Göteborgs universitet

What Aesthetic Attitude?

Insufficiency of Both Tradition and Critique

Robin Karlsson

5/28/2012

Advisor: John Eriksson

The aesthetic attitude is a dodgy concept. So dodgy that there are numerous theories about out there. Here we find ourselves in an attempt at making sense of the situation, trying to clean up. To salvage good parts. To find the way to clarity. Indeed, there seems to be quite some confused notions in the tradition. Both on the sides of defense and opposition. It is a well-known fact that Dickie delivered a heavy blow against the notion of an aesthetic attitude, and Disinterest specifically. But how bad was the blow really? Not too heavy .And can Disinterest stand on its own either way? Doubtfully. Are we in need of breaking with tradition and build a-new? Probably.

Table of Contents

Introduction.................................................................................................................................2

Outline.....................................................................................................................................3

Investigation................................................................................................................................4

Section I – What is an aesthetic attitude?............................................................................4

Part I – Perception...................................................................................................................5

Section II Aesthetic Vision..................................................................................................5

Section III – Impressionistic Seeing....................................................................................8

Part II – Psychical Distance..................................................................................................10

Section IV – Distance Explained.......................................................................................11

Section V – Dickie on Distance.........................................................................................12

Part III – Disinterest and Dickie............................................................................................15

Section VI – Disinterest Confused – Disinterested attention itself...................................15

Section VII – Disinterest Confuses – Relevance...............................................................20

Section VIII – Disinterest confuses – Morality.................................................................21

Section IX – Disinterest Confuses – Role of the Critic.....................................................23

Part IV – Stolnitz and Disinterest..........................................................................................25

Section X – Definition of Stolnitz Aesthetic Attitude.......................................................25

Section XI – Definition of ’Disinterested’........................................................................26

Section XII – Definition of ‘Sympathetic’........................................................................27

Definition of ’Attention’....................................................................................................28

Section XVI – Facing Dickie’s Criticism – the Role of the Critic....................................29

Part V – Criticizing Disinterest.............................................................................................31

Section XVII – Disinterest (a)...........................................................................................31

Section XVIII – Disinterested (b).........................................................................................32

Section XIX –Sympathetic................................................................................................33

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Section XX – Attention.....................................................................................................33

Section XXI –Striking beauty and the Last Strike at Disinterest......................................35

Part VI – The Final Showdown.............................................................................................36

Section XXII – Fenner’s Attitude......................................................................................36

Section XIII – Criticizing Fenner......................................................................................38

Conclusion................................................................................................................................39

What remains.....................................................................................................................39

An Attitude From the Ashes..............................................................................................41

List of literature.........................................................................................................................42

Introduction

It is with works of art as it is with wine – it is better if one can do without both and keep to water, and if from the inner fire and inner sweetness of the soul the water spontaneously changes again into wine.1

Or so Nietzsche would have us believe. Myself, I can’t help being sympathetic to the

statement above. Certainly, there seems to be quite a lot of things Nietzsche wants to say with

these lines. However, what I want to turn our attention to is the idea that one can view the

world in more than one way. Indeed, the quote here could be interpreted in the way that

Nietzsche wants to tell us that we are able to view the world in 'aesthetic light,' so to speak.

That the most mundane objects can face us aesthetically, and all we have to do is to be in a

certain state of mind.

This is not a notion originating in Nietzschean thought, or German for that matter. Indeed,

Kant may be the one most associated with the idea of an aesthetic attitude; but it is with the

British Taste-theorists we first find the concept, and more precisely: with Lord Shaftesbury.2

We should not be surprised were we to find differences in the ways these thinkers thought

about the aesthetic attitude, and what it is. They are, after all, from different times and much

has happened in between.1Human All-Too-Human part 2 aforism 1092The Aesthetic Attitude, David E. W. Fenner (1996) p 28-9 (in the continuation simply Fenner (1996))

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However, this is not a paper on a historical overview on the subject. In fact, Nietzsche and

Lord Shaftesbury will not be much mentioned in this essay. What we are going to do is to

search for the aesthetic attitude, orienting ourselves among the different concepts out there.

Perhaps we have to develop a new account, if none plausible exists. The question we ask

ourselves, at the outset of this essay is: What is the aesthetic attitude?

Outline

But before trying to answer that question, we will see how we are going to answer it.

At the outset of the investigation we shall introduce the concept of what an aesthetic attitude

is and what it is that we are actually looking for.

In part I we begin with considering two notions of the aesthetic attitude that focuses at

perception. While we these theories have their virtues, they also carry vices. Their vice being

in large parts that they are insufficient. It is clear that we do not wish to deny that their value

to us, only that they are not the whole explanation for the attitude. As such our abilities of

perception is an important aspect of the attitude we will pick up from them.

In part II we will familiarize ourselves with the account of Bullough, a psychologist who

brings Distance to our attention. This is a rather influential account of the aesthetic attitude

and will, during the second half of this part, be criticized by Dickie, of whom we will

familiarize ourselves with as his The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude is highly influential and

has convinced many philosophers that the aesthetic attitude does not exist. There is though,

some kind of thing that both Distance and Dickie agrees on: that there must be some kind of

inhibitory feature to the perceiver.

In part III Dickie continues his criticism in Myth by attacking Disinterest. Disinterest is the

most common and most accepted account of the aesthetic attitude and as such it is natural that

we should examine it. But it seems as if Dickie’s criticism is unsatisfactory and does not

really hit the mark. As such we must more closely examine Disinterest. We will do this in part

IV.

In part V, however, we see that Disinterest can’t stand as a theory either way, regardless that

Dickie’s criticism failed at its objective. It seems to be very little cause to allow for so little

interest towards the object of aesthetic appreciation. The Disinterest account seems to forbid

that the object be considered in regards to how it is connected with other objects or concepts

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in the world in an unmotivated manner. A larger participation of the individual will be shown

to be motivated.

Part VI will consist of a last account for consideration, as this is quite different from the

others. Since this account is not acceptable on its own terms either, we pick the useable parts

from it. This ought to give further support to a widening sphere of relevant connections to the

object to include cognitive connections.

In the conclusion we sum up our findings and try to give a sketch on how a plausible attitude

may look.

Investigation

Section I – What is an aesthetic attitude?

As was briefly implied in the introduction, the aesthetic attitude refers to a state of mind in

which you will be able to appreciate objects aesthetically. It has been a subject of much

debate what an aesthetic attitude is supposed to be and how to characterize it. Fenner gives a

definition of the traditional account of the aesthetic attitude and what the term contains:

The aesthetic attitude is, traditionally, an attitude, state of mind, or a state of perceiving that is entered into, voluntarily and consciously, by an agent (spectator, subject, viewer, listener, etc.) that serves to (1) make the spectator receptive to the having of an aesthetic experience (in connection with the aesthetic object or event [...]) and (2) transform the object of the spectator's perception from an ordinary object-in-the-world into an aesthetic object.3

While we may not yet be able to answer many questions, it seems proper to pose them:

Regarding point (2) in Fenner's presentation, about the object's ontology, we will spend little

time; merely noting that the change from an 'ordinary object-in the world' into an aesthetic

object needs not be a change on ontological level. Traditionally, this is done by denying the

existence of aesthetic properties in the object.4

It might also be questioned why this attitude must be voluntarily and consciously "switched

on," so to speak. Certainly, it is difficult to see how one could possibly enter a state of

perceiving non-consciously, but not so far-fetched when considering the state of mind.

3Fenner (1996) p. 34More on this later on in the essay, see specifically page 14.

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In my experience it is seldom the notion that the attitude must be volitionally and consciously

entered into is a feature of it that is seldom questioned. It might be difficult to question this, as

one can easily think of examples where one can choose how to view works of art, as in the

example of Duchamp’s Fountain. My first reaction to it was that is simply a broken urinal.5

Since then I have been able to appreciate it as a work of art. Today I would like to claim that I

am able to perceive it as any of the two depending on what I wish to see it as. But it’s just

as easy to claim that I’ve just happened to be in the right state of mind when considering the

Fountain one time, and as such I had an aesthetic experience of it. Once having known how to

perceive it, I might be able to resume my aesthetic viewing of it. It is possible to claim that I

just happened to be in a state of mind which made me susceptible to having aesthetic

experiences.

Furthermore, we can ask ourselves how a spectator is made receptive to having an aesthetic

experience. However, we will have to go on to examine the specific theories to be able to say

anything of value in this regard.

Part I – Perception

We begin with perception, as it is one of the key concepts in aesthetics. It should be noted that

while these accounts are not the most widely accepted, they are of interest as they focus on

different aspects than the other accounts.

Section II Aesthetic Vision6

Vincent Tomas, in Aesthetic Vision, asks:

If looking at a picture and attending closely to how it looks is not really to be in the aesthetic attitude then what on earth is?7

With this question we are introduced into how Tomas considers his idea of the aesthetic

attitude. One of the many aspects the aesthetic attitude focuses on is a perceptual distinction.

Tomas focuses on this particular feature of the attitude and tries to describe how it is

distinguished from ordinary perception:

[...] the recognition of physical objects – the sort that is involved i ordinary perception but which does not occur in aesthetic perception – is secondary recognition. It presupposes primary recognition, which occurs alone in aesthetic perception.

5 Not that I've actually stumbled upon Duchamps Fountain, but I've seen pictures of it as well as read about it, as Duchamps works are quite common in philosophical literature.6 The names of the attitudes is borrowed from Fenner (1996).7 Aesthetic Vision, Philosophical Review, 1959 p. 63. (in the continuation simply Aesthetic Vision)

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Secondary recognition is "predictive," but primary or aesthetic recognition is not.8

Certainly, there are concepts here which need explanation. Tomas is of the idea that ordinarily

when one sees, for example, a chair, one does not simply see the chair. In fact, one sees many

more characteristics of the chair than the purely perceptual, (or visual,) such as a body capable

of holding up ones weight and whose shape is unlikely to change to a significant degree

within the next five minutes.

However, the only characteristics that one can actually perceive in the chair "at the moment

are a certain set of colours and . . . a certain visible shape."9 As the quote marked with

footnote 8 suggests, Tomas seems to consider this to be a more original way of perceiving

than ordinary viewing.

Aesthetic perception, for Tomas, is the lines, shapes and the colors as a given whole which

can be categorized, while they are not. If it was to be categorized we would already have

taken the steps of secondary recognition, whereas in primary recognition, which Tomas takes

aesthetic viewing to be,

[...] we are made aware of familiar appearances, not familiar objects or events, and that when we attend to these appearances we are attending to something "in the picture" in precisely the same sense that lines, colors, shapes, and volumes are [...]10

It is clear that we are not concerned with actually perceiving objects but appearances that,

when communicated to others must be in such a manner as to refer to common every-day

objects, because these are the formations in which they are perceived in.

However, Tomas makes us aware that

[...] aesthetically to see a garden is not to see "a blooming confusion," but to see appearances of a familiar sort – the sort represented by shrubs and flowers.11

So, even though aesthetic vision, according to Tomas, is made up of lines, shapes and colors

they are not any more obscure or confusing than if we were to view ordinarily. Certainly, one

does not lose orientation of the world even though aesthetic viewing is pre-categorical. It is,

then, not a cow-blank stare where one is bombarded with seemingly randomized stimuli. It is

8 Ibid. p. 65.9Cit. Ibid..10Ibid. p. 67.11Ibid. p. 63.

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viewing attentively.12 One must agree with Tomas that in aesthetic viewing one does not even

begin to ponder the question of whether what one sees exists or not, seeing as 'aesthetic

viewing' is pre-categorical and wholly in "primary recognition."13

In extension, this means that Tomas considers every kind of aesthetic experience to be

formalistic in nature. In fact, when Tomas is describing a scene in a theater of a wistful tramp

shuffling down the road toward the sunset, he claims that one cannot aesthetically appreciate

it as such; what one appreciates is the beauty of the formalistic relations in the scene, the

appearances making up the categorized wistful tramp. I, myself, find this conclusion highly

counter-intuitive, surely it matters that the tramp is wistful or that it is the very same wistful

tramp that we have followed throughout the play? As this seems to be in accordance with

Tomas's goal, however, my intuitions might not be damaging criticism against it.

However, Tomas's account has a in how to handle other kinds of art, other than the visual arts,

or even representative visual arts. It's more difficult to understand how one is to view

a symphony in a classificatory way and in a nonclassificatory way, such as the former would detract from the aesthetic experiencing of that object. One could, of course, classify a certain symphony as a Romantic symphony, but this classification, it seems, is still in the purview of potentially helping one's aesthetic experience of the work; that is, this classification seems itself to be, broadly, an aesthetic feature of the work.14

It is possible to meet (the first part of) this criticism by referring to Heidegger, and how he

considers our ordinary perception to be, generally zuhanden, (equivalent to Tomas's ordinary

perception,) where things in the world are always value-laden and always contain gear-

complexes (where the object in question belongs, how it is characterized and how it is used)

and vorhanden, (equivalent to Tomas's aesthetic vision,) where the object faces us in its pure

formalistic appearance. This, of course, goes for any object in the world, including objects not

usually considered “objects” in the strict sense, (such as music,). As such we can explain how

we can stretch Tomas's view to things beyond representational, or even visual art generally.15

The second part of the criticism, that the classification of a symphony might be aesthetically

relevant is something that Tomas's 'Aesthetic Viewing' cannot handle. Tomas could simply

claim that it would be aesthetically irrelevant, but is this not quite counter-intuitive as well?

12Fenner (1996) p. 8313Ibid. p. 58.14Ibid. p. 84.15Sein und Zeit, Heidegger p. 68-70 (in Heidegger’s originial work). (in the continuation simply SuZ) It is, of course, not entirely enlightening to refer to a phenomenologist as Heidegger, seeing as it is difficult to understand him..

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Maybe not as much as what I found counter-intuitive above, when treating plays, but surely

it’s not implausible to assume that the place of the work of art in history and tradition is, or at

the very least could be, an aesthetic feature?

There is another aspect worth pointing out. Perhaps we cannot deny that the phenomenon

Tomas is describing exists, and perhaps we should not want to. But what Tomas has actually

accomplished is the explanation of a certain phenomenon and dubbing it 'aesthetic vision.'

Tomas has, through this, made the claim that this is what it means to experience something

aesthetically. Tomas provides no justification for this attribution of categorical (aesthetic)

experience to this way of perceiving. Heidegger, however, provides a motivation for the

individual to look at things in this way distinct from aesthetic experiences.16 And it’s not

difficult to conceive how one can perceive the form of an object non-aesthetically?

Even after we stretched Tomas’s account to other mediums than visual arts, it does not seem

as if it can handle all kinds of art; conceptual art, for instance, is something that ‘Aesthetic

Vision’ cannot handle.17 But this does not mean that we must give up Tomas account

completely. We have not shown that his account in its entirety is false, only that it is

insufficient. We want to retain, from Tomas’s account, that viewing the formalistic properties

is an important aspect of the aesthetic experience while we also claim that it is not the only

aesthetically relevant aspect.

Section III – Impressionistic Seeing

As we find 'Aestehtic Vision' unsatisfactory, we could perhaps turn to one closely related but

completely different conception: That of Virgil Aldrich. The most apparent similarities are

that they both are dealing with perception and that they make a distinction between ordinary

perception and the kind of aesthetic perception (which would be the kind of perception you

use when in the aesthetic attitude). This time, however, the aesthetic way of perceiving is

called 'viewing aspectually' or prehending or 'prehension.'

The distinction between ordinary perceiving and aesthetic perceiving is different with

Aldrich. Ordinary experience is, for Aldrich, characterized by science and observation. It's the

way one necessarily considers objects in the ordinary world. One is acquainted with patterns

and commonalities, while being disposed to use the object in purposeful ways. These are the 16SuZ p. 172.17If we again turn to Heidegger and the section of SuZ of which footnote 16's reference comes from (§36 but also §35 and §§ 37- 39,), we have further basis for accepting the impossibility of this aspect of perception might handle conceptual art. Indeed, as we have seen, Heidegger considers this kind of viewing to be devoid of "meaning" or such things.

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intrinsic characteristics of an object, what might be objectively there to be viewed. Fenner

summarizes:

A description of the physical object may be articulated, and in a manner complete enough to secure recognition of the object. Moreover, the object's uses are apparent in such a recognition. The base properties are forthcoming in a fairly superficial consideration of the object.18

We shall, without further ado, allow Aldrich to describe what the aesthetic viewer does in

contrast:

What I am approaching is the phenomenon of categorical aspection. It is so pervasive that it usually escapes notice. The same material thing may be perceptually realized either as a physical or as an aesthetic object . . . The aesthetic space of things perceived thus is determined by such characteristics as intensities or values of colors and sounds, which as we shall see later, comprise the medium presented by the material things in question . . . Thus prehension is, if you like, an "impressionistic" way of looking, but still a mode of perception, with the impressions objectively animating the material things – there to be prehended . . . Let us say, then, that under observation, the characteristics of the material things are realized as "qualities" that "qualify" it, while for prehension, its characteristics are realized as "aspect" (objective impression) that "animate" it19

Aldrich's example of categorical aspection, or prehension, is when one perceives snowflakes

falling, when focused on a point on the horizon, one can see them as comets falling.

Categorical aspection, then, seems to be attributing label(s) to the formalistic properties one

sees. While the objective qualities of the object does not change, one sees them as a, (possibly

different,) something.

There's a claim of objectivity to be found in Aldrich's account, seeing as whatever aspects of

the object viewed prehensiously, they all supervene on the same objective qualitites. That is,

one certainly cannot add or remove anything from the formalistic properties that one sees, and

as such there are boundaries for what I can 'prehend.' Indeed, it is very difficult for me to

prehend a pig when what I look at is a bottle of whiskey.

However, one can question whether this is enough to build a basis of objectivity upon. Fenner

does not think so, and Morreal means that such a weak claim of objectivity can

[…] end up with both P and not-P. “This cloud is and is not – depending on the ability of and plurability of the observers – a house, locomotive, frog on pad, sandwich,

18Fenner (1996) p. 87.19Cit. Ibid. p. 88.

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microscope”20

We can see that it limits our prehension but this claim of objectivity does not seem to give us

any guidance in determining what is good art or beautiful or anything of the sort. as Morreal

seems to point out, this criterion of objectivity seems to allow for two judgments that

contradict each other. We can conclude that this criterion of objectivity is quite inadequate.

Certainly, there is another difficulty with this theory in that it has a difficulty of handling

other aesthetic mediums than visual. How is one to aspectually appreciate music? And as

Dickie puts it: "Even looking at an impressionistic painting does not involve an

impressionistic way of looking."21 It's not even clear how this is connected with the visual arts

themselves.22

The question we ought to ask ourselves is whether there is anything useful in this account, for

our purposes. One may be able to perceive the same formalistic properties with different

prehensions. Indeed, some art may be welcoming something like it. It is not unheard of to put

“a face” in a painting.23 Perhaps just certain aspects of a work of art should be prehended, but

the phenomenon seems to exist. However, as with Tomas’s account, it does not seem to cover

all phenomena we call aesthetic experiences either. But we can pick it up as a feature of our

perception relevant to aesthetic experience.

Part II – Psychical Distance

As these two, ‘Aesthetic Vision’ and ‘Impressionistic Seeing,’ were the largest and most

developed accounts of the attitude theories whose focus is on perceptual distinctions or

abilities, proved insufficient as whole accounts we are not going to turn towards the two

largest and more well-known concepts; Disinterest and Distance. These attitudes are more

focused at motivation, intentionality and/or stances towards aesthetic experiences. We are

going to follow George Dickie in his The Myth of the Aesthetical Attitude in his criticism of

the two concepts.

Section IV – Distance Explained

The first account Dickie criticizes is Distance, whose main proponent is Edward Bullough.

Before going on to the criticism, however, we are in need of a presentation of the theory.

20Fenner (1996) p. 90.21Cit. Ibid. p. 8922Ibid..23See for example Allegory of Iconoclasm c. 1966-68, by Marcus Gheeraerts the Elder

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Distance simply consists in the assumption that if one wishes to experience an object

aesthetically, one must psychically distance oneself from the object, hence the name:

Psychical Distance or simply Distance. It has both a negative and a positive aspect. The

negative: one must remove oneself from the practical attitude one usually takes towards

objects. The positive:

[...] the elaboration of the experience on the new basis created by the inhibitory actions of Distance . . . Distance appears to lie between our own self and its affections . . . Distance is obtained by separating the object and its appeal from one's own self, but putting it out of gear with practical needs and ends.24

By psychically distancing oneself one does not stop being affected by the work of art.

Distance is necessary so that one's emotions or person is not actually engaged directly with

the object. One is Distanced insofar as one is able to remain in control of oneself; one might

experience sadness, joy or rage but one ought not to act on these emotions.25 If one is unable

to keep one's emotions in check, then one has been unsuccessful in “fusing” the emotions with

the experience. One becomes engrossed in the emotions and the aesthetic attitude is broken;

one has become Under-Distanced and the experience is no longer aesthetic.26

As Fenner points out, this account can be extended to include any object whatever; even

punches in the face can be regarded aesthetically. There is no logical necessity to lose one's

distance even if a play or a work of art would contain a punch in the face, while it might prove

to be difficult.

As has been mentioned above, one can be Distanced in degrees. One can be greatly distanced

to an artwork, only barely forming a connection to it, barely allowing it to stir one's emotions,

even to the degree of doing something else. This would be the kind of spectra ranging from

adequately distanced to over-distanced. When one is over-distanced one does not have an

aesthetic experience. Many of us have perhaps been reading a newspaper or something of the

like while in front of the television; very seldom does one feel moved by what is going on on

the screen while dividing one's attention between that and something else. We have already

mentioned under-distanced, and so no further comments on that will be provided.

This raises another question: is this scale of being under-distanced, properly distanced or

over-distanced either a set of absolutes or boundaries on a continuum, so as to allowing one to

24Cit. Fenner (1996) p. 61.25Fenner (1996) p. 61.26Stolnitz (1960) p. 54-57.

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be just slightly over-distanced. In the one case, with the degrees of distance as a set of

absolutes there are specific features about the work of art to be attended, otherwise one at

once becomes put into one of the two camps at the far ends. Certainly, one can consider

calling each person that thinks about the technicalities of a play (how they accomplish a

certain effect or have created one of the dresses) to be under-distanced, and as such not

enjoying the performance purely aesthetically. This is the view of Allan Casabier, whose view

of attention being that either it's there or it's not.

If one is not tempted by this account and turn to the continuum view where there is a range of

being properly distanced in order to appreciate the performance aesthetically. This is claimed

by Sheila Dawson. It can handle a more merciful view of the spectator, where he/she needs

not be disposed to pay attention to just some specific properties of the play. One might be

disposed to appreciate and prefer some properties among several which can all be considered

to be of aesthetic nature or aesthetically relevant. This is something which Casabiers account

has a difficulty of handling,27 so, for future reference, we are discussing Dawson’s account.

Section V – Dickie on Distance

Dickie begins, saying that the most relevant question we can pose ourselves when evaluating

this theory is:

Are there actions denoted by "to distance" or states of consciousness denoted by "being distanced"? [...] are we ever induced into a state of being distanced either by being struck by the beauty of the object or by pulling off an act of distancing?28

Dickie cannot recall ever performing any such action before, neither can he remember being

induced to such a state. Dickie has no reason to suspect that he is significantly different from

anyone else in this regard.

Dickie agrees that there are certain features one ought to pay attention to while ignoring

others while experiencing a work of art. However, he sees no reason to take the step to

introduce a technical term where there is no need for one. He believes that being 'under-

distanced' and 'over-distanced' is just two ways of not paying attention to the work of art,

since in either case one is preoccupied with other things (either an activity that does not

belong or with one's own emotions). Since Dickie considers Distance to be only about

27Ibid. p. 64-6.28Myth p. 57.

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attention to the right things, he believes introducing the terms mentioned above may mislead

one to believe that it says something of further value.

Is Dickie’s objection sound? There certainly appears to be more things being said in

presenting the concept of Distance. Distance seems to tell us to be actively engaged in the

work of art in whatever way we can. Only when we actively engage the work of art or directly

act on what happens one breaks Distance, and falls out of the attitude.

Dickie meets this objection by noting that there are conventions and patterns of behavior that

is acceptable, depending on where the work of art is exhibited. Dickie speaks of this in the

example of a theater and quotes Samuel Johnson:

[T]he truth is that the spectators are always in their senses, and know, from the first act to the last, that the stage is only a stage and that the players are only players.29

But there are moments when one is completely “swept away” and forgets that one is in a

theater. How can one plausibly claim that one remembers the accepted conventions and

patterns of behavior in such a case? Fenner relates one experience of his regarding this:

[…] as a student I was once in a particularly stirring performance of Faust at the Royal Opera House in Covent Garden. Toward the end of the opera, when the heroine is imprisoned and then finds relief in death, I was so caught up in the spectacle that I was inclined to behave in some way that would not be appropriate […] the only thing that stopped me was my last-moment recognition that I was in a theater and the spectacle was not real and would not benefit from my acting out.30

It could be argued that in such a case that one is swept away one is regarding the conventions

sub-consciously. Indeed, this may be a further fact that is being included in the term of

Distance. If so, then Dickie's criticism does not hit the mark. We are inclined to say, with

Bullough, that the Distance between us and the work of art ought to be as small as possible

while still being there.

This leads us to Dickie’s next criticism. Dickie questions whether one ought to be distanced at

all when we engage a work of art. Since Bullough claims that one ought to maintain, at the

very least, some distance for remaining in the attitude. First, Dickie brings a statement from

Dawson, regarding this particular aspect of distancing:

One remembers the horrible loss of distance in Peter Pan – the moment when Peter says "Do you believe in fairies? . . . If you believe, clap your hands!" the moment

29Cit. Fenner (1996) p. 68.30Ibid..

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when most children would like to slink out of the theatre and not a few cry – not because Tinkerbell may die, but because the magic is gone. What, after all, should we feel like if Lear were to leave Cordelia, come to the front of the stage and say, "All the grown-ups who think that she loves me, shout 'yes'."31

Dickie is unconvinced by these claims. The break in Distance might be, in fact, the dramatic

high point of the play, and children generally respond enthusiastically towards it. Dickie

believes that there also seems to be something suspect in the comparison to King Lear, seeing

as it is not the same kind of play. Surely we must agree with Dickie, especially as he points to

more examples, such as: Our Town, The marriage Broker, A Taste of Honey. It could

plausibly be argued, that addressing the audience in this way is not a fault in the aesthetic

character of these plays, but may even be thought to be one of their strongest points.

Of course, these are not the only instantiations of a negative reaction to this kind of disruption

of distance in a play. Susanne Langer reports one such occasion which "shattered the illusion

and caused her acute misery."32 even though most of the other children responded quite

favorably. With the argument from Dawson and the testimony of Langer, Dickie concludes

that this is not the aesthetic attitude. But I believe that we have to say a few more things in

regards to this.

Distance could save itself by appealing to a more moderate claim than it does originally, it

could surrender the position of being the aesthetic attitude, to being one among several, but in

so doing it is left to explain what kind of works of art that it is proper to adopt this particular

attitude towards and to distinguish itself from others.

However, I believe that it has lost much of its appeal already, and it’s questionable why we

should consider this an aesthetic attitude at all if it has a negative effect on aesthetic

appreciation, exemplified by both Dawson and Langer. If one has a bad experience as a

consequence of having the attitude it does not do its job as to facilitate an aesthetic

experience, much less being necessary for one. One could argue that it has good consequences

in relation to other works of art, but it may be that one can find an attitude which could handle

all works of art just as well.

What remains from this discussion that’s valuable to us, however, is that one ought to be

distanced in the way as to inhibit interventions in the way that the object of aesthetic

appreciation ought to be experienced. It might be in the way of a play, where one ought to 31Cit. Myth p. 5732Cit. Ibid..

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simply be a passive receiver and as such respect the accepted patterns of behavior. Some sort

of inhibitory feature ought to be retained from here, in either way.

Part III – Disinterest and Dickie

Before venturing on to explain the Disinterest theory it could, perhaps, be of interest to point

to the history this account has. As was said in the introduction, this account sprung up among

the British taste-theorists, first provided by Lord Shaftesbury. Of course, Lord Shaftesbury is

not the person most associated with the idea of Disinterest.

In fact, that honor befalls Kant. Kant wanted to "explain the rationality of subjective

presumptions of universality"33 as well as explain the value of aesthetic experience. Kant's

notion of Disinterest actually only stretched as far as to include beauty, while Schopenhauer

furthered the account to include all aesthetic experience in general.34 But we are not about to

explain more than is necessary. We turn to the account of Disinterest, and Dickie's criticism is

our ticket to ride.

Section VI – Disinterest Confused – Disinterested attention itself

As Dickie turns towards Disinterest he wants to emphasize that this way of conceiving of the

aesthetic attitude is to attend, in the ordinary sense, to an object in a certain way -

disinterestedly. He is arguing against the conception of Stolnitz, as this is the most accepted

account of this view today (as well as 50 years ago).

Stolnitz defines "aesthetic attitude" as "disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone." Stolnitz defines the main terms of his definition: "disinterested" means "no concern for any ulterior purpose"; "sympathetic" means "accept the object on its own terms to appreciate it"; and contemplation" means "perception directed toward the object in its own right and the spectator is not concerned to analyze it or ask questions about it."35

The distinction, then, is motivational or intentional in nature rather than perceptual; we are

attending with a certain purpose.

However, Dickie points out, this does not mean that when attending to a work of art our

attending does not change simply because we are led by different purposes: There is nothing

in the comparison of two differently motivated people that would suggest that they would

attend differently, as long as they are both attending to the same object. This is important 33Britisih Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 39, No. 4, October 1999 ; The Aesthetic Attitude, Gary Kemp p. 396 (in the continuation simply 'AA.')34Ibid..35Myth p. 57-8.

15

because it could only be fruitful to talk of attending disinterestedly if one could attend

interestedly.

Dickie takes it, since Stolnitz defined "disinterested" as "no concern for any ulterior purpose,"

the notion gets confused as, Dickie believes, it’s treated as a difference in perception. Dickie,

to prove his point, puts forward an argument similar to the one against Distance:

How would one look at a painting disinterestedly or interestedly? An example of alleged interested viewing might be the case in which a painting reminds Jones of his grandfather and Jones proceeds to muse about or to regale a companion with tales of his grandfather's pioneer exploits. Such incidents would be characterized by attitude-theorists as examples of using a work of art as a vehicle for associations and so on, i.e., cases of interested attention. But Jones is not looking at (attending to) the painting at all, although he may be facing it with his eyes open. Jones is now musing or attending to the story he is telling, although he had to look at the painting at first to notice that it resembled his grandfather. Jones is not now looking at the painting interestedly since he is not now looking at (attending to) the painting. Jones's thinking or telling a story about his grandfather is no more a part of the painting than his speculating about the artist's intentions is and, hence, his musing, telling, speculating, and so on cannot properly be described as attending to the painting interestedly. What attitude-aestheticians are calling attention to is the occurrence of irrelevant associations which distract the viewer from the painting or whatever. But distraction is not a special kind of attention, it is a kind of inattention.36

To put it shortly: Dickie believes that interested attention, in contrast to disinterested

attention, is just a form of distraction from the object of aesthetic experience, and in so is not

really attention at all.

Kemp defends the attitude view in his article from '99 titled Aesthetic Attitude37 and discusses

this particular criticism of Dickie's:

[...]Dickie's contention that the notion of interested attention collapses into that of distraction or partial attention is surely mistaken. [...] It seems straightforward that there can be cases of full attention to a work of art which is not the sort of attention exercised in aesthetic experience. [...] For example, a music student might listen closely to a piece in order to identify key modulations or rhytmic groupings. This is not a case of distraction, not a case of not attending to the music. Yet it is not an aesthetic attitude either, as the struggling music student will attest (we murder to dissect). It would be a diversion from the potential aesthetic experience but not diversion from the music.38

Dickie does discuss this kind of example:

36Ibid. p. 58.37I’m referring to AA as referred to in footnote 23.38AA p. 393.

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[...]Jones listens to a piece of music for the purpose of being able to analyze and describe it on an examination the next day and Smith listens to the same music with no such ulterior purpose. There is certainly a difference between the motives and intentions of the two men: Jones has an ulterior purpose and Smith does not, but this does not mean Jones's listening differs from Smith's. It is possible that both men enjoy the music or that both be bored. The attention of either or both may flag and so on. It is important to note that a person's motive or intention is different from his action (Jones's listening to the music, for example). There is only one way to listen to (to attend to) music, although the listening may be more or less attentive and there may be a variety of motives, intentions, and reasons for doing so and a variety of ways of being distracted from the music.39

Kemp believes that Dickie’s conclusion – that there is no such thing as the aesthetic attitude –

is unsupported by these claims. Furthermore, Kemp turns against Dickie's claim that "there is

only one way to listen to music." Kemp points out that this is "a substantive psychological

claim, and substantively false"40 as far as he can see.

Listening for modulations – as opposed not only listening more generally for enjoyment but as opposed to listening for changes of metre or rhythm – is a case in point. Another might be searching a Jackson Pollock for faces, if we want examples outside music. It is hard to agree that in these cases one can properly be described as being distracted from the music or picture.41

We shall have opportunity to discuss this shortly42, but for present purposes we only need to

take a look at why this criticism does not hit the intended mark of destroying the notion of the

attitude.

As Kemp points out, this distinction in purpose or motivation that Dickie points to is all that is

needed for an attitude-theorist. It is true that Stolnitz definition as it is quoted by Dickie can

be read as to regard the perception, but it needs not be read as such.

That it is the 'attitude' that possesses the distinguishing feature of being disinterested does not imply that the perception is itself what possesses that feature. It might not even make sense to speak of perceptions qua perceptions as interested or disinterested. [...] it is probably more plausible to say that they are so in virtue of the purposes which guide the perception. [...] the main point of the theory can without evident loss be put by saying that attention is aesthetic precisely when it is not pragmatically motivated. That there are clear cases of close, pragmatically motivated attention does nothing to show that there is no such thing as close attention which is not so motivated.43

39Myth p. 58.40AA p. 394.41Ibid..42We are going to introduce the problem om p. 22 but find it's solution on p. 29.43Ibid..

17

It does not matter that Dickie shows that the distinction between interested – disinterested is

perceptual. Indeed, all experiential distinctions are not perceptual.

Kemp says that Dickie might refer to a different claim:

[...]the music student's attention, since it focuses so narrowly upon one aspect of the music, necessarily excludes other aspects or properties which may be essential to an understanding or aesthetic appreciation of the piece. As it might be put, the student gives his whole attention to the music, but not to the whole of the music.44

According to Kemp, Dickie’s conclusion that there is no such thing as the aesthetic attitude is

unfounded. All that it amounts to is that the attitude has been misdefined. According to the

possible claim Dickie can make, Disinterested attention is nothing more than attention to the

aesthetically relevant properties. But this concerns the nature of the aesthetic attitude and is

no longer the simple objection Dickie wanted to make; it is no longer something that can be

solved by considering the term ‘attention’ and seeing that it is the same in both cases of

interested attention and disinterested attention.

This new definition of the aesthetic attitude may prove to make the attitude approach vacuous:

it is now a matter of whether we can replace the notion of an aesthetic attitude with the notion

of attention to aesthetic properties.

But it is precisely the most basic commitment of the aesthetic attitude approach – especially understood as deriving from Kant – to avoid the notion of an aesthetic property. Kant held that beauty is precisely not a concept, not a property, not something in terms of which objects can be literally described. The proper task of a philosophy of beauty rather is to attend to the special features of aesthetic experience or judgement. The basis of that judgement is subjective which is precisely to say that aesthetic predicates do not express genuine concepts, do not pick out objective properties or features of reality. [...] The sense of properly aesthetic description should be explained in terms of the mental propensities awakened by disinterested attention, not in terms of the mental propensities awakened by disinterested attention, not in terms of features literally possessed by the objects. Aesthetic experience takes explanatory precedence in aesthetics and the philosophy of art, not the objects of experience. If so, then it is no objection to the aesthetic attitude theory to point out that it would be logically adequate to define the attitude to generic attention to aesthetic properties.45

We are led to understand that this regards the basic metaphysical commitments of the two

views of Dickie and the attitude-theorists. The attitude theorist denies that there is such a

thing as aesthetically relevant properties and is, through their attitude, trying to explain 44Ibid. p. 395.45Ibid. p. 395-6.

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exactly in what way we are to engage an object aesthetically. According to attitude-theorists

aesthetic properties such as beauty, or aesthetic attributes in general, are not properties of the

object itself. Unless Dickie gives us a viable alternative – to explain which the aesthetic

properties are and how the relation between them and the object looks – he is asking us to

surrender the attitude approach to a concept which does not explain all aspects. And since this

debate, according to Stanford:

[...] seems to always result either in claims about the immediate graspability of aesthetic properties, which are arguably insufficient to the task, or in claims about the essentially formal nature of aesthetic properties, which are arguably groundless.46

It seems as if he is asking us to accept a notion which does not make sense. Surely, in light of

this, the attitude approach is to prefer. Even were we to deny the approach towards aesthetic

properties as not making sense we can move to a softer claim that would still deny this kind of

view, the Lockean-relational account:

One focuses on the aesthetic properties of the object. But the set of aesthetic properties is, formally, a matter of the relationship between the object and the subject; the subject is able to bring out the aesthetic properties from the objective base properties. [...] the aesthetic properties are supervenient on both the agent's attendance and the base properties.47

Thus leading to that the set of aesthetic properties is relative to the agents experience, and as

such it is impossible to explain which are the aesthetically relevant properties, since there is

no complete set of relevant aesthetic properties. Indeed, Dickie himself supports this

conclusion. He says that there is no aspect or property of an object that can be excluded a

priori from attention. As such we seem to have no grounds to accept that Disinterested

attention boils down to attention to the aesthetic relevant properties.

Section VII – Disinterest Confuses – Relevance

Further criticism that Dickie delivers is about confusion that Disinterest is causing in aesthetic

theory in different aspects. One such confusion would be about aesthetic relevance or

acceptable interpretation of a work of art. In the words of Stolnitz the question goes as

follows:

46http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetic-concept/#AesAtt visited 2012-05-17. These lines I have quoted is used as an argument against the attitude approach, however that is only insofar as we admit that there are aesthetically relevant properties that it is proper to focus one's attention to. If we do not, as the reasoning up to this point seems to imply that we should not, then the argument falls on the other side of the curtain. What is one to focus one's attention to?47Fenner (1996) p. 105.

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Is it ever 'relevant' to the aesthetic experience to have thoughts or images or bits of knowledge which are not present within the object itself?48

the subsequent answer being:

If the aesthetic experience is as we have described it, then whether an association is aesthetic depends on whether it is compatible with the attitude of "disinterested attention." If the association re-enforces the focusing of attention upon the object, by "fusing" with the object and thereby giving it added "life and significance," it is genuinely aesthetic. If, however, it arrogates attention to itself and away from the object, it undermines the aesthetic attitude.49

Dickie discusses via an example of a poem that Stolnitz provides:

Between the erect and solemn treesI will go down upon my knees;I shall not find this daySo meet a place to pray.50

One student reading this poem got an image of a rugby forward running while reading the

third verse51, while an image of a catherdral arose for another. According to Stolnitz, the

cathedral image "is congruous with both the verbal meaning of the poem and the emotions

and mood which it expresses. It does not divert attention away from the poem."52

Dickie believes that using Disinterestedness as a criterion of relevance is confused. It does not

seem to offer much guidance in that regard at all. Dickie points out that Stolnitz seems to use

congruousness with the meaning of the poem as a criterion, something quite independent of

Disinterest. Dickie thinks that the problem can be described in terms "of relevance to a poem,

or more generally, to a work of art, rather than aesthetic relevance.”53

We must agree with Dickie that disinterested attention does not offer much of a criterion for

determining what interpretation or what kind of "fusion" is acceptable/unacceptable. There is

nothing wrong with accepting Dickie's alternative – acceptable interpretation ought to be

judged in relevance to work of art – and it would not significantly damage the theory.

The theory could still claim that fusion is beneficent to the aesthetic experience so long as the

"fused image" does not draw attention to itself but helps to focus attention on the artwork.

48Cit. Myth p. 6149Cit. Ibid..50Cit. Ibid..51 How strong each pillared trunk; the bark / That covers them, how smooth; and hark, / The sweet and gentle voice / With which the leaves rejoice!52Cit. Ibid..53Ibid..

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And, indeed, we cannot say that the image of a rugby forward running would necessarily draw

away attention from the poem. Surely, one can interpret the poem in numerous ways, without

that drawing one's attention away from the poem. Regardless, the theory of Disinterest can no

longer, by itself, deny the adequacy of the 'rugby forward running'-image. There seems to be

other measures we can use to claim inadequacy of that, should we like to.

Section VIII – Disinterest confuses – Morality

Dickie also believes that the Disinterest confuses the relationship between art and morality.

He puts forward the attitude-theorists view in two quotations:

We are either concerned with the beauty of the object or with some other value of the same. Just as soon, for example, as ethical considerations occur to our mind, our attitude shifts.

And

Any of us might reject a novel because it seems to conflict with our moral beliefs . . . When we do so . . . We have not read the book aesthetically, for we have interposed moral . . . responses to our own which are alien to it. This disrupts the aesthetic attitude. We cannot then say that the novel is aesthetically bad, for we have not permitted ourselves to consider it aesthetically. To maintain the aesthetic attitude, we must follow the lead of the object and respond in concert with it.54

Dickie believes that, according to the attitude-theorists, the moral aspects of a work of art

cannot be aesthetic since moral aspects of a work of art are somehow practically interested,

and aesthetic attention is by definition disinterested.

Dickie, referring to Pole, is of the idea that the moral vision of a work of art can be

aesthetically relevant. Pole assumes that "philosophical theory should take notice of

practice"55 while referring to the fact that critics tend to refer to works of art in moralistic

terms and that it is a "philosophical commonplace . . . that the ethical and the aesthetic

modes . . . form different categories."56 Dickie agrees with Pole, although stressing that it may

be that all moralistic criticism is wrong one should not rule it out by means of definition.

Dickie presents Pole's view that the moral vision of a work of art can be either true or false, or

perhaps a mixture. If a work of art were to have a false moral vision there would be something

within the work itself that is lacking. The moral vision of the work of art would be an aspect

54Cit. Myth p. 63.55Cit. Myth p. 63.56Cit. Ibid..

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that would make the work internally incoherent, something that stood in strong contrast to the

other aspects of the work of art, and as such becoming an aesthetic fault. (Dickie himself puts

up a weaker alternative, such as the moral vision of a work of art may be either acceptable or

unacceptable, since he's uncertain as to whether it's proper to speak of a moral vision as true

or false. Also mentioning that a false or unacceptable moral vision does not make a work

incoherent, the coherence of the work is dependent on its internal relations, not anything

external.)

Dickie agrees with Pole in that the moral vision of a work is a part of the work. As such, as

soon as one comments on the moral vision of the work, one comments on the work.

Commenting on a work makes it a critical comment, and so, according to Dickie, it falls under

the aesthetic domain.

To judge a moral vision to be morally unacceptable is to judge it defective and this amounts to saying that the work of art has a defective part. [...] Thus a work's moral vision may be an aesthetic merit or defect just as a work's degree of unity is a merit or defect.57

However, this does not adequately describe Stolnitz view on this relationship of art and

morality. Stolnitz agrees with Pole and Dickie here, in that the moral point of view is a part of

the work of art. Stolnitz considers the moral point of view as one of the formalistic criteria of

a novel that one needs to take into consideration when reading. Since Stolnitz considers this

relationship in this way, this is not an argument against Disinterest.

Fenner points out that Stolnitz does not proclaim the moral point of view of a novel irrelevant

to aesthetic experience, in yet another way: It could serve as knowledge-about, giving a

perspective to read the novel from. Indeed, try reading Huckleberry Finn without having its

moral point of view in mind. Indeed, to have knowledge-about the work of art which helps in

aesthetic experiencing of the object is relevant, only when knowledge-about draws away

attention from the art-work to itself is it irrelevant and ought not to be part of the aesthetic

experience.58

What Stolnitz seems to say here is not that morality is always irrelevant to aesthetics. Stolnitz

believes that you ought to read the novel as if one accepted its moral point of view without

bringing anything external into consideration.

57Myth p. 64.58Fenner (1996) p. 76-7.

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Section IX – Disinterest Confuses – Role of the Critic

Dickie further believes that the attitude approach confuses aesthetic theory regarding the role

of the critic. According to Dickie, there is no reason to assume that the critic has a different

relationship with the work of art than an ordinary spectator. Stolnitz claims that appreciation

and criticism are distinct and psychologically opposed to each other. The critical attitude is

"questioning, analytical, probing for strengths and weakness, and so on"59 while the aesthetic

"[...] commits our allegiance to the object freely and unquestionally" ; "the spectator 'surrenders' himself to the work of art" "Just because the two attitudes are inimical, whenever criticism obstrudes, it reduces aesthetic interest."60

Before Dickie continues with his argument he admits that Stolnitz does not deny the value of

criticism to a work of art, as it can help in preparing the spectator to further aspects of the

work of art than the spectator hitherto had access to; in the form of knowledge-about Stolnitz

allows that criticism can give further perspectives from which to view the work of art.

However, he remains skeptical to the claim Stolnitz makes that criticism has to have been

available before the experience is had, or it will interfere with appreciation. Dickie believes

that this is a logical consequence of Stolnitz definition of the aesthetic attitude and that it

confuses motivation with attending. Dickie refers back to his earlier argument.61 And while

we could not accept the argument, it makes little difference in continuation of Dickie's

argumentation on this point.62

Dickie admits that it might be possible that searching for reasons is incompatible with

appreciation of art, but stays skeptical towards it. He relates one of his own experiences:

Several years ago I participated in a series of panel discussions of films. During the showing of each film we were to discuss, I had to take note of various aspects of the film /actor's performance, dramatic development, organization of the screen-plane and screen-space at given moments, and so on) in order later to discuss the films. I believe that this practice not only helped educate me to appreciate subsequent films but it enhanced the appreciation of the films I was analyzing. I noticed and was able to appreciate things about the films I was watching which ordinarily out of laziness I would not have noticed.63

59Myth p. 64.60Cit. Ibid p. 61-2. This is a quote of three quotes Dickie gathers to present Stolnitz view.61 Section VI62p. 14 and onwards.63Myth p. 62.

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Dickie sees no reason to assume that he is different from any other critic and so he denies that

there is any significant difference between attending to a work of art "perceptively and

acutely" and simply searching for reasons, as the experience is concerned.

A practiced viewer, he says, "does not even have to be looking for a reason, he may just

notice a line or an area in a painting, for example, and the line or area becomes a reason why

he thinks the painting better or worse."64 Pointing out that if this is what it means to be a critic,

then people can be critics without realizing it. Dickie believes that there is no competition

between aesthetic appreciation and criticism in aesthetic appreciation. Dickie thinks that

searching for reasons helps focus attention to the work of art. He believes that finding a

reason is more like an achievement than65 an activity. It does not take time to find one, "it is

done in a flash."66

Indeed, this seems to put us in a difficult position, in regards to whether it is possible to

criticize while still experiencing aesthetically. Indeed, Stolnitz believe that they are competing

concepts, while Dickie believes they are not. Since both sides of the coin refer to empirical

examples (Dickie to himself, Kemp with an unspecified, although plausible, example of a

music student) we don't seem to get anywhere. Indeed, Stolnitz says that one can have more

than one attitude towards an object at the same time, and as such this could provide part of an

answer to this dispute. But as Dickie believes that criticism does not compete for attention we

have two incommensurable positions.

Perhaps the difficulties can be resolved if we give an account of Stolnitz disinterest, as he

conceives of it, since the way Dickie thinks about it doesn't seem to give a fair picture. So let

us return to this question shortly!67

Part IV – Stolnitz and Disinterest

Before we begin, however, there is one thing we ought to note. Stolnitz is interested in

explaining necessary and sufficient conditions for having an aesthetic experience. Stolnitz

further considers aesthetic experiencing a goal worthy of achieving on its own. Regardless of

what makes aesthetic experiences worth having, most people seems to agree that you don't

need further motivations for having an aesthetic experience.68 As such we know that he at

very least ascribes aesthetic experience final value and taking the heritage from Kant and (in 64Ibid..65Ibid..66Ibid..67 We wil return to this question on p. 29.68Fenner (1996) p. 72

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particular) Schopenhauer into consideration we can assume that he also considered it to have

intrinsic value.69

Section X – Definition of Stolnitz Aesthetic Attitude

Stolnitz notes that attention is selective, i.e., when we look at an object we look at it

"purposefully." That is, an object appears to me with certain features in its focus depending on

what I'm about to use the object for. Stolnitz considers this as practical perception, or our

ordinary attitude towards the world. This is the attitude we take ordinarily towards the world

and the objects in it. Stolnitz says that if we could put the attitude into the form of a question

it would be: "What can I do with it, and what can it do to me?"70

Aesthetic perception is not as common as it's not concerned with practical matters. Again, in

the words of Stolnitz:

I will define "the aesthetic attitude" as "disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone."71

We have already faced these lines before, when they were presented by Dickie, but we must

now spend more time examining them to see what, if anything, Dickie missed.

As we can see, the definition of the attitude has three parts, as Stolnitz conceives of it, but also

adds 'any object of awareness whatever' as a fourth component. We shall, however, omit

saying anything about the fourth component of Stolnitz definition as it falls outside of the

scope of this investigation.

Section XI – Definition of ’Disinterested’

According to Stolnitz, perception can be considered 'disinterested' when we are not looking to

any ulterior purpose of which we could use the object, nor in manipulating the object itself.

Interest, insofar as it is relevant to aesthetic experience, is on the object alone.

Not every kind of interest matters, however. Stolnitz gives an example of a book-collector

who is only interested in the rarity of a book or its purchase price while completely ignoring

69 The distinction between these two – final and intrinsic – were not as clear when Stolnitz wrote his work, as these different concepts were often confused. Stolnitz does not explicitly say that he considers aesthetic experience to be of intrinsic value, but neither does he say that they gain their value from an external source. I have, as such assumed that he ascribes it intrinsic value.70Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism, Stolnitz (1960) p. 33 (in the continuation simply Stolnitz (1960)), furthermore Stolnitz does not seem to believe that perception is habitually practical out of necessity, though it certainly appears to always be in our society, leaving out other cultures. (p. 34 in his book)71Stolnitz (1960) p. 34-5.

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its value as a piece of literature, whereupon he remarks, almost upset, that there are collectors

who have not even read the books they possess.

Another such interest in the object, which Stolnitz considers non-aesthetic is “cognitive;”

Stolnitz does not consider the interest of gaining knowledge about an object aesthetically

relevant. Again, he gives an example: a metereologist is not interested in the appearance of a

striking cloud formation, but interested in understanding the causes and mechanisms behind

it.

Finally, Stolnitz presents us with a third way in which interest in the object can be non-

aesthetic viz. the interest of passing judgement, such as the critic does. Stolnitz thinks that the

attitude of an art critic is very different from the aesthetic attitude.72

Certainly, one can understand what Stolnitz wants to say with this. Even if one can be

interested in an object for its own sake, that does not mean that it is necessarily an aesthetic

interest one has. In fact it might, as in the case of the book-collector, be one sprung from self-

interest, pride and/or vanity.

As with the case of knowledge it is less obvious, perhaps. But, certainly, one can understand

how one who observes for knowledge of the object (or the underlying phenomena) can miss

out on the aesthetic aspects of a phenomenon, even though one offers ones full attention to it.

However, it is “disinterested” in the sense that it does not stretch outside of the phenomenon

itself, it is not Disinterested in the sense that it does not serve an ulterior purpose. And one

must admit to (at least the possibility of) the truth of the last of Stolnitz statements, regarding

the passing of judgments.

Stolnitz contrasts perceiving something in the aesthetic attitude with perceiving something in

the practical attitude: Practical perception which, once it has its object apprehended, it sees

the origins of the object as well as its “causes and interrelations with other things.”73

By contrast, the aesthetic attitude “isolates” the object and focuses upon it – the look of the rocks, the sound of the ocean, the colors in the painting. Hence the object is not seen in a fragmentary or passing manner […] Its whole nature and character are dwelt upon. One who buys a painting merely to cover a stain on the wall paper does not see the painting as a delightful pattern of colors and forms.74

72Stolnitz (1960) p. 3573Stolnitz (1960) p. 3574Ibid..

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By these last quotes I believe we have sufficient information to see where Stolnitz believes

that the boundaries are of what can be considered aesthetic experience and what cannot..

There seems to be heavy emphasis on the formalistic criteria of a work of art or an object of

aesthetic appreciation. As we saw above, this is a statement that appears unfounded.75 However, we need not spend time on this feature of the theory here, as this is merely a

presentation.

Section XII – Definition of ‘Sympathetic’

Moving on, we also need to examine the “sympathetic” part of the definition of the attitude.

As we have had opportunity to observe already: Even though the account is in large part

identified by its 'disinterestedness' we are not to take this to mean that we are not at all

interested in the object up for aesthetic experience. In fact, it is much to the contrary. We can

very well be so absorbed by the aesthetic experience, while reading books or such, that we

almost forget the rest of the world and are almost more interested in the activity of aesthetic

experiencing than we usually are in practical matters.

Insofar, Stolnitz claims, as we are “sympathetic” to an object of aesthetic experience we

prepare ourselves to respond to the object. We must, if we want to appreciate the object,

accept it on its own terms. That means that we have to accept everything which it might offer

us in terms of perception. For instance, if we do not agree with the moral nature of the object

of aesthetic experience, we are to inhibit our responses, as far as we want to experience it

aesthetically. If we do not we are, according to Stolnitz, not giving it a chance.76

We have been discussing this above to a sufficient degree to omit saying much more about it.

I will just remind the reader that knowledge about the work of art is relevant if it helps focus

the perceiver's attention and irrelevant if it draws attention to itself (and as such away from

the work of art).77

Section XVIII – Definition of ’Attention’

Furthermore, we have “attention” to deal with. Stolnitz turns against the notion that aesthetic

perception is some kind of “blank, cow-like stare,”78 a notion which, he believes, is derived

from aesthetic perception as characterized as just looking, without any activity or practical

interest. From here a step is taken to that aesthetic perception is had when you expose yourself

75See p. 5.76Ibid. p. 36.77Ibid. p. 53 also Fenner (1996) p. 7678Stolnitz (1960) p. 37

27

to a work of art and allow it to bombard you with “waves of sound and color.”79 He turns

against this and says that this is contrary to experience. In fact, he says, we are absorbed into

music or novels.

In taking the aesthetic attitude, we want to make the value of the object come fully alive in

our experience. Therefore we focus our attention upon the object and “key up” our capacities

of imagination and emotion to respond to it.

Further

Attention is always a matter of degree, and in different instances of aesthetic perception,

attention is more or less intense. A color, briefly seen, or a little melody, may be apprehended

on the “fringe” of consciousness, whereas a drama will absorb us wholly. But to whatever the

extent it does so, experience is aesthetic only when an object “holds” our attention.80

Attention, then, is an important aspect of the aesthetic experience and can also take expression

in physical enactments, such as tapping your foot to the music. Stolnitz believes that there is

nothing inherently un-aesthetical to that activity, at least. Stolnitz perspective is that, while it

may not be an integral part of the aesthetic experience, one might have to engage physically in

order to be able to fully perceive all the relevant aspects of an artwork. Such as walking

around a sculpture in order to get a fuller view of it than one would've got if satisfied with just

one perspective.81

Another relevant notion to attention is discrimination. Stolnitz calls it discrimination because it teaches the perceiver to pay attention to specific features of the artwork. He means that it is this which gives much of the satisfaction in aesthetic experience, and gives an example of such: One might not be able to appreciate a symphony if one does not know what to look for in it.

Indeed, Fenner says, one might at times be required to have a good deal of knowledge beforehand, and in some cases it's possible that even technical training is required. However, with this possibility to pay attention discriminating, one may be enriched in one's experience.

79Ibid..80Ibid.. holds for both the quotes81Ibid..

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Stolnitz believes that sometimes, without any possibility to discriminate, one's aesthetic experience becomes flat.82

These three aspects (disinterestedness, sympathy and discriminating attention) is what Stolnitz considers aesthetic contemplation to consist in. He is very specific to point out that the term contemplation is designating these three phenomena, and is not a notion on its own.83

Section XVI – Facing Dickie’s Criticism – the Role of the Critic

So how will we respond to Dickie's criticism? Stolnitz could claim that Dickie is mistaken

about what is considered criticism and recognition. Indeed, Stolnitz seems to be of the idea

that finding of a 'reason' is like an achievement, as Dickie thought. At least the discussion of

discriminating attention above seems to indicate so, in that it helps us and teaches us to pay

attention to some certain reasons in regards to that particular work of art.

Paying attention to certain elements such as a certain relation or harmony or whatever might

increase the aesthetic enjoyment and it seems that Stolnitz does not oppose that these things

are recognized immediately for “a practiced viewer.” A practiced viewer might be able to

quickly distinguish elements which the casual viewer could not.

However, this does not mean that Stolnitz accepts Dickie's idea that the critic has the same

kind of relationship to the work of art as an ordinary perceiver. As we have seen, it is not

impossible, according to Stolnitz theory, that we are both critical and experiencing

aesthetically at the same time, although these will compete for the attention, and will not be

really be any of them. That is: It might prove to be insufficient for having an aesthetic

experience to partly be in the aesthetic attitude and a criticizing attitude at the same time.

Furthermore, Stolnitz claims that any critique must take place before the experience itself, at

least insofar as the experience will be aesthetic in nature. Indeed, Dickie seems to agree to

some degree. In the demand that the viewer be practiced he would already have experience

with art similar to the one to be experienced. This means he has had his criticizing done

already and know what kind of features to look for in the new work of art he is to experience,

or he recognizes the kind of art and in so doing learns what aspects to look for. This idea,

also, seems to be in accordance with Stolnitz theory, rather than an argument against it.

82Ibid. 3883Ibid..

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The really incommensurable part, however, is Dickie's claim that criticism and aesthetic

experience is compatible with each other. It seems to find very little support for this, other

than his empirical example of himself. And even then, it seems, at very least to me, plausible

to claim that more often than not, we must “murder to dissect.”84 Studying music, trying to

identify modulations, etc. is a chore and does require quite a deal of attention which, in my

own experience, is not aesthetic in nature, regardless whether I'm able to enjoy the music

besides or not.

Perhaps, one could note, Dickie is, presumably, a competent critic and is accustomed to

distinguishing certain features while experiencing the work of art aesthetically. It could be

that, regardless of whether Dickie has very much experience with the particular style or art-

form, he is accustomed to dividing his attention in that sense. Perhaps this division of

attention comes so naturally to Dickie that he does not even notice it.

On a final note, it can be noted that I believe criticism, according to Stolnitz, is very much like

the interested attention in regards to knowledge. It is theorizing about what makes up the

object of attention, and Stolnitz seems to be of the idea that cognitive attention is always bad

for aesthetic appreciation.

As such, I believe, it has been sufficiently shown that Dickie's criticism in Myth has been

ineffective in regards of defeating the theory of disinterest. The only part Disinterest had to

give up was its place as a criterion of relevance.

Part V – Criticizing Disinterest

While Dickie could not prove the attitude a myth, there are still other reasons to criticize

Disinterest.

Section XVII – Disinterest (a)

In the same article that Kemp defended Disinterest against Dickie, he criticizes Disinterest

independently:

A man attends his daughter's first concert performance as a solo pianist. He listens intently and is pleased as she negotiates the intricate counterpoint of Mozart's K. 533. His close attention is motivated partly by his natural aesthetic receptivity but also, more efficaciously, by his concern for his daughter's career. Nothing could help it more than that she should perform well tonight. His listening is interest-driven: there is a clear sense in which he listens closely because of a practical concern. But his attention is not thereby distracted or partial, or need not be. The thought of his daughter's career

84 Referring back to the quote of Kemp in Section VI.

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may come to mind during the performance, but it does not seem as if it has to, in order that his attention be motivated by that concern. There is no reason to say that that kind of attention cannot be very intently focused, no reason to say that it must be distracted. Where attention is motivated or even guided by a purpose, there is no reason to say that the purpose must be held consciously before the mind, in such a way that there is, as it were, not enough room in consciousness for both the purpose and the object. Purpose and motive surely guide our perception and behaviour in more subtle and complex ways than that.

One cannot plausibly deny the familiar features between the music-student and the father in

the example above. Indeed, in both examples they use their full attention and they both are

pragmatically motivated. While we earlier concluded that the music-student did not have a

(purely) aesthetic experience, we want to claim that the father has, or could have.

The relevant difference between the two, however, lies in that while the music-student listens

for particular features, the father does not. He could very well, or so Kemp believes, listen to

the music as if it was someone else than his daughter performing. Indeed, this objection does

not aim to destroy the notion of the aesthetic attitude, but rather that the notion of disinterest

is sufficient for all cases of aesthetic appreciation.

For, indeed, the father does not look for any specific feature in the performance, such as the

music-student does. The father is not trying to understand it, he hopes that the performance is

beautiful.

Kemp believes that this is a problem that can be solved by allowing the notion of attending to

the object 'for its own sake, alone' to substitute the larger definition of disinterest. He refers to

Roger Scruton in Art and Imagination:

a desire to go on hearing, looking at, or in some other way having an experience of X, where there is no reason for this desire in terms of any other desire or appetite that the experience of X may fulfill, and where the desire arises out of, and is accompanied by, the thought of X.85

This, Kemp points out, runs into problems. To begin with, it might lead us to the formalist

claim that art is non-conceptual, or that the aesthetic value of literature is devoid of any

knowledge. Secondly, it might lead to including lovemaking as an aesthetic experience86 as

this seems to be able to satisfy the conditions of Scruton’s definition. (Perhaps it is not

entirely a mistake that it should, Kemp adds)

85Cit. AA p. 398.86"at least in the happier cases"AA p. 398.

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But that it can satisfy the conditions can be seen as a major fault in the conditions. It ought to

be seen as problematic if one has a definition supposed to distinguish aesthetic experiences

from others while unable to distinguish this from a sexual experience. Indeed, as Kemp says,

we might not want to count every act of sex as unaesthetic, but it seems as if sex can satisfy

the conditions above without being remotely near an aesthetic experience.

Section XVIII – Disinterested (b)

This criticism regards the idea the object has to be considered on its own. It might, in fact, be

damaging to aesthetic appreciation of the work of art if it is considered on its own. Fenner

points to the work of Duchamp:

In Advance of a Broken Arm, an object that was, before it became an art object, a snow shovel. Here, as in many instances of dadaist, modern or post-modern art, the meaning of the phenomenal object seems rather important, both to the establishment of the object as an art object and to its appreciation as such. [...] were one to consider the object with no regard for its purpose, one would find little of interest about it: it is starkly symmetrical, the red of the paddle and the green shaft complement one another, but that is about it.87

Can we really be content with this isolation of the object from its relations to other objects and

the world? Surely, we can consider the object in its own right while taking relevant

relationships it has with the world into consideration. It seems to me to be much more

plausible to call this to regard the object in its own right than the notion of isolation; I believe

an isolative stance omits too much of importance in regards of what the object is. This seems

to be exactly what Fenner aims for in the quote above.

I believe that the reason for maintaining such a strict isolating stance on the object is because

Stolnitz doctrine of Disinterest is heavily committed to formalism. Indeed, many writers88 are

reluctant to accept this. I see no plausible reason to keep the notion of the aesthetic attitude so

thin that it can’t handle other aesthetic aspects than the formalistic ones.

Section XIX –Sympathetic

If we can accept the criticism above, then we no longer have any plausible reason to regard

the relationship between morality and the work of art in the same way as before. 89 Indeed, we

can maintain that if we disregard a novel because we do not agree with the moral point of

view, then we have not read it aesthetically.

87Fenner (1996) p. 80-1.88Such as Fenner, Dickie or Kemp89 See Section VIII

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However, isn't it too much of a demand that we read literature in a way that we accept its

moral point of view? It ought to be straightforward to conceive how one can read a novel

without accepting its moral point of view while still understanding it and how it relates to the

further aspects of the novel. It does not seem implausible to suggest that the contrast between

my moral beliefs and those conveyed by the novel could be utilized as an aesthetic merit.

I do not mean to say that we ought to disregard the moral point of view in the novel and judge

it using our own moral point of view as a measure. But I want to suggest that the relationship

between my moral point of view and that of the novel might be more complex than simply

accepting surrendering to the novel and running with it. Just because one contrasts one’s

moral point of view with that of the novel, does not mean that one is disregarding the novel.

Section XX – Attention

Stolnitz does already allow for certain involvement with the work of art. But it seems that he's

a little reserved to allow the perceiver too much participation. This hesitation seems to stem

from the idea that one might be engrossed in the activity and as such loose one's attention to

the object. But this is not, in all cases, plausible. Indeed, Fenner gives an example of this:

suppose that one is a devout Christian […] in attendance at St. Paul's in London one Sunday. She aesthetically appreciates the formal qualities of the cathedral, the historical relations, the relations it bears to others of its kind, […] and the significance, in Christendom, of the cathedral.90

Since this is an objection regarding participation we can ignore the thoughts Fenner expresses

about meaning. Especially since we have dealt with this above.

Now suppose that the music begins to play, she sees the colorful procession, she smells the incense, she feels the cold stone and the hard chairs; soon she feels the movement of standing, kneeling, and sitting in unison with the rest of the congregation, and then she tastes the elements.91

Everything described tells of our devout Christian experiencing everything aesthetically,

while she is still using all her senses and is experiencing in as full a range as possible.

Our devout Christian is fully participating. Can we plausibly claim that she is not

experiencing aesthetically? I doubt it. I think we ought to say that it might even add to the

90Fenner (1996) p. 8091Ibid..

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aesthetic experience to participate in this way. As Fenner points out, this would mean that

“disinterestedness is not the appropriate attitude for having the best experience.”92

Fenner brings up an objection: our devout Christian might be having two attitudes at once.

Indeed, Stolnitz could take this route, claiming that she has one aesthetic attitude and one

religious. But it does not seem as if she has to be in separate attitudes. Indeed, one can

plausibly claim that our devout Christian can be fully in one, single, attitude of worship. This

attitude of worship, then, would include aesthetic experience. The church tells us it would.

Another way of meeting this criticism is by claiming that the aesthetic experience reaches its

peak when one gets completely absorbed into the act of worship. Fenner believes there is a

reason to suspect that there is a casual relationship to be found between the interested

experience and the aesthetic experience.93

Indeed, some art is even inviting the perceiver to play around with it. To take an active part

and almost lose oneself to the activity, as this is how the aesthetic experience happens in

connection with this work of art. Perhaps the most interesting point to make here is to point to

the ones who make art. Are we to plausibly deny that they are having aesthetic experiences

simply because they are creating the art?

Surely we cannot deny that the musician is experiencing the tune he plays aesthetically? Sure,

it does not seem as if he has to, but there seems to be no reason why he cannot. Indeed, have

not everyone participated in some form of art experienced aesthetically while performing their

art-form? Playing guitar, painting or dancing, for instance, are activities where one strives for

having an aesthetic experience as possible. While it may be correct to assume that a beginner

or one learning the practice of the art-form may struggle to achieve a completely aesthetic

experience, that says nothing about the one practicing within his/her own ability.

I do not wish to say that an artist always has aesthetic experiences when they create, I claim

that there’s no reason to assume that they cannot. Perhaps it becomes more clear through the

example of a master blues guitarist decides to play a 12 bar blues with his/her friends. It does

not seem as if this person needs to compose anything while playing. What this player plays

simply comes naturally. Similarily in other art-forms: a painter may have an aesthetic

experience when they “feel the flow” of their painting or the dancer when the dance

seemingly “dances itself.”

92Ibid..93Ibid..

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We could further remark that, while this criticism is aimed at Disinterest, it could be used

against Distance, and might be more effective there .

Section XXI –Striking beauty and the Last Strike at Disinterest

While the upcoming criticism may be a difficulty that all concepts of the aesthetic attitude

must be able to handle, it is aimed towards Disinterest, as all the other account have already

been abandoned. The last objection is provided by Fenner:

[…] one difficulty for the aesthetic attitude is in attempting to explain the beauty “breaking in upon us” or “striking us.” Perhaps each of us has had the experience where we […] suddenly [have] been struck with the beauty of some part of nature. These experiences are not planned, nor are they such into one freely, consciously, volitionally enters. These experiences are had immediately […] [and] occur without preparation, much less the adoption of a special attitude that gives rise to such experiences.94

Indeed, one can see the difficulty for a view explaining necessary and sufficient conditions for

having an aesthetic experience to account for this, insofar as it claims that it is always

voluntarily entered into. Fenner believes that while the major part of aesthetic experiences

happen volitionally entering an aesthetic attitude, the cases of “striking beauty” is common

enough to begin to question the tradition.95

Given the occurrence of striking beauty, the aesthetic attitude must give up on being

necessary for having an aesthetic experience, at least if we want to continue to hold that this is

something that we can volitionally enter into.

Part VI – The Final Showdown

The investigation is approaching its end and we are at a loss. We have no plausible attitude,

while many unsatisfactory suggestions behind us. We are going to examine one more

suggestion before summing up and heading to the aftermath.

Section XXII – Fenner’s Attitude

At the end of his book, The Aesthetic Attitude, Fenner points to what he believes is the most

important conclusion in his book, before he goes on to explain his understanding of the

aesthetic attitude.

Indeed, he stresses that we must deny that the attitude ought to handle any necessary

conditions for having an aesthetic experience. Indeed, striking beauty may well be a good 94Ibid. p. 109.95Ibid..

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argument against that necessity. However, this leads Fenner to draw a distinction between

what kind of aesthetic experiences his attitude can handle.96

He dubs his account 'The Investment Account,' and, indeed, it is a very business-minded

concept. Fenner begins by noting that while we want to experience aesthetically for its own

sake, there is always some pleasure in the aesthetic experience. He calls on authorities such as

Kant, Hume, Stolnitz and St. Aquinas to give support to this claim.97

For one to adopt that attitude sufficient for production of an aesthetic experience is for that individual to adopt the attitude of expectation of a return on the investment of attention paid into the object, or event under consideration. This return takes the form of pleasure, with 'pleasure' herein properly defined.98

Fenner seems to believe that explaining our motivation to have an aesthetic experience –

pleasure – we are in no further need to explain what the attitude is. While we need to examine

what the properly defined pleasure is, the attitude itself seems rather simple.

Fenner does not want to say that all pleasure is of an aesthetic kind. His aim “is not to show

that simple felt, emotional pleasure is plainly and straightforwardly a constituent of aesthetic

experience”99 and adds: “or is what one expects in taking on the attitude to achieve that.”100

And with the last addition we are here led to understand that it is not this kind of pleasure that

Fenner considers to be constituent of aesthetic experience. So, then, what is?

Fenner takes the example of Apocalypse Now: One might, in fact, not experience Apocalypse

Now very pleasurable at all, yet appreciate it nonetheless. Fenner claims that this is because

the subject matter of Apocalypse Now is not what gives the proper kind of pleasure. What one

finds pleasurable in Apocalypse Now could be the strength of feelings awoken by it or some

insight into moral issues or whatever of the kind. This is the proper kind of pleasure.

[…] the pleasure cannot be a first-order sort, where it is a feature of the direct experience of the object itself, like the experience that the object one views is red. The pleasure in question must be a second-order sort, attendant to the motivation one takes toward gaining this direct experience of the object, like, to put it oversimply, the delight one may experience in merely attending to a redness.101

96Ibid. p. 129.97Ibid. p 112. Also Stolnitz (1960) p. 4398Fenner (1996) p. 112.99 Ibid. p. 113100 Ibid..101Ibid. p. 116.

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This second order pleasure one might derive, then, is cognitive pleasure. Fenner claims that

aesthetic experience is not mere sentiment (which is not a necessary part of aesthetic

experience at all) but the cognitive engagement that all aesthetic experience has. Fenner

describes the aesthetic experience as: when one “considers the object, seeing connections to

other experiences, associating, appreciating in the object its elegancy, balance, beauty, or even

its usefulness.”102

I believe we ought to interpret Fenner simply as if he is trying to distinguish the pleasant parts

of an artwork from the relevant aesthetic pleasure, which he calls cognitive pleasure. Imagine

a work of art made of beautiful patterns of some sort. Further imagine that it is pleasant to rest

your eyes on it. Fenner believes that this kind of pleasantness is not the relevant pleasure and

ought not to be considered aesthetic.

Fenner seems to consider cognitive pleasure, in contrast, to be where one has formed a

cognitive connection with the object. A cognitive connection in the above example would be

to see what the beautiful patterns meant to one as a person. To see connections outside the

object and take pleasure therein.103 Perhaps one can think of it as a stronger version of

“fusion” which we have described above.

If one cannot take pleasure in the cognitive connection or is unable to form a connection, then

it is not so that one is not having an aesthetic experience, according to Fenner. Forming a

cognitive connection takes time and considerate contemplation. One spends energy on

attending and is expecting this to be returned in the form of pleasure. If one does not get a

sufficient amount of pleasure to how much one attended, then one could be said to have made

a “bad deal” or simply had a bad aesthetic experience.104

Section XIII – Criticizing Fenner

Indeed, we can claim that there seems to be something strange in this idea. The first thing to

note is that the aesthetic experience is no longer regarded as a good in itself, but what is

sought after is the pleasure. It is perhaps strange to take on this hedonistic utilitarian view,

seeing as the attitude has such

traditional associations with deontological value and self-effacing disinterest before the object[.] [T]his formulation reads more like a caricature of the calculating art collector than a serious modification of the tradition.105

102Ibid. p. 117.103Ibid. p. 118.104Ibid..105The Aesthetic Attitude, British journal of aesthetics, McAdoo, Nick,1997 vol. 37. p. 417

37

It might be suspect to include one's motivation to have an aesthetic experience into the

attitude. Can we not see this account to be vacuous? It certainly appears to say nothing of

further value than that our attitude is characterized by our expectancy of having an aesthetic

experience. Since we expect to have an aesthetic experience we attend, and that ought to be

sufficient for having an aesthetic experience? It does not seem to be in accordance with

ordinary experience, at least not in my case.

We could further ask why we ought to consider a failed act of having the return of the

invested attention paid as an aesthetic experience at all. Indeed, if what Fenner considers to be

the relevant sort of pleasure to aesthetic experiences is cognitive pleasure, and this is signified

by the cognitive connection one forms with the object, why would we call what we have

experienced a bad aesthetic experience if one cannot form a connection?

Indeed, this seems to run in the lines of what McAdoo points to when he says that we can

concentrate our attention on a work until we are “blue in the face and nothing happens.”106

How much nearer the mark is Schopenhauer when he says that: 'Everyone . . . who contemplates the work of art . . . has to stand before the picture as before a prince, awaiting to see whether it will speak and what it will say to them'.107

It seems as if we take this view, then Fenner's account loses its sufficiency-criteria as well. If

the account – the aesthetic attitude is simply the expectancy of the return of the attention

invested, and that this ought to be sufficient for having an aesthetic experience – loses its

sufficiency-criterion then it is completely vacuous. It does not tell us anything of value. The

only thing that remains is that we in the aesthetic attitude we expect to have an aesthetic

experience. But is this really enlightening? I don’t think so.

What we ought to retain from this account, however, is that cognitive connections ought to be

allowed to a further extent than we have seen hitherto. Forming a cognitive connection to an

object may be an essential feature of the aesthetic experience, and as such ought to be

included into the aesthetic attitude.

Conclusion

We are now arriving at our destination. The battle between the attitudes and criticism is now

over and we should now take a look on what has been left to us.

106Ibid..107Ibid..

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Section XVI – What remains

This last critique against Fenner regards the aspects of volition in attitude-theories. It seems

almost like we’re back at the start. The criteria in section I didn’t prove to be plausible. This

essay has proved them inadequate and it might not even have been a fair picture from the

start, it certainly seems strange to assume that the attitude traditionally has been about

handling sufficient and necessary criteria for having an aesthetic experience when one of the

main traditional proponents of it (Schopenhauer) has a view of aesthetic experience as

referred to in the quote in section XIII . What does remain is that the aesthetic attitude may

make one receptive to having aesthetic experiences.

But let us summarize our findings:

1. While perceptive abilities did not quite make it as accounts of the aesthetic attitude,

it’s dubitable to deny their relevance for aesthetic experiences. The ‘formalistic

seeing’ of Tomas and the ‘seeing things not in the picture’ of Aldrich is definitively

something important and our attitude might incorporate these aspects in that it contains

a will to try these things out.

2. Distance may not have made it as a theory, but some kind of limitation on our actions

ought to be put into a plausible theory of aesthetic attitude. Engagement seems to add

to the aesthetic experience and as such it should be allowed in as high degree as

possible insofar as it does not go against the limitations of the work of art. Perhaps the

limitations are more abstract than abiding by conventions and the acceptable patterns

of behavior. It could be that the work of art “dictates” a way it’s to be experienced.

Some works of art invite the spectator to go against the accepted patterns of behavior.

3. Furthermore a widened relevance of interpretation might be motivated. It does not

seem impossible to form many different cognitive connections to things which might

add to the aesthetic experience. And without one gets caught up in thoughts about

these interpretations. As such we would want to claim that the attitude promotes this.

Moral considerations should also be considered relevant to aesthetic experiences.

4. Being sympathetic towards the work of art is something that we should like to keep in

the attitude. Taking the work on its own terms might be one of the most important

features of the attitude.

5. Further we ought to accept something like physical enactment and perhaps full-blown

participation to be promoted by the attitude. We want the attitude to invite towards

active experimenting with the work of art.

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6. The notion about discrimination ought also to be retained. As searching for

familiarities and such knowledge-based aspects of aesthetic appreciation does not go

away.

7. Perhaps we should take a step back from the idea that the motivation behind having an

aesthetic experience is relevant for entering the aesthetic attitude. Indeed, the objection

by Kemp could be avoided in this way.

8. We could retain the traditional view that aesthetic properties do not exist in the objects

themselves, but any aesthetic attribute is available solely because we are taking the

aesthetic attitude towards the object.

Section XV – An Attitude From the Ashes

“Sympathetic and engaged playful contemplation towards any object whatever.” Or

something like it might be what we have to call our account, if we look to all the criteria we

have found as basis for the attitude. I doubt we have time and space to develop our account of

the aesthetic attitude in greater detail, but we will point to the first challenge of the account:

Striking beauty and McAdoo’s claim together speaks – in that aesthetic experiences can

happen spontaneously and that aesthetic experiences are not something one can always have

when approaching an object in a certain manner – against the attitude in either (i) that it is

sufficient for having an aesthetic experience or (ii) that it can be volitionally entered into. The

attitude’s third option is to deny both of these, that one cannot choose when to be in the

aesthetic attitude or that it is sufficient for having an aesthetic experience. This account would

be so severely watered down that it could hardly be called an aesthetic attitude at all. All we

could say about it would be that some days we are more susceptible to aesthetic experiences

than others and we cannot choose when. There seems to be no use to posit an aesthetic

attitude, then.

In alternative (i) we can choose when to be in the aesthetic attitude while this is not sufficient

for having an aesthetic experience. This can handle the phenomenon of striking beauty in that

it is what is missing in the aesthetic attitude is what causes the aesthetic experience and that is

what strikes us. Indeed, this might call for the claim that we are able to perceive aesthetically

relevant aspects of an object without having an aesthetic experience or being “moved” by it.

But, indeed, it sounds like the metaphysically suspect notion of mindfulness: One ought to be

aware of oneself, of the surroundings and the relevant aspects of the world, when putting full

focus on attending to one’s activity (attending to a work of art, for example). But even so, if

40

this is what we believe to be sufficient for being susceptible to aesthetic experiences there

seems to be no way for us to prove it. That which causes aesthetic experiences is something

“missing” fron the attitude and in so we could just as well posit that aesthetic experiences are

always random and “strikes” in.

Alternative (ii) seems to be the alternative I can sympathize with the most. Perhaps due to its

familiarity to my interpretation of the opening quote by Nietzsche, in that it describes a state

of mind where one can have aesthetic experiences towards any object whatever. But also,

while this would mean that when we are in the aesthetic attitude we can experience any object

aesthetically only as long as the attitude lasts. We could also claim that, since we do not

believe that being in the aesthetic attitude one necessarily has an aesthetic experience we

could claim that one does not have to view aesthetically. One could perceive as in practical

perception and still remain in the aesthetic attitude. This could tie this account closer to the

tradition.

Striking beauty could be accommodated for in that it strikes one into the aesthetic attitude, for

example. The idea is that the aesthetic attitude is a mood and as such more or less stable. An

object may cause the perceiver to enter into an aesthetic attitude, (or mood,) if ever so

slightly. It could then be explained why we are so dependent on the object of beauty in order

to continue to experience aesthetically. As with any mood it can be more or less stable, and if

one is not originally in one mood, then the cause for the mood may help one to remain in the

mood. Even so, it focusing one’s attention on the cause may not be enough to remain in the

attitude and the aesthetic experience may diminish or even end. A stable aesthetic attitude

(when the mood is not completely dependent on the objects of “striking beauty”) would , then

be able to view any object aesthetically, even the most mundane things. Neither does it

exclude the possibility of criticism when in the aesthetic attitude. I believe that alternative (ii)

is the best choice.

List of literature

Books:

The Aesthetic Attitude, Humanities Press International, inc., E. W. Fenner, David,

1996

Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism, The Riverside Press, Stolnitz Jerome,

1960

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Human All-Too-Human Parts One and Two[translated to English], Dover Publication,

Nietzsche, Friedrich, 2006 [original published 1878-1888]

Sein und Zeit[translated to Swedish], Daidalos AB, Heidegger, Martin, 1992 [original

published 1927]

Book Reviews

The Aesthetic Attitude, British Journal of Aesthetics, McAdoo, Nick, 1997 vol. 37

Articles

The Aesthetic Attitude, British Journal of Aesthetics, Kemp, Gary, 1999 vol. 39

Aesthetic Vision, Philosophical Review, Tomas, Vincent 1959

The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude, American Philosophical Quarterly, Dickie,

George 1964, vol. 1

Web: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetic-concept/#AesAtt visited 2012-05-17.

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