WHAT DEMOCRACY MEANS TO BRAZILIANS JOSÉ ÁLVARO MOISÉS1

1 José Álvaro Moisés is Professor of the Department of Political Science and Director of the Center for Public Policy Research – NUPPs, University of São Paulo.

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Abstract: Nearly a quarter of century after the reintroduction of democracy in Brazil, the majority of Brazilians supports the regime, but is strongly mistrustful of democratic institutions. This paper examines then what democracy means to ordinary individuals based on analysis of answers to the open question “What is democracy?”. The study is based on bivariate and multivariate analyses of data in research carried out by the author in 1989, 1990, 1993 and 2006. The aim of the surveys was to establish which aspects of the concept were most important, and their determining factors, in order to obtain a broader understanding of the growing normative adherence of Brazilians to democracy. Data has shown that they define democracy in terms of liberties, freedom and institutional procedures; surprisingly the dimension relative to social benefits has no important impact on the results. Both definitions, related to normative and pragmatic perspectives, are integral components of the democratic process and are relevant for the quality of democracy. INTRODUCTION Almost a quarter of a century after being re-established in Brazil, democracy is the most popular political regime for more than 2/3 of Brazilian citizens (see Table 2 page 14)2. However, the significance of this fact for the contemporary political history of the country cannot be properly understood without considering that in more than a century of republican government, Brazilians have experimented the virtues of democratic rule during only two periods of nearly two decades each, from 1946 to 1964 and from 1988 up to the present day. During the rest of the republican period, which takes up the greater part of the twentieth century, oligarchic, authoritarian or semi-liberal systems have predominated, which, by definition, did not guarantee fundamental liberties, free elections, popular participation or rights of citizenship. Then viewed in a long term perspective, democracy has been a relatively new political phenomenon in Brazil, both fragile and discontinuous. This reason alone justifies the interest for understanding better what democracy means for Brazilians. Now a days, unlike other periods of its history, the majority of Brazilians has expressed its adherence to democracy, and more importantly still, this support for democracy is backed by the fact that more than 2/3 of Brazilians are opposed to undemocratic alternatives, such as a return to military rule or the establishment of a one-party system (See Graph 1 page 15). The relevance of stable support for democratic rule has been emphasized by various students of the democratization process, especially Booth and Seligson (2009), Shin (2005) and Linz and Stepan (1996) who, while referring to different aspects of the processes of democratic consolidation, considered attitudinal factors to be one of the most important, since “democratic government can only become established when a large majority of public opinion believes that democratic institutions and their processes offer the best form of governing the collective life of their society and when support for opposition to that form is small or isolated compared to that which favors pro-democracy movements” (Linz e Stepan, 1996, p. 6). Great part of the literature dealing with the subject has followed Max Weber´s formulations according to which the legitimacy of institutions is a key element of the functioning of any political regime, most particularly in the case of democracies because acquiescence of citizens in the decisions which affect their lives does not depend on political coercion, but is voluntary (Weber, 1974).

2 According to the World Values Survey, which at present covers more than 80% of the world population, today democracy is the form of government preferred by the majority of those interviewed (Inglehart, 2003). The Latinobarometro in turn confirms the results for Latin America: as far as the specific cases of some countries are concerned, preference for democracy exceeded 50% in the continent for more than ten years (See Latinobarometro 2007, www.latinobarometro.org). However, for reasons explained bellow there is a discrepancy among the results of the author´s researches and the ones of Latinobarometro for Brazil.

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In spite of this, recent research has shown that, although overall popular support for democracy in Brazil has grown, paradoxically, so has also mistrust of democratic institutions (Moisés, 1993, 1995; 2008a; 2008b), and that this is also a feature in the majority of other Latin-American countries [as shown by data from Latinobarometro and the WVS; also Booth and Seligson (2009); table 1, page 5, shows data for Brazil). It is as if ordinary people were saying in opinion polls, that although, on the one hand, they love democracy, on the other, if not hating it, they at least had contradictory or ambiguous feelings towards the norms, procedures and rules which characterize the democratic institutions, whose function it is to ensure their participation both in elections and in the ways public decisions are taken and evaluated. Usually citizens do not feel motivated to appeal to institutions as means to realize the promises of democracy – political freedom, the equality of citizens before the law, individual and collective rights and the obligation of government to be accountable to society for its actions – unless they are meaningfull and not just formal. As they were created to ensure power distribution in society and enable citizens to evaluate and judge the performance of those who govern in their name, the lack of trust in public institutions could rob them of significance and meaning (Moisés, 2007).

Table 1: INTERPERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST IN BRAZIL – 2006 - %

INTERPERSONAL TRUST None (0) Little (1) Some (2) A lot (3) Mean

Family 1.5 9.9 16.0 72.5 2.59 People from the same church 11.3 32.6 37.7 18.4 1.63 Friends 12.3 39.1 34.6 14.0 1.50 Neighbours 21.3 42.1 29.3 7.2 1.22 Work colleagues 22.3 42.3 27.8 7.5 1.21 People in general 22.3 54.5 21.2 2.1 1.03

TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS None (0) Little (1) Some (2) A lot (3) Mean

Firemen 2.8 11.1 32.4 53.7 2.37 Church 6.0 18.7 34.3 40.9 2.10 Army 9.8 28.9 40.1 21.3 1.73 Television 8.0 34.1 46.0 11.9 1.62 Judiciary power 13.7 42.0 33.4 11.0 1.42 President 23.0 33.8 31.2 12.0 1.32 Police 18.8 43.2 29.4 8.7 1.28 Laws 20.8 41.3 30.6 7.3 1.24 Unions 19.4 44.3 30.6 5.7 1.23 Government 24.9 40.8 28.5 5.9 1.15 National Congress 26.7 45.9 22.6 4.7 1.05 Entrepreneurs 26.9 44.3 25.7 3.0 1.05 Political parties 36.8 44.2 16.9 2.1 0.84 Source: "Citizens Distrust in Democratic Institutions in Brazil" (2006). Note: DK, DA and missing cases excluded.

As the data in Table 1 show3, although the majority in Brazil supports democracy, their mistrust of democratic institutions is very high, particularly those of the political parties, the National Congress and the judicial system. Public and private institutions which enjoy the

3 The table shows simple frequencies and reliability varies between 0 and 3. The average has been calculated based on this range. There are higher averages for confidence in the family, the fire service and the church and lower for political parties, the majority of people, businesspeople and the National Congress.

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highest trust are those which are based on hierarchical structures, such as the Church and the Armed Forces. As concerning interpersonal trust, Brazilians are very much cautious of others, especially those to whom they have no personal attachment or who are not related to them by ties of blood – such as work colleagues and strangers in general. These low levels of interpersonal trust between Brazilians may also explain the low levels of political participation in the country; tests of statistic association (not shown here) confirm this hypothesis. In other words, as they lack confidence in each other, Brazilians seem to fail in developing an important stimulus when it comes to facing dilemmas of collective action.

The aparent contradiction implied by attitudes of adherence to democracy and lack of confidence in institutions has led some writers to see this as a one-dimensional phenomenon of political support; the more skeptical among them have tended to question to what extent popular support for the new democracies is really genuine. They argue that in spite of showing their support for the new democratic forms of government by participating in general elections, the population of poorer or developing nations is more concerned about their social and economic needs than the virtues or values of the democratic regime. In addition, those who hold such positions maintain that the citizens of such countries – who in many cases have low levels of education and income and consequently might have insufficient political awareness to understand the complexity of the democratic process – in expressing support for democracy are merely showing vague sympathy for a concept that is surrounded by a good aura - especially after its worldwide alternatives have collapsed – and that in practice the concept has little meaning. These analysts also suggest, that, as a result of the good image democratic systems have acquired after the Fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of the 80s, and the growing influence of mass means of communication, the present mass support for democracy arises more out of the desire of ordinary people to achieve levels of income and consumption usually associated with life in the Western democracies rather than any deep belief in its political values. In other words, rather than being an expression of choosing the principles of one specific form of government, the majority preference for democracy in fact arises from choices of a different nature (Schaffer, 1998; Baviskar and Malone, 2004; Schedler and Sarsfield, 2004; Dalton, Shin and Jou, 2007). The implications of such a scenario, if empirically demonstrated, could lead to the formation of a democracy without democrats, as was the case of the Weimar Republic in Germany in the early decades of the 20th century. This would place these new governments in jeopardy, should they ever have to confront economic or social crises (financial deficit, drop in investment, high inflation, unemployment, mass migrations etc) which governments and political leaderships could not respond to with the necessary efficiency or agility. Although the experiences of the last thirty years of political change in countries like Argentina, Brazil and Spain have advanced the process of democratization in spite of the social and economic crises that occurred during the final phase of transition, the aforementioned hypothesis demonstrates that there exists a political dilemma which demands more analytical treatment. Without dismissing what we already know in this regard, we need to learn more about what the average citizen understands by the word democracy in the light of the recent waves of world democratization. How do they define the concept of democracy? Would this definition allow it to be distinguished from other forms of governance? And particularly in the case of Brazil, where economic and social structures which exhibit profound inequalities, would individuals show a preference for matters relating to their own material needs, as opposed to concern for the values and processes typical of democracy?

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This study attempts to answer some of these questions based on analysis of data from four national surveys of opinion and attitudes carried out by the author between 1989 and 20064. Its analysis is exploratory and the study examines people’s concept of democracy based on answers to the open question, “What does ‘democracy’ mean to you?” which was included in four surveys carried out over a period of 17 years. Replies were categorized with the aim of clarifying which elements in the concept were most important - in particular if they relate to processes, principles or freedoms, or were related to more instrumental issues -, in such a way as to advance our understanding of Brazilians’ growing support for democratic forms of government. The most extensive empirical analysis was carried out on data from the 2006 survey, beginning with a description of frequencies, and later by factor analysis of variables, which were in general linked to replies to the above-mentioned open question. Finally results are presented of an analysis of logistic regression with a variable built in on the basis of replies from those interviewed who did offer a definition of what they understood by democracy. The aim in this case was to discover what determined these replies. The results show that the majority of Brazilians associate democracy with a fundamental normative concept, related to freedom and liberties, but also to institutional processes associated with this type of government. Although also mentioned in interviews, answers that referred to the social dimension or material benefits of democracy carried surprisingly little weight in the samples. In other words, inasmuch as democracy has been the standard form of government since 1988, Brazilians describe their support for democracy in terms of the freedoms it brings and the institutions with which it is associated. They seem to combine a normative idea linked to democratic principles with another of a more practical nature, related to the performance of institutions. These important twin aspects are related to the quality of democracy, which depends on the integration of these two factors (Diamond and Morlino, 2005). DEFINITIONS OF DEMOCRACY Different researches have shown that ordinary people tend to show hesitancy and confusion when interviewed about what they think of the concept of democracy. It is not unusual for interviewers to be confronted with answers such as “Well, I don’t really know, I’ll have to think about that…”, which finally crystallizes into something like, “I think it’s something important…” or “ It’s something we need, I think…” or similar incomplete responses. Dalton, Shin and Jou (2007) recall that in a similar situation recently, in a text about “how democracy is viewed in some unlikely places”, a Chinese student taking part in the anti-government demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in 1989 carried a placard with the message, “ I don’t know what democracy means, but I know we need more of it.” What is the point about this? In the first instance, it shows how difficult it can be for an ordinary person when asked to define a complex idea like democracy. Apart from those who can deal with such question more easily due to their level of education or personal experience,

4 Surveys carried out in 1989 (September and December), 1990 (March) and 1993 (March) were part of the research “Democratizaion and Political Culture”, which was designed and directed by José Álvaro Moisés, and done with the support of Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo – FAPESP, Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Tecnológico – CNPq and the Ford Foundation. The corresponding databank may be accessed on request to the author at the Center for Public Policy Research, of the University of são Paulo. The survey carried out in 2006 (June) was part of the research “Citizens’ Distrust of Democratic Institutions” which was directed by José Álvaro Moisés and Rachel Meneguello (UNICAMP), with the support of FAPESP and CNPq. Data from the research “Political Culture and the Citizenship”, of the Fundação Perseu Abramo, done in 1997, is also used in this study as are the ESEB surveys of 2002 and 2006, both co-coordinated by Rachel Meneguello of the University of Campinas.

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many hesitate, mention some partial aspects, equivocate or simply do not answer. Neither is this just a problem in dealing with citizens from poorer nations or developing countries where a democratic government has been installed more recently; it also occurs with the inhabitants of developed countries with a much longer experience of democracy, going back over decades or even centuries. The literature on political sophistication or political awareness of the mass public has shown for some time that ordinary people may be limited in their understanding of the world of politics by factors such as insufficient interest, the lack of perceived relevance of political systems and most of all insufficient levels of schooling or formal education (Neuman, 1986; also Converse, 1964). Even in countries like the United States, Britain or Germany there were significant sections of the population, who in spite of being pro-democracy and having ideas about it, were unable to define it in precise terms. This of course does not invalidate the beliefs and perceptions of those interviewed, whatever they might be; but might it not suggest that it would be better to wait until Latin-American countries, and eventually Russia, Ukraine, Afghanistan or South Africa, where social and economic inequality affect the level of education of a significant number of people and consequently their political awareness, reach higher levels of articulacy, sufficient to deal with a question as complex as “ What is democracy?”. Should we wait until at least a minority reach high enough levels of education to be able to respond, if not necessarily the majority of those interviewed? This alternative would mean taking no account of either the negative effects of societies having experienced authoritarian rule in changing people’s convictions, or of the cultural changes caused by processes of economic and social modernization (Soares, 1973; Moisés, 1995; Inglehart and Wezel, 2005). Then one of the questions relevant to research consists in knowing how to respond to different sections of the public who have undergone these experiences, how much replies should be allowed to vary and what is their relation to the functioning of government. That is, apart from contingent factors – such as the international spread of democracy or its association with the economic success of the government of the day – other variables with more lasting effect need to be taken into account when analyzing this topic. Democracy has different meanings expressed in different ways by different sectors of the mass public (Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007; Thomassen, 1989). In itself the concept of democracy has evolved different content, formulations and articulations over its long history, which has resulted in the variety of meanings it has today. It is clear, however, that these are not in opposition and do not nullify each other. It is no simple matter therefore, even for well-educated people, to offer a ready definition that can gather together the various meanings it has acquired during centuries while the democratic tradition has been developing. Although previous studies have sometimes suggested that there is a common general understanding of the term by the public, recent studies of countries which have only become democratic in recent decades have shown that understanding of the concept of democracy varies considerably between nations and their citizens, without there being a single, fully-defined standard (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004; Camp, 2001).This does not mean that these replies are without value, but does mean that it would be more realistic to expect, instead of a common unity of responses among those interviewed, which would draw together different aspects of the concepts, a wide range of descriptions with different significations, reflecting the distinct views of different publics of what they see as democratic government. Aside from which, whatever the percentage of those interviewed who are capable of describing their view, the second question relevant to the study is to understand which factors influence these replies and which aspects of a government’s performance they strengthen or weaken. In the academic literature, democracy is usually defined with reference to the processes and competitive mechanisms used to select governments at elections, but there are other perspectives, which broaden the understanding of the concept, including those aspects which

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refer to democratic content, as well as practical results which are expected in the field of the economy and society. Following the minimalist approach of Schumpeter (1950) and Dahl (1971), a number of authors have defined democracy in terms of competition, participation and a peaceful contest for power. So, for a democratic system of government to be in place there would have to be certain minimum conditions, such as: 1. The right of citizens to choose governments by means of elections involving the participation of all adult members of the body politic. 2. Regular, free, competitive, open and meaningful elections. 3. Guaranteed rights of expression, association, and organization, in particular of political parties ready to compete for power. 4. Access to independent sources of information concerning the actions of government and politics in general. This definition makes clear that whatever political system which is not based on competitive processes of selection of public authorities, which makes them dependent on a mass vote of citizens, that is, principally through a mechanism of vertical accountability, cannot be called democratic.

However the minimalist approach is vulnerable to what others have termed the “electoral fallacy” or the tendency to overvalue elections in relation to other aspects of the democratic process (Karl, 2000). In fact, by defining democracy essentially as a method of choosing governments from among elites who are competing for the position, this way of looking at things tends to overlook the fact that even countries which operate an electoral system may be undervalueting what happens with other democratic institutions. Even though a regime may appear democratic, institutions such as parliament, political parties, the judiciary or the police may be operating unsatisfactorily or in way that is incompatible with the doctrine of separation of powers. Recent examples can be seen from Russia, Pakistan, Peru under Fujimori, and Venezuela under Chavez. Dahl (1971) extended and completed the definition of democracy by referring to polyarchies, demonstrating that for the principle of free elections to be assured it is essential that specific conditions be in place to guarantee the participation of all citizens in the choice of government, including them also having a chance to be elected. He also wished governments and political leaders to be capable of being called to account for their running of elections. These conditions would offer relative guarantees of the right to organize and represent civil society, especially the right of political parties to represent the wide range of interests present in society. But they also imply a degree of constitutionality, that is, the notion that institutions are based on their own internal principles – such as having systems of checks and balances – before society accepts as legitimate the political order; in other words, it should have a judicial/legal basis which reflects the values shared by the majority of society. This refers to the concrete aspects of the political process under the democratic regime, which need specific democratic institutions to be functioning satisfactorily for them also to work. A concurrent (and complementary) perspective of the above defines democracy in terms of its quality, focusing specifically on the concrete aspects of democratic government. Using a market analogy, the concept is compared to the quality of a product or service, as defined by specific procedures, content and results. Quality involves processes controlled by precise methods and timing, which are capable of attributing specific characteristics to the product or service, in order to meet the expectations of potential consumers. In the case of democracy, the hope is that a government will be able to satisfy the expectations of its citizens in relation to the task they have imposed upon it (the quality of results). They and their associations will also wish to be sure that they enjoy sufficient political freedom and equality for them to achieve their aspirations or pursue their interests (content quality). Thirdly, it is expected that institutions will allow citizens to evaluate and judge the performance of governments and its representatives both at elections and by a system of checks and balances (the quality of processes). Institutions and procedures are seen in this case as the means of putting into

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practice the principles, content and results expected by society of a political process that involves democratic governance. Based on the aforementioned considerations, Diamond and Morlino (2004) identified eight dimensions which might vary according to the quality of democracy. The first five relate to procedural rules, although they are also connected to content: the rule of law, participation in political contests, the different modalities of accountability (vertical, social and horizontal); the two following are basically substantive: on the one hand, respect for civil liberties and political rights and, on the other, as a consequence of the first, progressive implementation of political equality and its correlates, such as social and economic equality, and finally a feature which combines both procedures and content, namely the openness of government and its representatives to evaluation, by means of which citizens can review and judge public policies, as well as the practical functioning of government (laws, institutions, procedures and the structure of public spending) so that these correspond with their interests and preferences. Although this way of looking at it defines democracy fundamentally in terms of its most important principles and content, it is clear that it also combines institutional processes and content, always bearing in mind the practical results of governments, always presupposing that social and economic equality can be achieved if and when political equality becomes effective. In addition to definitions which focus on the procedures, principles and content of democracies, a third approach concentrates principally on the social aspects of democratic governments emphasizing the opposition between substance and form, according to the arguments of authors who have analyzed the process of democratization in poorer and developing countries. In fact, in addition to ideas which relate to civil and political rights, definitions inspired by European social-democratic, socialist and communist traditions tend to include social rights such as a health service, education, housing etc in with the concept. Based on Marx´s critic of the class structure of capitalist society, this point of view suggests that, unless members of the body politic can provide conditions which are adequate to meet basic survival needs and the need for self-expression, principles of freedom, equality and political participation may not mean very much (Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens, 1997). We have to assume therefore that positive responses in respect of democracy presuppose that, when a democratic regime comes to power, high levels of income and consumption will follow. In such a case, far from considerations of institutional procedures or the fundamental principles of a democratic system, the public perception of democracy may be more centered on the tangible or instrumental benefits it can bring. It is well known that when responding to researchers, the general public may give varying answers to questions about democracy, but the above-mentioned perspectives, apart from forming part of the traditional political debate, refer to substantive choices which appear in the results of different international surveys on this subject. In this sense, the three approaches above mentioned offer a useful framework for examining levels of popular support for democratic government, even if the correspondence between the approach and nature of the answers provided does not follow a mechanical pattern. In fact each alternative does have different implications for how we interpret the support of public opinion for types of government which have resulted from processes of democratization in the last four decades, and that is why in this study it is considered that they offer a useful basis for analyzing the empirical data. OPINIONS AND ATTITUDES ABOUT DEMOCRACY Previous studies of political culture in Brazil have traditionally measured opinions and attitudes about democratic government using direct nominal stimuli, that is, by closed or structured

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questions explicitly mentioning the word ‘democracy’. The most commonly used alternative is the one also used in Europe and other Latin American countries which takes into account the public’s memory of both authoritarian and democratic regimes, asking those interviewed to choose or express their opinion about the alternatives related to different historical experiences and politico-cultural legacies (Moisés, 1995; Meneguello, 2007). It is at the same time a test of political involvement and preferences between politically opposing alternatives. The question is the following: “Which of these three statements do you most agree with?

- Democracy is always better than any other form of government;

- In some circumstances a dictatorship would be better than a democracy;

- It doesn’t matter whether the government is a democracy or a dictatorship”.

Table 2 bellow shows that two very important features stand out from the research results. First, it should be noted that, in the period of more than 20 years during which democracy has been the standard form of government in the country, apart from a few variations, public support for it has gone up about 28%, and is now at the level of two-thirds of the population, even if we consider that one of the 2006b surveys was probably influenced by the political mobilization of the presidential elections. In fact, looking at the results of the June 2006a survey, when the election campaign had not yet begun to mobilize public opinion, the movement towards support for democracy is in the order of 21% compared to 1989, or two-thirds of those interviewed. In December the difference rose to 30%. However, the second aspect to consider is even more relevant. Growth in preference for the democratic alternative has, over time, been at the expense of those who had no preference in terms of government type. The number of “Don’t Knows” and “No answers” has diminished. In the first case, the choice of “It doesn’t matter whether the government is a democracy or a dictatorship” fell by more than two-thirds. While in the second case, “Don’t Know” or “No answer”, it fell by half. In other words, while the percentage of those who preferred authoritarian rule remained constant at about 15% over the period, in reply to the nominal direct stimulus an absolute majority of Brazilians chose democracy. Confirming theories of political culture (Almond e Verba, 1965), it is reasonable to say that the values and beliefs of the majority of the Brazilian society, over the period considered, have shown themselves to be congruent with the new democratic structures. Previous surveys done by the author have shown, however, that Brazilian political culture was beginning to change even before the change in form of government, under the influence of factors such as the modernization of society and the economic growth of the 1960s and early 70s, the political experience of State terror and the contradictory maintanence of a semi-competitive political system during the period of the military rule (Moisés, 1995).

Table 2 – Preference for Political Regime in Brazil 1989 – 2006 (%)

1989[1] 1990[2] 1993[3] 1997[4] 2006a [5] 2006b [6]

Democracy 43,6 54,7 57,9 56,1 64,8 71,4 Dictatorship 19,4 16,7 13,7 12,3 13,5 14,2 No preference 21,3 17,1 13,7 16,9 16,9 6,9 Don’t know/ No response 15,7 11,5 14,7 14,7 4,8 7,6

Source: 1, 2 and 3: “Democratization and Political Culture” project; 4: “Political Culture and Citizenship” (Fund. Perseu Abramo); 5: “Citizens’ Distrust of Democratic Institutions” project; 6: “Brazilian Electoral Studies – ESEB”.

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Inglehart and Wezel (2005), although sustaining that political culture is a long lasting phenomenon, also argued that it does change under the impact of effects of the modernization and transformation of the policial processes. For them, the determining factor in the change of political convictions is associated with the emergence of post-materialistic values. However, the process of democratization in Brazil and other Latin-American countries, as also in Africa, points to a different direction. Even nations who have undergone incomplete processes of modernization have passed through changes in the political values of their citizens before and/or during the process of political consolidation and transition. The mobilization and politicization of civil society was a crucial factor in this respect, and did help the process of values change to advance. In other words, the transformation of the previous political culture was an important factor, even when it has not implyed a general emergence of post-materialistic values, indicating that it changes gradually under the effect of economic, political and social transformations and specific political mobilization. Some other authors have argued, nevertheless, that research carried out using direct questions about democracy may not reveal the true opinions and attitudes of those interviewed in view of the growing worldwide spread of democratic values following the fall of the Berlin Wall, which, under the mass media influence, would have lead people to respond more positively to questions about their preferences for types of government regimes5. Because of its methodological implications, the surveys mentioned used questions in an order of presentation which was designed to avoid the influence of one issue on another, and specific stimuli related to antidemocratic attitudes did not mention the term democracy directly, allowing different opinions to be expressed to those nominally formulated. The results of those questions are compared in Graph 1 below along with indices of nominal support for democracy. All the indicators went up over time, but rejection of a return to military rule and of support for a one party system are significant. In spite of this there was a slight reversal of this trend in 1993, immediately after the serious political crisis which resulted in the impeachment of ex-president Collor de Mello, the first Brazilian president directly elected after nearly 30 years. This might have indicated some reservations about the strength of support for democracy or perhaps some wavering of the memory in relation to the period of authoritarian rule but, this notwithstanding, preference for democratic rule continued to grow slightly in that year, indicating that, even in the face of a serious critical situation for the new political regime, Brazilians still confirmed their choice of democracy made before the crisis.

5 Likewise Porto, in a an article of 2000, argued that using the above mentioned question would produce spurious results as “people would have to choose between two extremes, democracy or dictatorship” and that preference for the first would only be expressing support for the “right” side. He did not take into account, however, that there was a third alternative on offer, “It doesn’t matter if the government is a democracy or a dictatorship”, apart from those interviewed being able to respond either “Don’t know” or decline to give an answer. In this respect, see also (Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007).

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To test more consistently the popular support for democracy, other questions included in the survey asked the interviewees about specific actions that the State might take to face acute social and political conflicts. The questions dealt with actions usually taken by military or non-military governments which broke the democratic rule of law. The idea was to present an antithetical stimulus that would challenge the consistency of beliefs revealed in responses to the direct nominal questions and allow this to be evaluated. Data in Table 3 below reveal that of the five alternatives offered - which did not mention the word democracy - the majority of those interviewed rejected the anti-democratic actions. In the case of conflict between workers and management, however, support for prohibiting the right to strike rose from 32% to 50% over the 17 years. In the other cases, only a quarter or less of those interviewed agreed that the government should be able to interfere with trade unions, prohibit a political party, censor the media or close the National Congress, confirming the predominance of democratic orientations over authoritarian ones. Although levels were slightly higher to indices of direct indications of preference for authoritarian government, the general trend followed that expected. Concerning the right to strike, it is probable that support by democrats for government action to limit it, rather than a rejection of that right itself, has arisen as a result of seeing the effects of the increasing number of semi-legal strikes which have affected important public services over recent decades. In fact, although the right to strike is guaranteed by the 1988 Constitution, the way it operated was not regulated by the National Congress, leaving open the possibility of public servants in the health, education, law enforcement and social security sectors, not to mention bank employees and other public services, withdrawing their labor at any time, even acting contrary to labor law, which caused much inconvenience to the population. In these circumstances, support for the government acting against strikers’ movements may rather be an expression of the desire to regulate situations in which conflicts can occur within a democratic system. It is worth observing that

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over more than twenty years under consideration, in virtually all cases the number of those who answered “Don’t know” or declined to give an opinion has diminished, indicating that the anti-democratic position gained strength because of the change of orientations of this group. In other words, with the passing of time, an important section of those responding who either did not know or did not wish to say what they thought the role of the State should be in questions which affect political conflicts, has become able to define their preference.

The support for democracy can also be seen from another kind of data. Two of the surveys carried out during the period included closed questions aimed at encouraging interviewees to say what principles, rights and values they associated with the idea of democracy. The purpose in this case was to explictly test the public’s view of different aspects of the democratic system based on structured conceptual elements. The data in Table 4 bellow draw attention to those

TABLE 3 – ACTIONS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT TAKE IN SITUATIONS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONFLICT ( IN %)

TYPE OF ACTION Sept. 1989 –

1 Dec. 1989 -

2 1990 –

3 1993 –

4 1997 – 5 2002 - 6

Ban strikes Yes 32,5 33,3 26,5 28,3 28,6 49,7

No 55,1 50,8 60,8 67,5 64,5 47,3

Don’t know/ No response 12,5 15,9 12,7 4,1 6,9 2,9

Yes 28,2 27,0 - 25,5 26,0 -

No 57,7 50,4 - 65,3 59,5 -

Intervene in trade unions

Don’t know/ No response 14,0 22,6 - 9,1 14,4 -

Yes 19,5 17,5 - 24,5 18,2 -

No 69,5 67,9 - 67,3 69,1 -

Ban a political party

Don’t know/ No response 11,0 14,6 - 8,1 12,8 -

Yes 23,4 19,3 - 24,6 - 24,6

No 64,8 64,9 - 68,3 - 67,3

Censor the media

Don’t know/ No response 11,8 15,8 - 7,0 - 8,0

Yes 15,5 11,6 - 21,9 17,3 -

No 68,6 70,3 - 66,4 64,0 -

Close the National Congress

Don’t know/ No response 15,9 18,0 - 11,6 18,8 -

Source: 1, 2, 3, 4: “Political Culture and democratization”; 5: Fund. Perseu Abramo; 6: Eseb.

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aspects. Firstly, in the two surveys – separated by a period of 13 years – the number of answers “Has to do with” or “Has a lot to do with” pointing to matters related to democracy grew by between 7% and 32%, the only exception being the one that associated democracy and equal rights of women, which fell by 1.5% in the second survey. Secondly, the features most associated with democracy were the right to choose a government by means of elections, freedom of organization and expression and the view that it is the role of government to meet the needs for employment, health, education etc. In effect, between 1993 and 2006 the features which were most strongly mentioned by respondents were those related to freedom in matters related to moral and sexual preferences (31.9% increase), the fight against corruption and traffic of influence inside government (31.5% up), the principle of social equality (26.1% increase), the belief that the National Congress and the Judiciary should be able to exercise fiscal control over the government (+ 24.5%) and the rule of law (+21.3%). All these aspects are related to the quality of democracy, i.e., referring to the rule of law, principles of freedom and equality and processes whose aim is to make governments more responsible in relation to those they govern. Over the 13 years that separate the two enquiries, the number of those who did not know or who declined to answer questions fell by between 6% and 11%, the largest fall being among those who identified democracy with the fight against corruption and traffic of influence (10.8%). Even if the 2005 crisis of “mensalão” (illegal payments made to members of Congress for their political support to Lula´s government) may have influenced answers on this subject, it has to be noted that, back to 1993, 50% of those responding identified democracy with the fight against the corrupt use of public funds. In other words democracy is generally seen as the form of government most likely to deal with such issues. Controlling corruption in fact is a function of the mechanisms of accountability which in turn form a central part of the concept of quality of democracy.

Table 4 – Factors associated to Democracy (closed question): 1993 and 2006 (%)

1993 -1 2006 – 2

Do you think democracy has to do with

Has a lot do with

Has to do with

Has little

to do

with

Has nothing to do

with

Don’t know/ No

response

Has a

lot do with

Has to do

with

Has little to do with

Has nothing to do with

Don’t know/

No respon

se

The right to choose a government by means of elections 57,1 21,3 8,1 5,2 8,3 57,6 31,9 3,7 4,9 1,9

Freedom to organize politically and freedom of expression ( trade union movts etc) 44,8 20,5 15,4 6,7 12,5 48,2 35,1 7,3 5,9 3,5

Social equality 36,7 18,7 19,1 12,8 12,6 50,8 30,7 8,4 7,0 3

Equality before the law 41,9 18,4 16,1 12,2 11,4 51,9 29,7 8,6 6,8 2,9

Financial control of government by Congress and Judiciary 35,6 16,9 21,2 11,4 14,9 45 32 10,6 7,8 4,6

Less corruption and traffic of influence 35,3 14,5 15,9 19,3 15,0 40,3 31,2 10,5

13,8 4,2

Government should provide healthcare, employment, education etc 49,1 20,1 13,4

7,5 9,9 55,6 32,3 5,3 4,4 2,3

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Equal rights for women 47,6 20,4 14,7 7,3 10,1 54 32,5 6,2 4,8 2,5

Freedom in moral and sexual matters 33,9 15,9 17,5 18,3 14,5 44,3 33,4 9,4 8,5 4,4

Source 1: “Political Culture and Democratization”; 2: “Citizen´s Distrust of Democratic Institutions”. MEANINGS OF DEMOCRACY TO BRAZILIANS Important as they are, the results presented above are, however, insufficient to resolve the controverse previously mentioned. In order to offer a different alternative to the test in question, the study focused on how Brazilians describe democracy in their own words, that is, exploring the meanings of responses to the open question included in the questionnaires. The advantage of using open questions in opinion polls is that those responding have to define concepts, categories and life situations in terms drawn from their own experience, using their own natural way of expressing themselves and in the light of their own level of political understanding. It is a tough test of opinion which complements and confirms the methodology based on closed or structured questions about democratic terms amongst others, as the ones above mentioned (see Converse, 1964, in this respect). Responses to the open question about the meaning of democracy have been codified in the light of the three different perspectives discussed in the previous section, namely, principles/freedoms, processes/institutions and the social dimension of democracy, and this procedure shown that they included the great majority of responses given, including those that were inconsistent. Principles and freedoms include, in this case, mention of freedom of association and expression, freedom of participation, the right to come and go freely and other related matters. Procedures and institutions include mention of government of the people, the right to vote, free elections, the right to choose a government, majority rule, political representation, access to justice and control of government spending. The social dimension includes social equality, access to health services, education, housing, employment, fair wages and economic development. Finally inconsistent responses involved the use of phrases like “Democracy is good”, “It’s honest government”, “It’s corrupt”, “It’s a bear garden” and such like (see Appendix 1 for a complete list of mentions). The results of this codification are shown in Graph 2 below.

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The data show that between 1989 and 2006 the majority of Brazilians interviewed were capable of defining democracy according to terms described previously. The precise figures are: 54% in 1989, 65% in 1993, 47% in 1997 and almost 71% in 2006. Overall between the first and the last survey there was an 18% increase. There was an important dip, however, in 1997 when no fewer than 53% of those interviewed answered “Don’t know” or gave inconsistent responses; this can be explained by the fact that in 1997 Fernando Henrique Cardoso´s administration decided to introduce a constitutional change allowing presidents to be reelected in contradiction with the local political tradition, and many electors expressed their disagreement with the change6. Looking to the results in more detail, it appears however that

6 There is no much studies about the impact of this constitutional change in the public opinion mood, but at the time being most of the Brazilian press referred to the fact that presidential reelection was not part of the Brazilian political tradition. It is unlike, however, that this factor alone played such an important role for the public evaluation of the regime in the following years, as the increase in electoral participation suggests; in as much as the reelection rule started to produce a new political picture in the country, with posivite results deriving from administrative continuation, the resistances to the change almost disappeared.

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in 2006 more than 32% defined democracy in terms of principles of freedom and associated rights in their spontaneous replies. At the beginning of the period the number describing democracy in these terms was higher at 40%, which may be a reflection of the lack of liberty during more than 20 years of military regime, but in the next years the number stabilized at roughly a third of the public interviewed. The data also show that a group of those interviewed in the latest survey, quite differently of the previous ones, described democracy in terms of processes and institutions, showing some fluctuation over the period, but by the end the number had grown, totaling about 30% of the public, who by this stage had been able to experiment several years of relatively stable functioning of democratic institutions. This is in fact an interesting result, as it suggests that institutional change produces also changes in the public perceptions of political regimes. Surprisingly, however, considering the substantial social and economic inequalities characteristic of the Brazilian society, the alternative that was least preferred by those interviewed in the four surveys was the one which referred to the social dimension. Thus, at the end of the period analyzed, when the level was at its highest, only 8 in every 100 Brazilians defined democracy in terms of substantive objectives7, which calls into question the theory that ordinary people prefer democracy because they believe it better meets their social needs. In fact, the analyses show that, although not completely rejecting this aspect, individuals rather tend to define democracy in terms of principles, content and procedures. Another important finding of the poll was that, taken together with the number of inconsistent replies, the number of “Don’t knows” and those who declined to give an answer when asked to define democracy has gone down over time. In 1989 they were about 46%, but by 2006 this had fallen to 30%. In addition, the number of those interviewed in 1989 who gave incomplete responses was about 7%, whereas by 2006 the number dropped to just 3%. This clearly contradicts some findings presented by Dalton, Shin and Jou (2007) in their article on the subject8. In other words, in the last year of the period under study, after democratic government had been the rule for nearly two decades in Brazil, more than 70% of those interviewed were able to give adequate answers to describe what democracy meant to them, a proportion comparable to results of countries where democracy is long established and in Eastern Europe, as the study of the above authors has indicated. Perhaps more relevant is the fact the majority of those consulted defined democracy in terms of two of the most important features of the democratic process, i.e., the freedoms and institutional procedures introduced to allow popular participation and their corollaries in the political process. This indicates that, contrary to the views held by part of the literature, the majority of Brazilians are not just paying “lip service” to democracy or repeating what they might consider to be the politically correct view; they do refer to fundamental aspects related to their recent democratic experience. Usual interpretations of this kind of results are based on the premises of institutionalist theories, according to which public support for democracy is derived from the experience with this political regime; in other words, that the longer it persists the more people will become used to its advantages, and stick by democratic values such as principles,

7 Baviskar and Malone (2004) also find that only 8% of their sample for Brazil difined democracy in social terms. 8 Dalton, Shin and Jou (2007, p. 7), after analyzing the historical series of data from the Latinobarometro of the last ten years, observed that the majority of Brazilians in 2001 were unable to answer the question about democracy and added that, in a number of other Latin American countries, interviewees showed a low level of democratic awareness. My researches clearly disconfirm this analysis for Brazil. A possible explanation for the discrepancy is that the Latinobarometro did not used representative samples in every year in which research was carried out and reduced samples were used mostly in state capitals in some Brazilian surveys; see also the results of ESEB (2002, 2006) for the same question: they also confirm the results obtained by my researches of 1989, 1990, 1993 and 2006.

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freedoms and institutional processes (Rustow, 1970). Other approaches, however, emphasize also the effect of values on institutions arising out of the modernization of economic and social structures, with important implications for the role of education and the mass media (Inglehart and Wezel, 2005). Adopting a probabilistic view rather than a determinist one, these authors emphasize the importance of political culture in explaining the growth of support for democracy. In this respect, as the level of attendance at primary school rose above 95% in the 1990s in Brazil and that more than 90% of the population have access to television in the country, those aspects have also been considered in this study; but the theoretical premise adopted is that these alternatives approaches are not contradictory but complementary, as has been argued by the author on other occasions (Moisés, 1995; 2008b). Other researches have also suggested that the public usually sees democracy in two different ways, one based on values and ideals, the other related to practical results. In the first case, political and cultural values are important, while in the second the role of institutions and their performance is decisive for the way governments are seen (Shin, 2005). For the quality of democracy approach, both dimensions are relevant because, whereas the first refers to the content and fundamental principles of government, the second concerns itself with the means by which such factors become effective; both are expressed in different ways and have distinct forms of empirical measurement. The responses of Brazilians to both the structured questions about democracy and the open-ended one, suggest that, on their own, neither principles such as freedom or democratic procedures alone are seen by them as sufficient to define the concept. Democracy is more than the sum of its parts, the significance of which is related as much to aspects which affect the ability of individuals to control their lives - through the enjoyment of freedom -, as the processes through which this is made possible as a result of the workings of institutions. In a certain sense, it is as if Brazilians were saying, in their own words, that democratic form and content cannot be separated when defining this political regime, as both are part of the same process. Tests of association shown in Table 5 below offer a new view of the subject. The associations presented between the variable formed by those who were able to state what they understood by democracy – based on the sum of those who mentioned freedom, processes and social ends – with social-demographic indicators and those of political culture, interpersonal and institutional confidence, political memory, evaluation of functioning of the government and its institutions are those which showed significance to the level of 0.01 and 0.05. The variables used in the test are binary, as is the case of preference for democracy, which is taken here in opposition to all those who preferred other options (see explanation of variables tested in Appendix 2).

Table 5 – ASSOCIATION BETWEEN “ KNOW WHAT DEMOCRACY IS” AND ATTITUDINAL INDICATORS

Variables Coeff. of

comparability

Sociodemographic

Monthly family income (low – up to R$ 780) .086 Age ( over39 years) .059 Regions ( South and Southeast) .059 Male .089

Education ( low: analphabetic to incomplete high school) .195

Democracy

Preference for government: democracy .171 Democracy = the right to choose a government .185 Democracy = political freedoms .150

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Democracy = social equality .135 Democracy = equality before the law .161 Democracy = financial control of the government by Congress .130 Democracy = control of corruption and traffic of influence .069 Democracy = education, health, employment etc. .133 Democracy = control of the government by public audit and the judiciary .141 Democracy = equal rights for women .105 Democracy = freedom in moral and sexual matters .131 Democracy = multi-party system .114 Political parties are indispensable to democracy .125 The president can take decisions without consulting Congress .075 The country would function better if military rule were re-established .-164 Brazil would be better if there were only one political party .-155

Dictatorship is the only effective form of government in Brazil .-130

Citizenship

I would vote even if it was not compulsory .133 There is equality before the law .058 Labor laws protect the citizen .065 Interviewees do not understand politics .069 I listen to the news on television .149

I am interested in politics .181

Confidence

Interpersonal confidence .062

Evaluation/ Satisfaction

Elections in Brazil are clean and honest .083 In spite of some problems, democracy is the best form of government .081 Source Research “Citizen´s Distrust of Democratic Institutions” (2006). NB – Variables studied are binary 1= an attribute 0 = the opposite.

The data confirmed the importance of level of education, but apart from it, there is an association between responses from those who know what democracy is and different attitudinal indicators such as preference for type of government and content of democracy, political values, interest in politics, electoral participation, views of citizenship and awareness of political information through television. A number of evaluation indicators of the performance of government included in the analysis are not significant, for example satisfaction with democracy, evaluation of the economy and others (omitted in Table 5). The few evaluation indicators of the performance of government which are significant, however, show very low coefficients of association. The results suggest that the opinion of those who know what democracy is has as much to do with indicators of political culture and political values as perception of the role reserved for democratic institutions. These results differ slightly from those found by Meneguello (2007) in a study of the bases of support for democracy in Brazil between 2002 and 2006, in which evaluation of Lula de Silva´s government and of the economic situation emerged as factors explaining that support. Some of the following tests take up this question again from the standpoint adopted in this paper. FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY A factor analysis of the variable formed by those who were able to answer the question about democracy and other indicators has been made in the following section (see Appendix 3 for a full account of the variables included in the model). The test aimed to act as a check of the

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meaning of the aggregation of variables relative to the two concurrent approaches, the institutional and the cultural, in respect of public perceptions of democracy.

Table 6 FORMING FACTORS OF DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL - 2006

Rotated Component Matrix(a)

Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Meaning of democracy ,406

Attention to TV news about politics ,681

Trust most people ,304

Trust in the Judiciary ,718

Trust the National Congress ,794

Trust political parties ,766

Trust the Government ,661

Political parties are necessary in Brazil

,812

Congressmen and Senators are needed in the country

,808

Law Courts are necessary in the country

,733

Proud to be Brazilian ,746

Equality before the law ,642

Brazilians are law-abiding ,713

The law should always be obeyed ,388

Labor laws protect the citizen ,453

I would live in another country -

,700

Satisfied with democracy ,540

Democracy can function without political parties

,833

Democracy can function without Congress

,835

In times of crisis the Government could ignore laws, Congress or institutions

,782

Prefer democracy to a leader who was not governed by the rule of law

,615

In times of crisis the president ,779

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could ignore Congress and political parties

The country would function better if military rule were re-established

,842

Dictatorship is the only effective form of government in Brazil

,842

Positive opinion of the Lula government

,756

Positive opinion of the country’s economic position

,715

Interested in politics ,755

Feel close to political parties ,532

Political parties are indispensable to democracy

,394

Would vote even if it were not compulsory

,359

Positive opinion of the Judiciary ,633

Positive opinion of the National Congress

,826

Positive opinion of political parties ,779

Positive opinion of the Government ,609

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Source - “Citizens’ Distrust of Democratic Institutions”, 2006 The model has included binary variables relating to the values, content and institutions of democracy – particularly relating to participation in elections and political parties – and variables of political evaluation of the Lula´s government, and the national economy. In explaining the variation above 54%, the resultant matrix created 10 factors, which suggests a certain analytic dispersion of categories: 1. the first factor was formed by the variables of confidence in institutions (weighting between 0.60 and 0.70) and interpersonal confidence (in this case with a much lower weighting of 0.30); 2. the second factor grouped together variables of the evaluation of institutions such as the Government, political parties, Congress and the Judiciary (weighting between 0.60 and 0.80); 3. the third factor was composed of an aggregation of variables which referred to institutions considered necessary for the country to progress, such as political parties, Congress and the Judiciary (weighting varying between 0.70 and 0.80); 4. the fourth factor grouped together two evaluative variables, one of the Lula´s government, the other of the national economy and in addition a variable about obedience to the law and another about willingness to take part in the electoral process (while the first two had weightings around 0.70, the last two were about 0.30); 5. the fifth factor consisted of a variable related to those who know what democracy is and other variables related to exposure to political information on television, interest in politics and closeness to political parties (the latter having a weighting between 0.50 and 0.70 while the first was below 0.50); 6. the sixth factor joined together two variables about the need for the existence of political parties and Congress for democracy to thrive (with a weighting over 0.80); 7. the seventh factor was made

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up of two variables expressing authoritarian views (weighting above 0.80); 8. the eighth factor linked other variables related to the choice between democracy and authoritarianism (weighting between 0.60 and 0.70; 9. the ninth factor contained variables relating to satisfaction with democracy, perception of the principle of equality before the law, as well as abiding by the law and protection of labor rights (weighting varying between 0.50 and 0.70, the last, however, lower than 0.50; 10. finally the tenth factor was formed by two variables which related to a feeling of belonging to the political community (weighting around 0.70). Prima faciae the responses of those interviewed about democracy only coincide over exposure to political news on television, general interest in politics and most notably, closeness to political parties. In principle, this linkage justifies, on the one hand, hypotheses which refer to the effect of the international spread of democracy, but also to the way this form of government is seen as being bound to one of the most important representative institutions, namely political parties. It is noteworthy even though factors such as political confidence, evaluation of institutions, choice of institutions necessary for the country to progress and indicators relating to the political community seem to be distributed among different factors. This in part confirms the hypotheses of Pippa Norris (1999), based on the contribution of David Easton (1963), that the phenomenon of political support cannot be considered en bloc, but has to be seen as part of the distinction between different dimensions that operate under their own logic, which sometimes makes them appear separate and sometimes indicates that there are points of connection between them. This appears to be the case in areas relating to the political community, support for political values and finally evaluation of government and institutions. It should also be noted that although participation in elections and recognition of the importance of political parties, parliament and the judiciary come under the same factor, they appear separate from similar attitudinal factors. Put another way, while there is apparently more coherence in the way variables related to freedoms are seen, the view in respect of democratic institutional procedures seems to be a good deal less focused. Meneguello (2007) also reported some dispersion of institutional factors when discussing support for democracy in her aforementioned text.

DETERMINANTS OF THE MEANINGS OF DEMOCRACY

The results presented here appear almost to show that, contrary to more pessimistic expectations, the majority of Brazilians interviewed do have definite ideas about democracy as an ideal, but previous tests did not allow us to clearly identify where these convictions came from. For this reason, the next step in the study was to carry out a logistic regression analysis of the variable which consisted of the responses of those who knew what democracy is and, by way of explanation, a grouping of socio-demographic indicators and those of civic culture, interpersonal confidence, political participation, evaluation of institutions and the performance of the government of the day (see Appendix 4 for a complete list of the variables tested). The aim of this procedure was to test the effect of indicators associated with competing hypotheses, that is, not only those supported by this study, but also those relative to the role of the international spread of democracy, the effect of economic and social modernization, the influence of government performance - especially in the economic area - the influence of religious beliefs, social capital and different forms of political participation. To say it straightly, the model is not exactly parcimounious. Its adjusted R squared is nearly 0.30. Lines in black indicate variables which are not significant and which moreover disprove corresponding hypotheses discussed in the literature.

TABLE 7 – LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF “KNOW WHAT DEMOCRACY IS” - 2006

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EXPLANATORY VARIABLES B Sig. Exp(B)

Intercept -2,752 .000 Men 0,298 ,014 1,347 Average level of education or above 0,651 .000 1,917 Family income greater than R$ 1300 0,312 ,071 1,366 Economically active 0,344 ,006 1,410 Cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants 0,022 ,869 1,022 Regions ( South and Southeast) -0,539 .000 0,583 Interpersonal confidence 0,322 ,025 1,380 Catholics 0,109 ,372 1,115 Whites 0,410 ,001 1,507 Listen to political news on TV 0,423 ,003 1,526 Interested in politics 0,620 ,001 1,859 Government should respect laws and institutions even in crises 0,315 ,007 1,371 Reject return to military rule 0,688 .000 1,990 Reject one party system 0,507 .000 1,661 Would vote even if not compulsory 0,264 ,027 1,302 Discuss politics 0,534 ,001 1,706 Would sign a petition 0,359 ,005 1,432 Would take part in a boycott 0,302 ,047 1,353 Member of a religious group -0,225 ,093 0,798 There is equality before the law -0,273 ,054 0,761 Political parties represent electors and the people 0,271 ,040 1,311 Elections are fair in Brazil 0,321 ,007 1,378 Govt. should intervene in the economy 0,319 ,015 1,376 Civil servants take no notice of what people think 0,283 ,061 1,327 Political bodies do not give the people enough information 0,229 ,046 1,257 Trust the police -0,205 ,130 0,815 Trust the National Congress 0,248 ,095 1,282 Mayors are necessary -0,290 ,126 0,748 Housing is good -0,259 ,033 0,772 Social security is good -0,294 ,023 0,745 Public transport is good 0,411 ,002 1,508 Corruption is a serious problem 0,905 ,011 2,473 Politicians use secret funds during elections 0,511 ,007 1,666 Brazilians would use secret funds ( instead of politicians) -0,534 ,002 0,586 Brazilians would fake bills for public works ( not politicians) 0,369 ,020 1,446 My family’s economic situation is good -0,105 ,372 0,900 Voted for Lula in 2002 -0,176 ,146 0,839 Economic situation in the country has improved under Lula -0,108 ,382 0,898

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Source - “Citizens’ Distrust of Democratic Institutions”, 2006 Nagelkerke R Square: .0.286; model variables are binary.

In the model adopted, the most important determining factors for responses defining democracy in terms of freedoms, institutional processes and social ends are – considering the coefficients of significance and odds ratio of explanatory variables – the view that corruption is a serious problem (2½ times more than chance), rejection of a return to military rule (99% more than chance), high school and above level of education (91% more than chance), interest in politics (85% more than chance), talk about politics with friends (70% more than chance), rejection of one party system (66% more than chance) and conviction that politicians use secret funds during election campaigns (also 66% more than chance). It is also worth noting that the interaction produced by the variables included in the model, shows that inhabitants of medium and small-sized towns of less than 500,000 inhabitants and those with a family income of approximately US$ 650 per month are just as likely to be able to offer a definition of democracy as others, other variables being constant; in other words, these factors are not decisive of a person’s ability to answer the question. This could indicate that the political culture in Brazil is changing, but these last factors are becoming less important. The view that civil servants do not take any notice of what people think is not significant, but that public bodies do not give the public sufficient information is (more than 25% more than chance). Confidence in the police and the National Congress and the belief that city halls are important did not influence the definition of democracy, nor did religious belief. In fact, the data contradicts Inglehart´s hypothesis, according to which Brazil, as part of Latin America, follows the catholic and Iberian cultural tradition (Inglehart, 2000). Being catholic or having any other religious belief had no effect on the results. The most surprising results, however, were those relating to the hypotheses in respect of the influence of a positive evaluation of the performance of the government of the day, in particular the economic situation of the country and interviewees’ family economic situation. None of these variables turned out to be significant in the model used, not even that relating to support for President Lula in 2002. That is to say, contrary to the conclusions drawn by Pippa Norris (1999), it is not necessarily the winners of the political game, in Brazil at any rate, who are likely to be able to best define democracy. Rather it is those citizens who are critical of the performance of institutions in dealing with corruption and of some public services who have the best chance of knowing how to define democracy. Nor do variables which produced a positive evaluation of actions of the government, at least in relation to the economy or government in general, help to explain the dependent variable. This is not what Meneguello (2008) found, and this suggests that we need more research about the relationship between the performance of governments and the economy and levels of support for democracy in Brazil. It should also be observed that even with an odds ratio closest to 1, of the socio-demographic variables, being part of the economically active part of the population (41% more than chance) and male (34% more than chance) are good indicators of ability to answer the question. Of the political culture variables, being white (50% more), listening to political news on television (52% more), trusting the majority of people (38%) and believing that the government is not entitled to disrespect democratic laws and institutions in a crisis (37%) are the factors most favorable to being able to answer the question. One important feature needs to be emphasized here. The likelihood of chance of the variable relative to the role of the media (and therefore the international spread of democracy) did not show any spectacular result, indicating that, although it may be important considered together with other factors included

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in the model, it does not in fact appear to play the significant part it is supposed by the previously mentioned literature. But knowing what democracy is also linked to other factors: of the variables dealing with evaluation of the functioning of institutions, the belief that political parties do represent the people and the electors (as opposed to the idea that that they only represent the interests of the politicians themselves) and that elections in Brazil are not subject to fraud are factors which influence positive responses about democracy (in both cases, holding these views increases by about 30% the chance of someone knowing what democracy is). The view, however, that Brazilian politicians use secret funds (66% more than chance) and present inflated bills when charging for public work, as many believe (44% more) are also determining factors in the capacity to define democracy. This does not apply, however, to the belief that many other Brazilians would do the same as politicians are said to do. There is a clear connection here between the view of democracy as an ideal and the regular functioning expected of an institution. As far as public services are concerned those who gave a negative evaluation of housing and social security had a greater likelihood of knowing what democracy was, whereas in the case of public transport it was those who had a positive opinion of the services. These results are apparently contradictory, but it is not impossible that those who are critical of areas which are generally agreed to be most deficient, namely housing and social security, are exactly those who have the highest expectations of democracy, while those who are satisfied with an area such as public transport, which is provided even though there may be deficiencies, may be reacting thus because they believe the sector is relatively better because of the functioning of democracy. In sum, the factors listed are related as much to theories of political culture as those that emphasize the performance of democratic institutions. The model adopted in this study, moreover, shows that the predictors of the meanings chosen by those interviewed to define democracy predicate the involvement of ordinary people in the world of politics and in the mechanisms for choosing governments. For example, those who discuss politics with others (70% more than chance), those who would sign a petition or protest (43% more), those who would take part in a boycott if necessary (35%) and those who would vote even if it was not compulsory (approximately half the sample, with 30% more than chance) were all more likely to know what democracy is. The results also suggest that memories of the military regime and the old Brazilian tradition of non-involvement in public life may be losing force today. At the same time, confirming some of the theories of Putnam (1998), interpersonal confidence is important to these results. In terms of the analyses of Linz and Stepan (1996) these results suggest that support for democracy in Brazil – aside from the transformation of the political institutions – is based on favorable attitudes towards the government, expressed in rejection of alternatives which might put it at risk, but also in views which reflect a demand for better quality of democracy. Concern about corruption, moreover, suggests there exists in the Brazilian society a demand for greater efficiency of mechanisms of accountability. DISCUSSION This study allow to some conclusions. Firstly, contrary to the skepticism of part of the literature, the data show that a majority of Brazilians are capable of defining democracy in terms which clearly refer to two of the main aspects of the concept: on the one hand, the principles of freedom and liberties and, on the other, procedures and institutional structures. These definitions of democracy clearly distinguish this form of government from its competing alternatives. In other words, they are not just vague or imprecise ideas, influenced by the international spread of democracy, which merely reflect the positive image it has acquired. Our examination shows that the majority of responses about democracy, involving the freedoms and processes associated with it, are influenced by the attention paid by those interviewed to political news on television, but at the same time by political values such as rejection of authoritarian alternatives, recognition of the role of representative institutions,

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interest in public life and political participation. In this sense they are in line with the findings reported by Camp (2000), Moreno (2000), Schedler and Sarsfield (2007) and also Dalton, Shin e Jou (2007) according to surveys carried out in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and other Latin American countries in recent years. Ordinary people in Brazil, even in circumstances not entirely favorable, do know how to define what democracy is and the definition is associated to an extent to their normative support of democratic governments, i.e. of the ideals implicit in them; on the other hand, they are also beginning to expect that institutions will become sufficiently competent to realize the democratic promises.

Brazilians’ definitions of democracy are influenced by some values of political culture and by how they see institutions performing, but it needs to be noted that the evaluative variables of the performance of the economy and the government of the day included in the analysis models do not appear important in explaining the responses of those interviewed. Definitions involving the two most important aspects in the concept of democracy – freedoms and processes – are basically determined by political values and other factors, such as evaluation of the situation regarding corruption and institutions in general, level of education and the influence of information received from the media. Looking at this from the perspective of the quality of democracy, it can be said that in Brazil democracy is seen as an expression of institutional procedures – for example participation in elections – but at the same time as a construct relating to political principles and values, such as freedoms, which clearly distinguish the democratic process from its authoritarian alternatives. As Inglehart and Wezel (2005) have pointed out, these factors are fundamental for the way government is seen as a cause and effect of human development, in other words, as a perspective which sees individuals as capable of defining the direction and meaning of their lives, which implies that they recognize themselves as free and equal to do so.

One final note of caution: as Dalton, Shin and Jou (2007) have pointed out, knowing how to describe what democracy is very important, but it is insufficient in itself to provide support for the regime because the democratic process requires more than just a simple definition [see also Booth and Seligson (2009) in this respect]. For a democratic system to work and offer quality it requires public involvement in its institutions and that citizens keep a check on the performance of government and public authorities through the media, political parties and civil society. In the case of Brazil, the paradox represented by continued high levels of citizens’ distrust of political institutions may hinder us from in achieving this, as this mistrust is also associated with deficiencies in the functioning of these same (Moisés, 1995; 2008b). In this sense, the fact that people’s definitions of democracy have acquired, over the almost 20 year period of research, a significance which relates to fundamental human values such as political and individual freedoms and the means which allow these to become effective such as guaranteed processes that assist the functioning of those democratic institutions, may offer a way out of the paradox. The results suggest in fact that a new standard of political culture may be emerging in Brazil. Unlike some hypotheses of Almond and Verba (1965) about countries where the democratic tradition is fragile, the way ordinary people see democracy in Brazil is showing itself to be more complex than in the past, including, at the same time, human values and the means of realizing them, which offer a potential basis of political support for those who wish to overcome the present distortions and institutional deficiencies. The views about corruption, on the one hand, and the role of political parties and representative institutions, on the other, are examples of this. The meaning given to democracy by Brazilians can also be seen as part of what Pippa Norris (1999), analyzing the situation of mature democracies, called critical citizenship. In effect, while political parties are recognized to be vital for democracy, their actual performance has been evaluated very critically, which is exemplified by the mistrust that many citizeasns have for them. However, rather than wishing to eliminate them, the majority of citizens seem to be saying that they should improve and perform their

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representative function more effectively. This view about the democratic regime could serve as a basis for pressure to introduce political reforms, particularly in relation to representative institutions. Finally, concern over corruption also shows that there is a demand for institutions charged with overseeing what politicians and governments do to improve their performance. For a country whose experience of democracy is relatively recent, these signs can not be disregarded.

APPENDIX 1 – RECODIFICATION OF OPEN RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION “WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?” – 1989 to 2006

Freedoms – mentions of:

Freedom to criticize the government

The right to come and go

Freedom of expression

Could fight for better wages Everyone can exercise their rights Freedom of association

Freedom from repression

Freedom of information

Government guarantees the security of the people

The right of opinion

Awareness of rights and obligations

A free country where people are not slaves

Processes/ Institutions mentions of:

Citizens exercise their rights and obligations

Obligation to vote

Need for strict laws

Government not corrupt

Political parties should have the same opportunities in the media Disputes between politicians/ Political disputes

Government with laws through parliament

A country governed by Congress

Fulfilling the Constitution

The people can oversee government spending

Organization of the people respecting laws

Government fulfills its obligations

Form of government

Government involving all social classes

Majority rule in government

Knowing how to demand your rights

Country has same laws for the rich and the poor

Citizens’ rights recognized in law

Same law for the rich and the poor

Balance between the three branches of government: judiciary, legislative and executive

Respect for the citizen

Rights and obligations laid down and applied Punish politicians who steal from the people

Social Ends – mentions of:

Right to public health independent of race, sex or color

Right to adequate public transport

Right to work

Government should improve conditions for the low paid

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Right to education

Country with full employment, no unemployment

Equal rights for all people

Equality between citizens

Equality between men and women/ equal rights

No discrimination on the grounds of color/ race Incomplete/ Don’t know/ Did not say

It’s violent

Lack of respect for the citizen

It’s good

A country with honest politics

Laws not obeyed

President corrupt in government / politicians

Difference between rich and poor / social inequality

Racial discrimination

Lack of honesty

Governors impose laws incompatible with the needs of the people

Government dominated by elite politicians

Too many Chiefs, not enough Indians

Don’t know / Would not say APPENDIX 2 – Binary variables used in bivariate analysis, but in Table 5 only significant variables have been included. Attribute = 1 Others = 0.

Monthly family income (low – up to R$ 780)

Age (over 39 years)

Regions ( South and Southeast)

Male

Cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants

Education ( low: analphabetic to incomplete high school) Preference for government: democracy Democracy is associated with

The right to choose a government

Political freedoms

Social equality

Equality before the law

Financial control of the government by Congress

Less corruption and traffic of influence

Education, health and employment

Control of the government by public audit and the judiciary

Equal rights for women

Freedom in moral and sexual matters

Plurality of political parties

Democracy cannot function without political parties

Democracy cannot function without the National Congress

Political parties are indispensable to democracy

The President of the Republic should be a member of a political party

Political parties are necessary for the country to progress in Brazil

Congressmen and Senators are needed for the country to progress

Law Courts are necessary for the country to progress

Prefer democracy to a charismatic leader not subject to the law

In a crisis, the president can take decisions alone, independent of Congress and the law.

The country would function better if military rule were re-established

I would give a blank check to a charismatic leader who could solve all the country’s problems.

Brazil would be better if there were only one political party

Dictatorship is the only effective form of government in Brazil

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I would vote even if it was not compulsory

There is equality before the law

Brazilians are not law-abiding

The law should always be obeyed

Brazilians know how to exercise their rights

Brazilians are aware of their obligations

Brazilians know their rights

Labor laws protect the citizen

People like me can’t understand what goes on in politics.

I have no influence on the government

Having the vote means I can influence what happens in this country

I’m proud to be Brazilian

I would be prepared to live in another country

I watch up to 2 hours TV per day

I watched the political news on TV last week

Interested in politics

Feel close to political parties

Voted in the last presidential election (2002)

Interpersonal confidence

Trust in the Judiciary

Trust the National Congress

Trust political parties

Trust the Government

Elections in Brazil are fair and honest

Corruption has not increased in the last 5 years

Corruption has not increased in the last year

Satisfied with democracy

Positive opinion of the country’s economic position

In spite of some problems, democracy is the best form of government

In a crisis, the Government could disregard the law or institutions

The economic situation has improved during the Lula government

The economic situation improved during the Cardoso government

The economic situation improved during the Military Dictatorship

Human Rights improved during the Cardoso government.

Human Rights have improved during the Lula government.

Human Rights improved during the Military Dictatorship

APPENDIX 3 – Variables used in factorial analysis ( Table 4) Interest in politics, Up to 2 hours of TV a day, Listen to political news on TV, Low level of education, Cities with more than 500,00 inhabitants, Democracy is the best form of government, Preference for a democratic regime, Democracy = the right to choose a government, Democracy = political freedoms, Democracy = social equality, Democracy = equality before the law, Democracy = Congress controls government spending, Democracy = control of corruption and traffic of influence, Democracy = meeting health, employment and education needs, Democracy = government spending is controlled by public audit and the judiciary, Democracy = rights of women, Democracy = freedom in moral and sexual matters, Political parties are necessary for democracy, Congress is necessary for democracy, Closeness to political parties, Political parties are vital for democracy, The President should be a member of a political party, Parties are necessary for the country, Congressmen and senators are necessary for the country, Law courts are necessary for the country, Voted in the last election, Would vote even if it was not compulsory, Know what democracy is. APPENDIX 4 – Variables used in the logistic regression ( Table 7) Sex (male), Level of Education (High school or above), Income (+ R$ 1,300), Economically active, Cities (+500,000 inhabitants), Region ( South and Southeast), Trust the majority of people, Religion ( Catholic), Color (white), Listen to the political news on TV, Interest in politics, Think the Government should still respect laws and institutions in a crisis, Reject return to military rule, Reject one party state, Would vote even if not compulsory, Discuss politics, Would sign a petition, Would take part in a boycott, Member of a religious group, There is equality before the law, Political parties represent the people and the electors, Elections are fair, Think the govt. should intervene in the economy, Civil servants do not take notice of what people think, Public bodies do not give citizens enough information, Trust the police, Trust the National Congress, Mayors are necessary for the country, Housing is good, Social security is good, Public transport is good, The majority of politician use secret funds during elections, Brazilians use secret funds as well as politicians, Brazilians, as well as politicians present false bills for public work, The economic situation is good, Voted for Lula, The economic situation has improved under Lula.

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