who shaped south africa's land reform policy? - wikileaks reform 11.pdf · national congress...

Politikon, (November 2004), 31(2), 219-238 1 ^ Carfax Publishing' ' / ' \ / ' ™IIW Taylor & Francis Croup

Who Shaped South Africa's LandReform Policy?MARINDA WEIDEMAN*

ABSTRACT This paper itivestigates the South African (land reform) policyformulation process in the period 1993 to 2000. The paper argues that thepolitical process of policy formulation and the nature of subsequent policies arethe results of the distribution of power within a given society, as well as globally,and the interaction (inclusion or exclusion) of a variety of local and inter-national interest groups and individuals within the context of a particularpolitical system. The wide range of actors that shaped South African land policyinclude the former National Party government, the World Bank, the AfricanNational congress (ANC), rural and land-related non-governtnental organiza-tions, the white commercial agricultural sector, the National African Farmers'Union, the former Department of Native Affairs, and the new departments ofAgriculture and Land Affairs. This paper gives a brief account and analysis ofthe role played by each of the organizations or institutions mentioned above, butalso highlights the fact that the poorest and most marginalized sectors of SouthAfrican society were not part of the policy development process. As a result, athree-part, legalistic, demand-driven, market-based (i.e. willing-buyer and will-ing-seller) land reform programme was developed.

Overview of the Land Reform Programme

The Land Reform Programme consists of a three-part structure. The firstcomponent is the Restitution Programme, which enables those who weredispossessed after the June 1913 cut-off date to apply for land restitution orfinancial compensation through the Land Claims Court and Commission.Plagued by problems, largely of a bureaucratic nature, the Programme hadbenefited 83,661 households or 444,002 individuals by June 2003. A total of36,488 claims had been settled, covering 590,112 hectares {The Star, Johannes-burg, 19 June 2003).

The Redistribution Programme would provide the poor' with residential andagricultural land to improve livelihoods. This programme was based on marketprinciples, with some state assistance. The Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant(SLAG) was introduced to the value of R15,000 (later R 16,000) per householdfor purchasing land from a 'willing-seller'. By November 1999, 714,407

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hectares had been redistributed to 360,256 beneficiaries (55,424 households)(Weideman, 2003, Ch. 7). The total area redistributed was less than 1 percent ofthe 32 million hectares of agricultural land in South Africa. By August 2001, onemillion hectares had been redistributed. The major problems emerged aroundgroup acquisition, ownership and management of land, lack of capacity andresources in the Departments of Agriculture and Land Affairs (exacerbated bythe market approach to land acquisition) and lack of post-settlement support.Thoko Didiza became Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs (DLA) in 1999and immediately embarked on a policy review and placed a controversialmoratorium on redistribution projects. After two years of confusion, the LandRedistribution for Agricultural Development Programme (LRAD), aiming totransfer 3.5 million hectares of South Africa's agricultural land to beneficiariesin 15 years, was unveiled. The programme is based on a government grantsystem (sliding scale) and requires an 'own contribution' from beneficiaries. Atthe lowest end of the scale, a contribution of R5,000 (in cash, labour or kind)qualifies a beneficiary for a R20,000 grant. At the highest end, a R405,000contribution qualifies one for R 100,000. Another important change is thatindividuals, rather than households, are eligible for grants. Where a poorhousehold could formerly access a maximum of R 16,000, several adult membersof the same household can now access R20,000 each. Beneficiaries of SLAG cantrade-up and receive additional grants under the LRAD programme. Despite anumber of sub-programmes focused on the needs of impoverished households,the emphasis of LRAD is on economically viable projects and the developmentof a black commercial agricultural class.

Tenure reform can be divided into reform in the former 'homelands' andreform on farms. Tenure reform policy has not been finalized for the former'homelands'. The Draft Land Rights Bill (that took four years to develop) wasshelved by Didiza when she took office in 1999.The latest policy document, theCommunal Land Rights Bill, has been criticized for arguably increasing thepower of traditional authorities over land administration in the Bantustans. Thetwo mechanisms for tenure reform on farms are the Land Reform LabourTenants Act (LTA) and the Extension of Tenure Security Act (ESTA).The LTAintroduced legal procedures for the eviction of labour tenants, but was ineffectivedue to capacity constraints in the DLA, the lack of publicity around the Act andthe exclusion of large groups of labour tenants and farm dwellers from the ambitof the Act. The ESTA was promulgated to prevent arbitrary evictions. Thiscontroversial piece of legislation appears to be largely ineffective and evenpotential beneficiaries are asking that the Act be scrapped.

The National Party

The National Party (NP) introduced its White Paper on Land Reform in 1991.The NP's programme was limited and aimed to maintain the status quo inproperty ownership. The NP's biggest contribution relates to agrarian, ratherthan land, reform—i.e. the agricultural deregulation and liberalization policies

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of the 1980s. The 1991 Paper called for the abolition of all land laws basedon racial discrimination. Accordingly, the Abolition of Racially Based LandMeasures Act of 1991 (amended in 1993) was introduced. Some of the importantlaws repealed by the Act included the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, the GroupAreas Act, the Asiatic Land Tenure Act and the Black Communities Develop-ment Act of 1988.

Although welcome, the mere repeal of this legislation could not address theextreme inequities in access to land. There was a danger that racially basedeconomic inequities would be entrenched under the guise of racially neutrallaws. A number of important racist laws were also not repealed by the Act.These included the Black Administration Act of 1927, the Rural Areas Act of1987, the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (though amended by the LessFormal Township Establishment Act 113 of 1991),^ and the Self-GovemingTerritories Act of 1971.^

The NP argued in its 1991 White Paper that the restoration of land lost as aresult of past racially discriminatory land legislation was 'not feasible' (RSA,1991, A2.11). Nevertheless, the Advisory Commission on Land Allocation(ACLA) was established at the end of 1991 to 'facilitate the process ofrestoration' to those who were dispossessed as a result of racist legislation. Thepowers of the ACLA were limited to making recommendations and its mandateto unutilized state-owned land.

The National Land Committee (NLC) and its affiliates, affected communities,'*and the ANC, rejected the ACLA, arguing that it did not address the injusticesof the past. Dissatisfaction was expressed regarding the lack of consultation inestablishing the ACLA as well as with the limited powers and scope of theCommission. The ANC claimed that neither it nor the victims of land disposses-sion were given an opportunity to participate in the drafting of the 1991 policy(ANC, 1991b). However, there was engagement between ANC representativesand members of the NP's Regional and Land Affairs Department in the early1990s regarding the ACLA. Several meetings took place during which ANCrepresentatives not only provided the NP with advice (which the NP adhered to),but actually presented the NP with a list of possible restitution cases thatincluded the Magopa and Riemvasmaak communities, which were eventuallyselected.^

Nevertheless, criticism led to the introduction of the Abolition of RaciallyBased Land Measures Amendment Act 110 of 1993, which introduced amend-ments to the ACLA's terms of reference. First, the removal of the word'advisory' from the Commission's name, thus changing the Commission from apurely advisory body to one with decision-making power in 'certain circum-stances' (Roux, 1996). Second, the Commission's powers were extended toidentify land previously outside its jurisdiction.

With regard to tenure reform, the NP argued for the creation of a nationalfreehold tenure system and the privatization of traditional and communal tenuresystems, which it argued, were 'unproductive' (RSA, 1991, A3.5, B3.3, B3.2,D5.5.2). The purpose of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1993,

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as amended by the General Law Second Amendment Act 108 of 1993, was toconvert all lower order tenure rights (quitrent, permission to occupy certificates,and communal tenure) to individualized freehold property rights. This wasaccompanied by the Land Titles Adjustment Act 111 of 1993, that repealed alllegislation relating to the adjustment of titles, including the Land Titles Adjust-ment Act 68 of 1979 and Section 8 of the Black Administration Act.

Many rural communities expressed concern regarding the fact that communaltenure would not be legal. Communities also expressed a lack of trust in privatetenure; 'title deeds do not make us more secure ... the government has taken titledeeds away from blacks before.'* The Black Sash pointed out that thousands ofpeople have relatively secure access to land through the communal tenure systemand that individualization could lead to dispossession and, thereby, increasedestitution. The concern was that freehold land could be sold in times of needor to pay off debt. Land could also be sold by husbands, effectively dispossess-ing women and children. A third concern was that group purchase and ownershipwas the only way in which impoverished individuals would be able to acquireland in a free-market context. 'The government is not allowing us to buy landas a group, nor is it allowing that farms be divided up. How can a single blackperson possibly afford to buy a big white farm?'^ It was also argued that landrights should not be restricted to title deeds and should include birthright, longoccupation, productive use and inheritance (Black Sash, 1990).

With regard to redistribution, the NP's White Paper stipulated that redistribu-tion would occur in a free-market context. No redistribution policies would bedeveloped or implemented by the state, with the exception of the 474,000hectares of SADT land originally set aside for black settlement schemes. Themechanism for redistribution was the Provision of Certain Land for SettlementAct 126 of 1993. The Act would redistribute state-owned land to those who weredispossessed by racist laws and, subject to certain conditions relating to sustain-able land use, financial assistance would be provided to families who earned lessthan R 1,250 per month. The financial package consisted of 5 percent of thepurchase price for land paid by the family, 80 percent of the purchase price inthe form of a government grant, and 15 percent through a loan repayable overfive years to the Minister of Finance (FRRP, 1998). Related legislation includedthe Distribution and Transfer of Certain Land Act 119 of 1993, that establishedprocedures for the transfer of state-owned land into private ownership.

Opponents argued that the extreme inequities in South Africa were the resultof apartheid, and that equity could only be achieved through state-led redistribu-tive and restorative land policies because the poor did not have the resourcesnecessary to participate in a free-market system. Opponents also argued thatthese policies would entrench the unequal social and economic systems createdby apartheid. According to the Black Sash, 'it is one thing to ensure rights to buyland, it is quite another to give people the ability to buy land and use itproductively. Apartheid has impoverished black people on the land over manydecades, to expect them to compete on a free for all scramble for land isunrealistic and will de facto perpetuate the present unequal division of land'

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(Black Sash, 1990). Western Transvaal communities expressed it as follows: 'Tosay that we should buy the land is just another way of denying black peopleaccess to land. It is very unfair for the government who impoverished us toexpect us to buy back the land that was stolen from our ancestors and that wewere thrown off again in the recent past. We have no money because we havebeen under-paid for decades. Buying farms is out of our reach.'^ By 1994, theProvision of Certain Land for Settlement Act had had no perceptible effect onland distribution in South Africa.

The NP thus lay significant groundwork for subsequent land reform policy.This includes the ACLA (precursor to the Commission for the Restitution ofLand Rights), a commitment to the upgrading of tenure rights, adherence tofree-market policies, agricultural market liberalization and, the introduction of apartial grant for land acquisition.

The World Bank

The World Bank engaged in the South African land policy development processin the early 1990s and was very influential. Most of the Bank's recommendationswere set out in Options for Land Reform and Rural Restructuring in SouthAfrica, presented at a conference organized by the Land and Agricultural PolicyCentre (LAPC) in 1993.

A wide range of land reform documents, produced mostly in 1991 and 1992,preceded Options. The early documents were produced by prominent WorldBank representatives, agricultural economists from the University of Pretoria,former staff of the Southern African Development Bank, and over a hundred(often 'progressive') social scientist and lawyers, mostly contracted to theLAPC. None of the researchers were historians.' Prominent authors includedHans Binswanger, Masiphula Mbongwa, Klaus Deininger, Bill Kinsey, HeinzKlug, Robert Christiansen, Bongiwe Njobe, Nick Vink and David Cooper."' TheWorld Bank managed to give legitimacy to its research and proposals by hiringANC-aligned and some 'radical' South African researchers. 'Of course, thesynthesis that the Bank produced was distorted but, by then, the research waslegitimated.'"

The World Bank's intervention in South African land reform policy formu-lation is viewed as 'manipulative' and as 'intellectual arm twisting' happeningat 'just the right time'.'^ 'A few individuals charged by the ANC withformulating (or conjuring) land and agricultural policies were overwhelmed byrepresentations, models and prescriptions from a variety of quarters. SouthAfrican and external ... ideological skill, policy analysis and advice were sup-plied by the World Bank and other agencies, the planeloads of consultantsattached to them and the rest of the internationally mobile usual suspects'(Bernstein, 2000). Or, according to a source who attended the first LAPCworkshop in Swaziland, 'these guys were technically superior and excellentlobbyists, nobody from South Africa was at that level. We just sat there and werelectured to.'

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The World Bank's representatives argued for a market-based land reformprogramme to redistribute 30 percent of white-owned land over a period of fiveyears. These arguments were included in subsequent land policy documents,including the Reconstruction and Development Programme (ANC, 1994, §2.4.5,§2.4.4, §4.5.2.2).

As early as October 1993, the South African Agricultural Union announcedthat it had won commitments from the Bank that 'no land would be expropriatedor nationalised with a view to establishing small-farmer projects' (Bond, 2000,Ch. 5). The Bank's representatives (Binswanger, 1994) also pushed for 'econ-omic liberalization' and the abolition of protectionist agricultural policies (whichwere included in the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Program, 1994,section 4.5.2.3). The ANC-led government soon embarked on a process ofagricultural market liberalization. In 1993, Bank representatives recommended aconstitutional guarantee of private property rights and a flexible communaltenure and land ownership system based on 'minimum democratic decisionmaking' (Binswanger and Deininger, 1992). These proposals were reflected inthe 1996 Constitution of South Africa and the Communal Property Associationsof the redistribution programme. The Bank also recommended a three-part landreform programme (i.e. separate restitution, redistribution and tenure reformprogrammes) that later formed the foundation of South African policy. The Bankrecommended a claims-based restitution process, complete with cut-off dates anda land claims court. The redistribution programme, it argued, should be market-based (i.e. willing-buyer, willing-seller) with a partial grant for land acquisition.

As NLC leader Abie Ditlhake concluded in 1998, the market-based landpolicy was established 'in the context of external influences, in particular theintervention that the World Bank made during the policy process. Alternativeviews and aspirations were not fully integrated into the policy, notwithstandingthe perceived consultative process the DLA undertook. Concerns raised by ruralcommunities in 1994 were outweighed by global imperatives represented by theWorld Bank and other international interests' (cited in Bond, 2002, Ch. 5).

Nevertheless, the role of Bank representatives should not be exaggerated.First, policy decisions are invariably influenced by processes in other countriesand by international organizations. What is important is whether particularinterest groups were excluded from the policy formulation process. Second,various groups within the ANC, or with close connections to the organization,were working in a fairly uncoordinated way on various aspects of the landreform policy before the Bank's involvement. Third, the World Bank is not ahomogenous body. Various Bank representatives, working in different sectors ofthe Bank, presented a variety of perspectives as opposed to a single World Bankpolicy for land reform in South Africa. Fourth, engagement with the Bank andparticipation in its research programme was preceded by intense debates amongland reform activists. While some activists argued against any kind of involve-ment with the World Bank, the flnal agreement appears to have been that theBank would fund and conduct research in South Africa, with or without SouthAfrican participation. Participation, therefore, would allow South African ac-

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tivists to significantly influence the direction and outcome of the Bank's researchprogramme. Former minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, Derek Hanekom,retrospectively conceded 'that the exercise turned out to generate lots of veryuseful material and very useful policy options, none of which we were com-pelled to adopt'.'^ According to this interpretation, Options closely resembledthe final land reform policy because it was the result of a process in which SouthAfrican activists played a key role (i.e. much of the final policy would have beensimilar had Bank representatives not participated in the process).

The African National Congress

By 1990, the African National Congress (ANC) had not produced any substantialland or agrarian reform policies and land reform did not feature very strongly onthe ANC's agenda.''* In 1986, when Helena Dolny organized a reading group onland issues in Lusaka, 'less than a handful of people were interestedin ... debating its [land reform] relevance to post-apartheid policy' (Dolny, 2001,Ch. 1). When policy statements were made, 'a recurrent theme was thatapartheid, capitalism and inequality were closely related and that a strongmeasure of state intervention would be needed to create a more equitable social,political and economic system' (Nattrass, 1994). In an April 1986 statement, forexample, the ANC argued for the nationalization and redistribution of farmsowned by monopoly business, the Land Bank and absentee landlords (Lodge,1990).

In the early 1990s, the ANC held a land conference in Lusaka at whichdivergent views were expressed but where nationalization was still a dominanttheme. Pallo Jordan's speech at the conference had a clear interventionist base.He stated that 'the National Liberation Movement will be compelled to im-plement policies that will entail the seizure of various economic assets' (Dolny,2001, pp. 31-9). Shortly after the unbanning, in May 1990, a second ANCconference was held in Harare. Nationalization was still a topic of debate, butthe reality and necessity of developing post-apartheid policy led to moreconvoluted discussions. Debates took place around a diverse range of issuesincluding regulated land markets, the re-emergence of sharecropping'^ as asolution to landlessness, the development of a black commercial agriculturalsector and safety nets for the rural poor. Masiphula Mbongwa made the lattersuggestion.'* The commitment to the development of black commercial agricul-tural sector and safety-net projects for the poor has been restated in the currentLRAD Programme.

In 1990, the ANC Land Commission and its Regional Commissions began tooperate. In October 1990, the Commission organized a workshop in Broeder-stroom where, according to Dolny, 'a popular understanding of nationalisationwas expressed' by community leaders and land activists. And, 'for the first timethe weaknesses of nationalisation were really explored'.'^ Further discussioncentred on the key individuals involved. Bongiwe Njobe, for example, focusedon the development of a black commercial farming class (Weideman, 2003, Ch.

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5). Other participants included Derek Hanekom, Helena Dolny, Joanne Yawitch,Cheryl Walker, Tessa Marcus, Sue Lund, Aninka Claassens, Davie Bosh andRichard Levin. By this time, the ANC leadership had already stated its comtnit-ment to fiscal restraint and work began on a 'compromised' land policy. Furtherpolicy development took place under the auspices of the Land Commission atthe 1991 ANC national conference in Durban and the NP conference held inJohannesburg in 1992. The Regional Commissions, however, failed to establisheffective links at a local level and, by the end of 1992, the National LandCommission was 'effectively dissolved and subsumed under the department ofeconomic planning as the Land and Agriculture Desk'. Hanekom became thehead of the Land and Agriculture Desk.

It was also in 1991 that the real policy work around land reform began. Thesmall group of ANC activists working on land reform issues in exile returnedand joined forces with NGO activists. Although policy work was co-ordinatedfrom the ANC's Shell House headquarters, the initial process was haphazard anduncoordinated, as various interest groups engaged in a series of meetings andworkshops, and small groups were researching and developing particular parts ofan ill-defined general land reform policy.

Codesa

The most significant principles for land reform policy that emerged from theCodesa negotiations include the adherence to free-market principles and theentrenchment of property rights in the 1996 Constitution. Both principlespotentially limit the amount of land available for redistribution and increase thecost of a land reform programme.

Many land activists saw the outcome of the Codesa negotiations as an'unacceptable compromise' that would 'fail to address the needs of SouthAfrica's poor majority'.'^ Academics argued that the Codesa concessions indi-cated that the 'aspirations of rural people around land had been subordinated toother priorities' (Levin and Weiner, 1996).

Others argued that, in the context of reconciliation and nation building, theANC had adopted a neo-liberal or 'home-grown structural adjustment' policyinstead of a programme directed towards the significant social and economictransformation of society. It is argued that the ANC government attempted toreach a compromise between an active role for the state in the redistribution ofwealth, while at the same time aiming to encourage competitiveness, promoteexports and make the country attractive to foreign investment. A compromisetherefore, of which the goals are inherently contradictory and which is in linewith the structural-adjustment policies imposed by the IMF and the World Bankin other African countries. These policies would arguably keep the political elitein power and result in the impoverishment of the poor majority (Anon., 1998).The July 1996, Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, thatreinforced the government's emphasis on fiscal discipline and export promotion,is seen as a case in point.

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The policy direction introduced at Codesa has also been explained as theresult of a transition process based on elite-pacting. According to the theory ofelite transition, transformation in South Africa came about not through revol-utionary change but, rather, through a process of compromise between the ruling'elite' of the NP and the ANC. The results of the elite-negotiated transition arethat politics become divorced from the mass of the people and become thepreserve of bureaucrats and politicians. By implication, the rural poor and thelandless have not participated sufficiently in policy formulation and implemen-tation and key land reform questions were debated without sufficiently incorpo-rating local knowledge, expertise and needs (Levin and Weiner, 1996; Bond2000, Ch. 5).

The concessions made at Codesa are also partly the result of strong lobbyingfrom the NP, the Freedom Front, the white commercial agricultural sector andothers who would benefit from maintaining the status quo in land distribution,while the ANC negotiators paid insufficient attention to the land issue. 'There isa perception that land reform was a high profile issue at Codesa, but the ANCnegotiators were not really interested in land reform. It became a big issue whenit came up on the agenda, but we had great difficulty in getting the keynegotiators to pay attention to the land issue. Even when it came to the propertyclause it was difficult to get the ANC negotiators to realise the importance of notlocking up land rights at that point.'"

The Land and Agriculture Policy Centre

The Land and Agriculture Policy Centre (LAPC) was established in the early1990s and, from 1993, became the ANC's think-tank on land policy. Althoughthe LAPC received substantial funding from a number of international donorsincluding DANIDA and the British Overseas Development Agency, it estab-lished strong links with the World Bank (particularly representatives of theWisconsin Tenure Center) almost immediately. In fact, the first contract awardedto the LAPC was a World Bank contract to investigate land needs and deviseapproaches to land reform.^" Under the leadership of David Cooper, a relativelysmall group of people, through a series of workshops, played a crucial role indeveloping land policy.

Non-Governmental Organizations

NGOs influenced land reform policy in two ways: through their direct involve-ment in policy formulation and, through the channelling of NGO staff into thenewly established DLA. Individuals from land and rural NGOs did importantand quality research and have contributed far more to South African land policythan is commonly recognized. Particularly infiuential NGOs included the NLCand its affiliates,^' the Centre for Rural Legal Studies in Stellenbosch, the LegalResources Centre, and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS). Affiliatesinclude the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA),^^ Border Rural Com-

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mittee (BRC), Southern Cape Land Committee, Surplus Peoples' Project,̂ ^ RuralAction Committee (TRAC),^'' and the Association for Northern Cape RuralAdvancement. Also influential (after 1995) is the Programme for Land andAgrarian Studies at the University of the Western Cape.

Although NGOs gave rural communities a voice through, for example, theNLC organized land conference in February 1994, or by facilitating regularinteraction between the DLA and some rural communities, the extent to whichNGOs represented unorganized, landless or very poor people, remains question-able. 'The people who were known to policy makers were the communities whohad been resisting forced removals and were relatively organised. Consultationwith landless people did not really take place'.^^ The extent to which communityinput was incorporated into subsequent land reform policy is also questionable.'People said their say, they had their charters and their demands. These weretaken and attached as an appendix to the Green Paper. It did not influence landreform policy.'^^

NGO involvement also led to skewed selection criteria and resource alloca-tion. In the Land Reform Pilot Programme, for example, the DLA tended toselect projects in sites where communities had been working with NGOs foryears. In the North West Province and Mpumalanga, the majority of communi-ties selected had a history of involvement with TRAC, in the Eastern Cape, thosewho had contact with the BRC and in KwaZulu-Natal, those who had contactwith AFRA. By implication, large amounts of human and financial resourceswere spent on communities who already had some access to resources andorganizational capacity.

The historical experiences of the NGOs ensured that emphasis was placed onparticular aspects of land reform, notably forced removals, labour tenants, andfarm workers, hence, the subsequent policy emphasis on preventing evictions offarm dwellers. The NLC played a significant role in the development andcriticism of the ESTA and the LTA (Weideman, 2003, Chs 8, 9). The partici-pation of legal-based NGOs contributed to the legalistic nature of the RestitutionProgramme (Weideman ,2003, Ch. 6).

The influx of former NGO staff into the DLA has had negative consequencesboth for the NGOs involved and for the land policy implementation process. TheNLC, in particular, lost many of its most experienced personnel to the govern-ment. As Hanekom explains, 'it is true' that the transformation and establish-ment of the DLA 'depleted the NGOs. ... We appointed most of our key peoplefrom the NGOs'.^^ The fact that approximately 70 percent of the senior staffappointed to the DLA came from NGOs also had a negative impact on therelationship between the Departments of Agriculture and Land Affairs.̂ ^ Theconflict between the so-called 'liberals' appointed under Hanekom and theleadership of the 1999 DLA may in part be explained by the 'liberal' history ofsome of these NGOs. AFRA, for example, sprang from the Northern NatalLandowners' Association, and was established with the 'blessing' of the LiberalParty in the late 1950s. Many of the leaders of the Northern Natal LandownersAssociation were also 'committed' members of the Liberal Party (Vigne, 1997,

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pp. 92-7). This conflict eventually led to a massive staff exodus, a loss of skillsand experience and slowed down the process of land delivery (Weideman,2003).

Many rural NGOs already had contact with the ANC in the 1980s as affiliatesof the UDF. Contact was strengthened by consultation between individualmembers of these organizations (some of whom were members of the ANC) andthe ANC in exile. This relationship was initially quite expedient for the ANC,as it allowed the organization to establish itself within a broad civil societyframework and provided access to intellectuals outside the NP government. 'TheANC did not have to rely on government officials and NP technocrats for policyformulation. It could rely on a whole set of academics and activists.'^'

This close connection was initially carried forward into the relationship withthe DLA in 1994, but began to falter as NGOs found themselves at a crossroads.They could either complement government efforts and aid in implementation, orcontinue to provide criticism of government policies, concentrating on represent-ing their various constituencies. The NLC increasingly distanced itself fromgovernment policies and became one of the most effective critics thereof,pointing to the government's apparently 'dwindling commitment to the problemsof the rural poor' (Turner and Ibsen, 2000). Some argue that the NLC has beentoo critical. 'Hanekom was quite critical of the role that NGOs played after 1994.He felt that they were hammering the inadequacies of the policies to the pointwhere they provided ammunition to those who were sceptical about landreform.'^" With the change of minister in 2000, the relationship between theNLC and the DLA had deteriorated to such an extent that the NLC began to seesocial mobilization as its core objective and emerged as an organized supporterof land invasions. 'An indication of where things are at, is that we [NLC] arenow getting visits from the National Intelligence Agency.'^' Other organizations,including CALS and the Centre for Rural Legal Studies, have been less criticalof government policies.

The White Commercial Agricultural Sector

By definition, the white commercial agricultural sector had a vested interest inmaintaining the status quo in land distribution. Nevertheless, they committedthemselves to negotiations and, although there have been important differencesbetween commercial fanner organizations,^^ the sector supported a market-basedreform programme, emphasized the importance of providing support services tonew farmers, and saw themselves as playing a supervising role in the develop-ment of a black farming class (Marcus, 1996). The sector entered negotiationswielding tremendous economic and political power, which it increasingly used.Economic power stemmed from the fact that white commercial farmers wereresponsible for 6 percent of the gross national profit (GNP) and 99.5 percent ofthe value produced on agricultural land (Weideman, 2003, Ch. 3). Politicalpower stemmed from decades of NP support. The sector was influential inencouraging the willing-buyer, willing-seller principle. The current renewed

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focus on the development of a black commercial farming class closely resemblesthe arguments that the sector put forward in the mid 1990s.

In the early 1990s, the white commercial agricultural sector had very littleofficial participation in agrarian and land policy formulation, but has becomeincreasingly influential overtime. There were some early meetings betweenindividual farmers and ANC representatives, as well as invitations to ANCrepresentatives to speak at conferences organized by various agricultural indus-tries (e.g. fisheries).Again, it was a largely uncoordinated process, consisting ofrelatively informal meetings and working groups.^^

The National African Farmers' Union

The National African Farmers' Union (NAFU), which represents established andemergent black fanners with commercial aspirations, was established partly inresponse to the fact that none of the actors shaping South African agrarian policyrepresented black commercial farmers. This exclusion is reflected in the conse-quent policy emphasis on poverty alleviation and the neglect of programmes topromote black commercial agricultural production.

NAFU became increasingly influential in the late 1990s. The union, whichadopted a resolution expressing no-confidence in Hanekom (Lodge, 2002, p. 79),because of the governments' apparent reluctance to support black commercialagricultural development, has developed close ties with Didiza. Indications arethat NAFU representatives were influential in bringing about the change inpolicy focus (from pro-poor to pro-agricultural development) that occurred in2001 with the release of the Strategic Directions Policy Paper. The closerelationship between NAFU and the leadership of the DLA is also evident fromthe positive policy response NAFU was able to secure in the form of theBroadening Access to Agriculture Tmst.̂ "*

The Department of Native Affairs

While governments change, bureaucracies often remain largely intact. Bureau-crats wield substantial power because they control information and implementpolicies, whilst subscribing to particular political ideologies. South Africa is noexception.

When the DLA was established in 1994, it took over the building andpersonnel of the former Department of Native Affairs. Staff from the olddepartments of Agriculture and Native Affairs had little influence on policyformulation, but significant influence on slowing-down policy implementation.In turn, this contributed to slow delivery, conflict between the Departments ofLand Affairs and Agriculture and finally to the change of minister and policydirection that commenced in 1999.

Although Hanekom systematically replaced personnel in the top leadershipstructures, he did so gradually, and the lower echelons (those responsible forbureaucratic processes and administration) continued to consist of personnel

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whose ideological background and experience were inconsistent with the policiesof the new Department. This created the contradictory impression that transform-ation in the Department was occurring both too slowly and too rapidly.

Personnel responsible for administration and bureaucratic processes, therefore,continued to wield significant influence on policy implementation allegedlyslowing down the process. As a former land claims commissioner explained,'They did not necessarily slow down the implementation process deliberately. Itis just that people were used to administering in a completely different kind ofdepartment. The old administration did not understand the community focus ofthe new department. For example, they could not understand why you had totravel to the far North to visit communities.' Another participant in the processexplained that when new administrators were appointed, they initially lacked theskills and experience required. 'People had never been in a government depart-ment before. They did not realize the complexity and importance of bureauc-racy'.

The Departments of Agriculture and Land Affairs

In 1994, two separate ministries were established to deal with Agriculture andLand Affairs. Hanekom was appointed as Minister of Land Affairs while Kraaivan Niekerk, of the NP, continued to hold the portfolio of Minister of Agricul-ture. Co-operation between the two departments was poor (particularly betweenthe national DLA and the provincial Departments of Agriculture) and thiscontributed to slow policy implementation. When the NP withdrew from thegovernment of National Unity in 1996, Hanekom became minister of bothdepartments, yet communication and co-operation remained poor.

Much speculation surrounded Hanekom's appointment, with Hanekom admit-ting that he was 'very surprised to be approached to be minister'. The dominantexplanation for his appointment revolves around the reconciliation framework ofthe time. It is argued that former President, Nelson Mandela, appointedHanekom, a white male, fluent in Afrikaans and with a commendable record inthe ANC^^ because, 'he was someone who was acceptable to all parties andcould pull them all together' .•"' This explanation, however, does not take accountof Hanekom's experience in land issues, his central role in early policyformulation and his senior positions in the ANCs Land Commission and Landand Agriculture Desk.

Under Hanekom's leadership, the DLA produced a complex and relativelysound policy framework. It is, however, during this time that the relationshipbetween the departments of Agriculture and Land Affairs was damaged in a waythat continues to effect land policy today. The exacerbation of tensions betweenthe two departments (which included racial tension and ideological differences)was partly the result of Hanekom's approach to staff employment and the failureadequately to address conflictual issues when they arose.

Hanekom filled the majority of positions in the DLA with individuals who hada background in rural NGOs (and, hence, experience in land policy issues). As

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a consequence of apartheid, however, these individuals tended to be white.Although racial tension should not be overemphasized, race was a real issue andcontributed to the feelings of marginalization experienced by staff in theDepartment of Agriculture. 'Hanekom did not appoint enough black people inthe department and the black people in the department felt marginalised by thepeople in leading positions who were not only white but formed part of the samesocial grouping. These tensions were not acknowledged or recognised earlyenough and people were not given an opportunity to let off steam. We conducteda workshop in the early 1990s, before the DLA embarked on its transformationdrive. Race was a very real issue at the workshop and Hanekom did not take itseriously. There were a lot of hurt feelings. People can deny it as much as theywant, but race was a real issue, and it was not managed well.'^^ By the late1990s, morale in the DLA was very low. The failure to address these issueseventually translated into the loss of skilled personnel in 1999-2000.

In 1999, following the transfer of power to President Thabo Mbeki, a newminister of Land Affairs, Thoko Didiza, was appointed.^^ The new appointmentgenerated quite a lot of controversy and the reason for Hanekom's 'surprisingdismissal' was debated intensely. Sources indicated that Hanekom was alsosurprised by the turn of events. Former employees of the NLC described how,'just days before the cabinet announcement, we were discussing our appoint-ments as National Programme Managers for Derek. Derek thought he was a surething and we resigned our jobs and negotiated contracts for July, when we wouldbe appointed.' Hanekom described his reaction to the change of minister as '75percent surprise'. However, a wide range of factors contributed to the appoint-ment of a new minister.

Among them, the slow pace of land delivery is paramount. Hanekom'sadministration was plagued by policy mistakes that included an announcementin 1996, that R15 billion in state subsidies would pay for land reform (900,000beneficiary families), when conservative estimates indicated that 1.7 millionfamilies required land (Bond, 2002, Ch. 5). Less then 1 percent of agriculturalland had been distributed and many of the families that had been resettled couldnot be found. It is in this context that people talked about the 'aura of failure thatsurrounded Hanekom'. Second, Hanekom's ability to 'play off different actorsagainst each other and reach a consensus' was beginning to have negativeconsequences. Hanekom was criticized by the commercial agricultural sector foragricultural liberalization policies, by NAFU for failing to develop policies insupport of emerging fanners and by the left and rural social movements foradhering to a market-based, 'World Bank designed', land reform policy. At thesame time, Hanekom's formerly sound relationship with rural NGOs began todeteriorate. When the NLC organized a protest march in 1996, against theproperty clause in the Constitution, Hanekom remarked that the NLC 'did notunderstand'. Later, Hanekom publicly accused members of the NLC of being'ultra-left' and 'frivolous' (Bond, 2002, Ch. 5). A series of bad personalrelationships also took their toll. Hanekom had experienced a hostile relationshipwith Bongiwe Njobe, who left the ANC Land Commission partly because she

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could not work with Hanekom.''^ Hanekom also had an antagonistic relationshipwith Didiza and reportedly also clashed with President Mbeki (Business Day,Johannesburg, 28 December 1999).

Furthermore, the majority of commentators describe Hanekom's approach toland reform as 'pro-poor'. By late 1999, policy directives had changed toemphasize support and development of a black commercial agricultural sector.A policy directive that Didiza, Njobe and the Department of Agriculture ingeneral, consistently advocated. On the other hand, such differences in approachto land reform should not be exaggerated. Despite 'pro-poor' rhetoric, Hanekomhad consistently supported the market-based land reform programme and, by1999, had brought a halt to large-scale resettlement projects that were not'economically viable'.

Finally, Hanekom had allegedly failed to cultivate a political support basewithin the ANC. 'Derek has this thing where he goes out every weekend to visita community. This meant that he was all over the place and that he failed tobuild a support base within the ANC.""'

The appointment of the new DLA Minister resulted in a massive staff exodusthat has been described as 'the purge of Hanekom's appointees' (Mail andGuardian, Johannesburg, 4-10 August 2000), 'ethnic cleansing' (Dolny, 2001,p. 295) and the 'Kensington cabal' (Lodge, 2002, p. 79). Among those who leftwere DLA Director General Geoff Budlender, Deputy Director Generals SueLund and Stanley Nkosi, Chief Directors Richard Levin and Snakes Nyoka, anumber of Land Claims Commissioners including Cheryl Walker and DurkjeGilfillan, two provincial directors and a number of other skilled staff includingchief planners.

This exodus was explained in a variety of ways. Some argued that years ofhostility between the two departments influenced Didiza 'not to trust staff in theDLA and to assume that people in the DLA would be difficult or hostile'.'" Asecond explanation relates to differences in land reform ideology (i.e. theapparent shift from a pro-poor policy to a policy that emphasizes the develop-ment of a black commercial agricultural sector). 'Didiza had a more agriculturalapproach to land reform and it is possible that she felt that the DLA staff wouldbe too committed to the old policies'.''^ A racial spin was also placed on thedepartures, particularly in the media, but racial tension is an oversimplifiedexplanation, which only contributed to increased hostility. Nevertheless, theconvergence of continuing departures (particularly of staff with NGO back-grounds) was no coincidence. Without exception, sources suggested that em-ployees of the DLA were 'marginalized' and 'made to feel unwelcome'.

Although it is certainly common practice for new ministers to appointhigh-level staff who share their policy visions (e.g. DGs), the replacement oflower-level management (e.g. Chief Directors, Chief Planners, etc.) is question-able. In the case of the DLA it led to a loss of institutional memory, skills andexperience. The moratorium placed on land reform projects in early 2000 and theshelving and re-emergence of the Draft Tenure Rights Bill years later were both(in part) consequences of this loss of capacity.

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Sources have placed emphasis on the roles of individuals, particularly the roleallegedly played by Bongiwe Njobe''̂ and Masiphula Mbongwa. Njobe, DirectorGeneral of the Department of Agriculture, is said to have close familial andfriendship ties with the Mbeki family—with whom she allegedly wields asubstantial amount of influence."^ Njobe is also said to be very influential withinthe Department of Agriculture. 'Bongi runs the Department, not Didiza. Bongiis the one who runs the show."*^ And, 'The first thing that Didiza did when shewas appointed, was to close down the minister's office in the DLA building andopen it up in the Agriculture building, right next to Bongi's office. Bongi is theone who pushes the buttons."*^ An ANC Member of Parliament explained that'Thoko is very dependent on Bongi. Bongi was the one who prepared herspeeches, for example'. Sources have also indicated that Njobe and Mbongwarestrict access to the DLA Minister. 'I could not get to the Minister's innersanctum. I could not get to speak to her directly. Everything was done throughMasiphula Mbongwa with Bongi Njobe in attendance' (Dolny, 2001, p. 271).And, 'we had great difficulty getting access to her [Didiza] ... the amount ofaccess we got to her was astonishingly little."*^ A further interesting aspect isNjobe's close relationship with staff from the Agricultural Economics Depart-ment at the University of Pretoria (where she lectured before joining theDepartment of Agriculture) and the renewed influence of these academics in theformation of post-1999 agricultural reform policy.

Indications of a power-struggle within the DLA resurfaced in July 2002, whenDidiza and Njobe contradicted each other over a controversial proposal tore-regulate agricultural marketing. Njobe told reporters that the document wouldprovide the basis for a policy review and new agricultural marketing legislationto be tabled in parliament in early 2003. A spokesperson for the Minister,however, argued that the report on the marketing proposal was incorrect. WhenNjobe was asked to comment on the spokesperson's statement she allegedlyasked reporters why they had gone to the Minister (Mail and Guardian,Johannesburg, 19-25 July).

Whatever the realities may be, Njobe has consistently argued for a land policythat promotes the development of̂ a black commercial agricultural class andreduces poverty and inequities in land ownership. The paper she presented at theWorld Bank workshop in Swaziland in September 1993 has striking similaritieswith the Strategic Directions Paper and the policy developments of August 2002.In the paper, Njobe emphasizes the development of small-scale agriculture anda more equitable distribution of land based on race, the importance of increasedagricultural productivity and, the provision of support services. In sum, 'theultimate success of such a programme in South Africa should be tested againstits ability to address equity in land distribution, reduction of poverty, creation ofrural employment and income generating opportunities, raise the number ofblack agricultural producers and enhance overall productivity whilst maintainingsustainable material resource management and utilisation' (Njobe, 1993).

Didiza, who was Deputy Minister of Agriculture under Hanekom, is describedas, a 'political player', not being 'close to communities or rural organisations'

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and 'more at home at political meetings than Hanekom ever was'. The relation-ship between the DLA and land NGOs (particularly the NLC) has deteriorateddrastically under Didiza's leadership. 'Our inputs were smashed and not takenseriously during the development of the Strategic Directions Paper. The Ministermade it clear that she was not going to listen to us."*^

Conclusion

The political process of policy formulation and the nature of subsequent policiesare the results of the distribution of power within a given society as well asglobally, and the interaction (inclusion or exclusion) of a variety of local andinternational interest groups and individuals within the context of a particularpolitical system. In South Africa, interest groups included the former NPgovernment, the World Bank, the ANC, NGOs, the white commercial agricul-tural sector, the former department of Native Affairs and the new departmentsof Agriculture and Land Affairs.

The NP laid significant groundwork for subsequent land reform policy. Thisincludes agricultural liberalization and deregulation policies, the ACLA, legis-lation to upgrade tenure rights, adherence to free market principles, the abolitionof racial land laws and the introduction of a partial grant for land acquisition.The World Bank was very influential, and the 1997 White Paper on SA LandReform closely resembles the policy proposals set out by Bank representativesand sponsored researchers in its Options document. The ANC historically paidinsufficient attention to rural issues and neglected the development of post-apart-heid land reform policy although, there appears to have been a general commit-ment to strong state intervention in the late 1980s and early 1990s. When seriouswork on post-apartheid land policy began, it was a fragmented and uncoordi-nated process. The negotiations at Codesa resulted in the entrenchment ofproperty rights and adherence to free market principles, which formed the basisfor the land reform programme that followed. This placed a limit on the amountof land available for redistribution and increased the cost of the land reformprogramme. NGOs were influential in shaping a legalistic Restitution Pro-gramme, ESTA and the LTA. The white commercial agricultural sector used itspower (particularly in the later stages of policy formulation) to maintain thestatus quo in land ownership, to gain constitutional protection of property rightsand to promote market-based reform.

Interest groups excluded from the process include NAFU, the poor masses andthe potential beneficiaries of the land reform programme. NAFU played almostno role in the early policy formulation process but became increasinglyinfluential in the late 1990s. Factors that contributed to slow implementationinclude the role played by staff from the former Department of Native Affairsand the conflict-ridden relationship between the Departments of Agriculture andLand Affairs. This particular combination resulted in an essentially market-based, three-part land and agrarian reform programme.

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Notes* Department of Political Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.

1. Defined as urban and rural poor, farm workers, labour tenants, marginalized groups, women and emergentfarmers

2. The Less Formal Townships Establishment Act provided for the establishment of informal settlements onland made available by provincial administrators or local authorities. The Act replaced the provision forestablishing less formal settlements (contained in the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act), but the powerof government to forcibly remove people remained.

3. Section 12 of the Self-Goveming Territories Act stipulated that the South African Development Trust(SADT), which became the National Rural Development Corporation, would continue to operate under thealmost exclusive power of the State President who could transfer SADT assets to any person, statedepartment or institution (Budlender, 1996).

4. This included communities represented by TRAC, the NLC and the Border Rural Committee covering theformer Western Cape, Border, Northern Cape, Eastern Cape, Natal and Transvaal. Specific communitiesinclude Daggakraal, Driefontein and KwaNgema.

5. Interview with former senior member of the ANC Land and Agriculture Desk, 8 September 2002.6. Statement by Communities of the Wakkerstroom District, TRAC, 26 March 1991.7. Statement by Communities of the Wakkerstroom District, TRAC, 26 March 1991.8. This sentiment was expressed on 7 April 1991 by the following communities in the Western Transvaal:

Braklaagte, Koster, Majakaneng, Mathopestad, Modderspruit and Mogopa. Similar sentiments wereexpressed on 25 November 1990 by communities from the Central and South-Eastem Transvaal:Vdsgewagte, Bafokeng, Hartebeesfontein, Oukasie, Monnakgotla, Leeuwfontein and Bloedfontein. Othercommunities expressing similar sentiments include KwaNgema, Piet Retief, Daggakraal, Driefontein andCampsite.

9. The majority of the research papers produced in this period is collected in Van Zyl, Kirsten andBinswanger (1996).

10. Mbongwa is the current Deputy Director General of Agriculture and is reported to have very close ties toBongiwe Njobe. He previously worked at the Centre for Policy and Information Analysis at theDevelopment Bank of Southern Africa. Njobe is the current Director General of Agriculture and LandAffairs and formerly lectured in the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of Pretoria.See Weideman (2003, Ch. 5) for biographical detail on all these authors.

11. Interview with Senior Researcher, NLC, 7 June 2001. See also Williams (1996).12. Interviews with senior participants in the process, July 2001 and 31 May 2001.13. Interview with Derek Hanekom (former Minister of Land Affairs and Member of Parliament), Harte-

beestpoortdam, 8 September 2002.14. The Freedom Charter is arguably the first significant policy statement on rural and land issues. Adopted

in 1955, the Charter addressed the structural causes of poverty and advocated equality in land ownership,redistribution and state support for land reform beneficiaries. The Freedom Charter stated that, 'our peoplehave been robbed of their birthright to the land'. That South Africa 'belongs to all who live in it, blaekand white' and demanded that 'the land shall be shared amongst those who work it. Restriction of landownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land re-divided amongst those who work it, tobanish famine and land hunger. The state shall help the peasants with implements, seed, tractors and damsto save the soil and assist the tillers; Freedom of movement shall be guaranteed to all who work on theland; All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they choose; People shall not be robbed of theircattle; Forced labour on farm prisons shall be abolished' (ANC, 1991a).

15. This argument was made by Mike de Klerk (1990). De Klerk argued that international and local evidenceindicated a shift to part-time farming. He argued that this shift would have two major consequences. First,responsibility for day-to-day production activities would in many instances be taken over by black farmmanagers, leading to the transfer of higher levels of skills and adding to the body of potential blaekcommercial fanners. Second, because supervision is more difficult for part-time farmers, there would bea growing need to replace direct supervision with productivity incentives and risk sharing. The logicalresult would be profit-sharing arrangements, which would constitute and important (indirect) route forresource poor black farmers to access land. De Klerk also advocated the scrapping of the sub-division ofAgricultural Land Act and discussed the possibilities of renting as opposed to purchasing land.

16. Mbongwa (1990) also argued for the introduction of a land ceiling policy, a progressive land tax, theremoval of agricultural monopolies, the creation of a Land Trust through which the government wouldprovide loans to farmers to purchase land, the restructuring of the Land Bank, public ownership of underand unutilized land, and a thorough census of the agricultural sector.

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17. Interview with Helena Dolny.18. 'We are number two in the world's ranking of countries with the greatest internal economic inequality.

Yet the outcome of the negotiated settlement is that South Africa's economic transformation now dependson governmental ability to create policies and influence the direction of investment to secure redistribution'(Dolny, 2001, p. 49).

19. Interview with participant in the process.20. Interview with former members of the LAPC.21. The NLC grew out of land/rural based NGOs in the 1980s (all organized against forced removals and with

some relationship to the Liberal Party). The NGOs were AFRA, the SPP, TRAC and the Grahamstown(now Border) Rural Committee.

22. AFRA was formed in 1979 and stems from the Liberal Party in KwaZulu-Natal.23. The SPP was formed in 1980 in response to the Crossroads evictions in the Western Cape and is still

affiliated with the NLC.24. TRAC grew out of the Black Sash and was therefore also subject to Liberal Party influence in its early

years. TRAC is still affiliated to the NLC and operates in Mpumalanga and the North West Province.25. Interview with former Director General of DLA, July 2001.26. Interview with Senior Researcher NLC, 7 June 2001.27. Interview with Derek Hanekom.28. Interview with Senior Researcher NLC, 7 June 2001.29. Interview with land reform activists and former senior employee of NLC.30. Interview with Director of PLAAS.31. Interview with Deputy Director NLC.32. Agri SA has consistently been more 'progressive' while the Transvaal Agricultural Union, for example,

is decidedly 'right wing'.33. Interview with Derek Hanekom34. A budget of R24 million was allocated to the Trust and it was proposed that R 10,000 per annum be spent

on 'deserving' fanners. So far, the Trust has failed to find a sustainable institutional form (Schirmer, 2000).35. Hanekom served a five-year prison sentence for running an ANC communications system from the

Magaliesburg (Lodge, 2000, pp.78-80).36. Interviews with land activists who were part of the process. It was also the dominant explanation adopted

by the South African media.37. Interview with former senior member of the Land Reform Tenure Directorate.38. When Didiza was appointed, she was not only the youngest member of cabinet, she was also South

Africa's first female Minister of Agriculture. Prior to her appointment, she worked for the Black SocialWorkers' Association and later as a legal secretary for the South African Council of Churches. In 1992,she became the first secretary-general of the Women's National Coalition and was nominated by the ANCYouth League to be one of their MPs in parliament in 1994.

39. Interview with former advisor to Derek Hanekom.40. Interview with personal friend of Derek Hanekom.41. Interview with former senior member of the Tenure Directorate.42. Interview with DLA Project Officer.43. Bongiwe Njobe speaks six languages, holds a Masters Degree in Agriculture from the University of

Bulgaria, has worked in farm management in Zambia and Tanzania, and has been a consistent championof women's rights.

44. Interview with land activist.45. Interview with employee of the Department of Agriculture.46. Interview with land activist and former employee of the NLC.47. Interviews with former DG of DLA, Helena Dolny, and former DLA Chief Planner and employees of the

NLC.48. Interview with senior researcher NLC.

ReferencesAfrican National Congress (ANC) (1991a) Freedom Charter, in: M Robertson (ed.) Human Rights for South

Africans (Cape Town: Oxford University Press).African National Congress (ANC) (1991b), The Government White Paper on Land Reform. Press statement

by the Department of Information and Publicity, dated 13 March, mimeo.

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African National Congress (ANC) (1994), Reconstruction and Development Programme (Johannesburg:Umanyano Publications).

Anon. (1998), 'Resistance to Neo-Liberalism: A View From South Africa', Debate 4, 12(1).Bernstein, H. (2000), Social Change in the South African Countryside? Land and Production, Poverty and

Power, Occasional Paper. PLAAS, University of the Western Cape.Binswanger, H. (1994), Agricultural and Rural Development: Painful Lessons. Address to: Agricultural

Economics Association of South Africa, Pretoria.Binswanger, H. and Deininger, K. (1992), South African Land Policy: The Legacy of History and Current

Options. Paper presented at: World Bank and UNDP Workshop, Swaziland.Black Sash (1990), Response to the Repeal of the Land Acts. Press statement, October.Bond, P. (2000), Elite Transition (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press).Budlender, G. (1996), The Land Issue and the Legacy of the Past: Some Fundamental Legal Issues. Paper

presented at: Conference on Land Reform, Stellenbosch University, mimeo.De Klerk, M. (1990), Opening Access: An Assessment of Market-Based Options for Land Reform in South

Africa. Paper presented at: Newick Park Initiative Conference, Land Reform and Agricultural Develop-ment, October (UK: Jubilee Centre Publications).

Dolny, H. (2001), Banking on Change (Johannesburg: Penguin).Farmworkers' Research and Resource Project (FRRP) (1998), A Critique of the Provision of Certain Land for

Settlement Act No.l26 of 1993 (Braamfontein: National Land Committee).Levin, R. and Weiner, D. (1996), 'The Politics of Land Reform in South Africa After Apartheid: Perspectives,

Problems and Prospects', Journal of Peasant Studies, 23.Lodge, T. (2002), Politics in South Africa (Cape Town: David Phillip).Lodge, T. (1990), 'Perceptions of Agrarian Issues in Black Polities', Development Southern Africa, 7.Marcus, T. (1996), White Farmers and Corporate Agriculture, in T. Marcus; K. Eales and A. Wildschut (eds).

Down to Earth (Natal: Indicator Press).Mbongwa, M. (1990), The Political Economy of Post-1960 Dispossession in South Africa. Paper presented at:

Newick Park Initiative conference. Land Reform and Agricultural Development, October (UK: JubileeCentre Publications).

Nattrass, N. (1994), 'Politics and Economics in ANC Economic Policy', African Affairs, 93.Njobe, B. (1993), Criteria for Participation. Paper presented at: World Bank and LAPC Conference, Swaziland,

September.Republic of South Africa (RSA) (1991), [National Party] White Paper on Land Reform (Pretoria: Government

Printers).Roux, T. (1996), Memorandum on the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Amendment Act 110 of

1993, Institute of Development Law, University of Cape Town, mimeo.Schirmer, S. (2000), Policy Visions and Historical Realities: Land Reform in the Context of Recent

Agricultural Developments, African Studies, (59)1.Turner, S, and Ibsen, H. (2000), 'Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa: A Status Report', Occasional

Paper Series, PLAAS, University of the Western Cape.Van Zyl, J.; Kirsten, J. and Binswanger, H. (eds) (1996), Agricultural Land Reform in South Africa (Cape

Town: Oxford University Press).Vigne, R. (1997), Liberals Against Apartheid (London: Macmillan).Weideman, M. (2003), Land Reform, Equity and Growth in South Africa: A Comparative Analysis.

Unpublished PhD thesis. University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.Williams, G. (1996), 'Setting the Agenda: A Critique of the World Bank's Rural Restructuring Programme for

South Africa', Journal of Southern African Studies, 22.

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