

ubjects

have

inherited his freedom, laiming

their fran-

chises not on abstractprinciples as therights of men but as the rights of Englishmen

and

as a

patrimony

derivedfrom their forefathers.18

Burke's

argument

s

that

rights

of freedomnevercan

be created

artificiallyon

the basis

of

universal

equality

but rather

must be cherished as a

particular



8/33


9/33

Bielefeldt

/ CULTURAL

ESSENTIALISM

97

religious

traditionsof

Europe.

On

the

contrary,people

in

the

West, too,

had

(and

still

have)

to

fight

to have their

rights respected.

In

fighting

for

their

human rights, they faced resistancenot only from traditionallyprivileged

groups

such as the

aristocracy

and from advocates of an

authoritariantate.

Anti-liberal

currentsalso were

strong

among representatives

f the

churches

who feared hat

he

emancipatory pirit

of human

rights

would

undermine he

moral

fabricof Christian

ociety

and the hierarchical tructure f the

clergy.

Senghaas

is thus

right

in

rejecting

cultural

essentialist

interpretation

of

humanrights.

These

rights,

he

emphasizes,

are achievements

brought

about

in

long-lasting political conflicts

during

the

process

of

modernization n

Europe. They are by no means the eternalheritageof an originalcultural

endowment

of

Europe. 26

IV

RETROSPECTIVE RITICALCONNECTION

BETWEENHUMANRIGHTS

AND

WESTERN

RADITION

Human

rights

involve

far-reaching

normative

changes

in

the

understand-

ing of politics and law.Unlike in premodern imes,people living in modern

societies no

longer

can resort

o more or

less

unquestioned

authoritarian

ra-

ditions

to

gain

normativeorientation.

nstead,

normshave

become

an

object

of active

efforts;they

are enacted

by

human

egislation

and remain

open

to

challenges

and critical debates.

Habermastherefore

suggests

that human

rights

belong

to a

posttraditional

ormative

reasoning that,

he

says,

has

replaced traditional orms of ethics

rooted

in

religion

or

metaphysics.27

The term

posttraditional ightly indicates

that

normative

ustification

underthe circumstancesof modernitycannotbe achievedsimply by conjur-

ing up traditionalauthorities.

And

yet

the term is misleading because it

can

nourish the idea that

posttraditional

uman

rights requirea

rupture

rom

all

tradition.

This,

however,

would be a

problematic ssumption. f

human

rights

were to

imply

an

abstract

dichotomy

between tradition

and

modernity, hen

those who continue to cherish their

religious

or cultural

raditionswould be

conceptionally

excluded from

havingfull access to

human

rights. In other

words,

the

acceptance

of

human

rights,

at

least in

principle, would be

con-

fined

to

a

circle of

people

who

implicitly

or

explicitly havebrokenaway

from

their

religious, philosophical, or

cultural traditions.

As a result of

such a

dichotomized

view, universalhuman

rights eventually

would get lost in an

ideology

of

progress, an ideology

perhapsnot less

exclusivist in its conse-

quences

than s the

essentialist

equationof human

rights

with a particularist

of

exclusively

Western r

Christian

alues.

Christianor Occidental

mis-



10/33

98

POLITICAL

THEORY

February

000

sionary

work

would

bereplaced

by a modernist

missioncivilisatrice

directed

against

premodern

ultures

or

worldviews.

Thereare

in fact scholars

who

subscribe o sucha dichotomizedview.TheGermanphilosopherEbeling,for

example,

argues

that

people

representing

premodern

ultures

and

reli-

gions,

in particular

Muslims,

should

be

excluded from immigration

and

political

participation

n European

ocieties.28

Alluding

to the

battle

between

Tours

andPoitiers

in 732 when

the

Franconians

epelled

the Muslim

inva-

sion,Ebeling

calls

for a

new intellectual

battle

of

Western

modernity

against

the

influx of

premodern

Muslimimmigrants

and asylum seekers

who,

he

29

thinks, currently

are conquering

Western

ocieties.

Against such an abstractdichotomyof traditionand posttraditional

human

rights,

I

would

argue

hat

humanrights

can

meaningfully

and

produc-

tively

be connected

with different

traditions. Once

again,

the

Catholic

Churchprovides

an

illuminating

xample.

After

a long

period

of reluctance,

if

not

resistance,

the Catholic

Church

inally

did

endorse

human

rights

and

religious

liberty.3

The Second

Vatican

Council's

declaration

Dignitatis

humanae

n

1965 explicitly

appreciates

he modern

understanding

f human

dignity

based

on the

recognition

of human reedom

andresponsibility.

Even

though the Second VaticanCouncil's declarationclearly marksa turning

point

within

thehistory

of

the

Church,

t

is

not

meant

o be

a total

rupture

rom

the

Catholic

tradition.

Rather,

he Church

considers

humanrights

to be

a

modernway

of

protecting

hat unconditional

dignity

of

every

human

being

that always

has been

a

part

of the

Christian

message.

The

Church's

commit-

ment

on behalf

of

human

rights,

albeit

a rather

recent

development,

thus

appears

o remain

n

keeping

withthe Christian

radition,

or

more

precisely,

with a

revised

and modernized

versionof Christian

radition

more

appropri-

ate

for Christians

iving

underthe

circumstances

of

modernity.

Protestantdenominations

oday

also understand

nd

foster human

rights

as a consequence

of Biblical

commands

and Christian

mpulses.

In 1977

the

churches

of

the Lutheran

WorldFederation

held a conference

n which

they

claimed

that

secular

human

rights

can

be

appreciated

rom

the

perspective

of

the

Christian

Reformation

because

it was

the

intention

of the reformers

hat

man

should

learn

to let God

be

God

in order

hatmanhimself

might

become

man

and the

world

remain he world.' 3

he workingpaperspublished

by

the

World

Association

of Reformed

Churches

n 1976

point

to the

right

of

resis-

tance as a contributionof the Calvinistictraditionto the developmentof

32

human

rights.

Connecting

human

rights

with

humanitarian

lements

of

the

Western

radition,

f

course,

s

not a

privilege

of Christians

nly.

One also

can

refer to

ancient

Greek

philosophy,

he

Renaissance,

he

English principle

of

the

rule

of

law,

the

early

modern

Enlightenment,

and other

currents

n

Westernhistorythat,

n one

way

or

another,provide

occasions

for an

incul-



11/33


turation

of human

rights.

Given such

possibilities

of

inculturation,

human

rightscertainly

are not

posttraditional

n

the sense of

being simply discon-

nectedfrom culturalorreligioustradition.

It would be problematic,however,if this inculturation

were to go along

with claims to an exclusive cultural

heritage,

claims that

may follow from a

teleological

view

of history,

as criticized earlier

by Kaviraj.

When

looking

back

nto

the

past,

we

easily

become

Hegelians

who

regard

he chain of

his-

toric

events as

entailing

a concealed

plan

of

history,

a

planaccording

o

which

antiquityharbors he cultural enes

of

what

ater

ripenedandfinallyculmi-

nated

n

the modernera. Modem

democracy

hus

appears

o have its

roots

in theancientGreekpolis. Likewise, modernstandards f humanrightsseem

to be

grounded

n

the basic sources of Occidental

culture,religion,

and

phi-

losophy at large.

And

even modern secularism often is traced back to the

Bible,

for

example,

to the wordof Jesus: render nto Cesarthe

things

which

are

Cesar'sand unto

God the

things

thatareGod's

(Matthew

22:2

1).

Such a

Hegelian way

of

thinkingeasily

leads to the

assumption

hatwhat

s rooted

in the

original

sourcesof a

particular

ulture

can

legitimately

be claimedas an

exclusive

heritage

of that

culture.

Against

such

an

essentialist

appropriation,

it is necessary to reflecton the contingencyof humanhistory,a history that

does

not

develop

in

the

way

of a

natural

nfolding

of a

preexisting

cultural

potential.Recalling

this

contingency

of human

history

would be a

first step

toward

abandoning

he essentialist

appropriation

f human

rights

thatthem-

selves cannot

simply

and

exclusively

be deduced from the

genes

of

any

particular

ulture.

One also should

be

awareof the hermeneutic

tandpoint

rom which we

look at history. Connectinghuman

rights

to

humanitarian lements within

religious, philosophical,

or cultural radition s

possible only

from the

stand-

point

of

modernity.

t is

from

a modern

tandpoint

hatwe can

discovertradi-

tional humanitarian

motifs that

allow

building

a

bridge

between the

present

and

the

past.

It is

in

retrospective

hat

we

see

an

analogy

between

modern

ideas of human

dignity

and

the Biblical

message

of

the

personbeing

an

image

of God.

By looking

back into the

past,

we can tracethe

genesis

of

the rule

of

law to the

1215 MagnaCharta ndothermedievalor

ancientdocuments. n

retrospective

t also

might

make

sense to

comparemodernprinciplesof free-

dom and

equality

to Luther'sdoctrineof the

free

religious

conscience

andthe

spiritualequalityof all believersbefore God. Andit is even possibleto con-

nect

retrospectively

ecular human

rights

to

aspects

of

a

disenchantment

of

the cosmos

that

can be found

already

n

the Bible.

Generallyspeaking,

her-

meneutic awareness should teach us that the

previously

mentioned tradi-

tional

ideas

are not roots or

sources hat

harbor

he

potential

of modern

human

rights,

a

potential

hat

gradually ipened

n

history.

It is the

otherway



12/33


13/33

Bielefeldt / CULTURAL

ESSENTIALISM 101

when the traditionalEuropean ociety was in a deep

crisis,

a crisis

triggered

by the split of EuropeanChristendom n the wake of the Reformationas well

as by decadesof civil wars betweenconflicting religious andpolitical fac-

tions.

Crisis of

traditiondoes not

necessarily

mean a decline or even

a loss of

tradition.

What it does

imply, however,

s a

serious transformation f tradi-

tion. Experiences

of

structural

njustice-civil wars,

religious intolerance,

arbitrarydetentions,

and other acts

of

state

oppression-demonstrated the

urgency

of

far-reaching olitical

andcultural eforms.Thus

people gradually

learned

how to achieve

peaceful

coexistence and

cooperation

n

a

modem

pluralist ociety on the basis of equal

freedomand

participation, hat s,

in

the

normative rameworkof humanrightsanddemocracy.

The modem awareness

of

freedom

has

its ethical core

in

the

profession

of

human

dignity. Understanding

human

dignity

in

Kantian

terms as

moral

autonomy

and

connecting

this

autonomy

o universal

rights

of

freedom and

participationcertainly is

a

specifically

modern

achievement.34 or all

the

novelty

of universalhuman

rights,however,

he

underlyingprofessionof dig-

nity

can

at

the same time

be

meaningfully

connected to the

Bible, to Stoic

philosophy,

and to other

founding

documents of

what we usually call the

Western radition.Althoughhumanrightscannotsimplybederived romthis

tradition

n

a deductivist

or

essentialist

way, they

certainly

are

not

posttradi-

tional

in

the sense that all connection between modern

rights conceptions

and

traditionalethical

principles

must be severed.

Two

systematic nsights

can be

gained

from

looking

at

the

European

his-

tory

of human

rights, insights

thatcan be

helpful

for a

cross-culturalnorma-

tive

dialogue.

On

one

hand,Europeanhistory

shows that

people fighting

for

theirbasic

rights

often faced a lot of

resistance.This resistancenot

only

was a

political

one but also

includedcultural

and

religious

opposition epitomized,

for

example, by

the Christianchurches

that, over a

considerableperiod of

time,

were

quite

reluctant o

support

modern

principles

of

politicalemanci-

pation.

On

the otherhand,Europeanhistoryalso

shows thata critical recon-

ciliation

between

modernity

and

traditionwas

possible,

a

reconciliation hat

today clearly

includes the

churches,

meanwhile often ardent

advocates

of

human

rights.

The

history

of human

rights

in

the West

is not

a

binding model that

allows us to makeforecastsabout he

prospects

of

human

rights

n

otherparts

of the world,norshould this Westernhistorybe coveredby a veil of igno-

rance

on

behalf

of a

purportedly

eutral

tandpoint

n

cross-cultural ebates.

Rather,

he

history

of human

rights

n

the West gives us an

example-not the

paradigmper

se but

merely

an

example-of the variousobstacles,misunder-

standings, earningprocesses, achievements,

and

failures

n

the

long-lasting



14/33

102 POLITICAL

THEORY February2000

struggle for human

rights. Such

a self-critical historic perspective

may

enhance our sensitivityfor the problems

and opportunities,

e they different

orsimilar, hathumanrightsadvocatesare facing in non-Western ultural

contexts as well.

Perhaps even more important,

a self-critical attitude

of Europeansand

North Americans

toward their own

complex and

complicated history of

human

rights also

is a necessarypreconditionor overcoming

he suspicion,

on the partof many people, that

by fighting for human

rights Westerners

simply try

to impose theirown culturalvalues and

norms n an imperialistic

fashion.

This

suspicion

is widespread

n Muslim countries

whose popula-

tions historically suffered from Europeancolonialismand, in many cases,

still feel threatenedby Western mperialism.

n

the face

of such widespread

mistrust,

t

seems

all

the more mportant o make t

clearthathumanrights

do

not

constitute

a

set of

essentially

Western

values

thatare to be exported

on a

global scale.Rather,whatunderlies

humanrights s

experiencesof structural

injustice

culminating

n those barbarouscts hat,

as

the Universal

Decla-

rationof

Human

Rights

of

1948

emphasizes

n

its

preamble,

haveoutraged

the conscience of mankind. 35akingseriously

this

fundamental

xperience

requiresusto embarkon a common earningprocesstoward stablishingeffi-

cient

human

rights mechanisms,

a

learningprocess

in

which claims

of cul-

tural

egacies

should cease

to

play

a dominant

political

role.

Vl

CONFLICTS

ETWEEN

SHARIAHAND HUMAN

RIGHTS

It is a trivialobservation hatreligionconstitutesmerelyone component

within a whole

range

of

political,

economic, social,

and

cultural

actors

that

inhibit or foster

the

implementation

of human

rights.

When it comes

to

Islamic

countries, however,

this truism

seems

worth

recalling

because

Islamic

religion

and cultureoften are

portrayed

s

being

the chief obstacle

to

an

improvement

of the

troubling

human

rights

situation

in

some

of these

countries.

Against

such a one-sided

view,

Faath

and

Mattes

point

out

that

most

of the human

rights

violations that

they

have

analyzed

n

North

Africa

do not show

specifically

Islamic

eatures:36

On the other

hand,

one can

hardly deny

that

the

relationship

between

Islam and human

rights

is

complicated

and

raises a

number

of

problems.

These

problems

do not derive

from

Islam

per

se

but

have

to

do

with the

Islamic shariah,

or

more

precisely,

with traditional

or fundamentalist

nter-

pretations

of the shariah

by

which the latter

s

rendered

a

comprehensive

ys-



15/33

Bielefeldt / CULTURALESSENTIALISM

103

tem

of

politically

enforcible normative

regulations.

Given

the fact that

the

basic features of the shariah

developed

in the first centuries

of

Islamic

his-

tory,37whereas the historicalbreakthrough f humanrightswas roughlya

millennium

ater,

differences

and

conflicts between these two

normative

ys-

tems can be no

surprise.

Concrete

conflicts

center

primarily

round

questions

of

gender equality

and

religious liberty.Although

acknowledging

women's

legal personality, the

traditional

shariah

did

not

include

the

principle

of

equality

n

rights

for men and women. It is

especially

in

matters

of

marriage,

family life, divorce,

and inheritance hat differences in

legal standing

be-

tween the

genders

have

persisted

to the

present day.

Measured

against

the

benchmark f modernhumanrights, heymustberegarded sdiscriminating

againstwomen.38

Furthermore, espite

the Islamic

tradition

of

religious

tol-

erance,

some

forms of discrimination

against religious

minorities,

such as

restrictionson

interreligiousmarriages,

are

still

legally

in

force in most con-

temporary

slamic

countries

oday.

Another

nfringement

n

religious liberty

stems

from the shariah

ban on

apostasy.

There is

a

minority

of

Islamic

countries,

such as

Iran, Sudan,

and

Saudi

Arabia,

n

which

apostates

from

Islam are threatened

by capitalpunishment.

But even

in

those

more moder-

ate countries in which the death penalty for conversion from Islam to

another

religion

no

longer exists,

other

legal sanctions,including

enforced

dissolutionof the convert's

marriage,

un

counter o the human

right

to

adopt

a

religion

on the basis of

a

person's

ree

decision.39

Besides these

problems

of

gender

equality

and

religious liberty,

a

minorityamong

Islamic

states

apply

shariahcriminal

aw,

including corporalpunishments uch as

flogging and

amputation

of

limbs,

penalties that,

from the

standpoint

of human

rights,

must

be rejected

as

cruel anddegrading.41

Facing

these

conflicts,

the

questionarises as to whether

and how

practical

solutions can be achieved. With

regard o this

question, different

positions

currently

are

being

brought

orward.

Despite manyoverlaps,

one

can distin-

guish

among

four basic

positions

that

I have

labeled Islamization

f human

rights(section VII),

pragmatic pproaches

section VIII),

liberal

reconceptu-

alization of the shariah

section IX), and secular

positions (section X).41

VII. ISLAMIZATION F HUMANRIGHTS

One

way

of

dealing

with the

relationship

between

Islamic

shariah

and

human

rights

is

simply

to

deny

that

there are

any problems.Representatives

of the

traditionalist

or

fundamentalist

urrents

of Islam

typically claim that

human

rightsalwayshave been

recognized

n

the

Islamicshariah,which, due



16/33

104 POLITICAL

THEORY February

2000

to its divineorigin,

provides

anabsolute

foundation

orprotecting

he

rights

and duties of every

human

being. An

early example

of this

tendency

is the

booklet,HumanRightsin Islam,writtenby Mawdudi.Whileadoptingmod-

ern rights

anguage,

Mawdudinever

addresses

critically

the previously

men-

tioned

conflicts between

shariah

and humanrights.

Moreover,

his section

on

Equality

of Human

Beings

reveals

a rather

restrictedunderstanding

of

equality.

Whereas

Mawdudirejects

all

distinctions

based

on colour,

race,

language,

or nationality, 42

is list

of criteria

of nondiscrimination

oes not

include gender

and religion, the two

main issues

over which

traditional

shariah and modern

human rights

collide. Mawdudi's

approach,

after all,

leads to a superficialanduncritical Islamization f humanrights,that s, an

ideological

conception

hatcertainly

s not less

essentialist

han

areessential-

ist

Western

r Christian eadings

of humanrights.

The

widespread en-

dency

in

Western

oncepts

of human

ights

o

claim

that

heserights

have their

roots

n the Occidental

radition

an thus

analogously

be found

n essentialist

Islamic interpretations

hattrace

human

rights

back to Qur'an

and Sunna.

A

radical

example

of an essentialistIslamic

occupation

of the concept of

humanrights

was given

by some

Iranian

participants

f the fourth

German-

Iranianconferenceon humanrights,which tookplacein November 1994 in

Tehran.43

t the

opening

of

the

conference,

the

Ayatollah

Taskhiri

rom

the

holy city

of

Ghom

presented

a

conservative

Islamic

conception

of

human

rights

from

which

he

drew

the

conclusion

that

a full

understanding

f

these

rights

must

be reserved o

faithful

Muslims. In

his exclusivist and

dogmatic

approach,

he

ayatollah

compromised

even

the

idea

of universal

human

dig-

nity by distinguishing

between

a

potential

nd

an

actual

ignity.

Assum-

ing

that

all human

beings

are

called

on

to

lead

a

virtuous

ife

well

pleasing

to

God,

all

humans,

he

said,

are

potentially

qual

in their human

dignity.

However,

t

was clear

to

Taskhiri hat

he

who

fulfills

his

duty

faithfully

ulti-

mately

can

claim a

higher

degree

of

actual

ignity

than

he whofails

to meet

the

religious

standard,

et

alone he

who refuses to

accept

his divine

vocation

altogether.

This is

to

say

that such

a

dogmatic

type

of reference

to a

divine

foundation

of human

dignity

leads

to

a

concept

of

dignity

that,

n

sharp

con-

tradiction

o

article

1 of the Universal

Declaration

of Human

Rights,

serves

as

a vindication

of

human

nequality

rather

han

ustifying

universal

equality

of

all human

beings

in

dignity

and freedom.

Such a tendencyof anessentialist Islamization f humanrightsmean-

while

has

found

expression

in a number of semi-official documents

on

human

rights

issued

by

various

Islamic

organizations.44

or

example,

the

final theses

of a

seminar

on human

rights

in Islam held

in 1980 in

Kuwait

include

the

following

statement:

Islam

was the

first to

recognise

basic



17/33

Bielefeldt / CULTURALESSENTIALISM

105

human rights

and almost

[fourteen]

centuries

ago

it set

up guarantees

and

safeguards

hat

have

only recently

been

incorporatedn[to]

universal

declara-

tionsof humanrights Likewise,theintroductiono the Universal slamic

Declaration of Human

Rights,

ssued

in

1981

by

the

Islamic Council of

Europe(a nongovernmental rganization ponsoredby

Saudi

Arabia),

starts

as follows: fourteenhundredyears ago,

Islam

gave

to

humanity

an

ideal

code of

human

rights. 46

A more

recent example

of this essentialist

tendency

is the declarationof

Human

Rights

in

Islam, adoptedby

the

foreign

ministers

of the

Organiza-

tion

of the Islamic Conference(OIC)

at

the

1990

annual

session of the

OIC

heldinCairo.47 hecentralrole of the Islamicshariahasboththeframeofref-

erence and the

guideline

of

interpretation

f the

Cairodeclarationmanifests

itself throughout he document,especially

in

its two final articles that

state,

All the

rights

and freedoms

stipulated

n

this

declaration

are

subject to the

Islamic

shariah.The Islamic shariah

s

the

only

source of

reference for the

explanation

or clarification

of

any

of the articlesof this declaration. 48n

arti-

cle

1 the

Cairo

declaration

emphasizes

that all human

beings

are

equal

n

termsof basic human

dignity

and

basic

obligations

and

responsibilities,

with-

out any discriminationon the groundsof race, colour, language, sex, reli-

gious belief, political affiliation,

social

status,

or

otherconsiderations. This

concept

of

equality clearly goes beyond

Mawdudi's and

Taskiri's

under-

standing

and

yet

remains

vague

because

equality

n

dignity

s not

clearly

con-

nected

to

claims of

equal rights.

The same

problem

comes to

the

fore in

arti-

cle

6 of

the

Cairo

declaration.While

stressing equal dignity

of men

and

women,the articleconcludes

with a statement

hat

seems to

support

he

tradi-

tional

role

division

between husbandand wife:

the

husband

s

responsible

for

the

support

and

welfare of the

family.

What s

striking

n

article

5,

which

also

deals with

family matters,

s

the formulation hatthe

right to marryand

build a

family

should not

be

restricted

according

o criteria

stemming

rom

race, colour,

or

nationality.

What

s

missing

in

this formulation s a

rejection

of restrictions

based on

religious

difference.

Thus traditional hariahobsta-

cles to

interreligiousmarriages

emain

unchallenged.

Even more

troubling

s

article

10,

which not

only gives

Islam

a

privileged

status

superior

o

all

other

religions

but also seems to ban

missionary

work

among

Muslims. The

article

reads as

follows:

Islam s the

religion

of

unspoiled

nature. t

is

prohibited o

exercise any form of compulsionon man or to exploit his povertyor igno-

rance n

order

o

convert

him

to

another

eligion

or to

atheism. Protectionof

the

Islamic

religion,

as

demanded

by

traditional hariah

nterpretations,

hus

apparentlyprevails

over

religious

freedom

of

the individualas well as

over

the

principle

of

equality

of

different

religions.

In

short,

he Cairo

declaration



18/33

106 POLITICALTHEORY February

2000

amounts o a one-sidedand uncritical

slamizationof human

rights

anguage

at

the expense of both the universalism

ndthe emancipatory piritof human

rights.

VIII. PRAGMATIC EFORMSN

THEFRAMEWORK F THE

SHARIAH

If conservative Muslims frequentlyare reluctant o undertakean

open

criticism of the traditional hariah, his does not mean that changes toward

modernhumanrightsarecompletelyexcluded.Fromearlyon, Islamic schol-

ars had to face the

problem

hat legal

norms

and institutionsof non-Islamic

origin played

a

role,

sometimes an importantone, in Muslim societies. To

deal with this situation, egal elements of non-Islamicorigin had to be

inte-

grated nto the overarching

ramework f the shariah, or example, by refer-

ring

to some

general principles

such

as

that of common welfare (maslaha).

Whatever eemed

to be

useful for

society

could thus be

justified

as being in

accordancewith,

and ndeed

part

of,

the shariah.At the same

time,

those ele-

ments of the shariahwhose implementation ould lead to undesiredconse-

quences

were

suspendedpragmatically.

t was

argued

hata

full and

thorough

implementation

of the shariah

could

be

enacted only

under ideal circum-

stances as it was the

case in the

original

Muslim

community

of Medina. As

Schacht

observes,

As

ong

as the

sacred

aw received ormal

recognition

as a

religious ideal,

it

did

not insist

on

being fully applied

in

practice. 49

hus

except

for some

puritan

hariah

chools,

flexible

interpretation

nd

prag-

matic

application

of

the

normative ules

always

have accommodatedmoder-

ate reforms.As a result,within most shariah chools, a traditionof humani-

tarian

pragmatism

has

developed

that

facilitates a mediation between the

validity

claims based

on

religious

revelationand the

practical

necessities of

daily

life.

The

Qur'an

tself

seems

to

justify

this attitude

given

thatSura2:185

emphasizes,

God

ntends

everyfacility

for

you;

he

does not want

to

put

you

to

difficulties.

The humanitarian

ragmatism

hat s

typical

of

large

currents

within Islam

today

also

permits

akingsteps

toward

a

gradual

reconciliation

with modern

deas

of freedom and

equality,

even

though

the

conceptual

dif-

ferences between

shariah

and

human

rights might yet

remain

unsettled.

With

regard

o

amputation enalties,

or

example,many

Muslims referto

a

precedent

enacted

by

the second

caliph Omar,

who is

said

to have sus-

pended amputation

or

theft

in times of starvation.50

rom this

precedent,

even conservative

Muslims often conclude

thatsuch

cruel forms of

corporal

punishment

hould

not be

applied

n

practice

unless and

until a

perfectly

ust



19/33

Bielefeldt /


society

will be achieved.That s to

say,

even those Muslims who do not

deny

the

validity

of the harsh shariah

penalties

in

theory frequentlyreject

their

applicability by invoking nsuperableobstacles to theirpractical mplemen-

tation.

Such

a

way

of

reasoning

s not

thoroughly

new. As Schacht

empha-

sizes,

there

always

has been

a

strong

tendency

o

restrict he

applicability

of

hadd

punishments i.e., punishments

based

on divine

guidance]

as much as

possible. 5

To achieve this

goal,

traditional hariah chools

introduced

nar-

row

definitions

of the crimes

in

question,

short statutes of

limitation,

and

extremely high evidentiaryrequirements.

The

fact that the vast

majority

of

contemporary

slamic

states

do

not list shariah

penalties

in

their criminal

codes does notseem toposeaproblem or the Islamicpopulationatlarge.On

the

contrary,many Muslims, including

moderate

conservatives,

hold the

opinion

thatthe

cruel

forms

of

corporalpunishment

mentioned

n the

Qur'

an

are meant to be an ethical admonitionand should be

no

part

of an

applicable

criminal code.

Pragmatic nterpretation

f

the shariah

also

has

helped

to

bring

abouta tra-

dition of

religious

tolerance. To be

sure,

this traditional slamic

tolerance

should

not

be

equated

with

religious liberty

in

the

modern

understanding

f

humanrightsbecause traditionalolerancedoes notimply equalityof rights.

But still

it is

worth

emphasizing

hat

the

Muslim

world,

when

judged by

the

standard

of

the

day, generally

showed

far

greater

oleranceand

humanity

n

its treatmentof religiousminoritiesthan did the Christian

West,

as

Mayer

observes.53

Although

n

theory only

the

people

of the book

(i.e.,

adherents

of the

monotheistic

religions

of

revelation)

could count on

being tolerated,

n

practicecoexistence between Muslims and membersof otherreligions, such

as the

Hindureligions

in

India,also proved

possible.54Although

in

theory

apostasy

was

considered

a

capital crime,there

are few

examples of execu-

tions of

apostates

n recent

Islamic

history.

During

the

OttomanEmpire,the

last

death

penalty

for

apostasyreportedly

was

carried

out

in

1843.55When

in

January

1985 Mahmoud Muhammad

Taha,

a

Sudanese

Muslim

reformer,

was

publicly

executed as

a

heretic, many

Muslims

in

Sudanwere shocked.

As

Mayerreports, Outrage nddisgust

over the

executionandtelevisedher-

esy

trial

prevailed,

ven

among

SudaneseMuslims

who

had

no

personal ym-

pathy

for Taha's

theological positions. 56

Pragmatic

eformsare even

possible

in the

delicate issues

of

shariah am-

ily law. In his study on Law Reform in the Muslim World,Anderson presents a

number

of

impressiveexamples

n

this

field.

The

1917

Ottoman

Law

of

Fam-

ily Rights,

for

example,

was meantto

curb

polygamy by officially recogniz-

ing stipulations hat,

on a

voluntarybasis, could

be

inserted nto

a

marriage

contract o bestow the wife with the

right

to

judicial

divorce

in

case her hus-



20/33

108 POLITICALTHEORY February2000

band took a second wife.57Again, whereasthe theoretical

validity of polyg-

amy remainedunchallenged, he practice of polygamycould be restricted o

a certain degree. At the same time, this reform slightly improvedwomen's

opportunities o go to court to get judicial divorces. It

might be worth men-

tioning

in

this context that alreadyat the end of the nineteenth

century, he

famous Muslimreformer

MohammedAbduhargued hat

the Qur'an prohib-

its polygamy implicitly because the theoreticalpermission

to marry more

than one

wife

depends

on

the

prerequisite

hat the

husband

can do justice to

all his wives

(Sura 4:3),

a

prerequisite hat, according

to the Qur'an tself,

hardly

ever can

be

met:

try

as

you may, you cannot

treat all your wives

impartially Sura4:129). This is another xamplethatnew interpretations

of

the shariah an lead to

gradual eformswithoutdenying he validityclaims

of traditional hariah

n

theory.

IX. CRITICAL ECONCEPTUALIZATION

OF THE

SHARIAH

Althoughthe possibilitiesof pragmatic eformswithin theframeworkof

the shariah

should be

taken into

consideration,

one also should be aware

of

the limits

of

such

a

pragmaticapproach.

So

long

as the

superiority

of the

shariah

as a divine

and inalterable et of

legal

norms s

unchallenged

n

the-

ory,

the

legitimacy

of

human

rights

remains

precarious.

Eitherhuman

rights

suffer from

the failureof not

being

considered

egitimate

n the full sense of

the

word,

or

the

danger

arises that

conceptual

differences between shariah

law and human

rights

are

simply

harmonized

with the result of an Islam-

ized version of

human

rights.

Liberal Muslim

intellectuals therefore do

not

content

themselves

with

suggesting merely pragmatic

reforms. What

they

demand s a

courageous

and frank

criticism of the

Islamic

shariah,

a criticism

that, although

not

nec-

essarily calling

for

the

dismembering

f the

shariah

radition,

s meantto lead

to a

thoroughly

revised

understanding

f

the

main sources of the

shariah,

namely,Qur'an

and Sunna.

Liberalreformers

argue

that

by

means of such a

critical

examination,

he

shariahcan be liberated

rom the bulk of medieval

legal casuistry hat,

n

the

course of

time,

has

unjustifiably

vershadowed

he

essential normativemessage of Qur'anandSunna.9

With

regard

o

Qur'an

and

Sunna,

Rahman

points

to

the

progressive

en-

dencies

embodied

in

the

original

normative

guidance

of

Islam,

tendencies

that aterhave

been lost to

a

largedegree.

What s therefore

needed,

he

argues,

is not blind

or

passive

submission

to

given legalistic

rules

but instead

an



21/33


22/33

110

POLITICAL

THEORY February

2000

foundation

of the

dignity of everyperson

as anend

in itself, as she puts

it

*

*

~~~~64

using Kantian erms.

A verycourageousand, atthe same time,highlycontroversialnterpreta-

tion of

the Qur'an

has been proposed by

the Sudanese

scholar

An-Na'im.

Taking

up a method

developed by his teacher

Taha,

An-Na'im

distinguishes

systematically

betweensuras

revealed n

Mecca andsurasrevealed

n Med-

ina. Thisdifference

alwayshas

been acknowledgedn

Islamicexegesis.

What

is

new

in

An-Na'im's

approach,however,

is that

he understands he two

stages of revelation

as entailing

a theological

ranking:whereas

the suras

of

the Mecca period

contain

the

eternal heological

message of Islam,

the Med-

inapartsof the Qur'an refermostly to thespecific needsandcircumstancesof

the first Muslim community

and cannot

be immediatelyapplied

to modern

society.65

Although

An-Na'im does not

deny the

divine characterof the

Qur'an

n its entirety,

he

introduces

a criterionby

which he can distinguish

between

different

degrees

of

validity

within the

Qur'an

tself. Whereas,

in

An-Na'im's opinion,

some Qur'anic

principlesare

indeed of timeless

valid-

ity, otherscontain

rules that

can be appreciated s

examples of an

Islamic way

of life

withina

particular

istoriccontext

without

beingimmediately

binding

for Muslimstoday.In sucha way,An-Na'im wantsto developamodernver-

sion of

Islamic aw

that s to be

in

accordance

with international

tandards

f

human

rights.

An-Na'im

is not the

only

contemporary

Muslim scholar

who calls for a

new

hermeneutic pproach

o

reading

he

Qur'an,

although

herearefew who

share

his

specific methodology.66

ahman,

or

example,

criticizes

the

com-

mon exegesis

of

the

Qur'an

as

piecemeal,

ad

hoc,

and often

quite

extrin

sic. 67

Making

use

of modern

hermeneutics

o achieve

a more

subtle under-

standing

of the

text is therefore

an

urgent

need.

Othman,

a

representative

f

the

Malaysian

Sisters

n Islam

a

liberal

Islamic

nongovernmental

rgani-

zation

committed

to

promoting

women's

rights),

points

to

the

difference

between

the time

of revelation

and the

present

day,

a difference

that

always

must be

taken

into consideration

for an

appropriate

understanding

of

the

Qur'anic

ext to

be

possible.

She

writes,

We

in

thepresent

have

to read hose

texts

in

order

o understand

hemat

all;

but n

seeking

to understandhem,

we-like

all

Muslims

hroughout istory-bring

to ourown

reading

of thosepasttextsthe frameworks f understandingf our own time andplace.Wehear

the

past

voices

that

speak

to us

speaking

with

contemporary ccents,

as it

were-our

own. So

we are

always,

like all

the

great

ulamaof the

past-even

if

they

were not

aware

of

it-both

reading

the

present

back

into the

past

from which we seek

contemporary

guidance

and

also left

with the

problem

..

of

deciding

howwe arenow to

implement

or

proceedupon

that

understanding.68



23/33

Bielefeldt / CULTURAL

ESSENTIALISM

111

The

awarenessof

historic

distance,

Othman

argues,

s a

way

in

which to

do

justice

to the

Qur'anictext.

At

the

same

time,

this

hermeneutic

awareness

helps to fight thetemptation osimply apply purportedlyimelessQur'anic

principlesto

the

differentcircumstances

of a

society

as we

enterthe

twenty-

first century.

The Egyptian

professor

Abu Zaidthinks

along similar

ines.The

purpose

of his

proposal

of a new

hermeneutics

s

to

recapture

ritically

the

guiding

principlesof

the

Qur'an

out of those

many

historical

detailsthat

belong to

the

circumstancesof

revelation

butdo

not

constitute he essential

message

of the

Qur'an.

In this

way,

he

wants to

bring

to new life

the

spirit

of

justice

that,

n

his opinion, lies at the core of the Qur'anicethicalprinciples.Among other

things, Abu Zaid

calls for

reforms

in the field of

Islamic

inheritance aw

because he thinks that the

general

tendency

of

Qur'anic ustice is

to

foster

equality among

all human

beings.

What

matters for

Abu Zaid is

that the

Qur'an endows

women

with

dignity

and

respect,

thus

giving

them a

legal

standing

that

they

did

not

enjoy

in

pre-Islamictimes.

However, concrete

details,

such as

the

difference between men

and women

in their

heritage

claims,

shouldbe

seen as a

historically

contextualized

application

of

this

gen-

eral tendency.These historic details should therefore not preventmodern

Muslims from

going

further n

the

general

direction

ofjustice

and

equality

as

demanded

by

the

Qur'an.69

A

decidedly feminist

reading

of the

Qur'anhas

been

proposedby

Hassan.

She

refers

primarily

o

the

strict

monotheistic

creed

that

constitutes he theo-

logical

center

of Islam. In the

light

of the

Islamic

warning hat the transcen-

dence

of

the divine

creator

must

never be

amalgamated

with his

creation,

Hassan

argues

that the

invocation of God

as a

pretext

to

legitimize

earthly

power relations must

be

rejected

as

a

violation of Islam.

In

particular, he

attacks he

traditional

hierarchy

between

the

genders

that

often has

provided

the

husbandwith

almost

a

quasi-divine

authority.Accordingto

Hassan,

this

religious

justification

of

social

authorityborders on

blasphemy. She

thus

points

out

sarcastically,

The

husband,

n

fact,

is

regarded s his wife's

gateway o heaven

or hell

and

the arbiter f

her final

destiny.

That

such an idea can exist

within the

frameworkof Islam-which

totally

rejects

the idea of

redemption,

of

any

intermediary

between

a

believer and

the

Creator-represents both a profound ronyanda greattragedy.70

Hassan's

argumentationdemonstrates

that the Islamic

doctrine of

strict

monotheism,

a

doctrine

from

which

fundamentalist

authors

such as

Maw-

dudi derive

authoritarian

olitical

consequences,

also can

be

understood

n

an



24/33

112

POLITICALTHEORY

February

000

emancipatory

ense

in thatmonotheism

provides

a theological

basis

for chal-

lenging

absolute

powerrelations

among

humanbeings.

It also is with referenceto the monotheisticcreedthatTalbi, a Tunesian

scholar and committed

human

rightsadvocate,

calls

for a full implementa-

tion

of

religious

liberty,

beyondthe limits

of

traditional

slamictolerance.

He

is convinced that

respect

for the inscrutable

divine

will implies

respectfor

one's fellow human

beings'

innerconvictions,

or no

one can

pretend o know

God's

plan

with

the

individualperson.

Talbi

comes to the

conclusion

that

from

a Muslim perspective

....

religious

liberty s fundamentally

nd

ultimatelyan act

of respectfor God'ssovereigntyand forthe mysteryof Hisplan for man,who hasbeen

given

the

terribleprivilegeof building

on

his own responsibility

his destiny

on earth

and

for the hereafter.

Finally,to respectman's

freedom

s to respect God's

plan.71

X. POLITICAL SECULARISM

IN

ISLAM

Islamic monotheism

also has been

taken

up

as an argument

or

promoting

a

secular

understanding

f law

and

politics.

Political secularismcurrently

s

72

not a popular position in most Islamic countries. Even liberal Muslims

mostly

show

reluctance o endorsing

ecularistconcepts

that

hey

often asso-

ciate with

an

anti-religious

ideology.

In

general,

there seems to

be little

awareness

n the Islamiccontext

about he

fundamental ifference

between

a

political

secularism

based

on

religious

liberty,

on

one

hand,

and an

ideologi-

cal

form

of secularism

hat

aims at

banning

religion

fromthe

public

space,

on

the

other.73

evertheless,

hereare

a number

of Muslim thinkers

who

explic-

itly

plea

on

behalf

of

secular

political

and

egal

reforms

by

referring

o

genu-

inely theologicalarguments.

One

of the

firstadvocates

of

political

secularism

n

Islam

was

Abdarraziq,

a

professor

of the

prestigious

Al-Azhar

University

in

Cairo,

who in

his

famous

book

on

Islam

and the Bases

of

Power

(1925)74

welcomed

the

abol-

ishment of the

caliphate,

an event

that had

stirredemotions

throughout

he

Islamic

world.

Abdarraziq

oints

to

the

fact

that

the

Qur'an

does

not contain

any

detailed

guidance

as to

how to

buildand

govern

a state.If it

is true hat

he

Qur'an

is the

final and

complete

book

of

revelation,

as

faithful

Muslims

assume,thenit follows thatstatepoliticscannotbelongto the coremessage

of Islam.

Consequently,

Abdarraziq

draws

a clear

conceptual

distinction

between

the

prophetic

and

the

political

roles

of

Muhammad.

Whereas

Muhammad

epitomizes

a timeless

religious

authority

as the seal

of

the

prophets,

is role

as

political

leader

wasdue to the historiccircumstances

of

the first

Islamic

community

n Medina.



25/33

Bielefeldt

/


During all his life, the Prophet

made no allusion to

anything

which

could be called an

Islamic tate or an

Arab tate. twould be

blasphemy

o

think

otherwise.The

Prophet

did

not leave this earthuntil he had

entirelyaccomplished

he mission

given

him

by God

and had explained

to his nation

the preceptsof religion in theirentiretywithout eaving

anythingvague

or

equivocal.75

Abdarraziq

urther

arguesthat

the

caliphs' pretension

of

religious authority,

culminating

in

the title of God's shadow

on

earth,

amounts to

idolatry,

which

is

one

of

the gravest

sins

in

Islam. Hence his conclusion

thatthe end of

the caliphate, ar

from

being

a

religiousdisaster,can

indeed

be appreciated s

a liberationof Islam: Muslims

are

free to demolish this worn-outsystem (of

the caliphate)before which they have debased and humiliatedthemselves.

They are free to establish the bases of theirkingdom and the organisationof

their

state

according

to more recent

conceptions

of the human

spirit. 76

Takingup Abdarraziq's

ine of

thought,Ashmawy calls the confusion of

religionand statepolitics

a

perversity 77ecause

it is

destructive o both;

it

debases religion by rendering

t

an instrumentof

everyday power politics,

and t

necessarily

results n a

problematic

acralization f

politics

that tself

is

thereby

shielded

against

critical

public

discourse.

Whereas

theocracy,

in

which earthlyrulersclaim a quasi-divineauthority, omes close to polythe-

ism,78 he monotheisticdogma

of

Islam, according

o

Ashmawy,demands

a

clear

conceptional

and institutionaldistinction between state and

religion.

This distin

western versus islamic human rights conceptions - a critique of cultural essentialism in the...

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