why do people go to war?

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Why do people go to war?Benno Torgler aa Wirtschaftswissenschafthiches Zentrum (WWZ) , University ofBasel , Abteilung Wirtschaftspolitik, Petersgraben 51, Basel ,CH-4003 , SwitzerlandPublished online: 17 Sep 2010.

To cite this article: Benno Torgler (2003) Why do people go to war?, Defence and Peace Economics,14:4, 261-280, DOI: 10.1080/10242690302929

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ISSN 1024-2694 print: ISSN 1476-8267 online © 2003 Taylor & Francis LtdDOI: 10.1080/1024269032000076323

Defence and Peace Economics, 2003, Vol. 14(4), August, pp. 261–280

* Thanks are due to Doris Aebi and two anonymous referees for advice and suggestions† E-mail: [email protected]

WHY DO PEOPLE GO TO WAR?

BENNO TORGLER*†

Wirtschaftswissenschafthiches Zentrum (WWZ), University of Basel, Abteilung Wirtschaftspolitik,Petersgraben 51, CH-4003 Basel, Switzerland

(Received 10 October 2001; In final form 3 January 2003)

The intention of this paper is to analyse why people go to war, despite the, at first sight, divergence between benefitsand costs. This paper provides a comparison of the willingness to go to war in different OECD countries using WorldValues Survey data. The empirical findings in the United States, Switzerland, Spain, Sweden and West Germany,using the willingness to fight as a dependent variable, indicate that such factors as pride, trust, and political ideologysignificantly influence individuals’ willingness to go to war.

Keywords: war, pride, trust

JEL Code: H 560

I. INTRODUCTION

Is it rational for individuals to go to war and risk giving their lives for the country? Whatwould happen if every person started to make a rational calculation of the costs and thebenefits of risking their life on the battlefield? At first sight, going to war seems ratherirrational for a person. Shakespeare was aware of this topic. We find a passage in Henry Von the night before the battle of Agincourt. King Henry V prays:

‘O God of battles! steel my soldiers’ hearts;Possess them not with fear; take from them nowThe sense of reckoning, if th’opposed numbersPluck their hearts from them’

(Shakespeare, p. 463).

The intention of this paper is to analyse why people go to war, despite the, at first sight,divergence between benefits and costs. The behaviour of an individual is determined by thepreferences and the constraints she/he faces. We are going to evaluate theoretically andempirically which factors might influence individuals’ willingness to go to war. Our intentionis to move beyond classical expected utility theory into social psychology or sociology

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theories and thus to check to what extent factors such as pride or trust have an effect onindividuals’ willingness to go to war. We do not assume in our analysis that going to war isan irrational force – we leave possible determinants inside a black box – but search for factorsthat systematically affect the willingness to go to war.

In Section II, we see that economics is far beyond the traditional economic domain and areorientation of standard economic analysis helps to study puzzles, capturing a broaderpicture of individual behaviour. After these theoretical considerations, Section III introducesthe main variables in our analysis and tries to evaluate the extent to which they influenceindividuals’ willingness to go to war. This is the starting point for the empirical part of thepaper. Before starting with multiple regressions, we analyse descriptively the willingness inOECD countries over time to fight for one’s country. Compared with a descriptive analysis,regressions help to isolate the effects of different factors on the willingness to go to war. Thepaper finishes with some concluding remarks.

II ECONOMICS: FROM EXPANSION TO REORIENTATION

The expansion of economics into other spheres of life, including politics, warfare, crime,religion was, according to Hirshleifer (2002, p. ix), ‘like a breath of fresh air’. With the helpof standard economic analysis, new insights into these ‘non-market topics’ have beendeveloped. Researchers such as Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Becker (1968), North (1981),have penetrated using economic analysis into such social sciences as political science,sociology or history. Several Nobel Prizes indicate that economists have successfully alsopenetrated into other territories.

Economics has had a strong impact on political science. On the other hand, politicalscientists have strongly influenced the political economy (see, for example., Ordeshook,1990). Sandler and Hartley (1999) show interesting applications of defence alliances lookingat the political economy of NATO. With increasing globalization, the economic analysis ofsupranational structures has gained more attention. In the economics of alliances, traditionalpublic good models, for example, play an essential role and game theory is increasingly usedas an analysis tool (see, for example, Sandler, 2002; Sandler and Hartley, 2001). To explainthe behaviour of important actors such as governmental officials, public choice theory istaken into consideration. Hartley and Sandler (1995) point out, in their introduction:

‘Defense economics applies the tools of economics to the study of defense and defense-related issues,including disarmament and peace. When applying these tools, defense economists must tailor economicmethods, both theoretical and empirical, to defense issues and policies, while taking account of institutionalaspects that characterize the defense sector (p. 3).

A rational choice perspective has given important insights. Breton et al. (2002) have recentlyshown that the tool of rational choice can be fruitful for such a complex topic as politicalextremism.

In line with these developments, many researchers have worked on the relaxation of thetraditional neoclassical assumptions. One of the main movements tried to enrich theconception of human motivation with social psychology elements. In particular, experimentshave shown that people’s behaviour does not conform to the traditional economic models ofHomo economicus (see, for example, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Reciprocity, fairness,loyalty and trust are factors that influence individuals’ behaviour (see, for example, Fehr andKirchsteiger, 1994; Rabin, 1993). Rothschild (2001) states that utility had erroneously beenunderstood as own advantage, which provoked objections. The objections become almostirrelevant when a neutral concept of utility or preferences of Homo economicus is put into

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WHY DO PEOPLE GO TO WAR? 263

account, which includes different sorts of human motivation. Therefore, no single dominanthuman motivation, such as selfishness, can account for behaviour under all possiblecircumstances.

A reorientation of economics, including social psychology elements, helps to get closer torevealed puzzles that have resisted the standard economic focus. Why people go to war mightbe such a puzzle. In our paper we propose a reorientation of the economic model of man witha more refined motivation structure and thus a stronger psychological orientation. Accordingto Frey (1999), the traditional Homo economicus can be further developed by putting intoaccount aspects as psychological motivation, altruism and ethical preferences or evenchanging preferences. Rothschild (2001) stresses that the complexity of the subject preventsthe development of a ‘general’ theory of human behaviour. He mentions the possibility of thecoexistence of several theories to live up to the complexity of human behaviour. In the nextsections we are going to analyse to what extent such factors as pride, trust, political ideologyhave an impact on individuals’ willingness to go to war.

III VARIABLES

Pride

Aspects of pride are not discussed intensively in the economics literature. Boulding (1992)states:

The dynamics which governs the creation, destruction, and distribution of various forms of pride andshame in society are very little understood, yet nothing perhaps is more crucial to the understanding of theoverall dynamics of a particular society than the marked differences which exist among societies in thisregard (p. 93).

Taking pride in work is a widespread phenomenon in organizations (Simon, 1947). Aperson could be proud of his/her country, of being a soldier and of the tradition of thefighting unit, especially if the soldier is in an elite unit (e.g. US Marine Corps, FrenchForeign Legion, etc). Interestingly, results from a survey conducted in the US find that theelite units were most severe on combat shirkers compared with other units. The surveyfurther asked if they would ‘trust’ the members of their unit in combat. Only 19% of thetank and infantry battalions agreed, compared with 71% of the airborne and rangers (seeBrown and Moskos, 1976).1 To be in an elite unit can yield recognition and prestige.Soldiers were furthermore asked: ‘Suppose the Army needed people to go into combat.What would you do?’ Generally, 79% stated they would ‘volunteer to go’ or ‘go ifordered’. Ninety percent of the elite units responded in this way, compared with 69% ofthe infantry and tank battalions. Doing something that others do not can create a personalsense of pride. Again, Henry V:

‘We few, we happy few, we band of brothers;For he to-day that sheds his blood with meShall be my brother; (. . .)And gentlemen in England now a-bedShall think themselves accurs’d they were not hereAnd hold their manhoods cheap whiles any speaksThat fought with us upon Saint Crispin’s day’

(Shakespeare 1953, p. 464).

1 The results should be taken with caution. It is difficult to measure the soldier experiencing combat. The averageage is between 20 and 21 years, so it can be doubted that they already had much real combat experience.

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Pride produces a sense of national identification. There can be a high satisfaction in one’srole as a soldier for the own country. Such national identification can be found, for example, ininternational soccer games (such as in the World Cup). Tyler (2000) argues that pride influencespeople’s behaviour in groups, organizations and societies. It gives a basis for encouragingcooperative behaviour. A person derives a sense of power and security from being amongbuddies on whom she/he can depend. Thus, a person’s ability is maintained at a level at whichshe/he remains capable of dealing with the combat stress. Akerlof and Kranton (2000, p. 720)illustrate this point with the following experiment. In the initial week, two groups of boys at asummer camp in Oklahoma were kept apart. During this period, the boys developed norms ofbehaviour and identities as belonging to their group. In the second week, they met for atournament. War broke out, with name-calling, stereotyping, and fighting.

Pride is linked to the desire to impress others. There has been an attempt to integrateaspects of impression or the desire to join the crowd, to be one of the boys in consumer’sdemand (see Leibenstein, 1976, and see Frank, 1985) for general concerns. The need toimpress others does not exclude the need to impress oneself. Loewenstein (1999) analyses themountaineering literature and states that most mountaineers view ‘ego’ as a much moreacceptable motive for their endeavours than impressing others. Victory and fame, self-esteemand the desire to reach a goal may make soldiers fight. The drive towards a goal is veryintense (e.g. winning a battle). Mountaineers are obsessed with their self-set goals. Peopleclimb mountains because they face extreme discomfort and danger, which enhances theindividual sense of self. Research on goal setting has shown that higher goals tend to lead tohigher performance (see Locke and Latham, 1990). Higher goals lead to exerting more effort,persisting longer, and focusing on the goal at the expense of other activities.

Trust

Trusting the Army

If individuals believe the army as an institution to be fair and worthy, the costs ofparticipating in the army get lower. As a consequence, individuals might be more willing tobe under the command of the army and to go to war, despite the high costs. Trust in the armymight be strongly correlated with an individual’s belief about the army’s efficiency in thecase of a war. A higher trust might reduce an individual’s concerns about the risk of dyingin a war, which increases the incentive to cooperate. Trust often goes hand in hand withloyalty, which raises the cost of not participating. In the absence of loyalty, the decision notto go to war is costless. The quality of the military institutional infrastructure depends notonly on the content of the norms and rules but also on the degree to which people actuallyhave internalized these norms and rules and the significance of the army. The obligation todo something comprises the feeling to follow a particular rule, but it must coincide with theinternal institution of the army and its fundamental values, so that people are able and willingto obey the instructions and the law. Clague (1993) argues that initiative and responsibilityseem to be the key to effective organisations.2 He sees a connection between rule obedienceand the social capital.3

Social capital consists of aspects of the social structure that individual actors can sure as resources to achievetheir objectives. One of the forms of social capital is the network of obligations in a community, which consist

2 Coleman (1994) illustrates that Japanese firms create company towns and common recreational facilities for theemployees to strengthen loyalty and identification.

3 According to Lindenberg (2001), the goal influences the frame within which the selective cognitive processestake place as, for example, certain aspects are considered more exactly, certain heuristics for goal achievements, andalternatives are ordered in terms of the relative contribution to the realization of the goal.

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of the credits that one has accumulated and the obligations that one has incurred, along with thetrustworthiness of the environment, which affects the degree to which the obligations will be repaid (Clague,1993, p. 396).

Rawls (1972, p. 11) says that we have a ‘fundamental natural duty (. . .) to comply with justinstitutions’.

Trusting Government and the Legal System

A further determinant is the degree of individuals’ trust in the government and the legalsystem. Trust in government is a manifestation of individuals’ satisfaction with thegovernment. A decrease in trust in government signals that citizens are unhappy with theparty in power but also about how politics is made by the politicians in general (Frey andStutzer, 2002). Trust in government measures the consequences from the current politico-economic point of view. Looking at the trust in the legal system, we focus on theconstitutional level, on how the relationship between the state and its citizens isestablished.

Positive actions by the state are intended to increase a persons’ positive attitudes andcommitment to fight for the country. If the government acts in a trustworthy fashion,individuals might be more willing to comply with the state’s intentions and politicaldecisions. Trust increases the moral costs of not complying and thus enhances the obligationto fight for the country. On the other hand, perceived unfairness increases the incentive to actagainst the government as psychological costs are reduced. The relationship between citizensand government can be seen as a relational contract or psychological contract, which involvesstrong emotional ties and loyalties. Such a psychological contract can be maintained bypositive actions, based on trust. Thus, one of the most important social psychological reasonsfor expecting cooperation is reciprocation (see Gouldner, 1960; Axelrod, 1984; Cialdini,1984; Regan, 1971). We can distinguish between positive and negative reciprocity. Positivereciprocity is the impulse to be kind to those who have been kind to us. On the other handan eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth is a principle of negative reciprocity (Fehr and Gachter,1997).

If people trust the government, they might not be sceptical about the decision of thegovernment to start a war. Their willingness to participate increases.

Socio-Demographic and Socio-Economic Variables

Age

Explaining differences in the willingness to serve in the army may depend on the opportunitycosts of a person to be a soldier. Older men have higher opportunity costs because they arefurther in their career and are therefore objectively giving up more. Older people might havea higher risk-aversion than their younger counterparts. Stouffer et al. (1994) found that thewillingness for service increase as age decreases. On the other hand, older people haveacquired greater social stakes over the years – such as material goods, status, a strongerdependency on the reactions from others – so that the potential costs of not participatingincrease. Thus, it is difficult to develop a clear hypothesis.

Gender

Social psychology argues that gender differences are based on the traditional female role.Females have not, in general, been involved actively in military service. They have a low

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identification with the institution and might be more critical of the military as an institutionto resolve conflicts. Thus, we would predict that females are less willing to go to war thanmales.

Education

Better educated taxpayers are supposed to know more about politics, the relevance and theconsequences of a war. They might be in a better position to assess the relevance of a warand might be more critical or motivated to go to war. They have more career possibilities,besides the army, which increases the opportunity cost of going to war. In the analysis ofSecond World War soldiers, Stouffer et al. (1949) concluded that better educated soldierstended to have a higher sense of personal commitment to war than their less educated fellowsoldiers, and tended more frequently to say they were in good spirits. On the other hand, theywere less likely to be convinced of the importance of their particular assignment and weremore likely to be sensitive to status deprivation. As one explanation, they argue that the bettereducated would be less objectively deprived because they were less likely to have parentswho were economically dependent upon them, such as parents in agricultural jobs.

Marital and Employment Status, Income

To go to war to many men means a deprivation. Married men, individuals with a (potential)employment status or a high income have higher opportunity costs fighting in a war, becausethey give up more. On the other hand, citizens with a lower income, the unemployed orsingles, might have lower society ‘stakes’ or restrictions, and might be more willing to takethe risk of going to fight, because of lower marginal utility losses (wealth reduction) in casethey are injured or killed in the war. Thus, it is difficult to develop clear predictions.

Religion

Religion might influence people’s habits and might be a restriction to fighting in a war inWestern countries. Religion forms habits of thought common to all human beings. Margolis(1997) analysed the question of why morality and religion are tied together. Religion includesthe belief in the right behaviour. Margolis argues that the right behaviour has two components:the performance of rituals and honouring, which is important in a society and which serves tobind society together and, in this sense, to determine what is fair and just. Religious behaviourcan be socially enforced with quasi-moral judgements and sanctions. Brooks and Bold (1994)analyse the role of religious organizations in encouraging the production of social goods asmoral behaviour, which we can find, for example, in the Ten Commandments. The relativecosts for religious inputs to produce social goods are quite low. The demand side is influencedby the culture’s complexity. In complex communities, individuals are less able to recognizesocial costs of misbehaviour and individual gain from proper behaviour is lower than in a smallsociety group. The authors state that religion has a comparative advantage in producing orencouraging social goods in large cultures of intermediate complexity, where the centralgovernment is too weak to enforce property rights.

The frequency of church attendance shows how much time individuals devote to religion.It tells more on behaviour than, say, religious attitudes. Since church attendance involves tiesto others, religious activities might support the norms of a larger community (see Tittle andWelch, 1983). Furthermore, someone’s reputation will be affected and will create a greaterlikelihood of embarrassment if being highly religious implies interacting with otherconventional individuals (see Grasmick et al., 1991).

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Political Orientation

In many countries, left-wing parties are traditionally more critical regarding the function andnecessity of an army. In Switzerland, for example, at the end of the 1990s, left-wing forceslaunched a popular initiative to completely dismantle the Swiss Army, although the SwissArmy was generally considered an important institution. Surprisingly, one-third of the votersopted for a dissolution of the Army. Left-wingers in particular kept the issue on the publicagenda. After the vote, Army reforms have been adopted. Thus, we would predict that peoplewho are more left-wing orientated are less likely to be willing to fight in a war.

IV EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Willingness to Go to War around the World

The willingness to go to war has been measured with the following question:

Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willingto fight for your country? (Yes, No).

Before starting with the multiple regressions, we present in Table 1 a descriptive analysisshowing the percentage of individuals in each country saying they would be willing to fightfor their country. We restricted our analysis to OECD countries, looking at three differentwaves where the World Values Survey (WVS) has been conducted (1981–84, 1990–93 and1995–97). This allows us to analyse how stable the willingness to fight is over time. It isinteresting to notice that Northern, especially Scandinavian, countries show the tendency to

TABLE I Willingness to Go to War in OECD Countries (in %)

Countries 1981–84 1990–93 1995–97

Australia 75 74.6Austria 66.3Belgium 34.2 39.3Canada 63.9 68Denmark 72.3 89.4Finland 83.4 88.2 84.2France 47.7 66West-Germany 46.5 42 49.2East-Germany 53.1 49.9Great Britain 68.3 74.4Iceland 74.3 77.2Ireland 61.3 60.8Northern-Ireland 58.9 60.7Italy 35.7 31.3Japan 32.7 20.3 24.2Netherlands 57.2 69.3Norway 89.3 91.3 88.6Portugal 68Spain 66.4 59.4 58.8Sweden 87.2 88.5 92.1Switzerland 77.2 70.3USA 73.8 78.6 77.4Average 62.7 65.2 66.9

Source: Author’s calculations from the WVS.Notes: WVS divides Germany into East and West to get a better comparison over time.

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a high willingness to fight over all years. On the other hand, countries such as Germany,Belgium, Italy and Japan show a relatively low willingness. It is not surprising that Germanyand Japan, with strong negative experiences in the Second World War, have such a lowwillingness to participate in a war. In general, the average values indicate that the willingnessto fight is relatively stable over time, with a small increase. The main disadvantage of theWVS Survey is the fact that not many countries participated in all three surveys. Thus, theaverage values must be treated with caution.

Multiple Regression Analysis

The World Values Survey (WVS) allows us to consider many factors in a multipleregression analysis, giving the possibility to check to what extent the variables in SectionIII have an effect on the willingness to fight. Regressions help to isolate the effects ofdifferent factors from each other and thus to get the correlation of a single factor when allother factors are constant. This research framework is novel, as there are not many studiesthat use the willingness to go to war as a dependent variable and search for factors thatsystematically influence the willingness to go war. We are going to focus on the wave1995–97 Figures, because in this set we find a higher set of variables to analyse. Thefollowing countries have been integrated separately in the analysis: the USA, Switzerland,Spain, Norway, West Germany. This helps to observe the robustness of the effects of theindependent variables. It can be argued that cross-country statistical analyses need to relyon a multiple item variable to measure better the willingness to go to war. There might bedifferences in the interpretation of a single question. However, as we analyse a relativelyhomogeneous region, this problem is reduced. Nevertheless, we are going to evaluatecountries with a certain cultural variety (North America, and countries from north-,middle- and south-Europe).

We will use weighted binomial probit estimation to correct the samples and thus to obtaina picture of the national distribution to analyse the information of the 0/1-scaled dependentvariable ‘willingness to go to war’. The calculation of the marginal effects is a method to findthe quantitative effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable ‘willingness togo to war’. We are going to present the marginal effects for the value 1 ( = willingness to goto war). Tables 2 to 6 present the results.

First, pride has been integrated into the equations. Pride seems to be an important variableto explain individuals’ willingness to go to war. In all countries, pride has a significantlypositive effect on individuals willingness to fight. An increase in pride by one unit raises theproportion of persons indicating that they are willing to fight by 13.1 percentage points in theUnited States, by 12.2 in Switzerland, 13.6 in Spain, 5.5 in Norway and 13.1 in WestGermany. These findings correspond to our predictions.

In a second step, the effect of trust has been analysed. Similar to pride, there is a significantpositive effect of trust in the army on the willingness to fight in all countries. An increase inthe trust-in-army scale by one unit increases the share of subjects willing to fight by 11.3percentage points in the United States, 17.3 in Switzerland, 14.7 in Spain, 6.3 in Norway and18.2 in West Germany. Thus, not surprisingly, trust in the army is a key determinant forindividuals’ willingness to go to war. The effects of trust in the government and the legalsystem are less strong. A significant impact can be found in three and two countries,respectively. The marginal effects of trust in government (legal system) vary between 0.07(almost zero) and 7.9 (7.7) percentage points.

Any pro army attitude can also be measured with the following ‘extreme’ question:

Is it very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad having the army governing this country (variable: beingruled by the army)?

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TABLE II Willingness to go to war in USA 1995

Weighted binomial probit

Variables

Eq· I

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· II

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· III

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· IV

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· V

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· VI

Coeff· Marg·

(a) Demographic FactorsAGE 30–49 0.237 0.054 0.217 0.048 0.201 0.048 0.167 0.040 0.179 0.042 0.150 0.036AGE 50–64 0.434** 0.098 0.470** 0.104 0.436** 0.104 0.405** 0.096 0.476** 0.113 0.374** 0.090AGE 65 + 0.073 0.016 0.166 0.032 0.136 0.032 0.061 0.014 0.108 0.026 –0.004 –0.001FEMALE –0.808*** –0.183 –0.817*** –0.192 –0.808*** –0.192 –0.799*** –0.190 –0.814*** –0.193 –0.782*** –0.188EDUCATION 0.048* 0.011 0.040 0.008 0.033 0.008 0.030 0.007 0.038 0.009 0.035 0.008(b) Marital StatusMARRIED –0.061 –0.014 –0.020 0.009 0.036 0.009 0.075 0.018 0.016 0.004 0.071 0.017LIVING TOGETHER –0.342 –0.077 –0.149 –0.043 –0.179 –0.043 –0.293 –0.070 –0.364 –0.086 –0.343 –0.082DIVORCED –0.449** –0.102 –0.555*** –0.098 –0.410** –0.098 –0.383* –0.091 –0.443** –0.105 –0.394* –0.095SEPARATED 0.679 0.154 0.605 0.163 0.687 0.163 0.666 0.158 0.593 0.141 0.699 0.168WIDOWED –0.376 –0.085 –0.358 –0.063 –0.265 –0.063 –0.249 –0.059 –0.285 –0.068 –0.250 –0.060(c) Employment StatusPART TIME EMPLOYED 0.077 0.018 0.169 0.017 0.073 0.017 0.106 0.025 0.049 0.012 0.066 0.016SELFEMPLOYED –0.080 –0.018 –0.013 –0.007 –0.030 –0.007 0.023 0.006 0.018 0.004 –0.024 –0.006UNEMPLOYED –0.356* –0.081 –0.316 –0.099 –0.417** –0.099 –0.364* –0.087 –0.401** –0.095 –0.318 –0.076AT HOME –0.323* –0.073 –0.351** –0.069 –0.290* –0.069 –0.305* –0.073 –0.333** –0.079 –0.292* –0.070STUDENT –0.515* –0.117 –0.714** –0.162 –0.680** –0.162 –0.658** –0.156 –0.650** –0.154 –0.648** –0.156RETIRED 0.023 0.005 –0.030 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.066 0.016 0.016 0.004 0.069 0.017OTHER 0.045 0.010 0.039 0.006 0.026 0.006 0.048 0.011 –0.010 –0.003 0.044 0.011(d) Economic VariableINCOME –0.036 –0.008 –0.022 –0.007 –0.029 –0.007 –0.024 –0.006 –0.027 –0.006 –0.028 –0.007(e) Religious VariableCHURCH ATTENDANCE –0.042* –0.010 –0.034 –0.004 –0.017 –0.004 –0.025 –0.006 –0.018 –0.004 –0.026 0.006(f) Political OrientationRIGHT 0.036 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.045* 0.011 0.046* 0.011 0.050* 0.012 0.059** 0.014(g) Attitude VariablesPRIDE 0.580*** 0.131TRUST IN ARMY 0.532*** 0.113TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 0.047 0.011TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM 0.154** 0.037BEING RULED BY ARMY 0.157** 0.037BEING RULED BY A LEADER 0.025 0.006Observations 1045 1052 1044 1048 1043 1031R-squared 0.156 0.169 0.118 0.123 0.123 0.115Prob(LM-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Notes: Dependent variable: willingness to go to war. In the reference group are AGE 16–29, MALE, SINGLE, FULL TIME EMPLOYED. Significance levels: *0.05 < p < 0.10, **0.01 < p < 0.05, ***p <0.01. Marginal effect = willingness to go to war.

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TABLE III Willingness to go to war in Switzerland 1997


Variables

Eq· I

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· II

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· III

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· IV

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· V

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· VI

Coeff· Marg·

(a) Demographic FactorsAGE 30–49 0.349* 0.097 0.276 0.076 0.360** 0.107 0.309* 0.092 0.358** 0.106 0.343* 0.099AGE 50–64 0.299 0.083 0.182 0.050 0.303 0.090 0.322 0.096 0.317 0.094 0.419* 0.121AGE 65 + 0.435 0.121 0.129 0.036 0.602* 0.178 0.615* 0.183 0.597* 0.177 0.878** 0.254FEMALE 0.084 0.023 –0.054 –0.015 –0.033 –0.010 –0.107 –0.032 –0.071 –0.021 –0.070 –0.020EDUCATION 0.055 0.015 0.010 0.003 –0.014 –0.004 –0.009 –0.003 0.010 0.003 0.004 0.001(b) Marital StatusMARRIED –0.209 –0.058 –0.032 –0.009 –0.043 –0.013 –0.006 –0.002 –0.068 –0.020 –0.059 –0.017LIVING TOGETHER –0.228 –0.063 –0.017 –0.005 –0.118 –0.035 –0.068 –0.020 –0.083 –0.025 –0.194 –0.056DIVORCED –0.692*** –0.192 –0.477* –0.132 –0.613** –0.182 –0.543** –0.162 –0.590** –0.175 –0.797** –0.230SEPARATED –0.032 0.009 –0.572 –0.158 –0.573 –0.170 –0.509 –0.151 –0.574 –0.170 –0.623 –0.180WIDOWED –0.941*** –0.261 –0.744*** –0.206 –0.679*** –0.201 –0.716*** –0.213 –0.754*** –0.224 –0.854*** –0.247(c) Employment StatusPART TIME EMPLOYED –0.381* –0.106 –0.403** –0.111 –0.429** –0.127 –0.313* –0.093 –0.298 –0.088 –0.143 –0.041SELFEMPLOYED –0.394* –0.109 –0.512** –0.141 –0.513** –0.152 –0.455** –0.136 –0.438** –0.130 –0.499** –0.144UNEMPLOYED –1.334*** –0.370 –0.926*** –0.256 –0.999*** –0.296 –0.924*** –0.275 –0.982*** –0.291 –0.922** –0.266AT HOME –0.645*** –0.179 –0.561*** –0.155 –0.488** –0.145 –0.430** –0.128 –0.438** –0.130 –0.346 –0.100STUDENT –0.980*** –0.272 –1.040*** –0.288 –0.939*** –0.278 –0.867*** –0.258 –0.761*** –0.226 –0.674** –0.194RETIRED –0.289 –0.080 –0.259 –0.072 –0.375 –0.111 –0.362 –0.108 –0.266 –0.079 –0.358 –0.103OTHER –0.269 –0.075 –0.194 –0.054 –0.266 –0.079 –0.222 –0.066 –0.296 –0.088 –0.298 –0.086(d) Economic VariableINCOME –0.001 0.000 –0.001 0.000 –0.001 0.000 –0.001 –0.004 –0.001 0.000 –0.002 –0.001(e) Religious VariableCHURCH ATTENDANCE 0.095*** 0.026 0.084** 0.023 0.106*** 0.031 0.103*** 0.031 0.127*** 0.038 0.114*** 0.033(f) Political OrientationRIGHT 0.141*** 0.039 0.089*** 0.025 0.165*** 0.049 0.147*** 0.044 0.164*** 0.049 0.171*** 0.049(g) Attitude VariablesPRIDE 0.441*** 0.122TRUST IN ARMY 0.625*** 0.173TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 0.196*** 0.058TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM 0.257*** 0.077BEING RULED BY ARMY 0.116 0.035BEING RULED BY A LEADER 0.109* 0.032Observations 717 738 738 746 720 674R-squared 0.21 0.232 0.153 0.150 0.150 0.163Prob(LM-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000


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TABLE IV Willingness to go to war in Spain 1995


Variables

Eq· I

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· II

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· III

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· IV

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· V

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· VI

Coeff· Marg·

(a) Demographic FactorsAGE 30–49 0.163 0.059 0.083 0.030 0.096 0.037 0.095 0.036 0.035 0.013 0.142 0.055AGE 50–64 0.162 0.059 0.032 0.012 0.108 0.041 0.110 0.042 0.101 0.038 0.152 0.058AGE 65 + 0.063 0.023 –0.112 –0.041 0.018 0.007 –0.027 –0.010 –0.166 –0.062 –0.076 –0.029FEMALE –0.314** –0.114 –0.192 –0.070 –0.294** –0.111 –0.286** –0.107 –0.319** –0.119 –0.307** –0.118EDUCATION –0.057** –0.021 –0.059*** –0.021 –0.066*** –0.025 –0.065*** –0.024 –0.067*** –0.025 –0.063*** –0.024(b) Marital StatusMARRIED –0.155 –0.056 0.005 0.002 –0.028 –0.011 –0.036 –0.014 0.020 0.007 –0.080 –0.031LIVING TOGETHER –0.264 –0.096 –0.403 –0.146 –0.267 –0.100 –0.267 –0.101 –0.253 –0.095 –0.503 –0.193DIVORCED 0.518 0.189 0.679 0.247 0.649 0.244 0.632 0.238 0.527 0.197 0.636 0.245SEPARATED 0.050 0.018 0.090 0.033 –0.030 –0.011 –0.051 –0.019 –0.142 –0.053 –0.200 –0.077WIDOWED –0.206 –0.075 –0.052 –0.019 –0.158 –0.059 –0.158 –0.060 –0.152 –0.057 –0.099 –0.038(c) Employment StatusPART TIME EMPLOYED –0.096 –0.035 –0.068 –0.025 –0.024 –0.009 –0.036 –0.014 –0.049 –0.018 –0.116 –0.045SELFEMPLOYED –0.542* –0.197 –0.446 –0.162 –0.546* –0.205 –0.543* –0.204 –0.715** –0.267 –0.404 –0.155UNEMPLOYED –0.058 –0.021 –0.039 –0.014 –0.051 –0.019 –0.050 –0.019 –0.017 –0.006 –0.096 –0.037AT HOME –0.073 –0.027 –0.101 –0.037 –0.044 –0.017 –0.068 –0.026 –0.066 –0.025 –0.088 –0.034STUDENT 0.011 0.004 –0.015 –0.006 –0.004 –0.001 –0.001 0.000 –0.041 –0.016 –0.044 –0.017RETIRED –0.476** –0.173 –0.387* –0.141 –0.378* –0.142 –0.360* –0.135 –0.354* –0.132 –0.418** –0.161OTHER –0.371 –0.135 –0.041 –0.015 –0.292 –0.110 –0.265 –0.100 –0.230 –0.086 –0.175 –0.067(d) Economic VariableINCOME 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 –0.001 0.000 –0.001 0.000 –0.001 0.000 –0.001 0.000(e) Religious VariableCHURCH ATTENDANCE 0.038 0.014 0.025 0.009 0.056** 0.021 0.057** 0.021 0.058** 0.022 0.054** 0.021(f) Political OrientationRIGHT 0.051* 0.019 0.034 0.012 0.059** 0.022 0.065** 0.025 0.043 0.016 0.054* 0.021(g) Attitude VariablesPRIDE 0.373*** 0.136TRUST IN ARMY 0.392*** 0.142TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 0.020 0.007TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM 0.073 0.028BEING RULED BY ARMY 0.183** 0.068BEING RULED BY A LEADER 0.150** 0.058Observations 719 720 727 714 687 664R-squared 0.091 0.106 0.0534 0.057 0.069 0.072Prob(LM-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000


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TABLE V Willingness to go to war in Norway 1997


Variables

Eq· I

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· II

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· III

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· IV

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· V

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· VI

Coeff· Marg·

(a) Demographic FactorsAGE 30–49 –0.064 –0.010 –0.090 –0.015 –0.064 –0.011 –0.060 –0.010 –0.021 –0.004 –0.073 –0.126AGE 50–64 0.227 0.034 0.130 0.021 0.136 0.023 0.126 0.022 0.182 0.031 0.115 0.020AGE 65 + 0.439 0.066 0.251 0.040 0.275 0.047 0.303 0.052 0.336 0.057 0.316 0.054FEMALE –0.314** –0.048 –0.276** –0.044 –0.205* –0.035 –0.225* –0.039 –0.269** –0.046 –0.230* –0.039EDUCATION –0.014 –0.002 –0.026 –0.004 –0.037 –0.006 –0.034 –0.006 –0.025 –0.004 –0.039 –0.007(b) Marital StatusMARRIED 0.010 0.002 0.061 0.010 0.068 0.012 0.081 0.014 0.093 0.016 0.064 0.011LIVING TOGETHER –0.101 –0.015 –0.140 –0.022 –0.125 –0.021 –0.094 –0.016 –0.090 –0.015 –0.090 –0.015DIVORCED 0.068 0.010 0.188 0.030 0.154 0.026 0.195 0.034 0.195 0.033 0.206 0.035SEPARATED 0.331 0.050 0.478 0.076 0.497 0.085 0.461 0.080 0.528 0.089 0.470 0.081WIDOWED –0.079 –0.012 0.056 0.009 –0.028 –0.005 0.009 0.002 –0.023 –0.004 –0.021 –0.004(c) Employment StatusPART TIME EMPLOYED –0.119 –0.018 –0.116 –0.019 –0.102 –0.017 –0.101 –0.017 –0.123 –0.021 –0.109 –0.019SELFEMPLOYED –0.259 –0.039 –0.279 –0.045 –0.238 –0.041 –0.252 –0.044 –0.305 –0.052 –0.244 –0.042UNEMPLOYED –0.038 –0.006 –0.288 –0.046 –0.306 –0.052 –0.316 –0.054 –0.356 –0.060 –0.296 –0.051AT HOME –0.152 –0.023 –0.147 –0.024 –0.117 –0.020 –0.162 –0.028 –0.149 –0.025 –0.206 –0.035STUDENT –0.064 –0.010 0.019 0.003 –0.090 –0.015 –0.068 –0.012 –0.064 –0.011 –0.089 –0.015RETIRED –0.643** –0.097 –0.471* –0.075 –0.488* –0.083 –0.515** –0.089 –0.528** –0.089 –0.532** –0.091OTHER –0.845 –0.128 –0.837* –0.134 –0.729 –0.124 –0.763 –0.132 –0.784 –0.133 –0.771 –0.132(d) Economic VariableINCOME 0.029* 0.004 0.033 0.005 0.022 0.004 0.026 0.004 0.026 0.004 0.026 0.004(e) Religious VariableCHURCH ATTENDANCE –0.051 –0.008 –0.073** –0.012 –0.048 –0.008 –0.043 –0.007 –0.045 –0.008 –0.045 –0.008(f) Political OrientationRIGHT 0.053 0.008 0.046 0.007 0.075** 0.013 0.067** 0.012 0.066** 0.011 0.068** 0.012(g) Attitude VariablesPRIDE 0.362*** 0.055TRUST IN ARMY 0.394*** 0.063TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 0.169 0.029TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM 0.001 0.000BEING RULED BY ARMY 0.245** 0.042BEING RULED BY A LEADER –0.106 –0.019Observations 967 998 998 998 996 993R-squared 0.049 0.053 0.030 0.027 0.034 0.029Prob(LM-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000


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TABLE VI Willingness to go to war in West Germany 1997


Variables

Eq· I

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· II

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· III

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· IV

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· V

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· VI

Coeff· Marg·

(a) Demographic FactorsAGE 30–49 –0.382** –0.147 –0.423*** –0.163 –0.434*** –0.170 –0.455*** –0.178 –0.407*** –0.158 –0.407*** –0.159AGE 50–64 –0.096 –0.037 –0.274 –0.105 –0.258 –0.101 –0.235 –0.092 –0.209 –0.081 –0.242 –0.095AGE 65 + –0.136 –0.053 –0.336 –0.129 –0.248 –0.097 –0.243 –0.095 –0.290 –0.113 –0.312 –0.122FEMALE –0.326*** –0.125 –0.367*** –0.141 –0.415*** –0.162 –0.423*** –0.166 –0.433*** –0.168 –0.444*** –0.173EDUCATION –0.020 –0.008 –0.043* –0.017 –0.061*** –0.024 –0.060*** –0.023 –0.047** –0.018 –0.042* –0.016(b) Marital StatusMARRIED 0.326 0.125 0.299* 0.115 0.363** 0.142 0.376** 0.147 0.401*** 0.156 0.418*** 0.163LIVING TOGETHER –0.033 –0.013 0.076 0.029 0.021 0.008 0.059 0.023 0.055 0.022 0.087 0.034DIVORCED 0.415* 0.159 0.522* 0.201 0.532** 0.208 0.582** 0.228 0.559** 0.217 0.590*** 0.230SEPARATED 0.253 0.097 0.391 0.150 0.407 0.159 0.298 0.116 0.411 0.160 0.420 0.164WIDOWED 0.121 0.046 0.310 0.119 0.224 0.088 0.236 0.092 0.266 0.104 0.198 0.077(c) Employment StatusPART TIME EMPLOYED –0.303* –0.117 –0.369* –0.142 –0.337** –0.132 –0.332** –0.130 –0.316** –0.123 –0.327** –0.128SELFEMPLOYED –0.296 –0.114 –0.061 –0.023 –0.040 –0.016 –0.044 –0.017 –0.034 –0.013 –0.098 –0.038UNEMPLOYED –0.158 –0.061 –0.442 –0.170 –0.273 –0.107 –0.305 –0.119 –0.345 –0.134 –0.333 –0.130AT HOME –0.670*** –0.258 –0.553*** –0.212 –0.573*** –0.224 –0.549*** –0.215 –0.603*** –0.234 –0.565*** –0.221STUDENT –0.476** –0.183 –0.442** –0.170 –0.390* –0.152 –0.457** –0.179 –0.367* –0.142 –0.357* –0.139RETIRED –0.378 –0.145 –0.364 –0.140 –0.294 –0.115 –0.279 –0.109 –0.287 –0.111 –0.299 –0.117(d) Economic VariableINCOME 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000(e) Religious VariableCHURCH ATTENDANCE 0.061** 0.023 0.038 0.014 0.047* 0.018 0.056** 0.022 0.068** 0.027 0.064** 0.025(f) Political OrientationRIGHT 0.113*** 0.043 0.129*** 0.050 0.149*** 0.058 0.171*** 0.067 0.161*** 0.062 0.159*** 0.062(g) Attitude VariablesPRIDE 0.340*** 0.131TRUST IN ARMY 0.474*** 0.182TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 0.203*** 0.079TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM 0.098 0.039BEING RULED BY ARMY 0.526*** 0.204BEING RULED BY A LEADER 0.199*** 0.078Observations 659 776 780 783 791 788R-squared 0.191 0.199 0.157 0.156 0.167 0.138Prob(LM-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000


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274 BENNO TORGLER

In four out of five countries, a strong pro-army attitude has a significant positive effect onindividuals’ willingness to go to war. Switzerland is the only country where the coefficientis not significant. Marginal effects vary between 3.5 (Switzerland) and 20.7 (West Germany)percentage points.

The army is an authoritarian institution, with a hierarchical structure passing from the topdown through a chain of commands and with the formal rules requiring obedience at eachechelon. Authority in the military serves to coordinate behaviour by enforcing rules allowingthe formation of more stable expectations about soldiers’ behaviour. It can be argued thatindividuals with the preference for a strong political hand might also have a strongerincentive to participate in an authoritarian institution such as the army. They might, therefore,be more willing to go to war. Thus, in equation VI we have integrated the variable ‘Beingruled by a leader’. In three countries (Switzerland, Spain and West Germany) the coefficientis significant. In general, the marginal effects vary between 0.6 and 7.8 percentage points.

Looking at the socio-demographic and socio-economic variables we observe the tendencythat females have a lower willingness to participate actively in war than males. Being femalerather than male reduces the probability of a person to be willing to go to war by around 19percentage points in the United States, 2 in Switzerland, 11 in Spain, 4 in Norway and 16 inWest Germany. Only in Switzerland there is no significant difference between females andmales. In general, the results are in line with our predictions that women seem to be morepacifist than men. A higher education has the tendency to result in a lower willingness to goto war. However, significant negative effects can only be observed for Spain and WestGermany. In the United States, the coefficient is even positive. Thus, the findings regardingthe effects of education are not robust throughout all countries. Contrary results can also befound looking at the age groups. In the United States, only the age group 50–64 has asignificantly higher willingness to go to war compared with the group 16–29. In Switzerland,we find the tendency to a higher willingness in the groups 30–49 and 65 + . On the otherhand, in West Germany, the age group 30–49 has a significantly lower willingness than thereference group. Thus, there is no possibility of a clear picture of the effects of age on thewillingness to fight. Similar non-robust findings have been obtained for marital and theemployment status. Furthermore, income has hardly any effect on the willingness to go towar. In our cases, it seems that the theoretical argumentation based on individuals’opportunity costs is empirically not well founded.

The variable ‘political orientation’ in most countries has a significant effect on thewillingness to fight. An increase in the scale to the right by one unit raises the share ofindividuals agreeing to fight by around 1 percentage point in the United States, 4 inSwitzerland, 2 in Spain, 6 in Norway and 6 in West Germany. These results correspond to ourpredictions. The obtained results regarding the effects of religion on war participationwillingness are also not so clear. Surprisingly, and contrary to our theoretical considerations,in the countries where the coefficient is significant, the sign is positive (see Switzerland andWest Germany). Religion seems not to be a restriction on the willingness to go to war.

In the next step, we are going to analyse whether these findings obtained from the WorldValues Survey 1995–97 are consistent with other results. We are going to evaluate data fromthe United States, as it is the country with the most observations throughout all sets of data.Tables 7 and 8 present the results. We have less variables than in 1995–97, from the sixestimations made before, only three (four) can be made in 1980–81 (1990). The results arein line with the results obtained earlier. Pride, trust in government and the legal systemsignificantly influence the willingness to go to war. Similar to 1995, an increase in the pridescale by one unit increases the share of persons indicating that they are willing to fight bymore than 13 percentage points in both years. An increase in the level of trust in the army byone unit increases the share of individuals saying that they are willing to fight by 5.1 in

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1980–81 and 3.3 percentage points in 1990. Similar effects can be found for trust ingovernment and the legal system. Also in line with the results in 1995, females report asignificantly lower willingness than males. Political orientation to the right has, as in manyother countries, a significant positive effect on the willingness to go to war. However, ingeneral, socio-demographic and socio-economic variables give a mixed picture. It seems thatthe effects of the main variables are not affected by the time period.

TABLE VII Willingness to go to war in United States 1980–81


Variables

Eq· I

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· II

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· III

Coeff· Marg·

(a) Demographic FactorsAGE 30–49 0.383*** 0.100 0.404*** 0.109 0.410*** 0.111AGE 50–64 0.241* 0.063 0.304** 0.082 0.339*** 0.092AGE 65 + 0.216 0.056 0.280* 0.076 0.327** 0.089FEMALE –0.641*** –0.167 –0.617*** –0.167 –0.626*** –0.170(b) Marital StatusMARRIED 0.143 0.037 0.138 0.037 0.162 0.044LIVING TOGETHER 0.006 0.002 –0.037 –0.010 –0.012 –0.003DIVORCED 0.376** 0.098 0.293 0.079 0.333* 0.091SEPARATED –0.088 –0.023 0.056 0.015 –0.012 –0.003WIDOWED 0.057 0.015 0.049 0.013 0.084 0.023(c) Employment StatusPART TIME EMPLOYED –0.081 –0.021 –0.158 –0.043 –0.148 –0.040SELFEMPLOYED –0.302 –0.079 –0.388 –0.105 –0.353 –0.096UNEMPLOYED –0.008 –0.002 0.082 0.022 0.027 0.007AT HOME –0.192 –0.050 –0.181 –0.049 –0.172 –0.050STUDENT –0.128 –0.033 –0.125 –0.034 –0.182 –0.050RETIRED –0.425*** –0.111 –0.418** –0.113 –0.409*** –0.111OTHER(d) Economic VariableINCOME 0.045** 0.012 0.044** 0.012 0.050*** 0.014(e) Religious VariableCHURCH ATTENDANCE –0.020 –0.005 –0.005 –0.001 –0.005 –0.001(f) Political OrientationRIGHT 0.037* 0.010 0.055*** 0.015 0.057*** 0.016(g) Attitude VariablesPRIDE 0.510*** 0.133TRUST IN ARMY 0.189*** 0.051TRUST IN GOVERNMENTTRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM 0.105** 0.029Observations 1498 1530 1524R-squared 0.125 0.105 0.098Prob(LM-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000

Notes: Dependent variable: willingness to go to war. In the reference group are AGE 16–29, MALE, SINGLE, FULL TIMEEMPLOYED. Significance levels: *0.05 < p < 0.10, **0.01 < p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Marginal effect = willingness to go towar.

V. CONCLUSIONS

‘Why’ is a frequently asked question in sciences. The intention of this paper was to ask thequestion: ‘Why do people go to war?’ This paper has analysed the extent to which it makessense to extend traditional neoclassical thinking to concepts in social psychology tounderstand why people go to war. It can be seen as an attempt to integrate findings of othersciences into economic analysis and thus a reorientation of economic thinking. However, itdoes not mean that we have to leave rational choice grounds. The paper offers a novelframework in analysing a person’s willingness to go to war, with the World Values Surveydata from OECD countries. The descriptive results indicate that the Northern part of Europe,

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especially Scandinavian countries, has a high willingness to fight, unlike such countries asItaly, Belgium, Japan and Germany. In general, a small increase in the willingness over timeis observed. In a second step, the paper evaluates United States, Switzerland, Spain, Norwayand West Germany separately to obtain a general picture about the robustness of the mainvariables. We find evidence that factors such as pride, trust in the army, the government, andthe legal system have a positive effect on individuals’ willingness to go to war. Wefurthermore find some evidence in a few countries that individuals with a preference to letthe army rule the country, or to let the country be ruled by a strong leader, have a higherwillingness to fight. Interestingly, ideology seems to have a significant effect on fightingwillingness. People who were more right-wing have a higher willingness to go to war.Looking at the socio-demographic and socio-economic variables, we observe the tendencythat females have a lower willingness to participate actively in a war than males. Accordingto our findings, the theoretical argumentation based on individuals’ opportunity costs areempirically not well founded.

In general, the findings indicate that it might be fruitful to go beyond the standardneoclassical economic model and to move in the direction of social psychology or sociologytheories, integrating such factors as pride and trust to analyse why people go to war.

TABLE VIII Willingness to go to war in United States 1990


Variables

Eq· I

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· II

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· III

Coeff· Marg·

Eq· IV

Coeff· Marg·

(a) Demographic FactorsAGE 30–49 –0.135 –0.031 –0.166 –0.041 –0.148 –0.036 –0.158 –0.039AGE 50–64 0.084 0.019 0.106 0.026 0.116 0.028 0.135 0.033AGE 65 + –0.031 –0.007 –0.013 –0.003 –0.002 –0.001 0.019 0.005FEMALE –0.555*** –0.126 –0.495*** –0.122 –0.504*** –0.123 –0.541*** –0.133(b) Marital StatusMARRIED 0.298** 0.068 0.369*** 0.091 0.376*** 0.092 0.385*** 0.095LIVING TOGETHER 0.202 0.046 0.179 0.044 0.233 0.057 0.229 0.057DIVORCED 0.164 0.037 0.186 0.046 0.199 0.048 0.210 0.052SEPARATED –0.052 –0.012 –0.073 –0.018 –0.114 –0.028 –0.081 –0.020WIDOWED 0.311 0.071 0.386* 0.095 0.294 0.072 0.378* 0.093(c) Employment StatusPART TIME EMPLOYED –0.097 –0.022 –0.098 –0.024 –0.085 –0.021 –0.088 –0.022SELFEMPLOYED 0.457 0.104 0.119 0.029 0.177 0.043 0.150 0.037UNEMPLOYED –0.002 –0.001 0.118 0.029 0.103 0.025 0.055 0.014AT HOME –0.303* –0.069 –0.310* –0.077 –0.326** –0.079 –0.324** –0.080STUDENT 0.354 0.081 0.232 0.057 0.400 0.097 0.306 0.076RETIRED –0.371** –0.084 –0.369** –0.091 –0.335** –0.082 –0.373** –0.092OTHER –0.495 –0.112 –0.540 –0.133 –0.595 –0.145 –0.595 –0.147(d) Economic VariableINCOME 0.000 0.000 –0.001 0.000 –0.005 –0.001 –0.002 –0.001(e) Religious VariableCHURCH ATTENDANCE –0.010 –0.002 0.001 0.000 –0.001 0.000 0.004 0.001(f) Political OrientationRIGHT 0.074*** 0.017 0.087*** 0.022 0.083*** 0.020 0.089*** 0.022(g) Attitude VariablesPRIDE 0.622*** 0.141TRUST IN ARMY 0.133*** 0.033TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 0.197*** 0.048TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM 0.160*** 0.039Observations 1225 1245 1235 1245R-squared 0.112 0.070 0.072 0.070Prob(LM-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Notes: Dependent variable: willingness to go to war. In the reference group are AGE 16–29, MALE, SINGLE, FULL TIMEEMPLOYED. Significance levels: *0.05 < p < 0.10, **0.01 < p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Marginal effect = willingness to go towar.

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APPENDIX

TABLE A1 Derivation of some variables

Variable Derivation

Willingness to Go to War(dependent variable)

Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were tocome to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?

1. Yes2. No

CHURCH ATTENDANCE Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do youattend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week,once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, lessoften, never practically never. (7 = more than once a week to 1 = never,practically never)

PRIDE How proud are you to be . . .? (substitute your own nationality)

1. Not at all proud2. Not very proud3. Quite proud4. very proud

TRUST IN ARMY Could you tell me how much confidence you have in armed forces in yourcapital: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not verymuch confidence or none at all? (4 = a great deal to 1 = none at all)

TRUST IN GOVERNMENT Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the government inyour capital: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, notvery much confidence or none at all? (4 = a great deal to 1 = none at all)

TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the legal system: is ita great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very muchconfidence or none at all? (4 = a great deal to 1 = none at all)

BEING RULED BY ARMY I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what youthink about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, wouldyou say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way ofgoverning this country?

Having the army rule

1. very bad2. fairly bad3. fairly good4. very good

BEING RULED BY A LEADER I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what youthink about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, wouldyou say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way ofgoverning this country?

Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament andelections

1. very bad2. fairly bad3. fairly good4. very good

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TABLE A1 Continued

Variable Derivation

RIGHT In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How wouldyou place your views on this scale (1–10), generally speaking? (1 = left,10 = right).

INCOME Here is a scale of incomes (1–10). We would like to know in what groupyour household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomesthat come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into,before taxes and other deduction.

US 19951. None or less than $4.9992. 5.000–9.9993. 10.00–14.9994. 15.000–19.9995. 20.000–24.9996. 25.000–29.9997. 30.000–39.9998. 40.000–49.9999. 50.000–74.999

10. 75.000 and over

US 19901. Under $10.000 per year2. $10.000–$14.9993. $15.000–$19.9994. $20.000–$29.9995. $30.000–$39.9996. $40.000–$49.9997. $50.000 and over per year8. $50.000 to $60.0009. $60.000 to $70.000

10. $70.000

Switzerland1. Less then 20’000 Swiss Francs2. 20.000–26.9993. 27.000–31.9994. 32.000–37.9995. 38.000–44.9996. 45.000–51.9997. 52.000–59.9998. 60.000–69.9999. 70.000–89.999

10. More than 90.000

Spain1. 45.000 or less ptas2. 45–75.000 ptas3. 75–100.000 ptas4. 100–150.000 ptas5. 150–200.0006. 200–275.0007. 275–350.0008. 350–450.0009. 450–1.000.000

10. More than 1.000.000

Norway (1 = low. 10 = high income)

West Germany1. Below 2.000 DM per month2. 2.000–2.999 DM3. 3.000–3.999 DM

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TABLE A1 Continued

Variable Derivation

4. 4.000–4.499 DM5. 4.500–4.999 DM6. 5.000–5.499 DM7. 5.500–5.999 DM8. 6.000–6.999 DM9. 7.000–7.999 DM

10. 8.000 DM and over

EDUCATION What is the highest educational level that you have attained?US 1995

1. No formal education2. Incomplete primary school3. Completed primary school4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type5. Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type6. Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type7. Complete secondary: university-preparatory type8. Some university-level education, without degree9. University-level education, with degree

Switzerland1. Never went to school2. Incomplete primary school3. Primary school (up to 12 years of age)4. Apprenticeship5. Lower secondary school (up to 16 years of age)6. Secondary school without diploma (16–19 years)7. Technical school8. Secondary school with diploma9. University or Federal Polytechnical School without degree

10. University or Federal Polytechnical with degreeNorway

1. No education or less than primary education2. Compulsory education at primary level only3. Second level education, 2nd stage (10th grade)4. Second level, 2nd stage (11th or 12th grade)5. University level I (13–14th years of education)6. University level II (15th–16th years)7. University level III (17th–18th years)8. Highest (dissertation) level

Spain1. No formal education2. Incomplete primary school3. Completed primary school4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type5. Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type6. Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type7. Complete secondary: university-preparatory type8. Some university-level education, without degree9. University-level education, with degree

West Germany1. No formal education2. Incomplete primary school3. Completed primary school4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type5. Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type6. Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type7. Complete secondary: university-preparatory type8. Some university-level education, without degree9. University-level education, with degree

Source: Inglehart et al. (2000).

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why do people go to war?

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