Why Did Britain Vote for

Brexit?

Paul Whiteley (University of Essex)

Matthew Goodwin (University of Kent)

Harold Clarke (University of Texas at

Dallas)

The Referendum June 2016

The referendum on UK membership of the European Union on June

23rd 2016 occurred because the promise of a referendum was

included in the Conservative Manifesto for the 2015 election which

made it binding on the British government.

There is a large literature on the determinants of support for EU

membership and for further integration which relates both to Britain

and to other countries. (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Franklin,

Marsh and McLaren, 1994; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998;

Hooghe and Marks, 2005, Maier and Rittberger, 2008; Armingeon

and Ceka, 2014).

However, much of this research does not recognize the large scale

volatility of opinions on this issue, a phenomenon which suggests

that the key drivers of attitudes to the EU must themselves be

subject to significant short-term changes.

Approval and Disapproval of UK

Membership, April 2004 to December 2015

32

36

40

44

48

52

56

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Approve EU Membership Disapprove EU Membership

Perc

ent

44

40

52

38

Start of-->

Eurozone

Crisis

The Geography of the Referendum Vote Majority Leave (Blue) & Majority Remain (Yellow)

Percentages of Constituencies Voting to

Leave in the EU Referendum

63.4

1.7

72.577.2

87.6

69.0

78.2

21.9

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Britain Scotland Wales North Midlands South East South West London

Per

Cen

t

Predictors of Voting to Leave at the

Constituency Level in the EU Referendum

Predictors B s.e.

Percentage University Degree -.791*** .042

Percentage Manual Workers .236* .102

Percentage Home Owners .246*** .029

Minority/White Ethnicity Ratio -1.033* .530

Age:

Percentage 18-29 -.288*** .054

Percentage 65 and Older .131* .066

Percentage Turnout 2015 Election -.334** .056

Country:

Scotland -14.812*** .650

Wales -5.033*** .650

Constant 81.266*** .102

R2 = .89

N = 632

*** - p < .001; ** - p < .01; * - p < .05; one-tailed test.

Leave Voting by Social Demographics(Source: Internet pre and post panel survey of the referendum vote)

64

63

48

35

51

51

53

23

25

38

44

57

57

66

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

D/E

C2

C1

Social Grade-A/B

Man

Gender-Woman

White British

Ethnicity-Minority

18-25

26-35

36-45

46-55

56-65

Age-66+

Per Cent Vote Leave

What Explains Support for EU

Membership among the Public?

Hooghe and Marks (2005) provided a succinct summary of the

factors which influence public attitudes to the European Union

across Europe in their paper: ‘Calculation, Community and Cues’.

Calculations are about perceptions of the costs and benefits of

membership, which vary according to who are the winners or loser

in the process. People who have done well tend to favour UK

membership, and people who have been ‘left behind’ do not

Communities are about people’s social identities, with people

having an exclusive national identity being significantly more

Eurosceptic than those who acknowledge multiple identities such as

being both ‘British’ and ‘European’.

Cues are about who the public listens to when making up their

minds about how to vote in the referendum. These will include

politicians and political parties as well as experts and opinion

leaders.

What Does the Research on Earlier

Referendums in the EU Show? Franklin, Marsh and McLaren (1994) showed that referendum votes

held to ratify the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 very often involved public

reactions to short-term, national and domestic issues in addition to

longer-term considerations about the future of the European Union.

Thus the unpopularity of the governments in Denmark and France

helped to ensure a rejection of the Maastricht treaty in the former

country and near rejection in the latter. They contrasted this with

Ireland, which had a much more popular government at the time and

where the referendum passed easily.

National and European issues get mixed up in the minds of the

voters and much of the time they are reacting to what their own

governments are doing. This means public attitudes to key issues in

Britain such as the economy and immigration and the popularity of

political leaders are likely to play a key role in explaining support for

the EU in the Referendum

A Valence Theory of Attitudes to the

European Union The valence model of electoral choice hypothesizes that voters will

support a party that offers the best chance of delivering policies

such as economic prosperity and efficient public services, over

which there is widespread agreement about what should be done

(Stokes, 1963, Clarke et al. 2004: 8, Whiteley et al. 2013).

Divisions among the public are about which party is best able to

deliver, not about the policy goals. The term valence was introduced

by Donald Stokes in his critique of the Downs spatial model of party

competition published nearly sixty years ago (Downs, 1957; Stokes,

1963). Spatial issues are those over which there is disagreement

about policy goals.

Stokes argued that the most important issues in elections are

valence issues concerned with economic growth and prosperity, the

protection of citizens from crime and terrorism, and the provision of

high quality public services.

Attitudes to EU Membership are Spatial But

with Valence Roots

Attitudes to UK membership of the EU is clearly spatial rather than a

valence issue, since there is widespread disagreement among the

public about the desirability of UK membership.

However, the source of this disagreement is a debate about whether

or not membership is delivering valence policies such as economic

prosperity, security, value for money in public spending, and more

generally if the EU is responsive and accountable to the voters.

If voters feel that the EU promotes prosperity, protects its citizens

from security threats, supports quality public services and enhances

democracy, then they are likely to support continued membership.

If on the other hand they think that the EU is failing to do these

things and worse still preventing a British government from doing

them, they are likely to oppose membership.

Variables in the Valence Model

Two key valence variables in the referendum debate concerned economic

performance and immigration. Both are valence issues in Britain since

there is an overwhelming majority of people who support economic

prosperity and also the control of immigration.

Voters also use their evaluations of political leaders as devices for judging

valence performance. In this case the focus is not so much on what is

delivered, but rather on who is delivering it. Voters will opt for a ‘safe pair of

hands’ or a leader they think is competent and trustworthy, and avoid a

leader who they think is not up to the job.

The third component of the valence model is partisanship or party

identification which plays a role in the valence model because it represents

a cumulative ‘running tally’ of performance evaluations in delivering on

valence issues in the past (Fiorina, 1981; Clarke et al. 2004, 2009).

Emotional reactions to the economy and the European Union are part of this

mix since affective reasoning is an important aspect of voter decision-

making alongside cognitive reasoning (Neuman et al. 2007)

Relationships are modelled using an internet pre-post panel survey in the

field at the time of the referendum with a sample size of 1,987 respondents

Perceived Costs and Benefits of Leaving the

European Union (internet panel survey data)

24

37

39

15

64

21

16

63

21

3

46

51

12

58

30

0 20 40 60 80 100

Better off

No Difference/DK

Economy - Worse Off

More Influence

No Difference/DK

Foreign Affairs - Less Influence

More Risk

No Difference/DK

Terrorism - Less Risk

More

No Difference/DK

Immigration - Less

Better Off

No Difference/DK

Personal Finances - Worse Off

Per Cent

Perceived Costs and Benefits of Continued

EU Membership

31

29

40

51

21

28

41

47

32

47

25

28

37

34

29

0 20 40 60 80 100

Agree

Neither/DK

Benefits British Culture - Disagree

Agree

Neither/DK

Erodes Sovereignty-Disagree

Agree

Neither/DK

Supply Needed Workers-Disagree

Agree

Neither/DK

More Terrorism-Disagree

Agree

Neither/DK

Keep Peace in Europe - Disagree

Per Cent

Emotional Reactions to UK Membership of

the European Union

23

12

20

26

44

14

19

12

32

50

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Angry Happy Disgushed Hopeful Uneasy Confident Afraid Proud 1or MorePositive

1 or MoreNegative

Per

Cen

t

Words Selected to Describe Feelings About EU Membership

Perceived Risks of Leaving the European

Union (LeDuc’s Law)

12.3

3.0

6.57.0

4.5

12.7

7.3

12.8

11.6

3.4

18.9

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

0 - NotRisky

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 - VeryRisky

Per

Cen

t

Risk of Leaving EU

Logit Model of Voting to LeavePredictor B s.e.

Benefits-Costs of Leaving EU

Economy-Influence 2.500*** .578

Immigration-Terrorism 1.030** .367

Risk Assessments of Leaving EU -.371*** .062

Emotional Reactions to EU -.304*** .096

Importance of Europe as Issue .599* .270

Left Behind in Economy -.039 .147

Party Leader Images:

Cameron -.029 .056

Corbyn -.054 .053

Farage .194*** .055

Johnson .196*** .056

Partisanship:

Conservative -.539* .322

Labour -.060 .321

Liberal Democrat -.347 .443

UKIP -.338 .563

SNP 1.416 .741

National Identity:

English .185 .243

Scottish -1.592** .552

Welsh -.323 .594

European -.841 1.305

Other -.287 .463

Campaign Contact:

Remain Campaign -.083 .194

Leave Campaign .270 .278

Socio-Demographics:

Age -.006 .007

University Education .093 .236

Gender .026 .221

Social Class -.148† .101

Constant 1.289 .753

McKelvey R2 = .89

Percentage Voters correctly classified = 93.2

Percentage reduction in classification error (Lambda) = 86.2 per cent

N = 1780

Impact of Important Predictors in the Model

of Voting to Leave

Scottish Identity, -0.32

Boris Johnson, 0.44

Nigel Farage, 0.44

Conservative Party Id, -0.07

Importance Europe Issue, 0.14

EU Emotions, -0.52

Risk Leave, -0.71

Immigration-Terrorism, 0.75

Economy-International Influence, 0.88

-1.00 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00

Change in Probability Vote Leave

Explanatory Power of Rival Models of Voting

to Leave in the EU Referendum

0.16 0.15

0.26

0.71 0.710.73

0.85

0.90

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

Socio-Demographics

NationalIdentities

Party Id EU Emotions LeaderImages

Risks Benefit-CostFactors

CompositeModel

Ak

aik

e I

nfo

rma

tio

n C

rite

rio

n

Mc

Ke

lve

y R

2

McKelvey R2 AIC

Modelling the Perceived Risks of Leaving

the EU Benefits-Costs of Leaving EU

Economy & International Immigration-

Influence Terrorism

Predictor B s.e. B s.e.

Negative Attitudes towards

Immigration .227*** .013 .474*** .020

EU Control of UK Economy .140*** .023 .204*** .036

Left Behind in Economy .007 .052 .012 .018

Party Leader Images:

Cameron -.046*** .004 -.063*** .006

Corbyn -.029*** .004 -.051*** .006

Farage .039*** .005 .062*** .007

Johnson .051*** .004 .082*** .007

Partisanship:

Conservative -.044* .028 -.093* .042

Labour -.090*** .026 -.133** .040

Liberal Democrat -.141*** .040 -.199** .061

UKIP -.050† .038 -.092 .059

SNP .020 .063 .006 .097

National Identity:

English .042* .021 .091** .032

Scottish -.098* .047 -.085 .072

Welsh .062 .052 .145* .081

European -.138* .061 -.238** .094

Other -.067† .046 .049 .071

Campaign Contact:

Remain Campaign -.026* .012 -.029† .019

Leave Campaign -.013 .018 .005 .027

Socio-Demographics:

Age .001 .001 .002* .001

University Education -.041* .020 -.039† .030

Gender .006 .018 .018 .028

Social Class -.024** .009 -.023* .013

Constant -.020 .052 -.137† .080

R2 = .69 .75

N = 1736

*** - p < .001; ** - p < .01; * - p < .05, † - p < .10, one-tailed test

Note: high scores on benefit-cost factors indicate pro-Leave

perceptions.

Conclusions

Two key predictors in the Brexit model were cost-benefit calculations

of the economy and fears of immigration and terrorism

Emotional Feelings about UK membership of the European Union

played an important role as well with negative emotions outweighing

positive emotions

Leadership evaluations of Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage had a

direct influence on the vote whereas Cameron and Corbyn did not.

However, they had an indirect effect via perceptions of the risks of

leaving.

Leave won because they had both a negative (‘fear of immigration’)

and a positive (‘take back control’) appeal, whereas the Remain

appeal was largely negative (‘risks of leaving’). The latter shifted

opinion towards remain but it was not enough to counteract the

appeal of Brexit.

Had the referendum taken place at the same time as the general

election in 2015, Remain would probably have won.