august2016

What Did Russian Bombers in Iran Mean?

Photo: RF Ministry of Defence/Youtube Russian bombers attack targets in Syria from Hamadan base in Iran

On August 15, 2016 Russian aircraft arrived at the Iranian air base Hamadan and the following day flew first combat missions, bombing Islamic State and Jabhat An-Nusra (now Jabhat Fateh ash-Sham) targets in the Syrian provinces of Aleppo and Deir Ezzor. Since then Russia has intensified bombings of terrorist targets including three launches of Kalibr cruise missile from the Mediterranean on Aug. 19.

Just six days after that, on August, 22 Iranian Defense Minister reported that Russia stopped using Hamadan air base in Iran. In addition, Defense Minister of Iran Hossein Dehghan criticized Russia for the “kind of show-off and ungentleman” way it publicized the deployment of its bombers in Iran. Shortly after that Russian Defense Ministry released the statement saying that all aircraft stationed in Hamadan airbase successfully completed their mission and returned to Russia. Thus, Russian aircraft were using Hamadan air base and performed strikes against terrorist targets in Syria just for six days.

As such move came against the Turkish reconciliation with Israel and Russia, improvement of Ankara’s relations with Iran, and growing Turkey’s tensions with the West (although after U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden’s visit to Ankara on August, 24 and Turkey’s de-facto intervention in Syria the same day, tensions between the two look less worrying), it brought some important changes in the regional power balance and dynamic.

Abrupt withdrawal

Together with the Iranian announcement of Russian bombers leaving Hamadan air base, Tehran criticized Moscow for the way it publicized the deployment of bombers in Iran and called it an attempt “to show they are a superpower to guarantee their share in political future of Syria...”

twitter.com/@miladvisor Autumn Is Coming. Russian VKS in Iran

Such reaction comes just a day after Iran’s Defense Minister actually praised Russia’s use of Hamadan air base in their common fight against terrorism in Syria. Besides, during the past week Iranian officials defended Russia’s use of Hamadan air base in their country’s parliament and explained to those concerned that it was a temporary and mutually beneficial decision. It seems that Tehran used such rhetoric to restore its image (both domestically and internationally) after decision to allow Russian aircraft access to Hamadan was criticized by conservative circles in Iranian establishment.

However, the real message of such “six-days agreement” on Russia’s access to Iranian air base was to showcase a new depth of Russia-Iran military cooperation and demonstrate Moscow’s increased capabilities in its operations in the Middle East.

This is why future usage of Iranian air bases or other military infrastructure by Russian aircraft should not be excluded.

Behind the deployment

It looks like the final decision to deploy Russian bombers in Hamadan was made during Putin-Rouhani personal meeting in Baku on 8 August, 2016. However, Iranian Defense Ministry officially explained access of Russian bombers to the Iranian Hamadan air base just four days after the first reports appeared on August, 15. During the past week some part of the Iranian establishment and parliament expressed disagreement with such move, so Iranian officials (parliament speaker Ali Larijani, the head of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Alaeddin Boroujerdi) defended and clarified Russian use of Hamadan air base. Basically Iran’s decision to allow Russia to use its airbase was not unanimously welcomed there and required some time to sell out the deal.

The real message of such “six-days agreement” on Russia’s access to Iranian air base was to showcase a new depth of Russia-Iran military cooperation and demonstrate Moscow’s increased capabilities in its operations in the Middle East.

Thus, Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan announced Iran’s official position Iran on August, 20: “Reception of Russian aircraft at the airbase in Hamadan is carried out in the framework of mutual cooperation and the fight against terrorism at the request of the Syrian government.” He further underlined that Russia is allowed to use the air base as long as the necessity exists an also did not exclude Iran providing Russia with an access to more of its air bases if needed.

So, Tehran’s initial line was to let Russian bombers stay in Iran for an unspecified period with possible extension of bases they can use.

It definitely underlines deepening military cooperation between Russia and Iran and sends a signal to everyone who doubted Russia-Iran partnership on regional issues like Syria.

Russia’s benefits

REUTERS/Hosam Katan How to Leave and Gain at the Same Time

Firstly, deployment of the Russian bombers at Iranian air base reduces flying time to targets by 60% which allows more flexibility for strikes and their higher intensity. According to Russian military experts, this increases the effectiveness of the long-distance flights at least threefold, allowing each Tu-22M3 bomber to carry about 20 tons of warheads and to hit four-five targets for each flight. This indicates a new, more active stage of fighting the ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra in East of Syria and around Aleppo. As a strategic battle for Aleppo is still ongoing, Russian air support can provide crucial advantage to the Syrian government forces.

By deploying its bombers to Iran Moscow on the one hand reinforced Tehran by the fact that Russia’s air force is present on its soil as it ties Iran closer to Russia in military cooperation in the region, strengthens its position in the region and improves its immunity to military action. On the other hand, it gave Russia a certain leverage over Iran as Russia takes certain responsibility for Iran’s behavior in the region.

This decision might well be a signal to the West that Russia and Iran stick together in their stance on Syria, demonstrating the unity between Moscow and Tehran and a new level of their military cooperation. Iranian officials also said that Tehran is ready to provide Russia with all necessary infrastructure to fight terrorists in Syria. It creates a good basis for further advancement of Russia-Iran military cooperation and can potentially lead to further “experiments” with giving Russian military access to its infrastructure.

However, let’s not forget that Russia and Iran have certain disagreements on Syria, namely the figure of Assad, and degree of possible compromise with the West and the rebels it backs. Thus, increasing military cooperation between Russia and Iran now does not exclude its decline later once the strategic aims of both sides more or less achieved or affected by change in regional dynamics.

Regional implications

The bottom line of Iran’s decision to allow Russia to station its bomber jets on its soil was to strengthen its positions against the U.S.-led regional alliance and in particular against its regional adversaries, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Thus, the signal was sent.

Russia and Iran have certain disagreements on Syria, namely the figure of Assad, and degree of possible compromise with the West and the rebels it backs.

Most certainly, Israel was aware of the Russia-Iran decision because all important decisions dealing with Iran are of direct business for Israel. Russian deliveries of S-300 air defense systems to Iran also worried Israel, so it required Moscow to give Tel Aviv certain guarantees that it does not threaten Israeli security. Also given Russia-Israel extensive military-intelligence cooperation, Israel was most certainly aware of Russia-Iran agreement. It should not be forgotten that Russia also coordinated with Israel before deploying jets to Syria in September, 2015. Frequent Putin-Netanyahu personal meetings (four since September, 2015) and phone talks (10 calls in 2015) demonstrate intensity of the dialog between the two countries.

As for Saudi Arabia, its reaction is muted for now, but most likely it will go in line with that of the U.S. So far Washington has expressed quite restrained reaction, describing the Russian move as “unfortunate but not surprising.”

In the light of the recent Russia-Turkey rapprochement, it is most likely that Ankara was informed about Russia’s move during Erdogan’s visit to St. Petersburg. It generally falls in line with the Russia-Turkey reconciliation and readiness to set up anti-terror cooperation. On the top of that, unverified reports appeared that the U.S. may be moving its nuclear weapons from Turkish Incirlik airbase to Romania while a Russian official suggested that Turkey could provide Incirlik for Russian jets operating in Syria. That would completely change regional dynamics.

Thus, Russian bombers in Iran come at little surprise for the regional and global actors, meaning that coordination between all major actors involved (which majorly goes unseen for the public) does exist, which gives a hope for the better.

Turkey’s intervention in Syria: A game changer?

REUTERS/Hosam Katan: Syria Talks: The Aleppo Dilemma

Ankara’s recent move to intervene directly in Syria brings more complexity to the Syrian conflict, although the amount of variables in the equation stays the same. What we actually see is that Turkey was finally granted a permission to establish its zone of influence in Syria along Turkish-Syrian border, which Ankara was dreaming about since 2012. After Turkey downed the Russian jet in November 2015, Russia deployed its state of the art S-400 air defense systems to Hmeymim airbase in Syria, which de-facto established an effective no-fly zone over much of the Syrian territory. That sent a clear signal to Ankara that its jets in Syrian skies would not be tolerated.

Exactly because of that, Turkey’s offensive on Jarablus is very indicative. It was preceded by preliminary airstrikes on the city by Turkish and other U.S.-led coalition jets. That means that that Turkish F-16s entered the Syrian skies for the first time since Russia had deployed the S-400 in November, 2015. It essentially indicates that Russia granted Turkey an exemption from its no-fly zone in certain areas which means Putin and Erdogan agreed on some trade-offs in Syria and Moscow gave a green light to Ankara. Otherwise, Turkey would not have launched operation “Euphrates Shield,” also given ongoing Russia-Turkey reconciliation and intensified military-intelligence ties between the two. In exchange Ankara might have agreed to be more cooperative on political track with Assad. This is why, it wouldn’t be fair to say that Russia had no idea of Turkish plans and that it goes against its interests.

It should not be forgotten that the absolute priority for Ankara is to prevent Syrian Kurds from taking control over the border with Turkey, not letting them to establish an area under their control from Afrin to Qamishli (about 70 per cent of the Syrian border with Turkey). By getting into Syria Turkey prevents the very idea of de-facto Kurdish-state in north of the country (following the model of Iraqi Kurdistan). This actually suits Russia, Iran and Syria. However, a main drawback of such development is intensification of the conflict between Syrian Kurds, represented by Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and Turkey-backed militants.

By getting into Syria Turkey prevents the very idea of de-facto Kurdish-state in north of the country (following the model of Iraqi Kurdistan). This actually suits Russia, Iran and Syria.

Intervening in Syria, Erdogan said the operation is also against Kurdish militia (apart from being against ISIS), whom Ankara views as a branch of Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) which is labeled as a terrorist organization in Turkey. This, in fact, put Turkey-U.S. relations at bigger risk as Washington bet on Kurds as the most efficient force to fight terrorists in Syria and provides them military and financial assistance. Besides, Ankara’s military offensive in Syria coincided with the visit of the U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden to Turkey. During his visit Biden basically supported Turkish move and gave an ultimatum to Kurds, to withdraw to the East of Euphrates, otherwise U.S. will cease its support to them. That will potentially become a huge problem in the U.S. relations with Syrian Kurds.

Therefore, it is also not fair to say that Turkish offensive in Syria goes against Russian interests. Russia maintains ties with both Turkey and Syrian Kurds and unlike the U.S., did not invest that much in Kurds which allowing itself more room for maneuver. Moreover, there were reports that many militants flocked to Jarablus which almost stopped their advances in Aleppo, making it easier for Russia and Syrian Arab Army to make progress, including recently launched humanitarian operation.

Thus it would be premature to talk about new tensions between Russia and Turkey, or overall worsening of the situation in Syria after the Turkish move. In fact, for the first time in years almost all key players of the Syrian crisis (Russia, Iran, Turkey, Syria, with U.S. to a lesser extent) have something that unifies them other than fight against terrorism – unity of Syria through not getting Kurds an opportunity for an autonomy. It is not that bad of a start at all.

23 august2016

The Sykes-Picot Agreement And Russia

Photo: Flickr/Paolo Porsia Sykes-Picot agreement map 1916

For almost four centuries – from the beginning of the 16th century until the end of World War I – most Arab countries were represented by Vilayets (provinces) of the Ottoman Empire while the western part of the Arab East was by that time already under the rule of colonial powers, England and France. In 1916, London and Paris secretly agreed on a future division of the Asian part of the Ottoman state, which was suffering defeat in the war. Under these agreements, after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the Arab vilayets were to come under the mandate of these powers. Their representatives, Britain’s Sir Mark Sykes and Francois Georges-Picot of France went down in history as the authors of the first hastily put together version to colonially divide the Asian part of Ottoman Turkey.

Sykes started travelling in the Middle East at the age of 11 with his parents, the eccentric Sir Tatton Sykes, who, according to his biographers, was only interested in church architecture, maintaining a constant body temperature and milk pudding, as well as the alcoholic Lady Jessica. He remained an amateur explorer and author of a short book titled The Caliph’s Last Heritage, although he did a spell as an attaché at the British Embassy in Constantinople. He cultivated a reputation of a connoisseur of Arabic and Turkish languages, although he had command of neither. Nevertheless, the young ambitious baronet made a good career as a politician and expert on the region.

Georges Picot, as one English author wrote, had France’s “civilizing mission” in Asia in his blood. Before World War I, he served as the Consul-General of France in Beirut and maintained active contacts with Arab nationalists. Both he and Sykes were arrogantly convinced that the Arabs had not yet matured enough to run their lands by themselves.

When these architects of the colonial conquest of the Ottoman Arab provinces were charged with delimiting the spheres of influence of the two powers, they simply drew an almost straight line in the sand in November of 1915 between the Palestinian city of Akko near Haifa on the Mediterranean coast and Kirkuk in northern Iraq, which came to be known as the E–K Line (“E” for the last letter in the English name of the first city, Acre, and “K” for the first letter of the name Kirkuk). The area south of the line was to be dominated by Britain, and the area to the north by France. England broke the promise conveyed to King of Hejaz Sharif Hussein through its high commissioner and Governor of Egypt Sir Henry McMahon to support the project to create a united Arab state under his aegis in Mashriq, the eastern part of the Arab world, in exchange for his participation in the war against the Turks. Although the plan of the two authors of the post-war disposition of the Arab East was strictly provisional and they continued to vie with each other for mandate territories for several more years, it went down in history as the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement, becoming a symbol of the colonial enslavement of the Arab people. It was signed on May 16, 1916.

REUTERS/Faisal Al Nasser Is a Collective Security System Possible in the Middle East?

This year saw the centenary of the Agreement, which prompted debates in many countries linking the events of World War I to the crisis that has befallen the Middle East region today. The thesis about the “collapse of the Sykes-Picot system”, which established borders that ignored the historical, geographical and demographic realities of the region, gained currency. It is often forgotten that the 1915–1916 agreements between England and France actually did not establish borders between the future territories/states formed in Mashriq. This was done later, at the Paris Peace Conference (January 18, 1919 – January 21, 1920), in the Treaty of Sevres of (August 10, 1920), and at conferences in San Remo (April 19–26, 1920) and Lausanne (sporadically between November 20, 1922 and July 24, 1923). In addition, part of the Anglo-French plan for administering Mashriq was the Balfour Declaration, a letter from the British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild dated November 2 expressing London’s approval of the “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people” that was to be passed on to the Zionist Federation.

These conferences also discussed the issue of the Black Sea straits, which was strategically important for Russia. The problem of the passage of Russian ships through these straits – Bosphorus and Dardanelles – had worried Russia since the 19th century, because England constantly tried to block its interests. Against the background of a rivalry with Turkey the idea of resorting to military force was mooted periodically from the time of the reign of Alexander I until Nicolas II. At the start of the war of 1806–1812, Minister of the Navy Pavel Chichagov worked out a plan to land on Bosphorus and storm Constantinople. Russia considered this plan again in the late 19th century.

However, in entering World War I, Russia did not seek to make any territorial acquisitions; it merely wanted to weaken Germany and ward off the threat of German domination of Europe and the strengthening of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. Nor did it raise the issue of occupying the Black Sea straits. Before long, however, the position on the Straits changed: Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Sazonov, an Anglophile who hated Germany, told the English and French ambassadors that in concluding peace Russia must “ensure for itself free passage through the Straits once and for all.” However, even then there was no question of territorial expansion into the Middle East.

The situation around the Straits changed dramatically after Turkey entered the war. It was at this point that Nicolas II declared that Turkey’s “reckless interference” would “pave the way for Russia to resolve the historical tasks on the shores of the Black Sea bequeathed by the ancestors.” There followed difficult negotiations with the Entente partners, England and France. While these powers, looking to defeat the Ottoman state, were primarily concerned with dividing the Turkish vilayets between them, the Russian authorities sought to solve the task of ensuring control over the straits and were inspired by the prospect of taking over Constantinople, a long-time dream of several Russian tsars. On February 19, 1915, Sazonov sent a note to the English and French ambassadors demanding that “the western bank of the Bosphorus, of the Sea of Marmara and of the Dardanelles, as well as southern Thrace to the Enez-Midye

line, as well as part of the Asian coast between Bosphorus, the River Sakarya, and a point to be determined on the shores of the Gulf of Izmid, the islands in the Sea of Marmara, and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos,” should henceforth be incorporated into the Russian Empire (the draft of the document was prepared at the Russian Foreign Ministry by Boris Nolde and Konstantin Gulkevich). As a result of the exchange of messages between the three powers, England and France accepted Russia’s terms and Russia acceded to the demands to take English and French interests in Asian Turkey into account and even revise the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 recognizing the neutral zone as British. It is reasonable to assume that the successes of the Russian army that occupied Erzurum and Bitlis in February 1916 played no small role in the Entente partners being so “accommodating.” In late November 1916, after the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Russia planned the so-called the Bosphorus Operation, in which the main force was to be the Black Sea Marine Division under General Alexander Svechin with Rear Admiral Alexander Kolchak as the overall commander. However, the operation was postponed until April 1917 because part of the force was dispatched to Romania and was then shoved under the rug in connection with the February Revolution.

www.barjeelartfoundation.org Abdulnasser Gharem, Men At Work, 2010: The Middle East: Postmodernism Is Over

Going back to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, it has to be noted that St. Petersburg must have been aware of the Russian plan to resolve the Straits issue being ambitious. First, the West European allied powers made their consent conditional – in addition to Russia accepting the division of the Ottoman Empire’s Arab vilayets between England and France, continued free trade through the Straits and the establishment of a “free port” regime in Constantinople – on total victory over Turkey (“if the war is brought to a successful end”). London and Paris, having experienced some bitter defeats in the war, were not sure that they could overcome the Ottomans without Russia. They assigned the key role in the war to Russia, putting it under great strain. Secondly, the issue was to be officially settled in a future peace treaty, and it was not at all clear how London and Paris would behave after Turkey was vanquished. Thirdly, to uphold its own positions, Russia needed powerful levers in order to exert pressure on its Entente partners, something it unfortunately did not have. It is not by chance that most Russian historians consider St. Petersburg’s agreement with London and Paris to be a kind of IOU, payment for which had yet to be extracted.

Finally, and most importantly, Russia’s accord with the Entente countries did not mean that it would join the project of colonial conquest in the Middle East. In effect, the projected expansion to the Straits was a reaction to the attempts of the Ottoman Empire, which had entered the war against Russia in alliance with Germany, to deprive it of vitally important access to the Mediterranean. We should not forget that Russia never harboured annexationist plans in the Middle East, something the Arab Muslim will forever remember. The fact that the medieval Russian principalities did not take part in the Crusades has always been highly appreciated by people in these countries, and continues to be so to this day.

It would be wrong, as some brash commentators do, to blame everything on the Bolsheviks, who had “undermined the morale of the army.” Their agitation fell on fertile soil. War-weary Russian soldiers did

not have enough motivation to risk their lives to seize the Ottoman capital, unlike the Soviet soldiers who stormed Berlin in 1945. I would hazard a guess that in any case the operation to occupy the Straits and Constantinople would not have been a cakewalk.

That is why the Russian Empire could not be seen as a party to the Sykes-Picot Treaty, even if the October Revolution had not intervened. This is borne out by the name of the Treaty which, not accidentally, does not mention Russia.

REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi Imperatives of Neomodernism for the Middle East

I have to go along with Elena Suponina, who writes that when people recall the Sykes-Picot Agreement “they remember how unceremoniously the Western powers dealt with the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, dividing it in their interests and ignoring the local population.”

Unfortunately, attention to this topic today has not produced works based on new archival and documentary materials and boils down, with a few exceptions, to a mass of journalistic and purportedly analytical speculations in the media, and very pretentious speculations at that. Suffice it to mention the bizarre idea of renaming the above agreement the “Sazonov-Sykes-Picot Agreement.” One of the most ardent authors of this idea, who often appears on television and calls the October 1917 Revolution “treacherous,” inveighs heavily against the Bolsheviks for “publishing these secret protocols which allegedly were patriotically supportive of the state… and proclaimed their idiotic policy.” If by “idiotic policy,” he means the policy of supporting national liberation movements, it has to be remembered that it was directed precisely against those Western powers whose hostile actions in the Straits region Russia has always feared (and, unfortunately, has grounds to fear even today).

Of course, we can dream naively about how well Russians would be living today if the country owned Constantinople, Alaska, part of California, Port Arthur with the Chinese Eastern Railway, Hawaii (whose local king sought the protection of Alexander I on May 21, 1816, promising to be loyal to the Russian crown) and New Guinea (think of Mikluho-Maclai). But one shudders at the thought of what Russia’s relations would be like with its powerful southern neighbour, Turkey, if it had taken away the city that had served as its capital for half a millennium – ever since 1453, when the army of Sultan Mehmed II took Constantinople, which until that time had been the capital of Byzantium (and not Russia). Instead, Soviet Russia helped Turkey uphold its independence and sovereignty and hopefully the Turkish people remember that. One sign of this is the sculpture of the Soviet military commander Semyon Aralov, the first head of the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, the forerunner of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The publication in Soviet Russia of the secret “patriotic protocols” of Sykes-Picot exposing the “imperial plans” of the Tsarist regime gave a boost to its popularity in the Arab East. To this day, Russia has a huge reputational edge there because after the Revolution and the end of World War I it resolutely dissociated itself from Western European colonialism and started supporting the national liberation

movements of the peoples in the region. The leading Western European powers will continue to reap the bitter fruit of their colonial domination for a long time yet. It is not by chance that the crazy idea of retrospectively including Russia (in the person of its foreign minister, Sazonov, who incidentally, was sacked in July 1917 and replaced by Boris Stürmer) in the project of colonial conquest of the Middle East meets the approval of some of Russia’s foreign ill-wishers, as far as I can judge by the social networks and debates at a number of conferences. Well, and where does patriotism come in?

The above-said does not mean that Russians should not be proud of the military exploits of their grandfathers and great grandfathers in the battlefields of World War I, their self-sacrifice and heroism. My grandfather fought in that war. Unfortunately, I never got to meet him, but I honour his memory.

22 august2016

Russia and Turkey: More Than a Rapprochement?

Photo: REUTERS

On August 9, 2016 a high level meeting between Presidents of Russia and Turkey took place in St. Petersburg. This crucially important summit was the first foreign visit made by Erdogan after the failed coup attempt in Turkey on July, 15.

Historically speaking bilateral relations between Turkey and Russia have been shaped according to their respective relations, positive or negative, with the West. Today the situation is no different and the St. Petersburg summit was held against the background of both Ankara and Moscow having turbulent relations with Brussels and Washington. The Kremlin’s foreign policy goes against Western interests in Ukraine and the Black Sea. The result is ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine and economic sanctions against Russia. Turkey, on the other hand, is close to being isolated from international affairs. Turkey has historically been NATO’s ally. Still, Washington is supporting the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria, which is considered in Ankara as a branch of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), which regularly organizes terrorist attacks in Turkey. The coup attempt, which put Turkey’s relations with its Western partners into further trouble, made the meeting between Putin and Erdogan more significant.

Adventurous and unsuccessful neo-Ottomanism is likely to be replaced by a neo-Kemalist foreign policy that focuses on national interests and respects the territorial integrity of Turkey’s neighbors.

There is no surprise that beside other issues the parties concentrated on discussing Syria. In geopolitical terms, Syria is a top priority for Turkey, just as Ukraine is of central interest to Russia. Russian decision, in late September 2015, to intervene in Syria had caused huge problems between Ankara and Moscow. After Russian SU-24 had been shot down by Turkish Air Forces, bilateral relations further deteriorated. By sending troops to Syria, Moscow was trying to find a common ground with the West by diverting attention away from Ukraine, where the interests are conflicting, to the Middle East, where parties are united by the ISIS threat. However, this policy did not produce expected results. EU sanctions against Russia have not been lifted and a massive confrontation in Ukraine is still possible. On the other hand, during this period Turkey has again developed strong relations with the West and considered revising its security policy

regarding the Black Sea. Possible steps could involve a change in Convention of Montreux (1936), which establishes passage regime in Turkish Straits, was considered. This move could have severely undermined Russian interests in the region. Moreover, under previous minister Davutoglu there was a reinvented honey moon between Turkey and EU regarding migrant readmission and visa free deals. However, this policy did not produce desired results either. Under such conditions and after 7 months of crisis, Turkey and Russia have finally started rapprochement with Erdogan’s apology stemming from objective geopolitical necessities.

REUTERS/Alexander Nemenov The Birth of the “Caspian Three”?

Syria is a top priority for Turkey, just as Ukraine is of central interest to Russia.

The meeting has geopolitical significance since it exposed Putin’s eagerness to woo Ankara in its problematic status in formal Western alliance and Erdogan’s willingness to reconsider the place of Turkey in international system. At the moment Turkish foreign policy is at a crossroads and after the meeting one could argue that Turkey will be more courageous to follow a more independent policy. Amidst the deterioration of its relations with the European Union, the country will reinvigorate its involvement in Eurasian affairs. Ankara is expected to turn to China and Russia in an attempt to establish closer economic and political ties. Moreover, adventurous and unsuccessful neo-Ottomanism is likely to be replaced by a neo-Kemalist foreign policy that focuses on national interests and respects the territorial integrity of Turkey’s neighbors.

After two presidents met it is clear that Ankara and Moscow have similar posture on Black Sea security and underline the importance of status quo. More importantly, they are trying to find common ground to solve the Syrian crisis together. However, it remains to be seen if such policy leads to success due to very different policy choices so far. The key question is whether Moscow will stop its support of the Syrian Kurds in return for Ankara giving up its attempts to overthrow Bashar al-Assad administration. Declaration on unprecedented partnership in defense industry was one of the important points of the summit. The parties also agreed to form a joint military and intelligence mechanism to coordinate their activities in the Middle East, including Syria. With this mechanism, joint operations against ISIS could be started. In this case Turkey would be able to make cross-border interventions against PYD forces in North Syria to prevent completion of Kurdish corridor, envisaged under the US project of the Greater Middle East. This corridor would have open access to the Mediterranean Sea, is needed to keep the Kurdish state alive.

Brussels seemed to benefit from the deteriorating Turkish-Russian relations cautiously trying to force both Ankara and Moscow to accept its own rules of the energy game.

Another important topic of the meeting was energy cooperation. Akkuyu Nuclear power plant could be invigorated though financial problems are still there. Russian-Turkish gas relations are expected to

progress as well, with revival of Turkish Stream project. In fact, within the general energy triangle between the EU, Turkey and Russia, Brussels seemed to benefit from the deteriorating Turkish-Russian relations cautiously trying to force both Ankara and Moscow to accept its own rules of the energy game. Brussels wants Turkey to be only a transit country (which goes against Ankara’s declared plans to be a regional energy hub) and to push it towards full liberalization of its natural gas market. As for Russia, the decision to put the Turkish Stream gas pipeline on hold increased the importance of Nord Stream – 2 as the only new natural gas transit route circumventing Ukraine. However, Nord Stream – 2 was also seen as an acceleratory tool to further liberalize Russian gas market harmonizing it with EU energy regulation.

REUTERS/Faisal Al Nasser : No surprise in Russia-Turkey Reconciliation. Reasons Why

After presidential meeting, Turkish Stream is more prospective than before with two lines to be built for transportation of 31.5 bcm/a capacity. The 14 bcm of gas that are currently imported from Russia through Trans-Balkan line, could be diverted to Turkish Stream with the construction of first line. The second line could be used to export Russian gas to Southeast Europe. Nevertheless, due to the fact that Gazprom is conducting talks with European Commission (EC) to construct Nord Stream – 2, one could assert that the pipe game is far from over. Taking financial difficulties into account, Gazprom might also intent to use Turkish Stream as a leverage in its negotiations with the EC. Now competition between Nord Stream–2, Turkish Stream and even South Stream projects is reemerging and if the Nord Stream – 2 fails, the likelihood of the Turkish Stream becoming a reality will increase. Actually, Poland's objections to a joint venture for the Nord Stream – 2 project expressed through its anti-monopoly watchdog, has increased the likelihood of Turkish Stream.

Surprise of the summit was the preparation for establishing a trilateral cooperation mechanism between Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey. This has potential to be transformed into a new institutional regime in Caucasus. If succeeds, it will have important geopolitical ramifications for the region. Karabakh problem could be solved in favor of Baku and also a new energy alliance between the three might be found. Such a move would have potential to undermine EU supply diversification plans by putting future of Southern Gas Corridor into question.

Due to the fact that Gazprom is conducting talks with European Commission (EC) to construct Nord Stream – 2, one could assert that the pipe game is far from over.

To sum up, it seems that after both suffering from the plane crisis Russia and Turkey finally agreed to look forward in their bilateral relations. With the St. Petersburg meeting Russia-Turkey relations, having based on economic cooperation for decades, are about to be upgraded to politically strategic level for the first time. This new era of ‘more than a rapprochement’ seems to work in the short term. Nevertheless, taking in consideration different interests of Turkey and Russia in some international issues and Turkey’s current membership in NATO, it is too early to talk about a full-scale strategic partnership between the two. Time will show whether Ankara and Moscow are really interested in and more importantly capable of

forming such a political partnership that could become a real game changer in international system. In that sense, Syria will be the first test to observe the likelihood and future of the partnership.

18 august2016

“The Narrow Corridor” of American-Polish Relations

Photo: REUTERS/Kuba Atys/Agencja Gazeta U.S President Barack Obama speaks during a ceremony marking the "Freedom Day" anniversary in Warsaw's Castle Square June 4, 2014

“That’s what makes us democracies, not just by the words written in constitutions or in the fact that we vote in elections, but the institutions we depend on every day – such as rule of law,independent judiciaries and a free press." According to Mr. Obama, these are the values the American-Polish alliance is based on. These words the American President addressed to Andrzej Duda, the President of Poland at the recent NATO summit in Warsaw; these words might have passed unnoticed in the world, but in Poland, they created an uproar. They unequivocally stated that Poland has anti-democratic tendencies, which has already long been discussed in Europe. The current state of Polish-American relations is considered to be nearly the worst in recent history. At the same time, one cannot say there are reasons for serious disagreements or a personal dislike between the leaders.

The synchronization snare, or a trap for Sancho Panza

When Barack Obama became President, one of his key foreign policy tasks was to normalize relations with the key European partners, especially with France and Germany. His predecessor faced their refusal to support the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, yet he was supported by NATO neophytes, and by Poland first and foremost. That earned the Eastern European partners not only compliments from George W. Bush and members of his administration, but they, as a “new Europe,” were rhetorically contrasted with the “old Europe.”

Poland has always striven to take an active part in the dialog on the Middle East and Iran, positioning itself as a serious player in international politics.

Still, the Americans did not limit themselves to compliments only, since the condition of Poland’s participating in the Iraq campaign was US aid in rearmament Poland which continued its costly transition to NATO standards. In particular, there was a contract for purchasing American F-16s, concluded in April 2003 and entailed a no-interest loan and guarantees of serious investments from American companies. At the same time, the Polish public started discussing hosting American military bases in the country.

Even when it became obvious that the US had started the Iraq campaign on false pretenses and Saddam Hussein’s government had not been developing any WMD, the Polish authorities preferred to remain part the coalition. Besides demonstrating their allied loyalty, participating in the Iraq campaign was important for gaining experience of joint action with the US.

REUTERS/U.S. Missile Defense Agency/ Leah Garton Europe under Aegis

In its relations with the US, Poland never forgets to provide small services.

Besides, Poland has always striven to take an active part in the dialog on the Middle East and Iran, positioning itself as a serious player in international politics. For a while, the conflict in the Middle East even became a key issue of the Polish-American agenda. Poland traditionally believes that the US is not only a trustworthy ally, but also provides important support for the transatlantic mechanisms of security policy.

In its relations with the US, Poland never forgets to provide small services. For instance, before the start of the “Desert Storm” operation, Polish intelligence helped to secretly evacuate American agents from Iraq and from the occupied Kuwait, and after the war, it was Poland that represented the US interests in Iraq since American-Iraqi relations had been severed. Subsequently, until July 2012, the Polish embassy similarly represented American interests in Syria.

However, in its relations with the US, Poland does not confine itself to either small services or even to the military cooperation: Warsaw strives for complete synchronization with Washington’s politics. The example of Polish-Russian relations is particularly telling. In 2001, after a meeting in Ljubljana, there was a short thaw in Russian-American relations, and soon, a similar process started to pick up steam between Russia and Poland. Vladimir Putin was warmly received in Warsaw, and when newspapers wrote about his visit, they spoke only about the friendship of the two presidents. A little less over a year later the idyll was shattered by Moscow’s special stance on the Iraq question. The relations with the US and Poland ran on a parallel downward track during the “Orange revolution” and the 2008 Georgian crisis exactly until Washington and Moscow announced a “reset” of their relations in 2009. Immediately afterwards, Poland announced it was increasing the volumes of gas it purchased from Russia and began negotiations, and in September 2009, the-then Prime Minister of Russia Vladimir Putin visited Poland and signed several bilateral agreements of a symbolic nature: on navigation in the Vistula Bay, on bringing irradiated radioactive fuel from Poland into Russia, and a couple of months later, an agreement on border region cooperation. It is important to remember that the negotiations were conducted at the level of the heads of government, that is, between Vladimir Putin and Donald Tusk, while Lech Kaczyński was then Poland’s President. And again, in synch with American politics, in 2013, after the death of the Polish president, there appeared signs of a cooling down in Russian-Polish relations, and November 11, 2013 became a symbolic watershed: Polish nationalists attacked the Russian embassy.

In its relations with the US, Poland never forgets to provide small services.

To a somewhat smaller degree, yet clearly enough one could also see the Polish politics following in the wake of the American one in Europe. Warsaw rapidly travelled the way from an enfant terrible of the European politics of the last decade to a confident and fairly loyal partner of Brussels and Berlin. One could and should find various reason for such a turn of events, but the key reason is precisely Barack Obama’s administration’s turn to its European allies from the “old Europe” camp. Yet, despite a more positive engagement in European processes, Warsaw failed to shed the reputation of “America’s Trojan horse in Europe,” as Jacque Chirac imaginatively put it.

These thoughts make one recall the leaked phrase Radosław Sikorski, former foreign minister, said in a conversation with Jacek Rostowski claiming that Polish politicians get nothing from pleasuring Americans. Mr. Sikorski claimed that an alliance with the US gives Poland a fake sense of security and pushes it to a quarrel with Germany and Russia without giving anything in exchange. Mr. Sikorski also believed Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s and defense minister Tomasz Siemoniak’s politics a mistake stemming from Poles’ very low national self-esteem.

Without going into the specifics of the Polish mindset, it should be noted that Poland’s following in America’s wake is partly justified. Traditionally seeing international politics in terms of conflict and competition, the Polish leadership strives to side with the strongest party, having soundly sized up Washington’s possibilities compared to Europe and even to Moscow. The American foreign policy resource is capable of scaling Polish politics up, bringing it to a level, which, under other circumstances, it could not have achieved.

A crisis in bilateral relations

Dursun Aydemir / Anadolu Agency / East News Russia and NATO after the Warsaw Summit

Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama’s new strategy introduced confusion into the American-Polish relations. In 2012, the concept of a Pacific rebalance was introduced as one of the key tenets of the US revised military strategy “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.” It happened against the background of a detente with Russia and of China’s growing influence. Poland perceived the changes with deepest regret and perplexity. Washington shifted its attention away from Europe, which threatened Poland with the loss of its hard-earned place in the regional politics and with weakening its positions in Europe.

Mr. Sikorski’s sad words reflected the crisis in the bilateral relations, which was known and understandable to international politics actors, but it was nicely dressed up for the public. The crisis did not even stem primarily from the shifting focus of the American politics (which was partly a bluff aimed at

the European partners). Apparently, the previous agenda of Polish-American relations was exhausted. In the 2000s, Poland and the US mostly cooperated in the military missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Lebanon. On the whole, these actions had a positive effect on Poland’s reputation, but as time went by, it became apparent that going further down that road was pointless. In 2013, President Bronisław Komorowski spoke about the need “to draw far-reaching conclusions and change expeditionary policies.”

Warsaw rapidly travelled the way from an enfant terrible of the European politics of the last decade to a confident and fairly loyal partner of Brussels and Berlin.

Despite Poland’s long-time desire to strengthen the regional dimension of its relations with the US, for a long while it could not achieve its goal. Washington rarely moves toward its partners, and it has its reasons. While maintaining close ties with Poland, the US attempts not to get carried away and lets other countries in the region see that the ties with them are important, too. At the same time, the US had no reason to be actively engaged in political activity in the region after a majority of the countries joined NATO. Even when in 2006 adiscussion started concerning hosting the US missile defense elements, it moved slowly, and then it stopped entirely. In its talks with Russia, the US attempted to present its initiative as a response to Iran’s nuclear program, but this argument, weak as it had been, fell to pieces when Poland demanded that Patriot missiles be put in Poland for protection against Russia as a condition for hosting ABM interceptor missiles. The Polish diplomacy had to create artificial tensions, since Warsaw’s foreign political resources were clearly inadequate for maintaining the positive agenda of the American presence in the region: both economically, and in its European policies and politics, Warsaw is not of much interest for Washington.

The American foreign policy resource is capable of scaling Polish politics up, bringing it to a level, which, under other circumstances, it could not have achieved.

Bilateral relations evolving on the anti-Russian grounds

The logic of Polish-American cooperation began to change around 2012, when the US began to lean gradually toward a confrontation with Russia. The crisis in the US relations with Russia, a coup d’état in Ukraine and the civil war that followed contributed to creating new regional meanings in the American foreign policies. Since 2014, the US-Polish relations evolved primarily on the anti-Russian grounds: it can be seen from the bilateral agenda, from the increasing cooperation within NATO, from active military exercises with the participation of Polish and American military close to Russian borders.

Washington, indeed, sees Poland as a very important and valuable partner, but it also understands that Poland will be ready to support American policies almost come hell or high water. This is the case when loyalty itself is probably more important than its derivatives. The relations between the two countries revolve almost entirely around security problems despite Poland’s clear desire to expand the range of cooperation issues. Moreover, many issues are approached in terms of security. As an example from the last decade, we could recall the widely discussed question of producing shale gas; the issue was served up in the context of the energy security.

While maintaining close ties with Poland, the US attempts not to get carried away and lets other countries in the region see that the ties with them are important, too.

American companies with significant experience in this area should have started working in Poland, and the topic itself was put on the agenda of the Strategic Dialog and the Economic Dialog, the bilateral cooperation institutions. A special conference and the Polish-American Energy Round Table were set up on the issue of producing shale gas. During Barack Obama’s visit to Poland in May 2011, the institutional architecture of the Polish-American cooperation of shale gas production was presented. However, when prices on energy sources were high, no significant progress was made, and similarly, no progress was made on another, even older issue: visa waiver for Poles wishing to visit the US. Citizens of most EU countries, even of those which are less friendly to the US in international politics, are bound by no restrictions. Including Poland into the US Visa Waiver Program was discussed during that very same President Obama’s visit to Poland in 2011, and Obama virtually promised to admit Poland to the visa waiver program, “I am going to make this a priority. And I want to solve this issue before very long. My

expectation is, is that this problem will be solved during my presidency.” However, it was five years ago, and despite the still close ties and powerful support on the part of the EU, the question is up in the air, and its prospects are still vague.

EPA/CPL JAMIE DUDDING/Vostock Photo NATO Exercises: More Provocations from Poland

Expanding the interaction channels and cooperation areas could allow Poland to maneuver in its relations with the US and to move to a kind of “linkage strategy”

American politicians believe such a format of relations is optimal, since expanding the interaction channels and cooperation areas could allow Poland to maneuver in its relations with the US and to move to a kind of “linkage strategy” (using the terms of J. S. Nye and R. Keohane), obtaining concessions in exchange for cooperation [1]. Therefore it is not surprising that Washington ignores even moderate Warsaw’s demands which are natural for a close partnership.

A crucial, but not only partner

Given currently energized American politics in Europe, particularly in its eastern part, Poland faces new challenges. Since Poland’s geopolitical interests are limited to Europe and to a part of the post-Soviet space, and its partnership with the US is restricted primarily to security issues, Poland’s role in the American foreign policy planning turns out to be narrow both functionally and geographically. Otherwise, Warsaw has to play an auxiliary role, participating in the US operations on other continents etc. In the meantime, Washington efficiently mobilizes its eastern European allies, which, as it has seemed recently, nearly lost their automatic readiness to follow American politics. The role of America’s second eastern European partner is solidly attached to Romania, which hosts elements of the missile defense initially intended for Poland [20]. The regional significance of the Baltic countries is also on the rise, despite the fact that it is based almost exclusively on the geographical factor coupled with their governments’ loyalty. As regards Prague and Budapest’s alienation from Washington, it had been previously useful for Polish diplomacy as it increased the value of Poland as a partner. However, this period is apparently nearing its end, and under these circumstances, the US policy toward Poland will have to become less demanding and, as before, follow within the narrow “corridor” of security.

Vladimir Putin Meets with Serzh Sargsyan: Moscow Supports a Compromise

Photo: president.am Meeting with President of Armenia, Moscow, 10 August, 2016

On August 10, 2016, Vladimir Putin and Serzh Sargsyan met in Moscow. Mr. Sargsyan’s working visit to Moscow should not be considered as an isolated event as it was a part of a series of important meetings: on August 8, 2016 in Baku, President Putin met with Presidents of Azerbaijan and Iran; on August 9, Mr. Putin met with R. Erdogan in St. Petersburg; it was their first meeting after the Russian fighter plane being shot down in Syria. Thus, these meetings signify the countries’ attempt to look at the Greater Caucasus both from its inner dynamics point of view and considering such background factors as Russian-Turkish relations, the economic situation, energy security, and the effect the Middle Eastern crisis has on the situation in the Caucasus.

Next year, Armenia enters an electoral cycle. The Russian factor will not be of primary importance (Armenians are primarily concerned with the country’s socioeconomic situation), yet it will be significant in the context of national security. Therefore, the two main points to consider about Mr. Putin and Mr. Sargsyan’s meeting are the regional factor and the factor of Russian-Armenian relations.

The escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh was a serious challenge that jolted Armenia, gave a great impetus to the sociopolitical movement in the contended territory, and made people think about the role of Russia and of the Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Besides the authorities, there is also the public, and this factor also was probably discussed.

EPA/VAHRAM BAGHDASARYAN/PHOTOLURE The Daredevils of Sasun

Moscow does not envision this conflict resolved through a victory of one of the parties and through a lack of compromise between the states. Compromises and a struggle to achieve them are the foundation of stabilizing the situation.

Both Mr. Sargsyan and Mr. Aliev always pay close attention to the statements and promises Mr. Putin makes when meeting with the other party. It should be noted that Mr. Putin made similar statements on the Nagorno-Karabakh situation both in Baku and in Moscow. At the meeting with Mr. Sargsyan, Mr. Putin repeated almost verbatim his words spoken in Azerbaijan: Moscow does not envision this conflict resolved through a victory of one of the parties and through a lack of compromise between the states. Compromises and a struggle to achieve them are the foundation of stabilizing the situation. One can conclude that Russia prefers such a resolution of the conflict which will have no losers. Russia will balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan, try to shift the settlement into a diplomatic format and maintain it within that format so that it does not look like the victory of one party and the crushing defeat of the other.

There is much talk in Armenia now that Moscow will put pressure on Yerevan and that Armenia will be forced to make unfounded concessions so that Azerbaijan could join the EEU. The implication is that Moscow does not intend to force any country into the EEU and to turn it into a “Soviet pioneers” organization. If the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is not settled, Azerbaijan will not be able to become a full-fledged member of the EEU. This is why Moscow insists that the countries move to a compromise discussion via negotiations in bilateral or trilateral format.

Baku and Yerevan often attempt to view Russia’s policy only through the prism of “what is my advantage?” However, they forget that Moscow also wants to defend its interests and make decisions which are advantageous for it. Russia’s task is to prevent a conflict exploding near its borders. Today, Moscow is already taking an active part in settling other conflicts: in Syria, in Ukraine, in the North Caucasus, and it does not want any additional destabilization. This is why Russia tries to postpone its final decision, since should Moscow declare its clear support for either party, it might do so to its own detriment.

Presidential diplomacy does not become the only dialogue format between the Russian and Armenian political communities.

EPA/DMITRY LOVETSKY/Vostock Photo Azerbaijan and the Four Day War: Breaking the Karabakh Deadlock

This is why this meeting is important primarily to rationalize the dialog and avoid unnecessary phobias. Another thing is that such work should be systematic, and the system is not there. It is important that presidential diplomacy does not become the only dialogue format between the Russian and Armenian political communities.

Besides, the meeting between Presidents Putin and Sargsyan is important not only from the processes in the Greater Caucasus point of view; it is also an important element of the Russian-Armenian relations. Both parties made statements that their relations are those between strategic allies, but it is apparent that both diplomats and politicians do not voice many things and that Russian-Armenian relations are being tested at this stage.

In the meantime, Russia’s role and one of this presidential meeting will hardly be of major importance for Mr. Sargsyan’s political career. Moscow supports Mr. Sargsyan and considers him to be an old partner. Yet at the same time, Moscow understands that it should be working with various Armenian politicians, and any of them should become a partner. This is why one could talk indirect support, and the Moscow factor in the future elections of the President or the Prime Minister of Armenia will not be critical; Armenian society has priority here.

29 july2016

Europe under Aegis

Photo: REUTERS/U.S. Missile Defense Agency/ Leah Garton

In May 2016, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency announced that its ballistic missile defence (BMD) base at Deveselu, Romania, had been put into operation. This marked the second phase of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) announced by Barack Obama in 2009. Immediately thereafter, construction of a similar base in Redzikowo, Poland began as part of the third EPAA phase. These events force us once again to reflect on the potential threat that the United States’ current plans to deploy BMD in Europe poses to Russia’s national security.

Aegis Ashore

EPAA replaced a previous idea to deploy a missile defence base in Poland which was to include ten silo-based GBI (ground-based interceptor) missiles. GBIs were previously deployed in Alaska and California. The plans to create a third GBI installation in Europeinfuriated Moscow, who feared it would threaten the survivability of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. The rationale behind this third GBI installation as an approach to European security was questionedby then French President Nicolas Sarkozy, stating that the deployment of an American BMD “would bring nothing to security in Europe.” On the contrary, it “would complicate things.”

After Washington abandoned the idea of a third GBI installation, it was decided to instead deploy BMD in Europe on the base used by the U.S. Navy’s Aegis system. The main declared objective was to protect Europe from the hypothetical threat of an Iranian missile attack.

REUTERS/ Inquam Photos/Octav Ganea/ U.S. Army personnel cleans the red carpet ahead of an official inauguration ceremony at Deveselu air base, Romania, May 12, 2016

Initially, the EPAA was to have four phases. Phase one was implemented in 2014–2015, when four U.S. destroyers carrying Aegis BMD systems with SM-3 IA interceptor missiles were permanently stationed at Naval Station Rota in Spain. At the same time, a ground-based AN/TPY-2 radar was deployed in Turkey. The second and third phases are to involve the creation of bases in Romania and Poland, respectively. These bases are to be built around the Aegis Ashore Missile Defence Complex, a ground version of the U.S. Navy system.

Aegis Ashore consists of a SPY-1D(V) radar and a 24-celled Mk41 vertical launching system. SM-3 IB interceptors will be deployed in Romania [1], with the more advanced SM-3 IIA missiles to be deployed in Poland [2]. As part of the EPAA’s fourth phase, the missiles in Poland were to be replaced by a more advanced version, the SM-3 IIB. However, the Pentagon dropped the fourth phase in 2013.

The Aegis BMD System

The Aegis multi-functional weapons control system (AWS) was initially intended primarily for unit air defence. However, in 2004, the U.S. Navy began deploying ships outfitted with a modified version of the AWS, capable of performing ballistic missile defence tasks.

Aegis uses two families of interceptors: an anti-missile version of the SM-2 for intercepting in the final stretch, and an SM-3 for midcourse interception. The very limited number of SM-2 interceptor missiles are being replaced by the more sophisticated long-range multi-functional SM-6, capable of air defence, anti-missile missions and combating surface targets [3].

defenceindustrydaily.com

At present, the U.S. Navy has 33 ships fitted with the AWS [4]. By 2021, that number is set to increase to 49 [5]. By that time, the total stockpile of SM-3 interceptors should amount to 320 [6]. (There are 200 such interceptors today [7]. ) The U.S. Navy calculates that performing its own missions (escorting aircraft carriers and carrying out support duties for naval groups in Japan and Europe) would require 40 ships fitted with AWS. In addition, requests have been sent to regional commands (to ensure BMD in theatres of hostilities, including on the ground), which have grown from 44 ships in 2012–2014 to 77 in 2016.

U.S and Japanese vessels, along with the Aegis Ashore complex, test fired a total of 36 SM-3 interceptors (29 were launched successfully, including a hit on a disabled American satellite in February 2008) and five SM-2 and SM-6 missiles (all successful). Judging from publicly available sources, in all but one case, the tests were on targets that simulated short and intermediate-range ballistic missiles with multiple or single warheads [8].

Official reports concerning the ability of Aegis to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles, including Russian missiles, are conflicting. Some sources say that the existing system cannot be used to destroy IBMs. Other sources note that although Aegis cannot destroy IBMs, it can be used for detection and tracking purposes at long distances. Moreover, some sources describe the SM-IIA and AWS 5.1 versions and higher as having “a limited capability” to combat IBMs [9].

Russia’s Fears

So what is the Russian side afraid of? Russia’s concerns are most fully formulated in the BMD-related materials of the 2012 Moscow Conference on International Security. They boil down to the following points:

• The third and now cancelled fourth phase of the EPAA threatens Russian IBMs and SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missile) in various flight trajectories.

• Improvement of the SM-3 family of interceptors continues. Also, the number of ships capable of BMD missions and the number of interceptors continues to grow.

• U.S. BMD assets in Europe coupled with BMD in the Asia-Pacific Region are elements of global BMD intended, above all, to protect the United States.

The current threat to Russia’s security on the part of Aegis Ashore can be said to be fairly low. U.S. naval ships are still the real threat.

Russia has expressed doubts of a real missile threat from Iran, noting that there have been no breakthrough designs of missiles. Instead, obsolete missiles are being multiplied and built. This, along with certain other factors, has led Moscow to think that the risk of the Iranian missile challenge developing into a real missile threat to Europe is low.

To ensure security in Europe, including from the hypothetical Iranian threat, Russia proposed that the United States focus on political and diplomatic mechanisms. Moscow has even offered to ensure missile defence in Europe together with Washington, which would have addressed most of Moscow’s fears. However, theseproposals were turned down. Russia insists that the intercept zone of the European BMD should not cross the Russian border. Besides, Moscow urged (without success) the need to promote confidence and monitoring measures, and conclude legally binding agreements to ensure equal security of the participants.

www.raytheon.com

The intransigence of the United States means that Russia can take retaliatory military-technical measures. Such measures include activating the Voronezh-DM radar in the Kaliningrad Region, strengthening the cover of the Strategic Nuclear Forces, deploying Iskander operational-tactical complexes in the Kaliningrad Region, and even threatening to withdraw from the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.

There are tell-tale differences in the public statements of the members of Russia’s political leadership on the one hand and the leaders of the Strategic Missile Troops on the other. In May 2016, the Press Secretary for the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Peskov declared: “There is no doubt that the deployment of the BMD system is a real threat to the security of the Russian Federation.” The same day, the Commander of the Strategic Missile Troops Colonel-General Sergei Karakayev said: “The threats of the European segment of BMD to the Strategic Missile Troops are limited and do not at present critically diminish the combat capacity of the Strategic Missile Troops.” This shows that although the current Russian response measures can still balance the threat of the U.S. BMD, the fact that it exists has a negative impact on the military-political situation in Europe, giving Moscow additional cause for concern.

One of the problems is that despite the assurances that Aegis Ashore is strictly designed for missile defence, it can be fitted with other types of cruise missiles. While the Tomahawk, considering its comparatively low speed and vulnerability is not such a concerning threat, future anti-ship missiles and surface-to-surface missiles could increase the risks for the Russian side. Missiles with a range of 1000 kilometres stationed in Redzikowo and Deveselu can reach most parts of the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, Crimea, Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg.

Aegis uses two families of interceptors: an anti-missile version of the SM-2 for intercepting in the final stretch, and an SM-3 for midcourse interception.

However, the total number of missiles in Poland and Romania will not be great and, in reality, they do not pose any new serious threats compared to the Aegis-fitted ships in the Black and Baltic Seas. The only significant difference is that U.S. cruisers and destroyers do not have a permanent presence near the Russian shores – not yet anyway. However, such “visits” have been fairly frequent recently.

In Their Own Element

www.mda.mil: Have Rockets, Will Quarrel. Complex THAAD on Korean territory

The current threat to Russia’s security on the part of Aegis Ashorecan be said to be fairly low. U.S. naval ships are still the real threat. And that threat is likely to grow.

The fact that the United States has not yet deployed the most advanced versions of its sea-launched interceptor missiles cannot in itself serve as a guarantee for Russia. The key indicators are the speed of interceptor missiles and the area in which they are deployed. Sea-based BMD makes it possible, if necessary, to deploy interceptor missiles in the Baltic and Norwegian seas, the most sensitive areas for Russia. Deploying interceptor missiles with critical speed indicators (over 5 km/sec) is a real threat for the Russian nuclear deterrent.

Threats, however, are not limited to BMD. First of all is the development of a new version of the Aegis – the Aegis Combat System Baseline 9. One of the main features of this version is that it integrates the functions of air and missile defence. The existing versions of Aegis do not simultaneously perform air and missile defence functions. That is, a ship on a missile defence mission is to a large extent defenceless against modern air offensives, for example, if it is not covered by the anti-air capabilities of an aircraft carrier. Baseline 9 envisages the simultaneous performance of both functions. In combination with the latest versions of Aegis BMD (5.0 CU and 5.1) and the latest modifications of SM-3 interceptors, the value of a single ship increases substantially. The intransigence of the United States means that Russia can take retaliatory military-technical measures.

The U.S. Navy needs 40 ships capable of integrated air and missile defence. Their main task, of course, is not to deter Iran or North Korea, but rather advanced potential enemies, which today means only Russia and China. The pace at which the U.S. Navy has been upgrading its destroyers to the Baseline 9 version has slowed down in recent years, however. This is mainly due to the need to save money in light of the newly implemented, resource-heavy programme to build new-generation missiles. Ten destroyers are to be modernized in the 2017–2021 fiscal years.

www.fortworthchamber.com: In the Impact Zone. Trends in the Development of the U.S. Naval Surface Forces

Other important ways of boosting the potential of Aegis are to include them in the single sea and air defence NIFC-CA system and build a new version of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers fitted out with a new and far more powerful AMDR radar. While AMDR, for all its advantages, does not change the balance substantially, the same cannot be said of NIFC-CA, which involves integrating all the elements of the U.S. Navy’s air defence from aircraft carriers and destroyers to Conformal Airborne Early Warning Aircraft (CAEW) and electronic-warfare aircraft into a single network of information exchange and transmission. NIFC-CA, for example, would make it possible to use long-range SM-6 guided air defence missiles against sea and air targets beyond the effective area of the ship’s own warning assets by having planes distanced from the ship transmit target data. All these factors together will significantly enhance the capability of the U.S. Navy during the course of a strategic aerospace offensive operation.

***

Thus, at first glance, the current plans of the United States to deploy Aegis-based BMD in Europe do not pose a serious threat to Russia’s national security. But the situation somewhat changes if seen in the context of the global U.S. BMD system being aimed at defending U.S. territory against Russian and Chinese nuclear deterrents. The emergence of more sophisticated sea-based interceptor missiles makes the threat more than substantial. And we should not forget about the threat that American Aegis ships pose in the event of a hypothetical armed clash without the use of Strategic Nuclear Forces. The Russian response measures can still balance the threat of the U.S. BMD, the fact that it exists has a negative impact on the military-political situation in Europe.

These challenges force Russia to take retaliatory measures to ensure its own security. That in turn has a negative impact on security in Europe, the world, and the existing arms control regimes. Strategic threats may to a large extent be neutralized. And while conventional threats can be brought down to an acceptable level through negotiations, cooperation and diplomacy, that calls for an established and equal dialogue between Washington and Moscow aimed at signing legally binding treaties. Until that happens, the idea of equal and indivisible security in Europe will be far removed from reality. 1. The SM-3 IB differs from the previous IA version, having more advanced transverse targeting engines, a self-targeting warhead and signal-processing devices.

2. The SM-3 IIA differs from the IA and IB versions in that the missile body has a larger diameter, allowing the size of the warhead and fuel stock to be increased. This, in turn, allows the speed at the end of the trajectory to be increased.

3. A total of 75 SM-2 IV interceptor missiles were built by modifying the existing surface-to-air SM-2 IV.

4. Of which 4 ships use version 5.0 CU; 10 ships use version 4.X; and 19 ships use version 3.6.

5. Of which 21 ships will use version 5.1; 2 ships will use version 5.0; 20 ships will use version 4.X; 6 ships will use version 3.6.

6. Of which there will be 14 IIA modification interceptors; 271 IB interceptors: and 35 IA interceptors.

7. Roughly equal numbers of IA and IB interceptors.

8. It has to be noted that the target used during FTM-11a tests on August 31, 2007 is secret. Data on all the other targets are in the public domain.

9. As pointed out above, the United States decided against building an even more advanced modification of the SM-3 IIB.

25 august2016

Russia and Iran: Historic Mistrust and Contemporary Partnership

Russia’s recent use of an Iranian air base to bomb targets across Syria marks a striking new development in the history of Russian-Iranian relations. Throughout the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries, Iran had unsuccessfully resisted Russian designs to control its land and influence its politics. Iran’s 1979 revolution was meant, among other things, to restore the country’s sovereignty against great powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and to stand up to the atheist Soviet Union. Yet in contrast with the past, Russia now is no longer an uninvited imperial power, but a welcome strategic partner—the first time since 1979 that Iran has allowed foreign military personnel to operate from its territory.

As Moscow reenters the Middle East after a quarter-century break, it understands the importance of Iran, one of the most important countries along Russia’s southern periphery. Russia is fully ready to engage with Iran on a wide range of bilateral, regional, and international issues involving trade, energy, and security. Yet although the two countries share many goals and cooperation looks promising, the relationship is still relatively fragile and policy disagreements between them must be handled deftly.

Russian and Iranian foreign policy goals converge or diverge depending on the issue. Despite the ongoing U.S.-Russian confrontation, Moscow partnered with Washington and other world capitals to achieve the recent nuclear agreement with Iran. Russians and Iranians are close military allies in Syria. However, their political strategies in that country may diverge. In the wider Middle East, Moscow and Tehran pursue very different objectives, but in the greater Eurasian context, Russia looks forward to Iran joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a political forum of non-Western countries co-chaired by China and Russia.

What, then, are the drivers behind Russia’s policy toward Iran? It is worthwhile to examine Moscow’s long-term goals and short-term objectives, as well as how they fit in with Russia’s other important relationships, both regionally and globally.

Iran’s Regional Importance

Even after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Iran has remained Russia’s neighbor across the Caspian Sea. With over 2,500 years of mostly unbroken statehood, Iran is virtually a permanent fixture in the otherwise highly volatile environment south of the Russian border. Whatever the regime in Tehran, Russia needs a relationship with it.

Iran is no longer a sphere of influence for Russia and Great Britain, as it was during the nineteenth century, nor is it a junior ally of the United States as it was between the 1950s and 1970s. It is an independent regional power wielding influence from the Mediterranean Sea in the west to Afghanistan in

the east, and from the South Caucasus in the north to the Yemeni port of Aden in the south. In its decades-long confrontation with the United States since 1979, Iran has proven its resilience. A Shiite, non-Arab Iran is a loner in a Middle East characterized by countries largely populated with Sunni Arabs, but Moscow recognizes that there can be few lasting outcomes in the region without Tehran’s participation or consent.

Key Issues for Russian-Iranian Relations

Generally, Russia wants Iran to be a stable and friendly neighbor. Moscow might have a preference for more pragmatic Iranian leaders, but is basically prepared to deal with anyone who is in charge in Tehran, unless, of course, they challenge Russian interests.

There is little ideological affinity between present-day Russian and Iranian leaders. Iran is an Islamic theocracy, whereas Russia is a secular authoritarian state, with the Orthodox Church traditionally serving as a junior partner of the Kremlin. Both leaderships and societies are highly nationalistic, sensitive to their previous glory, and determined to regain their status in global and regional terms. There is not much trust between them either. Iranians remember czarist conquests and Soviet attempts at domination, and Russians complain about Persian evasiveness and duplicity.

Both leaderships are currently motivated by strong animus toward the United States, which has imposed sanctions on both countries, and this shapes their prevailing worldviews. Like Russia, Iran rejects U.S. dominance in the global system, and seeks to reduce that dominance in its own region. Moscow and Tehran are partners in opposing the existing world order.

Russia’s outreach to Iran—a major Muslim country—is important in bolstering Moscow’s image as friendly to Islam and open to a “dialogue of civilizations.” This concept was favored by former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami and is supported by the Kremlin as part of its efforts to make the global order more multipolar. Such cultural solidarity has a pragmatic side. Russians appreciate that Tehran did not criticize Moscow’s military campaigns in Chechnya and backed Russia’s observer status in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (now called the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) in 2005.

As Russia seeks to build economic ties to the countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia along a north-south axis, Iran is a key transit country. At a trilateral summit in Baku, Azerbaijan, in August 2016, Presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia, Hassan Rouhani of Iran, and Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan pledged to work hard to develop a 7,200-kilometer-long trading corridor linking their countries, mostly by rail. For Russia, Iran provides economic opportunities given its population size and potential for technological, educational, and cultural growth.

Yet, so far, economic relations between the two countries have usually taken a backseat to geopolitics. Iran’s principal export, oil, is not something that Russia is interested in buying, and Iranians mostly prefer more advanced Western technology to that of Russia. At present,Russia’s trade with Iran is small in scale—approximately $1.2 billion in 2015, down from $3.5 billion each year in 2010 and 2011, after which Russia joined UN-mandated sanctions against Iran. But Moscow hopes to expand its exports to Iran now that major economic sanctions against Tehran have been lifted.

In anticipation of this, there was talk in 2015 of potential investment deals amounting to $40 billion. Achieving this will not be easy. Cash-strapped Moscow is finding it hard to provide Tehran with substantial credit to stimulate Iranian imports from Russia. In the summer of 2016, the Russian government released two loans to Iran totaling 2.2 billion euros (about $2.5 billion), but a promised $5 billion loan to Tehran has yet to materialize.

Major Russian civilian stakeholders are exploring opportunities in Iran. Rosatom, the nuclear energy corporation, is looking for new orders to complete after it finishes constructing reactors at Bushehr. Lukoil, Russia’s largest privately owned oil company, is seeking to move into Iran’s oil and gas sector, and the Russian aerospace industry is looking for export markets as it is recovers from its post–Soviet era nadir. In the current post-sanctions environment, however, these companies face competition from European firms that have reentered the Iranian market.

With regard to energy relations, although Iran is a potential rival to Russia as a producer, Russians are taking the long view. The 2015 resumption of Iranian oil exports to Europe, predictably, has come at some cost to Russia, in terms of market share and oil prices, but this did not deter Moscow from actively pursuing the P5+1 nuclear deal with Tehran, which lifted the embargo. In March 2016, Iran did not agree to cap its oil production to support oil prices, as Moscow had advocated doing; yet the Russians professed understanding of Iran’s situation. When Iran finally begins exporting its natural gas to Europe, the principal market for Russia’s Gazprom, Moscow will not like it but will probably take this in stride. Rather than opposing something it cannot prevent, Russia has been demonstrating its sangfroid, while seeking to limit the damage to its interests and cementing important relationships.

Russia’s defense industry is one of the principal beneficiaries of the country’s relationship with Iran. Even when the last of the economic sanctions are removed, Iran will still be denied access to Western military technologies and hardware. Russia’s Rosoboronexport, which sells weapons systems, views Iran as an important market. Iran’s increasing oil revenues make it a more credible customer. In early 2016, Russia finally delivered to Iran the S-300 air defense system, which it had previously not done to put pressure on Tehran during the nuclear talks. Meanwhile, Tehran has been considering purchasing the more advanced S-400 system from Moscow. Russia has stated that there are no restrictions on selling Iran the T-90 main battle tank or the Su-30 fighter aircraft.

Keeping Nuclear Weapons Out

Russia acknowledges Iran’s ambition to be a major Middle Eastern player, but it wants it to stay a non-nuclear-weapons state. Moscow’s stance on the Iranian nuclear issue has been driven mainly by Russian national interests, and was thus unaffected by the U.S.-Russian confrontation in 2014. The Russians certainly want the nuclear deal with Iran—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—to hold, the alternatives being either a nuclear-armed Iran or a major war on Russia’s doorstep. However, with the agreement under attack from influential quarters in Washington and opposed by the more hardline elements in Tehran, its implementation cannot be taken for granted.

Moscow, which throughout the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program was generally more understanding of Iran’s position than the Western members of the P5+1 group, will have an important role to play, for example, in terms of reprocessing spent fuel. If, however, the JCPOA falters and U.S.-Iranian tensions spike again, Russia will have to make some hard choices. It might try to play the role of good cop, or act as a mediator. However, it should not be expected to automatically follow the United States. Depending on the level and intensity of the U.S.-Russian confrontation, the isolated pocket of cooperation between the two countries on Iran may not always remain a protected area. Moscow also has been looking with concern at the development of Iran’s medium-range missile program, but this concern is now rarely made public.

Cooperation and Competition in Syria

To Russia, Iran has been a valuable geopolitical ally in a number of areas, including Afghanistan, Syria, and the southern areas of the former Soviet Union. In Syria, Iran and its Hezbollah allies have provided forces on the ground in support of the government in Damascus, along with significant financial support, while Russia provides Damascus with air support, artillery, and intelligence, as well as arms, matériel, and diplomatic cover. Since the start of the Russian military intervention in Syria in September 2015, Moscow has been coordinating its operations there with both Damascus and Tehran, and also has worked closely with the Tehran-friendly government of Iraq. Russia obtained permission from Iran and Iraq to use their airspace for cruise missile strikes in Syria. Such coordination, it should be stressed, does not restrict Russia’s freedom of action. Moscow notified Iran about both the September 2015 decision to engage militarily in Syria and the March 2016 partial drawdown of the air campaign, and consulted about coordination both times; however, this was not made part of a joint decisionmaking process. Russia’s use of an Iranian air basebeginning in August 2016 for its bombing missions in Syria marked an upgrade in the quality of military cooperation between Moscow and Tehran. It was the first time since 1979 that Iran has allowed foreign military personnel to operate from its territory.

While Moscow, like Tehran, seeks to prevent the toppling of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the triumph of the Islamist extremists, there is a fundamental divergence between the two governments’ goals. The Russians want to preserve some kind of a Syrian state, under a regime reformed with their active participation—such a regime would continue to be friends with Moscow. Their end goal, however, is not to preserve Assad, over whom they have limited influence, or to maintain Alawite rule. While Russia’s ongoing direct intervention in Syria has prevented the defeat of Assad’s forces, it also has resulted in the relative reduction of Iran’s influence in Damascus. Moscow also has been paying attention to Israel’s security needs, in Syria and elsewhere—something which is clearly at odds with Tehran’s use of Hezbollah as its geopolitical tool on Israel’s borders. Moreover, despite the de facto alliance over Syria, Moscow has insisted on Iran paying full price for the armamentsit purchases from Russia.

The Iranians, by contrast, are fighting to keep the Assad regime in power, to preserve crucial supply links to Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and to shore up their influence in so-called useful Syria— a reference to Syrian territory that the Assad regime still controls. These goals can only be achieved with the help of Iran’s Shiite and Alawite allies. Thus, while the Russians are aiming for an outcome that might eventually include some sort of a political compromise that involves Syria’s disparate warring factions and key regional players, the Iranians are focused on achieving military victory for their party. The Iranians are unhappy that the Russians arenot giving enough support to Hezbollah and other Shiite forces on the ground and that they have not been active enough on some key battlefronts, such as Aleppo last June.

A major goal of the Russian intervention in Syria has been winning U.S. recognition of Moscow’s great-power role. The Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, and the U.S. secretary of state, John Kerry, have acted as informal co-chairs of the intra-Syrian negotiations process that aims to achieve a political settlement. In February 2016, they brokered an agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Syria which has since been violated. The United States and Russia, however, also have had a record of success. In 2013, they reached a landmark accord to rid Syria of chemical weapons, which has since been implemented despite the ongoing civil war.

Iran has watched U.S.-Russian collaboration on Syria with suspicion, fearful that they may collude at the expense of Tehran’s interests. There is also distrust on the U.S. side. One reason for Washington’s refusal to share information with Russia on the Syrian opposition forces is its concern that such information could be leaked to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. Moscow, for its part, has been weighing the implications of Iran’s rapprochement with European Union countries following the signing of the JCPOA. However, the Russians are much more relaxed about the possibility that Tehran might tilt toward the United States. They see the obstacles to radical improvement in the U.S.-Iranian relationship as fundamental ones, and such an outcome as highly unlikely.

Russian-Iranian Relations in Other Regional Settings

In Afghanistan, Iran and Russia have been allies since the Taliban gained power in Kabul in 1996. The two countries actively collaborated with the United States to defeat the Taliban in 2001. Since then, the U.S.-led operation in Afghanistan has been both a relief in security terms and a source of geopolitical anxiety for Moscow and Tehran. On the one hand, U.S. forces in the Hindu Kush mountains took on al-Qaeda and Taliban extremists who also posed a threat to Russia and Iran; on the other, the U.S. military presence in the region greatly increased Washington’s influence in Russia’s and Iran’s backyards. Now, as the Western military presence in Afghanistan progressively wanes, the Iranians and the Russians will need to collaborate more closely again to prevent instability in Afghanistan from threatening their own security interests. Another source of worry for Iran and Russia is drug trafficking from Afghanistan, for which the two countries are both transit territories and growing markets.

In the future, Moscow and Tehran may also find common cause in Central Asia, if the security environment in that former Soviet region seriously deteriorates. They have a history of cooperation there. In 1997, Moscow and Tehran joined forces to end the brutal civil war in Persian-speaking Tajikistan. In the South Caucasus, Iran has stayed on the sidelines of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, allowing Moscow and the other Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group co-chairs, the United States and France, to mediate between the warring parties. It was in

large part thanks to Iran that landlocked Christian Armenia, a Russian ally, could keep a lifeline to the outside world.

In a number of other areas, however, Russia and Iran remain apart. Moscow views Hezbollah as a sectarian politico-military grouping that warrants engagement, but it has reservations about its more violent activities. Russia also takes a more neutral stance toward the civil war in Yemen, where Iran supports the Houthi tribes. Crucially, Russia does not support Iran’s agenda in the Persian Gulf. While Tehran reaches out to various Shiite forces as it seeks to bolster its regional position in the bitter rivalry with the Sunni Arab powers led by Saudi Arabia, Moscow has carefully steered clear of the Sunni-Shia conflict.

The Dogma of Flexibility

Moscow is reentering the Middle East as a very different kind of player than it was during the Soviet period. The salient feature of its engagement today is its largely nonpartisan approach, by which Russia promotes its interests while remaining on speaking terms with all players in the region. The only exception to this has been Turkey, which in November 2015 shot down a Russian warplane near the Turkish-Syrian border—an act that impaired Russian-Turkish relations until Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan apologized to President Putin seven months later. After the meeting of the two presidents in St. Petersburg in August 2016, Russian-Turkish ties are being restored. They may even grow tighter than before, given President Erdogan’s complaints about U.S. and EU behavior at the time of the attempted military coup in Turkey in July 2016. As an overall rule, then, Russia retains flexibility in the region, maintaining a margin for maneuvering in both its alliances and conflicts, except for the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, against which its commitment is complete.

Russia’s close relations with Iran have had a bearing on Moscow’s ties to Israel, as well as its links to a number of Arab countries, above all in the Persian Gulf. Russia’s ability to stay close to both Iran and Israel is a testament to the degree of Moscow’s foreign policy flexibility, the quality of its diplomatic skills, and the inherent limits on Russian-Iranian cooperation. As perhaps the only world leader who has met with both Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Putin has demonstrated his pragmatic, transactional, and realpolitik-based approach to foreign policy. Consistently, Russians have been less worried than the Israelis about Iran’s technical capabilities and its leadership’s political rationality, while at the same time warning about the dangers of an Israeli preemptive strike against Iran.

The Russians have been careful not to be drawn into a Sunni-Shia conflict, whether in Syria or in the Persian Gulf. To Moscow, the coalition it has formed with Baghdad, Damascus, and Tehran does not represent a Russia-Shia axis but only a meeting of interests. In Syria, the Russians have been reaching out, with limited success, to a range of Syrian opposition groups, in an effort to reach an acceptable peace settlement—something unthinkable for Iran. At the same time, Moscow repeatedly has made the point that no political settlement in Syria could be sustainable unless it is backed by Iran—a fact that many Syrian Sunnis have had difficulty swallowing.

Putin has also cultivated relations with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt, the most populous Arab country, and a Sunni one at that. The Kremlin’s relations with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan are traditionally close. Leaders of all the smaller members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have recently traveled to Russia to confer with Putin. Moscow’s economic interests have pushed it to embrace the GCC states, but its strategic objectives make it a situational ally of Iran.

In this context, the biggest challenge for Moscow is to manage ties with Iran even as it deepens its dialogue with Saudi Arabia. Becoming partners with the Saudi kingdom and cementing friendships with other rich Gulf monarchies while maintaining and expanding relations with Iran could prove even more difficult than the feat of simultaneously dealing with Iran and Israel. Russia has no appetite for taking sides in the Iranian-Saudi dispute, but pursuing parallel relationships with countries that are bitter regional rivals is a test of its resourcefulness and litheness.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and before the Ukraine crisis, Russia’s relations with Iran were highly susceptible to the ups and downs in Moscow’s relationship with Washington. When pressed hard by the United States, Russia would often make concessions at the expense of their Iranian connection. In Tehran, such practices destroyed Russia’s credibility and made Iranian leaders even more cynical toward their colleagues in the Kremlin, whom they had never fully trusted to begin with. In the post-Ukraine era, this no longer applies because the severity of Moscow’s confrontation with Washington rules out such maneuvering, for now. Russia did not withhold its cooperation with the United States on Iran during the P5+1 talks, as many in the West had feared, but once the JCPOA was signed, Moscow proceeded with arms sales to and military cooperation with Iran without any regard for the U.S. attitude toward these moves.

Moscow is eager to have Iran join the SCO, which it has co-led with Beijing since its founding in 2001. The SCO’s forthcoming expansion in 2017, to include India and Pakistan, will serve Russia’s interest in diluting China’s weight in the organization. If Iran also joins as a full member following the lifting of sanctions that were imposed by the UN Security Council, China will be even more embedded within a group of its continental Asian partners. Russia, with its vast foreign policy expertise and diplomatic experience, would be able to benefit from such an arrangement. Tehran, however, has become more cautious toward that prospect, concerned about limiting its options precisely when the West, particularly Europe, is opening up to it.

Conclusion

For the time being, Russian-Iranian cooperation is much more pronounced than competition between the two countries. Disagreements between them—for example on how to divide the resource-rich Caspian Sea, which strategy to follow in Syria, and whether to cap oil production—are being managed more or less successfully, and are on the way to some sort of resolution.

However, the foundation of the relationship between Russia and Iran is relatively weak and imbalanced. Economic ties are underperforming and unimpressive. Mutual trust at the government level is largely lacking. Societal ties are virtually nonexistent. As Iran opens up due to the lifting of sanctions, Iranians are looking west not north. Iran is unlikely to become Russia’s soul mate, and the most Moscow and Tehran can hope for is a pragmatic relationship based on the two countries’ interests, as defined by their respective leaderships. Their international weight and connectivity differ greatly, creating a glaring asymmetry. While Russia is one of Iran’s two most important strategic partners (the other being China), Iran is much lower on the list of Russia’s priorities.

The potential for discord between Iran and Russia exists in a number of domains—including Middle Eastern geopolitics, the Caspian Sea divisions, and natural gas exports—even if neither side at the moment regards it as in its interest to push hard against the other. For the foreseeable future, Moscow and Tehran need each other in order to accomplish their wider goals and objectives, even if they know that their cooperation has clear limits and can only decrease their competition rather than fully abolish it. This understanding, in turn, can make the relationship sustainable and even moderately successful, despite its shallow roots, sordid history (particularly for the Iranians), and deep and lingering distrust.