what does the second form of the ont arg proof

8/6/2019 What Does the Second Form of the Ont Arg Proof

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What does the second form of the ontological argument prove?H. JONGKIMClaremont,CA,USA

^^ InternationalJournal or Philosophy of Religion 56: 17-40, 2004.^1^ 2004 KluwerAcademicPublishers. Printedin the Netherlands. 17

Some forty years ago, Norman Malcolm and CharlesHartshorne,philos-ophersfrom two distinctiveschools of thought, championed, ndependentlyof each other, a form of ontological argumentbased on chapterIII ofAnselm's Proslogion as well as on variouschaptersof Reply to Gaunilo.1While differentaspects of the argumentare emphasized by Malcolm andHartshorne, his second form of the ontological argumenthinges on thefollowing two points: (1) necessaryexistence is constitutiveof the conceptof God,2and(2) therefore, n understandinghe conceptof God, one under-standsthat God necessarilyexists in fact or in actuality.WhereasMalcolmvacillates between affirming only (1) and both (1) and (2),3 Hartshorneaffirms both (1) and (2); however,he holds that Anselm's formulationofthe actualexistence of Godis somewhatconfused.My argumenthere is thatwhile (1) has some sense, (2) is a confusion arisingfrom confoundingthelogical orconceptualexistenceof God with the actualexistence of God.4

ILet us begin with (1): their claim that the notion of necessaryexistence isconstitutiveof the conceptof God.5Both MalcolmandHartshorne orrectlyappealto how the conceptof Godis understoodwithinthe theistic traditionsin orderto show,contra ogical positivists,the sense of the conceptof Godand the sense of thenecessaryexistence of God.Thus,Malcolmwrites,

In the NineteenthPsalm it is said: 'before the mountainswere broughtforth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even fromeverlastingto everlasting,thou art God.' Here is expressed the ideaof the necessaryexistence and eternityof God, an idea that is essen-tial to the Jewish and Christianreligions. In those complex systemsof thought,those 'language-games,'God has the status of a necessarybeing. Who can doubt that? Here we must say with Wittgenstein, thislanguage-games played!'6


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And,according o Hartshorne,[J]ustsuch a theory s implicitin the veryidea of Godas unsurpassablyexcellent. This theory(whichcanonlybe crudelystatedhere)is thatthebasic referentof "possible"s to the divinecapacityto create andenjoycreatures.This capacity is neither a law of naturenor a mere rule oflogic, but the presupposition f any existence and of any law, meaningortruthwhatever.WhatGodcould notpossess could notbe, and sincehecould notpossess his ownnonexistence, his couldnotbe, and the notionof it is nonsense. Here the ontological impossibilityappearsas also alogical one,but because theconceptof Godand its logical content s putinto theequation.Wecannotconsistentlyconceive God as worshipfullysupremeandyet not the groundof all possibilityandmeaning.I believethat no less than this is impliedin the conceptof "Creator f all things,visible and invisible."7

Indeed, nsofar as one looks at theconceptof God as found in the tradition,insofar as a believer affirms that God is "creatorof all things, visible andinvisible," nsofar as a believer confesses that "before the mountainswerebrought orth,or ever thou hadst formed the earth andthe world,even fromeverlastingto everlasting,thou art God,"God's necessaryexistence too isaffirmed.Viewed withinthe tradition, t is indeedthe presuppositionof anyexistence and of anylaw,meaningortruth,and is acceptedas "thegroundofall possibilityandmeaning." ndeed,to worshipGod is to affirm hatGod'sexistenceis a necessarycharacteristic f God.But this is also where Malcolm and Hartshornebegin to strayfrom thetraditionaluse of the concept. Ratherthanaffirming hat the notion of thenecessaryexistence of Godis aconfession,theyseek toprovidephilosophicaljustification or that notion. Malcolmand Hartshorneunderstand he notionof necessaryexistence in two ways. First, it is claimed thatGod is under-stoodwithin the traditionas theSupremeBeing. Sincenecessaryexistence issuperior o contingentexistence, God, as the SupremeBeing, it is claimed,must necessarily exist. Second, it is claimed that the notion of necessaryexistence s a constituentof theconceptof God.Thus, t is claimed,thatwhichpossesses the notion of necessary existence, unlike concepts that possessothernotionsof existence,must exist or not exist. Since that whichpossessesnecessaryexistencemust exist unless it is logically contradictory remptyofsignificance, nsofaras theconceptof Godis neithercontradictory oremptyof significance, t is argued,God must exist. However,neitherunderstandingof necessaryexistencetakenalone canmovebeyondthelanguageof worshipwhereGod's existenceis confessed to the proof that God necessarilyexists.The first way, namely, that necessary existence is superiorto contingent


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existence,disregards he very distinction n kind that is confessedin theistictraditions oncerningGod's existence andcontingentexistence. The secondway, namelythe acknowledgementof the differences n kinds of existence,canonly show that the necessaryexistence is internallyconsistentwithothercharacteristics f God; however, t cannot show that Godactuallyexists.Further,while these two ways are not contradictories,heyarecontraries.If one affirms he firstway (namely,necessaryexistence is superior o contin-gent existence), then one cannot affirmthe second way (namely, necessaryexistence is differentn kindfromother ypesof existence)sinceanycompar-ative can only be appliedto differencesin degree and not in kinds. And,conversely, f one affirms the second way, then one cannot affirm the firstway since the recognitionof the difference n kind forbidscomparison.Yet,in theirattempts o give philosophical ustification or the notionof necessaryexistenceof God,both Hartshorne nd Malcolmconfoundthese two uses ofthe notion of necessaryexistencepreciselybecause they realized,I believe,that neitherof the two understandingsaken alone can achieve their aim.Becausetheydo so, not only do theycommit the logical fallacyof affirmingcontrary elationsbetween the two understandings, ut also neitherof themmoves beyondthe languageof worshipwhere God's existence is confessedto the proof that God necessarilyexists. Let us then investigatehow eachof these two ways is espoused and confoundedin the Second Form of theOntologicalArgument.The first way employs the claim that necessary existence is superiorto other types of existence. This is more apparent n Malcolm than inHartshorne.Malcolm builds his case for the necessary existence of Godby employing some 'neutral' criteria of limitedness and dependencethatbinds all beings/things.This is curious,given that Malcolm recognizedinhis discussions of eternity,omnipotenceand omniscience,God's propertiesare not determinedby the same measureas we determinepropertiesof otherbeings/things.8As he recognized, God's eternitydoes not mean that Godhas existed/will exist longer than anyone or anythingelse, God's omnipo-tence does not mean that God is more powerfulthanany otherbeing, andGod's omniscience does not mean that God has more knowledgethananyotherbeing.Otherwise,Godbecomes a contingentbeinglike Malcolm'sownexampleof "Jonesis the tallest man in the world."9 f perchance,there isa greaterbeing (e.g., a being with morepower)thanGod, then God cannotbe God. This is to pose some measure of duration,power and knowledgeapartandawayfromGod,whichgoes againsthow thoseconceptsare under-stood within the tradition tself: In the tradition,God is not God becauseGodpossesses the most power andknowledgeover all otherbeings;rather,because God is God, God is understood o be the source or the groundof


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20 H. JONGKIMallpower,knowledge,andbeing.Thus,there s no sense in tryingto measureGod'sduration,powerorknowledgeas there s whenwe compare herelativeduration,powerorknowledgeof contingentbeings/things.Malcolm correctlynotes the similarpoint concerningthe existence ofGod.10However,althoughhe explicitlyacknowledges his difference n kindbetween existence of God and existence of other beings/things,Malcolmneverthelessgnoresthis differencewhen he explainsthe notionof necessaryexistenceby appealing o unlimitednessandindependenceof God. He treatsboth unlimitednessand ndependencentermsof limitednessanddependenceof contingentbeings/things.Again,Malcolm startspromisinglyby lookingatthe use of independencen the actualChristianradition.He states,

Whetherwe believe Him or not we must admit that the 'almightyandeverlastingGod' (asseveralancientprayersbegin),the 'makerof heavenandearth,and of all thingsvisible and nvisible'(as is saidin the NiceneCreed),cannotbe thoughtof asbeing brought ntoexistenceby anythingor as dependingfor His continuedexistence on anything.To conceiveof anythingas dependentupon somethingelse for its existence is toconceive of it as a lesserbeingthanGod.11Yet,Malcolm theninterpretshis use in terms of meredegrees.His explana-tionsandexamplesconcerning he superiority f independenceoverdepend-ence and unlimitednessover limitedness show as much. To explain thesuperiorityof unlimitedness,Malcolm employs the example of dishes. Heholdsthat f there are two sets of dishes,identical n every aspect, exceptthatone set is fragilewhile the other s not, then the non-fragileset is superior othe fragileone since that set of dishes does not dependon carefulhandling,etc.12Of course, in this sense, the non-fragileset is superior o the fragileset. AlthoughMalcolm does not explicitlymake an analogouscase for Godand otherbeings, implicitin Malcolm'sdiscussionis that God is superior ootherbeings in a similarmanner.Why else would he employthis example?SinceGod is notdependenton others or God'sexistence,while otherbeingsare(food,parents,etc.), Malcolmimplicitlyaffirms,Godis superior o otherbeings. In this way,Malcolm turnsGod's independence nto somethingakinto the non-fragilityof dishes, but only more so. Malcolm claims the samein his discussion of unlimitedness.He correctlystates that "Godis usuallyconceived as anunlimitedbeing.He is conceivedof as a beingwho could notbe limited,thatis, as an absolutelyunlimitedbeing."13Yet, he employs theexampleof two engines, one thatrequiresfuel, and the otherthat does notin order o show the superiority f unlimitednessover limitedness.He claimsthat he latterengineis superior o thefirstenginesince it is not limited ike inthefirst.God,he claims, is unlimited n a similarway.Whereasotherbeings


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andcreatures relimited,God is unlimited.Whereas he existence of plants slimitedby theirdependenceon moistureandtypesof soil, God is not. This isto postulatesome measureof limitednessuponwhich God,people, animals,plants,etc. arejudged.But, as noted and as Malcolm also recognized n hisdiscussions of eternity,omnipotenceandomniscience,God's propertiesarenot determinedby the same measureswe determine he propertiesof otherbeings/things.Otherwise,God becomesmerelya contingentbeing,albeit themostindependentand unlimitedone.Because Malcolm thus ignores the very distinction he makes betweenGod'spropertiesand the propertiesof otherbeings/things n his discussionsof the unlimitednessand independenceof God, he turns God's necessaryexistence into one instanceof the existence of contingentbeing/thing,albeitthe most independentand unlimitedone. This is why RushRhees criticizesMalcolm'sdefinitionof thenecessaryexistence of God.Rhees states,Malcolm n his discussionsuggeststhatyou can talk about henecessaryexistence of God, meaningthat God's existence is unlimited,and thathis existenceis not dependenton anythingelse. But then it is not clearhow 'existence' is beingused at all. Malcolmemphasizesthatyou mayuse the term 'existence' in a varietyof ways. Cf. The discussions ofexistence theoremsin mathematics, or instance. But when he speaksof the unlimitedexistenceof Godin contrastwith other existence- theexistenceof material hings- well what is God's existence then if it isnot the same 'existence' as that of materialthings?And does it makeanysense to speakof existence in thatuse as unlimited?The existence of a plantis dependentupon soil andlight, moistureand air. This does not say anythingabout the kind of existence it has:exceptthat t shows somethingof how we mightanswerthequestionofwhetherany plantsexist undersuch and such circumstances perhapson certainplanets.It does show something mportant f how we use theword 'exists' or theexpression'does not exist.'If we takethis sense of 'existence',then 'unlimited xistence'seemsto be meaningless.And it is not clear on his account of thing what itdoes amount o.14

Rhees' pointhere is similarto the one I madeabove.While acknowledgingthatMalcolmnotes the differentkinds of existence,Rhees criticizesMalcolmfor not explainingwhat that difference amounts to. Rather,Rhees states,Malcolmis using existencein the same way for bothplantsand God. If so,there is no distinctionbetween 'existence' and 'necessaryexistence,' sincenecessaryexistence is simply the same kind of existence as a plant'sexist-ence,exceptthatnecessaryexistence is notdependenton its surroundingsnd


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lasts forever.This is why Rhees says that the notion,"unlimited xistence,"understood his way, is meaningless.While Malcolm explicitly notes thatGod's existence is different n kind from the existence of otherthings, hisemploymentandexplicationof the unlimitednessandindependenceof Godshow that he is treatingGod's existencein the same manneras the existenceof otherthings/beings.Yet,if God'sindependenceand unlimitednessare understood o be boundby the same measureas thatof contingentbeings/things, n what sense can wespeakof somethingexistinglike plants,engines, dogs, or dishes, thatis notlimited n anyway?Thepossibilityof imaginingany givencontingentbeing'snon-existence stems from our prior experiencesof and languageaboutthatbeing.Forinstance,because ourlanguageaboutdogs and ourexperiencesofthem includedeath,disappearance, ickness,old age, etc., we can imagineapossible world wheredogs do not exist. Only because their nonexistence salreadypresent n ourexperiencesand n our anguage,we understandhat heconceptof dogs is contingent.But how canwe speakof God'sexistencein asimilarmanner?Can we show a pictureof Godlike we can show apictureofa dog?CanI conversewith God likeI do withmy mentor?CanI pointto Godlike I canpointto aplant?The obvious answersto thesequestionsare "No."Wecannotpointto God,we cannotshowpicturesof God,we cannotconversewithGodlike we do withotherbeingsnot becausewe are imited,butbecausewhateverGod's existence maybe, it does not share the same grammarwithplants,dogs, engines,etc.WhileMalcolmexplicitlystates thatquestions ike the ones abovecannotbe asked of God, his treatmentof the unlimitedness and independenceofGod in terms of some neutralmeasure nvites these very questions.15Thus,there is an inherentcontradiction n Malcolm'sposition:on the one hand,he claimsthe superiority f necessaryexistence overcontingentexistencebyappealingto some neutralmeasure of unlimitednessand independence;onthe otherhand,he claims that God'sproperties such as omniscience,omni-potence,andeternity)cannotbe assessed in termsof themeasure hatwe usein assessingthepropertiesof contingentbeings/things.His demonstration fthesuperiority f necessaryexistence overcontingentexistence is contraryotheverydistinction hat allows us to understand heconceptof God, i.e., thedistinction n kind between God's existence and the existence of contingentthings/beings.Let us nowconsiderwhetherwe are betteroff stayingwiththe secondwayas emphasizedby Hartshorne.The secondway in which the notionof neces-saryexistence is used in the arguments by centralizing he very differencein kind that Malcolmrecognizedbutignored.Hartshorne ttempts o explic-itly distinguishbetween differentkinds of existence by appealingto modal


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logic. Accordingto Hartshorne,"all modalities reduce to three:Np, N~p(~Np&~N~p)."16 By Np, he means what he calls the modalityof neces-sity, where "onlythe existence,but not the nonexistence, s conceivable."17This,of course,according o Hartshorne,s God.By N~p, he meanswhat hecalls the modalityof impossibility, .e., a being whose existence is logicallyimpossible (round-square).By (~Np&~N~p), he means what he calls themodalityof contingency, .e., a particular eing, whose nonexistenceas wellas existence can be conceived(cheese,unicorn, sland,etc.).AlthoughHartshorne xplicitlyclaims that he is dealingwith conceptualexistencein his distinctionof the modes of existence, implicitin his distinc-tion is his assumption hat the talkof existence is bound to talkof objects.18WhereasMalcolm at least acknowledged ypesof existence that aredifferentfromobjects (e.g., the existence of an infinite numberof primenumbers),19Hartshorneimplylimitstypesof existenceto objects.His claimthatall typesof existence can be reducedto his three modes of existence shows this. For,what,according o Hartshorne, ossesses themodalityof contingency?Suchobjects as cheese, humanbeings, unicorns,plants,etc. What, accordingtoHartshorne, ossesses themodalityof impossibility?Round-squares, ot ice,etc. Not only are all of these conceptsof objects,but our understanding fthe contingencyor impossibilityof these things stems from our experienceandunderstanding f objects.For instance,I know that a humanbeing is acontingentbeing andthata roundsquarecannotexist. I know that a humanbeing is contingentnot simply because I grasp abstractly uch constituentsas space-time imitations n the conceptof a humanbeing, butbecausemyunderstandingf suchconstituents tem frommy encounterswith death,myregretof events in the past which cannot be changed,my havingto choosebetween staying and leaving, etc. It is not that my understandingof thecontingencyof humanbeings stems from my understanding f the conceptof contingency;but rather,my understanding f the contingencyof humanbeings stems frommy understanding f and encounterswith humanbeings.In otherwords,ourexperiencesof contingentobjectsprecedeourconceptualgraspof themodalityof contingency.The same holds for the concepts that possess what Hartshornecallsthe modalityof impossibility.For instance,I know that a roundsquareisimpossibilitybecauseI understandwhat a circle is and what a square s aswell as the constituentsof these concepts.I know thatsquarespossess fourright nterioranglesand fourequalsidesbecauseI haveencountered quares,angles,andlengths.I know that a circle hascircumference ndlacks internalanglesbecauseIhave encountered ircles,curved ines,etc.Theimpossibilityof a roundsquare hen stems not simplyfrom theconceptsandtheirconstitu-entsbeing contradictory. ather, urgraspof roundnessandsquarenessbeing


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contradictorytems fromour encounterswithobjectsand what we do as wellas how we assess objects.In otherwords,ourexperienceswith objectsmakepossibleourconceptualgraspof modalityof impossibility.Hartshorne laims that that which possesses the modalityof necessity(God) is such that only its existence is conceivable but not the possibilityof its nonexistence.20Yet,the possibilityof nonexistencehere cannotbe thesame kind of possibilitythatbelongs to those thatpossess the modalityofcontingency.Otherwise, t binds theconceptof God to our talk aboutcontin-gent objects,e.g., whereasdogs die, God cannotdie;whereasdogs areboundto space-time ocation,God is not,etc. Butif this wereso, as we have seeninthe discussions of Malcolmabove, then all sorts of unanswerablequestionsinevitablyarise because the possibility of its nonexistence stems from ourexperiencesof andtalk aboutcontingentobjects.So, whatevers meantby theimpossibilityof God'snonexistence, t cannot be on parwith the possibilityof nonexistencethatbelongs to contingentbeings. But Hartshornedoes notdistinguishbetween the two. He simplyclaims that the conceptof God doesnot includethepossibilityof nonexistencewhereas all contingentbeingsdo.Stated this way, the possibilityof (non)existence s treated n the same wayforGod andcontingentbeings.Thus, in order to understand he impossibility of nonexistence in theconcept of God, we would have to differentiate t from the possibility ofnonexistence hatbelongsto contingentbeings/things.And,Hartshornes ontheright rackwhen he appeals o theistic anguage.Indeed,viewed withinthetradition,Godpossessesneitherwhat Hartshorne alls themodalityof contin-gency nor what he calls the modalityof impossibility.Within the tradition,God,as Hartshornetates, s understood o exist necessarily.But this is a tritepoint:If one worshipsthe theisticGod, then of courseone accepts that God necessarily exists. In other words, implicit in theproclamationhatGod is "Creator f all things,visible and invisible" s theproclamationhat God exists. However,this is the languageof worshipandconfession.Indeed, n looking at the conceptof God as confessed within thetradition, ontra he positivists,it does not have "the statusof round-squaresandotherimpossiblethings."The concept of God is not self-contradictory.Withinthe tradition,God is confessed to be eternal,omnipotent,omnibene-volent,omnipresent,omniscient,etc. But, as Malcolmrealized but ignored,God's omnipotencedoes not mean that God has more power than anyoneelse, God's eternitydoes not mean thatGod has infinite durationwhereasotherbeingsdo not,God's omnibenevolencedoes not mean thatGodis morebenevolent hananyotherbeing, andGod's omniscience does not mean thatGod has moreknowledgethananyotherbeing. Otherwise,God'spropertiesarebound o thesame measureas thatof contingentbeings/things.God would


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then be boundto the samecomparativesused to comparecontingentbeings.These comparativesare senseless in traditionalanguageaboutGod: God isconfessed to be the creator,and as such it does not make sense to use themeasurewe use to comparecontingent beings/thingsin measuringGod'sproperties.The same, of course, is true of God's existence. It is not that God isconfessed to have the impossibilityof nonexistencebecause the possibilityof nonexistence thatbelongs to contingent beings/thingsis excluded fromthe concept of God. Rather,God is confessed to have the impossibilityof nonexistencebecause the talk of existence and nonexistenceconcerningcontingentbeings do not make sense in regardsto God. In other words,God'sexistenceis understoodwithinthe tradition o be conceptuallydifferentfrom existence of otherbeings/things ust as God's omnipotence s under-stood within the tradition o be conceptuallydifferentfrompower of otherbeings/things.But Hartshornedoes not seem to see this. While he appealsto the tradition,he fails to note the grammaticaldifference n talkingaboutGod's existenceand aboutotherbeings/things.He simplytakes existence andthe possibilityof existence in both grammars o be the same. But this runscontraryo thenotionthathe startedwith,i.e., thatGod's existence is differentin kind fromcontingent hings.Thus,both of the ways in which necessaryexistence is employedin thesecond form of the argumentmistreat the notion of necessary existence.The firstway, as exemplifiedby Malcolm,simplydismisses the differencesin kindof existences by employingcomparativesbetween independenceofGod anddependenceof contingentbeings as well as between unlimitednessof God and limitednessof contingent beings. While explicitly statingthatvery difference,the secondway, as exemplifiedby Hartshorne, everthelessignoresthegrammatical ifference ntalkingaboutGod'sexistence and aboutotherbeings/things. Exist'in "Dogsexist,""Round quaresdo notexist,"and"Godexists"turnsout to mean the samein eachcase eventhoughHartshornestartedby emphasizingtheirdifferences.But, when this difference n kindsof existenceis takenseriously,all we canappealto is the theisticlanguageofworshipand confession.As such, that which is proclaimed n worship(i.e.,the existenceof God) cannotitself be partof the formalproof to show thatGoddoes indeedexist apartandawayfrom thelanguageof worship.

IIMalcolmand Hartshorneurtherstate that because necessaryexistence is aconstituentof the concept of God, the very concept of God prohibitsques-tioning God's existence. This is their attemptat answeringthe objection


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26 H.JONGKIMmade famous by Kant and Caterus.In objectingto the argumentsof KantandCaterus,Malcolmnotes thatboth KantandCaterus laim that"'God is anecessarybeing' (or 'Godnecessarilyexists') is equivalent o the conditionalproposition'If God exists then He necessarily exists.'"21Malcolm thinksthatthe conditional s faulty.He asks, "Forhow do theywantthe antecedentclause, 'If God exists,' to be understood?Clearlythey want it to imply thatit is possible that God does not exist."22Hartshorneputs the similarpointin the following manner:While acknowledging hat "Whether omething sconsistentlyconceivable or not cannotdepend upon whathappensto exist"and "Conceivabilityand its contradictorydependnot on alterablerelationsof ideas to facts,butonly on inherentand fixed relationof ideas to ideas,"23Hartshorne,mmediately precedingthese statements,states, "WereGod toexist, yet his nonexistenceto be conceivable,he would either exist by sheerchanceor luck,or else owingto some cause. Eitherway,he would not be thebest conceivablebeing,andhencewouldnot be worthyof worshipas God. Hemust then existwithoutconceivablealternative.f you say, 'yes, supposingheexists at all,' you unwittingly mply theconceivabilityof the veryalternativeyou admitmustbe excluded."24 hus,both Malcolm and Hartshornewant toprohibitsuchconditionalsas "If Godexists, then his existence is necessary"and "Yes, supposinghe exists at all, God necessarilyexists" by claimingthatthe antecedentsof these conditionals contradict he logic of necessaryexistence in theconsequents.Both Malcolm and Hartshornearguethus to reject the objectionmadefamous by Kant.25Kant, as Malcolm himself quotes, states, "To posit atriangle,and yet to reject its three angles, is self-contradictory; ut thereis no contradiction n rejectingthe triangle togetherwith its three angles.The same holds true of the concept of an absolutely necessary being. If itsexistence is rejected,we rejectthe thingitself with all its predicates;and noquestionof contradiction an then arise."26Here,Kantagreeswith MalcolmandHartshornehat o rejectone of thenecessaryelementsof aconcept(threeangles of a triangle) yet affirm the concept (triangle) s self-contradictory.Thus, in affirmingthe concept of God, one cannot reject the conceptualnecessaryexistence of God.However,Kantalso statescorrectly hat one canrejectthe whole concept.Kant is saying thatwhile q is a necessary consequentwhen p is accepted,when p is rejected,then it makes no sense to assertq as being a necessaryconsequentof p, not thatq is not a necessaryconsequentof p at the concep-tual level. In otherwords, Kantacknowledgesthatnecessaryexistence is anecessaryconstituentof theconceptof God,but he also notes thatthe wholeconceptof God is not necessary.Forexample,one of thenecessaryelementsof theconceptof cigarette s thatcigarettescontainnicotine.Thus,in under-


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standing heconceptof cigarette,one also understands hatcigarettescontainnicotine.But, it is possibleto imaginea world where theconceptof cigarettedoesnot exist. If it does notexist, then t makesno sense to speakof cigarettescontainingnicotine. In the similarway,in understandingheconceptof God,one also graspsthat necessaryexistence is a constituentof the concept ofGod.But,if one rejectsthat God exists (i.e., the whole conceptof God),thenit makes no sense to speakof God existing necessarily.There are then twodifferentgrammars oncerningexistence here:(3) the conceptualor logicalexistence internal o a concept,and(4) the actualexistence. As such,a personcan affirm 3) yet doubt(4). Taken hisway,theconditional,"Godnecessarilyexists (3), if God exists (4),"contains no contradiction,pace Malcolm andHartshorne.Yet,Hartshorne nd Malcolmmay object that there is a huge differencebetweenthe necessity of God's existence in the conceptof God and neces-sity in otherconcepts, e.g., cigarette.In conceiving God as that thanwhichnothing greatercan be conceived, Malcolm and Hartshorne laim, we areconceiving of a concept where the very possibility of its nonexistenceisruledout,whereasotherconceptsare such that it makes sense to doubttheirinstantiation, .g. cigarette, sland,triangle,etc.28More thanMalcolm,it is Hartshornewho attempts o note the differentkinds of necessity by distinguishing"what is only trivially a priori ornecessary"from "what is strictly a priori and purely necessary."This isHartshorne's ttemptat distinguishingbetweennecessity thatbelongs in theconceptof God andnecessityin otherconcepts.He states,

That "blue cheese containsmicroorganisms"if this is partof whatwemeanby cheese) is only triviallya priorior necessary;for theremighthave been no such thing as cheese, or even any idea of such a thing.Whatis strictlya prioriand purely necessaryhere is only some suchprincipleas thattheconsequencesof a definedtermmust be accepted fthe term s accepted.This much more abstractproposition,orsomethinglike it, is, I believe, in a genuinesense implied by anypropositionandany thoughtat all. I hold similarlythat the validityof the Argument, fit be valid,canonly mean thatthe existence of perfection s nontriviallynecessary,an implicitor more or less hiddeningredientof anyconceptor anybelief whatever. t follows that it must be highly abstract,highlygeneral;and thisconsequenceI acceptandemphasize."29According to Hartshorne, rivial necessity is found in such statements as"bluecheese containsmicroorganisms." his is so, he argues,since althoughcontainingmicroorganisms constitutiveof beingcheese, theremaynot havebeensuchathingascheese or the idea of cheese.Thus,suchstatements s "all


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is claiming that the concept of God necessarilyleads to postulatingGod'sactualexistence. This issue will be discussed ater n section III of thispaper.If by purenecessity,Hartshornemeans (5), then I don't really see whatthe second form of theontological arguments supposed o proveexceptthatthe theisticconcept of God is such that the existence of God is necessarilyconstitutiveof thatconcept. More positively, it does answer the challengeposed by thepositivists, especiallyFindlay,who proclaimed hat the conceptof God and God's existence are logically incoherent.31However,and thisis a big however, both the noting of and the acknowledgementof suchlogical/conceptualcoherencydo not precludea person saying in her heart,"there s no God."Afterall, therejectionof the actualexistenceof anything,be it something logically contingentas cheese, triangle,unicorn, bachelor,etc., or something ogically necessary,be it God, Brahman,BuddhaNature,etc., does not have to be basedupon findingsome internal ncoherence n theconcept.Otherwise,if we were to take Malcolm's and Hartshorne'spoint hereat face value, if we were to accept that it is contradictory o affirm thenecessaryexistence of God at theconceptual evel yet questionGod's actualexistence, then we would have to assert many concepts, insofar as theseconceptspossess necessaryexistence as aninternalcharacteristic, s existingin fact or in reality.These would include the Hindu notion of Brahman,the Confucian/Taoistnotions of Tao, and the Buddhist notion of Buddha-Nature,amongothers.Yet,how manytheists,let aloneChristians,would becomfortablen asserting hatbecauseof thenecessaryexistence of Brahman,for instance, Brahmanis the underlying reality of all that there is? Atheist, especially if she is a student of religions, can sensibly grasp andstate the conceptualnecessaryexistence of Brahman,but at the same timedeny its actualexistence. For the affirmationof the necessaryexistence ofBrahman tems fromdescriptiveanalysisof the concept,while therejection,ordoubtingof it, stems from her own confessionalstance. Thus to recognizethata concept possesses necessaryexistence as one of its internalcharacter-isticsdoes not lead to asserting ts actualexistence.Rather, o understandhatBrahmanhas the necessaryexistence as an internalpropertyof the conceptof Brahmans to understand hat and that alone. A studentof religion,then,cansay,"Hindushold thatBrahman's xistence is necessary,and theconceptof necessaryexistence of Brahman s internallycoherent.But, / do not thinkthatBrahmanexists." These statementsare logically coherent. In a similarmanner,a person can sensibly affirm the necessary existence of God yetrejector questionGod's existence, as in "(Christians old that)God neces-sarilyexists (descriptivegrammar)but it is possible that He does not exist(confessionalgrammar)." ecause Malcolm andHartshorne onflatethe two


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grammars one of descriptionand one of confession), they believe that thestatement hatthey attribute o Kant andCaterus,namely,"Godnecessarilyexists,but it is possiblethat He does not," s fallacious. ThusKantwas right,pace Malcolm and Hartshorne,n makingthe trianglecase analogouswithGod case: Just as havingthree sides cannot be denied when the conceptoftriangleis affirmedbut the whole (the existence of the triangleas well asits properties)can be denied, God's necessaryexistence cannot be deniedinsofaras one sees that t is a constitutiveelementof the conceptof God,butthe whole (GodandGod'sproperties) an be denied.In otherwords, neither Malcolm nor Hartshorneare able to rescue theontologicalargumentrom Kant'scriticismby limiting t to conceptualneces-sary existence. Their failure stems from their not realizing that while theexistence of God is logically necessary for the theist conceptionof God,the conceptof God is itself contingent.32While necessaryexistencebelongsto the concept of God, the concept of God is not itself necessary.Amongotherthings,the conceptof God is limited to anddependenton the practiceof a theisticreligion. As such, a non-practitioner f a theisticreligion cangraspthatnecessaryexistenceis constitutiveof theconceptof a theisticGod,but she may state,"Yes,God necessarilyexists, if God does exist," ust as aChristian tudentof Hinduismor Buddhismcan acknowledgethe necessaryexistence of Brahman r BuddhaNaturewithout heacknowledgement f theactualexistence of BrahmanorBuddhaNature.

IllI have argued thus far that both Malcolm and Hartshorneconfound theconceptual grasp of the necessary existence of God with the confessionalproclamation f the actualexistence of God. While Malcolm seems to sensethe differencebetween the two, Hartshorne sserts that the conceptualgraspnecessarilyleads to God existence in fact or in reality.Let us first look atMalcolm.Malcolm seems to note the difference between conceptual grasp andconfessionalproclamationn the finalparagraph f his essay.He states,

I can imagine an atheist going through the argument,becomingconvinced of its validity, acutely defending it against objections, yetremainingan atheist. The only effect it could have on the fool of thePsalm would be that he stopped saying in his heart "there s no God,"because he would now realize that this is somethinghe cannot mean-ingfully say or think. It is hardlyto be expected that a demonstrativeargument hould,in addition,produce n him a livingfaith.33


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32 H. JONGKIMthe basisof philosophicalreasoning.Rather, egardlessof seeingwhether heconceptmakes sense for her, God, and as such the worshipof God as well,has no place in her life.Moreimportantly,Malcolm'sdiscussions of the fool and the atheistshowthat Malcolm vacillates between asserting(1) thatthe Second Form of theArgumentsimply shows thatconceptualnecessaryexistence is constitutiveof the conceptof God, i.e., the conceptof Godis not self contradictory, nd(2) not only that the concept of God is not contradictory, ut also that theargument hows the actual existence of God. (1) is supportedby Malcolm'sunderstandingof the atheist who is able to see the logical coherence inaffirmingGod's necessaryexistence in the concept of God while rejectingthe actualexistence of God. (2) is supportedby Malcolm'srejectionof theobjectionsraisedby Kant and Caterusas discussedin the section II of thispaper.As seen there,Malcolm wantedto prohibitsuch conditionals as "IfGodexists, he exists necessarily"andsuchconjunctivesas "Godnecessarilyexists but he maynot exist."Malcolm vacillates between these two because he is dissatisfied withaffirming,on the one hand, only (1) and, on the other,both (1) and (2).If he were to simply affirm(1), then, his proof is simply that those whoworshipGod do not commit some logical fallacy.But of course,this wouldbe consistentwith those who say thatunicornsare animalswith one horn.Inbothcases, the actualexistenceis notshown;rather,heonly thingaffirmed sthe internalcoherencyof the concept.However,showingthe internalcoher-ency of the conceptof God is not enoughfor Malcolm.This is seen by hisattempt o respondto Kant's criticism.However, f he affirmsboth (1) and(2), he leaves no room for his atheist, someone who can see the sense ofthe conceptof God, yet rejectGod's actual existence.This contradictshowsome atheistsactuallyare. Thus, throughouthis essay, Malcolm vacillatesbetween (1) and (2), attempting o resolve the problemsin affirmingonly(1) by appealing o (2), and vice versa. Because he does so, his argumentsinherently ontradictory.Let us turn back to Hartshorne.As statedat the beginningof the essay,Hartshorne'sargumentpostulates a strongerthesis than Malcolm's does.Unlike Malcolm, who vacillates between God's necessary existence as alogical concept and as an actuality,Hartshorne laims that his version ofthe argumentactuallyshows the existence of God in reality,albeit whathecalls the 'bare existence.' This claim is due to his understanding f purenecessity in the sense of (6) discussedin sectionII of this paper.Accordingto this definitionof pure necessity,Hartshorne sserts,since God'snecessaryexistenceis aconsequenceof theconceptof God,Godmust exist in fact orinrealityand is the groundof all being and truth.However,unlike Anselm,


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WHATDOESTHESECONDFORM OFTHEONTOLOGICALARGUMENTPROVE? 33

what the argumentshows, accordingto Hartshorne, s the bare existenceof God and not the concrete actual existence of God. (He also calls "bareexistence,""existence;" nd"concreteactualexistence,""actuality.")[Bare]existence,"accordingto Hartshorne,"is that the defined abstractnature ssomehowconcretelyactualized;but how it is actualized, n whatparticularstate,withwhatparticular ontentnot deduciblefrom the abstractdefinition,constitutes he actuality."36hus,he states, "Anselm,rightlycontending hatexistence s deducible rom the definitionof God(assuming hat hedefinitionis conceivable),overlooked the immeasurablegulf between bare existenceandactuality.Actualitycan neverbe deduced,not even in the divinecase."37Hartshorne laims that herearethreeparts o graspinga concept:essence,bareexistence,andactuality.Further,he states,"Eventhe stepfromessenceto existenceis, in the case of creatures, lwaysa contingentone, a questionofwhat the factshappen o be."38But in the case of God,Hartshorne olds, thestepfromhis essence to existence is non-contingent:"His essence or naturemust be actualizedsomehow,in some concrete state or other.But how it isactualized, he concrete stateitself, cannotbe deduced,for,beingricher hananyabstraction,t cannotbe logicallycontained n any."39findthis thesis ofHartshorneo be problematic.The difference between God and other beings/things, according toHartshorne,is that whereas the bare existence of God is necessarilyconstitutive of God, the bare existence of other things/beings,insofar asthey are contingent,is "a questionof what the fact happensto be."40Butthen, how do we determine the contingency of a thing/being?Considersuch concepts/things/beings s cheese, bachelor,and unicorn.AccordingtoHartshorne,we know that these possess contingencybecause it is possibleto imagine them not to be. But, Hartshornedoes not ask the prior ques-tion of how we got knowledge of the essence of these things in the firstplace. Included n the essence of cheese is the notion that it is a fermenteddairy product.Includedin the essence of bachelor is the notion thathe isan unmarriedman. Included n the notion of unicorn is that it is similar tohorsesexceptthat t possesses a horn.Ourknowledgeof fermentation, airyproducts,marriages,males, horses, horns, etc., does not stem simply fromourgraspingthese concepts.Ourgraspof the conceptsof cheese, bachelor,and unicorn, too, does not simply come a priori.Rather,Hume was half-rightin statingthat ourknowledge,be it a priorior a posteriori,stemsfromour experiences.41The other half is that the basis of our knowledgeis notsimplyempiricalexperiencesas Humeasserts,but it also includes the wholeof languagegamesandtheirrelations,as well astheveryform of life inwhichthese language games areplayed.As Wittgensteinstates,we do not learn a


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34 H. JONGKIM

singleaxiom,rathera host of them and theirrelations o the axiom as well asto eachother.Thus, in learningthe essence of cheese, bachelor,or unicorn,one learnstheircontingencyas well as theiractuality. t is the concreteform of life, andbeing raisedand taughtto function withinthat form of life, which informsus of the contingencyof a concept/thing/beingas well as its actuality.Inotherwords,the two stepsthat Hartshorne laimsarenecessary n assessinga concept's actualexistence, a step in showing essence to existence and afurtherstep in showing existence to actuality,are not only gratuitousbutfallacious.There s but one step:Inlearninga concept, n learning o use thatconcept,we havealready earned he answers o thequestionsof theconcept'scontingencyandactuality. did notgaintheknowledgeof thecontingencyofcheese and ts actualityby firstbeing taught he essenceof cheese,thennotingits contingency,andfinally assessingwhether t actuallyexists. Rather, hesequestionswere answered or me intastingcheese, in cuttingcheese, inbuyingcheese,etc.I didn't earn hatunicornsdo notactuallyexist and arecontingentby firstlearningthe definition(essence) of unicorns.Rather,my knowledgeof whatunicorns ook like stem frommy priorknowledgeof whata hornis,what a horse is, etc., and my knowledge of nonexistence of unicorns stemfrommy knowledgeof fablesand make-believe.The same holdsfor theconceptof God.Necessaryexistence n theconceptof God did not arisesimplyapriori.Thatwe conceive Godto be a certainwaystems from the worshipof God,thepracticeof theisticreligionsthemselves.Throughoutboth essays, Hartshorneclaims that we conceive of God (orGod'sbareexistence)asbeing "worshipfully upreme," creator f all things,visible and nvisible,""unsurpassable y another," perfectionn knowledge,""necessary," immutable," independent," withoutparts,""completeonceand for all,""perfect reedom andgoodness,""the sole individualdefinablea priori,"etc. Indeed, correctlyor incorrectly, hese are some of the waystheologyhas definedthe essence of God. But thesetheologicaldefinitionsofGod did not arise from sheerreflection;rather, hey stem from how believersworshippedGod, confessed God as the Most High, the being to whom thehighest glory belongs, etc. But if these characteristics f God areconfessedin the worshipof God, then bare existence andnecessaryexistence arenotdeduced from these characteristics.Rather,God's bare existence and hisactualexistence are confessed alongsideandin connectionwith God'sothercharacteristicsn theworshipof God.Because Hartshornehoughtwronglythat the necessaryexistenceof Godis a result of logical deduction,he held that understandingt leads to theaffirmation f the bare existence of God,thatAnselm "hadrefuted'atheism,'in the sense in which this consists in admitting he logical possibilityof the


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WHATDOESTHESECOND ORMOFTHEONTOLOGICALRGUMENTROVE? 35

divine existence while yet denyingits reality."42 et, if the necessaryexist-ence of God is thatwhich is alreadyconfessedalongsideothercharacteristicsof Godin the worshipof God, in what sense is Hartshorne's econdform ofthe ontological argumentan argument?What does it prove?At best, it canonly show thatin the worshipof God, God's existence is confessed along-side confessions of other characteristics f God without contradiction.Butit cannotprohibit"the fool of the Psalm"from saying, "inhis heart, 'thereis no God,' because he would now realize that this is somethinghe cannotmeaningfully ay orthink,"as Malcolmstates.43Nor is it "Anselm'sgloriousdiscovery" hat "God'sbareexistenceis indeedentirelynecessary,as well asunsurpassable,mmutable,ndependent,"s Hartshorne sserts.44There s nodiscoveryhere;rather, he necessaryexistence of God is simplya confessionof a believer.What then remains of the second form of the ontological argument?Simply that those who worshipGod affirmthat God exists. And, how dotheyhold this? In theirprayers,worship,anddevotion to God. To believe inGod is to assert that God exists. But this is trite, and a truism.Implicitinthe proclamationhat God is "Creator f all things,visible andinvisible" stheproclamationhat God exists. This, of course,is the sense of (1), namelythatnecessaryexistence is constitutiveof the conceptof God. However, ustas a Christianstudentof Hinduism can understand he necessaryexistenceof Brahmanyet deny its reality,so can an atheist or a fool see that God's(necessary)existence is logically consistentwith otherarticles of faith,yetdenyGod'sreality.

AcknowledgementI am indebted o themembersof ClaremontWittgensteinSociety,particularlyPatrickHorn, or theirvariouscontributions o thispaper.Of course,allerrorsaremy own.

Notes1. NormanMalcolm, "Anselm'sOntologicalArguments,"n TheMany Faced Argument,edit, by JohnHick and ArthurC. McGill (New York:Macmillan,1967), pp. 301-320.

CharlesHartshorne, WhatDid Anselm Discover?"and "TheIrreduciblyModalStructureof theArgument"n thesamecollection,pp. 321-333 and334-340. BothHartshorne ndMalcolm acknowledgedthat Anselm may not have distinguishedthe first form of theargument romthis second form.2. The claim thatnecessaryexistence is a propertyof God is not a novel developmentbythese two thinkers. As they recognized,this notion is found as early as in Descartes'


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36 H. JONGKIMdiscussion of theontological argumentHartshorne, WhatDid Anselm Discover?"322).Malcolmactuallycites thepassagefromDescartes:

I do not see to what class of reality you wish to assign existence,nor do I see why itmay not be said to be a propertyas well as omnipotence, akingthe wordpropertyasequivalent o any attributeor anythingwhich can be predicatedof a thing, as in thepresentcase it shouldbe by all meansregarded.Nay,necessaryexistencein the case ofGodis also a trueproperty n the strictestsense of the word,because it belongsto Himand formspartof His essence alone. (HaldaneandRoss, ThePhilosophicalWorks fDescartes,2 vols. (Cambridge,1931),II,p. 228 andquotedby Malcolm,p. 310.)Barth,earlier than these two, also recognizedthe differencebetweenProslogionII andIII. KarlBarth,"Proslogion II:TheSpecialExistence of God," n Hick andMcGill.For athoroughhistorical reatment f theargument nddiscussions on it, see McGill's"RecentDiscussions of Anselm'sArgument"n the same collection.3. D.Z. Phillipsalsonotes a similarpoint.D.Z.Phillips,"SublimeExistence,"n WittgensteinandReligion,GreatBritain:Macmillan, 1993,p. 17.4. By logical or conceptualexistence of God, I mean the conceptof God'sexistencein theconceptof God, whereasby God's actualexistence,I mean God's existence in fact or inreality.Similarcriticism s notedby JohnHicks in "ACritiqueof the 'SecondArgument,'in TheMany Faced Argument edit, by John Hick and ArthurC. McGill (New York:The MacmillanCompany, 1967), pp. 341-356) and by Jerome Shafferin "Existence,Predicationand the OntologicalArgument"in HickandMcGill,242-243.)5. Malcolm articulates t in thefollowingmanner:

If God,a beinga greater hanwhich cannotbe conceived,does not exist then He cannotcome into existence. For if He did He would either have been caused to come intoexistence or have happenedto come into existence, and in either case He would bea limited being, which by our conception of Him He is not. Since He cannot comeinto existence, if he does not exist His existence is impossible. If He does exist Hecannot have come into existence (for the reasons given), nor can He cease to exist,for nothingcould cause Him to cease to exist nor could it just happenthat He ceasedto exist. So if God exists His existence is necessary.Thus God's existence is eitherimpossibleornecessary.It can be the formeronly if theconceptof sucha beingis self-contradictory r in some way logically absurd.Assumingthatthis is not so, it followsthatHe necessarilyexists. (Malcolm,309)

Hartshornetates,To exist necessarily s better than to exist contingently;hence the greatestconceivablebeing can exist only necessarily.Moreover,whatevercould be necessaryis necessary("reduction rinciple"of modallogic);hence to saythatGoddoes not exist necessarilyis to say thathe could not do so, and since he also could not exist contingently, t isto say that he could not exist at all. ... The only logically admissibleway to rejecttheism s to rejecttheveryidea of Godas eithercontradictoryremptyof significance.(Hartshorne, 22)

6. Malcolm,314-315.7. Hartshorne, 248. Malcolmstates,


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WHATDOESTHESECONDFORMOFTHEONTOLOGICALARGUMENTPROVE? 37There s nothingwe shouldwish to describe,seriouslyandliterally,as 'testing'God'sknowledge andpowers.ThatGod is omniscient and omnipotenthas not been deter-minedby theapplicationof criteria: ather hese arerequirements f ourconceptionofHim. Theyareinternalpropertiesof the concept, although hey are also rightlysaidtobe propertiesof God. (Malcolm, 309-310)

9. Malcolm,305.10. Malcolmstates,Necessary existence is a propertyof God in the same sense that necessary omni-potence and necessary omniscienceare His properties. . . The a priori proposition'God necessarilyexists' entails the proposition'God exists,' if and only if the latteralso is understoodas an a priori proposition: n which case, the two propositionsareequivalent. n thissense,Anselm'sproofis a proofof God's existence.(Malcolm, 310)

11. Malcolm,306-307.12. Malcolm,307.13. Malcolm,307.14. RushRhees, OnReligionandPhilosophy,editby D.Z. Phillips (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1997), p. 17. Rhees further eflectsuponMalcolm'susageof necessaryexistence,and states that"Ifyou speakof God as a necessary being, I do not think thishas point or sense except in contrast with the existence of the world - which is thensupposed o be 'contingentexistence.' 'Godis a necessarybeing' is a way of speakingofGod as creator.There are difficulties n talkingabout the contingencyof the world whichare almost as greatas talkingaboutthe necessaryexistence of God. In ordinaryuse thecontrastbetweencontingentand necessaryrefers to events - to what can be predictedandwhat is accidental, or instance." 18) Thedifficultyof talkingaboutthecontingencyof the world is that while it makes sense of talkingabout otherthings being contingent,and hence dependent, t does not make sense to talk about the world in the same way.Forexample,one can talk about when the child was born and the time before,or when acountrywas started,etc., but what would it mean to talk about the time when the worldwas not? Rhees makes animportantpointthat can be easily missed here:he states that tospeakof thenecessarybeing of God is to speakof God as creator.And, to speakof Godas a creator s to speakin the languageof worship.The importanceof this pointwill bediscussedfurtherbelow in connectionwith what it means to state,"there s no God."Asalways,Rhees speakssuccinctlyandclearlywhereI botch and tend to be verbose.15. These are similar o theveryquestionsthat Malcolm claims cannotbe asked aboutGod'sexistence. Hecorrectlynoted that"It s absurd o make God the subjectof suchquestions"as " 'How long has he existed?', 'Will he still exist next week?', 'He was in existenceyesterdaybut how abouttoday?',andso on."(Malcolm, 305) However,givenhis explic-ation of unlimitednessandindependenceof God, these questionsnow can be asked andinevitablyarise.16. Hartshorne, 40.

17. Hartshorne, 26.18. Elsewhere,Hartshornedenies that God sharesobject languagewith otherbeings/things(forexample,see his PhilosophersSpeakof God,amongotherwritings).However, n histwo papersthat discuss this second form of ontological argument,HartshornereatsGodon parwithobjects.19. Malcolm,312.


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38 H.JONGKIM20. Yet, in what sense is Hartshorneusing this possibility of nonexistence? Given thatHartshorne oesnot note the differences n kinds of existenceas Malcolm does andgiventhat his other two modes of existences deal with objects, it is justified to assume thatHartshorneakes the existencein this third ypeof modality n the same sense as his othertwo modalitiesof existence:objects.21. Malcolm,316.22. Ibid.23. Hartshorne, 27.24. Hartshorne, 26.25. Malcolmfurther tates of KantandCaterus,

On the one hand,they agreethat theproposition Godnecessarilyexists' is an a prioritruth;Kantimplies that it is 'absolutelynecessary,'andCaterussays that God's exist-ence is implied by His very name. On the otherhand, they thinkthat it is correct toanalyzethisproposition n such a way that it will entail the proposition'It is possiblethatGod does not exist.' But so far fromits being the case that the proposition'Godnecessarilyexists' entails the proposition'It is possible that God does not exist,' it israther he case that they are incompatiblewith one another!Can anythingbe clearerthan the conjunction'Godnecessarilyexists but it is possible thatHe does not exist'is self-contradictory?s it notjust as plainly self contradictory s the conjunction"Asquarenecessarilyhas four sides but t is possiblefor a squarenot to have four sides'?Inshort,this familiarcriticism of the ontological arguments self-contradictory,ecauseit acceptsboth of two incompatiblepropositions. Malcolm,317)

Here,Malcolm believes that to state"Godnecessarilyexists, but it is possible that Goddoes not exist" is as absurd as statingthat "A square necessarilyhas four sides, but itis possible for a squarenot to have four sides." He thus claims that bothof these sharethe same propositional orm:Np(pv~p). Yet, these two statementsare not analogous.The statementconcerningthe squareand its four sides is a nonsense becauseit affirmsthe internalnecessity and definitionof a square (Np), yet at the same time assertthepossibilityof it not being the case (pv~p). Here,the both sides of the conjunctiveassertthe same sense of p, therebycontradicteach other.Howeverthe statement,"God neces-sarily exists, but it is possible thatGod does not exist,"has two different senses of p,two differentgrammars.The first part,"God necessarilyexists,"is the affirmationofthe internal ogical necessity of the conceptof God. But the second part,"It is possiblethat God does not exist,"is concernedwith the actualexistence, or rather,employmentof confessional grammar.As such, one can state both statementswithoutcommittingacontradiction.26. As quotedby Malcolm,310-311.27. See endnote 27.28. This distinctionbetween God and otherbeingsis theverybasesby whichAnselm refutesGaunilo's infamous Perfect Islandobjection.Both Malcolm and Hartshorne xpandonAnselm's somewhat facetiousreply that"Ican confidently say thatif anyonediscovers

for me somethingexistingeither n fact or at least in thought,otherthan 'that hanwhicha greatercannot be conceived,' and is able to apply the logic of my argument o it, Ishall find that 'Lost Island' for him and shall give it to him as somethingwhich he willnever ose again." ReplyIII)However,my pointhere differs from thatof Gaunilo n thatI am concernedhere withnecessaryconstituentsof existing concepts(suchas nicotineintheconceptof cigaretteor necessaryexistencein theconceptof God) whereasGaunilo's


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WHATDOESTHESECOND ORMOFTHEONTOLOGICALRGUMENTROVE? 39Lost Island,as rejected by Anselm and echoed by Malcolm and Hartshorne,s intern-ally incoherentdue to postulatingnecessaryexistence as being constituentof a concept(Island)that cannotpossess such existence as one of its constituents. n otherwords,(A)that an island mustbe surrounded y water on all its sides is a necessaryconstituentoftheconceptof island;but,(B) an island asbeing necessarilyexistingcannotenter nto theconceptof island because the conceptof islandalreadydenotescontingentexistence.Myexampleof theconceptof cigarettedealswith (A), not (B).

29. Hartshorne, 40.30. Hartshorne, 40.31. J.N. Findlay, "Can God's Existence be Disproved?", n New Essays in PhilosophicalTheology,ed. A.N. Flew andA. Macintyre London: 1955).32. Jerome Shaffernotes a similarpoint by distinguishingbetween intensionand extension.He states,

What lies at the heart of the puzzle about the Ontological Argument s the fact thatour concepts have two quite differentaspects, markedby the familiarphilosophicaldistinctionof intension and extension. A world like "horse"has a particularmeaningand is logically connected with other words like "animal";ts corresponding oncept,theconceptof ahorse,has aparticularontentand s connectedwithotherconcepts iketheconceptof an animal.It is this intensional eatureof words and theircorrespondingconcepts which makes certainassertions ike 'A horse is an animal'tautological.Butwords andconcepts arealso applicable o things.It turnsout to be the case that therehaveexisted,do nowexist, and will exist entities such that t is trueof each of them thatit is a horse, this fact we may express by saying that the word 'horse' or the conceptof a horse has extension.In makingassertionsabout the extension of a concept, therearetypicalforms of expressionwhich we use; ". . . exist,"". . . arenonexistent,"thereare . . .,' 'there are no ... ,' '. . . areplentiful,' '. . . are scarce,' '. . . are extinct,' '. . .are mythological,' '. . . are found in Africa,' etc. that such expressionsare typicallyused in assertionsaboutthe extension(orlackthereof)of particularoncepts s what iscorrectlybroughtout in the slogan,"'exists' is not a predicate."But the typicaluse isnot theonly use. Since anystatement,with suitabledefinition,can be trueby virtueofthemeaningsof theterms,sentenceswith existentialexpressionscan be used to expresstautological tatements.Theverysame sentencewhich is typicallyused to makea claimabout he extension of the concept mayinsteadbe used to make a claim about he inten-sion of the concept. We cannot tell by the form of the expressionhow the expressionis beingused. 'Particularsxist,' when asserted autologically,s used to make a claimabout the meaningof the word 'particulars'and thereforecannot be used to make aclaim about the extension of the term.Similarly, f someone uses the sentence, 'Godexists,'tautologically,he tells us only thatbeingan existent is a logicalrequirementorbeing God. If, on the other hand, someone asserts,"God exists,"nontautologically,then he claims that the term "God" has extension, applies to some existent. In thecase of the OntologicalArgument heonly valid conclusion is anintensionalstatementaboutthe meaningof the conceptof God. A fortiori the conclusion cannotbe aboutwhetheranythingexists to which the concept applies.Theprimafacie plausibilityofthe Argumentcomes fromthe use of a sentence ntensionallywhen typicaluse of thatsentence is extensional. In this way it conceals the illicit move from an intensional oan extensionalstatement"JeromeShaffer,"Existence,Predication nd theOntologicalArgument,"n Hick andMcGill,242-243.)


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40 H. JONGKIM33. NormanMalcolm, "The Second Form of the Ontological Argument,"n Classical andContemporaryReadings in the Philosophyof Religion, edit. By JohnHick (EnglewoodCliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall, nc., 1970), 463.34. This,of course,is Anselm'sunderstanding f the fool. ProslogionIV.35. O.K.Bouwsma,"Anselm'sArgument,"n Without roofor Evidence,ed. And introducedby J.L. Craft: and R.E. Hustwit (Lincoln and London:Universityof NebraskaPress,1984).36. Hartshorne, 29.37. Ibid.38. Ibid.39. Hartshorne, 29-330.40. Hartshorne, 29.41. DavidHume,An EnquiryConcerningHumanUnderstanding,CharlesW. Hendel, edit.,New York:Macmillan,1957.42. Hartshorne, 27.43. Malcolm,320.44. Hartshorne, 31.

what does the second form of the ont arg proof

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