white-paper-safety-dna why acc at work keep happening

Cracking the DNA of safetyWhy accidents at work keep happening

Eugene Burke, Chief Science & Analytics Officer

Version 1.0

White Paper | Cracking the DNA of Safety

2011 SHL Page 2

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Human error and why it keeps happeningMajor safety incidents have again brought home the importance of workplace safety, and the economic and human consequences of unsafe acts. Sixty to eighty percent of workplace accidents are attributed by various industry surveys to operator error1. In 2008, the US Department of Labor reported the cost of accidents in the US to be $1 billion a week in both direct and indirect costs. The UK Health and Safety executive reported in 2004 that workplace accidents and work-related ill health cost employers between 3.9 and 7.8 billion, and that the UK economy lost 39 million working days due to accidents between 2003 and 2004. While statistics may vary, there can be little doubt of the financial and human impact of accidents at work.

With the investment made by organisations in the training of employees, and in complying with health and safety regulations, the inevitable question is why does human error play such a significant part in major incidents? Put simply, why is this investment in training and safety compliance not enough to avoid major incidents and the ongoing cost of accidents at work?

We at SHL see safety as relying on three key factors. The first is the design of equipment and facilities such as production plants and installations where safety critical work is undertaken. If these are well designed, with the operator and human error in mind, then sciences such as ergonomics and human factors will have made their contribution to mitigating against unsafe acts.

The second factor relates to the processes and procedures that govern the day-to-day operations of employees as well as responses to safety incidents. Here, training and education are critical in raising awareness and knowledge, but knowing what should or should not be done is clearly not enough to avoid accidents happening. As a colleague pointed out to me recently, we all know the speed limits on our roads but that doesnt mean that we all comply with those speed limits.

This brings us on to the third and possibly the most difficult safety factor to deal with human behaviour. Our work with clients has consistently shown that, irrespective of safety education and training programmes, there will be employees whose disposition to risk is such that will they take the risks that will lead to an accident or, possibly, a more catastrophic sequence of events. Without full knowledge of the disposition to risk across its employees and contractors, we suggest that organisations have an incomplete picture of the factors influencing the likelihood of unsafe acts happening, and it is therefore not surprising that human error continues to play a significant part in causing accidents in the workplace.

There will be employees whose disposition to risk is such that will they take the risks that will lead to an accident.


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Building a truly behavioural approach to safetyLet us begin by defining risk tolerance as the amount of risk that an individual or group of individuals is willing to accept in the pursuit of a goal or objective. This tolerance for risk will reflect beliefs about the consequences of actions, and those with a higher tolerance for risk will tend to believe that either their actions will not result in negative consequences or that they can somehow manage the extent of those consequences. The key question is how can these dispositions be identified in such a way as to provide tangible and actionable data to improve safety?

Our work clearly shows that risk tolerance is influenced by deep dispositions held by individuals who are more likely to be involved in accidents. These dispositions influence the way they feel about risk as well as their perceptions of events which,in turn, are reflected in the way they behave. Later in this paper we will share case study materials that will show the relationship between these deeper dispositions and actual accidents at both the individual and work group levels. For now, we will explore these dispositions in a little more detail.

Our model of risk tolerance or orientation to safety is founded on five key behaviours. These behaviours reflect underlying dispositions to take or to avoid risk that relate to processes, whether the person has the disposition to plan ahead, pay attention to the detail and to comply with policies and procedures. The model also encompasses the disposition for someone to consider the impact of their behaviour and approach to risk on others. This is reflected in providing support to the team or wider work group and, irrespective of whether the person works alone or not, to keep people informed, as well as showing responsibility by addressing safety issues and promoting the value of safety in the workplace and across the organisation.

Figure 1: The Safety Five Behaviours

Processes Behaviours People Behaviours

Planning aheadThink forward, anticipate issues and plan for contingencies

Teamwork and communicationConsult with others and encourage proactive communication within and across work groups

Attention to detailCheck the detail and reward efforts and achievements for getting quality right

Showing responsibilityBuild awareness of responsibility to the bigger team beyond immediate work tasks and colleagues

Following proceduresEnsure that procedures and policies are followed correctly

The relevance of these behaviours is apparent from recent recommendations published through an oil and gas safety initiative, itself drawing on safety models in other industries such as transportation2. The initiative provides case study materials with short recommendations as to the actions that someone should take to address similar events occurring in the future.

Risk tolerance is influenced by deep dispositions held by individuals who are more likely to be involved in accidents.


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Figure 2: The relevance of the Safety Five to safety initiatives

Processes Behaviours Safety Initiative Recommended Tip

Planning aheadThink forward, anticipate issues and plan for contingencies

When planning a job, assess the practical problems you will encounter and how you will deal with them

Attention to detailCheck the detail and reward efforts and achievements for getting quality right

A work site may have the best safety culture in the world, but you cant rely on the culture rubbing off on a new team. Keep an eye on a new team to verify that your high standards are being adopted

Following proceduresEnsure that procedures and policies are followed correctly

Procedures need to be prepared in advance and reviewed by competent persons.

People Behaviours Safety Initiative Recommended Tip

Teamwork and communicationConsult with others and encourage proactive communication within and across work groups

Talk about the job at the work site. Walk, point and mark the plant to be worked on. Those doing a job should beable to explain the job and their role in it

Showing responsibilityBuild awareness of responsibility to the bigger team beyond immediate work tasks and colleagues

People will put up with poorly designed equipment and make the best of it. Designers cant foresee all situations.Speak up if there is equipment that is difficult to operate.

So, have recent organisational safety initiatives already embraced the SHL Safety Five behaviours? To the extent that they are implicitly providing a basis for feedback and for safety education, then the answer is maybe. However, in terms of direct and valid intelligence on these behaviours and what that intelligence says about the people factor in safety, then, with very few exceptions, the answer has to be no.

Why? Let us take the case of safety surveys. Such surveys will tell us about how people perceive compliance with safety procedures, how well safety is communicated within an organisation, and about the commitment that an organisation is showing to best practice. But the one thing such surveys will not tell you is how people will act and, directly, the behavioural risks that underlie and drive risk at the individual and work group levels.

We argue that this direct data not only complements current safety practice and data gathering in the form of surveys, but actually addresses a blind spot in current safety practice. To put this argument across, we will now look at two case studies showing how information on behavioural safety predicts actual accidents and incidents, and we will follow these case studies with a description of how the data gathered from a simple and efficient tool can be used to strengthen safety management in organisations.

Safety surveys wont tell you how people will act.


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Case study: evaluating risk among security personnelBefore we describe the first case study, let us introduce the concept of odds and likelihoods. As we have alluded to above, risk is about perception of consequences which, in turn, comes down to a judgement about the odds of something beingpositive or negative. For example, if we think that there is a 50 : 50 chance that something will happen in a certain way, then we can say the odds are even or 1 to 1. In other words, the odds are no better than the chance offered by flipping acoin and one or the other side landing face up.

If we observe a series of events and the outcomes are that eighty percent of the time the outcome that we expect happens, then the odds are 80 : 20 or 4 to 1. In the context of a financial investment, most of us would be happy with an investment that has those odds and the associated likelihood of providing us with growth in that financial investment.

Let us come back to safety and ask the question of the odds of an individual, the potential source of human error, having an accident. Our argument is that, with data on the dispositions that relate to the Safety Five, you can significantly improve your knowledge of those odds. The first case study will serve to explain.

A major global provider of security services was concerned about why accidents and other counterproductive outcomes seemed to be concentrated in some work groups and not others, despite conducting safety audits and running regular educational and training programmes.

Following administration of a short behavioural questionnaire3 to a sample of employees, covering the Safety Five described earlier, the results were evaluated alongside records of vehicle accidents, attacks on personnel as well as absenteeism for a six month period. The data showed that those classified as higher behavioural risk on the questionnaire were five times more likely to be responsible for a vehicle accident4, and were three times more likely to be involved in an attack when compared to the rates for all employees in the sample. The same high behavioural risk employees were also two and a half times more likely to have been absent without authorisation in the six month period examined. In summary, those who were lower on the Safety Five were far more likely to be a source of accidents and other counterproductive outcomes in the workplace.

The substance of this finding is emphasised when the likelihood of an accident or an attack is considered. In general, the odds of a vehicle accident were 19 to 1 against while the odds of an employee experiencing an attack while performing their duties were 3 to 1 against.

Those classified as higher behavioural risk on the questionnaire were five times more likely to be responsible for a vehicle accident.


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Figure 3: Overall scores on the Safety Five, accidents and other counterproductive outcomes in the workplace

Vehicle Accidents Zero Accidents (A) 1 or more Accidents (B) Odds (A:B)

High behavioural risk 80% 20% 4:1

All employees 95% 5% 19:1

Attack Incidents Zero Incidents (A) 1 or more Incidents (B) Odds (A:B)



Unauthorised Absences Zero Absences(A) 1 or more Absences (B) Odds(A:B)



%s show the relative proportions for zero versus one or more recorded incidents for each type of incident and for high behavioural risk versus all employees in the sample. High behavioural risk indicates low scores on the Safety Five.

So, despite an environment where the chances of an accident were low, and where the employer pursued an active programme of safety management, staff training and communication, those lower on the Safety Five were much more likely to be involved in an accident or an incident.

Why? Further research on the SHL safety model shows that those higher on the Safety Five are far more likely to take a considered approach to their work and to safety critical tasks, while those lower on the Safety Five are far more likely toact impulsively, deviate from procedures and to fail to consider the consequences of their actions.

We will come back to how the data gathered from such a study can be used to improve safety management a little later in this paper, and we will now shift the focus to look at entire populations of employees through a second case study in the oiland gas industry. This case study focuses on the relationship between the frequency of behavioural risk at different installations and the history of safety incidents at those installations.

Case study: identifying areas of behavioural risk within a global oil companyIn this second study, we look at an international oil company operating oil rigs (referred to as sites) in the North Sea. Having conducted a number of safety initiatives, the company wanted to test whether the SHL behavioural questionnaire could identify those sites where the history of incidents was highest, as well as identify which specific work groups were more disposed to risk.

Those lower on the Safety Five are far more likely to act impulsively, deviate from procedures and to fail to consider the consequences of their actions.


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Records of 571 incidents gathered over a two year period and classified into low, medium and high severity by the client were analysed to identify the historical safety profiles across the three offshore sites. Relatively few incidents were recorded as high severity, but discussion with the company indicated that many of the medium risk incidents represented near misses where a higher severity event could have occurred. Accordingly, incidents were classified into the proportion of medium and high versus low severity incidents at each site.

Incidents were also examined in terms of whether they affected an asset (e.g. a piece of equipment) or involved injury to an employee or a contractor. The analysis showed that the risk profiles across sites remained the same whether the incident data was broken out into these specific types of incident or grouped into an overall safety profile. As such, this overall profile was used to evaluate the relationship between historical risk and behavioural risk across the three sites.

Data on behavioural risk were gathered through an online survey using the SHL behavioural questionnaire which was well received by employees as indicated by high completion rates (65% of questionnaires were completed within the first two weeks). This data covered 195 employees and contractors, and provided information on the site employed, their job level as well as their job role (i.e. the specialist role in which they operated).

Figure 4 shows the association found between levels of behavioural risk (the proportion of respondents classified as higher behavioural risk) and the two year history of safety incidents at each site (the proportion of medium and high severity incidents at each site).

At Site B, the odds over two years of a medium to high versus a low risk incident occurring were approximately 60% : 40% or 1.5 : 1, approaching twice that expected by chance alone. In contrast, the odds at Site C were essentially the opposite at30% : 70% or around 1 : 2. Effectively, the odds were 2 : 1 against a medium to high incident happening at Site C.

The data on levels of behavioural risk showed a clear association with the likelihood of medium to high risks happening. At Site B, 40% of those surveyed were identified as high behavioural risk, while at Site C 20% were identified as high behavioural risk. That is, the odds of an employee or contractor being identified as high behavioural risk were 2 : 1 at Site B when compared to Site C.

We have since expanded the analysis to show specifically where levels of behavioural risk sit in the organisation and which behaviours need to be focused on to address the people risks identified. In the next section of this paper, we will describe how the data gathered from such a behavioural audit can be used to strengthen an organisations management of safety and mitigation of the people risks critical to successful safety management.

The data on levels of behavioural risk showed a clear association with the likelihood of medium to high risks happening.


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Will perceptions of safety actually result in safe behaviours?

Figure 4: Case of three North Sea platforms and comparison of behavioural risk using the SHL safety model and previous two years incidents

Case study: taking a holistic approach to managing safety and risk in the workplaceMany organisations use safety climate and safety culture surveys across theirorganisations to provide data on how effectively safety is managed and communicated to employees. While there is no doubt that these are useful tools, the question posed in this paper still remains will perceptions of safety actually result in safe behaviours? To paraphrase a widely used saying without data on the behavioural dispositions underlying risk tolerance, how will organisations know whether their people will walk the safety talk? A current client engagement will help to show how the SHL safety model is helping to strengthen an organisations understanding of safety risk by incorporating direct data on the Safety Five.

The client is a global leader in manufacturing who is collecting data across work groups and job levels, managers, supervisors and operational staff to build up a more complete picture of safety risk and risk tolerance. In additions to more traditional survey and safety audit information, the project will include the SHL behavioural safety questionnaire. The data from the questionnaire will be used at two levels.

At the macro level, the data will provide intelligence of where the organisation has sources of behavioural best practice. That is, which managers and supervisors, work groups and work sites show strengths against the Safety Five5. The data will also identify specific behaviours under the Safety Five that need to be addressed most urgently as well as the dispositions that will need to be addressed to ensure that safety initiatives do reduce human error.

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Site A

% behavioural risk % actual safety incidents

Site B Site C


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At the micro level, feedback will be provided to individual work groups and their managers and supervisors to help them understand the key behaviours they need to address, and to enable them to develop, commit to, and track progress against.

As shown in the figure 5, the project will provide intelligence that will enable the organisation to take a holistic and systemic approach to addressing risk tolerance and safety by addressing how staff are recruited, and where they are assigned and supervised, by building a clearer behavioural focus into training programmes, as well as reviewing policies and procedures for potential gaps where key Safety Five behaviours need greater emphasis. The data will also be used to develop and specify behaviourally focused safety leadership programmes.

Figure 5: A holistic approach to safety

What is the DNA of safety?At SHL, we see that the answer lies in behaviour and the disposition to risk tolerance. From our more traditional vantage point of supporting organisations in their talent management strategies and practices, we would suggest that the mitigation against safety risk begins with the staffing of the organisation, and getting the people element of the safety equation right from the outset. Many organisations have seen the value of deploying the SHL behavioural questionnaire (Dependability and Safety Instrument) in recruiting employees and ensuring that those employed in safety critical roles have a good fit to the expectations for those roles.

Organisations that we have worked with have also found that using the behaviourally focused model and tools that we have deployed to support safety also provide a powerful and effective approach to developing existing employees, and for ensuring that the investment made by organisations in safety and risk management pays off.

We started this paper by asking the question why the investment in training and safety compliance is not enough to avoid major incidents and the ongoing cost of accidents at work. Our answer is that safety can only be improved through a systemic, holistic and behavioural approach.

The mitigation against safety risk begins with the staffing of the organisation.

Gather data and evaluate

Safety culture /climate survey

SHL Model

Staffing

LeadershipDevelopment

Training

Policies andProcedures

Am I likely to act safely?

Am I encouraged to be safe?

Action Plan


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About the authorEugene Burke is Chief Scientist at SHL Group Ltd. where his focus is on the practical application of behavioural psychology and the science of assessment to deliver solutions to organisations. He has held various leadership roles at SHL ranging from R&D to product management as well P&L responsibility for consultancy and professional services. He has consulted with private and public sector organisations across a wide range of industries in Asia, Europe and North America. He is a regular contributor to professional and public events, has authored articles and book chapters on innovations in psychometric models, assessment design, identifying high potential, meeting the global challenges to talent management, identifying and managing the people risks in organisations, and how to improve safety by adopting a behavioural approach. He has held several positions on professional bodies including past Chair of the British Psychological Societys (BPS) Steering Committee on Test Standards, past Chair of the BPS Division of Occupational Psychology, past Council Member of the International Test Commission, past Chair of the European Association of Test Publishers, and is currently a member of the ISO Task Force for developing standards for the use of assessment data, and a member of the Board of the Association of Test Publishers.

Further informationMore information on the Dependability and Safety Instrument (DSI) used can be found via: http://www.shl.com/uk/solutions/products/docs/Fact_Sheet-Dependability_and_Safety1.pdf

The technical manual for DSI can also be accessed and downloaded free of charge from: http://central.shl.com/en-gb/TheLibrary/Pages/Library.aspx

Please visit our Thought leadership page page on which you will find articles, manuals as well as access to the presentations that our scientists deliver at professional events: http://www.shl.com/uk/resources/thought-leadership/


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References 1. Examples include various studies cited by Aas, A. L. (2008) The

Human Factors Assessment and Classification System (HFACS) for the oil & gas industry, International Petroleum Technology Conference; Aas, A. L. (2009) Probing human error as a casual factor in incidents with major accident potential. Third International Conference on Digital Society; Wiegmann, D. A., and Shappell, S. A. (2001). A human error analysis of commercial aviation accidents using Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). DOT/FAA/AM-103, Office of Aviation Medicine, Federal Aviation Administration. Washington DC; the John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Centre online piece on automobile driver error retrieved on December 10th. via www.volpe.dot.gov/infosrc/highlts/05/winter/focus.html

2. Details of this initiative can be foundviahttp://stepchangeinsafety.net/stepchange/

3. Short behavioural questionnaire = SHL Dependability and Safety Instrument (DSI). Please refer to further information section.

4. The odds are worked out from the data shown in Figure 3. For all employees, the odds of an accident were low at 95 : 5 or 19 : 1. For the high behavioural risk group low on the Safety Five, the odds were 80 : 20 or 4 : 1. 19 divided by 4 gives a result that is close to 5 and is why the high behavioural risk group are seen as five times more likely to be responsible for an accident.

5. If you think back to the last case study set in the oil and gas industry, Site C clearly had stronger sources of behavioural best practice that could be drawn upon to provide tangible examples to the wider workforce on effective approaches to safety.

For more information about this paper please contact Eugene Burke, [email protected]

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