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WhitePaperonInfluenceinanAgeofRisingConnectedness

AStrategicMultilayerAssessment(SMA)PeriodicPublication

August2017

Contributing Authors: Brig. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich (Deputy Director Global Operations, Joint Staff),Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI), David Broniatowski (George Washington University), Hriar “Doc”Cabayan (Joint Staff, J-39, Strategic Multilayer Assessment), Erik Dahl (Naval Postgraduate School),Charles Eassa (Strategic Capabilities Office), Bill Edwards (Special Operations Northern Command),Robert Elder (George Mason University), James Giordano (Georgetown University), Gia Harrigan(DepartmentofHomelandSecurity, ScienceandTechnologyDirectorate),Regina Joseph (Pytho),GinaLigon (University of Nebraska, Omaha), Corey Lofdahl (Systems of Systems Analytics), Ian McCulloh(Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Lab), Spencer Meredith III (National Defense University),Christophe Morin (Fielding University), Brad Morrison (University of British Columbia), TimothyMoughon (National Counterterrorism Center), Chris Paul (RAND), Valerie Reyna (Cornell University),Nawar Shora (Transportation Security Administration), Val Sitterle (Georgia Tech Research Institute),PeterSuedfeld(UniversityofBritishColumbia),ScottThomson(OfficeoftheUnderSecretaryofDefenseforPolicy),RobertToguchi(USSpecialOperationsCommand),ToddVeazie(NationalCounterterrorismCenter),NicholasWright(UniversityofBirmingham,UK)ExecutiveEditors:WestonAviles&SarahCanna(NSI),[email protected]:SamRhem(SRC)

StrategicMultilayerAssessment(SMA)PeriodicPublication

Thiswhitepaperrepresentstheviewsandopinionsofthecontributingauthors.

ThiswhitepaperdoesnotrepresentofficialUSGpolicyorposition.

Thiswhitepaperisapprovedforpublicreleasewithunlimiteddistribution.


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TableofContentsPreface–Brig.Gen.AlexusG.Grynkewich,DeputyDirector,GlobalOperations,JointStaff ........ 3

ExecutiveSummary:WhitePaperonInfluenceinanAgeofRisingConnectedness–Dr.HriarS.Cabayan,JointStaffJ-39 .................................................................................................................. 5

Chapter1:APeekIntotheFuture:AStealthRevolutionbyInfluence’sNewMasters-Ms.ReginaJoseph,NewYorkUniversity ............................................................................................. 10

Chapter2:FromConceptstoCapabilities:ImplicationsfortheOPSCommunity-LtGeneral(Ret)Dr.RobertJ.Elder .......................................................................................................................... 17

Chapter3:NetAssessment:ImplicationsforHomelandSecurity–Dr.GinaLigon,UniversityofNebraska,Omaha .......................................................................................................................... 21Chapter4:FromFailuretoSuccess:InformationPowerandParadigmaticShiftsinStrategyandOperationalArt-LTC(P)ScottK.Thomson,OSD(Policy) .............................................................. 24Chapter5:RethinkingControlandInfluenceintheAgeofComplexGeopoliticalSystems-COL(R)CharlesEassa,SCO,Dr.ValerieSitterle,GTRI,Dr.RobertToguchi,USASOC,Dr.NicholasWright,UniversityofBirmingham ................................................................................................. 31

Chapter6:MetaphorforaNewAge:Emergence,Co-evolution,Complexity,orSomethingElse?-Dr.AllisonAstorino-Courtois,NSI,Dr.ValerieSitterle,GTRI,Dr.CoreyLofdahl,SoSA,CAPT(Ret)ToddVeazie,NCTC ................................................................................................................ 37

Chapter7:Don’tShortchangeDefenseEffortstoInform,Influence,andPersuade-Dr.ChristopherPaul,RAND ................................................................................................................. 43Chapter8:OperationalizingtheSocialBattlefield–Dr.SpencerMeredithIII ............................. 46

Chapter9:RethinkingControlandInfluenceintheAgeofComplexGeopoliticalSystems-Dr.NicholasD.Wright,UniversityofBirmingham,UK ....................................................................... 49

Chapter10:Evidence-basedPrinciplesofInfluence-Dr.NicholasWright,UniversityofBirmingham ................................................................................................................................... 54

Chapter11:NeuroscienceandTechnologyasWeaponsonthe21stCenturyWorldStage-Dr.JamesGiordano,GeorgetownUniversity ...................................................................................... 58

Chapter12:TheNeurocognitiveScienceofPersuasion–Dr.ChristopheMorin,FieldingGraduateUniversity ....................................................................................................................... 66

Chapter13:AScientificApproachtoCombatingMisinformationandDisinformationOnline-Dr.DavidA.Broniatowski,GeorgeWashingtonUniversityandDr.ValerieF.Reyna,CornellUniversity ....................................................................................................................................... 74

Chapter14:NeuralInfluenceandBehaviorChange-Dr.IanMcCulloh,JohnsHopkinsUniversity ....................................................................................................................................................... 82Chapter15:TheRoleofIntegrativeComplexityinForecastingandInfluence-Dr.PeterSuedfeldandMr.BradfordH.Morrison,UniversityofBritishColumbia .................................................... 88


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AppendixA:AuthorBiographies ................................................................................................... 93

Preface–Brig.Gen.AlexusG.Grynkewich,DeputyDirector,GlobalOperations,JointStaffIn the pluralized, multipolar world, in which military and economic sources of power are widelydistributedandtechnologiesaremakingnationstatesincreasinglymoreporous,theUSanditspartnersfacesignificantchallengesonhowbesttoadaptandthriveinaperiodofrevolutionarychanges.ThesefactorsmaychangethewayUSanalysts,planners,andoperatorsevaluateapproachesinordertoaffectanddirecttheoutcomesofmilitaryoperations.Todate,suchcoursesofactionstoalargeextendhavefocused on compelling adversaries through the threat or application of force to achieve victory (i.e.,“control”).Inthischanginggeopolitical/technicallandscape,itisincreasinglyclearthattheDODneedscomplement“control”withanexplicit focusupon“influence” factorsandforces thatproducedesiredbehavioraloutcomesacrosscomplexandintermeshedhumanandtechnicalsystems.The articles in this white paper explore and present possible implications for how such changinggeopoliticalandtechnicalfactorsmaynecessitateanexplicitfocusupon“influence,”andhowinfluencecould exert effects on national, regional, and global levels over the next several decades. It assessestheserevolutionarychangesfrompolitical,sociological,biological,cognitive,andtechnicalperspectives.Thearticlesmakeinferencesthathaveclearimplicationstotheoperationalandplanningcommunities.There are some key observations derived from these white papers that have clear implications foroperationalplanning,namely:

- Today’snationalandmilitaryleadershavegrownupinanenvironmentwheretheobjectivewasto defeat the adversary. In today’s environment, preserving stability may be an even moreimportantsubject.Ourcompetitorsunderstandourdesiretowin,and—asinagameofchess—canusethatknowledgetomaneuverus intoastalematesituation.WeneedtosetobjectivesthatallowtheUnitedStatestowininasituationthatappearstobeadraw.

- Strategy is inherently about changing the behavior of relevant actors in support of national

interests.Thismeans informationmustbeaprimaryplanningconsiderationforthe jointforceratherthananenablingcapability.Tobetterlinktacticstostrategy,thejointforcemustchangebothitsoperationalartanditsculturalmindsettofocusonbehavioraloutcomes.

- Capabilitiestoinform,influence,andpersuadearenecessarybothfornationalsecuritysuccessandasacost-effectivetoolsetrelativetophysicalmilitarypower.

- Influence and control are two ways to exert power over others’ decisions, where control

removesanactor’sability tochoose. Influence is critical inconflicts suchas those in theGrayZone, whose limited nature leaves adversaries and allies able to choose. Influence requiresplannerstofocusonthreekeyaspects:(1)usingmorerealisticaccountsofhumanmotivation;(2) focusing on areas of particular human cognitive bias as a source of low-hanging fruit forperformance improvement; and finally (3) using tried and tested tools and techniques fromotherfieldstomakeevidenceavailableinusableformsforoperators.


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- Control is dependent on actual or at least perceived power—political, economic, military,

demographic,andother. Influence is theproductofanevenmorevariedandchangingsetofvariables.Thecriteriathatdefinetheprobabilityofsuccess inexertingorcounteringinfluencemust includetwofactors:accuracyinassessingthepossiblestepsofanadversaryandshapingpersuasivecommunicationssoastoadvanceone’sownpositionandreducethepoweroftheopponent’s.

- Neurocognitive science is providing increasinglymore detailed understanding of processes of

influence, decision-making, and behavioral action. Understanding thesemechanisms enablesgreatercapacitytodeveloptechniquesandtoolsthatcanbeusedtoaccess,assess,andtargetthe ways and extent that thought and emotion can elicit and/or mitigate certain types ofbehavior.

- Combatingmisinformationanddisinformationonlinewillrequireascientificapproachgrounded

inempiricallyvalidatedtheory.Itisnecessarilyinterdisciplinary,requiringinsightsfromdecisionscience,computerscience,thesocialsciences,andsystemsintegration.

- Militarycommandersandseniorleadersmusthaveabasicunderstandingofcognitiveinfluence

inordertomakedecisionsaffectingtheGrayZoneandhumanpopulationsinareasofongoingmilitaryoperations.SuccessduringGrayZoneoperations requirescommanders tounderstandinfluenceandemploymodelsofbehavioral change in the samemanner that theyunderstandtheelementsofpatrollingandemploykineticpower.

Thewhitepaperisacompilationofcontributionsonthistopicthathavebeensynthesizedtoreflectandbuildofftheinsightsofoneanother.


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Executive Summary: White Paper on Influence in an Age of RisingConnectedness–Dr.HriarS.Cabayan,JointStaffJ-39

HriarS.Cabayan,Ph.D.JointStaffJ-39

[email protected]

A strong argument can bemade thatwe aremoving toward a pluralized,multipolarworld, inwhichmilitary and economic sources of power are widely distributed. Technologies (e.g., the Internet andrapidmeansofmassmigration)aremakingnationstatesincreasinglymoreporous,andaresurgenceofnationalism and other forms of ethnic or religious identity politics has solidified some states andweakened others. Given these properties of human development, the question remains as to hownations and societies position themselves to ride these revolutionary changes with some degree ofconfidence. The continuance of these factors may change the way that the US, its partners, and itsadversaries considerandprioritize influence,bothwithin the stateandacross interstateborders. TheDOD is evolving in ways that demanda more synergistic approach than we have traditionally takenacrossthehumanandtechnicaldimensions.Todate,militaryoperationshavecharacteristicallyfocusedoncompellingadversariesthroughthethreatorapplicationofforcetoachievevictory(i.e.“control”).Changingenvironmentalfactors,increasedactivismbynon-stateactors,technology,andrecentlessonslearned suggest that theDODwill be challenged to adopt revised, if not entirely newapproaches, toaffect anddirect theoutcomesofmilitaryoperations. Toward suchends, theDODwill need to focusuponthefactorsandforcesthatexertthenecessaryinfluencetoproducedesiredbehavioraloutcomesacrosscomplexandintermeshedhumanandtechnicalsystems.Thiswhitepaperexaminesthesetrendsandexploresandpresentspossible implications forhowsuchfactors may necessitate an explicit focus upon “influence” rather than “control,” and how influencecould exert effects on national, regional, and global levels over the next several decades. It assessestheserevolutionarychangesfrompolitical,sociological,biological,andtechnicalperspectives.In her opening chapter, Ms. Regina Joseph (NYU) examines the coming tests of preserving nationalsecurity through influence. She reviews the domestic information environment, where corporateinterestsgenerateaconfluenceofcontentandaccessbarriers,andobservestheglobalinfluenceeffortsthatwillcontinuetobuffetsociety.Whiledifficult, resiliencemaybecultivatedthroughanoffsetthatharnessesWesternattitudestowardsinformation,education,andcultivationofsuper-synthesizers.Shegoeson to say that toenvision the future, a forecastermay first look to thepast in aneffort to findsignalsanddetectpatterns.Inthefollowingchapterentitled“FromConceptstoCapabilities:ImplicationsfortheOPSCommunity,”LtGeneral(Ret)RobertJ.Elder(GeorgeMasonUniversity)examinestheimplicationsofthechangesinoursecurityenvironment,considersthewaysthatdifferentinternationalactorsarecapitalizingonthesechanges,andreflectsontheirimplicationsfortheUnitedStatesandourpartners.Henotesthattoday’snational andmilitary leadershavegrownup inanenvironmentwhere the strategicmilitaryobjectivehasbeentodefeattheadversary,butintoday’senvironment,restoringorpreservingstabilityhasoftenbecometheprimarystrategicobjective. CompetitorsunderstandtheU.S.desire towin,and leveragethatagainstusbyemployinga "don't lose" strategy. Theyconsideradrawtobeawinbecause theyhave prevented the U.S. from winning, and like Tic-Tac-Toe, they just wait for the U.S. to make a


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mistake.ThissuggeststhatemployingwholeofgovernmentandpartnercapabilitiestoadvanceoverallU.S.nationalinterests,evenifitdoesnotleadtoamilitary"win,"maybeapreferablestrategy,andonethatnational security leaders shouldpromote. Drawsarenot inournature--winning is theAmericanWay-- but if a competitor is playing for amilitary draw, then defeating the competitor's strategy byemployingacomprehensiveapproachtopromotestabilitymaybeinournationalinterest.In the followingarticle entitled “NetAssessment: Implications forHomelandSecurity,”Dr.Gina Ligon(University of Nebraska Omaha), Ms. Gia Harrigan (Department of Homeland Security, Science andTechnologyDirectorate,OfficeofUniversityPrograms),Dr.ErikDahl (NavalPostgraduateSchool),Mr.Timothy N. Moughon (National Counterterrorism Center), Colonel Bill Edwards (Special OperationsNorthernCommand), andNawar Shora (Transportation SecurityAdministration) examine implicationsfromahomelandsecurityperspective.Theyaddresstheissueofhownetassessment—thepracticeofconsidering how strategic interactions between the United States, adversaries, and the environmentmay play out in the future—may be adopted to advance homeland security (especially as related tothreats that emerge outside the homeland). In this chapter with contributors from government andacademia, implicationsofusinganetassessmentapproachtounderstand influence isdiscussed.Theydetail theoverarching framework fornetassessments. They then review theapproach fromNCTConmeasuringpowerandthecriticalityofassessing“GreenActors.”Theyconcludebyhighlightingsomeofthe challenges faced by Blue Network, as well as how net assessments can provide greater sharedunderstanding of emerging threats to homeland security by incorporating planning for threats,capabilities,andlegitimacy.

Next in a chapter entitled "From Failure to Success: Information Power and Paradigmatic Shifts inStrategy and Operational Art," LTC Scott Thomson (Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy),InformationOperationsDirectorate)takestheargumenttothenextstepandexaminestheunderlyingassumptions about war, warfare, and other military operations within the DOD, which traditionallyfocuses on lethal dominance. Hemakes the argument that strategy is inherently about changing thebehaviorofrelevantactorsinsupportofnationalinterests.Thismeansinformationmustbeaprimaryplanning consideration for the joint force rather than an enabling capability. To better link tactics tostrategy, the joint force must change both its operational art and its cultural mindset to focus onbehavioraloutcomes.Heconcludesbystatingthattoshiftourdominantparadigmwilltakeaconcertedeffortanddirectionbyseniorleaderswithinthedepartment.Thedepartmentmustrealizethatwhileitlookstoimproveinformationalcapabilities,itismoreimportanttofirstmodifytheoperatingsystemofthejointforcesothatitcanrealizethefullpowerofinformationtoachievestrategy.Next in their chapter entitled “Rethinking Control and Influence in the Age of Complex GeopoliticalSystems,”Dr.ValSitterle(GTRI),COL(ret)ChuckEassa(StrategicCapabilityOffice),Dr.RobertToguchi(USASOC),andDr.NickWright (Univ.ofBirmingham) in linewithLTCScottThompson’schaptermakethecasethatthefutureofconflictfacingtheDODisevolving inwaysthatdemandamoresynergisticapproachthanwehavetraditionallytakenacrossthehumanandtechnicaldimensions.Todate,militaryoperationshavecharacteristically focusedoncompellingadversaries throughthethreatorapplicationof force to achieve victory (i.e., “control”). Changing environmental factors, increased activism bynonstate actors, technology, and recent lessons learned suggest that the DOD will be challenged toadoptrevised,ifnotentirelynewapproachestoaffectanddirecttheoutcomesofmilitaryoperations.Toward such ends, the DODwill need to focus upon the factors and forces that exert the necessaryinfluence to produce desired behavioral outcomes across complex and intermeshed human andtechnicalsystems.


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In the following chapter entitled “Metaphor for aNewAge: Emergence, Co-evolution, Complexity, orSomethingElse?”Dr.ValSitterle(GTRI),Dr.AllisonAstorino-Courtois(NSI),Dr.CoreyLofdahl(SystemofSystems Analytics), and CAPT (ret) Todd Veazie locate these challenges in the context of complexadaptivesystemsparadigm.Theyask,asglobalizationandsociotechnicalconvergencecollidewiththecontinuing evolution of the post-Cold War security environment, do we know the appropriatemetaphorstodescribeourworld?Ourenvironmentisnowcharacterizedbynon-uniformityandstarts,stops,andleapsacrossordersofmagnitudeandacrossgeographicalareasandsocio-economic-politicalsectors.Theyaskhowthelensesthroughwhichweviewanddrawconclusionsaboutvariousaspectsofthe world and the behaviors within it change and what can we perceive and, hence, act upon?Understanding the nature of paradigms and howwe use them to provide insight in the US Defensecommunityiscriticaltohowwellwemayfacefuturesecuritychallenges.In his chapter entitled “Don’t Shortchange Defense Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade,” Dr.ChristopherPaul(RAND)arguesthatcapabilitiestoinform,influence,andpersuadearenecessarybothfor national security success and as a cost-effective toolset relative to physical military power. Hediscusses shortfalls and deficiencies in this area and concludes with recommendations to increaseresources for manning and tools for informing, influencing, and persuading, as well as efforts toinculcatecommunicationmindednessincommandersandseniorleaders.In his chapter entitled “Operationalizing the Social Battlefield,” Dr. Spencer Meredith III (NationalDefenseUniversity)arguesthediffusionofinfluencefromtraditionalelitestobroaderandmorediversesourceshas raisedchallenges for theUnitedStates,butnot inherent risksby itself. The toolsused tomobilize individuals and groups within society have for some time existed across a spectrum ofindustries, academic disciplines, and ultimately, government actions. As such, while the ubiquity ofinfluencehasratchetedup inrecentyears, ithasnot fundamentallyalteredwhocanbe influencedorthemeansofdoingso.EvaluatinghowthesephenomenaaffecttheJointForceCommander’srangeofoptions and,more importantly, strategic paradigms onways,means, and ends,must include severalelements.Theseincludegovernance,mobilizationpotential,andnarrativelandscapes.Inthesubsequentseveralchapters,thereaderisexposedtotheneuro-cognitiveaspectsofcontrolandinfluence.InthefirsttwoChapters,Dr.NickWright(UniversityofBirmingham)encouragesthereadertorethinkcontrolandinfluence.Hestatesattheoutsetthatinfluenceandcontrolaretwowaystoexertpoweroverothers’decisions,wherecontrolremovesanaudience’sabilitytochoose.Influenceiscriticalinconflicts suchas those in theGrayZone,whose limitednature leavesadversariesandalliesable tochoose.Heconcludesbystatingmanyaspectsofinfluenceandcontroldonotneedrethinking.Hegoesontoencouragethereadertofocusonthreekeyaspectsofinfluence:(1)usingmorerealisticaccountsof human motivation, (2) focusing on areas of particular human cognitive bias as a source of low-hangingfruitforperformanceimprovement,andfinally(3)usingtriedandtestedtoolsandtechniquesfromotherfields(e.g.,medicine)tomakeevidenceavailableinusableformsforoperators.Inthefollowingchapterentitled“EvidenceBasedPrinciplesofInfluence,”Dr.Wrightstressestheneedfor scientific approaches (i.e., what dowe know, and how canwe know it?). He advances three keyconsiderations:First,thereadershouldbeawareofthereplicationcrisisinthescientificliteratureinthisarea. Second, in order to accumulate robust scientific knowledge about the factors that influencepeople,thereaderneedstofocusonempiricalfindings.Finally,thereisalevel-of-analysisproblem.Toconsiderinfluenceandpersuasion,youhavetothinkaboutmultiplelevelssimultaneously.


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In the following chapter, Dr. James Giordano (Georgetown) in an article titled “Neuroscience andTechnologyasWeaponson theTwenty-FirstCenturyWorld Stage”makes the case thatneuroscienceand neurotechnologies (neuroS/T) can be used as (1) “soft” weapons to foster power, which can beleveragedthroughexertionofeffectsuponglobalmarketstoimpactnationstatesandpeopleaswellasto provide information and tools to more capably affect human psychology in engagements of andbetweenagents and actors; and (2) “hard” (e.g., chemical, biological, and/or technological)weapons:includingpharmacologicalandmicrobiologicalagents,organictoxins,devicesthatalterfunctionsofthenervoussystemtoaffectthought,emotionandbehaviors,anduseofsmallscaleneurotechnologiestoremotelycontrolmovementsof insectsandsmallmammalstocreate“cyborgdrones”forsurveillanceor infiltration operations. He goes on to say that brain sciences can also be employed tomitigate orprevent aggression, violence, and warfare by supplementing HUMINT, SIGINT, and COMINT (in anapproach termed “neuro-cognitive intel”: NEURINT). Such possible applications generate two corequestions: (1)towhatextentcanthesetechnologiesbedevelopedandusedtoexertpower?And, (2)howshouldresearchanduseoftheneurosciencesbebestengaged,guided,andgoverned?Hegoesontoaddress following issues: (1) thecurrentcapabilitiesofneuroS/T foroperationaluse in intelligence,military,andwarfightingoperations; (2)potentialbenefits,burdens,andrisks incurred; (3)keyethicalissuesandquestions,and(4)possiblepathstowardresolutionofthesequestionstoenabletechnicallyrightandethicallysoundusetowardmaintaininginternationalsecurity.Dr.ChristopheMorin(FieldingGraduateUniversity)inhischapterarguesit iscrucialthatwerecognizetheurgencyofusingbetterpersuasionmodels to createandevaluatebothpropagandaand counter-propaganda campaigns. Also, the dynamic and implicit nature of the effect of media content onadolescentmindshighlightsthenecessityofconductingexperimentsthatrevealtheneurophysiologicaleffectofmessagesonyoungbrains.Subjectscannotcompetentlyandobjectivelyreporthowmessagesworkontheirminds.However,newresearchtoolsusedbyneuromarkerscanrevealcriticalinsightsbysafely and ethically monitoring different subsystems in the nervous systems while participants viewpersuasivemessages.Drs.DavidA.Broniatowski(TheGeorgeWashingtonUniversity)andValerieF.ReynaCornellUniversity)intheirarticleentitled“AScientificApproachtoCombatingMisinformationandDisinformationOnline,”argue for a scientific approach to combating online misinformation and disinformation. Such anapproachmustbegroundedinempiricallyvalidatedtheory,andisnecessarilyinterdisciplinary,requiringinsightsfromdecisionscience,computerscience,thesocialsciences,andsystemsintegration.Relevantresearch has been conducted on the psychology of online narratives, providing a foundation forunderstandingwhysomemessagesarecompellingandspreadthroughsocialmedianetworks,butthisresearchmustbeintegratedwithresearchfromotherdisciplines.In his article entilted “Neural Influence and Behavior Change,” Dr. Ian McCulloh (Johns HopkinsUniversity), argues thatmilitary commanders and senior leadersmust have a basic understanding ofcognitiveinfluenceinordertomakedecisionsaffectingtheGrayZoneandhumanpopulationsinareasof ongoingmilitary operations. Influence is counter-intuitive. This has led to poor decisions thatmayhaveadverselyaffectedthesuccessofUSoperations.Heprovidesaprimerofcognitiveinfluence,setintacticalmilitaryterms.Theintentistoinformcommandersandseniorleaderstoenablethemtomakebetterdecisionsregardinginform-influenceoperationsinsupportofUSobjectives.SuccessduringGrayZoneoperationsrequirescommanderstounderstandinfluenceandemploymodelsofbehaviorchangeinthesamemannerthattheyunderstandtheelementsofpatrollingandemploykineticpower.


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In his article entitled “The Role of Integrative Complexity in Forecasting and Influence,” Dr. PeterSuedfeld and Mr. Bradford H. Morrison (The University of British Columbia) argue that If control isdependent on actual or at least perceived power—political, economic, military, demographic, andother—influenceistheproductofanevenmorevariedandchangingsetofvariables.Thecriteriathatdefinetheprobabilityofsuccessinexertingorcounteringinfluencemustincludetwofactors:accuracyinassessingthepossiblestepsofanadversaryandshapingpersuasivecommunicationssoastoadvanceone’s own position and reduce the power of the opponent’s. The former aspect, anticipatoryintelligence, has been a major research focus to date. They briefly look at what may be a fruitfulapproach to the latter. In short, besidesbeing a tool for anticipatory intelligence analysis, IntegrativeComplexity may also be used to help shape persuasive communications as well as responses toadversarialattemptsatpersuasion.In his article entilted “Neural Influence and Behavior Change,” Dr. Ian McCulloh (Johns HopkinsUniversity) argues that military commanders and senior leaders must have a basic understanding ofcognitiveinfluenceinordertomakedecisionsaffectingtheGrayZoneandhumanpopulationsinareasof ongoingmilitary operations. Influence is counter-intuitive. This has led to poor decisions thatmayhaveadverselyaffectedthesuccessofUSoperations.Heprovidesaprimerofcognitiveinfluence,setintacticalmilitaryterms.Theintentistoinformcommandersandseniorleaderstoenablethemtomakebetterdecisionsregardinginform-influenceoperationsinsupportofUSobjectives.SuccessduringGrayZoneoperationsrequirescommanderstounderstandinfluenceandemploymodelsofbehaviorchangeinthesamemannerthattheyunderstandtheelementsofpatrollingandemploykineticpower.In his article entitled “The Role of Integrative Complexity in Forecasting and Influence,” Dr. PeterSuedfeld and Mr. Bradford H. Morrison (The University of British Columbia) argue that If control isdependent on actual or at least perceived power—political, economic, military, demographic, andother—influenceistheproductofanevenmorevariedandchangingsetofvariables.Thecriteriathatdefinetheprobabilityofsuccessinexertingorcounteringinfluencemustincludetwofactors:accuracyinassessingthepossiblestepsofanadversaryandshapingpersuasivecommunicationssoastoadvanceone’s own position and reduce the power of the opponent’s. The former aspect, anticipatoryintelligence, has been a major research focus to date. They briefly look at what may be a fruitfulapproach to the latter. In short, besidesbeing a tool for anticipatory intelligence analysis, IntegrativeComplexity may also be used to help shape persuasive communications as well as responses toadversarialattemptsatpersuasion.


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Chapter1:APeekIntotheFuture:AStealthRevolutionbyInfluence’sNewMasters-Ms.ReginaJoseph,NewYorkUniversity

Ms.ReginaJosephPytho

[email protected]

AbstractThischapterexaminesthecomingtestsofpreservingnationalsecuritythroughinfluence.Itreviewsthedomestic information environment, where corporate interests generate a confluence of content andaccess barriers and observes the global influence efforts that will continue to buffet society. Whiledifficult, resilience may be cultivated through an offset, which harnessesWestern attitudes towardsinformation,education,andcultivationofsuper-synthesizers.To envision the future, a forecastermay first look to the past in an effort to find signals and detectpatterns.If wewant to understand the information environment of the next five years, we should consider aprescient warning from Aldous Huxley, the author of the 1932 novel Brave NewWorld. In a speechdeliveredat theBerkeley LanguageCenter at theUniversityofCalifornia in1962,Huxley laidout theprospectofwhathecalledthe“ultimaterevolution,thefinalrevolution,wheremancanactdirectlyonthemind-bodyofhisfellows…thatweareinprocessofdevelopingawholeseriesoftechniqueswhichwill enable the controllingoligarchywhohavealwaysexistedandpresumablywill alwaysexist to getpeopletolovetheirservitude.”

TheDomesticInformationLandscape:theHuxleyParadigmofInfluenceThroughDesireNowconsiderthe informationenvironmentofthepresent:thebusinessmodelsofat leasttwooftheworld’stenlargestcorporationsaccordingtomarketcapitalization,FacebookandAlphabet,relyonuserengagement—howlongorfrequentlyauserinteractswithaproduct.Thisisknownmorecolloquiallyas“brain hacking:” compelling users of digitalmedia to repeatedly return to their products through theneurotransmitter-charged experience of pleasure received via “likes,” Snapchat streaks, new texts,emojis,andmore(Anderson,2017).Asofthefirstquarterof2017,Facebookhad1.94billionmonthlyactiveusers; inMay2017,Googlesurpassed2billionmonthlyactiveAndroidplatformusers (Matney,2017). A 2015 Deloitte consumer study found mobile phone users in the US check their phones anaverageof46timesaday,upfrom33timesin2014,withusersbetweentheagesof18and24lookingthemostoftenwith74checksperday(Eadicicco,2015).AccordingtocomScore,in2016,Facebookuseconstituted14%oftotaltimespentonlinebyAmericans(Adler,2016).Algorithmicfilteringandnetworkeffects devised by digitalmedia companies intentionally induce user desire bordering on addiction, aphenomenonCornellInformationScienceresearcherscall“socialmediareversion”(Baumeretal,2015).Usersofsocialmediawillinglyforfeittheirpersonaldatainexchangefortheuseofthesesystems,evenwhenthecostsofprivacyandsecurityarenottotheirindividualadvantage.Huxley’sultimaterevolutionhas been achieved stealthily by corporations that many trust and revere. Inattentional blindness, acognitiveinabilitytoperceivestimulidirectlyinourview,blocksusfromseeingchange(Neisser,1979;Mack and Rock, 1998; Moore and Egeth, 1998; Simons and Chabris, 1999; Most et al, 2000); the


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condition serves as aworthy lens throughwhich to view how digitalmedia and telecommunicationscompanies have transformed the way our society is open to influence. The Internet’s exponentialincrease in noise and signals exacerbates this barrier to perception. The apocryphal “invisible ships”phenomenon associatedwith the arrival of European vessels to shores inwhich natives of Australia,CentralandSouthAmerica,andvariousothercountries—dependingonthere-telling—wereunabletosee theseunrecognizable foreignobjectsmay remain the targetof skepticaldebunkers (Evans,2009),but the reality of perception blindness to the growing complexity in our information environmentfostersascenarioinwhich—minusasea-changeinawareness,training,andtools—neithercontrolnorinfluencemaybeeffectivelyachievedthroughthestateapparatusofnationalsecurity.At the most malign end of its utility spectrum, the Internet’s one-to-many broadcasting facilitatesinfluenceand recruitmenteffortsofboth lonewolfandnetworked insurgents. Italso sortsusers intofactionsorientedaroundpoliticalandsocialbiases.Suchbiasesarenotoriouslydifficulttocorrectevenin the face of factual opposition (Mercier and Sperber, 2017). Digital networks thus become usefultargetsforallowingdisinformationtoflourish.“Fakenews”maybeareductivememeusedforpoliticalends,butthatshouldnotdiscounttheincreasingpolarizationthreatposedbyvarietiesofideologicallyslantednews,misinformation,propaganda,lazyjournalism,andopinionmasqueradingasfact.ThenetworkexternalityofsocialmediasystemslikeFacebookandTwitterentrenchestheseeffectstotheextentthatanyinherentsecurityriskoughttobeviewedinrelationtohowpeopleseekinformation.Accordingtoa2016PewResearchstudy,while57%ofAmericansgottheirnewsthroughtelevisionin2016,38%,or four-in-ten,gottheirnewsonline—withthestudy’sauthorsexpectingthatdigital trendwill increase at the expense of TV, print, and radio given younger adults’ projected online habits(Mitchelletal,2016).A2017PewResearchstudyexaminingonlinenewshabitsobservedthat26%ofnewsretrievalwasthroughsocialmedia,morethanthroughnewswebsitesorapps,searchenginesoranyothersinglepathway. (Mitchelletal,2017).Absenttheveracitychecksbuilt intotraditionalnewsresources like TV and print outlets, the agnostic information provision of socialmedia platforms hasalready demonstrated the potential for annealing bias, partisan mob-rule aggression and botmanipulation.Corporateattemptsatcorrectingadverseeffects fromclickbaitandextremistcome-onshave been halfhearted because habit-forming engagement is the core of digitalmedia’s ad revenue-supportedbusinessmodel.Adscomprised97%ofFacebook’srevenueand87%ofAlphabet’srevenuein2016 (Ingram, 2017). Instead of becoming distribution partners to credible news providers, digitalplatformshavebecomeorgansofinfluence.Current projections suggest further weakening of reliable public information sources. Despite atemporarybumpincirculationpostthe2016USelection,totalUSnewspaperrevenueisforecastedtodeclineby2021atanaveragerateof-4.1%,withdigitalrevenueplateauingtotheworld’sslowestrateof digital news revenue growth and the world’s third-fastest rate of print advertising revenue loss(Bothunetal,2017).Addtothisanongoingmediaconvergence.IntheWest,thelastdecadeofmediaconsolidation has, through acquisitions and shutdowns, progressively concentrated control over thelargest share of global mass media among less than 15 conglomerates worldwide, thereby creatingpowerfuloligopolies.Shortof regulatory interventionalong the linesofanti-trustmeasures,access tocrediblenewsandinformationinthenextfiveyearswillbefurtherBalkanizedasaresultofcorporaterevenuemaximizingandinformationdiversityminimizing.This pertains to both the content as well as the access to it. In 2017, the Federal CommunicationsCommission overturnedbroadcast station ownership restrictions to pave theway for activity like the


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proposedSinclairBroadcastGroup’s$3.9billionacquisitionofTribuneMedia’sTVstations.Thedeal’saimisthecreationofahardlineconservativerivaltoFoxNewsthatwouldreachapproximately72%ofAmerican households (Johnson, 2017). Efforts to overturn net neutrality rules by thosewhoown the“pipes,” e.g., cable companies and telecoms carriers,will allow them to charge for Internet access asthey see fit.As costs goup, informationeconomizing can result among Internetusers, reducing theirintake of premium news. Should the Open Internet Act of 2015 be overturned, short of any majorcountermeasures, the end result may be analogous to food environments found in economicallychallengedneighborhoods:arejectionofnutritionintheformofcostly-to-producequalitynewsinfavorofcheapandinstantlygratifyinginformationaljunkfood.Netneutrality isnotapanacea.The Internet-enabled informationenvironmenthasdemonstrated thecapacity to destabilize democratic order via its vulnerability tomanipulation. “Attention hacking” hasincreasedthevisibilityofonce-marginalextremistandpopulistgroupsthroughbotsandmemes.Groupslikethealtright,whitenationalists,Identitarianists,men’srightsactivists,andothersdisseminatefalsestoriesthroughInternetcommunities(MarwickandLewis,2017).Consequently,bothconservativeandprogressive constituencies wind upmistrustingmedia sources nomatter how reputable. However, astudy led by Yochai Benkler suggests a current right-wing asymmetry in both the propagation of andattentiontodisinformation(Benkleretal,2017).ThenextfiveyearsmayyetforceareckoningwiththeparadoxofSiliconValley’sgains:wehavemoreinformation and tools, but less informed people. Browsers and platformswill continue to shape ourcommunications away from information-rich semantic systems to information-minimized visual ones,furthererodingourabilitytodetectandexpressnuance.Wewillcontinuetodesiresystemsthatsellourpersonal data, while remaining suspicious of the state apparatus of governance. Actors withsophisticated methods can leverage the public’s attention deficit and distrust and exert sufficientdamaginginfluencebeforebeingdetected.

TheGlobalInformationLandscape:theOrwellParadigmofInfluenceThroughControlRussiaisjustonesuchactorwithanevolved,hybridizedinformationstrategy.AmongthemanyfacetsofitsingenuityistheaimingofphishingandpropagandaatavulnerableUSdomestictarget:veteransandactiveservicemembers.Ratchetinguppro-VladimirPutinrhetoricamonganarmedmilitarypopulationisostensiblyonewaytofacilitatetheRussianpresident’spreferenceforcovertWesterndestabilizationthrough implosion (Schreckinger, 2017). By enflaming targeted populations with trolls, malware, andpropagandaamplification throughprofessional-lookingmediaoutlets likeRTandSputnik, theRussianFederation has made visible progress towards Putin’s goals. Fanning partisan anti-governmentsentimentintheUSwhilethegovernmentfocusesitsattentiononforeignterroristshasconsequences:consider the2015 study finding Islam-inspired terror attacks accounted for 50deaths since9/11, but“right-wingextremists averaged337attacksper year in thedecadeafter9/11, causinga totalof 254fatalities” (Kurzman and Schanzer, 2015). Russia’s influence hacking does not stop once elections areover, but rather aims for metastasis over time; given the constraints of the domestic informationenvironment,weshouldexpectahardeningoffact-challengedbeliefamongthemostsuggestible.ThefalloftheSovietUniondeceivedsomeUSpundits intobelievingintheColdWar’send.WithsuchthinkingcamereducedvigilanceintheWestoverhowinformationcouldbeweaponized(PomerantsevandWeiss,2015).


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But theRussianFederation,asdidotherstates, sawan importantopportunity tocontrol influencebyopposing Western views on Internet governance. Whereas Western states see the Internet as anunfetteredutility allied to freedomof information, Russia, China, Turkey, and several other countriesview itscontrolasasovereignright.ThisOrwellianarchetypeofa1984-styleBigBrotherstate,whichkeeps its population in line through fear of arrest and retribution, stands in stark contrast to theHuxleyianparadigmofvoluntarysubmissiontocontrol.Theformerisstate-led;thelatteristhedomainof corporations and non-state actors. These positions outline the contours of themodern ColdWar,dividing ideological camps along East and West and North and South axes. While tactics and goalsremaindiverseamongsuchglobalactors, state-ledpolicieson Internet-driven influencecombinewiththe US’s own domestic influence trap to pose a running risk for American national security and forWesternliberal-orderdemocraciesingeneral.Whilestate-ledinfluencecampaignsseektosubvertforeignaudiences,theyalsorequirekeepingtheirowncitizensquiescent.China’snewCybersecurityLaw,whichwentintoeffecton1June2017,notonlycedestothestatealmostcompletecontrolovernewsandonlineactivities, italsorequiresbusinessesandcitizens to reportonanyviolators. Iran’s IslamicRevolutionaryGuardCorpsowns largeswathsofthecountry’stelecommunicationssector,enablingtheIRGCtohaveeyesandearsconstantlytrainedonIran’scitizens;andnowtheIRGC’scompanieswillreconstructSyria’smobilephonenetworkwithaneyetoexpandintoIraq(“IranToBuild,”2017).Informationdominanceisnotrestrictedtostateactors:internationalnon-stateactors,rangingfromISISto Anonymous, have catapulted to prominence by leveraging online influence. Waging informationwarfarecanbeassimpleastweetingorpostingavideo.Falseflagoperationsandmasspanicsdesignedtooverwhelmlawenforcementandfirstresponderscanbepropagatedthroughsocialmediapranksandhoax claimswith relativeease. If publicmistrust is sufficient, conducting crisismanagementbecomesconstrained,exposingvulnerabilitytoexploitation.Whetherledbystateornon-stateactors,influencecampaignsinvariablyinvolvecontroversiallevelsofsurveillanceeitherasacompanionrequirement,orasaconsequence.Thatiswherewefindourselvestoday. Without real evolution in US strategy, tactics, and policy, the next five years could entrenchadversarialgains—andHuxley’srevolution—toAmericandemocracy’sdetriment.

TheOpportunity:Offsets,CognitiveProsethics,andSuper-SynthesizersWhiletheperniciouseffectsofmoderninfluencemeasureswillbedifficulttoerodeatthisstage,asea-changeinhowtheUScanaddresshybridizedinformationwarfareisstillpossible.Thethirdoffset,whichemphasizesmanufactured technologies like unmanned vehicles and robotics, yields little that cannotultimatelybecopiedbydeterminedadversariesovertime.Butthefreedomofinformationprivilegedbythe US and the West—and how citizens can harness this in aggregate to form a powerful humanresource—offers a true asymmetric advantage, which authoritarian adversaries cannot effectivelyreplicate(Joseph,2015).Anticipatory intelligence systems that train and crowdsource human forecasters (whetherworking incombinationwithmachinemodels or not) to predict outcomes rely on anunconstrained informationlandscape.Thediversityofinformationsourcesinthepublicdomainiscentraltothepredictiveaccuracyobserved in the best displays of forecasting, like the “superforecasting” observedduring IARPA’sACEprogram(TetlockandGardner,2015).Withtrainingtomitigatethebiasesandnoisetoday’sinformationenvironmentimpartstothepublic,wecanboostanalyticalprowesstoachieveanedge.


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Trainingincognitivede-biasing,probabilisticreasoningandcriticalthinkingtodevelopourhumanoffsetwill notbeenoughhowever. Thenatureofour informationenvironment requires toolsandcognitiveprosthetics, like structured analytic techniques and machine learning-enhanced platforms, to helphumansapplynetworkedcreativityandthoughttocomplex informationenvironments.Theywillneedtolearnhowtoundothecognitivedamageourscreenservitudeexerts—principallyhowtoasktherightquestions, recognize veracity in thickets of disinformation, and develop an evidence-basedunderstandinginspiteofdistractions.Findingthebestcandidatesforthiskindofworkisthefirststep.Myresearchsuggestsfollowingtheoryofmindstudiesandobservingdifferenceinneuro-atypicalbehavioroffersaclue.Superforecastersareagoodstart,butwhatIcallsuper-synthesizers—asmallsubsetof individualswhodemonstratenotonlyhighemotional andverbal intelligence,butalsohigh systemizing capacity to theextent that they canprocess and communicate more effectively—may provide the kind of human skills offset repressiveregimeswillstruggletocultivate.Add to this human factor the dominance the US maintains in media development and narrativegeneration.WhetherintheformofadvertisingorMarvelsuper-heromyths,Americanmediacreativityexerts apotent influence that compels imitation fromevenour fiercest adversaries. TheUSMedia&Entertainmentmarket is the largestmarketworldwide and represents a third of the global industry,reaching$771billionby2019(Bothunetal,2017).Entertainmentmediacanhavegeopoliticaleffects—Turkishsoapoperasforexample(Yusuf,2013)havebeenbothpraisedandcriticizedfortheirabilitytoinfluence.Yetforallouremphasisondefenseinnovations,itisworthaskingwhetherAmericancreativenarrativepowerhasbeenadequatelyintegratedintohowweviewourinformationstrategy.Bringing together thequantitative inhuman forecastingaptitudeand thequalitative innarrative thatcancommandmindshareisnowparamountifwewishtoseizewhatremainingopportunitylies intheinformationenvironmentofthepresentandfuture.WemaynothaveavoidedHuxley’snightmare,butrevolutionscanstillberesistedandoverturned.

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Baumer, E.P.S., Guha, S., Quan, E., Mimmo, D. and Gay, G.K. (2015). Missing Photos, SufferingWithdrawal, or Finding Freedom? How Experiences of Social Media Non-Use Influence theLikelihoodofReversion.SocialMedia+Society,July-December2015:1-14

Benkler, Y., Faris, R., Roberts, H., and Zuckerman, E. (2017,March 3). Study: Breitbart-led right-wingmedia ecosystem altered broader media agenda, Columbia Journalism Review, retrieved fromhttps://cjr.org/analysis/breitbart-media-trump-harvard-study.php

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Cooper,A.(Writer)(2017).BrainHacking[Episodesegment].Campanile,G.(Producer),60MinutesNewYork,NY:ColumbiaBroadcastSystem

Eadiccio,L.(2015,December15).AmericansCheckTheirPhones8BillionTimesaDay.Time,retrievedfromhttp://www.time.com/4147614/smartphone-usage-us-2015/%3Fsource%3Ddam

Evans, B. (2009, July 23). The Myth of the Invisible Ships. North Coast Journal, retrieved fromhttp://www.northcoastjournal.com/humboldt/myth-of-the-invisible-ships/Content?oid=2129921

Galeotti, M. (2017, May 10). Russian intelligence is at (political) war. NATO Review, retrieved fromhttp://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/Also-in-2017/russian-intelligence-political-war-security/EN/index.htm

Ingram, D. (2017, May 4). Facebook nears ad-only business model as game revenue falls, Reuters,retrievedfromhttp://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-revenue

“IrantoBuildNewSyrianMobileTelephoneNetwork.”(2017,January).SpaceWatchME,retrievedfromhttps://spacewatchme.com/2017/01/iran-build-syrian-network/

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Matney,L.(2017,May17).Googlehas2billionusersonAndroid,500MonGooglePhotos,TechCrunch,retrieved from http://www.techcrunch.com/2017/05/17/google-has-2-billion-users-on-android-500M-on-google-photos/amp/

Mercier,H.,andSperber,D.(2017)TheEnigmaofReason,Boston:HarvardUniversityPress

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Mitchell,A.,Gottfried,J.,Shearer,E,andLu,K.(2017,February9).HowAmericansEncounter,RecallandActUponDigitalNews.PewResearchCenter,retrievedfromhttp://www.journalism.org/pathways-to-news

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Most,S.B.,Simons,D.J.,Scholl,B.J.,andChabris,C.F.(2000).Sustainedunintentionalblindness:Theroleof location in the detection of unexpected dynamic events. Psyche, 6, retrieved fromhttp://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v6/psyche-6-14-most.html


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Neisser, U. (1979). Cognition and reality: Principles and implications of cognitive psychology. SanFrancisco:W.H.Freeman

Pomerantsev, P. and Weiss, M. (2014). The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin WeaponizesInformation, Culture and Money. The Interpreter, retrieved fromhttp://www.interpretermag.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/The_Menace_of_Unreality_Final.pdf

Simons D.J., Chabris C.F. (1999). Gorillas in our midst: Sustained inattentional blindness for dynamicevents.Perception,28,1059-1074.

http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/

Marwick, A., and Lewis, R. (2017, May 17). Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online. Data +Society,Retrievedfromhttps://datasociety.net/output/media-manipulation-and-disinfo-online/

Schreckinger, B. (2017, June 12). How Russia Targets the US Military. Politico, retrieved fromhttp://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/12/how-russia-targets-the-us-military-215247

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Yusuf, H. (2013, January 10). The Geopolitics of Soap Operas, The New York Times, retrieved fromhttps://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/10/the-geopolitics-of-soap-operas/?_r=0


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Chapter2:FromConceptstoCapabilities:ImplicationsfortheOPSCommunity-LtGeneral(Ret)Dr.RobertJ.Elder

LtGen(Ret)Dr.RobertJ.ElderGeorgeMasonUniversity

[email protected]: CAPT Phil Kapusta (USSOCOM),Mr. JasonWerchan (USEUCOM),Mr.Marty Drake(USCENTCOM), Mr. Mark Sisson (USSTRATCOM), Dr. Bob Toguchi (USASOC), COL Seth Sherwood(USNORTHCOM),MajGenEricVollmecke(JointStaff,J5,USAFRICOM)RegionalPerspectivesThepurposeofthischapteristoexaminetheimplicationsofthechangesinoursecurityenvironment,consider theways thatdifferent international actorsare capitalizingon these changes, and reflectontheirimplicationsfortheUnitedStatesandourpartners.Webeginbyexaminingregionalperspectivesofoperatorsfromacrosstheglobe.FromaSOCOMperspective,evenwhenwehaveallofthebestinformation,westillendupmakingbaddecisions.Thus,weshouldnotoverestimatewhatwecanaccomplish,andshouldbeginbydefiningastrategy.Unlike strategiesof thepast,we should transitionaway from the ideaofperfect end statesbecauseinourcurrentenvironment,weareinaconstantstateofbattle.Furthermore,theterm“nationbuilding”nolongerseemsrelevantand,asaresult,wenowincreasinglyencounternon-traditionalandadaptivepartnerships.FromaEUCOMview,Russiaisarguablythebestnationstateatexecutingwhatitdefinesasastrategyofindirectactionand theUnitedStateshas failed todevelopaneffectivecounter-strategy. Itwas justafewyearsagothat theUSbeganto lookatRussiaasastrategicpartner,but therelationshipwasnotmutual. The US is not properly organized to effectively execute a whole of government response toRussian activities. While there are efforts such as the Russian Engagement Group, the GlobalEngagementCenter,andtheRussiaStrategicInitiative,thesituationmayrequireacompletelydifferentapproach,perhapsontheorderofaninter-agencytaskforce.ACENTCOMperspectivenotes thatwehavemore information thaneverbefore, butweneed to getbetteratproperlyanalyzingtheinformationsowecanuseittomakebetterdecisions.Inthissense,wefaceanumberofnotablechallenges,butperhapsmostsignificantly,wecansensefarmoreinformationthan we can actually analyze, the analysis takes too long, we do not always know who needs theinformation,andthereisnotagoodfeedbackmechanismtoenableimprovements.Puredataneedstobe transformed into recognizable information. The information then needs to be used to createknowledge.Theknowledgethenmustbeusedtocreateunderstanding.Theunderstandingwillhelptomakebetterdecisions,which thenhelps tocreatewisdom.Thepeoplewithwisdomwillbe themostlikelytomakethebestdecisions.From a STRATCOMperspective, the focus is on strategic deterrence, decisive response, and having acombat ready force. To properly operationalize, commanders need to properly measure. First, it isessential thatweclearlydefinewhatmeasurement is.Second,weneedtoclearlydefinewhatweare


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tryingtomeasure.Thingslikestrategicdeterrence,decisiveresponse,andhavingacombatreadyforceare difficult to define—often times these things are contextual. Therefore, we need a very flexibletoolsettohelpappropriatelyaddressmeasurementsofthistype.Anotherspecialopsviewsuggests that theUSneedsbothcontroland influence—these twoconceptsarenotnecessarilycompetingwitheachother.TheDODisverygoodatphysicalmaneuver,butnotasgood at cognitivemaneuver—where influence truly resides. US competitors aremastering this spacewhiletheUSisnotreallycompetingatall.Cognitiveobjectivesinmanycasesshouldbethecenterpieceof the future military campaign, from which both physical activities and cognitive activities areorchestratedtoachieveUSpolicyoutcomes.USNORTHCOMhasadifferentproblemsetthantheotherCOCOMs—whileotherCOCOMsaretryingtocontainproblemsintheirAOR,USNORTHCOMprovideshomelanddefenseandworkstokeepbadthingsoutofitsAOR.USNORTHCOMdoesperformalotofinfluencingactivities,primarilythroughmilitary-to-military cooperation with partners. USNORTHCOM also spends a lot of time working with theInteragency to provide homeland security and homeland defense, and have developed a number ofmodelsforinteragencycooperationandcollaborationthatcouldbeappliedtosituationsOCONUS.FromanAFRICOMperspective,theUSwillcontinuetotrailbehindourcompetitorsintheregionuntilitbuilds trustwith local populations and can convince locals towillingly fight for their country. TheUSmust help push change in ways that do not create problems or inadvertently become part of theprobleminAfrica.Changemustbeginatthelocallevel,andthepropercivilian-militarybalancerequiresawhole-of-governmentapproach.China,inparticular,isputtingnoticeableeffortintogaininginfluenceonthecontinent.Considerthatroughly70%ofUSaidinAfricagoestoSpecialOpsForceactivities,whileabout 80% of Chinese investment in Africa goes to infrastructure. This difference is quite significant.ChineseinvestmentinAfricaninfrastructureispavingthewayforprolongedChineseinfluenceoverthelong-term, and this gives China a noticeable advantage over the US in the competition for Africaninfluence.Onesolidopportunity is to leverage relationshipswithUSpartners—asanexample, FrancehasstrongrelationshipsinWestAfricathattheUSlacks.

OperationalImpactHowhasthisaffectedtheapproachtooperationstheCOCOMsconduct?USCENTCOMnotedthatitnowhasoneofthelargestInformationOps(IO)forcesintheDepartmentofDefense.TheirIOWebOPSTeamgets information from an array of sources as ameans of gauging sentiment in the AOR, which thendevelops insightsthatcanbefoldedintotheplanningprocesstohelpUSCENTCOMmakebetterplansand preparations. USCENTCOM’s IO force operates 24/7 and continually polls USCENTCOM’s AOR tohelpinformUSCENTCOMdecision-making.USASOChighlightedthattheyareworkingtoaddresstheneedtoproperlysharedata.Thecurrentdatasharing process is stove-piped and needs to be improved. Additionally, given the importance ofInformationOps,thereisacriticalneedtomeasureinformationopsactivities.EUCOMnotedthatCOCOMcollaborationisimportant,particularlyfordealingwithglobalissues(suchasRussia). USECUOM is also focused on providing security cooperation assistance to countries that aremost susceptible to Russia influence to increase their resiliency and preparedness. STRATCOMhighlightedtheimportanceoftimely,proactivemessageshaping.


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AnotableUSchallengeisitsrequirementto“playbytherules”duetoadherencetointernationalruleoflaw, democratic principles, and bureaucratic constraints when US competitors are not similarlyconstrained.HowshouldtheUnitedStatesdealwiththisproblem?RecognizingthatourcompetitorsareextremelyresponsiveandabletoactmuchmorerapidlythantheUS, USEUCOM has learned that its greatest strength is its European allies. Whereas the US hasrestrictionswith respect to authority and authorization, its European allies are uniquely equipped torespondincertainwaysthatarenotavailabletotheUnitedStates.CENTCOMarguedthatwehavethecapabilitytoavoidbeingsurprised—wewillbeabletopredictwhena change in environment might happen and take action to shape the situation and be prepared torespond. STRATCOMnoted that this problem is not specific just to government, and that DOD couldlearnagreatdealfromthewaycivilianentitieshandleproblemssuchasthese.From USASOC, we learned of the need to build resilience so that we can be prepared to deal withsurprise when it does occur. Resilience is more than just controlling the narrative—it is also gainedthroughbuildingcapacitytoaddresschallengesastheyarepresented.Thereisalsoaneedtolookmoreclosely at non-traditional indicators and warnings that an adversary like Russia will not expect theUnitedStatestomonitor.Controlofthe informationenvironmenthasbecomean increasingly importantelementofUSnationalsecurity.SOCOMnotedthatDODlikestocontrolinformation:Itvastlyovervaluesclassifiedinformationandgoesoutof itsway tomaintain separateproprietarypoolsof information,which cannot connectwithoneanother.At thesametime,weputapremiumonclassified information,and ignorea“hugeocean”ofunclassifiedinformationthatcouldbeofbenefittoouroperations.Toalargeextent,theUSsuffersfromaninformationproblem,andtheproblemrequiresaparadigmshifttobesolved.CENTCOMsuggestedthatwemightnotneedtocontroltheinformationenvironment,providedthattheUS can leverage the information environment in an efficient and useful manner to generateunderstanding and knowledge.USASOC added thatwe should also listen to our allies and learn howtheyareleveragingtheinformationenvironmentbecausewearenottheonlyonesexploringthisspace.

OpportunitiesLookingtoopportunitiestoaddressthecurrentenvironmentalchallengesdifferently,thereisconsensusthattheUSsimplycannotcompeteinactivitiesshortofconflictwithouradversariesbyusingtheDODonitsown.Operatinginthisspacerequiresaninter-agencyapproach.Whatweseemtolackisafocalpoint short of the President who has the authority to deal with whole of government responses tocompetitionshortofarmedconflict.Onesuggestion is that theUSshouldrevamptheeducationalprocessesused formilitarymembersasthey come up through the ranks and start making plans and decisions. Information operations andinfluenceoperationsneedtobeinculcatedintoUSmilitaryeducationprocesses.Another problem is that our partners have high expectations for the US ability to fulfill promises,particularly incompetitiveplacessuchasAfrica,butUSacquisitionprocessesundermineourabilitytocompete with countries and organizations which are much more agile. The US has argued that its


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acquisition processes need to bemade faster andmore efficient for the benefit of the taxpayer, buttherearealsonationalsecurityimplicationsofthislackofresponsiveness.SOCOM has two core functions: working with locals and direct action. However, roughly 90% ofUSSOCOM’s effort goes into direct action—wehave created theworld’s best killingmachine, butwehavenotputthepropereffortintoworkingwithlocals,whichisultimatelywheretheUSwillfindlong-termbenefit.ThecyberrealmhasbecomearealchallengebecauseconstraintsonUSoperationsinthisdomainarecausing it to fall far behind the capabilities of US competitors. It is also clear that the United StatesneedsasynchronizedglobalCOCOMplan.Forexample,whenlookingattheinfluencethatRussiahasintheArctic,theUSneedstoalsoknowhowthis influenceaffectsotherthingssuchastraderoutesandhomelanddefense.To summarize, today’s national and military leaders have grown up in an environment where theobjectivewastodefeattheadversary.Intoday’senvironment,preservingstabilitymaybeanevenmoreimportantsubject.Ourcompetitorsunderstandourdesiretowin,andliketic-tac-toe,understanditasaminimum,theycanforcetoadraw.WeneedtosetobjectivesthatallowtheUnitedStatestowininasituationthatappearstobeadraw.Itisnotinournature,butitisinourinterest.Thegoodnewsisthatwereallydounderstandhowtodothis,buttheproblemis thatwewouldmuchratherwin—it is theAmericanway.


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Chapter3:NetAssessment:ImplicationsforHomelandSecurity–Dr.GinaLigon,UniversityofNebraska,Omaha

Dr.GinaLigonUniversityofNebraskaOmaha

[email protected]

GiaHarriganDepartmentofHomelandSecurity,Science

andTechnologyDirectorate,OfficeofUniversityPrograms

[email protected]

ErikDahlNavalPostgraduateSchool

[email protected]

TimothyN.MoughonNationalCounterterrorismCenter

[email protected]

ColonelBillEdwardsSpecialOperationsNorthernCommand

[email protected]

NawarShoraTransportationSecurityAdministration

[email protected]

AbstractThis chapter addresses the issue of how net assessment—the practice of considering how strategicinteractionsbetweentheUnitedStates,adversaries,andtheenvironmentmayplayoutinthefuture—maybeadoptedtoadvancehomelandsecurity(especiallyasrelatedtothreatsthatemergeoutsidethehomeland). In a panel of contributors from government and academia, implications of using a netassessment approach to understand influence were shared. In the following sections, we detail theoverarching framework for net assessments.Next,we review the approach fromNCTConmeasuringpower and the criticality of assessing “Green Actors.” We conclude by highlighting some of thechallenges faced by Blue Network, as well as how net assessments can provide greater sharedunderstanding of emerging threats to Homeland Security by incorporating planning for threats,capabilities,andlegitimacy.

OverviewofNetAssessmentsTheconceptofnetassessmentiswidelyregardedasintegralinsecurityplanning.1ThePentagon’sOfficeof Net Assessments (ONA) and the Congressionally-mandated Net Assessment Branch within NCTCactivitiesareoutsidethescopeandlegalauthoritytoplanfordomesticthreats,butdoofferroadmapsof how to incorporate this strategic process into Homeland Security planning. The DOD defines netassessmentas“thecomparativeanalysisofmilitary,technological,political,economic,andotherfactorsgoverning the relative military capabilities of nations. Its purpose is to identify problems andopportunitiesthatdeservetheattentionofseniordefenseofficials.”2Netassessment is linkedwith itsfounderAndrewMarshall,whowrotethatnetassessments“are intendedtoprovide insightforpolicymakers at the highest levels by discovering and illuminating the nature of major national securityproblems.”3

1ErikJ.DahlisanassociateprofessorofnationalsecurityaffairsattheNavalPostgraduateSchoolandwrote,“AHomelandSecurityNetassessmentisNeededNow!”intheWinter2015IssueofStrategicStudiesQuarterly.2DepartmentofDefenseDirective5111.11,DirectorofNetassessment,23December2009,1.3AndrewW.Marshall,“NationalNetassessment,”memorandumfortherecord,10April1973,2.AvailablefromtheDigitalNationalSecurityArchive,fileno.01198.


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RequiredElementsinNetAssessmentPlanningFor example, while most planning efforts involve a detailed understanding of external threats, netassessmentsfocusontwofactors:theenemyandone’sowncapabilities.However,inthepanelattheSMA2017Conference,NCTC’sMoughondiscussed the importanceof also assessingGreenActors, ortheactorsand factors thataffect the interactionbetweenaprotagonist (i.e.,Blue)andanantagonist(i.e., Red). In this sense, Green could include individuals (e.g., family members, onlookers) andcollections of individuals (e.g., NGOs, corporations, community groups, third-party governments), aswellasfactorsthatarenotdirectlyassociatedwithindividuals(e.g.,norms,geography,technology).ForDOD planning efforts, likely actions of elites in a given region may be included to understand themarket-shareof total influence. It followsthenthat identifyingcriticalGreenActors forhomelandnetassessment inclusioncouldaccount forprivateenterprise suchas socialnetworking sites thatarenotpart of DHS, but can directly enhance or mitigate the efficacy of DHS planning efforts. Thus, oneimportant factor for DHS to consider in standing up a net assessment office is to not only plan forred/external threats, but to include a forecast of downstream consequences of emerging Blue andGreencapabilitiesandlikelyactions.We also argue for an expanded definition of “capability” in the net assessment process. While“capability”traditionallyismeasuredbyHardPower,suchasassetsandtechnologieslikelytoemerge,Ligonarguedthatleadershipcapabilityandotherorganizationalconsiderationsshouldalsobecapturedandcontemplatedinthenetassessmentprocess.Moreover,identifyingemergingtechnologieslikelytobe adopted by aNonstate Adversary (e.g., Da’esh)may also depend on the types of individualswhohavebeen recruitedby leadershipmessaging fromabroad.Withoutunderstanding leader intent, it isdifficult to forecast what Hard Power capability may emerge. Relatedly, Moughon recommended anexpanded measurement of “Power” to include elements of Soft Power. In addition to consideringimplications for emerging technology as a capability, the panel recommended considering theorganizational aspects andanexpanded concept in general of Powerwhen forecasting capabilities ofBlue, Red, andGreen Actors. In areas of homeland security, particularly, it is especially important tounderstandexternalthreatswithabalancedperspectiveofourowninternalcapabilities.

ConsiderationsinApplicationtoHomelandSecurityWhileNCTChastheresponsibilityforproducingnetassessmentsfocusingonterroristthreats,thereisno central office within Homeland Security focusing on threats to the Homeland specifically. Someelements of DHS, such as the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), do appear to conduct netassessments,4asapracticefortheirownareas.However,thepanelcalledforDHStostandupabroaderoffice for net assessments to plan for long-term challenges and infuse more “imagination” versusreactivelyrespondingtothreatsaftertheyemerge.5Becausenetassessmentrequiresanexaminationofathreatrelativetointernalcapabilitiestocounterthatthreat,aDHSnetassessmentwouldrequireaninternal lookatUScounterterrorismcapabilitiesastheycomparetoemergingandfuturethreats. It isalso importanttonotethatcounterterrorismiscertainlynottheonlyemergingthreatforDHStoplanagainst. The upcoming 2018 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) is a capstone strategy

4Dahl,E.(2015).AHomelandSecurityNetassessmentNeededNow!StrategicStudiesQuarterly,Winter2015Issue,pp.67.5JamesJayCarafano,FrankJ.Cilluffo,RichardWeitz,andJanLane,“StoppingSurpriseAttacks:ThinkingSmarteraboutHomelandSecurity,”Backgrounderno.2016,HeritageFoundation,23April2007,http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/04/stopping-surprise-attacks-thinking-smarter-about-homeland-security.


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document that outlines a plan to safeguard the Homeland, and this document could be a roadmapagainstwhichthreatstoplan.Forexample,inthe2014QHSR,fivestrategicprioritieswereidentified:1)securingagainst theevolving terrorismthreat,2) safeguardingandsecuringcyberspace,3)counteringbiological threats and hazards, 4) securing flow of people and goods (e.g., border security and tradelaw),5)executingpublic-privatepartnerships to securecritical infrastructure.6Accordingly, aDHSNetAssessmentOfficecouldfacilitateplanningforBlue,Red,andGreencapabilitiesineachoftheseareastoinformDHSstrategyandallocationofresources.One panel member, Colonel Bill Edwards of Special Operations Northern Command (SOCNORTH),described the challenges of understanding the Blue Network, specifically. For example, he describedissuesfacedinhisrelativelyneworganization,whichoperatesinacomplexenvironmentacrossmultipletitle authorities and areas of responsibilities. One issue to consider when implementing a netassessment in DHS is to understand the true information sharing environment across stakeholders,bridge cultural gaps associated with different services and professional norms, and build lastingrelationshipsthattranscendassignmentcycles.Giventhiscomplexity,itisevenmorecriticaltoestablishanetassessmentbranchtogainaperspectiveofthecollaborativedistancethatexistsamongpartnersinourBlueNetworkandacrosstotheGreennetwork.7Focusingonstrategicthreats,ourcapabilitiestocounterthem,andthenetworkprocessthatfacilitatethem is not enough for a DHS net assessment, however. Erik Dahl, who has done a great deal ofacademicworkon these issues, suggested that a net assessmentprocess forDHSmight consider theeffects of homeland security capabilities on the population it protects—the American people. In his2015articlehewrote,“Ifanational-securitynetassessmentistheappraisalofmilitarybalances,thenahomelandsecuritynetassessmentshouldbetheappraisalofother,equallyimportantbalances,suchasthebalancebetweensecurityandliberty…”8Thus,DahladdsthatinadditiontocapabilitiesofRed,Blue,andGreenActors,aDHSnetassessmentmighthave the requirementofunderstanding theeffectsofsuch efforts on the American people. He argues that this additional requirement be captured in theconcept of legitimacy: are the capabilities our government has developed to keep us safe seen aslegitimate in the eyes of the people they are designed to serve? Thus, evaluating Blue and GreencapabilitiessuchasthoseaffordedunderthePatriotActorthemorerecentTravelBanmayalsoshedlightontheNetefficacyofourcapabilities.In summary, the panel’s proposed DHS net assessment would involve at least three requirements:threats,capabilities,andlegitimacy.TheprocesswouldexamineemergingthreatsoutlinedintheQHSR,including the Red and Green Actors that affect them. In addition, it would examine Blue Actors’capabilities tocounterspecific threats, includinganetworkanalysisofhowagencies in theHomelandSecurityenterprisecollaboratetosolvecomplexproblems.Andfinally,foreachthreat,anetassessmentwouldidentifywhetherthecapabilitiesdevelopedtocounterthemareseenbytheAmericanpeopleaslegitimateorareseenasriskingcivillibertiesorotherdemocraticvalues.

6JehJohnson,The2014QuadrennialHomelandSecurityReview(Washington,DC,DHS,2014),5,http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf.7Ligon,G.S.,Derrick,D.C.,andTousley,S.T.(2017)presentedaframeworkcalled“CollaborativeDistance”atthe10thAnnualHomelandDefense/SecurityEducationSummitasaway-aheadforunderstandingcollaborationinmulti-agencypartnerships.8Dahl,2015.pp.70


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Chapter4:FromFailuretoSuccess:InformationPowerandParadigmaticShiftsinStrategyandOperationalArt-LTC(P)ScottK.Thomson,OSD(Policy)

LieutenantColonel(Promotable)ScottK.ThomsonOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense(Policy),InformationOperationsDirectorate

[email protected]

“Thenationthatwillinsistupondrawingabroadlineofdemarcationbetweenthefightingmanandthethinkingmanisliabletofinditsfightingdonebyfoolsanditsthinkingbycowards.”

-SirWilliamFrancisButler

“Capturingtheperceptionsofforeignaudienceswillreplaceseizingterrainasthenewhighgroundforthefuturejointforce.”

-General(Ret.)JamesMattis

AbstractStrategy is inherently about changing thebehaviorof relevant actors in supportof national interests.Theseactorschoosecertainbehaviorsbaseduponinformationtheyperceiveintheirenvironment.Thismeansinformationmustbeaprimaryplanningconsiderationforthejointforceratherthananenablingcapability.Failurestoachievecampaigngoalsarelargelyduetothejointforce’spoorunderstandingoftheimportanceandnatureofinformation.Tobetterlinktacticstostrategy,thejointforcemustchangebothitsoperationalartanditsculturalmindsettofocusonbehavioraloutcomes.

The Department of Defense is struggling with two important contemporary challenges—gray zonewarfareandtherelatedareasofcounterterrorism,counterinsurgency,andpost-warstabilization.Inthefirstcase,stateactorsdisplacetheutilityofphysicalpowerbyoperatinginwaysthatrestrictoptionsfortheUStoresorttoforce.Inthesecondcase,forceisnecessary,butinsufficienttodestroyordismantleloosely networked organizations. Both cases highlight critical flaws in military thinking and thevulnerabilitiesof adepartmentorganizedalmost exclusively formajor combatoperations.Both casesalso highlight the ascendancy of information as a primary consideration, rather than an enablingcapability,fortheplanningandconductofmilitaryoperations.

Toeffectivelycompete,thejointforcemustadjustitsapproachtooperationalart(thewayitplansandoperates) in a way that preserves our ability to fight, but allows us to achieve enduring strategicoutcomes—in other words, to more predictably influence the behavior of relevant actors.Simultaneously, through education and training, wemust change service and joint culture to reducebiasesthatinhibitqualitystrategicthinkingaboutinfluence(withinformationandphysicalactionsbothbeing components of influence). Until DOD adopts this new paradigm—planning toward behavioraloutcomes—andmakesthenecessarychangestoitscoreoperatingsystem,nocapability-basedsolutionwillyieldtheneededresults.

In today’s world, if success were primarily a question of resources, no other nation or group couldmount a credible threat to the interests of the US. The core problem we face is our institutionalthinking—how we use our military in pursuit of strategic outcomes. The way our leaders look atproblems layersontopoftheplanningsystemstheyusetoproduceafiniterangeofoptionsmuch in


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the way software and hardware interact toward specific purposes. Theoretically, there are noboundaries tousingcurrentoperationalart togenerate informationpowerandguide thebehaviorofrelevant actors. However, the reality is that a regression to mean planning outcomes still exists(Simpson,2013).

Toquestionmilitarycultureandplanningprocessesisbold,andneitherthejointforcenortheservicesare likely to accept easily the premise that the larger system is to blame for strategic failures ofinformationpower.Weareadeptattheplanningprocessesweuse,andweacceptthemassufficient—perhapsevenasexcellent.Andtheyareexcellentforthepurposesofbattle,buttheyappeartofail instrategic applications. Yet, tomy knowledge,we have not systematically tested ourways of thinkingagainstalternatives,buthavesimplysharpenedthedaggerweinheritedfromourpredecessors.

Aswithallsystems,DODisgettingexactlytheresultsithasdesigneditssystemtoyield.Processessuchas Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment, the Joint Planning Process, and targeting areexcellent for “solving the visible part of the problem,” but they fall short of being appropriatewheninfluence is more important than war.9 This statement will likely cause most leaders some form ofcognitivedissonance,asitissimplertoplaceblameelsewherethantoquestionthingsweholdsacred,suchastheoriesofwar,viewsonstrategy,planningprocesses,andevenconceptsofpower.Tosolvetheproblemwe face with influence and strategy, wemust focus first on systemic problems rather thansymptomatic capabilities.Manywho read thiswhitepaperwill think that informationoperations (IO)are the problem, but “failing at IO” is a symptom of the problem. The problem is the contextwithinwhichIOandothermanifestationsofinformationpowersit.

As Lieutenant General Ken Tovo, the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)commanderarticulatedatanAprilSeniorLeaderForumhostedbyUSASOC,“theproblemislikeIO,butit’s bigger.” Significantly, Tovo also lamented that our planning systems tilt us toward battle (clearlyimplyingbattleisoftenaninsufficientorinappropriatesolutiontostrategicproblems),andthatwedowin the fights in which we engage, but we still fail to achieve campaign objectives (conferencediscussion,ExpandingManeuverSeniorLeaderForum,Tyson’sCorner,VA,April5,2017).Thesolutionheandotherleadersseekisinformational,butourcultureandplanningsystemsareblindtotheproperimportanceandplacementofinformationinalllevelsofplanning.

StrategyandPowerTo followthisargument,wemust startby lookingat theconceptsof strategyandpower themselves.Traditionally, strategy is articulated in a taxonomy of ends, ways, means, and risk. In its simplestmanifestation,astrategy(oftenintheformofacampaign)isaplantocauserelevantactorstobehaveinwaysthatsupportUSnationalinterests.TheUSengagesstrategically—includingmilitarycampaigns—tochangeormaintainhumanbehaviorsinsomedesiredwaythatsupportsitsnationalinterests.

Militaryofficerstraditionallythinkofpowerastheabilitytodominateinbattle.This“victorybias”isadangerouslyrestrictedwayof thinking.Whiletheability todominateanopponent isan indispensablecomponentofpowerandanunquestionablemandateforDOD,physicaldominanceisnotpowerinitspurestform,andthe“victorybias”revealsapredominantlytacticalviewofoperations.

9Creditfor“thevisiblepartoftheproblem”goestoMr.JesseBourqueintheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense’sInformationOperationsDirectorate.Heoccasionallylendsaphrasethatbegstobeborrowed.


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DuringnegotiationstoendtheVietnamWaratthe1973ParisPeaceAccords,ColonelHarrySummersremarked toaVietnameseofficer that theUSnever lost abattle in thatwar. TheVietnameseofficeragreed thatwhile Summers’ observationmay have been true, itwas “also irrelevant” (Wood, 2011).Indeed,ArmyDoctrinalPublication1:TheArmyacknowledges“lethality,byitself,isnotenough.IfArmyforcesdonotaddresstherequirementsofnoncombatantsinthejointoperationalareabefore,during,andafterbattle,thenthetacticalvictoriesachievedbyourfirepoweronlyleadtostrategicfailureandworld condemnation” (p. 1-7). Forty-five years after COL Summers’ conversation, leaders are stillstrugglingwiththesamefrustrationsintryingtolinktacticsandstrategy.

WhatCOLSummers’engagementrevealsisthat,ultimately,powerisanactor’sabilitytoachievetheirdesired strategic outcomes or states. Strategic success—not tactical victory—is the purest form ofpower.TheVietnamWarexposedonesituationwherephysicalpowercouldnotyieldpoliticalresults.Victory can also be irrelevant when an adversary displaces the utility of physicalmight by operatingbelowthethresholdofwar(e.g.,grayzoneoperations)oroperatesinlooselynetworkedorganizationsthateasily reorganizeandare therefore immune to systemic collapsewhen itsmembersarekilledorcaptured(e.g.,violentextremistorganizations).

An importantcorollarytostrategyandpowerrevolvesaroundviewsofthepurposeofthe jointforce.TheDepartmentofDefense (2013)states that it is themissionof theUSmilitary to fightandwinthenation’swars (p. I-13).While theability to fightandwinwars isunquestionably critical, leadersmustbroadentheirviewandacceptthatthepurposeofthejointforceistoachievewhateverendspoliticalleaders ask of it.More often than not, this is notwar, but some other task such as preventingwar,consolidatinggainsfollowingawar,providinghumanitarianassistanceordisasterrelief,orsomeotherpoliticalpurpose.MadelineAlbright’sviewofthemilitaryhasprovenhistoricallyvalid.

Thereasonthisviewofstrategy,power,andtheroleofthejointforce is important isthatwhenDODexplicitly articulates clear thinking on these topics, it will find it needs to adjust the way it plansoperations, develops leaders, and invests in capabilities. Commanders will view the purpose ofcampaigns and operations as approaches to modify human behavior and will understand that it isalways the cumulative effect of emergent social behavior that defines progress toward strategicoutcomes.

Behavior,Information,andStrategyWhatever the purpose of a strategy or operation, it is always ultimately tied to a set of humanbehaviors, and it is essential thatweexplicitly state this fact as it changes theway commanders andplannersthink.Whenonestepsbackfromthedailyplanningactivitiesofthejointforce,whetherintheform of global campaign plans being written by the Joint Staff or in the context of Joint Task Forceoperations in Afghanistan, they will see that enumerated behavioral outcomes are typically absent.Plansroutinelymissaunifyinglogicthatonlybehavioralanalysisandoutcomescanprovide.Theresultisthatweoftenconfuseactivitieswithprogress.General(Ret.)StanleyMcChrystalobservedthat:

An inability to understand our surroundings often left a burned-out building or acratered road—a stark symbol of our shortcomings—andwastedprecious time in theoverallcampaign.Wagingsuchcampaigns,designedtopersuadepeopletobehaveinacertainway[emphasisadded],iscomplex(MackayandTatham,2011,p.V).


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The reason this problem exists is that our planning systems are optimized to quickly and efficientlycoordinate the application physical force. Current systems do in fact synchronize the application offirepower for thepurposeofbattle.However, the logicof these systemsbends to thebreakingpointwhen applied to the behavioral outcomes that define strategy.Outside of battle ormajorwar,whatoftenemergesisacollectionofactivitiesthataremerelysimultaneousratherthansynchronized.Thisisthedifferencebetweendrowningandswimming.Ouressentialtaskistoretooloperationalartsothatitanswersboththeneedsofstrategyandbattle.The jointforcecannotcontinuetoapply industrialagethinkingtoinformationagechallenges.

Gharajedaghi(2011),asystemstheorist,statesthatcomplexadaptivesystems(i.e.,socialsystemssuchas populations, violent extremist organizations, and militaries) are “information-bonded” (p. 12). Inother words, information drives human behavior. People make decisions and take actions based onenvironmental observation, culture, history, and amyriad of other complex considerations. If peoplebehave based on the information that they observe in all its forms, and strategy is the pursuit ofbehavioral outcomes in support of national interests, then strategy is actually an approach tomanipulatetheenvironmentofrelevantactorsinwaysthatcueinformationthatdrivesthemtodisplaydesired behaviors. Information must become the pinnacle focus of operational art. As Gharajedaghi(2011)alsostipulates,“Asocialsystemhastobeunderstoodonitsownterms”(p.12).Understandinghuman behavior is a critical capability that the intelligence community must provide at all levels ofoperations.Inotherwords,theintelligencecommunitymustconductanalysisfromthepointofviewofrelevant actors and understand the information that drives the behavior of relevant actors, andcommandersmustbaseoperationsonthisintelligence.

Throughoutthedurationofanoperation,plannersmustdiagnosewhichgroupsorkeyindividualstheywishtoinfluence,similartoidentifyingnamedareasof interest intraditionalcombatoperations.Theymust thenunderstandwhytheyareexhibitingtheircurrentbehaviors thatdiffer fromstrategicgoals.Finally,Pauletal. (2015),recommendthatplannersmustform“theoriesofchange”(p.9), forhowtofavorably change these behaviors. Importantly, behaviorally focused operational art will makemeasuringeffectivenessofeffortsandprogresstowardcampaignsuccessmucheasier.Howeverironicitmaybe, intangible factors yield tangible results.Whenweknowwhatwewantpeople todo,wecancounttheinstancesofthesebehaviorsandmeasureprogresstowardstrategicgoals.

TheInformationalAspectsofMilitaryPowerWhendiscussing influence, thedefault reactionofmilitary leaders is to thinkof IOor its subordinateinformationrelatedcapabilities(IRCs–seeJointPublication3-13:Informationoperations).Theytendtothink of activities to influence in a vacuum that is separate from other operations, such as combat.Further, when leaders do consider IO (and most do), they almost always integrate IO with otheroperations.Inotherwords,IOisasupportingcapabilityandroutinelyaseparatestafffunction.Butinfluence,andthereforeIO,rarelyexists inavacuum.Theexceptioniswhenthereisnomeanstointeractwitha targetaudience,and IO (or relatedactivitiessuchaspublicaffairs)mustbeconductedseparatelyandatadistancefromtherelevantactorsthejointforceseekstoinfluence.Inmostcases,applicationsofinformationmeanttopersuaderelevantactorsisconductedinthesameoperational environment with other physical activities, such as battles or air strikes. These physicalactivities carry their own message. Tanaka argues, “actions are used as the principal ‘language ofcommunication (as cited in Manheim, 2011, p. 215)’.” They modify the environment from which


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relevant actors draw the information that drives their subsequent behaviors. These are the“informational aspects of military power.” These physical actions almost always generate a highervolume of information than any communication that is produced via IRCs. If commanders do notspecificallyplantheseoperationstoproduceinformationthatdrivesthebehaviorsdesiredbyrelevantactors,operationswillbeatriskofproducingtheproverbial“say-dogap.”Worse,operationswilloftenbeconductedinisolationfromstrategy.Again,thispurposeisnotwellservedbycurrentoperationalartandmilitaryculture.

SlayingtheStrawMenOnemustacknowledgethatwhenmakinganargumentthatelevatestheimportanceofinformationandbehaviorseveralroutine,thougheasilydisproved,objectionssurface:

• “Thisisnotourjob.”• “Thiscannotbedone.”• “Wealreadydothis.”• “Thiswillcosttheservicescombatcapability.”

“Thisisnotourjob.”Thisstatementusuallyariseswhenonementionstheword“influence.”Buteventraditionalcombathasapurposelargerthandestruction.There,thepurposeistodefeatthewilloftheenemyintraditionalClausewitzianterms.But“will”isincompletebyitself.Itisthewilltodosomething,andthatmeanswillisactuallyabehavior.Influenceisthepurposeofthejointforce.Further,sincewecannot typically isolate“influence” fromotheractivities, to includediplomacy, itmustbeeverybody’sjob,oritsuffersfromatragedyofthecommons.“This cannot bedone.” If planning towardbehavioral outcomes cannot bedone, then the joint forceshouldshedcapabilitiessuchasmilitarydeception,militaryinformationsupportoperations(MISO),civilaffairs,andpublicaffairs.Eachofthesecapabilitiesareinherentlylinkedtomoldingbehaviors,andeachrequiresplanningtowardthoseoutcomes.Eventypesofmissions,suchascounterinsurgency,areaimedatchangingaselectgroupofbehaviors.Planningtowardbehavioraloutcomesisnotonlypossible,itisroutine. MISO already has a planning process called target audience analysis (TAA) focused onbehavioraloutcomes,butitisnotuseddoctrinallytoguideunitoperations,onlyMISO(whichroutinelyincludes physical actions as well as communication [Special text 33-01: Military information supportoperations process, 2014, p. 2-1]). If one wants to see how possible it is to plan toward behavioraloutcomes,theyneedonlylookattherichbodyofliteraturedocumentingtheuseofsocialpsychologyandbehavioraleconomics to see thedramaticandscientificallyvalidbehavioralplanningapproaches.Thatthejointforcehasyettoadoptthesemethodsmakesthemnolessvalid.“Wealreadydothis.”Thisstatementusuallyreferstoeitheroperations ingeneral,or IO inparticular.Wedoplanoperationstowardacommander’sintendedendstate.However,thebehavioralcomponentistypicallyabsent,andsoplanningtowardbehavioraloutcomesthatsupportstrategyisimplied,ratherthan specified. Further, the best routes to persuasion are assumed, rather than planned using validbehavioralanalysisandinformedbyknowledgeofbehavioralscience.ItistruethatunitsdoexecuteIO,but in the currentdoctrinal construct, IO is a largely separateand supporting staff activity. IOalmostneverplaysadominantroleinoperations.Tobeeffective,IOneedstobedoneinacontextofasystemdesignedforinfluencinghumanbehaviors.“Thiswillcost theservicescombatcapability.”Atsomeminor level, this ispossibly true.Forexample,theArmydoesnothavetheMISOforcesitneedstosupportlong-termstabilityoperationssuchasitdid


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duringtheheightsofoperationsinIraqandAfghanistan,andtheintelligencecommunity issimplynotyet resourced to support thisparadigmatic shift.However, two facts standout. The first is that greattacticsandphysicalcapabilityareirrelevantiftheydonotachievestrategicaims,andsuccessisdefinedbycollectivesocialbehaviors.Second,thissimplyisnotanargumentfornewlarge-scaleinvestmentininfluence capabilities. While new capabilities and capacity are likely necessary, the first and mosteffective approach is tobetter employ the force at handby improving theway the forceemploys itscurrentassets.Adoptingthisnewparadigmisaboutclearerthinking.TheWayAheadTheJointStaffisinvaryingstagesofthreeseparate,butrelated,jointconceptsthatwillhelpmakethisnewparadigmareality.Thoughtherearedebatesoverwhichconcept issupportedbytheothertwo,they are all necessary. The first is the Joint Concept for Operations in the Information Environment(JCOIE). This concept explores how to combine physical and informational activities toward a goal ofchanging thebehaviorof relevantactors.Thesecond is the JointConcept for IntegratedCampaigning(JCIC),whichmentionsbehaviorsinanumberofplaces,andisdesignedtobetterharnessthepotentialofwholeofgovernmentapproachestocampaigning.ThethirdistheJointConcept–HumanAspectsofMilitaryOperations(JC-HAMO),whichwillhelpthejointforcebetterunderstandthedriversofhumanbehavior. Finally, the Joint Staff ismoving tomake “information” the only new joint function in overtwentyyears.

Whichconceptisthe“lead”conceptamongthethreeisirrelevant.Whatallthreeconceptsandajointfunctionforinformationimplyisthatwemustboldlyquestionourplanningprocessesandensurethattheysupportstrategicoutcomeswhilepreservingtacticalcapabilities.Throughtrainingandeducation,we candevelop leaderswho thinkdifferently in the future than theyhave in thepast.COLSummersshared his vignette because of his revelation that something in our thinking needed to change ifwewere toachieve strategic successes.Hewas struckwithhow limitedour thinkingwasover theentiredurationoftheVietnamWar.Thatthinkingisstilllargelyembeddedincontemporarymilitaryculture.

Toshiftourdominantparadigmwilltakeaconcertedeffortanddirectionbysenior leaderswithinthedepartment.Wemustmodify policy, doctrine, training, and education, andmust build stronger linkswith partners within the US government and between partner nations. Strategy, in the form ofcampaignplans, is inherently informationalbecause relevantactorsbehavebasedon the informationtheyperceive.Thedepartmentmustrealizethatwhileitlookstoimproveinformationalcapabilities,itismore important to firstmodify the operating system of the joint force so that it can realize the fullpowerofinformationtoachievestrategy.

Note:Theviewsexpressed in thispaperareLTC(P)Thomson’s,anddonotrepresent theviewsof theOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense.

ReferencesDepartmentofDefense(2013).Jointpublication1:DoctrineforthearmedforcesoftheUnitedStates.

Washington,D.C.GovernmentPrintingOffice.

Department of Defense (2014). Joint publication 3-13: Information operations. Washington, D.C.GovernmentPrintingOffice.


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Gharajedaghi, Jamshid (2011). Systems thinking: Managing chaos and complexity. Burglington, MA.MorganKaufman.

Headquarters, Department of the Army (2012).Army doctrinal publication 1: The army.Washington,D.C.GovernmentPrintingOffice.

Headquarters,UnitedStatesArmy JohnF.KennedySpecialWarfareCenterandSchool (2014).Specialtext 33-01:Military information supportoperationsprocess. FortBragg,N.C.GovernmentPrintingOffice.

Mackay,A.,&Tatham,S. (2011).Behavioralconflict:Whyunderstandingpeopleandtheirmotivationswillprovedecisiveinfutureconflict.Essex,UnitedKingdom.MilitaryStudiesPress.

Manheim,JarolB.(2011).Strategyininformationandinfluencecampaigns:Howpolicyadvocates,socialmovements,insurgentgroups,corporations,governmentsandothersgetwhattheywant.NewYork,NY.Routledge.

Paul,C.,Yeats, J.,Clarke,C.P.,Matthews,M. (2015).Assessingandevaluatingdepartmentofdefenseefforts to inform, influence, and persuade: Desk reference. Santa Monica, CA. RAND NationalDefenseResearchInstitute.

Simpson, Emile (2013).War from the ground up: Twenty-First-Century combat as politics. New York,NewYork.OxfordUniversityPress.

Wood, David (2011, 14 February). The Afghanistan war: Tactical victories, strategic stalemate? TheAmericanAudacity.Retrievedfromhttp://theamericanaudacity.blogspot.com/2011/02/

afghanistan-war-tactical-victories.html#!/2011/02/afghanistan-war-tactical-victories.html.


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Chapter5:RethinkingControlandInfluenceintheAgeofComplexGeopoliticalSystems-COL(R)CharlesEassa,SCO,Dr.ValerieSitterle,GTRI,Dr.RobertToguchi,USASOC,Dr.NicholasWright,UniversityofBirmingham

COLCharlesEassa(USA,Ret)StrategicCapabilitiesOffice

[email protected]

Dr.RobertToguchiChief,ConceptsDivision

[email protected]

Dr.ValerieSitterleGeorgiaTechResearchInstituteValerie.Sitterle@gtri.gatech.edu

Dr.NicholasWright

InstituteforConflictandSecurityUniversityofBirmingham,[email protected]

AbstractThefutureofconflictfacingtheDODisevolvinginwaysthatdemandamoresynergisticapproachthanwe have traditionally taken across the human and technical dimensions. To date,military operationshavecharacteristically focusedoncompellingadversariesthroughthethreatorapplicationof forcetoachievevictory(i.e.,“control”).Changingenvironmentalfactors,increasedactivismbynon-stateactors,technology,andrecentlessonslearnedsuggestthattheDODwillbechallengedtoadoptrevised,ifnotentirelynewapproachestoaffectanddirecttheoutcomesofmilitaryoperations.Towardsuchends,theDOD will need to focus upon the factors and forces that exert the necessary influence to producedesiredbehavioraloutcomesacrosscomplexandintermeshedhumanandtechnicalsystems.ControlandtheChangingCharacterofWarfareAdvances in societyhavealwaysdirectly influenced theevolutionarydevelopmentof themethodsbywhichwarfare iswaged.Forexample,theadventofboththeAmericanandFrenchRevolutions inthe1700sledtothelarge-scalemobilizationsofpopulationsduringtheNapoleonicwars.Somecallthisthedemocratizationofwarfare.Later,thetechnologicaladvancesprevalentintheFirstIndustrialRevolutioninvolving railroads, telegraphs, steam ships, and rifling of gunpower weapons contributed to themethodsinwhichWorldWarIwaswaged.Next,theSecondIndustrialRevolutionbroughtadvancesinmechanization, transportation, bombers, precision tools, radar, sonar, and large-scale production ofmunitions to affect the prosecution of World War II. Similarly, the advent of the atomic andthermonuclearbombs followingWWII led toaperiodofPentomicWarfare reflecting theseadvances.Later, in the 1970s, the digitization of society contributed to the shift toward precision guidedmunitions, GPS, digital communications, and the impact of micro-electronics on the character ofwarfare.

DuringtheWorldWarIIera,ourUSDefensefocuswasentirelyonmilitarypower,specificallypersonnelandweapons.Thosewereourvectorsofcontrol,andtheyformedthebasisformaterielandcapabilitydevelopment. As the world order evolved, defense structures and the sociopolitical dynamics thatshapedthemchanged.Bythemid1980s,theUSDefensefocusconsequentlyshiftedtothenumberofsoldiersintheNATOconsortiumandlevelsofdedicationtonationstateswithclearideasaboutdefense


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of territory. Capability and capacity-level attention extended toward technology, space, andcommunication frontiers. Today, however, if you ask amember of our community (whethermilitaryofficer, analyst, or subject matter expert scientist) about control, the responses you receive are asdifferentastheindividuallenses.

Notionsofcontroltodaybleedintothoseofinfluence:neitherisseparablefromtheotherthoughtheyaredistinctlydifferent in their implicationsandanyoperational realization. In thepresent, research isdriven by multi-national corporations charging ahead on new technology development and aproliferation of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) shaping their own operational spheres ofinfluencearoundtheglobe.Nationstatesandaffiliated,orevenrogue,groupshavejoinedthefraytointentionallyadd“noise”totargetedsub-spheresofcacophony,exploitinghumannature,technologicaladvance,andsocio-dynamicssimultaneouslytoachievedisruptiveeffect.Whereasnationalandethnicboundariespreviouslyprovidedaconstrainingforceonourconceptionofconflict,adversariestodayandtheinfluencestheywieldarefrequentlynon-kineticandamorphous—eveninspatiallysensitiveregions.

WhatisInfluence?The terms control and influence are often used interchangeably, but in the context of military anddiplomatic actions, represent distinct functions. Control implies a greater exertion of specific effort,usually requiring sustained levels of forcewith associated resources to obtain a specific outcome. Bytraditionalmilitary definition, control is the regulation of forces and battlefield operating systems toaccomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent. This has very Newtonian (i.e.,linear) implications of connectedness. The specificity of control also usually includes temporal andsequentialconstraints,wheretacticsarenecessarilyinterdependent.

Influence,ontheotherhand,impliesamorerelaxedandunspecificstructure,recognizingthedynamicnatureoftheenvironment.Thisdynamismisduetothecomplexityofthetargetandthesubtler(andunpredictable) effects of influence operations. Influence is affecting the behaviors, attitudes, orperceptionsofothers(e.g.,deterrenceandescalationmanagement). Inthisrespect, influence ismoresubjective, fluid, andmore likely to require resources and authorities beyond the traditionalmilitarydomain. Control and influence are often visualized as opposing states at either end of the control-compel-coerce-influence spectrum. They are, however, interacting dynamic states with a highly non-linearrelationship.

Toeffectivelyinfluence,weneedtobeabletoanticipatehowagivenaudienceisgoingtodecide;whatweknowaboutdecision-makingiscriticaltounderstandinginfluence.Forexample,peopletendtothinkonlyonetotwostepsaheadanddonotanticipatetheentireprocesswhenmakingdecisions.Weneedto listen better to those we seek to influence and improve how we present evidence to properlycapitalize on that knowledge. The operational question we need to ask is “How do we develop thecapabilitiestostrategicallyinfluenceenvironmentalelementsordynamicstomaintainbehaviorswithinbounds we believe are necessary from a Defense perspective?” Preserving these bounds, despiteuncertaintywithinthebounds,allowsforabetter‘strategiccontrol’aswecanmorepredictablymovewithinthespace.

TheInformationAgeAnother factor we face is the accelerating pace of change in the information age, which is directlyaffectingthecharacterofwarbyharnessingthecapabilitiesofsuper-empoweredgroupsorindividualsin the waging of conflict. The ubiquity of data and its exponential growth, created by humans and


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machines, increasingconnectiveaccess,andmobility isacceleratingthepaceofchangeandincreasingtheglobalecosystemcomplexity, itself increasinglyGray.Whilehumanmotivationsunderlyingconflictare relatively static (e.g.,desire to increasepower), theenvironmentandcontext surroundinghumanbehaviormoderateshowthatbehaviormanifests.

In the sociotechnical realm, control versus influence relates tomany things, among them the role ofmedia, rapid and overwhelming dissemination of falsehoods, truths, truthsmodifiedwith falsehoods,andinformationthoughtprotectedandreleasedwithoutwarning.“Spaces”intheinformationrealmareabstract realizations of socio-dynamics through which ideas (drivers) and actors (people and,increasingly, machines) interact complexly. Emergent patterns of behavior are too chaotic to beexplicitlypredictedordirectlycontrolled.

These factorsare creating significant changes in capabilities for individuals,nonstateactors, andnearpeercompetitors,whicharechangingthenatureofpower—powerisdiffusing.Peopleandpopulationswill quickly become a more decisive factor in warfare. This presents an awkward truth. “Influence,”especially of “non-combatants,” has very negative connotations to Western mores. Yet the need todevelop influence as a strategic capability in spaces not customarily addressed by the DefensecommunityispreciselytherealityofGrayZoneconflicttodayandfortheforeseeablefuture.

AdaptationIntheasymmetricwarfarecommunity,thereisanadagefromlongagothatholdstoday:“Whendoesathreatadapt?When ithasto.”HavingwitnessedDesertStormIandII,stateadversarieshave learnedtheUSplaybookandhavefoundnewwaysinwhichtocompete.Thespacebetweenpeaceandwarhasbecomeanewbattlearea,ifnotthemainbattlearea,thatouradversariesaretargetingforoperations.Stateadversariesrecognizevulnerabilitiesinthetimetakentogaininternationalandpublicconsensusontheneedforintervention.Byhidingtheidentificationofcombatants,leveragingthehumanterrainofdense populations, creating fake news, and contesting the authenticity of media reporting, stateadversaries can exploit temporary decision paralysis to accomplish their policy objectives.We cannotexpecttoplaythesamewargamesofthepastandgetthesameresults—ouradversariesareadaptingandsoareourconflicts.Modernwarfare isbecomingmoreaboutdetectionanddecidingwhat todowithwhatwasdetectedthan about deploying mass as it was historically. Kinetic actions are not always straight forward,practical, or desirable. When they are not, and when the US Defense community faces ambiguousproblemswithdiversedatasourcesandvariedinterpretationsofthatdata,howdowemakeactionabledecisions? We must extend our capability focus beyond an emphasis on ‘observe’ to improve the‘orient, decide, and act’ parts of theproblem space.As before, this is likely to require resources andauthoritiesbeyond the traditionalmilitarydomainand theanswers to thecapabilitydevelopmentweseekmaybequitedifferentatthestrategic,operational,andtacticallevels.

TechnologyandScaleMateriel development is a perfect complement todiscussions about the changingnatureofwhatweneed in terms of capability. Rapid development across an increasingly contextual operationalenvironment, where widely available technology evolution changes what system capabilities arenecessary, exacerbates the threat of hybrid warfare and confounds traditional superiority short oftraditional war. Moreover, all too often, materiel developments are specific to realizing kineticcapabilities. Commanders in the field today find they need capabilities of a very different type to


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integrate the complex interactions across kinetic and nonkinetic, military and civilian, state andnonstate,economicsandideologythattogethercombinetoinfluenceanAreaofResponsibility.

PresentchallengesinmaterielsolutionsexemplifywhythechallengeswefaceinaglobalGrayZonearesoconfounding.Consideraswarmofunmannedautonomousvehiclesasasystemwhereeachvehicleconstitutes a node and they are dependent on communications or data transfer between them toachieveagivenoperationaleffect.Eachnodecanconnect toanyothernode,andall connectionsaretwo-way.Inathree-nodesystem(nodes1,2,3),forexample,connectionsbetweennodes(Abetween1-2,Bbetween2-3,andCbetween1-3)canbeonoroffforanynumberofreasons.Therearethereforeeight possible states of the system: {} (no connections), {A} (only connection A is on), {B}, {C}, {A,B}(nodes1-2and2-3areconnected),{A,C},{B,C},{A,B,C}(allconnectionson).Thenumberofstatesscaleswiththenumberofnodes(n)as2^(n*(n-1)/2).A10-nodesystem—justtennodes—willhave45possibleconnectionsandover3.5E13possiblesystemstates.Thenumberofpossiblestatesfora30-nodesystemwillexceedtheestimatednumberofatomsintheknown,observableuniverse(whichis1078-1082).Wearesimplynotcapableof testingeveryscenarioandproducingunambiguousperformancebounds forsuchsystems.

There are three important lessons to take from this discussion. Firstly, we need new approaches tocapabilitydevelopmentandvalidationandverification(V&V)whenfacedwithintractableenumerationsofpossibleoutcomes.Secondly, controlandautonomyarenot thesamething.Thesesystemscannotfunction using traditional control schemes and require strategically engineered autonomy to guide(influence) overall system behavior to be what we need and prefer. Thirdly, this relates directly tochallenges we face in development of sociotechnical capabilities and operations in the informationspace.We need to develop sound capabilities, butwewill be forced into new paradigms for vettingthese capabilities becausewe cannot explicitly predict or bound the possible outcomes.Wewant toinfluencetheoutcomestostaywithinperformanceorbehaviorboundswithwhichwearecomfortabletosupportacertainspectrumofoperationsinstrategic,operational,ortacticaldimensions.Moreover,wemusttradebetweencompleteself-determination(control,limitedtoself)versusinfluence(ofothersystemelements)toshapecircumstancesinourenvironment.

CognitiveManeuverTheUSDefensefocusonmaterielcapabilitiesovertheyearshasensuredadegreeofsuperiorityinthephysicaldomain.Justasweexcelinthe‘observe’spaceandfalterinthe‘orient,decide,andact’spaces,wesimilarlylaginthecognitivedomain.Wemaycontrolanareawithmassandkineticmeans(physical),but influence and cultural norms are established and maintained through relationships (cognitive)between the people and groups within and, thanks to technological advances, even outside of thatphysicalspace.Non-physicalconnectionsandtheinfluencedynamicstheysupportarevitaltomanagingmodernconflicts.Cognitiveterrainisbecomingincreasinglyvitaltowieldinginfluence—oftenwithverysubstantialresults—intheglobalGrayZoneofpsychological,informational,andunconventionalconflictoperations.However,ourexcellenceinkineticforceandmassdonothelpustakeandholdthatterrainatall.

Atpresent,US conventional forcesdonothaveprovenandeffectivedoctrine for the cognitive spacedespitewidespreadconsensusthatouradversariesareout-maneuveringusinthisdomain.Weneedtobeginwith becomingmore knowledgeable about howothers aremaneuvering in the cognitive spaceandabouthowwecanimproveourcapabilitiesandcapacityinthearea.Moreover,standardizedDODtools for cognitive visualization, cognitive modeling and simulations, and cognitive assessments are


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lacking.Thisisinpartbecauseitishard,itisaspacewedonotunderstandaswellasthekineticoneandso are not as comfortable there, systems are too complex to be bounded using traditional analyticalmethods, and we have not yet considered what new approaches and paradigms it will take to fieldcognitivemaneuverasadistinctcapability.Yet,iftheUSmilitaryisgoingtobepreparedandeffectiveforfutureconflicts,thisisadeficitwemustaddresswithacogentstrategy.

Conclusions–WhatistheCapabilityfortheFuture?FortheUSDefensecommunity,theworldhasbecomeagiganticGrayZone.Transience—manifestedbyconnectivity or action—is omnipresent. Organizations are frequently an instantiation of interactiveprocess, and vulnerabilities are no more static than the system. Adversaries, some of which are ill-defined or not even identified as adversaries, operatewith little regard for increasingly disappearingrules of Westphalian order. They exploit the nature of operating within a Gray Zone, engaging andadvancingyet staying just shortof thewell-defined framesandcriteria fordeclaringwar.Adversariesbothstateandnonstatetakeadvantageoftechnology-enabledasymmetriestoadaptquickly,disguiseintentthroughdistributedtactics,andengage ina“strategyof influence.”Theirgoalsarenotphysicaldamage via kinetic means but rather disrupting the internal coherence of an enemy system.Increasingly, the US and its allies are that enemy system. If we try to address these problems fromtraditionalapproachesorsimplymirrorapproachesalreadybeingundertakenbyouradversaries,thenwedonotchangethelandscape.Wedonotcreateadisruptiveinfluencethatdifferentiates“us”from“them” or stress the capacity of our adversaries to adapt and thereby place ourselves in a betternationalsecurityposition.

TheimplicationsfacingtheUSDefensecommunityareprofound.Weneedtocontrolbehaviorsacrosssystems not amenable to direct control. We need those system behaviors to stay within certainbounds—which may be entirely different across strategic, operational, and tactical domains—thatenabletheUSmilitarytoeithermoreeffectivelyoperateinconflictto“control”themissionoutcomesorprevent larger-scaleconflicts fromdevelopingaltogether.Wemustdevelop influenceasastrategiccapability in a Gray Zone of varied scales, dimensions, and adversary types with the intent of“controlling”behaviors,largelyoperatingthere,andyetnotlosethecapabilitytoenforcedirectcontrolviakineticmeansifnecessaryfornationalsecurity.Thatisnotatrivialbalance.Analytically and cognitively speaking, our traditional view of structures and how we act on them(whethermilitary, technological, social, political, etc.) is hierarchical and tree-likewhere physical andfunctionalrelationshipsareclearlydelineatedandunderstood.TheglobalGrayZoneisnot likethatatall, but rather a hypergraph spreading across and through an amorphousmedium.We cannot bruteforceitsanalysisortreatitasatreeandexpecttoachievetheoutcomeswerequire.Asacommunity,wemustembraceanontraditionalviewofwhatitmeanstohaveandfieldacapability:Withtheabovecharacterizationsinmind,weneedtoanswersomekeyquestionsandchallenges:

• Whatsystemsdoweneedtoinfluenceinstrategic,operational,andtacticaldomains?• Doweunderstandwhy,meaninghowinfluencingthemcanaffectoverallsystembehaviors?• To understand how, we need to (a) discover ways to describe an effective representation

despitespecificlinksandcausalrelationshipsbeingpotentiallyhiddenfromexplicitviewand(b)findnewapproachestoevaluatesystemsandtheimpactofactions(oursandothers’).

• Howdoweimplementthesecapabilitieswhentheirverynatureandtargetsrequireresourcesandauthoritiesbeyondthetraditionalmilitarydomain?


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This requires us to rationally develop influence as a strategic capability to impact decisionmaking intargeted spheres of influence completely outside of traditional materiel development pathways, notleavingittoadhocimplementation.

FiveBulletPoints• Thechangingnatureofconflictrequiresustoaddressthedistinctionsbetweenmilitarycontrol

andinfluenceastheyapplytoUSmilitaryoperations.

• Advances in technology are creating significant changes and asymmetries in capabilities forindividuals,non-stateactors,andnearpeercompetitorsthatare,inturn,changingthenatureofpower.

• Ouradversarieshaveadapted tousing influenceasa strategic capability, staying just shortofthe well-defined frames and criteria for declaring war and consequently confounding ourtraditionalprowessinsheermassandkineticcapacity.

• TheUSDefensecommunitymustrationallydevelopinfluenceasastrategiccapabilitytoimpactdecision making in targeted spheres of influence completely outside of traditional materieldevelopmentpathways,notleavingittoadhocimplementation.

• WemustdevelopinfluenceasastrategiccapabilityinaGrayZoneofvariedscales,dimensions,andadversarytypeswiththeintentof“controlling”behaviors,largelyoperatingthere,andyetnot lose the capability to enforce direct control via kinetic means if necessary for nationalsecurity.


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Chapter6:MetaphorforaNewAge:Emergence,Co-evolution,Complexity,orSomethingElse?-Dr.AllisonAstorino-Courtois,NSI,Dr.ValerieSitterle,GTRI,Dr.CoreyLofdahl,SoSA,CAPT(Ret)ToddVeazie,NCTCDr.AllisonAstorino-CourtoisNSI,[email protected],[email protected]

Dr.ValerieSitterleGeorgiaTechResearchInstituteValerie.Sitterle@gtri.gatech.eduCAPTToddVeazie(USN,Ret)[email protected]

AbstractAsglobalizationandsociotechnicalconvergencecollidewiththecontinuingevolutionof thepost-ColdWar security environment, do we know the appropriate metaphors to describe our world? Ourenvironment is now characterized by non-uniformity and starts, stops, and leaps across orders ofmagnitude, and across geographical areas and socio-economic- political sectors. How do the lensesthroughwhichwe view and draw conclusions about various aspects of theworld and the behaviorswithin itchange?Whatwecanperceiveandhenceactupon?Understandingthenatureofparadigmsandhowweusethemtoprovide insight in theUSDefensecommunity iscritical tohowwellwemayfacefuturesecuritychallenges.ParadigmsandMetaphors–What’stheDifferenceandWhatareTheyGoodFor?Ametaphorguidesourunderstandingbydrawingaparalleltophenomenawecomprehendwell,oratleast feelwedo.Aparadigm, incontrast, isnormative.Asweapply themtostudyandanalyze in theoperational environment space, they shape our thought patterns, theories, researchmethods, and—consequently—ouranalyticalconclusions.InhissecondeditionofTheStructureofScientificRevolutions,Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn, 1970) defined a scientific paradigm as: "universally recognized scientificachievementsthat,foratime,providemodelproblemsandsolutionsforacommunityofpractitioners,”namelyassomethingthatspecifies:

• whatistobeobservedandscrutinized,• thekindofquestionsthataresupposedtobeaskedandprobedforanswers inrelationtothis

subject,• howthesequestionsaretobestructured,• whatpredictionsmadebytheprimarytheorywithinthediscipline,and• howtheresultsofscientificinvestigationsshouldbeinterpreted.

ForKuhn,aparadigmembodiedpreconceptions,andhedevelopedhisessaysspecificallyforthenaturalandphysicalsciences.Socialsciences,withtheirflairforopenlyembracinganomaliesinsteadofseekingconformation, caused his great distress: “Even more important, spending the year in a communitycomposedpredominantlyofsocialscientistsconfrontedmewithunanticipatedproblems...Particularly,Iwas struck by the number and extent of the overt disagreements between social scientists about the


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natureof legitimatescientificproblemsandmethods.…somehow, thepracticeofastronomy,physics,chemistry,orbiologynormallyfailstoevokethecontroversiesoverfundamentalsthattodayoftenseemendemicamong,say,psychologistsorsociologists”(Kuhn,1970,VolII,No.2,pvii-viii).

Despite Kuhn’s feelings, social scientists proceeded to adopt a Kuhnian view of paradigms and theirdescriptive role. “Dominant paradigms” describe the values and associated basis of thought that aremost widely held in a society at a given time; “paradigms shifts” denote changes in how societiesorganize and understand their perceptions regarding the world. Paradigmsmatter a great deal withrespect to howwedrawand interpret information for operational purposes—even if social scientistswield themdifferently fromKuhn’s intent. For the remainder of this chapter,wewill briefly describewhyparadigmsmattertotheUSDefensecommunityandthemodernchallengeswefaceinusingthemtoproducetangibleinsightsandactionableinformation.

LensesandHowtheWorldHasChangedWe have for years applied a Westphalian lens to the world, where states are primary actors andpurveyors.IntheColdWarera,wehadaveryUS-centricandbipolarview,whichresultedinadoptingasentimentofcoercivepowerasthemotivatorforourglobalactions.Thatworld,however,haschangeddramatically. Power has diffused over time, the very nature of what constitutes a threat and—critically—how that threat is realized have drifted seemingly far away from the understanding wethoughtwas concrete. Theworldhas changed. Yet,havewenotheard thatbefore?Why is this timedifferent?Certainly, the nature of power, connectivity, and even transience has changed considerablywith theadvent of technologies that empower state and nonstate actors alike. Future conflictwillmost likelyinvolve a mixture of sovereign state and nonstate threats acting across competing and cooperatingdimensionswith varying degrees of asymmetry to produce a highly complex system. Terrorism is nolonger spatially confined or built from shared experiences in battles as it was for the AfghanMujahedeen. Today, affiliation with nearly any ideological group is as simple as an individualdeclaration.Global threats ingeneralhavebecomemore impersonal tosomeandpersonal toothers,but they are increasingly dispersed and amorphous. Regardless, the US Defense community mustunderstandhowtomakesenseofthisworldinwaysthatareinformed(correctly)andactionable.Today we still believe that the US exists in a world split between democratic and non-democraticregimes.WearestillUS-centric inourview,rational,andstill focusedonmilitarycoercivepower.Wesee a stronger role for ideology in driving present conflict, however, and recognize that intra-stateconflicts can produce a contagion effect quite relevant to our national interests. Because of thesebeliefs, we are more interested in evaluating the sources of conflicts, especially with respect tonationalismandgrievancesthatmayproduceconflictsthatcouldimpactusconsiderably.Perhapsthen,ourlensesthroughwhichweviewtheworldand,consequentlytheparadigmsweapplytounderstandandcharacterizeitsactorsandtheirbehaviors,havenotchangedsignificantlybutrathersimply expanded. To decipher the implications this may have for national security, we need to firstunderstandhowandwhereweuseparadigmsinsupportofUSdefense.WhyDoWeNeedParadigmsandWhatCanWeTangiblyDoWithThem?Wehaveusedmanymetaphorsovertheyearstoexplainthecomplexity inherent intheworld.Some,such as ecosystems and co-evolutionary systems explain competitive, symbiotic behaviors but imply


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both a continuous system and continuous change. Other metaphors, which were occasionallyinstantiated in executable models, like cell-cell interactions and other biologically inspired dynamicframeworks, sought instead to explain cooperation but still imply uniformity in space or time. Again,however,tocaptureonetrait,welostanother.

Theworld today is both non-uniform and discontinuous. It is characterized by leaps across orders ofmagnitudeandacrossgeographicalareasandsocio-economic-politicalsectors.Technology,forexample,doesnotjustremovespatialbarrierstoproduceenhancedconnectivityandspeedofdisseminationbutcreates filters and echo chambers that serve as discrete percolation points influencing beliefs andbehaviors.

In theory, we can always make an existing model agree with past observations by making it morecomplicated.While improving itsapplicability tocapturing thepast,however, thisusually reduces themodel’spredictiveabilities. So,what shouldwedo?Everyoneappliesmetaphors toenhancecultural,political, economic, organizational, and biological sense making. When rigorously applied—even ifdifferentversionsareapplieddifferentlybydifferentgroups—theseparadigmsprovideuswithamentalstructurethathelpsusframeandunderstandtheoperationalenvironmentandrelatetotheworld.Tothepractitioner,theyprovideascaffoldtowhichwecantetherourpolicyandplanningassumptionsanddecisions.Theirexplanatorypowerrangesfromtacticaltostrategic,andthegreaterthecomplexityoftheenvironment,thegreatertheexplanatorypotential.

Itseemsreasonabletosaythatasweattempttounderstandandcopewiththeglobalnationalsecurityenvironment, we must also challenge our assumptions about legacy paradigms that areunderperforming in the faceof rising interactivecomplexity.Howdoweupdateourunderstandingoftherulesofthesystem(s),however?Ifweneednewparadigms, istheresufficientcommongroundtodetermineifanewoneisbetter?

Asacommunity,ifweseektoapplyand/orreplaceparadigms,weneedtoestablishsufficientcommonstandards of description andmeasures of comparison.Wemaynever reconcile all the various lensesprevalentthroughoutthesocial,cultural,political,andotherdimensionsweseektoexplain,butbeingable to tangibly explain their differences matters. It matters because we typically capture and useparadigmsastoolstocreateactionableinformationabouthighlycomplexsystems.

ChallengesofContextandExecutionComplexityandSystemDynamicsThere is usually amismatch between how realworld complex systemswork and howwe think theywork.Ourmodelsandtheparadigmsonwhichtheyarefoundedare imperfectrepresentationsofthereal-worldsystem.Despitethegap,therearedifferentwaysthroughwhichwecanapplysystemrulessimplyandstillderiveabasicunderstandingof thecomplexity,expanse,andemergentpossibilitiesofour system. The classic work of Friedrich von Hayek, Herbert Simon, and Jay Forrester continues toprovideinsightsintothecomplexpolicyproblemsoftoday.Specifically,JayForrester’ssystemdynamics(SD) simulation modeling (Forrester 1971; Sterman 2000) addresses three forms of complexity thatcontinue tobedevilpolicymakers: (1) integrative, stock-flowcausal relationships, (2)nonlinear causalrelationships, and (3) and feedback causal relationships, both reinforcing (positive) and balancing(negative).Eachofthesecausalrelationshipsisconfusingtothehumancognitionandmakesthesystembehavior that features them hard to understand and predict. When all three are present, then the


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system’s behavior becomes impossible to predict. This complexity reveals itself in relationship topeople’s inability to predict even fairly simple system behavior—what Herbert Simon calls “boundedrationality” (Simon 1990). This inability to predict the behavior of complex social systems accuratelyreveals itself as policy resistance (Hayek 1964) and unintended consequences (Forrester 1971). SDleveragesmoderncomputationtoaddresssystemcomplexitytohelpthehumanmindunderstandtheworkingofandrecognizethepatternswithincomplexsystems.

SDisalsoeffectiveatintegratingmultipletypesofsystemsandexpertise,makingitespeciallyusefulforsynchronizing and choreographing the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME)elementsofnationalpowerassociatedwithwholeofgovernmentsolutions.TheseelementsofnationalpowercanthenbebroughttobearonSDmodelsthatintegratenaturalandsocialsystemsandthatcanbe comprisedofhundredsof complex causal relationships. SDdepicts such relationshipsusingpartialdifferential equations that areexecutedquickly andaccuratelywith computation, something that thehumanmindisincapableofdoing.Simulationprovidesthecapabilitytoperformingscenarioanalysisaswellas toevaluateandrefineproposedpolicies to improve theirprobabilityof success isgreaterandreducetheircostintermsoftime,money,andhumanlives.

The ability of system dynamics to address system complexity and support “whole of government”analysiswasdemonstratedby theDARPAConflictModeling,PlanningandOutcomesExperimentation(COMPOEX) program in themid-2000s (Kott andCorpac 2007). Plans that spannedboth political andmilitary (Pol-Mil) features were depicted in a suite of 14 simulation models, 11 of which were SDmodels. Traditionally political andmilitary operations were treated as separate “lanes” and pursuedindividually, but COMPOEX showed that simulation could integrate and test various combinations ofpoliticalandmilitarypolicies.TheimportanceofthiscapabilitybecameapparentinAfghanistanandIraqasboth theatres featuredcombinedpolitical andmilitaryoperations,but inneither theaterdid theseoperations achieve their intended policy goals. The United States Government appears to haverecognized this shortcoming and is now funding a range of research programs to better understandcomplexsocialsystemsaswellashowtoachievedesiredpolicyoutcomeswithinthem.

TransformingBodiesofKnowledgeintoExecutableToolsAcompletelydifferenttypeofmodelderivesfromsemanticallyexpressedknowledge.TheUSDefensecommunityfrequentlyrequestsinsights,discussion,orothercharacterizinganalysesonspecificsubjectsor relating to certain regions of the world. SMA’s historical body of analytical products is a primeexample.Howdowecapturethisknowledgeinwaysthataremorerapidlydigestibleandexplore-ablefor decision makers? Converting our bodies of knowledge that include textual analyses, exemplarymodels, geographically referenced characterizations, etc. into executable analytical products thatconveythepropercontextforeffectiveinterpretationisamassivechallenge.

Scientistsusedmanyparadigm-basedassumptions tocreate theknowledgebase, frequently (asKuhnnoted for social scientists)working fromcompletelydifferentparadigmsor setsof assumptions, eachreferenced to a specific contextual understanding. Due to the nature of the field, reconciling theseanomaliesandthedistinctlydisparateconclusionstheymayproducewouldbeamistake.Inacomplexsystem,therearemanypossibleoutcomesandhenceinterpretationsassociatedwiththoseoutcomes.Therearenoexplicit,uncontestedanswers.

Toproduceanexecutable,searchableform,weapplymoreparadigmstocreate,characterize,explain,and extrapolate from our knowledge base for any given problem. The computational paradigms we


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applyslotthedimensionsofthatproblemintosomepatternthatinturnguidesandconstrainswhatwelookfor,howwelookforit,andwhatweexpecttofind.Weapplystillmorecomputationalparadigms(e.g., assumptions that craft the framework for simple query rules or adaptive artificial intelligencetechniques)tosculptournowdigitallycapturedontologicalframeworkintoanexecutableproductthatcanconveypropercontextforeffectiveinterpretation.

Part of the challenge is that decisionmakers in themilitary operations space do not want a searchengine for semantically expressed analytical products; theywant a contextually relevant answer to aquerythatusestheanalyticalknowledgebasetoderivethatanswer.Thatwillrequireustoknowwhatgaps intheknowledgebasewerecreatedorexistedbutwereunrecognizedduringthecomputationalimplementation.Similarly,weneedtodeterminehowtotreatthesegaps—nottomentionconflictsthatarisewhentheanalyticalproductsoffermorethanoneanswer,answersweshouldnotforcedowntoasingleview—whenconstructing insightful responses forusers.Much like forsystemdynamics,wewillneed a considerable presence of humans in the loop to guide semantic conversion and contextualextraction.

Conclusions:WhattoDowithParadigms?Withtheworldtransitioning froman Industrial to Informationbasiswheretherelational rulesetsaretransformingfundamentally,wemustchallengethepersistentparadigmsandmetaphorsthatdriveourintellectual framingandanchorourdecisionsbecause they increasinglyno longer fit. Forexample, toseethelocusofpowerandleveragepointsinthegeostrategiclandscapeastheexclusiveprovenanceofnationstatesisincreasinglyflawed.Further,itisalsowhollyinadequatetosimplytreatviolentnon-stateactorsasiftheywerenationstatessimplybecausewehavenotfoundamoreappropriateparadigm.Itrequires us to rethink the nature andderivation of power to account for “movements” and statelessnetworks.

Asbefore, ifweneednewparadigms, istheresufficientcommongroundtodetermineifanewoneisbetter?Weregularlyutilizeparadigmsinouranalyticalproducts,whetheranexecutabletoolthatseekseither tomodel a systemor extract actionable insights from a semantic corpus or simply the corpusitself.Wemustdevelopabetterunderstandingwithrespecttowhatweneedfromthesetoolstoinformdecisionsacrossthestrategic,operational,andtacticaldomainsandhowwecanusethemtoactonthesecuritychallengesineach.Further,wemustestablishanevaluationmethodologybeforerelyingonanynewtooltoocompletelythat,intryingtocreatenewstrengths,wedonotinsteadcreatefalse-insightsthatleaveusexposedtomassivenewrisks.

We use paradigms to guide how we structure, digest, and express our analytical thoughts. We usemetaphors, in turn, to explain thoughts and what they tell us tangibly and visually to make themintuitivelydigestibletoothers.Intheprocess,weshouldrememberthatthereisadistinctionbetweenexchanginginformationandthemobilizationofknowledge.Theformerembodiestheliteralexchangeofdataor informationderived fromdata.The latterentailspurposefullypushingthat informationoutofone’sowncontrolinaformandwayitcanaccessed,augmented,andacteduponbyothers.Weneedtorethinkhowwewieldtoolsthancanunabashedlyprovidemultiple,disparateviewsofourproblemtoeffectivelytheparadigmswedevelopandevolvetomobilizeknowledgetotheUSDefenseoperationalcommunity.


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“Aparadigmcan,forthatmatter,eveninsulatethecommunityfromthosesociallyimportantproblemsthatarenotreducibletothepuzzleform,becausetheycannotbestatedintermsoftheconceptualandinstrumentaltoolstheparadigmsupplies”(Kuhn,1970,VolII,No.2,p37).

FiveBulletPoints

• Weapplyparadigmstostudyandanalyzeintheoperationalenvironmentspace;theyshapeourthoughtpatterns,theories,researchmethods,and–consequently–ouranalyticalconclusions.

• Manyofour currentparadigmsarewholly inadequate todescribe Stateandnon-Stateactorsandtheirbehaviors.

• Before rushing to embrace new paradigms, however, we must establish sufficient commongroundtodetermineifanewoneisbetter.

• Understanding the nature of paradigms and how we use them to provide insight in the USDefensecommunityiscriticaltohowwellwemayfacefuturesecuritychallenges.

• Weneedtorethinkhowwewieldtoolsthancanunabashedlyprovidemultiple,disparateviewsofourproblemtoeffectively theparadigmswedevelopandevolve tomobilizeknowledge totheUSDefenseoperationalcommunity.

ReferencesForrester, Jay W. "Counterintuitive behavior of social systems."Technological Forecasting and Social

Change3(1971):1-22.

Hayek, Friedrich A. "The theory of complex phenomena."The critical approach to science andphilosophy(1964):332-349.

Kott,Alexander,andPeterS.Corpac.COMPOEXtechnologytoassist leaders inplanningandexecutingcampaignsincomplexoperationalenvironments.DARPA,ARLINGTONVA,2007.

Kuhn,T.S.(1970).TheStructureofScientificRevolutions,2ndenl.ed.UniversityofChicagoPress.

Simon,Herbert.Reasoninhumanaffairs.StanfordUniversityPress,1990.

Sterman, JohnD. JohnD.Businessdynamics: systems thinkingandmodeling fora complexworld.No.HD30.2S78352000.2000.


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Chapter7:Don’tShortchangeDefenseEffortstoInform,Influence,andPersuade-Dr.ChristopherPaul,RAND

Dr.ChristopherPaulRAND

[email protected] chapter has been adapted from a publication produced for RAND called “Don’t ShortchangeDefenseEffortstoInform,Influence,andPersuade.”Theabilitytoinform,influence,andpersuadearenecessarybothforthesuccessofnationalsecurityaswellasacost-effectivetoolsetrelativetophysicalmilitarypower.ThishasbecomeincreasinglyrelevantandbrutallyobviousinUSmilitaryengagementsinIraqandAfghanistanandisindicativeoftheshiftingsandsofwarfaretheworldover.Capabilitiestoinform,influence,andpersuadearealsoevolvingwiththe advancement of technology; correspondingly, the historical theme of propaganda no longeraccurately captures the magnitude of this domain. Every action, utterance, message, image, andmovementofanation’smilitaryforcesinfluencestheperceptionsandopinionsofthepopulationsthatwitness them—both first hand in the area of operations and second or third hand elsewhere in theworld. Despite the scope and intricacy of informing, influencing, and persuading, these tools areundeniably cheaper than overtmilitary intervention and can be used as a supplemental device in allnationaldefenseoperations.Therearetwoargumentstosupportthesecapabilities:1)thepreventativeargumentwhereinforming,influencing, and persuading efforts help avoid the need for deploying more expensive capabilitiesbecause an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure and 2) the enabling argument where thecombinedarmsapplicationofinformationpoweralongwithotherformsofpowermakesiteasier,andthuslessexpensive,toaccomplishmissions.Bydecreasingoreveneliminatingthepursuitofterroristsand the associated collateral damage in counterterrorism efforts, the preventative argumentdemonstratesthepotentialfordiminishsupportforviolentextremism.Followingthesamelogic,evenifprevention isnotpossible,effortsto inform, influence,andpersuadecanmodestlydecreasethecostsof,orthreatsto,othereffortsbymakinganoperatingenvironmentmorepermissiveandconducivetodesired end states before operations begin. In addition to shaping the battlespace or preventing theneed for full-fledgedoperations, a secondargument insists the synergies from informing, influencing,and persuading alongside other military capabilities can reduce costs. A stronger statement of thisargumentassertssomeoperationsrequirethesupportofindigenousconstituenciesinordertosucceedandthatwinningsupportstrictlythroughphysicalforceandwithoutemployinginfluencecapabilitiesisimpossibleoratleastextremelycostly.Occurringmoreoftenthanwewouldliketothink,thissituationisoneofthemaindriversbehindwinningallthebattlesbutlosingthewar.The benefits of a sophisticated and viable strategy to inform, influence, and persuade can easily beimagined, butmaking concrete cost-benefit calculations and generating causal evidence of success ismuchmoredifficult.InanarticleinIOSphere,MarkOchoausednotionaldatatoillustratethepossiblecostsavingsfrominfluenceoperationsduringmilitaryoperationsunderanumberofdifferentscenariosandassumptions.Heconcludedthat the increaseduseof informationoperations inphase0,phase1,and phase 2 “should beworth the investment to avoid or delay the significantly higher costs of the


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remainingphases,”wheretheapplicationofconventionalforcescostsordersofmagnitudemorethaninformationoperations.10Thepushforreformhasalsobeendemonstratedinthepastdecadethroughahostofwhitepapers,reports,articles,andcommentariessuggestingreformsandimprovementsforUSstrategic communication and public diplomacy, two prominent categories of US efforts to inform,influence,andpersuade.A synthesisofanalytical literature froma2009RANDstudy thatexamined36 reportsonUS strategiccommunication and public diplomacy present four commonly repeated themes: (1) demand forincreasedresources,(2)acall for leadership,(3)acall foracleardefinitionofoverallstrategy,and(4)the need for better coordination. The call for more resources was the single most frequentrecommendation, appearing in more than half of the 36 reports reviewed, and agencies anddepartments across theDODbroadly agreedon theneed forboth increasedpersonnel and formoreprogrammaticresources.11Roughlyonequarterofthe36strategiccommunicationandpublicdiplomacydocumentsreviewedmakeanexplicitcallforleadership,whichreferredtoatleastfourdifferentthings:1)presidentialattention (adesireofproponents inany issuearea),2)authority;3)goodchoices (badpolicies cannot be well communicated), and 4) clear direction. Often related to calls for leadership,almost one-third of the strategic communication reports reviewed make a call for clear strategicdirection.According toone commentator,without a clear strategy, “the leaders of eachdepartment,agencyandofficearelefttodecidewhatisimportant.”12Lastly,anadmonitiontocoordinatebetterintheUSgovernment(manysourceslamentthelackofcoordinationofUSgovernmenteffortstoinform,influence, and persuade),13 was also recommended in more than half of the reviewed strategiccommunicationandpublicdiplomacydocuments.Recognizingthecriticalimportanceofinforming,influencing,andpersuadingwillnecessitateadditionalforcestructure, includingpersonnelandformationsandstaffbilletsintheDepartmentofDefenseandtheDepartmentofState,aswellasinvestmentinspecializedtools.Alesstangiblemeasure,butnotlessimportantoneischanginginternalculturetoinculcatecommunicationmindednessincommandersandseniorleaders;thiswilltaketimeandeffortbutischeapandverypossible.TrainingleadershipelementswithintheDODwillfilterthemessageofcommunicationmindednessacrosstheboardandshifttheUSsecurity establishment to bemore sensitive to informing, influence, and persuading. Thismay take agenerationforachangeinculturetooccur;however,theeffectwillbeubiquitousandwillinfiltratethemorestubborndynamicsandprocesses in theDOD. If leadersbegin toaskquestionsabouteffects inand through the information environment, then subordinates will have to try to answer them. Thisaccountabilitywillleadtoatleastthreefurtherpositivedevelopments:first,subordinateswillaskthesequestions earlier in the planning process to be able to answer their leadership’s queries. Second,subordinateswillbegintoseekoutandconsultwiththosewhohaverelevantexpertiseininformationoperations and information-related capabilities rather than such specialists having to fight to try to

10MarkA.Ochoa,“ConventionalOperationsMustBeLessExpensivethanInformationOperations,”IOSphere(June2011),43.11ChristopherPaul,WhitherStrategicCommunication?ASurveyofCurrentProposalsandRecommendations(SantaMonica,CA:RandCorporation,2009).12LindseyJ.Borg,“CommunicatingwithIntent:DoDandStrategicCommunication”(graduatestudiesreport,AirUniversity,April2007),23.13See,forexample,ASmarter,MoreSecureAmerica(Washington,DC:CenterforStrategicandInternationalStudiesCommissiononSmartPower,2007);DefenseScienceBoard,TaskForceonStrategicCommunication;KristinM.Lord,VoicesofAmerica:U.S.PublicDiplomacyforthe21stCentury,(Washington,DC:BrookingsInstitution,2008);andQuadrennialDefenseReviewReport(Washington,DC:USDepartmentofDefense,2006).


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somehow insert themselves into the planning process (which happens far toooften at themoment).Third, the answers to these questionswill inevitably alignwith broader goals and lead to changes inoperationsorexecution.Distribution of the capability to inform, influence, and persuade between the DOD and other civilagencies (namely the Department of State) is a balance that deserves examination. The DOD hasprominenceinthecapabilitytoinform,influence,andpersuadeandashifttotheDepartmentofStatewillrequiresubstantialchangesintermsoforientation,priorities,funding,andcapabilitiesavailableforpublicdiplomacyandstrategiccommunication.GiventhecomplexityofshiftingcapabilityfromtheDODto theDOS aswell that inherent problems such as theDOS lacking surge capacity and expeditionarycapability,theDODwillneedretainsignificantcapability.BothDepartmentswillbenefitfromageneralreview and by emphasizing assessment and evaluation to continuously calibrate efforts to inform,influence,andpersuade.Onemethodofintroducingcapabilitiestoinform,influence,andpersuadecanbegin with Military Information Support Operations (MISO) personnel who currently supplement USSpecialOperationsCommand.ProliferatingMISOawarenessthroughouttheDOD,DOS,civilaffairforcesandcivilmilitaryoperationswillbenefitallconcernedpartiesandthiscanbedoneinthecyberdomain.MISO personnel operating in the public sphere are ideal candidates to instill capabilities to inform,influence, and persuade across the US government. Particularly relevant, a possible relationshipbetween cyber operations and information operations could give rise to cyber-enabledMISO, whichwouldfillanimportantoperationalseam.Asanexample,cyberforcescanpotentiallyaccessandexploitadversarynetworksandsystems,toincludeelectroniccommunications—email,forexample—however,justbecauseoffensivecyberoperationsorcomputernetworkexploitationexpertsmightbeabletosendmessages to adversaries or potential adversaries, cyber experts are not necessarily expert in thecompositionofeffectivepersonalinfluencemessages.Thatexpertiselieselsewhere—namelyinmilitaryinformation support operation. Even more important in this context, funds dedicated to the cybermission area can and should be used to support these improvements to both cyber and inform,influence,andpersuadecapabilities.


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Chapter8:OperationalizingtheSocialBattlefield–Dr.SpencerMeredithIII

Dr.SpenserMeredithIIINationalDefenseUniversity

[email protected]

Abstract:The diffusion of influence from traditional elites to broader and more diverse sources has raisedchallengesfortheUnitedStates,butnot inherentrisksbyitself.Thetoolsusedtomobilize individualsand groups within society have for some time existed across a spectrum of industries, academicdisciplines,andultimately,governmentactions.Assuch,whiletheubiquityof influencehasratchetedup in recentyears, ithasnot fundamentallyalteredwhocanbe influencedor themeansofdoingso.Evaluating how these phenomena affect the Joint Force Commander’s range of options, and moreimportantly, strategic paradigms on ways, means, and ends, must include several elements. Theseincludegovernance,mobilizationpotential,andnarrativelandscapes.

KeyWords:Governance,MobilizationPotential,AlternativeNarrativesThe diffusion of influence from traditional elites to broader and more diverse sources has raisedchallengesfortheUnitedStates,butnot inherentrisksbyitself.Thetoolsusedtomobilize individualsand groups within society have for some time existed across a spectrum of industries, academicdisciplines,andultimately,governmentactions.Thesetoolsarejustasreadilyfoundinmajoradvertisingfirms as national news channels. As such, while the ubiquity of influence has ratcheted up in recentyears,ithasnotfundamentallyalteredwhocanbeinfluencedorthemeansofdoingso.EvaluatinghowthesephenomenaaffecttheJointForceCommander’srangeofoptions,andmoreimportantly,strategicparadigmsonways,means,andends,mustincludeseveralelements.First, the context for operationalizing the social battlefield resides squarely in governance. As thepracticalapplicationofpoliticalwilltowardssocialdemands,governancesetsthestageforexpectations,bothforelitesandthemasses.Itisthereforetheprocessofnegotiatingandapplyingpressuretowininan often zero-sum game, even in democratic political systems. Governance is also the product ofrepeated testing of boundaries and relative strength. This includes the exploitation of seams andfissureswithinandbetweenrivals,aswellastheacknowledgementofextantintereststhatpredateandlikelyendurelongerthanthecurrentconfigurationofpoliticalpower.

Governanceisthereforetheareaofresponsibilityforallparties,recognizingthatpoliticalsystemsvaryto the degree and types of issues for which social forces share responsibilities with those in power.Regardless of the nomenclature for the regime, which has become almost universally “democratic”despitethegeneraldearthofrealdemocraticsubstanceinthepracticeofpolitics,authoritarianregimesandtheirmoreopengovernmentalcounterpartsmustfindwaystoestablishanddefendareasofpublicdebate.Theseborderscanbeseenaseasilyin“free-speech”debates,asinstrictprivate-publicdividesin closed systems. Accordingly, these aspects speak to capacity, autonomy, and legitimacy forgovernance.

Capacity relates to the ability to accomplish objectives. This may be the easiest to quantify whenassessinggovernance,butremainshardestforstatestoapplybecausefewresourcesareunequivocally


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fungible—they involvemultiple levels of deeply contested processes to secure,manage, and allocategoods and services. Autonomy also shares that appearance of certainty, yet also with far greateruncertainty inpractice. If autonomousactionmeans theabsenceof countermandingordersbyeitherinternalorexternalforces,canwesaythatanypoliticalentityhascompleteautonomy?Allarebeholdentosomedegreeatdifferenttimesonvariousissues.Asaresult,autonomy,likecapacityandlegitimacy,fitsmore on a sliding scale rather than functioning as an established, immutable fact once achieved.Legitimacy typifies this transitorynaturemost clearly givenhoweasy it is to lose, andhard to regainafterwards. Based on elements of cognitive trust, emotional resonance, and behaviors that can spanfrom tacit “staying out of things” to overt demonstrations of support, legitimacy is the constantbattlegroundforinfluence,yetisalsooneofthehardesttomeasurebeforehand.

This leadstothesecondfactorforconsideration,mobilizationpotential.Consideredasthecrossoverbetweenindividualandgroupdynamics,thispotentialcanbegradedwithameasureofcertainty.Todosorequirestwoapproaches,namelytrendanalysistogainasenseoftrajectories,andcomparisonstorelatedcases to indicate flashpointsand likely turns indirectionand intensity.Standardsocial sciencemethodologiesallowforboth,andcangiveindicationsofthefollowingvariables.

Primarily,wecanlookforwindowsofvulnerabilityandopportunity.Eachofthesespeakstocoreaspectsofcapacity,autonomy,and legitimacy,andhowmalleable theyare tochange,either from internalorexternal forces. When viewed from the lens of mobilization, this translates to the ability to get anindividualorgrouptomovefromthecurrentstatusquofirst,thenfollowedbytheabilitytodirectthatmovement in desiredways. Again,muchof the analytical framework for these processes is verywellestablishedinmultipleacademicdisciplines,whicharecurrentlyintheserviceofavarietyofeconomicandpolitical enterprises. Thekeypoint is thatmobilizationpotential is a combinationofmanyof thesame variables used to measure governance, thereby enabling easier, more consistent assessmentswhenconsideringinfluenceoperations.

Someexamplesoffactorsthatcangointoassessingmobilizationpotential include:1)GroupCohesiondefinedbyunifyingideas,commonidentities,clarityofgoals,andactionsinthepastthateitherdepleteoraddtogroupresources;2)Factionswithinorganizationsevaluatedbasedonthedepthofthefissure,itssignificancetothegroup’sleadershipandmembership,thedurationofunityvs.timespentasrivalsornon-participants,andhoweasilyseamsareheldtogetherortornasunder;3)PublicSpaceforDebatemustalsobedefinedandmaintainedbythestate,includingthetypesofissues,frequencyofusagebysocialgroups/individuals,andhowelitesengagewiththatspace;and4)GeographyofMovementandAssemblytheenableorrestrictthephysicalityofmobilization.Itisnoteworthythatthisbrieflistisnotmeant to be exhaustive, but rather to tie into existing DOD evaluation matrices while moving theconceptualframeworkmoretowardsinfluenceoperationsspecifically.

Finally,narrative landscapes vis-à-vis cognitive openings and organizational lifecycles rounds out thecore concepts needed for this kind of analysis. Narratives are both abiding stories of meaning andpurpose,andadaptivemessagesthatreactto,andpropelintheirownright,thekindsofactionsunderdiscussion in thiswhitepaper.Theycontainelementsofmasternarratives thatbindadherentsacrosstime and communities, aswell as individualized variations that can give personalized action plans aswell.Narrativesalsoserveasgatekeepersfor legitimacybycorrallingmessagesthatstraytoofarfromtheorthodoxview,orostracizingones thathave left the foldandmoved into thehostile categoryof“other.”Theserelatetocognitiveopeningsbysettingthestageforboththestatusquoandtheneedtoassessnew,oftenpainfulinformationrelativetotheindividualsunderstandingofhis/herlifeandplace


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inthegranderschemeofthings.Theseopeningsarenotoriouslydifficulttopredict,insteadbeingmorevisible after the fact in radicalization or deradicalization, as extreme cases, or more normally whenpeoplechoosenewcareers,schoolprogramsfortheirchildren,spouses,orlifestyles.Cognitiveopeningsarethereforethewaysbywhichcertainendsareachievedthroughthemeansofpopulacefactors.

Thesamecanbesaidatthegrouplevelregardingorganizationallifecycles,whichtrackthedevelopmentstagesgroupsundergo,butnotoftenalonglinear,predeterminedpaths.Often,thestagesoccurinfitsand starts, without equal time spent in each phase. Those phases include incubation, securitization,politicization, and finally redefinition/revolution/destruction. Incubation occurs as interests and ideasarearticulatedbynewandexistingmembers,thencoalesceafterdebateswithintheorganizationleadto winners/losers, and finally become representative for themembers individually and collectively—union workers, Republicans, Shia, etc. Securitization results from the inevitable hostile environmentencounteredasthenewgroupemergestoclaimideationalandphysicalspace,alongwiththeattendantresources tomaintain and promote both. Insularity—a defensive identity posture—often results, andcore ideas/messages/interests become sine qua non for the group, making any internal revisionsdangerous for fear of external losses. If organizations survive this phase, they can move into thepoliticization arena whereby goals can either moderate to fit the available space or become moreextreme in theabsenceof a viable seat at thegoverning table; for revolutionarymovements like theBolsheviksandISIS—thetableitselfhastobereplaced.Thefinalstageoccursasgroupseitherenterintotheprocessofacceptingtheneedforredefinitioninlightofchangingconditions,revolveintosomethingaltogetherdifferentfromitsorigins,orceasetoexist.

Asananalytical framework, thisbriefreviewofsomecorescholarlyapproachesyieldsseveraloptionsfor the practitioner at the strategic and operational levels. First, they set the stage formore than aWhole of Government approach, that oft-cited, yet never seemingly achieved goal for better policyimplementation. Instead,specializationofaction isahallmarkofanyeffectiveenterprise,so longas itfollows core strategic goals and methods for achieving them. The approach listed above gives thatcommonalitytodiverseUSGentitiesbyensuringtheyarelookingatsimilarthings,whiledoingsofromdifferent vantage points. The analytical richness that can result will aid in developing nuanced, butcoordinatedoperationalplans,whetherfromDOS,DOD,USAIDorothers.

TheresultofthiscanbeaneffectivealternativenarrativetotheonescurrentlyonofferfromUSrivalsatthestateandnon-statelevels.SuchamessagewouldhighlightthethingsthatmaketheUnitedStatesadesirable partner in the process of governance andmobilizing populations for beneficial goals. It canalsogiveevidenceofwhatisdesirableabouttheUnitedStatesasaproductoflonghistoricaldebates—oftencontentious,sometimesviolentlyso—thathaveyieldedaprosperoussocietyandsecurepoliticalsystem.Bothofthesehave“sold”wellinthepast,andcandosoagainintheemergingGrayZoneofthehumandomain.For in theend,despite the increasingvolumeof information, theability toprocess itandinturn,beinfluencedbyit,remainsthesame.


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Chapter9:RethinkingControlandInfluenceintheAgeofComplexGeopoliticalSystems-Dr.NicholasD.Wright,UniversityofBirmingham,UK

Dr.NicholasD.WrightInstituteforConflict,CooperationandSecurity,

UniversityofBirmingham,UK

AbstractInfluenceand control are twoways toexertpoweroverothers’decisions,where control removesanaudience’s ability to choose. Influence is critical in conflicts such as those in the Gray Zone, whoselimitednature leaveadversariesandalliesable tochoose.What shouldwe rethinkaboutcontrolandinfluence now? I argue thatwe should focus on three aspectswe need to rethink about howwe doinfluence: First, use new facts about how to influence human audiences. For example, what reallymotivates audiences? Second, try to focus on areas where cognitive biases make humans operatepoorly, despite the fact that they are often activities that seem easy. Third,we need to get smarterabout howwe operationalize evidence from the science of human decision-making. I illustrate thesethree areas through an example. I describe how humans are bad at thinking from the audience’sperspective (thinking “outside-in”) and how this can be mitigated by using a simple checklist forempathythatincludesrealistichumanmotivations.

WhatAreControlandInfluence?Idefineinfluenceasameanstoaffectanaudience’sbehavior,perceptions,orattitudes.Influencecanbe achieved by deterrence, persuasion, ‘nudge,’ or the use of hard or soft power. A key feature ofinfluence is that audiences can choose,whichdistinguishes influence from thedirect effects of bruteforcethatremovestheabilitytochoose.Removingchoicemaybetermedcontrol.AsthelateThomasSchellingwroteinhisseminalArmsandInfluence:“Militaryforcecansometimesbeusedtoachieveanobjective forcibly, without persuasion or intimidation; usually, though—throughout history butparticularly now—military potential is used to influence other countries, their government or theirpeople.”14 “Deterrence is about intentions—not just estimating enemy intentions but influencingthem.”15Strategy is fundamentally the sameacross conflict inmanyhuman competitive spheres. Sir LawrenceFreedman’s recent book, Strategy, illustrates this commonality across three spheres: military,sociopolitical,andbusinessstrategy.Inallthreecases:“Therealmofstrategyisoneofbargainingandpersuasionaswellasthreatsandpressure,psychologicalaswellasphysicaleffects,andwordsaswellasdeeds.Thisiswhystrategyisthecentralpoliticalart.Itisaboutgettingmoreoutofasituationthanthestartingbalanceofpowerwouldsuggest.Itistheartofcreatingpower.”16

Ifstrategyistheartofcreatingpower,thenwhataspectofpowermattersmostintheconflictssuchasthose in the “Gray Zone”? Power can be exerted through influence or control—and given the highly

14ThomasC.Schelling,ArmsandInfluence(London:YaleUniversityPress,1966).p.xiv15Ibid.p.3516SirLawrenceFreedman,Strategy:AHistory(Oxford ;NewYork:OUPUSA,2013).


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limitednatureofGrayZoneconflictinwhichaudiencesaremoreorlessfreetochoose,influenceisthekeyway to exert power. This is instead of removing their capacity to choose by using brute force initself. Adversaries can choose whether to act or not (e.g., to be deterred) and whether or not toescalate. Allies can choose whether or not to provide support. Third parties and local populationschoosewhotobackandwhotooppose.TwoThingsWeShouldnotNeedtoRethinkaboutControlandInfluence(ButaboutWhichitisGoodtobeReminded)Firstly,thatthehumandimensionisimportant.LeadingstrategistsfromSunZi(Tsu)tothe21stcenturystress the human dimension. As the British commander in the successful Malay counterinsurgencycampaignof theearly 1950s, SirGerald Templernoted, “The shooting sideof thebusiness is only25percentof the troubleand theother75percent lies ingetting thepeopleof this countrybehindus,”whichdidnotrequire“pouringmoretroopsintothejungle”butinsteadinaphrasehemadefamoustheanswerlay“intheheartsandmindsofthepeople.”17Secondly, that theworld isglobalizedandcomplex.Theworldhasbeenglobalizedandcomplex foralong time.At the turnof the20thcentury, cities like Londonstoodatglobal crossroadsandsawvastwavesofmigration,trade,investment,andeconomicintegration.

WhatDoweNeedtoRethinkaboutControlandInfluenceinanAgeofComplexGeopoliticalSystems?What we need to rethink relates to features of control and influence that are new. One importantadvanceisournew,morerealisticknowledgeabouthumanfactorsfrompsychologyandneuroscience.18Idescribethreewaysthisneedsrethinking.First,usenewfactsabouthowtoinfluencehumanaudiences.Wehavelearnedalotabouthowhumansmakedecisions—notjustmathematicalmodelsabouthowpeopleshouldmakedecisions,buthowtheyactuallydomakedecisions.Forexample,wehavelearnedthatpeopleactuallytypicallyonlythinkoneortwostepsahead,notallthewaythrough.19KeyhumanmotivationsaredescribedinFigure1onthenextpage.Second,trytofocusonareaswherecognitivebiasesmakeusoperatepoorly,despitethefactthattheyareoftenactivitiesthatseemeasy.Focusingontryingtodothosethingsbettercanreaplargebenefits,becauseeven justdoingthemadequatelymayprovidearealcompetitiveadvantageoveradversaries.Oneexampleofsuchacognitivebiasisthatmostpeopleplanprojectstoooptimistically,becausesuchan“optimismbias”isnaturaltohumans.Asimpleruleofthumbcanminimizesuchanoptimismbiasinoneself,whichistoaskhowlongonethinksitwouldtakesomeoneelsetodotheproject.20Perhapsthemostimportantbiastocounteractforinfluenceordeterrenceoperations,however,isthathumanstendtothinkfromtheirownegocentricperspective,ratherthanseeingtheworldfromtheaudience’spointofview.Howtoovercomethiscriticalbiasisthefocusofthefinalsectionofthischapter. 17Ibid.p.18818Otheraspects,suchasnewtechnologiesareclearlyalsoimportant,butwillbedealtwithelsewhereinthewhitepaper.19Seeforexamplethep-beautygamedescribedinCamerer20DanLovalloandDanielKahneman,HarvardBusinessReview,2003.https://hbr.org/2003/07/delusions-of-success-how-optimism-undermines-executives-decisions


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Third, we need to get smarter about how we operationalize evidence from the science of humandecision-making. Surgeons learnt long ago that in emergencies simple checklists or guidelines can becritical decision aids. Furthermore, just givingmedical doctors evidence ofwhatworks best does notoftenchangetheirclinicalpracticeinitself.Thus,onewaytointroduceevidenceistoincorporateitintochecklists and guidelines tomake it useable for operators.One example is the checklist for empathydescribedbelowthathelpspractitionersthink“outside-in.”

KnowingyourAudience—Thinking‘Outside-in’To influenceanAfghan farmernot togrowpoppy, the influencermustconsider thatcourseofactionanditsalternativesfromtheaudience’sperspective.21Iftheaimistodeterahostilestate,i.e.,influenceitnottoact,thentheinfluencermustestimatehowthehostileStateperceivesthecostsandbenefitsofacting—andofnotacting.Embracinganoutside-inperspective—amindsetthatstartswiththeaudienceandfocusesoncreativelydelivering something it values—brings benefits relative to an inside-out mindset focused on internalprocesses that push out products to the audience.22 In business, this has been a staple ofmarketingsinceHarvardMarketingprofessorTheodoreLevitt’s1960articleMarketingMyopia.23Inamorerecentstudy, customer-driven companies doubled the shareholder returns compared to shareholder-drivenones24andtheadvantagesareevenmoremarkedinthemostchallengingandturbulentmarkets.25BBCMedia Action’s development projects in countries such as Afghanistan are critically “audience-

21ThissubsectiondrawsonWright2017FromControltoInfluence:CognitionintheGreyZone,ReportfortheSMAgroup.22Evidence:PopulationStrong;StateStrong23Levitt,T.‘MarketingMyopia’,HarvardBusinessReview,July-August,1960,p.4524Ellsworth,R.(2002)LeadingwithPurpose,TheNewCorporateRealities,StanfordBusinessBooks25Gulati,R.(2009)‘Reorganiseforresilience:Puttingcustomersatthecentreofyourorganisation’,HarvardBusinessPress

Figure 1 The audience decision process


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centered.”26 In international relations, a key recommendation of JosephNye’s seminal 2004 book onpowerandinfluenceis,“Toputitbluntly,tocommunicatemoreeffectively,Americansneedtolisten.”27Influenceaimstoshapebehavioreitherimmediatelyorinthefuture,whichrequiresunderstandingtheaudience’sdecision-makingprocessasshowninFigure1.Thedecisiontheaudiencefacesmustbeattheheartofplanningforinfluence.Influenceisaffectinganaudience’sdecision-makingprocess,wherethataudiencecandecidebetweenoptions.Theinfluencershouldexplicitlyestimatethataction’sperceivedcostsandbenefitsandtheperceivedcostsandbenefitsofalternatives.Thisincludesrealistic,consciousandunconsciousaswellas“irrational”motivations,forexamplefear,fairnessandidentity.Thinkingoutside-inseemsobvious,yetbusinessesandgovernmentsoften fail todo it.One importantreason for this is theunavoidable force in anybureaucracy to focus internallyonprocess and knownroutines.28Humansarealsopredisposedtothinkegocentrically.29ASimpleApproachtoThinkingOutside-inOutside-in thinking is very hard. Box 1 shows one simple, practical approach to achieving this. Suchpractical questions as set out in the checklist below can help to estimate the perceived costs andbenefits of an action from an audience’s perspective—based on a realistic understanding of humanmotivationanddecision-making,coupledwiththespecificcontext.

Box1:ChecklistforEmpathy

Asetofpracticalquestionscanhelptoestimatetheaudience’sperceivedcostsandbenefitsfor their potential alternative actions in a given context, i.e., help complete Figure1. Thesemayinclude:

! Self-interest:“Whatmaterialbenefitsmaytheygainorlose?”30Theimportanceofself-interestwasshownbytheswitchingallegiancesofSunnigroupsduringthe2007SurgeinIraq,whichinvolvedUSrewardsandthreatsofpunishment.31

! Fairness:“Howfairwillitbeseenfromtheaudiences’perspectives?”Humanstypicallypaycoststorejectunfairnessandpursuegrievances.32

! Fear:“Dotheyfearfortheirsecurityandwhy?”33

26BBCMediaactionrefs27Nye,JS.(2004)SoftPower:TheMeanstoSuccessinWorldPolitics,PublicAffairs28Allison,G.andZelikow,P.(1999)EssenceofDecision:ExplainingtheCubanMissileCrisis,2nded.Pearson.29Bazerman,M.H.etal(2000)'Negotiation',AnnualReviewofPsychology,Vol51,pp279–314,doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.51.1.279.30Paternoster,R.(1995)'HowMuchDoWeReallyKnowaboutCriminalDeterrence?’inTheJournalofCriminalLawandCriminology,2010,pp.765–824.KagelJ.H.,andRoth,A.E.(1995)TheHandbookofExperimentalEconomics,Princeton,NJ.31‘LosingIraq’July29th2014,Frontline,PBS32ColinCamerer2003BehaviouralGameTheory,PrincetonUniversityPress33Posen,BR.(1993)'TheSecurityDilemmaandEthnicConflict'inSurvival,Vol35,No1.pp.27–47,doi:10.1080/00396339308442672;Jervis,R.'WastheColdWaraSecurityDilemma?',JournalofColdWarStudies3,no.1(January2001)pp.36–60,doi:10.1162/15203970151032146.


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! Identity:“Whataretheirkeyidentities?”Humansaredriventoformgroups(“us,”the“in-group”)thatarecontrastedagainstothergroups(“them,”the“out-group”).Individualsalsooftenholdmultipleoverlappingidentities.34

! Status:“Howmaythisaffecttheaudience’sself-perceivedstatus?”e.g.,ForkeyaudiencesinAfghanistan,joiningtheTalibanhadhighstatus.35

! Expectations:“Whataretheirkeyexpectations,andwhatmayviolate

them?”36Themoreunexpectedaperceivedeventis,thebiggeritspsychologicalimpact.37

! Context,opportunity,andcapability:“Whatopportunitiesandcapabilities

doestheaudienceperceiveithasforitspotentialalternativeactions?”e.g.aninterventiontoencouragesomeonetopaytaxeswhoisactivelyavoidingpayingtaxes,differstothatforsomeonewhofeelsunabletouseanonlinesystem.

ConclusionManyaspectsofinfluenceandcontroldonotneedrethinking.However,herewefocusonthreeaspectsof influence that do: (1) usingmore realistic accounts of humanmotivation; (2) focusing on areas ofparticular human cognitive bias as a source of low-hanging fruit for performance improvement; andfinally (3) using tried and tested tools and techniques from other fields (e.g., medicine) to makeevidenceavailableinusableformsforoperators.

34Sambanis,N.,Schulhofer-Wohl,.J,andShayo,M.(2012)'ParochialismasaCentralChallengeinCounterinsurgency',Science336,no.6083pp.805–8,doi:10.1126/science.1222304.35Munoz,A.(2012)USMilitaryInformationOperationsinAfghanistan:EffectivenessofPsychologicalOperations2001-2010.RandCorporation:NationalDefenceResearchInstitute.36CrombieSchelling,T.(1966)ArmsandInfluence,YaleUniversityPress;Smoke,R.(1977)War:ControllingEscalation,HarvardUniversityPress.37Wright,ND.(2015)'TheBiologyofCooperativeDecision-Making:NeurobiologytoInternationalRelations',inGalluccio,M(ed.)(2015)HandbookofInternationalNegotiation,SpringerInternationalPublishing,pp.47–58.


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Chapter10:Evidence-basedPrinciplesofInfluence-Dr.NicholasWright,UniversityofBirmingham

Dr.NicholasD.WrightInstituteforConflict,CooperationandSecurity,

UniversityofBirmingham,UKEvidence-basedPrinciplesofInfluenceWhenconsideringhowwemightoperationalize theories relatedtopersuasionand influence,wemaybegin by asking, “What do we know, and how can we know it?” Robert Jervis said you can find ahistorical example to back up any contention youwant tomake in international relations,38 and it isbasicallythesamecase inpsychology.Canwebesureenoughofthescientificevidencewehavenowaboutpersuasion?Threeconsiderationsareparticularlypertinent.First,weshouldbeawareofthereplicationcrisisinthescientificliteratureinthisarea.Inonlyabouthalfofthestudiesinpsychologycanthefindingsofstudiesbereplicated.Thismakes itverydifficult toreadtheacademic literature,andevenamongacademics,peoplewill tend to attribute credibility to the results of a singlehigh-profile study. This is not robustscience. Second, in order to accumulate robust scientific knowledge about the factors that influencepeople,weneedtofocusonempiricalfindingsthat1)havebeentestedandreplicatedand2)providesourcesofcorroboratinginformationandconvergentevidence.Inaddition,weshouldbecarefulnottosimply apply findings from neuroscience laboratories and other settings to the real world withouttesting.Aswetrytomovetowardascienceofpersuasionandinfluence,wearegoingtohavetostopreferencingindividualstudiesanddowhathappensinmedicine:corroborateandreplicate.Third,thereisa level-of-analysisproblem.Toconsider influenceandpersuasion,youhave to thinkaboutmultiplelevelssimultaneously(e.g.,thestatelevelandthelevelofthepopulations).Theevidenceatonelevelisnotthesameas,anddoesnotapplyto,otherlevels,soyouhavetoaskyourselfaboutthenatureoftheevidencethatyouhave.Itistruethatwedohavealotofgoodevidence,sohowdoweorganizeit?Wecanusemethodsfromfieldssuchasmedicineor internationaldevelopment,whichassessbodiesofevidenceforaparticularinterventionorconcept, ratherthanrelyingon individualor fewstudies.As in thosefields,weshouldthinkintermsofclassifyingthestrengthofevidencebehindeachcontention—aswasdoneintherecentSMAGrayZoneCognitiveReport.Thisprovidesevidence-basedrecommendationstomakethemostofcurrent thinking on techniques for influence. It draws on expertise frommultiple sectors—includingsecurity,psychology,neuroscience,andthecommercialworld—andassignsascoreforthestrengthofevidenceunderlyingeachrecommendationitcovers.Itspecificallyexaminesevidencetoexertinfluenceatthestatelevelandatthepopulationlevel,asworkingatbothlevelstogetherisakeychallengeintheGrayZone.Ireproduceasummaryofthekeyfindingsoftheseprinciplesforinfluencebelow,whichforease of presentation is divided into three sections that focus on Audiences, Messages, and thenMessengers.39 38RobertJervis,PerceptionandMisperceptioninInternationalPolitics(PrincetonUniversityPress,1976).39SeeWright2017FromControltoInfluence:CognitionintheGreyZone,ReportfortheSMAgroup.PartIcontainsdetailedexpansionsofallpointsraisedhere.


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AudiencesInfluenceeffortsmustbetailoredtotheaudiencetomaximizeintendedeffect.Fivekeyconceptsare:

(1)Organizations should adopt an “outside-in”mindset,whichmakes the audience’s decision-makingprocessthefocusoftheinfluencestrategy.Practicaltoolscanprovidetheempathyrequiredtoputtheinfluencerintheaudience’sshoes,e.g.,tounderstandtheirmotivations,fears,andidentities.

To influence an Afghan farmer not to grow poppy, or if we seek to deter an adversary state, theinfluencer must consider that course of action and its alternatives from their perspective. We mustestimatehowtheyperceivethecostsandbenefitsofacting,andofnotacting.Theinfluencermustputthemselvesintheirshoes.

Simple, structuredapproaches shouldbeused tounderstand theaudience’sdecision-makingprocess.Practical tools canprovide theempathy required toput the influencer in theaudience’s shoes.Manytools are available; the key is to use a structured approach. One such approach is a “checklist forempathy”(seeChapter9above).

(2) Messages are likely to reach multiple audiences—so it is vital to anticipate potentially divergentinfluences.

(3) Audiences seldom passively receivemessages. Audience analysis often requires understanding theongoing,interactiverelationshipwithmessengers.

(4) Identify groups with propensity for influence and who are more likely to act on the basis of theinfluencetheyencounter.Focusonthesegroupsanddevelopspecificstrategiesforinfluencingthem.

(5)Audienceanalysisisakeyareaofcompetitionwithpotentialadversaries.

! TheRussiansareheldtoconductgoodaudienceanalysis,withwhichtheUSmustbeabletocompete.

! TheChinesesurprisinglyareheldtoconductlittleaudienceanalysis—andthusbetterunderstandingaudiencesisacriticalareaofpotentialUSadvantage.

In addition to the five areas outlined above, the chapter also contains amore detailed discussion ofparticularfactorsthatinfluenceaudiencebehavior,suchasage.

MessagesAfter developing an in depth understanding of the target audience, successful messages must bedeveloped. This chapter discusses how to fashionmessages, the content of messages, and then thecontextofmessages.

(1)Whenfashioningmessages,considerthefollowing

! Themessagemustbesimplewhilenotleavinganincompletenarrative.! Theaudiencemustfindthemessagesufficientlycredible.! Creativityinmessagingisoftenkey—managenoveltyandunexpectedness,otherwise

messagesmaylackthesalienceneededtoimpactonaudiences.


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(2)Contentofmessages:Messagesshouldaddresskeyaudiencemotivationssuchasidentity,fairness,fear,orself-interest(e.g.,seechecklistforempathyabove).

(3) It is vital to consider the communication context, not the message content alone. Humans areattunedtoevaluatestimulibycomparingstimuliwithotherstimulioroptions,sousecontrasteffectstomake the desired option the better option. Timing matters: prepare for influence operations ontimescales of minutes (e.g., responding on social media) to years (the Chinese building of ConfuciusInstitutes).

Standingoutagainstnoise:Theimpactofanymessageisdeterminedpartlybythefactorssetouthereandpartlybythebackgroundvolumeofalltheotherinformationanaudiencereceives.‘Noise’hasbeenused as a strategy. The Russia Today television network is an interesting example. Rather thanpromulgatingonespecificpositiveexplanationofanevent, suchas theMH17airliner crashoverEastUkraine in2014, thenetworkcreatednoisebycirculatingmanydifferent (andat timescontradictory)explanations. This acted to drown out other messages and create doubt, thus creating confusion.Interestingly, this seems in contradiction to theChinese techniques,where they seek to explain theirperspectiveornarrative,withmorefocusonbeingunderstood.Thereisnooneclearstrategytostandout against noise. It is likely best achievedby audience-centered approaches that use the techniquesabovetofashionmessages,whicharedeliveredbycrediblemessengers.

Counter-messaging should be augmented by longer-term, more preventative interventions, e.g.,televisiondiscussionprogramsor radio soapoperas involvingcommunitycohesion.Acoherentmediastrategyshouldbepartofperi-conflictnation-orstate-buildingefforts.

MessengersFindinganddevelopingtherightmessengersisvital.

(1)Therearethreekeymessengercharacteristics:trust,salience,andcapability.

(a)Trust inmessengersisoftencritical.Perceivedtrustworthinessorcredibilityis intheeyeoftheaudienceand ishighlycontextdependent.Multiplefactorscontribute, includingperceivedexpertise,goodintentions,andcapability.Likingand“softpower:”Individualstendtobemoreinfluencedbythosetheylikeandbelesslikelytotakeadvicefromthosetheydislike.Similarityofthemessengertoanaudienceincreaseslikelyinfluence.USoralliedgovernmentsareoftennot themost appropriatemessenger. This can be overcome by developing partnershipswithtrustedindividualsandgroups.

(b)Messengersmustalsobesalient toaudience; theyneed to standout tobeable to impactpsychologically on audiences constantly bombarded by information. Manage messengersalience:Amessengermustbesalient—standout—togaintheaudience’sattention,consciouslyor subconsciously. Whilst recognizing the factors above, a creative choice of messenger canpenetrateaudiences constantlybombardedby information.Oneway toachieve salience is tomanage the unexpectedness of messengers. Iranian President Rouhani’s unexpected use of2013Twitterdiplomacychangedthepoliticalclimateandenabledthesuccessfulnucleartalks.Repeated exposure to the same messenger can lead audiences to habituate or fatigue.However,familiaritywithmessengerscanalso increasetheir influence.Ambiguityand“salamislicing” can help minimize unexpectedness and avoid adverse responses. Using multiple


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messengers over time enables a campaign to change between them—actively managingunexpectednesshelpskeepmessengerssalient.

(c)Messengersmustbecapableofreachingaudiences.Messengersmusthavethecapabilitytoreach target audiences. Television, radio, and social media impact may vary according toaudience.Language Isacritical factor.Achannelmayhavewidegeographicalreachbut itwillbeuselessifitisnotaccessibleinthelanguageoftheintendedaudience.

(2)Understandingnetworks canhelp identify effectivemessengers. Face-to-face, family, socialmedia,andothernetworks canprovidekeyaccess toaudiences.Three issues for thepolicymakerare: First,whatarekeysocialnetworksamongst theaudience?Second,whatnetworks link theaudience to theoutside?Trust exists innetworks, sonetworks canbe goodmessengers to access an audience. Third,whoarekeyopinionleaders?

(3)Competitionwithotheractors: Key Stateandnonstateactorsplace influenceat theheartof theiractivitiesandinvestheavilyandstressthe importanceof influenceatthehighestpoliticalandmilitarylevels.

(a) Resources and high-level policy support:State competitors such as Russia and China havebeenbuildingpowerful,well-resourcedmessenger capabilities.China is investing$7-10billionperannumin“overseaspublicitywork.WhiletheBBCWorldServicebroadcastsin32languageson an annual budget of $378 million, Russia Today ran just six language services with anestimated budget of over $300 million in 2014. Adversaries such as Daesh can use cheapasymmetric strategies, such as social media. To compete with both, US and allied influencecapabilitiesmust have appropriate resources, high-level policy support and cross-governmentorganizational structures that provide strategic level coordination with tactical autonomy,adaptabilityandresponsiveness.

(b) Timescales: Interacting with capable competitors requires preparing for influence ontimescalesofminutes,suchasrespondingtokeyeventsonsocialmediaandthe24/7newsfeed.Thisrequiresarapidresponsesetwithinastrategicplan.Atthatotherendofthescale, istheestablishmentofinstitutionssuchastheBBC,whichtakeyearstobuild.

(c)Concepts:Thewesternviewof informationsecurity fundamentallydiffers fromtheRussianand Chinese approaches. Giles and Hagestad (2013) describe this: “Thus the Chinese view‘information space’ as a domain, or landscape, for communicating with all of the world’spopulation.” This chimes with the Russian view of this space including human informationprocessing,ineffectcognitivespace.ThisfactoriskeytounderstandingtheholisticRussianandChineseapproachestoinformationsecurityasdistinctfrompurecybersecurity,afundamentaldifferencefromthewesternapproachtothesubject.”

(d)Agility:Helpkeeporganizationsflexiblebyadoptingan“outside-in”perspectivediscussedinChapter9,whichstartswithanaudienceandfocusesondeliveringsomethingofvaluetoit,anddrawingonexternalpartnerorganizationstohelpmeetaudienceneeds.


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Chapter11:NeuroscienceandTechnologyasWeaponsonthe21stCenturyWorldStage-Dr.JamesGiordano,GeorgetownUniversity

JamesGiordano,PhDDepartmentsofNeurologyandBiochemistry

NeuroethicsStudiesProgramGeorgetownUniversityMedicalCenter,

Washington,DC,[email protected]

AbstractNeuroscience and neurotechnologies (neuroS/T) can be used as (1) “soft” weapons to foster power,which can be leveraged through exertion of effects upon globalmarkets to impact nation states andpeoples, and to provide information and tools to more capably affect human psychology inengagements of and between agents and actors; and (2) “hard” (e.g., chemical, biological, and/ortechnological)weapons: includingpharmacological andmicrobiological agents, organic toxins, devicesthatalter functionsof thenervoussystemtoaffect thought,emotionandbehaviors,anduseofsmallscale neurotechnologies to remotely control movements of insects and small mammals to create“cyborg drones” for surveillance or infiltration operations. Brain sciences can also be employed tomitigateorpreventaggression,violence,andwarfare,bysupplementingHUMINT,SIGINT,andCOMINT(inanapproachtermed“neuro-cognitiveintel:”NEURINT).Suchpossibleapplicationsgeneratetwocorequestions: (1)towhatextentcanthesetechnologiesbedevelopedandusedtoexertpower?And, (2)howshouldresearchanduseoftheneurosciencesbebestengaged,guided,andgoverned?Thischapteraddresses: (1) the current capabilities of neuroS/T for operational use in intelligence, military andwarfighting operations; (2) potential benefits, burdens, and risks incurred; (3) key ethical issues andquestions,and (4)possiblepaths toward resolutionof thesequestions toenable technically rightandethicallysoundusetowardmaintaininginternationalsecurity.

KeyPoints• NeuroS/Tcanandwillbeincreasinglydevelopedemployedformilitaryandwarfarepurposesby

bothnationsandnon-stateactors.• Realistic assessment of neuroS/T capabilities and limitations is essential to any approach to

gaugingoperationaluse(s),andrelativebenefits,burdens,risksandthreats.• A simple precautionary approach to both research and use is insufficient; rather a stance of

technicalandethicalpreparednessisadvocated.• Keyelementsofthisstancearepresented.

UsingNeuroscienceandTechnologyto‘ContendAgainstOthers’The term“weapon”maybedefined in twoways: First, asameansof contendingagainstothersand,second,asatoolusedforinflictingdamageand/orharm(MiriamWebster,2004).Intheformersense,wemay consider “soft”weapons, namely those that exert either direct or indirect influencewithoutexplicitphysicaldamageorharm,tomodifyor incurothers’behaviors inparticularways. Inthe latter


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sense,arethoseimplementsofeitherrealorapparentforce,whichcanbeusedtoexertdirectphysicaleffect(s).Increasingly,neuroscienceandneurotechnologies(neuroS/T)canbeusedasweaponsineitherorbothoftheseways(GiordanoandWurzman,2011;WurzmanandGiordano,2015;Giordano,2016;2017a,b). For example, as a “soft”weapon, brain science canbeused to foster power,which canbevariouslyleveraged:fromeconomicfortitudethroughexertionofeffectsuponglobalmarketstoimpactnationstatesandpeoples,toprovidinginformationandtoolstomorecapablyaffecthumanpsychologyin engagements of and between agents and actors. Brain science can also be (dually or directly)developed and utilized as “hard” (e.g., chemical, biological, and/or technological) weapons. Theseinclude pharmacological and microbiological agents, organic toxins, and devices capable of alteringfunctions of the nervous system to affect thought, emotion, and behaviors, aswell as the (relativelynew,stillincipient,butiterative)useofsmallscaleneurotechnologiesthatcaninteractwiththenervoussystemsofvariousorganisms(e.g.,insects,smallmammals)toremotelycontroltheirmovements,soastocreate“cyborgdrones”thatcanbeusedinsurveillanceorinfiltrationoperations(foroverviews,see:WurzmanandGiordano,2015;Evers,Farisco,GiordanoandSalles,2017).Ofcourse,brainsciencescanalsobeemployedtoprovideinformationandtoolstomitigateorpreventaggression, violence, and warfare. For example, neural and cognitive sciences can be engaged asadjuncts to human, signal, and communications intelligence (viz., HUMINT, SIGINT, and COMINT,respectively).Thisapproach,whichwehavetermed“neuro-cognitiveintel”orNEURINT,canbeusedtofoster deepened understanding and insight to human psychological and social processes in order todevelop improved approaches to alter individual and group thought and actions, fortify methods ofhumanterrain,andoptimizemilitaryinformationsupportandpsychologicaloperations(viz.,MISOandPSYOPS). As well, NEURINT methods (e.g., brain-machine interfaces to improve signal-to-noisediscrimination, etc.) can be developed and utilized to optimize operators’ capabilities of intelligenceacquisitionandassessment(WurzmanandGiordano,2015;GiordanoandWurzman,2016).While NEURINT type approaches may be viewed as instrumental to assessing and preventing orlesseningbio-psychologicalfactorscontributorytoviolenceandwarfare,thereisnonethelessincreasingconcernaboutdual-anddirect-militaryusesoftheneuralandcognitivesciences,particularlyasregardsresearch, and potential employment of more overt forms of weapons (Moreno, 2006; 2012; Dando,2007;2014;2015;Giordano,2012;2015;2016;2017a,b;KosalandHuang,2015).Inthislight,itwillbeimportanttoposeandaddresstwoimportantquestions.First,towhatextentcanthesetechnologiesbeleveraged to exert power in political, military, and warfare domains? And second, given suchconsiderations, how should research and use of the neurosciences be best engaged, guided, andgoverned?Thesequestionsareevermorepressing, foranumberof reasons. In themain, is thatbrainscience isbecoming,andisbeingutilizedas,aninternationalenterprise,withrecentestimationsthatnon-westerncountries(e.g.,ChinaandIndia)willassumeanever-moredominantpositioninbothneuroS/Tresearchand theemploymentofbrain science inmedicalanddual-useapplications (LynchandMcCann,2009;Giordano, Forsythe and Olds, 2011; Giordano, 2012; Chen, Andriola and Giordano, 2017).Moreover,suchneuroscientificdevelopmentsarebeingachievedinternationally inspansof5-10years,anddual-useanddirect-to-militaryapplicationsofbrainscience,inclusiveoftheweaponizationofneuroscientifictechniquesandtechnologies,arethereforeadvancinginyears,notdecades(NeuroInsights,2014).Last,butcertainlynotleast,isthattheseenterprisesarebeingundertakenbyseveralnationsincludingthose(e.g.,Russia,Iran,NorthKorea)thatdonotnecessarilysharetheinterestsorintentsoftheUnitedStatesanditsallies(Giordano,Forsythe,Olds,2010;Giordano;2015;Tennison,GiordanoandMoreno,2017).


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Of additional and growing concern is the potential for the expanding do-it-yourself community ofscientiststobeinfiltrated,supported,andmanipulatedbynationaland/ornon-stateactorstodevelopviableneuroweapons (Evers,Farisco,Giordano,andSalles,2017;Giordano,2017b).Theavailabilityof“off-the-shelf” products, such as CRISPR-Cas9-based gene editing kits, to enable manufacture andmodificationofpharmacologicalandbiologicalsubstances(e.g.,drugs,toxins,microbes),addsfacility—andgravitas—tosuchenterprises (DiEuliis andGiordano,2017).Taken together, these trendspresentclear and present risks to international biosecurity, a view supported by a recent report of thePresident’sCouncilofAdvisorsonScienceandTechnology(PCAST)aboutemergingcapabilitiestocreatenovelpathogens, toxins,and insectandplantvectors thatcan threaten thestabilityandsafetyof thepublichealth,environment,andeconomy.NeuroS/TasWeaponsofMassDisruptionNeuroweapons shouldnotbe regardedas instrumentsofmassdestruction,but ratherasweaponsofmass disruption (Wurzman and Giordano, 2015; Giordano, 2017a; b). Certainly, greater destructiveeffect could be incurred by more traditional (e.g., conventional or nuclear) weapons. However, thedisruptive power of neuroweapons is significant in both short- and long-war scenarios. In the formercase, neurotropic drugs, toxins, and/or microbes can be employed to incur “ripple effects” againstgroup, community, or population scale targets. Such agents could be dispersed at varied geographicsitestoproduce“sentinelcases”ofindividualswhoexhibitneuro-psychiatric(andotherphysical)signsand symptoms. Internet attribution as a terrorist action, with (intentionalmis)information about keyescalating signs and symptoms (such as anxiety, sleeplessness, and paranoia) would tend to amplifyreactions among an expanding number of “worried well” members of the group/population. Theseindividualswouldseekhealthcare,evokeanincreasingburdenonthepublichealthsystem(evenifonlyin the short term), and would engage public health officials and organizations with questions andconcerns. Subsequent Internet messaging of narratives aimed at denigrating any governmentalresponses in reaction to the intended“threat” inattempt toassuagesuchconcernscould fosterbothdissolutionofpublictrustandincreasewideningsocialdisruption(Giordano,2017b).Inamorelong-warscenario,drugs,toxins,and/ormicrobescouldbeemployedtoincurchangesinthedevelopment,structure,and/orfunctionofthebrain,soastoevokelatentneuro-psychiatricdisordersin targeted populations, and thereby produce disruptive effects on individual, group, and communitylevels.Aswell,neuroweaponscouldbeusedagainstindividualtargetstoincuramplifiedeffectinbothshort-or long-warsituations.For instance,neurologically-actingchemicalsandtoxinscouldbeusedtoincurmoremorbidorlethalconsequences,todebilitateorkilltargetedindividualsof“sentinelvalue”toparticulargroupsorpublics,asdemonstratedbytheuseofthenerveagentVXtoassassinateKimJong-nam.Or,neurotropicdrugscouldbeemployedtoselectivelyaffectthecognitionsand/orbehavior(s)ofpolitical or military leaders, to evoke resulting, albeit perhaps more slowly evolving changes in thesentiments and actions of those they lead.What’s more, neuroS/T can be utilized as a “soft powerweapon” to manipulate health care and biotechnology sales markets to affect socio-economics, andinternationalrelationsandexertstrategically latent,yetsignificantanddurableinfluenceontheworldstage(Giordano,2017a,b).Currentbiologicalandchemicalweapons’conventions(e.g., theHagueConventions;GenevaProtocol;Biologic,ToxinandWeaponsConvention-BTWC;ChemicalWeaponsConvention-CWC;UnitedNations’Security Council Resolution 1540; Lisbon Treaty, and 2014 Arms Trade Treaty) constrain research,stockpiling, and trade of certain neurotoxins and microbiological agent (e.g., anthrax; ricin; OPCW,2014). In the United States, any and all federally funded programs would be subject to oversight in


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accordancewithdual-usepolicies,whichreflectthegeneraltenoroftheseconventions.However,asthe2008NationalAcademyofSciencesreportEmergingCognitiveNeuroscienceandRelatedTechnologieshasnoted,productsintendedforthehealthmarketcanbe—andfrequentlyare—studiedanddevelopedforpossibleemployment inmilitaryapplications,andthusavarietyofneurobiologicalsubstancesandtechnologies—suchasneurotropicdrugs,bio-regulatoryagents (e.g.,opioidsandotherpeptides),andneuromodulatorydevices—maynotbewithinthescopeofextantinternationalrules(NationalResearchCouncil, 2008). Foreign governments could use medical incentives to either pursue research anddevelopment to affect international economic balance, and/or as a veil to engage new dual-use ordirect-to-militaryS/T,andshieldtheiractivitieseitherbehindcommercialnormsprotectingproprietaryinterestsandintellectualproperty(BenedikterandGiordano,2012;BrindleyandGiordano,2014;Chen,Andriola and Giordano, 2017; Palchik, Chen and Giordano, 2017). And nonstate actors (inclusive ofneuro-biohackers) may exploit opportunities to engage in research and development of disruptiveneuroS/Toutsideofthespecterofinstitutionaloversight.ThesetrajectoriesdemonstrateandstrengthentheviewthatneuroS/Tisbeing,andincreasinglywillbe,developedandused inways that impact international security. In lightof this,wehavearguedthatasimpleprecautionaryprinciplewilllikelybeoflittleutilityorvalue(Giordano,ForsytheandOlds,2010).Instead, what is necessary is a stance of preparedness, which must be based upon both realisticassessment of (1) the current intent, capabilities, and limitations of various nations and nonstateenterprises’neuroS/Tresearchanddevelopment(R/D)efforts,and(2)thecapabilitiesandlimitationsoftheneuroS/Tbeingdevelopedandoperationalized(Giordano,2015).Suchassessmentwillnecessitate“deepsurveillance”ofinternationalneuroS/TR/D,tofocusupon(1)universityandindustrialprogramsand projects with direct and/or dual-use applications; (2) types and extent of (governmental andprivate) support of neuroS/T R/D; (3) recruitment of subject matter experts with explicit and tacitknowledgeand skills focal toneuroS/T; (4) product anddeviceproductionand commercialization, (5)presentandplannedmilitaryandintelligenceuseofneuroS/T,and(6)currentandnear-futuremarketpositionandleveragingofcurrentandplannedneuroS/Tproducts(Giordano,2016).WhattoDoNext?Thispromptsquestionofwhataction(s)willbemostappropriateinresponsetocurrentandpredictedenterprisesinneuroS/TR/Dthatcanbeengagedforproductionofboth“soft”and“hard”weaponry.A“waitandsee”orlaissez-faireapproachmightcreateopportunitiesforbothtacticalunbalancing,aswellas more strategically latent influence of neuroS/T agenda and use (Chen, Andriola, Giordano, 2017;ForsytheandGiordano,2011;Giordano,ForsytheandOlds,2010;Giordano,2015;Giordano,2016). If,ontheotherhand,surveillancepromptsaction,itiscertainlypossiblethatapatternof“brinkmanship”mightresult,withsurveillance-basedescalationoftestinganddevelopmentofcountering(and/ormoreeffective)neuroS/Tproductsthatareusableforbotheconomicleveragingandas“hard”neuroweapons(National Research Council, 2008; 2014; McCreight, 2015). Therefore, a vital first step of theaforementioned preparatory stance entails accurate assessments of the relative benefit-burden-risk-threat likelihood(s) posed by R/D and use of neuroS/T in specified contexts that are relevant tointernationalsecurity.Fromtheseevaluations,decisionscanbemadeastowhetherandtowhatextentproactive or countering engagement of R/D and use could be undertaken, what effects would beincurredinthenearandintermediateterm,andbaseduponsuchpossibleoutcomes,if,whatandhowresearch and operational activities should be undertaken. In all of these approaches, it is equallyimportanttoassessandaddresstheethico-legalandsocialissuesthatwillarise.Toaddresstheseissues,


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we have proposed methods of risk-assessment and mitigation (Giordano, 2015; 2017c; Giordano,Casebeer,Sanchez,2014),andcriteriathatsoughttoestablish:

1. ThatemphasisshouldbeuponusingneuroS/Ttopreventwarfare(i.e.,juscontrabellum)2. That if utilized, only the least harmful neuroS/T should be employed toward mitigating

realisticallyidentifiedthreat(s).3. That the use of neuroS/Tmust be admissible under themost stringent, current international

legalstandards.

Conclusion:TowardaGoalandPath(s)AheadNevertheless,even justifiableuseofneuroS/T topreventwarfare raisesethical issues,questions, andconcerns,andwebelievethatanynewdevelopmentorapplicationofneurosciencedemandsdedicationto neuroethico-legal and social issues and guidance. To be sure, such questions and concerns arechallenging; the challenge reflects and must address 1) strategic transnational neuroscientificinnovation, 2) cross-cultural values, needs, and norms, and 3) the need to negotiate more stableeconomic,political,andnationalsecurityrelationships.Moreover, given the novelty—and potential power—of these techniques, existing ethical and legalconcepts, while viable to some extent, may require re-examination—and in some cases revision orreplacement—soastoaccountforsocio-culturalandpoliticalperspectives,needs,andvaluesthataregermanetothepotentialuseand/ormis-useofneuroS/Tinnationalsecurityandintelligenceoperations(ShookandGiordano,2014;Tractenberg,FitzGeraldandGiordano,2015;Tennison,Giordano,Moreno,2017). Clearly, any such attempt to develop ethico-legal standards, guidelines and methods ofgovernancewill necessitate coordinated efforts of themilitary and civilian (i.e., political, commercial,andpublic)sectors—aselementsof the ‘triplehelix’of thescientificestate (Etzkowitz,2008;Moreno,2006;2012;Wurzman2010).However,publicdiscourseofthisnaturedemandsparticularstewardshipto insure transparent illustration of issues and possible resolutions, and concomitant integrity of(classified)informationthatisessentialtonationalsecurity(Giordano,ForsytheandOlds,2010).Navigatingthispathwillnotbeeasy.NeuroS/Thasbeenseenasa“BigScience”efforttoaddressthe“grandchallenge”ofdevelopingimprovedcapabilitytounderstandandaffectthebrainanditsfunctionsof thought, emotion, and behavior. Yet, as President Barack Obama (2016) so eloquently stated,“Technological progress without an equivalent progress in human institutions can doom us. Thescientific revolution...requires a moral revolution as well.” Hence, it may be that the real “grandchallenge”will be dedicating effective investments of time, effort, and funding required tomeet theurgentneuroethicaldemandsspawnedbycurrentand future iterationsofneuroS/T,andasPresidentObama noted, “...to prevent conflict...and strive to end conflicts after they’ve begun...as a cause forpeacefulcooperationandnotviolentcompetition.”ReferencesChenC,Andriola J,GiordanoJ.2017.Biotechnology,commercialveiling,and implications forstrategic

latency:TheexemplarofneuroscienceandneurotechnologyresearchanddevelopmentinChina.In:DavisZ.(ed.)StrategicLatency:Red,WhiteandBlue.LivermoreCA:LawrenceLivermorePress.

BenedikterR,GiordanoJ.2012.Neurotechnology:NewfrontiersforEuropeanpolicy.PanEuroNetworkSciTech,3:204-207.


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BrindleyT,GiordanoJ.2014.Internationalstandardsforintellectualpropertyprotectionofneuroscienceandneurotechnology:Neuroethical, legalandsocial (NELS)considerations in lightofglobalization.StanfordJLawSciPolicy,7:33.

Dando,M.2007.PreventingtheFutureMilitaryMisuseofNeuroscience.NY:Palgrave-Macmillan.

DandoM. 2014. Neuroscience advances in future warfare. In: Clausen J, Levy N. (eds.) Handbook ofNeuroethics.Dordrecht:Springer.

DandoM.2015.NeuroscienceandtheFutureofChemical-BiologicalWeapons,NY:Palgrave-Macmillan.

DiEuliis D, Giordano J. 2017. Why gene editors like CRISPR/Cas may soon be a game-changer forneuroweapons.HealthSecurity,15(3):296-302.

Etzkowitz, H. 2008. The Triple Helix: University-Industry-Government Innovation in Action, New York:Routledge.

Evers K, Farisco M, Giordano J, Salles A. 2017. Dual use in neuroscientific and neurotechnologicalresearch: A report on background, developments and recommendations for ethical address,assessment and guidance of Human Brian Project activities. Available online at:http://www.crb.uu.se/research/neuroethics/;accessedon10June2017.

Forsythe C, Giordano J. 2011. On the need for neurotechnology in national intelligence and defenseagenda:Scopeandtrajectory.Synesis:AJournalofScience,Technology,EthicsandPolicy.2(1):88-91.

Giordano J. 2012. Neurotechnology as demiurgical force: Avoiding Icarus’ folly. In: Giordano J. (ed.)Neurotechnology:Premises,PotentialandProblems.BocaRaton:CRCPress,p.1-14.

Giordano, J. 2015. Neurotechnology, global relations, and national security: Shifting contexts andneuroethical demands. In: Giordano, J. (ed.) Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense:PracticalConsiderations,NeuroethicalConcerns,BocaRaton,CRCPress,pp.1-10.

GiordanoJ.2016.Theneuroweaponsthreat.BullAtomicSci,72(3):1-4.

GiordanoJ.2017a.Battlescapebrain:Engagingneuroscienceindefenseoperations.HDIACJournal,3(4):13-17.

GiordanoJ.2017b.Weaponizingthebrain:Neuroscienceadvancementssparkdebate.NatDef.Availableonline at: http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2017/5/11/weaponizing-the-brain-neuroscience-advancements-spark-debate;accessed22.June,2017.

Giordano J. 2017c. Toward an operational neuroethical risk analysis and mitigation paradigm foremergingneuroscienceandtechnology(neuroS/T).ExpNeurol,287(4):492-495.

Giordano J, Casebeer WD, Sanchez J. 2014. Assessing and managing risks in systems neuroscienceresearchand its translation:Apreparatoryneuroethical approach.Paperpresentedat6thAnnualMeetingoftheInternationalNeuroethicsSociety,Washington,DC.

GiordanoJ,ForsytheC,OldsJ.2010.Neuroscience,neurotechnologyandnationalsecurity:Theneedforpreparednessandanethicsofresponsibleaction.AJOB-Neuroscience,1(2):1-3.

Giordano J, Wurzman R. 2011. Neurotechnology as weapons in national intelligence and defense.Synesis:AJournalofScience,Technology,EthicsandPolicy,2:138-151.


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GiordanoJ,WurzmanR.2016.Integrativecomputationalandneurocognitivescienceandtechnologyforintelligence operations: Horizons of potential viability, value and opportunity. STEPS- Science,Technology,EngineeringandPolicyStudies,2(1):34-38

KosalME,HuangJY.2015.Securityimplicationsandgovernanceofcognitiveneuroscience.PoliticsLifeSci,34(1):93-108.

Lynch, Z. and C.M. McCann. 2009. Neurotech clusters 2010: Leading regions in the globalneurotechnology industry 2010-2020. NeuroInsights Report, 2009. Accessed online at:http//www.neuroinsights.com.,20.June,2017.

McCreightR. 2015.Brainbrinksmanship:Devisingneuroweapons lookingatbattlespace,doctrineandstrategy. In: Giordano J. (ed.) Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense: PracticalConsiderations,NeuroethicalConcerns,BocaRaton:CRCPress,p.115-132.

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary. 2004.Weapon. InMerriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary,11thed.394,Springfield,IL:Merriam-WebsterInc.

Moreno,J.2006;2012.MindWars.NY:BellevuePress.

NationalResearchCounciloftheNationalAcademiesofScience.2008.EmergingCognitiveNeuroscienceandRelatedTechnologies.WashingtonDC:NationalAcademiesPress.

NationalResearchCounciloftheNationalAcademiesofScience.2014.EmergingandReadilyAvailableTechnologiesandNationalSecurity:AFrameworkforAddressingEthical,LegalandSocietal Issues.WashingtonDC:NationalAcademiesPress.

NeuroInisights2014. (2014). Available online at:http://www.neuroinsights.com/#!neurotechreport2014/cmca;accessedonlineon10.June,2017.

Obama,B.2016.FulltextofPresidentObama’sspeechattheHiroshimamemorial.NYTimes,availableonline at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/28/world/asia/text-of-president-obamas-speech-in-hiroshima-japan.html;accessedonlineon20.June,2017.

Organization for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons. 2014.Convergence of Chemistry and Biology:ReportoftheScientificAdvisoryBoard’sTemporaryWorkingGroup.OPCW:TheHague,June.

PalchikG,ChenC,GiordanoJ.2017.Monkeybusiness?Development,influenceandethicsofpotentiallydual-usebrainscienceontheworldstage.Neuroethics,10:1-4

Shook J,Giordano J. 2014.Towardaprincipledandcosmopolitanneuroethics.Phil, EthicsHumanitiesMed,9(1).

TennisonM,Giordano J,Moreno JD.2017.Security threatsversusaggregated truths:Ethical issues inthe use of neuroscience and neurotechnology for national security. In: Illes J, Hossein S. (eds.)Neuroethics: Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice, and Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press,2017.

TractenbergRE,FitzGeraldKT,GiordanoJ.2015.Engagingneuroethical issuesgeneratedbytheuseofneurotechnology in national security and defense: Toward process, methods, and paradigm. In:Giordano J. (ed.) Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense: Practical Considerations,NeuroethicalConcerns,BocaRaton,CRCPress,p.259-278.

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WurzmanR,GiordanoJ.2015.NEURINTandneuroweapons:Neurotechnologiesinnationalintelligenceand defense. In: Giordano J. (ed.) Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense: PracticalConsiderations,NeuroethicalConcerns,BocaRaton,CRCPress,p.79-114.


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Chapter12:TheNeurocognitiveScienceofPersuasion–Dr.ChristopheMorin,FieldingGraduateUniversity

Dr.ChristopheMorinFieldingGraduateUniversity

[email protected]

AbstractWhile ISIS influencehas lessenedon the ground, it is not clear that it hasweakened in thenarrativespace,especiallytorecruitteensandyoungadults.Therefore,itiscrucialthatwerecognizetheurgencyof using better persuasionmodels to create and evaluate both propaganda and counter-propagandacampaigns.Also, thedynamicand implicitnatureof theeffectofmediacontentonadolescentmindshighlightsthenecessityofconductingexperimentsthatrevealtheneurophysiologicaleffectofmessageson young brains. Subjects cannot competently and objectively report how messages work on theirminds. However, new research tools used by neuromarkers can reveal critical insights by safely andethically monitoring different subsystems in the nervous systems while participants view persuasivemessages.

HowNeurocognitivePersuasionModelsCanHelpUsWintheWarintheNarrativeSpaceThewaronterrorisurgingustorethinkthepowerthatmessageshaveonvulnerableminds.Two-thirdsofISISrecruitsarelessthan25yearsold(Bouzar,2015).ThesuicidebomberoftherecentManchesterblast was only 22. A Pew poll conducted in 2015 among Muslim youths in the West revealed thatyoungerMuslimssupportsuicidebombingsmorethantheolderMuslims(Kohut,2007).Shockingly,theaverageageofallsuicidebombersimplicatedin28attemptedsuicideattacksinsideIsraelandtheWestBank,andGazaStripin2001was21(Harel,2001).

Ihavespentthreedecadesresearchinghowadvertisingmessagesaffectourbrains(Lin,Grewal,Morin,Johnson, & Zak, 2013; Morin, 2014). Most recently, I decided to look at the effect of public healthmessagesandpropagandacampaignsonvulnerableminds,i.e.,adolescents(Morin,2015).WhatIhavefoundfirstandforemostisthatamajorityofcampaignsdonotusecrediblepersuasionmodelstoguidetheircreativedevelopmentprocess.Accordingtoameta-analysisconductedbyRandolph,lessthanone-thirdofempiricalarticlesonpublicserviceannouncements(PSA)reportusinganypersuasiontheoryatall(Randolph&Viswanath,2004).Inmyopinion,theparallelsbetweenPSAandpropagandacampaignsare clear. Because the creative process is not informed by a sound theoretical framework, manycounter-propagandacampaignsappealtologicormoralityratherthanemotions.Bothapproacheshavevery little effectondevelopingbrains (Morin, 2016). Thispaper argues that thepatternofdismissingsoundpersuasiontheoriesor,worse,relyingonoldcognitivemodelswillnotallowustowinthebattleinthenarrativespace,especiallyonadolescentsandyoungadults.

Thefollowingaresomeofthemostpopularpersuasionmodelsusedoverthelastthreedecades.Whileamajorityofthemodelsdonotintegratetherecentfindingsontheneuroscienceofadolescents,manyhavemade importantcontributionstothefieldofpersuasion.Thesignificantdifferencesbetweenthemodels highlight the challenges facedby researchers todeconstruct the critical processes involved inexplaining and predicting the effects of persuasion. While this review explains why there is oftenconfusion and discord amongmedia researchers, I believe emerging neurocognitivemodels offer thebesthopeforcreatingandtestingradicallymorepowerfulcampaigns.


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TheElaborationLikelihoodModel(ELM)(Petty,Cacioppo,&Heesacker,1981)Inspiredbythecognitivetheoreticalmovement,thismodelstatesthatapersuasivemessagewilltriggeralogicalsuccessionofmentalprocessesthatengageeitheracentralorperipheralroute,andthatbothroutes represent the levels of thinking performed by recipients to understand the meaning of theinformation.Thecentralrouteensuresthatthemessageisconsideredfurther(orelaborated),inwhichcase the message has achieved its persuasive intent. However, if a message is processed by theperipheralroute,theeffectispredictedtobemild.AccordingtoELM,agoodmessagemustappealatadeepandpersonal leveltotargets.ELMadvocatesalsoarguethataneffectivecampaignmust includestrongwarrantstoestablishthecredibilityoftheevidenceandtheclaimsusedinapersuasivemessage.Despite itswidepopularity, thecritical flawofELM is that itargues thatpersuasion isonlypossible ifrecipientsengagecognitivelywiththecontentofamessage,afactthatisnolongersupportedbyrecentadvertisingresearch.

PsychologicalReactanceTheory(PRT)(Brehm&Brehm,1981)AccordingtoPRT,humansaremotivateddeeplybythedesiretoholdthemselvesaccountableandfreefromother’srulesandsuggestions.ThePRTmodelpredictsthatifpeoplebelievethattheirfreedomtochoose how theywant to conduct their life is under attack, theywill experience an ardent desire to“react” as away to remove the pressure. Reactance is believed to be at its peak during adolescencebecause teens have a strong drive toward independence and form beliefs and attitudes that oftencompetewiththoserecommendedbytheirparents.Themodelfurtherpredictsthatexplicitpersuasivemessages triggermore reactance than implicit attempts. Also, Grandpre (Grandpre, Alvaro, Burgoon,Miller,&Hall,2003)etal.demonstratedthatreactancetopersuasivemessagesincreaseswithage.Thismay explain why campaigns invoking the role of parents discussing the dangers of smoking are noteffective(Farrellyetal.,2002).

TerrorManagementTheory(TMT)(Rosenblatt,Greenberg,Solomon,Pyszczynski,&Lyon,1989)LargelybasedonFreud(1933)andtheworkofBecker(1973,1975),TMTisanattempttoexplainthecore psychological coping mechanism we use to face our mortality. The anxiety we experience byconfronting the inevitability of our death is expressed at both a conscious (i.e., proximal) level andunconscious (i.e., distal) level.According to the theory,whenwe facedeath consciously,weuse self-esteemasawaytosuppressanxietyandrestoreself-confidence.However,thisraisesastateofdenial.ResearchersusingTMTsuggestthatsmokerswhogainself-esteembysmokingtendtosmokemore,andtherefore,denythattobaccouseisadirectthreattotheirhealth(Martin&Kamins,2007).Advocatesofthe TMT model would argue that to persuade people who join ISIS; campaigns should increase thesalience of mortality to shatter their worldview and draw more cognitive processing to accept theevidence(Veer&Rank,2012).

TheMessageFramingApproach(Rothman,Martino,Bedell,Detweiler,&Salovey,1999)Thismodelisbasedonthenotionthatapersuasivemessagecanbeframedintwoways:eitheralossifrecipientsfailtocorrectariskybehaviororagainifrecipientsagreetoadoptahealthybehavior.Loss-framedmessagesaretypicallymoreeffectivewhentheypromoteillness-detectingbehaviors,basicallyraising consciousness on the pathological nature of risky behavior. On the other hand, gain-framedmessagescanbemoreeffectivethanloss-framedmessagestopromoteachangeinthebehavioritself.Other experiments using this approach have demonstrated that loss-framed messages are better to


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prevent risky behaviors than to change them (Detweiler, Bedell, Salovey, Pronin, & Rothman, 1999;Schneider,Salovey,Apanovitch,etal.,2001;Schneider,Salovey,Pallonen,etal.,2001).

TheLimitedCapacityModelofMediatedMessageProcessing(LCM)(Lang,2000)The LCM is another model inspired by the field of cognitive psychology. It provides a conceptualframeworkbasedonaseriesofempiricalstudiesexaminingtherelativeeffectofmessageelementsonkey cognitive functions such as encoding, storage, retrieval, information processing, and limitedcapacity. The model suggests that allocation of brain resources may be equally distributed amongseveralcognitivesub-processesleadingtoinconsistentresultsinrecallandgeneraleffectonrecipients.StudiesusingtheLCMmodelindicatethatadolescentsremembermoredetailsfromPSAsthancollegestudents do and require more speed in narratives to stay engaged. This confirms that key cognitivedifferencesexistbetweenadolescentsandyoungadultsandthat thesedifferencesmayalter thesub-processesinvolvedinviewingpersuasivecampaigns(Lang,Zhou,Schwartz,Bolls,&Potter,2000).

TheSensationSeekingTargeting(SENTAR)PreventionApproach(Palmgreen,Donohew,Lorch,Hoyle,&Stephenson,2001)This approach draws on extensive research performed on the psychophysiology of high-sensationseekers (Lang, Chung, Lee, Schwartz, & Shin, 2005; Stephenson et al., 2002; Zuckerman, 1996).According to the researchers, adolescents use twomain adaptive responses in front of any stimulus:approach orwithdraw. The behavioral activation system (BAS) commands the organism to approachattractive rewardsand is known tobemediatedby themesolimbicdopaminesystem.Thebehavioralinhibitionsystem(BIS)makesuswithdrawfromaversivestimuli.Basedonthismodel,researchershavefound that adolescents who engage in risky behavior tend to display higher than normal sensation-seeking traits, which means that they are more likely to activate their BAS to approach risky butpotentiallyrewardingsituations.SENSORpredictsthattheeffectofsensationalmessagesisgreateronadolescentsbecausetheyscorethehighestonasensation-seekingscale.

FearAppealsandtheExtendedParallelProcess(EPPM)Model(Dickinson&Holmes,2008;Hastings,Stead,&Webb,2004;Witte&Allen,2000)Fearhasbeenusedextensivelyforseveraldecadesinpublichealthandcounter-propagandacampaigns.Fear urges targets to avoid orwithdraw from a perceived threat. According toWitte and Allen, fearappeal theories have often changed to reflect the dominant theoretical perspective of a particularperiod. For instance, in the 1970s and 1980s, fear theories were grounded in cognitive perspectives(Rogers&Smith,1993).Thesemodelsinsistedthatfearprocessingwascontrolledrationallyinthebrain,a fact that is contested today by a majority of affective neuroscientists (Ledoux & Phelps, 2004;Panksepp, 2004). EPPM claims to integrate several classical fear appeal theories, and as such, isespecially important to highlight. The EPPM posits that perceived threats can predict the degree towhichpeoplecontrol their responses,whereasperceivedefficacyexplains thenatureof theresponse.The model predicts that threat appeals work best when the message includes information that cansupportefficacy.Without it, fearappealstendtotriggerdenialorpromotetheretrievalofoldbeliefs.Meanwhile,recentstudiessuggestthatsocialthreatshavemoreinfluenceonadolescentsthanphysicalthreats,presumablybecausetheyaremoreafraidtodisrupttheirsocial lifethandamagetheirhealth.Despiteheateddebatesamonghealthadvocatesregardingtheeffectofnegativeversuspositivehealthmessages, fear appeals appear to producemore resultswith adolescents, especiallywhen campaignsneedtodeliverimpactonsmallbudgets(Apollonio&Malone,2009).Interestingly,campaignsthatelicitnegative emotions such as fear or disgust also appear to work better on lower socioeconomic


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populations (Durkin,Biener,&Wakefield, 2009).A content analysisof 197antismokingadsproducedbetween 1991 and 1999 revealed that fearwas themost common theme (31%), followed by humor(29%),andsociability(26%)(Beaudoin,2002).Suchmeta-analysesobviouslyarehelpful,buttheyfailtoprovide clarity on which theme is the most effective. A recent neuroimaging study confirmed thatpersuasiveness involvesbothaffectiveandexecutiveprocesses.Performedon70teenagers,thestudytestedthirty30-secondanti-drugPSAsusingfMRI.Allclipswereselectedtoproducenegativevalence.TheresultssuggestthateffectivePSAsmustelicitstrongarousalactivityintheamygdalaandthemedialPFC(Ramsay,Yzer,Lucian,Vohs,&MacDonaldIII,2013).

System1andSystem2Dual-processTheory(Stanovich&West,2000)andNeuroMap(Morin&Renvoise2002-2017)Originally introducedbyStanovichandWest (2000), thedualprocessing theory isknownasSystem1and2andwaseventuallyenhancedbyDanielKahneman throughhis seminalbookThinkingFastandSlow(2011).Thetenetsofthisapproacharebothsimpleandprofound.Whiletheresearchsupportingthismodel was done to study rationality and explain cognitive processes in amultitude of decision-makingtasks,thevalueofthetheoreticalframeworkextendsfarbeyondcognitivepsychology.Infact,itspeaksdirectlytothenatureofourcomputationalbiasesandhowtheyaffectourdaytodaychoices.ForKahneman,weaccesstwocognitivesystemsthathavedifferentifnotopposingpriorities.System1is automatic, unconscious and requires low computational resources. System 2 is more intentional,needsmoreconsciousnessandhasaccesstomorecognitiveresourcestoestablishgoalsandcalculateconsequences of our decisions. The table below is a high-level summary of the differences betweensystem1and2(Figure2).Theillustrationshowstherespectiveanatomicalbordersofeachsystem.Theexact location of such borders is the subject of ongoing controversy but has gainedwide acceptanceamongmembersoftheneuromarketingcommunity.

Figure2:System1andSystem2.SalesBrainCopyrights2012-2017


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The research I have conductedon theeffectof advertisingmessageson thebrain since2002 revealsthatadvertisingcampaignsdonotworkunless they firstand foremost influence thebottom layersofthebrain,i.e.System1(Morin,2014).System1isinfactcontrolledlargelybythereptiliancomplex(RC),asystemcomposedofthebrainstemandcerebellum.Incidentally,theRCofadolescentsrespondstosixstimuli before triggering a decision. RC is highly egotistic, impatient, social, visual, emotional andresilient.Furthermore, it is important toconsider thatwhenamessage isSystem1-friendly, itquicklyradiates to the upper sections of the brain wherewe process the information in amore logical andrationalway (System2). Inshort, thepersuasionmodel IdevelopedwithmypartnerPatrickRenvoisecalledNeuroMapisbasedonthedualprocessingmodelproposedbyKahneman.Byapplyingthemodeland by using proprietary predictive algorithms, we have convincingly demonstrated that successfulpersuasive messages capture first (System 1) and convince second (System 2). Both conditions arenecessary for anybehavioral change to occur. Thebenefit ofNeuroMap is that it integrates thedualprocessingmodelaswellasrecentfindingsontheneurocognitivebasisofpersuasion.Thatiswhyitcanpredictthecriticaldifferencesthatexistbetweenadolescentbrainsandadult’sbrainswhenexposedtoadvertising stimuli. For instance, adolescent brains relymore on System 1 than adults because theirfrontal lobeshavenot finishedmaturatinguntil they reach theageof25. Theseneurodevelopmentallimitationsalsoexplainswhyadolescentshaveheightenedsensitivitytorewards,reducedsensitivitytopunishments,andinferiorcognitivecontrol.Toconclude,acursoryreviewofsomeofthemostpopularpersuasionmodelsguidingthecreationofalargenumberofPSAsandpropagandacampaignssuggeststhatNeuroMapmayofferapowerfulwaytointegrate recent findingson theneuroscienceofadvertisingand itseffectonadolescent’sbrains.Thebasisofthemodelalsosuggeststhatthebestwaytoprobetheeffectofpersuasivemessagessuchascounter-propagandacampaignsistomeasuretheirdirecteffectonthebrain.Regrettably,amajorityoftheresearchassessingtheimpactofpropagandacampaignscontinuetorelyonself-reportsasthebestway to measure the effect on targets. However, we know that emotions and visual responses havestrong neurophysiological correlates, which act below our level of consciousness. Consequently, Istrongly argue that thebestway to improveourunderstandingofpersuasivemessages is to conductmoreresearchusingneuromarketingtechniques.Theportabilityandvalidityofthesetechniqueshavebeenfullydemonstratedoverthelasttwodecades.AtypicalneuromarketinglabcanmonitorSystem1andSystem2responsesbyusingGRS,eyetracking,ECG,EEGandfacialimaging(Figure3).


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Figure3:SalesBrainNeuroLab

There are compelling reasons to use stronger neurocognitive theoretical frameworks before creatingeffectivecampaignstargetingadolescents.Buttestingandmeasuringthedirecteffectofmessagesonthebrainisthebestwaytooperationalizeandsucceedinthenarrativespace.Ifnotnow,when?

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Chapter 13: A Scientific Approach to Combating Misinformation andDisinformationOnline-Dr.DavidA.Broniatowski,GeorgeWashingtonUniversityandDr.ValerieF.Reyna,CornellUniversity

DavidA.BroniatowskiTheGeorgeWashingtonUniversity

[email protected]

[email protected]

AbstractWe argue for a scientific approach to combating online misinformation and disinformation. Such anapproachmustbegroundedinempiricallyvalidatedtheoryandisnecessarilyinterdisciplinary,requiringinsightsfromdecisionscience,computerscience,thesocialsciences,andsystemsintegration.Relevantresearch has been conducted on the psychology of online narratives, providing a foundation forunderstandingwhysomemessagesarecompellingandspreadthroughsocialmedianetworks,butthisresearchmustbeintegratedwithresearchfromotherdisciplines.

TheBattleoftheNarrativeOnline misinformation has long been problematic: counterinsurgency campaigns acknowledge thecrucial “battle of the narrative.” For example, the US Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24)emphasizesthepowerofnarrativestochangepopulationbehaviors,notingthatthe“rootcausesofaninsurgencyarerealorperceivedgrievancesthatinsurgentsusetomobilizeapopulation…Asconditionschange, insurgent leaders create different narratives to mobilize a population.” (p. 4-3). Similarly,militarydoctrinestates:

For enduring interventions, there can be a continuing struggle to define the national andinternational debate/discussion on terms favorable to one side, causing a clash between thecompetingnarrativesoftheactorsinvolved.Thisisoftenwhatisreferredtoasthe“battleofthenarrative.” A key component of the narrative is establishing the reasons for and desiredoutcomesof the conflict, in termsunderstandable to relevantpublics. (pp. ix-x.) Commander’sCommunicationSynchronizationJointDoctrineNote(JointDoctrineNote2-13)

This document notes that social media is an especially effective platform for propagating thesenarratives,statingthat“Socialmediaenablestherapidtransmissionofinformationandmisinformationtodomesticandinternationalpublicsandcommunitiesofinterest”(p.II-13).

LessonsfromOtherFieldsThe effects of online narrative are not restricted to the national security space. For example, publichealthprofessionals facesimilarchallenges: the journalVaccinedevotedanentirespecial issuetotherolesocialmediaplaysinvaccinationdecisions(Betschetal.,2012).Importantly,theconsensusarticleinthisspecialissueemphasizestheroleofnarratives,statingthat“Narrativeshaveinherentadvantagesoverothercommunicationformats…[and]includeallofthekeyelementsofmemorablemessages:Theyare easy to understand, concrete, credible… andhighly emotional. These qualitiesmake this typeofinformationcompelling…”(p.3730).


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Similarly,therecentUSpresidentialelectionhighlightedthepopularityof“fakenews,”whichalthoughfactually inaccurate, may have been shared more widely on Facebook than vetted media sources(Silverman,2016).Ratherthantakeapartisanapproach,weproposethattherelationshipbetweentheperceptionof news as fakeor genuine canbe studied as a scientific problem, and, indeed, there areanalogues in the literature (e.g., vaccination) that provide theoretical and empirical insight into theprocessofsocialandpoliticalinfluencethroughsocialmedia.

TheUniqueRoleofSocialMediaSocial media have an especially wide reach. A recent Pew Center study (Perrin, 2015) indicates thatmorepeoplegettheirnewsfromsocialmediathanfromanyothersource.Amongmillennials,thistrendis even more pronounced: 61% of millennials get more than half of their news from social media.Furthermore,71%ofallonlineUSadultsareonFacebook(Anderson&Caumont,2014),and30%oftheUSpopulationgetsnewsprimarilyfromthissocialmediaservice.Finally,Facebookpostsrepresent81%ofallarticleshares(Crum,2015).Thus,socialmediaenabletherapidincreaseinthespeedandscopeofnarrativesmayaffectbehaviorchange.

TheRoleofEmpirically-ValidTheoriesofComprehension:Fuzzy-TraceTheoryEffectivemessageshelpreadersretainthemeaningofthemessageinmemoryandfacilitateavailabilityoftheknowledgeatthetimeofbehavior.Fuzzy-TraceTheory(FTT),aleadingtheoryofdecisionunderrisk,explainsthepopularityofonlinemessagesbecauseofthesearchformeaningandthetendencytointerpreteventsdespiteinadequateknowledge.FTTpositsfourkeyfactorsthatdrivedecisionsbasedonhowinformationisinterpreteddiscussedbelow(foraformalmodelseeBroniatowski&Reyna,2017):

1)MentalRepresentationofNarrativeContentFTT’s approach to online communication builds on the core concepts of gist and verbatim mentalrepresentations,modifiedandadaptedfromthepsycholinguisticliterature(Kintsch,1974)inthelightofmore recent findings (see Reyna, 2012a). According to FTT,meaningful stimuli such as narratives areencoded into memory in two forms: a verbatim representation (the objective stimulus or adecontextualizedrepresentationofwhatactuallyhappened)andagistrepresentation(thesubjectiveormeaningful interpretation of what happened (Reyna, Corbin, Weldon, & Brainerd, 2016). Verbatimrepresentations encode details, such as exact numbers (e.g., “4.5% of vaccinated individuals becameill”). In contrast, a gist representation encodes the essential meaning of the sentence. Furthermore,theremaybemultiplegist representations (e.g., “virtuallynoneof thosevaccinatedbecame ill,” “youcan still get sick if you get vaccinated”). Gist representations are subjective and depend on culture,knowledge, beliefs, andother life experiences (Reyna&Adam,2003).However, in practice, coherentgist representations have been communicated to diverse audiences. Importantly, gist interpretations,ratherthanverbatiminterpretations,tendtoguidedecisionsandbehavior.Whenmakingsenseoftext,gist representations form coherent, causal stories. These narratives “connect the dots,” to offer acoherentaccountandaremorelikelytobeaccepted.Forexample,morecoherentstoriessuchasthoseconnectingadversehealthoutcomes(suchasautism)tocertainbehaviors(e.g.,vaccination)aremorelikelytobeacceptedbecausetheyprovideanexplanationforotherwisemysteriousadverseevents.WehavesuccessfullymodeledFTTinthedomainofriskydecision-making(Broniatowski&Reyna,2017)andaredevelopingrelatedmodelsforvaccination.

2)GistPrinciplesandValuesWhendeciding,subjectsmustendorsevalues,orgistprinciples.Forexample,asubjectwhoisexposedto anarrative about vaccinationmaydecideaboutwhether to vaccinate themselvesor their children


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basedonhowtheyperceive theiroptions. If,afterexposure toanarrative, theyerroneouslyperceivethat a vaccine may make them sick and their status quo is “feeling okay” they may choose not tovaccinatebecauseof thegistprinciple that feelingokay is superior tonot feelingokay. Similarly, onewho feels that they are at risk from the virus but perceives nil risks from the vaccinewould endorsevaccinationsincenotgettingthevirusispreferredtogettingsick.Forstillothers,thegistofthedecisiontovaccinateboilsdowntothegoodof thegroup,asopposedtothegoodof the individual (Fehige&Frank,2010;Reyna&Casillas,2009)anddecisionsaremadebasedonrelevantvalues.Cuingsocialandmoralvalueshasalsobeenshowntobeeffective inchangingdecisions(especially inconcertwithgistrepresentationsofmessages;Reyna&Casillas,2009;Reyna,Estradaetal.,2011;Reyna&Farley,2006).

3)WillingnessandAbilitytoInhibitBiasesThoseexposedtonarrativesvaryintheextenttowhichtheyarewillingandabletoderivecorrectandmeaningful causal information from complex information (Linderholm et al., 2000; van den Broek,2010).Forexample,skilledreaders(definedasthosepossessingtheabilitytocomprehend,retain,andintegratetext informationaccurately,Oakhill,1994)are lesssubjectto incorrect inferencesfromtextslacking clear causal structure (e.g., because events were not arranged in temporal order or becausecausality was not explicitly indicated). Similarly, numerate individuals (i.e., those possessingmathematicalliteracy)aremoreabletorecognizewhentworiskydecisionoptionshavethesamelinearexpectedvalue, thus leadingthemtotreat theseoptionsequally (e.g.,Schley&Peters,2014).Finally,individualsdiffer intheextenttowhichtheyarewillingtoemployeffortful thinking(e.g.,Cacioppoetal., 1996)with thosewhodo so less likely to be subject to cognitivebiases. Therefore,websites thatemphasize decontextualized facts rather (such as many government websites) than a clear causalnarrative may not be easily comprehensible to some individuals, potentially leading them to drawincorrect inferences. Thus, subjects differ in the degree towhich they rely on categorical gist versusverbatiminformation.Inadditiontoemphasizingcategoricalgist,fuzzy-tracetheorysuggestsstrategiesthatrelyonemphasizingmultiplelevelsofrepresentation,suchasbyemphasizingordinalinformation.

4)MotivationalFactorsandPriorKnowledgeInconcertwithmentalrepresentation,narrativesarepredictedtoincreaseinpopularitywhenculturalnorms make certain ideas plausible (e.g., that the government would intentionally infect people)coupled with an increased prevalence of poorly understood health conditions (Kata, 2012; Reyna,2012b).Intheabsenceofpriorknowledge,compellingnarrativesbecomeplausiblebyprovidingacausal(thoughnotnecessarilyaccurate)explanationforanotherwisemysteriousevent.Specifically,studiesinpsycholinguistics have identified a narrative’s causal coherence as a key factor driving a story’scomprehensibility and long-term retention (van den Broek, 2010). Although several dimensions ofnarrativecoherencehavebeenproposed(Reeseetal.,2011;Gernsbacher,1996),thereisaconsensuswithintheliteraturethatcoherentnarrativesoftenprovideacausalstructurefortheeventsdescribed(Mandler,1983;Trabasso&Sperry,1985;Gernsbacheretal.,1990;Diehletal.,2006;vandenBroek,2010), thereforeconveying themeaning,orgistof thestory. Incontrast, incoherent storiescontainarelatively weak causal structure. According to this theory, therefore, websites that produce morecoherent and meaningful gist will be more influential (even if they are not factually accurate!). Forexample,astorydescribinghowchildrendevelopedsymptomsofautismafterhavinggottenvaccinatedmightallowonetoconcludethatvaccinescauseautism.Infact,thesymptomsofautismtendtooccuraround the same time as the CDC recommends that children receive vaccines. Similar spuriouscorrelations underlie the false claims that exposure to the larvicide pyriproxifen (Vazquez, 2016) orreceipt of the DTaP vaccine by pregnant mothers, rather than the Zika virus, causes birth defects(Dredze,Hilyard,&Broniatowski,2016).Thus,whensubjectslackpriorknowledge,orwhentheirprior


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knowledge makes conspiracy theories plausible to them, narratives that aim to provide a causalexplanation for “why” mysterious adverse events occur are consequently more comprehensible,influential,andmemorable(Trope&Liberman,2010;Fukukuraetal.,2013).

TestingHypothesesonSocialMediaSocialmedia analytic techniques allowus unprecedented opportunities to test these hypotheses. Forexample,we (Broniatowski,Hilyard,&Dredze,2016)examinedFTT’spredictions in thecontextof therecentDisneylandMeaslesOutbreak,whichbeganinDecember2014atDisneylandinCaliforniaandledto111confirmedcasesofmeasles in seven states (aswell asCanadaandMexico).AlthoughmeasleswaswidelyconsideredeliminatedintheUnitedStates,reducedvaccinationratesinsomecommunities,duetoconcernsaboutvaccinetoxicity,ultimatelycalledattentiontotheissueofherdimmunity—howslightreductionsinvaccinationratescanleadtoepidemics.

Thisstudywasconductedinthecontextofanongoingdebate:Doesincludinganarrativeleadtomoreeffective communication compared topresenting “just the facts” (i.e., statistical data)? In addition tothe perceived effectiveness of narratives noted above, public health officials have been hesitant toincludestoriesintheircommunicationsduetoconcernsofappearingbiasedorpaternalistic.Incontrast,FTTpredictsthattheverbatimdetailsofamessage(suchas“measlescanleadtopneumonia,deafness,lifelong brain damage, and even death, and almost 1/3 of children with measles have to behospitalized”)are incorporated separately from,but inparallel to, thegistof themessage, (e.g., “notvaccinatingmeanstakingariskthatyourchildcouldgetthemeaslesandsufferseriouslifelonghealthproblemsordeath.Vaccinationisthebestwaytoprotectyourchild”).AccordingtoFTT,narrativesareeffective to the extent that they communicate a gist representation of information (e.g., aboutvaccination or a political ideology) that then better cues motivationally relevant moral and socialprinciples.

Ourapproachcombineddecisionandcomputersciences.WeusedAmazon’sMechanicalTurkservicetocrowdsourcethecodingof4,581outofacollectionof39,351outbreak-relatedarticlespublishedfromNovember2014toMarch2015.Weaskedcoderstoindicatewhethereacharticleexpressedstatistics(averbatim representation) a story, and/or a “bottom linemeaning” (a gist). Finally,wemeasuredhowfrequentlythesearticlesweresharedonFacebook.

ResultswereconsistentwithFTT’spredictions—wefoundthatexpressionofbothagistandverbatimdetailsincreasedanarticle’slikelihoodofbeingsharedatleastonce.Incontrast,storiesdidnothaveasignificant impact on an article likelihood of being shared after controlling for gist and verbatim,indicating that stories are only effective to the extent that they communicate a gist. Among thosearticlesthatweresharedatleastonce,onlytheexpressionofagistwassignificantlyassociatedwithanincreased number of Facebook shares (articleswith gistswere shared 2.4 timesmore frequently, onaverage, than articles without gists). Articles expressing a gist that also expressed positive opinionsaboutbothpro-andanti-vaccineadvocateswereshared57.8timesmoreoftenthanotherarticles.Thissuggests that facts can be effectively shared if they acknowledge the concerns of those on the“opposing” side while still expressing the bottom-line meaning of the data. These results suggest aframeworkthatmaybeusedtocommunicateeffectively:inadditiontodescribingverbatimfacts,publiccommunicators should endeavor to link those facts to a clear bottom line meaning (Broniatowski,Hilyard, & Dredze, 2016). Thus, future work should focus on testing these and other theoretically-motivatedinterventions.


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ElicitingGistsonSocialMedia:SynergiesBetweenSocialMediaandSurveyTechniquesFTTemphasizesthedegreetowhichgistsareculturallycontingent.Toconstructeffectivemessages,wemustunderstandhowvalues andmotivations vary across audiences. Toeffectively countermessagesthatareharmful tonational securityandpublichealth,officialsmust tailor their responses togroups’narratives and rationales (Hawkins et al., 2008). Determining how these attitudes and narratives aredistributedwithinthepopulationisakeychallenge.

Validated techniques for eliciting group attitudes towards health behaviors rely on surveys, focusgroups,andrandom-digitdialingoftelephonelandlines.Theyarethereforetime-consuming,costly,andtend tounder-sample youngpeople andminoritieswhooftenhaveonlymobilephone service.Morenoveltechniques,basedonsocialmediadata,arewidelyavailableinreal-time,andeasytoaccess(e.g.,Aramakietal.,2011;Culotta,2010;Lamposetal.,2010;Signorinietal.,2011;Bandarietal.,2013).Also,young people andminorities are heavy users of socialmedia (Brenner& Smith, 2013;Mislove et al.,2011). Thus, the strengths and weaknesses of social media and survey methods complement oneanother. We therefore aim to develop, for social media, the research norms and practices thatcharacterize high quality survey research such that we can test hypotheses rapidly with very largesamples.

ConclusionInconclusion,nationalsecurityandpublichealthpractitionersfacesimilarchallengesfromnarrativesonsocialmedia.Onlineorganizedmisinformationand/ordisinformationcampaignscanunderminepublichealth and national security. However, empirically validated scientific theories, such as FTT, makespecificpredictionsforhowwemaycombatmisinformationanddisinformationonline.

Weaimtodevelopnewtechniquestoassesshowcompellingandinfluentialmessagesmightbe.Suchtechniquesmustbebasedonempiricallyvalidatedtheorywhiletakingadvantageofsynergiesbetweensurvey methods and social media data. Our approach also recognizes the key role of culture as adetermining factor in how individuals attributemeaning to risky events. Thus, a productive researchprogramwouldachieveabetterunderstandingofthedriversofcoherentgistcommunicationsinonlinemessagesandhowthesevaryacrosssociodemographicgroups.Thisresearchagendarequiresasystemsapproach: combining the rigor of scientific psychology with the technological scope and scale of bigdata.Weadvocateresearchintohowtoimplementrelevanttheories,suchasFTT,sothattheycanbeusedtofightmisinformationanddisinformationonline.

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Chapter14:NeuralInfluenceandBehaviorChange-Dr.IanMcCulloh,JohnsHopkinsUniversity

[email protected]

AbstractMilitarycommandersandseniorleadersmusthaveabasicunderstandingofcognitiveinfluenceinorderto make decisions affecting the Gray Zone and human populations in areas of ongoing militaryoperations. Influence is counter-intuitive. This has led to poor decisions that may have adverselyaffectedthesuccessofUSoperations.Thispaperprovidesaprimerofcognitiveinfluence,setintacticalmilitary terms. The neural bases of cognitive influence are further supported by neural imagingconductedintheUSandintheMiddleEast.Theintentistoinformcommandersandseniorleaderstoenablethemtomakebetterdecisionsregardinginform-influenceoperationsinsupportofUSobjectives.

InfluenceandPersuasionThe scienceof influence andpersuasion iswell understood in science, but counter-intuitive.Westernculturalbiaspreventsmanyleadersfromfullyappreciatingtheeffectsofsocialconformityandthewaysin which people will interpret messages and actions. A proper understanding of influence andpersuasionisessentialforUSmilitaryforcestopositivelyaffectthehumandomainandsucceedintheconductofGrayZoneoperations.Peopledonottypicallyrespondtologic-basedarguments[1-18].Theymoreoftenrespondemotionallyandthenrationalizetheirresponsewithfactsandlogic[1-4,10,16].Whenpeoplehearinformationthatdivergesfromwhattheyalreadybelieve,itdoesnotappearcredibleandtheydiscounttheinformationas false or untrustworthy [1-5,12]. It does notmatterwhether the information is true. People assesstruth based on what can be reasonably integrated within their existing understanding of the worldaroundthem[5,9,12].Therearemultiplegroups,bothwithinandoutsidegovernment, thatspendtheir timeposting factualinformation in response tomisinformation and rumor. They feel that contesting false information issomehowimportantforshapingviewsofthosewithoutastrongopiniononthegivenissue.Mostoften,however, this online argument creates noise that distracts information operations from adversarialnarratives that are the real problem [16]. It is the emotion-over-fact cognitive bias that allowsmisinformationandrumortoperpetuate.Adversaries identifyandexploitthesecognitivebiases.Theyeffectively turn people and groups into conduits that perpetuate their message for them. Arguingagainstthisinformationwithfactsisbringingthewrongtoolstobearagainsttheproblem.ThecognitiveterrainofagiventargetaudiencecanbeassessedusingtheacronymKABIB(knowledge,attitude,belief,intention,behavior)[10].Knowledgeisdefinedastheinformationapersonknows.Thisinformation is not central to the person’s identity. Attitudes are the feelings of like or dislike that aperson has towards information or viewpoints. Beliefs are things that individuals think to be true,without any supporting evidence. Intention is the motivation for a person to carry out a specificbehavior.Behavioristheactionthatsomeoneconducts.


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Modeledintentionisthebestsinglepredictorofbehavior[1-4,16].Intentionisafunctionofattitudes,social norms, and the control that the person in question has to conduct the behavior. For example,someonemay have every intention of eating a salad at lunch, only to find that all the salads in thecafeteriaaresoldandhecannoteatasalad.Theymayalsoplanoneatingasalad,butseealloftheirfriendssharingapizzaandinvitethemtojoin.Inthiscase,thesocialnormofpizzaeatingmaymoderatetheintention.Theymustalsohavetheattitudeoflikingthebehaviorofeatingsalad…orpizza.Intentionis a belief, held by an individual, that they will carry out some behavior. Thus, beliefs and attitudecontributetointentionandsubsequentbehavior.Military planners must be as deliberate with influence planning as they are with infantry patrolling.Whenconductingaraid,forexample,apatrolleaderwilllocatetheobjective,conductreconnaissance,identify obstacles, develop a plan to breach or bypass the obstacles and conduct actions on theobjective. In the same way, an influence planner must locate a desired KABIB objective. In theirreconnaissance,theymustidentifyobstaclestoinfluence.Whatmightpreventpeoplefromreceivingamessageorinterpretingstimulusasintended?Arethereincongruentculturalorsocialnorms?Aretherecompetingadversarynarratives?Dopeoplelackknowledge?Plannersmustthenselectanappropriatemodel of behavior change to breach or bypass the obstacle to influence. At that point, influencemessagingandprogramscanreachtheobjective.AninfluenceobjectivecanspanKABIB.Itisnotnecessarytofocusonattitudepriortoaffectingbeliefsorintentions.Aclassicexampleofthisisseatbeltusage.Publicserviceannouncementsshowingcrashtestdummies flying throughwindshieldswereairedovermanyyears inaneffort toaffectknowledgeandattitudesregardingseatbeltusage.Theseadsfailedtochangebehavior.Thechangeinlawmakingseatbeltsrequired,coupledwiththe“Click-itorTicket”campaignandtheannoyingseatbeltchimeinvehicles forced a behavior change. The change in behavior led to changes in beliefs and attitudesregardingseatbeltusage.Thisapproachtoinfluenceplanningintendstoservetwokeychallenges.First,itprovidesaconceptualbridgeforseniorleaders.Aseniorleadermaynotbeaninfluencedomainexpert,yettheyneedenoughunderstandingtoproperlyemployinfluenceasacombatmultiplier.Second,itprovidesasimplesystemfor leaders to verify that their influenceexpertshave, in fact, done their duediligence inplanning.Asenior leader should be able to ask their influence planner the following questions: 1) What is the(KABIB) objective? 2)What obstacles exist to influence? 3)Whichmodel of behavior changewill youemploy to breachobstacles? 4)What is your narrative security (counter-adversarymessage) plan? 5)Whatareyouractionsontheobjective(whatistheinfluencegoal)?

ModelsofBehaviorChangeThere are three classic models of behavior change: social judgment theory (SJT) [6,11,15,17-18],cognitivedissonance(CD)[5,9],andthetheoryofplannedbehavior(TPB)[1-4,16].Iofferoneadditionalmodelcalledtheneurocognitiveinfluencemodel[12].Thethreeclassicmodelsofbehaviorchangearedesigned to affect attitude, belief, and intention respectively. The neurocognitive influence modelintegratesthethreeclassicmodelsandincludestheneuralbasesofthesecognitiveprocesses.

SocialJudgmentTheoryFor any particular stance that a person has on an issue, they will have a latitude of acceptance[6,11,15,17-18].Thisistherangeofalternateviewsthatsomeoneelsecanhaveontheissueandstillbe


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seenas reasonable. The individual’spersonal viewpoint is referred toas their anchor. The latitudeofacceptancewill includethoseviewssurroundingtheanchor.Someonemayhaveasimilarviewandbeslightlymistaken,butnotcrazy,whilesomeonewithradicallydifferentviewsareseenasunreasonable.Unreasonableviewsformthelatitudeofrejection.Anyviewsinthisregionareimmediatelyrejected.Whenfactsarepresentedthatfallinsomeone’slatitudeofrejection,theydonotlistentoorrespondtothosefacts[6,11,18].Theybegintocounter-arguethosefacts.Itdoesnotmatterwhetherthefactsaretrueornot.Theythinkofreasonswhythefactsarewrongandwhytheyshouldremaincommittedtotheir original viewpoint. Often times, this creates a boomerang effect and makes someone morepolarizedintheoppositedirection.Asamodelofbehaviorchange,socialjudgmenttheoryattemptstoeitherwidensomeone’slatitudeofacceptance (equivalent to preparing an objective) or offer appeals that fall within the zone of non-commitment.Thezoneofnon-commitmentistherangeofattitudesbetweenthelatitudeofacceptanceandthelatitudeofrejection.Alikelyoutcomefromthisapproachisnotaradicalchangeinopinion.Thegoal is simply to create conditions that allow people of differing viewpoints to develop relationshipswhere they can exchange ideas and opinions in a more productive manner. Once they develop arelationshipandovercome threats to their identity, theycanbegin tomoreobjectivelyevaluate factsandenterintomoreproductivenegotiations.

CognitiveDissonanceCognitivedissonancedescribesthementalstressthatan individualexperiencesbymaintainingtwoormore conflicting beliefs [5,9,14]. Peoplewill actively avoid situations and information to reduce theirlevelof cognitivedissonance [5,9].Understandingexistingbeliefs andhow theymaybe congruentordissonantfromintendedmessagesprovidesawaytounderstandhowthecognitiveterrainmayaffectatarget audience’s interpretation of themessage. In the sameway,manipulating cognitive dissonanceprovidesopportunitytoinfluenceatargetaudience.Twoormorebeliefsthatpeopleholdmaybeconsonant,dissonant,orirrelevant.Considerthefollowingexample:

• Consonant:Idon’twanttogetdrunktonight.Idrinkwaterinsteadofwine.• Dissonant:Idon’twanttogetdrunktonight.Idrinkalotofwine.• Irrelevant:Idon’twanttogetdrunktonight.Iworeanexpensiveshirttodinner.

Thelevelofdissonanceapersonexperiencesisafunctionofthepersonalvaluetheyplaceonanissueand the proportion of consonant to dissonant beliefs. When a person’s actions are dissonant withrespecttotheirbeliefs,thepersontendstochangebelief.Thisisexhibitedinaclassicexperiment[9].Subjectswererecruitedandaskedtoperformaboringandmundane task, where they simply were turning blocks on a board. They were then asked to recruitothersfortheexperiment.Somesubjectsweregiven$1,whileothersweregiven$20.Afterthesubjectscompleted their recruiting task, where they essentially lied to others about the task being moreinterestingthanitreallywas,theywereaskedabouttheiropiniononthetaskandwhetherthey’dliketodo it again. Those that were given $20 were able to reconcile lying with the financial reward andremained consistent in their opinion that the task was boring. Those that were only paid $1 were


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dissonant in their assessmentof the taskand theirwillingness to lie toothers. Theyactually changedopinionandvolunteeredtodothetaskagain.Cognitive dissonance, as amodel of behavior change, attempts to create conditionswherebehaviorsandbeliefsare inconsistentwithatargetbelief.The intent is thatthetargetaudiencewillchangethetarget belief to become less dissonant.Understanding the tactics, however,may change theway themilitary implements incentives, such as a “Rewards for Justice” program. Perhaps increasingly largeincentivesarenotaseffectiveasinsufficientincentivesforcreatingbehaviorchange.Additionaltestingwouldberequiredtoevaluateeffectiveness.

TheoryofPlannedBehaviorThereoftenexistsadiscrepancybetweenattitudeandbehavior.Inotherwords,socialjudgmenttheorymayfail.Thetheoryofplannedbehavior(TPB)attemptstoovercomethisbydirectlytargetingintention[1-4,16]. Intentionis,afterall,thebestpredictorofbehavior. Intentionisafunctionofattitude,socialnorms,andcontrol/efficacy.Theattitudesnormsandcontrolmustbespecifictoaparticularbehaviorofcourseandremainstablebetweenthemeasurementofintentionandbehavior.Asamodelforbehaviorchange,TPBattemptstoaffecteithertheattitudes,socialnorms,orlevelofperceivedcontrolatargetaudiencehastochangetheirintention.

SelectingaModelofBehaviorChangeSelectingamodelofbehaviorchangedependsuponthecognitiveobjective.SJTiseffectiveforchangingattitude. CD is effective for changing belief. TPB is effective for changing intention. All three maycontributetochangingbehavior.Thesearethecognitiveequivalentsofraid,recon,ambushininfantrypatrolling.ModernGrayZoneconflictsrequirecommanderstobecomefamiliarwithmodelsofbehaviorchangeandtheymustlearntotacticallyemploythesemethods.

NeurocognitiveInfluenceModelWe understand a great deal about neural processes that affect cognition and behavior. MatthewLiebermanandEmilyFalk[7-8]haveidentifiedbrainregionsassociatedwithprocessessuchascounter-arguing, affirmation, narrative immersion, andmentalizing (where peoplemake sense of stimuli andtheir surrounding world). We understand from social psychology and neuroscience alike how theseprocessesinteract,supportinganddisruptingeachother.Activity in these brain regions can measured in several ways. Most of Emily Falk’s [7-8] work hasconsisted of using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure the blood-oxygen leveldependent(BOLD)signalinthebrainduringconditionsofinfluenceandbehaviorchange.Shehasfoundthat BOLD signals in key brain regions aremore predictive of intention andbehavior change than anindividual’sself-report.Inotherwords,aneuralimageismorereliablefortestingmessageeffectivenessthanafocusgrouporsurvey.McCullohandLieberman[12]havereplicatedFalkandLieberman’sworkusingfunctionalnearinfraredspectroscopy(fNIRS).fNIRSisahighlyportable,lightweight,lowcosttoolthatuseslightemittingdiodes(LED)tomeasureBOLDsignalsinthebrain.fNIRScannotmeasureasmanyareasofthebrainasfMRIorpenetratetodeeperbrainregions,however, itcanmeasuremostofthebrainregionsassociatedwithinfluence and persuasion. fNIRS has greater spatial resolution than electroencephalogram (EEG). This


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allowsmore focused testing toevaluate theeffectivenessofmessageswithin thecontextofdifferentmodelsofbehaviorchange.McCulloh and Lieberman’s most recent work involved using fNIRS to test message effectiveness ofpublichealthadsthatwereairedinJordan[12].TheJohnsHopkinsCenterforCommunicationsProgram(CCP) develops and airs public health service announcements inmany countries around theworld toinclude Jordan. Measures of effectiveness are collected in traditional ways to evaluate messageeffectiveness.McCulloh and Lieberman selected several of these videos and then recruited Jordaniansubjects that were either within or outside of the designated target audiences. They were able todemonstratestrongerneuralresponseamongsubjectsviewingatailoredmessage.Theywerealsoabletotest theeffectivenessof twoCENTCOMattributedcounter-DA’ESHvideosthathadbeenpostedonYouTube.

ConclusionSuccessduringGrayZoneoperationsrequirescommanderstounderstandinfluenceandemploymodelsof behavior change in the samemanner that theyunderstand theelementsof patrolling andemploykineticpower.Influenceiscounter-intuitive,however.Itis,therefore,evenmoreimportantthatproperresources are allocated for understanding target audiences and assessing the potential impact ofinfluencemessagesandprograms.Neuroscience ingeneralandfNIRS inparticularoffers therequisitetechnology to provide assessment of influence effectiveness. The Department of Defense shouldincrease resourcing for influence related activities due to its growing importance to national securityobjectives.

References[1]Ajzen,I.(1985).Fromintentionstoactions:Atheoryofplannedbehavior.InJ.Kuhl&J.Beckmann

(Eds.),Actioncontrol:Fromcognitiontobehavior.Berlin,Heidelber,NewYork:Springer-Verlag.(pp.11-39).

[2] Ajzen, Icek (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human DecisionProcesses.50(2):179–211.

[3] Ajzen, I. (2002). Perceived Behavioral Control, Self-Efficacy, Locus of Control, and the Theory ofPlannedBehavior.JournalofAppliedSocialPsychology,32:665-683.

[4] Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. Psychologicalreview.84(2):191.

[5]Brehm,J.W.,&Cohen,A.R.(1962).Explorationsincognitivedissonance.

[6]Doherty,Michael E.; ElkeM.Kurz (1996). Social JudgementTheory. Thinking andReasoning: 109–140.

[7]Falk,E.B.,Berkman,E.T.,Mann,T.,Harrison,B,&Lieberman,M.D.(2010).Predictingpersuasion-inducedbehaviorchangefromthebrain.JournalofNeuroscience,30:8421-8424

[8] Falk, E., Rameson, L., Berkman, E., Liao, B., Kang, Y., Inagaki, T. K., & Lieberman,M. (2010). Theneuralcorrelatesofpersuasion:Acommonnetworkacrossculturesandmedia.JournalofCognitiveNeuroscience,22:2447-2459

[9]Festinger,L.(1962).Atheoryofcognitivedissonance(Vol.2).Stanford,CA:Stanforduniversitypress.


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[10]Fishbein,M.&Ajzen,I.(1975).Belief,attitude,intention,andbehavior:Anintroductiontotheoryandresearch.Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley.

[11] Hovland, Carl I.; Sherif, Muzafer (1980). Social judgment: Assimilation and contrast effects incommunicationandattitudechange.Westport:Greenwood.

[12]McCulloh,I.(2016).NeuroscienceofInfluence.InBio-Psycho-SocialDeterminantsofBehavior(Ed.JasonSpitaletta).WashingtonDC:OfficeofSecretaryofDefense.

[13]McCulloh,I.(2013).SocialConformityinNetworks.OfficialJournaloftheInternationalNetworkforSocialNetworkAnalysts,33(1):35-42.

[14] McCulloh, I., Armstrong, H., & Johnson, A. (2013). Social network analysis with applications.Hoboken,NJ:JohnWiley&Sons.

[15]Nebergall,R.E(1966).Thesocial judgment-involvementapproachtoattitudeandattitudechange.WesternSpeech:209–215.

[16]Seese,G.(2014).ComprehensivePSYOPAssessmentandEvaluationinCounterterrorismEfforts.In,Strategic Communication in Counter Terrorism: Target AudienceAnalysis,Measures of Effect andCounterNarrative.Ankara,Turkey:NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)CenterofExcellence.

[17]Sherif,CW(August1963)."Socialcategorizationasafunctionof latitudeofacceptanceandseriesrange.".Journalofabnormalandsocialpsychology.67:148–56

[18]Sherif,C.W.;Sherif,M.S.;Nebergall,R.E. (1965).Attitudeandattitudechange.Philadelphia:W.B.SaundersCompany.


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Chapter15:TheRoleofIntegrativeComplexityinForecastingandInfluence-Dr.PeterSuedfeldandMr.BradfordH.Morrison,UniversityofBritishColumbia

IntroductionIf control is dependent on actual or at least perceived power—political, economic, military,demographic,andother—influenceistheproductofanevenmorevariedandchangingsetofvariables.Thecriteriathatdefinetheprobabilityofsuccess inexertingorcounteringinfluencemustincludetwofactors addressed in this paper: accuracy in assessing the possible steps of an adversary and shapingpersuasive communications so as to advance one’s own position and reduce the power of theopponent’s.Theformeraspect,anticipatoryintelligence,hasbeenourmajorresearchfocustodate;attheendofthisdiscourse,weshallbrieflylookatwhatmaybeafruitfulapproachtothelatter.

CognitiveComplexityinForecastingandDecision-MakingA leader in current research on forecasting, Philip E. Tetlock of the University of Pennsylvania, hasstudiedforecastingandpredictionforthelast30years.Oneofhisdiscoveriescamefromcollecting28thousandpoliticalandeconomic forecasts from284expertswhoranged fromgovernmentofficials toprofessors,journalists,andwhorepresentedawiderangeofbackgroundsandpoliticalallegiances.Theresult?On average, the forecasts of these expertswereonly slightlymore accurate than chance. ButTetlock also identified a group of “super-forecasters.” Super-forecasters have “hit” rates about 30%higherthantheothers(Tetlock&Gardner,2015).Someofthecharacteristicsofsuper-forecastersareanalmostexactreplicaofthecognitiveprocessesthatdefinehighintegrativecomplexity(Suedfeld,Tetlock,&Streufert,1992).Integrativecomplexity(IC)is an index of how an individual or group processes information and makes decisions. Like super-forecasting, high integrative complexity is marked by extensive information search and processing,flexible planning that changes with feedback, open-mindedness about one’s own and others’conclusions, tolerance for cognitive dissonance, and the ability to understand the arguments andmotives of others (including adversaries). However, it is also somewhat slow, may be led astray byattentiononirrelevantortrivialinformation,andmaymaketheindividualappearunsureorindecisive,orvacillating.

IntegrativeComplexityandDecision-MakingComplexity canbemeasured from textsproducedby the individualof interest and turning them intoquantitativedatathroughtheuseofdetailedscoringmanualsusedbyqualifiedscorersand,inthenearfuture, very likely the use of software currently in development (Conway et al., 2014; Suedfeld &Tetlock, 2014). The basic components of IC are differentiation, the ability to identify differentdimensions or aspects of an issue or different opinions about it, and integration, recognizingrelationshipsamongthosedifferentiateditems(Suedfeld,etal.,1992).Functioningatahigh levelofcomplexity imposesaheavycognitive load: it takes time,attention,andhardthinkingtoconsiderandweighsomuchinformationanditspossiblepatternsandimplications,todeviseandmonitorplans,tochangethemanddevisenewonesthattakenewinformationintoaccount,to develop hierarchies of urgency and importance. Eventually, if a serious issue persists without asolution,thecognitiveloadbecomestooheavyandcomplexityislikelytodropasmental,physical,and


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emotionalresourcesaredepleted.Thisisastagewerefertoasdisruptivestress(Suedfeld1992,2010).Super-forecasterssimilarlycanlosetheiredgeiftheircognitiveloadistoohighfortoolong(Tetlock&Gardner,2015).When it occurs, and the problem still persists, the decision-maker is likely to resort to informationprocessingstrategies that require less thinking, time,andenergy.Theseare likely to includecognitiveshortcuts and heuristic thinking (Gilovitch, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). In international or domesticpolitical conflict, excessive cognitive loads often lead to one of two decision options: a partial or fullwithdrawal from the field—giving away toomuch in negotiation just to get an agreement, or actualsurrender—or its converse, a drastic escalation that changes the problem and may transfer it to adifferentcontextandadifferentsetofdecision-makers:aviolentsolutionsuchasgoingtowar(seealsoJohnson&Tierney,2011).

LeaderAssessmentataDistanceOur research group measures complexity in studying and forecasting the decisions of national andmilitary leaders. We focus on changes over time as the person makes decisions in the context ofcompetitionorconfrontation.Wehavereliablyfoundstablelevelsorevenincreasesincomplexitywhennegotiationsprogresswell,andwhensuccessortheterminationoftheproblemseemstobenear;anddecreasesinICprecedingandaccompanyingviolentoutcomes,usuallywithintwoorthreemonthspriorto the event. This has held in case studies of wars resulting from escalating conflict spirals, such asWorldWarI;majorwarsagainstadecades-longbackgroundofpersistentinternationalrivalrybetweenIsrael and the United Arab Republic and between India and Pakistan; and IC drops shown by theeventual attacker in advance of strategic surprise attacks, for example Pearl Harbor (see Suedfeld,2014).Thegreatmajorityofourworkinthiscontexthasaddressedquestionsofinternationalwarorpeace.Inthepastmonths,wehaveextendedtheworktoexplorewhethertheICpatternsfoundinthatareaalsocharacterizeeventsIntheGrayZone.Sofar,wehavefoundconsistentlyreducedcomplexityinspeechesbyseniorIsraeliofficialscorrelatedwithheightenedviolencebyIsraeliforcesintheGazaStrip,startingtwomonthsbeforeeachoftwoIDFincursionsintotheStrip.TherewerealsosuchdecreasesinadvanceofsignificanteventsdamagingtheIraniannuclearprogram,includingassassinations,cyber-attacks,andalargeexplosionatamissilelaunchfacility.AlthoughthesourceorsourcesoftheseGrayZoneattackshave not been identified, we would hypothesize that the Israeli government probably at least hadinformationthattheywerebeingplanned.Most recently,wehave lookedatevents related toRussianGrayZoneactivities in theCrimea,whichwere followedby invasion, occupation, and annexation. The analysis so far has covered the termsofthreepresidentsofUkraine.Ingeneral,wehavefoundthattheircomplexitydroppedsignificantlyduringperiods ofmajor crisis—losing their position, the Russian invasion—and rosewhen negotiationswithRussia were ongoing. Increases in complexity were most likely to occur when negotiations wereprogressingwell,asinestablishingacease-fireorobtainingtheresumptionofoilandgasdeliveries.Inthese cases, other eventswere occurring aswell, so that the specific cause of IC changes cannot bepinpointed,butthepatternfitsourotherdataandICtheory.WearecurrentlyupdatingourstudyofBasharal-Assad.Aswehadreportedearlier,hiscomplexitylevelfluctuatedwith events in the civilwar, butwas generally not very high (Suedfeld,Morrison,&Cross,2014).ThatdatacollectionendedlongbeforetheRussianinterventiononhisside.Wearenowlooking


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at 2015, the year that the interventionbegan, and so far have foundamajor increase inAugust andSeptember2015, leadinguptothebeginningofRussianairstrikesonSeptember30ofthatyear.Theimplicationisthathewasexperiencingaloweredlevelofstress,presumablyrelatedtoknowledgethathissituationwasabouttoimprove.ForICscoringtobeusedoptimally,itisimportantforthescorertohaveadequatebaselinedataforthegroup or individual being scored. Individual differences can be significant: some high-level decision-makers are unusually resistant to disruptive stress (Suedfeld, 2014). Among these are leaders ofoutstanding stature, such as Napoleon and the Duke of Wellington. When scoring such a person,continuedhighcomplexityinthefaceofstressdoesnotnecessarilymeanapeacefuloutcome.Although it has limitations, IC scoring is a useful tool in anticipatory intelligence analysis. Given theaccessibilityofanadequatebodyofscoreabletexts,itcanalerttheanalysttotheincreasedprobabilityofadrasticcoursechangebyanotherparty,althoughitdoesnotspecifywhatthenewcoursewillbe;orconversely,itmaysuggestthatnosuchchangeisimminent.It would obviously be desirable to increase the number of super-forecasters. If super-forecasters“naturally” functionat ahigh levelof IC, two relevant strategiespresent themselves.One is to selectpotentialcandidatesonthebasisof theirbaselinecomplexityscores.Alternatively,anattemptcanbemadetotrainatleastsome“ordinary”forecasterstoacriterionofincreasedcomplexity.Thishasbeendonewithexperimentalsubjects (Hunsbergeretal.,2006),andan investment inmoresuchprogramsfocusingonforecastersmaybeworththeeffortintheimprovementofourpredictivepowers.

CommunicationsandICOneotheraspectofICthatmeritsmoreexplorationisitsroleinshapingcommunicationsandreactionsto communications. Compared to the copious research on decision-making complexity, only a fewstudieshave investigated thisarea.Theworkof theYalepersuasiongroup,nowa classic in the field,coveredtheeffectivenessofdifferentsources,channels,andcontentsofpersuasivemessages(Hovland,Janis, & Kelley, 1953).McGuire (1964; see also, Banas& Rains, 2010) added the concept of attitudeinoculation,messagepresentationthatenhancesresistancetopersuasiveattemptsbythe“otherside.”Bothlinesofresearchhavehadresultsimplyingarolefortakingthecomplexityofmessagesintoseriousaccount.Forexample,theYalegroupmadesuggestionsastotheuseofone-vs.two-sidedmessagingasa functionofaudiencecharacteristics,which linkwith researchon ICandaccountabilitybutalsowithpotential research on other factors that are likely to affect the optimal complexity of messages.Similarly,McGuire’sfindingsonhowincludingargumentsopposingtheviewoneistryingtoadvancecanhavetheparadoxicaleffectofmakingone’sownmessagemorepersuasiveshowanunexpectedimpactforcommunicationsofrelativelyhighcomplexity.ICresearchershavefoundthatsuchcharacteristicsastheperceivedviewsoftheaudienceandtheopenidentificationofthesource(accountability)affectthecomplexitylevelofmessages(e.g.,Tetlock,1983).A study of face-to-face negotiations has shown that higher ICmessages of one negotiating team canraisetheICleveloftheother,leadingtomoreprogresstowardagreement(Liht,Suedfeld,&Krawczyk,2005).OtherwaysofapplyingICtheorytocommunicationsremaintobeexplored.Last, increasing the IC of a selected audiencemay be difficult butworth the effort. There have beenseveral successful programs designed to do just that, resulting in less hostile attitudes toward other


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groups(Liht&Savage,2013;Savage,Khan,&Liht,2014).Theseexperimentalstudiesshouldbefollowedup.In short,besidesbeinga tool foranticipatory intelligenceanalysis, ICmayalsobeused tohelp shapepersuasivecommunicationsaswell as responses toadversarial attemptsatpersuasion.ThisaspectoftheICconstructcallsforattentionbyresearchers.ReferencesBanas, J.A., & Rains, S.A. (2010). A meta-analysis of research on inoculation theory. Communication

Monographs,77,281-311.

Conway, L.G. III, Conway, K.R., Gornick, L.J., & Houck, S.C. (2014). Automated integrative complexity.PoliticalPsychology,35,603-624.

Gilovich,T.,Griffin,G.,&Kahneman,D.(Eds.)(2002).Heuristicsandbiases:Thepsychologyofintuitivejudgment(pp.49–81).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Hovland,C.I., Janis, I.L.,&Kelley,H.H. (1953).Communicationandpersuasion:Psychologicalstudiesofopinionchange.NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress.

Hunsberger, B., Lea, J., Pancer, S.M., Pratt, M., & McKenzie, B. (2006). Making life complicated:Promptingtheuseofintegrativelycomplexthinking.JournalofPersonality,60,95-114.

Johnson,D.D.P.,&Tierney,D. (2011).TheRubicontheoryofwar:Howthepathtoconflictreachesthepointofnoreturn.InternationalSecurity,36,7-40.

Liht,J.,&Savage,S.(2013).Preventingviolentextremismthroughvaluecomplexity:BeingMuslim,beingBritish.JournalofStrategicSecurity,6,44-66.

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AppendixA:AuthorBiographiesAllisonAstorino-CourtoisDr.AllisonAstorino-CourtoisisExecutiveVicePresidentatNSI,Inc.Shehasalsoservedasco-chairofaNationalAcademyof Sciences studyon StrategicDeterrenceMilitaryCapabilities in the21stCentury,and as a primary author on a study of theDefense and Protection of US Space Assets. Dr. Astorino-Courtois has served as technical lead on a variety of rapid turn-around, Joint Staff-directed StrategicMulti-layer Assessment (SMA) projects in support of US forces and Combatant Commands. Theseincludeassessmentsofkeydriversofpolitical,economicandsocialinstabilityandareasofresilienceinSouth Asia; development of a methodology for conducting provincial assessments for the ISAF JointCommand;productionofa"richcontextualunderstanding"(RCU)tosupplementintelligencereportingfortheISAFJ2andCommander;andprojectsforUSSTRATCOMondeterrenceassessmentmethods.Previously, Dr. Astorino-Courtois was a Senior Analyst at SAIC (2004-2007) where she served as aSTRATCOM liaison to US and international academic and business communities. Prior to SAIC, Dr.Astorino-CourtoiswasatenuredAssociateProfessorofInternationalRelationsatTexasA&MUniversityinCollegeStation,TX(1994-2003)whereherresearchfocusedonthecognitiveaspectsofforeignpolicydecisionmaking.Shehasreceivedanumberofacademicgrantsandawardsandhaspublishedarticlesinmultiplepeer-reviewedjournals.ShehasalsotaughtatCreightonUniversityandasavisitinginstructorat the US Military Academy at West Point. Dr. Astorino-Courtois earned her Ph.D. in InternationalRelationsandMAinandResearchMethodsfromNewYorkUniversity.HerBAisinpoliticalsciencefromBostonCollege.Finally,Dr.Astorino-CourtoisalsohasthedistinctionofhavingbeenawardedbothaUSNavyMeritoriousServiceAwardandaUSArmyCommander'sAward.DavidBroniatowskiDr.BroniatowskiisDirectoroftheDecisionMakingandSystemsArchitectureLaboratoryatTheGeorgeWashington University, where he is an Assistant Professor in the Department of EngineeringManagement and Systems Engineering. Heconducts research in decision making under risk, groupdecisionmaking,systemarchitecture,andbehavioralepidemiology.Thisresearchprogramdrawsuponawide rangeof techniques including formalmathematicalmodeling,experimentaldesign,automatedtext analysis and natural language processing, social and technical network analysis, and big data.Current projects include a text network analysis of transcripts from the US Food and DrugAdministration's Circulatory Systems Advisory Panelmeetings, amathematical formalization of FuzzyTraceTheory --a leading theoryofdecision-makingunder risk, derivationofmetrics for flexibility andcontrollabilityforcomplexengineeredsocio-technicalsystems,andusingsocialmediadatatostudyfakenewsandwhyitspreads.ErikDahlErik J. Dahl is Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School inMonterey,California.He isAssociateChair for InstructionoftheNationalSecurityAffairsDepartment,and he is also on the faculty of the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) at NPS. Inaddition, he is a Research Fellow with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism andResponses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. His research focuses on intelligence,terrorism, and international andhomeland security, andhe is the author of Intelligence and Surprise


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Attack:FailureandSuccessfromPearlHarborto9/11andBeyond(GeorgetownUniversityPress,2013).HisworkhasbeenpublishedinPoliticalScienceQuarterly,StudiesinConflictandTerrorism,Intelligenceand National Security, Homeland Security Affairs, The Journal of Strategic Studies, The Naval WarCollege Review, US Naval Institute Proceedings, the Journal of Policing, Intelligence, and CounterTerrorism, and Joint Force Quarterly. Dahl received the Naval Postgraduate School’s LCDR David L.Williams Outstanding Professor Award in 2013, and in 2014 he received the Carl E. and Jessie W.MennekenFacultyAward forExcellence inScientificResearch.Before joining theNPS faculty in2008,Dahlwasapre-doctoralfellowintheInternationalSecurityProgramattheBelferCenterforScienceandInternational Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He received his Ph.D. from TheFletcherSchoolofTuftsUniversity,fromwhichhealsoreceivedaMasterofArtsinLawandDiplomacy.Inaddition,heholdsmaster’sdegreesfromtheNavalWarCollegeandtheLondonSchoolofEconomics,andreceivedhisbachelor’sdegreefromHarvard.DahlretiredfromtheUSNavyin2002afterserving21years as an intelligence officer, including service from 1999 to 2002 on the faculty of theNavalWarCollegeinNewport,RhodeIsland.CharlesEassaCOL(R)CharlesEassaisaSeniorResearchAssociateatGeorgiaTechResearchInstitute(GTRI)wherehespecializesinInformationOperations,SpecialTechnicalOperations,OperationalAssessments,andGapAnalysis.HejoinedGTRIin2016following30yearsofserviceasanofficerintheUnitedStatesArmy.FollowinghiscommissioningaftergraduatingfromtheCitadel,COL(R)Eassabeganhismilitarycareerasa FieldArtillerymanat Fort Sill,Oklahoma.As a lieutenant, he servedas a firedirectionofficer, firingplatoon leader, and nuclear cannon assembly team leader before attending the Infantry Officers’AdvancedCourseatFortBenning.Aftergraduating,hewasassignedtoBaumholder,Germanywhereheservedon theDivisionFire SupportElementand commandedBravoBattery, 6thBattalion,29thFieldArtillery.Next,hewasassignedtoFortGillem,GeorgiawhereheservedasafieldartilleryadvisortotheGeorgiaNational Guard. Hewas selected to serve as the Aide-de-Camp for theDeputy CommandingGeneral,ThirdUSArmywherehedeployedtoKuwaitforOperationalVigilantShield.Postdeployment,hewasassignedtoBattleCommandTrainingProgramatFortLeavenworth,KansaswhereheservedasaFireSupportObserver-Trainer,DeputyOperationsOfficer,ExerciseController,andExercisePlanner.Hisnext assignment carried him back to Germanywhere he served as the V (US) Corps Deputy Chief ofPlansandInformationOperationsOfficerduringtheplanningandexecutionofOperationIraqiFreedom.Postdeployment,hewas reassignedas theUSArmy InformationOperationsProponentwherehe ledtheexpansionoftheArmy’seffortstodealwiththeinformationenvironment.In2008,hewasassignedto the US European Command in Stuttgart, Germany as the Information Officer in the Plans andOperations Center and participated across numerous joint, combined, and coalition efforts. He wasdeployed toAfghanistan to serveonNATO’s International JointCommandwherehe servedalongsidecoalitionpartnersfromover60nations.Uponhisreturn,hewasselectedtoserveontheJointStaffJ39astheChiefof IOandStrategicEffects.Acrosshiscareer,COL(R)Eassahasendeavoredtobridgethechallengesofinfluence,actionsintheinformationenvironment,cuttingedgetechnology,theinitiationofcyberasawarfightingdomain,andthepaceoftechnology.COL(R)EassareceivedaMasterofBusinessAdministrationfromBrenauUniversity,aMasterofMilitaryArtsandSciencefromtheSchoolofAdvancedMilitaryStudies,aMasterofPublicAdministrationfromHarvard’s Kennedy School of Government, and aMaster of Strategic Studies from the US ArmyWarCollege.


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BillEdwardsColonel William “Bill” Edwards is the current Director of Intelligence -SOJ2 for Special OperationsCommand-North. His previous assignments in senior leadership roles include TRADOC CapabilityManager-Sensor Processing (DCGS-A) and TRADOC Capability Manager Biometrics, Forensics andMachine Foreign Language Translation. Prior to these positions he attended the United States NavalWar College, graduating in July 2013with aMaster of Arts degree inNational Security and StrategicStudies. His most recent tactical assignment was successful Command of the 3rd Brigade TroopsBattalionduringOperationIraqiFreedomandOperationNewDawn2009-2011.ColonelEdwardsreceivedhiscommission20July1990throughtheUSArmyReserveOfficersTrainingCorpsat SanDiegoStateUniversitywherehe receivedaBachelor’sofArtsdegree inEnglish.Healsoholds a Master of Science degree in Personnel Management/Administration from Central MichiganUniversity.Hismilitary education includes the completion of theArmorOfficer Basic Course,MilitaryIntelligence Transition andAdvance Courses,Military Counterintelligence Course,Military IntelligenceCombatingTerrorismCourse,USArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollegeandtheUnitedStatesNavalWarCollege.In over 27 years Colonel Edwards has served as armor Platoon Leader for Task Force 6-40th Armor(Berlin,Germany), CompanyExecutiveOfficer andAssistant S3Operations forVCorps Special TroopsBattalion(Frankfurt,Germany).COLONELEdwardshasalsoservedastheAssistantS-3Operations,2-34Armor;1st InfantryDivisionG2PlansOfficer,FortRiley,Kansas;1-68ArmorBattalionS-2 Intelligence;3rdBrigadeCombatTeamS-2Intelligence;HHC1-68ArmorCompanyCommander,4thInfantryDivision,Fort Carson, Colorado; University of Tennessee Army ROTC Training Instructor; Battalion ExecutiveOfficer,165thMilitary IntelligenceBattalion/LongRangeSurveillance-Corps (Darmstadt,Germany/IraqTheater of Operations); US Army Europe Intelligence G2 Plans Officer, as well as US Army EuropeIntelligence G2 Executive Officer (Heidelberg, Germany); USNORTHCOM Intelligence J2 Plans Officer,DeputyDivisionChief, IntelligenceandOperationsDivision,Commander3rdBrigadeTroopsBattalion,4th Infantry Division (Fort Carson, Colorado/Iraq Theater of Operations) and Deputy Division ChiefMission Integration and Architecture Division USNORTHCOM Intelligence J2, Peterson AFB, Colorado,TRADOCCapabilityManager Biometrics and TRADOCCapabilityManager-Sensor Processing (DCGS-A),FortHuachuca,AZ.ColonelEdwards’decorationsincludetheBronzeStarMedal(OneOakLeafCluster),theLegionofMerit,theDefenseMeritorious ServiceMedal (OneOak LeafCluster), theMeritorious ServiceMedal (5OakLeafClusters), theArmyCommendationMedal (3OakLeafClusters), theArmyAchievementMedal (4Oak Leaf Clusters), The Iraq Campaign Medal (3 Campaign Stars), the Global War on TerrorismExpeditionaryMedal,theGlobalWaronTerrorismServiceMedal,theMeritoriousUnitCommendation(1OakLeafCluster/CombatAward/Iraq2003-2004and2010-2011),theJointMeritoriousUnitAward,National Defense ServiceMedal (2 Bronze Stars), theOverseas Service Ribbon, and theArmy ServiceRibbon.HehasearnedthefollowingBadges:TheCombatActionBadge(AlAnbarProvince,Iraq)andtheParachutistBadge.


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RobertElderLieutenant General Robert Elder (USAF, retired) joined the George Mason University faculty as aresearchprofessorwiththeVolgenauSchoolofEngineeringfollowinghisretirementfromtheAirForceastheCommanderof8thAirForceandUSStrategicCommand’sGlobalStrikeComponent.Hecurrentlyconductsresearch intheareasof integratedcommandandcontrol,operationalresiliency indegradedenvironments, strategic deterrence, and the use of modeling to support national security decision-making. General Elder served as the Central Command Air Forces Deputy Commander for OperationEnduring Freedom and later as the Air Operations Center Commander and Deputy Air ComponentCommanderforOperationIraqiFreedom.HewasthefirstcommanderofAirForceNetworkOperationsand led the development of the cyberspace mission for the Air Force. General Elder also served asCommandant of the Air War College, and holds a doctorate in engineering from the University ofDetroit.JamesGiordanoJames Giordano is Professor in the Departments of Neurology and Biochemistry, Chief of theNeuroethics Studies Program of the Pellegrino Center for Clinical Bioethics, and Co-director of theO’Neill-Pellegrino Program in Brain Science and Global Health Law and Policy at the GeorgetownUniversity Medical Center, Washington DC. As well, he is Distinguished Visiting Professor of BrainScience,HealthPromotionsandEthicsattheCoburgUniversityofAppliedSciences,Coburg,Germany,and was formerly Fulbright Visiting Professor of Neuroscience and Neuroethics at the Ludwig-MaximiliansUniversity,Munich,Germany.Prof.GiordanoisaResearchFellowoftheEuropeanUnionHumanBrainProject,workingasteamleadertodefinespecifictechnical,ethicalandpolicyrelatedissuesarisinginandfromdual-useapplicationsofbrainsciences.Hecurrentlyservesasanappointedmemberof theDepartmentofHealthandHumanServicesSecretary’sAdvisoryCouncil forHumanResearchProtection;and isanappointedmemberofthe Neuroethics, Legal and Social Issues Advisory Panel of the Defense Advanced Research ProjectsAgency(DARPA).A neuroscientist and ethicistwith over 30 years’ experience in basic and translational research, Prof.Giordano is theauthorofover250publicationsand7books inneuroscienceandneuroethics,and12governmental whitepapers on bioscience, biotechnology and biosecurity. His recent bookNeurotechnologyinNationalSecurityandDefense:PracticalConsiderations,NeuroethicalConcerns(CRCPress)iswidelyusedinanumberofnationaldefense,securityandpolicycurricula.Named as a Distinguished Lecturer of both Sigma Xi – TheNational Scientific Honor Society, and theInstituteforElectricalandElectronicsEngineers(IEEE),Prof.GiordanowasnamedaPresidentialPointofLightbyPresidentGeorgeH.W.Bushforrecognitionofhiscontributiontoscienceandsociety,andwaselectedtotheEuropeanAcademyofScienceandArts inacknowledgmentofhiswork inbrainscienceandethics.


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AlexusGrynkewichBrig.Gen.AlexusG.GrynkewichistheDeputyDirector,GlobalOperations.HeservesastheJointStafffocal point for cyber and electronic warfare operations, information operations, special technicaloperationsandsensitiveDepartmentofDefensesupporttogovernmentagencies.GeneralGrynkewichreceivedhiscommissionin1993aftergraduatingfromtheUSAirForceAcademy.Hehasservedasaninstructorpilot,weaponsofficerandoperational testpilot in theF16FightingFalconandF22Raptor.General Grynkewich has commanded at the squadron and wing levels, and his staff assignmentsincluding Air Combat Command, US European Command and Headquarters Air Force. GeneralGrynkewichisacommandpilotwithmorethan2,300hoursintheF16andF22.GiaHarriganMs. Gia Harrigan is currently employed by the Department of Homeland Security, Science andTechnology Directorate and serves as the Program Manager for the National Center for Risk andEconomicAnalysis of TerrorismEvents (CREATE),National Consortium for the Studyof TerrorismandResponses to Terrorism (START), and National Transportation Security Center of Excellence. Ms.Harriganison-siteattheNavalWarCollege,WarGamingDepartmentandsupportsHomelandSecurity/HomelandDefense activities. Prior to joiningDHSMs.Harrigan servedas ScienceAdvisor at theCNOExecutive Panel (N00K) in Washington, DC. She began government service at the Naval UnderseaWarfare Center Division, Newport, Rhode Island and has led strategic initiatives for organizationaltransformation, in the areas of Technology Insertion Strategies, Business War Gaming, BalancedScorecard,andKnowledgeManagement.Ms.HarriganhascompletedanAdvancedStudiesPrograminSystem Dynamics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She has a Master of BusinessAdministration degree from the University of Rhode Island and an undergraduate degree inMathematicsfromBostonCollege.ReginaJosephValerie Reyna is Professor of Human Development, Director of the Human Neuroscience Institute,Director of the Magnetic Resonance Imaging Facility, and Co-director of the Center for BehavioralEconomics and Decision Research at Cornell University. Her research integrates brain and behavioralapproaches tounderstandand improve judgment,decisionmaking,andmemoryacross the life span,withaspecialfocusondecisionsinvolvingriskanduncertainty.Sheisadeveloperoffuzzy-tracetheory,a model of the relation between mental representations and decision making that has been widelyapplied in law,medicine, and public health. Dr. Reyna has been elected to theNational Academy ofMedicine and is a Fellow of the Society of Experimental Psychologists. She is also a Fellow of theAmerican Association for the Advancement of Science, the Divisions of Experimental Psychology,Developmental Psychology, Educational Psychology, and Health Psychology of the AmericanPsychological Association, and the Association for Psychological Science. Dr. Reyna has served as apermanentmemberonstudysectionsoftheNationalInstitutesofHealth,andonexpertpanelsfortheNationalScienceFoundation,MacArthurFoundation,andtheNationalAcademyofSciences.GinaLigonDr.GinaLigonisanAssociateProfessorofManagementandCollaborationScienceattheUniversityofNebraskaatOmaha.ShereceivedherPhDin IndustrialandOrganizationalPsychologywithaMinor inMeasurement and Statistics from the University of Oklahoma. She is a member of the NationalConsortiumofStudiesofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START).SincearrivingatUNO,shehasbeen awarded over $3,000,000 inNational Security-related grants and contracts. She currently is the


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PrincipalInvestigatoronagrantfromDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)examiningtheleadershipandperformanceof transnationalViolent ExtremistOrganizations (VEOs,) and is theoriginatorof theLeadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) database. Her researchinterests include profiling leaders from afar, violent ideological groups, expertise and leadershipdevelopment, and collaboration management. Prior to joining UNO, she was a faculty member atVillanovaUniversity in theDepartment of Psychology. She alsoworked in St. Louis as amanagementconsultantwiththefirmPsychologicalAssociates.ShehaswontheBestPaperawardfromtheCenterfor Creative Leadership and The Leadership Quarterly Journal, the Dean’s Merit for OutstandingResearch, and the NSRI Team and Leadership awards. She has published over 50 peer-reviewedpublicationsintheareasofleadership,innovation,andviolentgroups,andsheistheincomingeditortotheacademicjournalDynamicsofAsymmetricConflict.CoreyLofdahlDr.CoreyLofdahl isa recognizedexpert in thecomputermodelingof complex social andengineeringsystems.AtMIT,he specified,quantified, and integrated social science theoryusing systemdynamics(SD) simulation. At the University of Colorado, he used econometrics to specify empirical tests andintegratemultipledatasourcestoexaminetherelationshipsbetweeninternationaltradeandtheglobalenvironment,whichresultedinanMITPressmonograph.Dr.LofdahlcontinuedthisresearchforDARPAundertheConflictModeling,PlanningandOutcomesExperimentation(COMPOEX)programbybuildingsuites of SD models to support creating whole of government plans for Baghdad. These plan usedcomputationtointegratediplomatic,intelligence,military,andeconomic(DIME)linesofefforttoinformseniormilitaryandciviliandecision-makers.TheseresultsledtoaninvitationbytheSpecialOperationsCommandinAfghanistantoapplytheseanalytictechniquesinanoperationalsetting.Uponhisreturn,Dr. Lofdahl was the Principal Investigator for the DARPA Agent-based System Produced EmergentNetworks (ASPEN) project as well as a range of other projects for multiple government agenciesincluding Army ERDC, AFRL, and ONR. He currently works as a principal engineer for the System ofSystems Analysis Corporation (SoSACorp) where he creates complex simulation models to supportoperational planning and systems development. Dr. Lofdahl holds degrees in electrical engineering,computer science, and international relations from the University of Colorado at Boulder, BrownUniversity,andMIT.IanMcCullohIanMcCullohholdsjointappointmentsasaParson’sFellowintheBloombergSchoolofPublichealth,aSeniorLecturerintheWhitingSchoolofEngineeringandaschiefscientistintheCyberWarfareSystemsGroup of the Applied Physics Lab, at Johns Hopkins University. His current research is focused onstrategic influence in online networks and understanding the cognitive dimension of the informationenvironment.Heistheauthorof“SocialNetworkAnalysiswithApplications”(Wiley:2013),“NetworksOverTime”(Oxford:forthcoming)andhaspublished40peer-reviewedpapers,primarily intheareaofsocialnetworkanalysis.HeretiredasaLieutenantColonelfromtheUSArmyafter20yearsofserviceinspecialoperations,counter-improvisedexplosivedevice(C-IED)forensicsandtargeting,andweaponsofmassdestruction(WMD)defense.HefoundedtheWestPointNetworkScienceCenterandcreatedtheArmy’s Advanced Network Analysis and Targeting (ANAT) program. In his most recent militaryassignmentsasastrategist,heledinterdisciplinaryPhDteamsatSpecialOperationsCommandCentral(SOCCENT)andCentralCommand(CENTCOM)toconductsocialscienceresearchin15countriesacrosstheMiddleEastandCentralAsiatoincludeddeniedareas,whichheusedtoinformdata-drivenstrategyfor countering extremism and irregular warfare, as well as empirically assess the effectiveness of


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military operations.He holds a Ph.D. andM.S fromCarnegieMellonUniversity’s School of ComputerScience, an M.S. in Industrial Engineering, and M.S. in Applied Statistics from the Florida StateUniversity, andaB.S. in Industrial Engineering from theUniversityofWashington.He ismarriedwithfourchildrenandagranddaughter.SpencerMeredithDr.SpencerB.MeredithIII,PhDisanAssociateProfessorintheJointSpecialOperationsMasterofArts(JSOMA) program for the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) at the National DefenseUniversity(NDU).AftercompletinghisdoctorateinGovernmentandForeignAffairsattheUniversityofVirginia in 2003, he served as a Fulbright Scholar in the Caucasus in 2007 working on democraticdevelopment and conflict resolution, andhas focusedon related issues in Eastern Europe for severalyears. He has also served as a subject matter expert for US Department of State public diplomacyprogramsinSouthandEastAsiadealingwiththeroleofreligionanddemocracyinUSforeignpolicy.Dr. Meredith has areas of expertise that address “4+1” challenges in the Gray Zone through theframeworksofdemocratizationandconflictresolution.HisregionalfocushasbeenonRussian,EasternEuropean and Middle Eastern politics. Accordingly, he has advised US Special Operations Commandprojects on countering Russian influence operations inUkraine and the Baltics, US Central Commandprogramsanalyzingandsupportingeffectivegovernance in IraqandSyria, andotherUSArmySpecialOperationseffortsinanalyzingnarratives,deterrence,andarangeofviolentandnon-violentconflicts.Hehas alsoworkedwithpartnernations toestablisheffective governance in EasternEurope,CentralAsiaandtheMiddleEast.Dr.Meredith’spublicationsincludehisfirstbookondemocraticdevelopmentandinternationalnuclearsafetyagreements(NuclearEnergyandInternationalCooperation:ClosingtheWorld’sMostDangerousReactors), as well as articles in scholarly journals ranging from Communist Studies and TransitionPolitics,PeaceandConflictStudies,toCentralEuropeanPoliticalScienceReview.Hehasalsopublishedinprofessionaljournalsrelatedtounconventionalwarfareandthefutureoperatingenvironment,witharticles in SmallWars Journal, Inter-Agency Journal, SpecialWarfare, Foreign Policy Journal, and thepeer-reviewedSpecialOperationsJournal.ChristopheMorinCEO and co-founder, SalesBrain, Media Psychologist. Media Psychology. Adjunct Faculty FieldingGraduateUniversityLeadFacultyfortheMediaNeuroscienceCertificateProgram.With over 30 years of marketing research, advertising, psychology and business developmentexperience,Dr.Morinispassionateaboutunderstandingandpredictingconsumerbehaviorandmediaeffect using neuroscience. Dr. Morin authored the first book on neuromarketing which is currentlyavailable in 11 languages. Prior to founding SalesBrain, he was Chief Marketing Officer of rStarNetworks,apubliccompanythatdevelopedthelargestprivatenetworkeverdeployedinUSschools.Dr.Morin has receivedmultiple awards during his career. In 2011 and 2013, he received prestigiousspeaking awards from Vistage International, the largest CEO leadership training organization in theworld. In2011,2014and2015,Dr.MorinreceivedGreatMindResearchAwards fromtheAdvertisingResearchFoundation(ARF).


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Dr.MorinholdsanMBAfromBowlingGreenStateUniversity,anMAandaPhD inMediaPsychologyfrom Fielding Graduate University. He is an expert on the effect of advertising on the brains ofadolescentsandyoungadults.HeisanadjunctfacultymemberofFieldingGraduateUniversitywhereheteaches several post graduate courseshe created.Heactively volunteershis expertise formanynon-profitorganizations.BradfordMorrisonBradfordH.MorrisonstudiespsychologyinthePhDprogramattheUniversityofBritishColumbia,andisa Research Co-ordinator at the UBC REST Lab. He specializes in political psychology, especially thedecision-makingofpoliticalleadersduringcrises,andthepsychologyofviolentextremistgroups.Oneof his current research foci is the psychology of the Irish Republican Army and Sinn Fein (themovement’spoliticalparty),inparticularwithrespecttomajorshiftsinthemovement’sstrategy.Heisalso working on studies of the psychology of Bashar al-Assad, and of the political leadership of thecurrentChineseandRussianregimes.ValerieReynaValerie Reyna is Professor of Human Development, Director of the Human Neuroscience Institute,Director of the Magnetic Resonance Imaging Facility, and Co-director of the Center for BehavioralEconomics and Decision Research at Cornell University. Her research integrates brain and behavioralapproaches tounderstandand improve judgment,decisionmaking,andmemoryacross the life span,withaspecialfocusondecisionsinvolvingriskanduncertainty.Sheisadeveloperoffuzzy-tracetheory,a model of the relation between mental representations and decision making that has been widelyapplied in law,medicine, and public health. Dr. Reyna has been elected to the National Academy ofMedicine and is a Fellow of the Society of Experimental Psychologists. She is also a Fellow of theAmerican Association for the Advancement of Science, the Divisions of Experimental Psychology,Developmental Psychology, Educational Psychology, and Health Psychology of the AmericanPsychological Association, and the Association for Psychological Science. Dr. Reyna has served as apermanentmemberonstudysectionsoftheNationalInstitutesofHealth,andonexpertpanelsfortheNationalScienceFoundation,MacArthurFoundation,andtheNationalAcademyofSciences. NawarShoraNawar Shora is a Senior Advisorwith the Department of Homeland Security, Transportation SecurityAdministration Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Counter-Terrorism Team. He works on culturaldemystification and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts on the Office of Intelligence andAnalysis, Counter-Terrorism Team. He is also a Syria Expert and conducts briefs to the IC and lawenforcementonSyria:Past,Present,andPossibleFuture.Nawar is the author of The Arab American Handbook (2nd. Edition 2010, Cune Press –www.ArabAmericanHandbook.com), an easy-to-read, introductory guide to the Arab, Arab-American,and Muslim cultures. The book has received endorsements from FBI, Georgetown University, HelenThomas,andTheChristianSecurityNetwork.Overthepastfifteenyears,Nawarhasdeliveredin-persontrainingstomorethan50,000professionals,includingintelligenceanalysts, lawenforcement,university,andcorporategroups.Additionally,hehasreachedhundredsofthousandsofothersthroughtwofederalgovernmenttrainingvideosaboutArabs


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andMuslimswhereheservedasasubjectmatterexpert;(TheFirst3to5Seconds–ArabandMuslimCultural Awareness Training for Law Enforcement – Community Relations Service, US Department ofJustice;andDepartmentofHomelandSecurity,OfficeforCivilRightsandCivilLiberties,IntroductiontoArabAmericanandMuslimAmericanCulturesCourseforDHSPersonnel).Nawar’s effortshavebeen recognizedby theFBIwith the “Director’sCommunity LeadershipAward”-(2009) and the “FBI Exceptional Service in the Public Interest Award” (2005), the Department ofHomelandSecurity’sOfficeforCivilRightsandCivilLibertiesLeadershipPlaque(2007),Washington,DCMetro Police Department’s “Outstanding and Dedicated Service Plaque” (2008) “FBI CommunityOutreachTrainingAward”(2009,2010)andmostrecentlybytheDHS“OutstandingAmericanbyChoiceAward”(2011).Nawarisahighlysoughtafterpublicspeakerwithgovernmentagencies,lawenforcement,intelligencecommunity, colleges and universities and corporations. He speaks about the history, norms, mores,culture, and current events of Arabs and Muslims. He has also served as a guest lecturer at variedacademic institutions, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia, theNationalTargetingCenter,andtheFBIAcademy.ValSitterleDr.Sitterle isaSeniorResearcherattheGeorgiaTechResearch Institutewhereshehasover20yearsexperienceindefining,executing,andleadingappliedscienceandengineeringR&Defforts.Herprimaryexpertise is in engineering science, integrating engineering, natural and physical sciences, andmathematics to design and analyze systems across disciplines. Dr. Sitterle specializes in asymmetricalwarfareand systemsengineeringanalysis anddesignwhereherworkbridgesoperational complexity,sociotechnicalanalysis,andcomplexity theory.Shedesignsand/oranalyzescomplexdefensesystems,threat environments, and emergent threats in the asymmetric space in support of various DODorganizationsincludingtheUSAirForce,USArmy,andtheJointImprovised-threatDefeatOrganization(JIDO). She also develops analytical methods and frameworks to enable more effective systemengineering design and characterization in support of defense acquisitions for both complex defensesystemsandcyber-physicalresiliencechallenges.InthisworkshesupportsboththeDOD’sEngineeredResilientSystems(ERS)effortandtheSystemsEngineeringResearchCenter,aDODUniversityAffiliatedResearchCenter.Dr.SitterleearnedaPh.D.inMechanicalEngineeringatGeorgiaTech,aBMEandMSin Mechanical Engineering from Auburn University, and an MS in Aerospace Engineering andEngineeringSciencefromtheUniversityofFlorida.PeterSuedfeldPeter Suedfeld is an experimental social psychologist holding an appointment asDeanandProfessor,Emeritus,attheUniversityofBritishColumbiainVancouver,B.C.,Canada.HewaseducatedinHungary,Austria, and the US (BA, Queens College, MA and PhD, Princeton), and previously taught at theUniversityofIllinoisandRutgers.HeisaveteranoftheUSArmyandtheUSAirForceReserve,andnowhas dual citizenship in the US and Canada. His research, described in over 300 publications, dealsprimarily with adaptation and resilience during and after challenging, dangerous, and/or extremeenvironments and experiences. These have included high-level political and military decision-makingandinformationprocessingunderstress,survival ingenocidaldeathcamps,andworkinthetwopolarregionsaswell as space.He is a Fellowof theRoyal Society (theNationalAcademies)ofCanadaand


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manyotherscientificsocieties.AmonghisawardsaretheAntarcticaServiceMedaloftheUSNationalScienceFoundation, theCanadianPsychologicalAssociationGoldMedal for lifetimeachievement,andQueenElizabethII’sDiamondJubileeMedal.ScottThompsonLieutenantColonelScottK.ThomsonisanArmyReservePsychologicalOperationsofficerwhorecentlycompleted a National Security Fellowship at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School ofGovernment, where he focused his research on the application of behavioral science to counter-insurgency and stability operations. Prior to his fellowship, LTC Thomson commanded of the 17thPsychological Operations Battalion in Austin, TX, from 2013-2015, where he provided MilitaryInformationSupportOperationssupportprimarilytoArmySouthandSouthernCommand.From2011-2013, LTC Thomson attended the US Army Command and General Staff College and the School ofAdvancedMilitaryStudiesfrom2011-2013wherehestudiedoperationalplanning.From2009-2011,LTCThomson activated and commanded the 316th Psychological Operations Company at Grissom AirReserve Base, IN. Activities included manning, equipping, and training the unit to conduct MilitaryInformation SupportOperations. Prior to company command, LTC Thomson served as the operationsofficerofthe16thPsychologicalOperationsBattalioninFortSheridan,ILfrom2007-2009.LTCThomsonpreviouslyservedonactivedutyasanArmorOfficerinmultipleassignments,includingdutyinIraq.Heholds aBS in exercise science fromGeorgia StateUniversity, anMA in communicationsmanagementfrom Webster University, and a Masters of Military Arts and Sciences in operational art from theCommand and General Staff College. His academic interests include the military and diplomaticapplicationofbehavioralsciencessuchassystemsthinking,socialpsychology,andbehavioraleconomicstonationalsecurityissues.RobertToguchiDr.RobertM.ToguchiiscurrentlyservingastheChief,ConceptsDivision,G9Directorate,intheUSArmySpecial Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He has spent over 30 years on activemilitary duty while serving as a Functional Area 59 strategist for the US Army. His past assignmentsincludedatourastheDirector,StrategicPlansandChief,ARCICInitiativesGroup,TRADOC.InthePacificregion,hespentatourwiththeUSPacificCommandwhileservingastheDeputyDirector,J8;andtheChief,StrategicPlans, J5Directorate,USPACOM.Dr.ToguchiwasalsoassignedtoAfrica in2005whileservingas the seniorUSmilitaryobserver to theU.N.Mission in Liberia.Previously,he servedon thefaculty and taught military strategy at the US National War College, National Defense University.Additionally, in theWashingtonD.C. area,Dr. Toguchi gainedvaluableexperienceswithin thehallsofthePentagonwhileservingasastrategistintheDAMO-SSP,StrategyandPolicyDivision,ArmyG3/5/7;andasawarplannerinDAMOSSW,WarPlansDivision,ArmyG3/5/7,1996-1999.Dr.ToguchireceivedaB.S.degreeconcentratinginEngineering,fromtheUSMilitaryAcademyin1980;andreceivedaPhDinHistoryfromDukeUniversityin1994.NickWrightDr.NicholasWrightisaSeniorResearchFellowattheUniversityofBirmingham(UK).Heappliesinsightsfromneuroscienceandpsychologytodecision-makingininternationalconfrontationsinwayspracticallyapplicabletopolicy.HehasconductedworkfortheUKGovernmentandPentagonJointStaff.Hewaspreviously an Associate in the Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,Washington DC. Prior to joining Birmingham and Carnegie, he examined decision-making usingfunctionalbrain imagingatUniversityCollegeLondon (UCL)and in theDepartmentofGovernmentat


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the London School of Economics. Heworked clinically as a neurologist inOxford and at theNationalHospitalforNeurologyinLondon.Hehaspublishedacademically(e.g.ProceedingsoftheRoyalSociety),ingeneralpublicationssuchastheAtlanticorNationalInterest,andwiththeJointStaffatthePentagon(seewww.nicholasdwright.com/publications).HehasbriefedmultipletimesatthePentagon,andalsoattheUKMoD,FrenchMoD,GermanForeignOfficeandelsewhere.HehasappearedontheBBCandCNN.Wright receivedamedicaldegree fromUCL,aBSc inHealthPolicy from ImperialCollegeLondon,hasMembership of the Royal College of Physicians (UK), has an MSc in Neuroscience and a PhD inNeurosciencebothfromUCL.ToddVeazieCAPT(Ret)VeazieisassignedtotheNationalCounterterrorismCenterwhereheleadsateamexploringthe future of terrorism and researching and producing whole of government counterterrorismassessments. He was born in Washington D.C. and earned a Bachelor of Science degree in MarineSciencefromtheUniversityofSouthCarolinaandwascommissionedin1986.AftercommissioninghereportedtoBasicUnderwaterDemolition/SEALtrainingandgraduated inClass140.Veazie isacareerNaval Special Warfare (NSW) SEAL officer and has served in east and west coast SEAL Teams anddeployed to over fifty countries around the globe leading Naval Special Warfare formations in theexecution of combat and peacetime special operationsmissions in Latin America, Europe, Africa, theWestern Pacific and theMiddle East. Command tours include SEAL Team SEVEN in San Diego, NavalSpecialWarfare Unit THREE in Bahrain as well as duty as Commodore, Naval SpecialWarfare GroupFOURinVirginiaBeach.HehasservedinnumerousstaffassignmentsthatincludetheExecutiveDirectorof JoiningForces intheOfficeof theFirstLadyat theWhiteHouse,personnelpolicyat theBureauofNaval Personnel, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments for theCommander,NavalSpecialWarfareCommandandintheOperationsDirectorate(J3)ontheJointStaffat the Pentagon. Decorations include the Legion of Merit (3), the Bronze Star, Defense MeritoriousServiceMedal(2),MeritoriousServiceMedal(3),andvariousotherawards.Heisalsoa2003Graduateof the NationalWar College earning aMaster’s Degree in National Security Strategy. Todd has beenmarriedtohisbrideVanessafor26years.TheyliveinAlexandria,VA.

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