whatever happened to kant's ontological argument (philosophy and phenomenological research, 74.2)

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Whatever Happened to Kant's Ontological Argument? Author(s): Ian Logan Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 74, No. 2 (Mar., 2007), pp. 346-363Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40041047Accessed: 02-07-2015 19:50 UTC

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Whatever Happened to Kant's Ontological Argument? IAN LOGAN

Blackfriars Hall, University of Oxford

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXIV No. 2, March 2007 2007 International Phenomenological Society

Introduction1

In the New Elucidation of 1755, Kant first put forward an argument for the existence of God from the concept of possibility, seeking to demonstrate that it is impossible to think of the non-existence of that which is the ground of the possibility of things.2 He developed this argument further as the only basis for a rigorously viable proof of God in The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God (OPB) of 1763. But when he came to write the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) in 1781, Kant had apparently discarded what he had previously referred to as the one possible proof, and did not include it in the critique of the proofs of God in the Transcendental Dialectic'. The proofs that he did subject to critique in the CPR were those that he had excluded in the OPB from the realm of possible proofs. Kant's own proof is of particular interest, because it represents an 'ontological' or 'ontotheological' argument which is distinct from that of Descartes, and which for Kant does not succumb to his critique of the Cartesian argument. As has been well attested, the subject of this proof evolved from the ens realissimum of Kant's so-called 4pre-critical' thought into the transcendental ideal of

1 My particular thanks are due to Dr M.J. Wood for commenting on more than one version of this paper. I. Kant, A new elucidation of the first principles of metaphysical cognition, in D. Wal- ford (Ed.), Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy 1 755- 1 770, Cambridge 1992, pp. 1-45: "if you deny the existence of God, you instantly abolish not only the entire existence of things but even their inner possibility itself (p. 16); "as soon as you deny the existence of God every concept of possibility vanishes" (p. 17).

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the CPR? The aim of this paper is to uncover what precisely happened to Kant's argument, and to suggest reasons why it evolved the way it did and why it continues to pose problems for Kant's position. My the- sis has four main contentions: (i) that the evolution of Kant's argument was occasioned by a fundamental empiricist shift in his thought, (ii) that this shift was 'pre-critical' and not established or justified by the argument of the CPR, (iii) that as a result Kant could no longer sustain the conclusion of his ontological argument, but (iv) that he was unable to discard this argument, since his account of the transcendental ideal depended on it. Kant was caught on the horns of a dilemma - without this proof he could not establish the subjective necessity of the transcendental ideal, but with it he left the way open for 'pre-critical' metaphysics. For, in its evolved state, the proof depended on the assumption of radical empiricist limitations on our knowledge, i.e., that knowledge "can have no other object than that supplied by experience"4. If any argument such as that put forward by Kant in the OPB is successful, then this assumption is refuted. Such a refutation would have serious consequences for the doctrine of the transcendental ideal and for the whole architectonic of Kant's critical philosophy. To say that any such refutation is not possible, because we cannot have any knowledge out- side of these empiricist limitations, is to beg the question, and it is this, I suggest, that Kant has done.

The argument of this paper is developed in four main stages. Firstly, I consider Kant's own version of the ontological argument in the OPB and the 'pre-critical' basis of his critique of the Cartesian ontological

3 See, for example, J. Schmucker, 'On the development of Kant's transcendental theology' in L. Beck (Ed.), Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress, Dord- recht 1972, pp. 495-500, p. 496: "there has been undoubtedly a real and significant evolution, which proceeds from his famous onto-theological argument in the Nova Dilucidatio of 1755 and in the Beweisgrund of 1763 and terminates in the doctrine of the transcendental ideal." Similar views are expounded in J. Schmucker, Die Onto- theologie des vorkritischen Kant, Berlin 1980; J. Schmucker, Kants vorkritische Kritik der Gottesbeweise: Ein Schlussel zur Interpretation des theologischen Hauptstiicks der transzendentalen Dialektik der 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft', Mainz 1983; R. Dell'Oro, From Existence to the Ideal: Continuity and Development in Kant's Theology, New York 1994; P. Laberge, La Theologie kantienne precritique, Ottowa 1973; G. Sala, Kant und die Frage nach Gott: Gottesbeweise und Gottesbeweiskritik in den Schriften Kants, Berlin/New York 1990.

4 I.Kant, Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, translated by N. Kemp Smith, 2nd impression with corrections, London 1933, A471; B499. (All translations of the CPR in this paper are from Kemp Smith's edition.) Kant continues: "if we trans- cend the limits thus imposed, the synthesis which seeks, independently of experience, new species of knowledge, lacks the substratum of intuition upon which alone it can be exercised." To be more precise "upon which alone it can be exercised" is true iff knowledge is limited to experience. What sounds like an argument justifying Kant's assumption is in fact a restatement of it.

WHATEVER HAPPENED TO KANT'S ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT? 347


argument in the CPR. Secondly, I expose the nature of the empiricist shift that led to Kant's rejection of the objective reality of the conclusion of his ontological argument in the OPB. Thirdly, I detail the evolution of Kant's ontological argument from his early writings to the CPR by way of this empiricist shift. And, fourthly, I examine Kant's implicit 'refutation' of his own ontological argument from possibility in The Transcendental Ideal', and why it is that the critique of the proofs of God in the CPR does not include a critique of Kant's own ontological argument. In conclusion, I discuss the difficulties facing Kant's position in the CPR, arising from the role he is obliged to give his own version of the ontological argument.

1. Kant's ontological argument It is frequently overlooked that Kant's use of the term, 'ontological' and his application of this term to certain proofs for the existence of God predates the CPR.5 This might not be so important, if the issue were 'merely' one of linguistic usage, but in the OPB Kant actually pre- sents an ontological or ontotheological argument, which, he believes, constitutes the singularly effective possibility of the title. Kant's knowledge of the origins of ontological arguments was limited. It is clear, for example, from the lack of any serious discussion of Anselm that Kant was not directly acquainted with his work, and that his view of Anselm's argument as an ontological argument (in the sense of that of Descartes or Leibniz) was based on the reports of others who were lit- tle or no better acquainted with Anselm than Kant himself.6 Kant seems to consider his own argument from possibility as the only alternative to the ontological arguments of Descartes and Leibniz, but he does not establish that this is the case.7 He is assisted in this view by his ignorance of the history of ontological arguments.

5 See, for instance, J. Barnes, The Ontological Argument, London 1972, p. 1. 6 There are, for example, no references to Anselm in Kant's writings prior to the pub-

lication of the CPR. It seems likely that Kant would have noted the reference to Anselm in Wolffs Theologia Naturalis, II, 13, 'Ens perfectissimum possibile est\ in which Wolff puts a Cartesian spin on Anselm's argument, stating that Anselm affirmed that the existence of God is to be inferred from the notion of the most perfect being. In Reflexionen 6214 (dating from the early 1780s) we find a reference to Anselm's Ontotheology (Gesammelte Werke (GW), XVIII, p. 500). There is also a reference to Anselm in the Lectures on the philosophical doctrine of religion (GW, XXVIII, p. 1003). And in 1791 Kant writes of Leibniz as adding to or supplement- ing Anselm's argument (GW, XX, p. 349). But, perhaps, most revealing of Kant's knowledge of the history of ontological arguments is the reference dating from 1794, in which he calls Anselm a Parisian scholastic, who first put forward the argument developed by Descartes and Leibniz (GW, XVIII, p. 782).

7 That Anselm's argument is such an alternative is a view I hold, but will not attempt to justify in this paper.

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In the OPB, Kant argues that "the great truth, that there is a God, must, if it is to be of the highest degree of mathematical certainty, have this property: that it can be achieved in only one way."8 Kant goes on to argue for a particular demonstration, a non-Cartesian ontological argument from possibility, with the consequence for him that all other demonstrations, in this rigorous sense, must fail. Although Kant 'dis- cards', or to put it more accurately does not explicitly treat of, this proof in the CPR, it is clear that he already views all other competing arguments for God, including the Cartesian ontological argument, as doomed to failure. For Kant there could only be one apodictic proof for God. If it is not apodictic it is no proof at all, and as early as the conclusion of the OPB, he already appears unsure of the apodictic force of his argument:9 "Seek the proof here. And if you are not pre- pared to meet it on this ground, turn from this unfamiliar path to the highway of human reason. It is thoroughly necessary that one be con- vinced of God's existence; but it is not nearly so necessary that it be demonstrated."

But, what was the only possible proof of God in the OPB that Kant dismisses without an explicit critique in the CPRV0 At the end of the OPB, having sought to refute the Cartesian ontological as well as the cosmological and physico-theological proofs, Kant states that "experience of contingent things cannot give an adequate argument by which to comprehend the existence of something of which it is impossible that it not be. It is solely in that the denial of divine existence is absolutely nothing that the difference between this [divine] existence and that of other things lies. Internal possibility, the essence of things, is precisely that whose negation cancels all thought."11 It is this characteristic of the proof, that to deny God is not possible, since this would involve a denial of all thought, that constitutes its unique character. For Kant the term, 'demonstration', refers to a particular kind of proof,12 a proof

8 I. Kant, The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God, translation and introduction by G. Treash, Lincoln/London 1994, p. 223. That it can only be achieved in one way1 does not seem an obvious truth to me, but nevertheless, I do not intend to investigate the claim further here, other than to note that this is a useful methodological move, which simplifies the issue of proofs of God, since once you have found one that works, then there is no reason to consider or search out any others.

9 OPB, p. 239. 10 Unlike B. Reardon, Kant as Philosophical Theologian, London 1988, p. 32, I do not

take the view that we "need no longer dwell on Kant's argumentation, therefore, since he himself subsequently dropped it." It seems to me that that is all the more reason for dwelling on it.

11 OPB, pp. 237f. 12 OPB, p. 223.



"with mathematical clarity," i.e., an apodictic proof, of the existence of a supreme and unique being, God. However, as the title of the work suggests, OPB does not present a fully developed version of such a proof, but what he calls the "basis" (Beweisgrund) for it, i.e. "the first strokes of a master plan."13 What he is putting forward is the outline of a proof of God's existence based on the possibility of things. For Kant, if the proof of God is possible, then this is how it must work.

In the OPB, Kant divides the so-called proofs of God into two groups of two:14

A. The 'a priori' proofs that proceed from the concepts of the understanding (the ontological concepts).

1. The proof from the concept of the possible as cause to the existence of God as effect - the Cartesian proof, which treats existence as a predicate.

2. The proof from the concept of the possible as possible to the existence of God as cause of the possible - Kant's own ontotheological proof.

B. The 'a posteriori'15 proofs that proceed from the concept of experience of existing things.

1. From what exists (the world), in so far as it exists, to the existence of a prime/independent cause, God - Wolffs proof from contingence - though this cause is not necessarily to be equated with God. In the CPR Kant refers to this as the cosmological proof.16

2. From what exists, in so far as it possesses certain charac- teristics, to God - the inductive or what Kant refers to in the CPR as the physico-theological proof.17

13 OPB, p. 45. 14 See Sala, 1990, pp. 163f. See also Reardon, 1988, p. 31. 15 The term 'a posterior f should be treated with caution, in so far as Kant regards

these arguments as dependent on the 'ontological argument'. Cf. A638; B666: "all merely speculative proofs in the end bring us always back to one and the same proof, namely, the ontological."

16 A604; B632: "This proof, termed by Leibniz the proofs contingentia mundi,.." 17 Kant refers to this as the cosmological proof in the OPB, p. 233. But the same

argument is defined more precisely as the physico-theological proof in the CPR, A620; B648ff.

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For Kant, A.2. alone counts as a logically rigorous proof, i.e., a demonstration, whilst B.2., lacking "geometric rigour,"18 possesses only a moral certainty, and A.I. and B.I. are false. It is the subject of A. 2., i.e., Kant's own ontotheological argument, that returns under the guise of the transcendental ideal in the CPR.19 As for the three other arguments, in the CPR Kant identifies them as the only possible ways of proving God's existence "by means of speculative reason,"20 and sub- jects them to a critique which is intended to culminate in their refutation. In this way, Kant seeks to establish that no proof of speculative reason is, in fact, achievable. L. Kreimendahl notes Kant's continuing satisfaction with the systematic classification that he employed in his critique of the proofs of God in Part Three of the OPB, and that Kant consequently carried it over with terminological modifications into the 'Ideal of Pure Reason' in the CPR.21 What is distinctive about the critique in the CPR is that the other arguments are made dependent on the Cartesian ontological argument. The refutation of the ontological argument involves the refutation of the other arguments. But the refutation of the ontological argument is the same as the pre-critical refutation in the OPB. At the heart of the Transcendental Dialectic' we find evidence of Kant employing arguments that do not simply arise out of his critical philosophy as it is developed in the Transcendental Ana- lytic', but derive from his so-called 'pre-critical' period. In other words, the refutation of these proofs of God does not have its basis in, and can be understood independently of, the working out of Kant's critical philosophy.

It is in OPB Part 1, Observation 2, that we find the central argument of Kant's proof. In 1, Kant makes what he calls a "necessary distinc- tion" between the formal or logical and the material or real elements of possibility. Something is formally or logically possible in so far as it contains no contradiction. However, in 2 Kant makes it clear that for something to be possible it requires not only formal or logical possibility, but also matter or data for thought, i.e., material or real possibility. Thus, although there is no logical contradiction in the denial of all existence, there is a contradiction in asserting that absolutely nothing exists, but that something is possible. This contradiction arises,

18 But not entirely lacking cogency, pace Reardon, 1988, p. 32, since Kant makes it clear that argument type B.2. "is not only possible, but also worthy of being brought to its proper perfection through concerted efforts" {OPB, p. 231).

19 Sala, 1990, p. 7. 20 A590; B618. 21 L. Kreimendahl, Kant-Index, Band 38: Stellenindex und Konkordanz zu 'Der einzig

mogliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes\ Stuttgart/Bad Canstatt 2003, p. xiii.

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because, according to Kant's notion of material or real possibility there has to be matter or data for thought, and clearly if there is absolutely nothing, there is no such matter or data and accordingly there is no possibility. Three points are worth making at this juncture. Firstly, for Kant the possible is restricted to the thinkable.22 So, only what can be thought, i.e., that to which the rules of thought can be applied, is possible. Whatever restrictions are placed on the thinkable have a similar restricting effect on the possible. Secondly, Kant's notion of possibility is bi-polar. It involves not simply the absence of contradiction, but also the presence of some actuality. Thus, he cannot accept the Cartesian ontological argument, since this only addresses one element of possibility, the logical or formal.23 The third point follows on from the second. For Kant the possible presupposes the actual, thus all possibility has to be derived from something actual either directly (as a determination) or indirectly (as a consequence).24 It is this understanding of the relationship of the possible and the thinkable and the possible and the actual that opens the door to the all-pervading effects of Kant's empiricist shift. For, once the actual is confined to the empirical, then so are the possible and the thinkable.

Kant argues that the "internal possibility of all things presupposes some existence." Although there is no internal contradiction in denying all existence, such a contradiction is found when one tries to assert that there is "some possibility and yet nothing actual." This is because "if nothing exists, nothing conceivable is given and one would contradict himself in nevertheless pretending something to be possible."25 In 3, Kant concludes that it is absolutely impossible that nothing should exist, since "if all existence is denied, all possibility is also abolished." Kant's argument appears to be based on the following steps, which are not explicitly stated: Something exists, therefore something is possible. To attempt to think of a state of affairs in which nothing exists, is to think of a state of affairs in which nothing is possible, but in fact we know that something is actual and consequently that something is possible.

22 For the connection between possibility and thinkability in Kant's proof, see A.W. Wood, Kant's Rational Theology, Ithaca/London 1978, pp. 66ff., esp. p. 66: "Kant begins his proof by distinguishing two kinds of impossibility. A supposition, he says, is 'formally' impossible when its concept is unthinkable because it contains a contradiction. It is 'materially' impossible, however, when it is unthinkable because 'no material, no datum is there to think'."

23 Dell'Oro, 1994, p. 89. 24 See 4- OPB, p. 71. 25 OPB, p. 69.

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In other words, it is impossible (unthinkable) that nothing is possible. Therefore it is impossible (unthinkable) that nothing should exist.26

In Part 1, Observation 3, 1, Kant moves on from the notion that it is impossible that nothing should exist to the positive concept of absolutely necessary existence. There exists something which is "absolutely necessary," since the undeniability of the possible demands this: "if I annul all existence in general and if through that the final real ground of all thought is abolished, then likewise all possibility disappears and there is nothing left to be thought."27 It is in 2, that Kant draws the conclusion that there exists an absolutely necessary being:28 "All possibility presupposes something actual in which and through which everything conceivable is given." Thus there is something whose annulment would annul all (internal) possibility. "But that whose annulment or negation eradicates all possibility is absolutely necessary."29

Of course, establishing that an absolutely necessary something exists is not yet to have demonstrated that God exists.30 In the remainder of Part 1, Observation 3, Kant seeks to show that this absolutely necessary being is unitary, simple, immutable and eternal, containing the highest reality. In the next Observation, he provides the outline of an argument to show that this necessary being is a spirit and concludes that this spirit is "a God," though again he does not intend to go so far as to give "a definite definition of the concept of God here."31 He provides a summary of the nature of his argument: "the ground of proof we give for the existence of God is built simply upon [the fact] that something is possible. Thus it is a proof that may be adduced completely a priori. Neither my existence nor that of other minds nor that of the corporeal world is presupposed."32 But can Kant's proof

26 See G. Oppy, Ontological Arguments and Belief in God, Cambridge 1995, p. 273, for a brief criticism of Kant's argument.

27 OPB, p. 77. 28 OPB, p. 79. 29 Kant appears to make an illicit move here from 'it is necessary that something

exists' to 'a particular thing necessarily exists'. (Cf. Wood, 1978, pp. 70f.) However, our concern is not to defend Kant's argument, but to understand the grounds on which Kant limited its effectiveness to that of a regulative principle.

30 Sala, 1990, p. 1 16 notes that the structure of Kant's proof is thoroughly traditional, and can be found already in the medieval scholastics. The existence of a necessary being (Wesen) is established, then the attributes of this being are worked out, in order to show that this necessary being is God. (Cf. A629; B657.) This thoroughly traditional approach to the proofs points to the weakness Kant finds in the "a posteriori proofs. Without the ontological argument, they cannot even attain to the ens necessarium, let alone God.

31 OPB, p. 91. 32 OPB, p. 95.



from possibility be classified as a priori in this way, since real possibility is derived from the actual? Already we see a tension between Kant's intention of setting out an a priori argument for God in the OPB and his developing (empiricist) understanding of the role of the actual.

For Kant the argument for God's existence is "deduced from the internal possibility of everything conceivable."33 He writes: "if one is to conclude from the concepts of possible things, no argument is possible for the existence of God except the one which regards the internal possibility of things as something presupposing some existence."34 Kant terms this proof "ontological."35

Ernst Cassirer has already identified in Kant's own 'ontological argument' in the OPB a forerunner of the transcendental method that Kant was to develop later.36 It is this transcendental character of Kant's argument that distinguishes his from the Cartesian. (Although it should be noted that Kant at different times refers to both types of argument as transcendental.37) In so far as it is transcendental, Kant's argument proceeds, not by demonstrating "the necessity of God's existence as an immediate consequence of conceiving him as the perfect being,"38 but by demonstrating that the non-existence of that which is absolutely necessary, God, is unthinkable, that God is the ground of the possible (the thinkable), and is not to be derived as a consequence from the possibility of things: "if you take away God, not only all existence of things but even their internal possibility is absolutely abolished."39 For Kant, the significance of his own version of the ontological argument "is that we must affirm the existence of God as the presupposition of all possibility and of all determination."40 In this argument he does not pass immediately from concept to existence, but from the inner possibility of things to "the affirmation of the existence of that which makes possibility itself possible."41 The absolute necessity of "that which makes possibility itself possible" is derived not from analysis of the concept and of the

33 OPB, p. 227. 34 OPB, p. 231. 35 OPB, p. 233. 36 E. Cassirer, Kant's Life and Thought, translated from the German by J. Haden,

New York/London 1981, p. 65: "We have before us essentially a prelude to the transcendental method to come, since the ultimate justification for positing existence in an absolute sense resides in the fact that without this assertion the possibility of knowledge is inconceivable."

37 See Wood, 1978, p. 66 n. 59. 38 OPB, p. 11. 39 F. E. England, Kant's Conception of God, London 1929, p. 50. 40 England, 1929, p. 55. 41 England, 1929, p. 54.

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identification of existence as a perfection or predicate contained in the concept, but from the fact that its non-existence cannot be thought.

Kant soon showed signs of dissatisfaction with his own proof. Thus in the Reflexionen from the mid- to late- 1760s, he called into question the conclusion of his own version of the ontological argument, for the ens realissimum might be a successive series (the World) rather than a single being (God).42 However, he does not develop such objections explicitly in his published works. But not long after the publication of the CPR, he makes clear the precise force that this proof has for him. In the Lectures on the philosophical doctrine of religion (1783/4) he is reported as saying of the OPB argument:43 "Here it was shown that of all possible proofs, the one which affords us the most satisfaction is the argument that if we remove an original being, we at the same time remove the substratum of the possibility of all things. But even this proof is not apodictically certain; for it cannot establish the objective necessity of an original being, but establishes only the subjective necessity of assuming such a being." However, Kant immediately goes on to say that the proof is irrefutable, "because it has its ground in the nature of human reason." As we shall see in the next section, it was Kant's unjustified empiricist assumption that led him to the view that this argument did not establish God's objective necessity. Of course, there may have been other objections available to Kant here, but the point is that Kant did not employ them, since they would put at risk the coherence of his doctrine of the transcendental ideal.

2. Kant's empiricist assumption In the Prolegomena, Kant writes: "I freely admit: it was David Hume's remark that first, many years ago, interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave a completely different direction to my enquiries in the field of speculative philosophy."44 It was not Hume's conclusions, but the question he tackled, that was the cause of Kant's 'awakening'. This was the question of a priori knowledge, and although Kant did not accept Hume's empiricist conclusion, "that all [reason's] ostensibly a priori knowledge is nothing but falsely stamped ordinary experiences,"45 it was

42 Reflexionen, 3795: "nondum constat, utrum maxima realitas in ente compossibilis sit simultaneo vel in serie successive" {GW, XVII, 295.) See Sala, 1990, pp. 202f.

43 I. Kant, Lectures on the philosophical doctrine of religion in A. W. Wood & G. Di Giovanni (Edd.), Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology, Cam- bridge 1996, pp. 335-451, p. 357. {GW, XXVIII, 1034.)

44 I. Kant, Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to present itself as a science, translated from the German by P. Lucas, Manchester 1953, p. 9.

45 Prolegomena, p. 6.

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the Humean insight concerning the problem with a priori knowledge (in particular in relation to cause and effect) that awoke his interest and admiration. Kant, however, took a different direction to Hume. For him, concepts such as that of the connection between cause and effect "have their origin in pure understanding."46 Nevertheless, in spite of Kant's rejection of Hume's empiricism, somewhere along the line (perhaps shortly after 176347), he incorporates a fundamentally empiricist principle into his philosophy. The effect of this is that Kant interprets his own statement of this principle, "Our nature is so constituted that our intuition can never be other than sensible...,"48 in such a way that all knowledge of objects is to be limited to as well as by sense experience.49 It is this 'limited to' that needs to be established, rather than assumed, if Kant is to succeed in the general task he sets himself in the CPR of establishing the illusory nature of speculative thought about God, and the particular task of avoiding opinions and treating anything "which bears any manner of resemblance to an hypothesis" as "contraband."50 As we have seen, the OPB had already opened the door to the devastating effects of Kant's empiricist principle, the roots of which are already to be found in Kant's understanding of the relationship between possibility and thinkability, which meant that "for a reality to be an object of thought it must be instantiated somewhere in an existing thing."51 However, in the OPB, such an existing thing was not yet restricted to the realm of sensibility.

It is interesting to observe how in the CPR Kant seeks to manoeuvre us into sharing his empiricist assumption: "We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge."52 The effect of this Copernican turn is to ensure that all objects are objects of knowledge and that objects of knowledge are limited to objects of experience. By this simple move, objects that are not given to us in experience are defined out of existence. As a consequence, in the 'Postulates of Empirical Thought', Kant is able to conclude: "Our knowledge of the existence of things reaches, then, only so far as per- ception and its advance according to empirical laws can extend. If we

46 Prolegomena, p. 10. 47 See for example Reflexion 3716 (1763/66): "Die metaphysic ist nicht eine philosophie

xiber die obiecten, denn diese konnen nur dm eh die Sinnen gegeben werden, sondern ilber das subiect, nemlieh dessen Vernunftgesetze" (GW, XVII, p. 259.)

48 B75. 49 See Reardon, 1988, p. 42. 50 Axv. 51 Wood, 1978, p. 67. 52 Bxvi.

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do not start from experience, or do not proceed in accordance with laws of the empirical connection of appearances, our guessing or enquiring into the existence of anything will only be an idle pretence."53 But, as Allen Wood points out, even abstract and a priori arguments for God "cannot be dismissed simply by appealing in some vague way to an empiricist epistemology."54 Wood goes on to say that Kant in fact does not follow this route in trying to demonstrate the impossibility of any proof of God's existence: "Instead [Kant] proceeds by divi- ding all possible theistic proofs into kinds, and arguing in each case that no successful proof of that kind can be given." However, there is at least one argument for God, which is excluded from Kant's apparently exhaustive list of all possible proofs in the CPR. Furthermore, it is precisely this proof, which he had previously regarded as the only possible proof in the OPB, that Kant dismisses by appealing to his empiricist assumption, prior to his critique of the proofs of God in the CPR. In the next section we shall see in more detail how Kant's empiricist shift impacted on his ontological argument.

3. Kant's treatment of his own ontological argument in the CPR and the evolution of the ens realissimum into the transcendental ideal

In the CPR Kant reiterates his attack on the Cartesian form of the ontological argument, but does not discuss his own 1763 version of the argument, although he appears to allude to it in one place where he says of the ontological argument that it "contains (in so far as a speculative proof is possible at all) the one possible ground of proof [den einzigmoglichen Beweisgrund\ with which human reason can never dispense."55 However, this one possible proof refers to the argument of Descartes, which he had been discussing a few pages previously. Thus, although we might expect from the OPB that Kant would be referring here to his own non-Cartesian ontological argument, he ignores that argument and is only concerned with that of Descartes. There appears to be a certain disingenuousness on Kant's part here, since he had already determined in the OPB that Descartes' argument was "false and completely impossible."56 He now refers to that argument as the only possible proof, although he has never previously considered it to be such. In this way he is able to exclude his own version of the ontological argument from the critique of the proofs of God, since it no longer belongs to the realm of possible proofs. Furthermore, by stating

53 A226; B273f. 54 Wood, 1978, p. 96. 55 A625; B653. 56 OPB, p. 237.



that the argument of Descartes is the only possible proof Kant has eliminated the need to explicitly refute his own or other versions of the ontological argument, since only one proof is possible.

Kant's treatment of the arguments for the existence of God in the Transcendental Dialectic' is well documented and it is not my intention to add yet another general discussion to this topic. Rather I want to examine the 'guise' under which Kant's own version of the ontological argument is present in his 'critical' work, in order to see whether Kant's position has evolved in such a way as to undermine the argument of the OPB. Certainly, between the production of the OPB and the CPR Kant had undergone a shift in his understanding of the relationship between the necessity involved in judgements about concepts and the necessity in things.57 It was no longer possible from his new perspective for judgements to attain to any existence uncon- strained by sensibility. Existence can never be added to a concept by a judgement in such a way that 'renders' the referent of the concept actual.

The process by which Kant's notion of the 'transcendental ideal' evolved has already been traced clearly in the work of Schmucker, Sala and others.58 This process was virtually complete by the mid- 1760s and is consequently 'pre-critical' in the sense the term is usually employed.59 According to Schmucker,60 the "decisive step" in this evolution is con- nected with a problem left unresolved in the OPB: "how can the material contents of possibilities as a consequence of the supreme infinite Being be given to our thinking, if these possibilities must be conceived as ontologically prior to the actual existence of the things themselves?" In Kant's Reflexionen of the mid- 1760s he resolves this problem: "that the material contents of possibilities may be given to our thinking only in and through the existing things themselves, so that our knowledge of possibilities does not reach further than our knowledge of the objects of experience. This means that practically speaking, possibility is nothing other than a metaphysical dimension of the existing things." As Sala points out, for Kant our concept of what is really possible {vom Realmoglichen) is dependent on experience: "With this new conception of the possible, the basic presupposition of the OPB was abolished."61 Or perhaps, it was not so much abolished as taken in a new, restrictive

57 Cf. A593; B621. 58 See note 2 above. 59 Schmucker, 1972, p. 496. See also Kreimendahl, 2003, p. xiii. 60 Schmucker, 1972, p. 497. 61 Sala, 1990, p. 205: "Mit dieser neuen Auffassung vom Mdglichen war die Grun-

dvoraussetzung des EmBg aufgehoben." (My translation.)

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direction, i.e., the positive, material element of Kant's bi-polar notion of possibility was restricted to the realm of sense experience. Thus, only that which is given in sense experience is possible.

Kant's empiricist shift is tied up with this 'decisive step' in the evolution of the 'transcendental ideal'. For objects of experience constitute the material basis for all our knowledge, whether of principles or of objects, and in the case of objects of knowledge constitute the set of such knowledge. Thus knowledge can only be knowledge of principles or of objects of experience. It is the assumption that Kant adopts in his empiricist shift that allows him to come to the final stage of the development of the 'transcendental ideal', but it is only an assumption.

In 9 of the 1770 Dissertation, Kant articulates this new perspective in the doctrine of the theoretical ideal of pure reason, in which God is not required to be an object, in order to function as a principle.62 In the 'Ideal of Reason' in the CPR, the evolution of the argument from possibility is complete. The ens realissimum is no longer an object of knowledge, "but rather the transcendental representation of an Ideal. That is to say, the Prototypon Transcendent ale is the condition for the representation of all possibility, but it is nevertheless a merely subjective representation."63 What in 1763 was an argument that attained to the ground of things from their possibility, now operates on a purely conceptual level: "It was in this remodelled form, which was at the same time a critique of the earlier ontotheology, that the ens realissimum was absorbed into the main theological section of the CPR."64 Thus, implicit in the development of the transcendental ideal is a refutation of the argument of the OPB, in so far as the latter claimed to have established the objective existence of the ens realissimum. It is to this refutation, which is fraught with dangers for Kant's critical enter- prise, that we shall turn in the next section, for, although he cannot grasp the objective existence of the ens realissimum, he cannot simply discard it.65

62 I. Kant, On the form and principles of the sensible and the intelligible world [Inau- gural Dissertation] (1770), in D. Walford (Ed.), Immanuel Kant: Theoretical philosophy, 1755-1770, Cambridge 1992, p. 388. {GW, II, p. 396.)

63 DeH'Oro, 1994, p. 167. See also W. Rod, Der Gott der reinen Vernunft: Die Auseinandersetzung um den ontologischen Gottesbeweis von Anselm bis Hegel, Munich 1992: "Ein Gottesbeweis mit Hilfe der Annahme objektiver 'Moglichkeiten' la'Pt sich somit nicht mehr fuhren" (p. 133).

64 Sala, 1990, 209: '7/7 dieser Form, die eine Umgestaltung und zugleich eine Kritik der fruheren Ontotheologie ist, wurde dann die Ableitung des ens realissimum in das theo- logische Hauptstuck der KrV aufgenommen." (My translation.)

65 See Sala, 1990, p. 213: "Wir brauchen ihn, ko'nnen ihn aber nicht einsehen"



4. The 'refutation' of Kant's ontological argument In the section on the Transcendental Ideal' Kant reiterates a version of the proof from possibility. But on this occasion he does so to help explain the illusion by which "we treat the empirical principle of our concepts of the possibility of things, viewed as appearances, as being a transcendental principle of the possibility of things in general." This illusion arises because we omit the fact that it is only objects of the senses that can be given to us "in the context of a possible experience."66 However, it is not clear why we should accept that no objects "besides those of the senses" could be given to us (even if we should accept that they must be given in the context of possible experience). This is precisely the point to be established if Kant's 'refutation' of his own ontological argument is to work.

Kant had raised the question: "how does it happen that reason regards all possibility of things as derived from one single fundamental possibility, namely, that of the highest reality, and thereupon presupposes this to be contained in an individual primordial being?"67 In other words how was he able to come to the conclusion of his own ontological argument? He placed his answer firmly in the context of "the possibility of the objects of the senses". In that context it is reasonable to limit knowledge to objects of the senses, and thus to come to the conclusion that his argument ends in an illusion. But in order to establish that it is an illusion he has to establish that the context of the possibility of the objects of the senses is the only possible context, and that the possibility of objects, which are not limited to the senses, must be excluded. But once again, we have to say that this is the point at issue. If we are to capture this point, then we should render Kant's argument thus: 'If no other objects, besides those of the senses, can, as a matter of fact, be given to us, then nothing is an object for us, unless it presupposes the sum of all empirical reality as the condition of its possibility'. The success of Kant's 'refutation' of his own version of the ontological argument is dependent on his empiricist assumption. But he fails to establish this assumption, and consequently it is to be regarded as dogmatic: "But when empiricism itself, as frequently happens, becomes dogmatic in its attitude towards ideas, and confidently denies whatever lies beyond the sphere of its intuitive knowledge, it betrays the same lack of modesty...."68 This assumption is an hypothetical, and as Kant himself says in the Preface to the first edition of the CPR:M

66 A582; B610. 67 A581; B609. 68 A471; B499. 69 Axv.

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"Everything, therefore, which bears any manner of resemblance to an hypothesis is to be treated as contraband."

The importance of the passage on the transcendental ideal, with its implicit or indirect attempt at a refutation of the argument of the OPB, is easily missed. Thus Kemp Smith appears somewhat bemused by it and 'absolves' the reader "from the thankless task of attempting to render Kant's argumentation in these paragraphs consistent with itself,"70 apparently unaware of the Kantian basis of this argument, believing rather that it derives from Wolff and Baumgarten. A failure on the part of this refutation undermines the notion that the arguments in the succeeding sections constitute the "only three possible ways of proving the existence of God by means of speculative reason"71 or that the Cartesian ontological argument "contains (in so far as a speculative proof is possible at all) the one possible ground of proof with which human reason can never dispense."72 The whole project of the Trans- cendental Dialectic as Kant envisaged it falls apart if Kant is unable to provide a non-hypothetical foundation for his empiricist principle, since his rejection of the constitutive nature of the ens realissimum is dependent on it. And without that rejection, 4pre-critical' metaphysics remains potentially viable. Of course, it might be possible to refute Kant's ontological argument on other grounds. But any such refutation would potentially leave the argument of the Transcendental Dialectic in disarray, since it would undermine the coherence of the notion of the ens realissimum and hence the coherence of the notion of the transcendental ideal.

Conclusion In the New Elucidation and the OPB, Kant developed an ontological proof of God as the ens realissimum and a refutation of other proofs, including that of Descartes. Soon after completing the OPB, in the mid- 1760s, a decisive development took place in Kant's thought, the door to which was opened in the OPB, and which I have referred to as his empiricist shift. Objects are objects of experience, and knowledge of objects is limited by and to sense experience. The kind of reasoning Kant had employed in the OPB could no longer be understood as able to grasp objective reality, since such reality could only be grasped in and by sense experience. As a consequence, by the time of the 1770 Dissertation, Kant had developed the notion of the transcendental

70 N. Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason', 2nd ed., revised and enlarged, Atlantic Heights, N.J., 1962, p. 525.

71 A590; B618. 72 A625; B653.



ideal, which could account for the necessity in thought of what the old, dogmatic metaphysics took to be God, in terms of a subjective necessity governing the possibility of thought. The ens realissimum had evolved from a constitutive object to a regulative idea. In the CPR, in place of the proof of the objective existence of the ens realissimum, we find an argument concerning the subjective necessity of the transcendental ideal. In the CPR Kant incorporated his critique of the Cartes- ian ontological argument, but did not provide an explicit refutation of his own version of the argument. The requirement for such a refutation, Kant appears to have assumed, was vitiated by the introduction of the transcendental ideal in the Transcendental Dialectic', the argument of which derives from his earlier thought and is independent of the argument of the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic.

Kant's refusal to give constitutive, rather than merely regulative, sub- stance to what in the CPR had become the transcendental ideal was based on his empiricist assumption. This assumption was the 'dogmatic' basis of his 'refutation' of his own non-Cartesian ontological argument in The Ideal of Pure Reason'. Unless he can successfully provide a refutation of such ontological arguments, he is unable to justify (1) this assumption and (2) the claim that the Cartesian ontological argument constitutes "the only possible ground of proof of God,73 whose refutation undermines all other proofs of God. With regard to (1), it would constitute no serious argument on behalf of Kant to say that an ontological argument cannot be sound, because all metaphysical arguments are limited to and by experience, since this is the point at issue. With regard to (2), it would seem that Kant avoids attempting a direct refutation of his own ontological argument, precisely because he needs it to establish the coherence of the notion of the transcendental ideal. In fact, as we saw above, he continued to state that it was "irrefutable", even after he had written the CPR. As a result, he fails to provide a compre- hensive and successful refutation of the proofs of God in the CPR.

In sum, the answer to the question, 'Whatever happened to Kant's ontological argument?' is that, caught on the horns of a dilemma,74 Kant both sought to discard this proof of the objective existence of God, since knowledge cannot grasp that which is beyond sense

73 A625; B653. 74 The precise nature of the dilemma can perhaps be best expressed in terms of the

following argument: If Kant refutes his own ontological argument, then the necessity of the transcendental ideal is not established, and the basis of his critique of theology is undermined. If Kant does not refute his own ontological argument, then his empiricist assumption is not established, and the basis of his critique of theology is undermined. Kant either does or does not refute his own ontological argument. Therefore, the basis of his critique of theology is undermined.

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experience, and to retain it, in order to support the notion of the transcendental ideal. However, he failed to provide a critical justification for either move, and one must consequently conclude that the foun- dations of his critique of theology were fundamentally flawed.



Article Contentsp. 346p. 347p. 348p. 349p. 350p. 351p. 352p. 353p. 354p. 355p. 356p. 357p. 358p. 359p. 360p. 361p. 362p. 363

Issue Table of ContentsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 74, No. 2 (Mar., 2007) pp. 275-528Front MatterHow Indirect Can Indirect Utilitarianism Be? [pp. 275-301]Constructivism about Practical Reasons [pp. 302-325]A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman's Paradox [pp. 326-345]Whatever Happened to Kant's Ontological Argument? [pp. 346-363]Conceivability, Imagination and Modal Knowledge [pp. 364-380]McDowell and the New Evil Genius [pp. 381-396]On Williamson's Argument for (${\rm{I}}_i$) in His Anti-Luminosity Argument[pp. 397-405]DiscussionsOn 'Facts Revisited' [pp. 406-412]Can We Say More about Factual Discourse? [pp. 413-420]

Book SymposiumPrcis of "Inference to the Best Explanation", 2nd Edition [pp. 421-423]Inference to the Only Explanation [pp. 424-432]The Lovely and the Probable [pp. 433-440]The Fine Structure of Inference to the Best Explanation [pp. 441-448]Replies [pp. 449-462]

Review EssaysReview Essay on "The Reasons of Love" [pp. 463-475]The Return of the "Tabula Rasa" [pp. 476-497]Review Essay on Jonathan Kvanvig's "The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding" [pp. 498-514]

Critical NoticesReview: untitled [pp. 515-518]Review: untitled [pp. 518-523]Review: untitled [pp. 523-526]

Recent Publications [pp. 527-528]Back Matter

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