why gordon perished or, the political and military causes
DESCRIPTION
Further on in this military romancing spirit--for common sense will not permit any other description of the views Lord Wolseley expresses in it--he further congratulates himself by these successes of being able to capture Berber, " as Gordon's steamers, manned by the Naval Brigade, will assist him in that operation." So far, however, as Gordon himself was concerned, these steamers would enable him to communicate direct with him, and ascertain the real condition of Khartum!TRANSCRIPT
TOY GORDON PERISHED;
OR,
THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CAUSES
WHICH LED TO
THE SUDAN DISASTERS.
A WAR CORRESPONDENT 1 ,
WHO ACCOMPANIED THE NILE EXPEDITION, '
Anther ef " Tee Utt for Garden at Khartum,'* &•(.
WITH MAPS AND PLANS.
LONDON :
W. H. ALLEN & CO., LIMITED,
13. Waterloo Place, S.W.
1896.
I.''.' I
PRINTED BY
WYMAN AND SONS, LIMITED,
GREAT QUEEN STREET,
LONDON, W.C.
/'harvard
UNIVERSITYl
LIBRARY
AUG 21 1973
PREFACE.
The chief object of the Author in the publication
of his history of the Nile Expedition in 1887, was
to give a more complete account of it than either
himself or his Press colleagues, who accompanied
it with him, were able to supply through the Press
at the time. This inability was chiefly owing to the
demand for the rapid despatch of news from a seat
of war by the Journalism of the present day, and
to the precedence consequently given to telegrams
over the letters of War Correspondents. Hence
only a synopsis of the most important events at
first reaches the public ; and this, to a large extent,
reduces the interest of later and fuller communica
tions despatched by mail.
Under the trying circumstances of such an
Expedition as that up the Nile, and the rapidity
with which its most important events followed each
other, it was physically and mentally impossible,
even in our fuller despatches, to deal satisfactorily
with them, and especially with those which in plan
and conduct contributed to its sad and disastrous
failure, so far as the objects it was intended to
accomplish were concerned.
iv PREFACE.
Some of these events were noticed by the Author
in the work referred to, but, as one of its reviewers
rightly remarked, the Author knew more than he
cared to publish at the time. This was consequent
upon the difficulty of supporting his statements by
satisfactory and sufficient evidence. That evidence
Having since been available, the restraint under
which he dealt in his former volume has becii
removed, and hence the full statement of substan
tiated facts is laid before the British public in
answer to the questions :—Why Gordon perished ?
and what were the political and military blunders
which contributed to this and our other disasters
in the Sudan, after our occupation of Egypt proper,
following on the victory at Tel-el-Kebir.
The reasons which have induced the publication
of the present volume are given to the Author's
readers in the introductory chapter, and to which
he will only add here that he is inspired by the
epitaph on the monument at the Pass of Thermo
pylae, to the memory of Leonidas and his gallant
three hundred, by their fellow-countrymen, which
was this :—
Stranger, tell the men of Sparta, we who obeyed
the laws lie here !
THE AUTHOR.
London, Dtttmbtrjth, /Stf.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
PAOB
Introductory i
CHAPTER H.
A "non-proven" verdict—After Tel-el-Kebir—Pressed
for an explanation—Warned of threatened danger and
complications 20
CHAPTER III.
Premature announcement of the "Rescue and Retire
Policy "—Effects on Gordon's mission 39.
CHAPTER IV.
Mr. Gladstone and the demand for Zebehr Pasha—Have
we come to this?—Sir E. Baring's interference with
Gordon's plan of evacuation $6
CHAPTER V..
Goidon in danger of being cut off—Refusal to keep his
communications open—The Berber and Suakim route 72
CHAPTER VI.
Refusal to facilitate evacuation of Khartum by a diversion
of British troops—Gordon's virtual abandonment— ... 92
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER VH.
PAGE
Lord Wolseley reports on the three lines of advance for an
Expedition to relieve Khartum—Proposals of General
Stephenson and others relative thereto 112
CHAPTER VIH.
Her Majesty's Government roused to action and adopt
preparatory measures for Gordon's relief (..127
CHAPTER IX.
Expedition delayed by the adoption of the small-boat
plan of advance up the Nile ... 137
CHAPTER X.
Key to the policy of Her Majesty's Government—Not
ready yet to sanction advance of troops beyond
Egyptian frontier 144
CHAPTER XI.
The Suakim-Berber route seriously considered—Why
rejected—Objections against it criticised 159
CHAPTER XH.
Lord Wolseley urges immediate measures for Gordon's
relief while pressing the adoption of the Nile route ... 174
CHAPTER XHI.
Gordon can only hold out after December 14th with
difficulty—How Lord Wolseley responds to his implied
demands for hasty relief 189
CONTENTS. vti
CHAPTER XIV.
PACE
Lord Wolseley's fixed plan of operations and General Von
Moltke's strategic maxim—His view of the position on
December 31st 199
CHAPTER XV.
In view of Gordon being known to be pressed for food
Lord Wolseley delays a dash across the desert to
Khartum 209
CHAPTER XVI.
The Nile Column—Its object—How delayed by unknown
obstacles—Its recall 220
CHAPTER XVH.
Caravan roads from Hamdab to Berber and from Korti to
Mutemma compared—Gordon's view for an advance
from Ambukol on Hamdab 225
CHAPTER XVIH.
The short camel supply question—The double march to
Jakdul and its consequences 235
CHAPTER XIX.
How Lord Wolseley delayed responding to Gordon's call
from Khartum on December 14th to come quickly ... 248
CHAPTER XX.
The Desert Column not primarily despatched for relief of
Khartum—Why Sir Charles Wilson was delayed at
Gubat • ... 262
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXI.
PACK
Lord Wolseley congratulates himself on having secured
the desert road to Mutcmma and a post there 276
CHAPTER XXH.
How and why Khartum fell before the Expedition could
save it « 290
CHAPTER XXIH.
The theory of the fall of Khartum by treachery disproved
—Concluding observations and final appeal 302
ILLUSTRATIONS.
PAGE
V Sketch Map of the Nile, showing Second and
Third Cataracts ... 131
✓The Nile from Dongola to Khartum ... Facing A 154
Sketch on back of Gordon's letter, Novem
ber 4th 191
Sketch Map Showing Position of Enemy round
Khartum and the Breach in Defences
through which they entered january 26th... 29 1
Ill
WHY GORDON PERISHED.
CHAPTER I.
THE SUDAN DISASTERS.
When the Prince of Wales, on a memorable public
occasion, referred to the Hero of Khartum as " the
never-to-be-forgotten Gordon," His Royal Highness
expressed not only his own high personal estimate
of him but also that of his fellow-countrymen.
Future generations will likewise regard him as the
Great Englishman of the Nineteenth Century, in
whom genius and virtue, patriotism and self-
abnegation were illustriously combined.
These high characteristics, which had marked every
step of General Gordon's eventful career, were con
spicuously displayed in the last service he was called
upon by its Constitutional Rulers to render to his
country. Although they knew the perils and diffi
culties which would have to be encountered in its
discharge, they had every confidence in his ability
to carry it out successfully. This was frankly
admitted by Lord Tweedale in moving the Address
to the Queen's Speech on February, 1884.
His Lordship then said that, while he thought
Gordon's mission to the Sudan could not fail to be
B
2 WHY CORDON PERISHED.
attended with success, he did " not mean to suggest
for a moment that it would not be attended with
risk and peril," nor did he think General Gordon
was a man to draw back from danger "when he
hoped to obtain a great good by encountering that
danger."
The lives of 40,000 Egyptian troops and 5,000
civilians, and that of their wives, children, and
servants, had been endangered by the reckless
manner in which Her Majesty's Government had
decided upon carrying out its policy with respect to
the Egyptian provinces in the Sudan. Humanity
and British honour demanded their rescue, and
General Gordon, ready to perish in the attempt,
nobly responded to that call.
We know how he faithfully discharged the high
duties he had so patriotically undertaken ; how he
held that fortress on the Nile against the savage
hordes who besieged it—held it hoping, when its
position became critical, against hope that those who
were responsible for his safety would send him that
relief which any British officer had a right to expect.
But, as we know, that succour was so tardily sent,
and so planned that it might not conflict with the
policy that had called for his mission, that it came
too late to save the fortress he had so long and so
bravely held. When it fell his high sense of duty
led him to choose rather to share the fate he
evidently knew its fall would bring upon those who
had so confidently and patiently aided in its defence
—to share it with them.
Mr. Gladstone thus eloquently recognised this self
TOUCHING KOVAL SYMPATHY.3
sacrifice of General Gordon when he told Parliament
that :—
With reference to those persons—the garrison and Egyptian
officials of Khartum —the lamented General Gordon had so
well vindicated his title to the character of hero, now recog
nised throughout the civilised world !
The reference made by H.R.H. the Prince of
Wales to General Gordon, on the occasion referred
to, not only recognises his high characteristics . as
a man, a patriot, and a soldier, but also/ patheti
cally suggests the circumstances under which his
valuable life was sacrificed. Its keynote was that of
profound regret and touching sorrow for such a
national loss.
In these sentiments our Beloved Sovereign was in
perfect and sympathetic accord with her Royal son,
for in the first letter of sympathy received by the
late Miss Gordon * after the news had been received
of the disaster at Khartum was from Her Majesty,
and was as follows :—
How shall I write to you, or how shall I attempt to
express what I feci t To think of your noble, heroic brother,
who served his country and his Queen so truly, so heroically,
and with a self-sacrifice so edifying to the world, not having
been rescued! That the promises of support were notfulfilled
—which I sofrequently and so constantly pressed on those who
asked him to go— is to me grief inexpressible; indeed, it has
made me ill I
My heart bleeds for you, his sister, who have gone through
* This letter was by Her Majesty's permission published by the late
Miss Gordon in her book—" Letters from General Gordon to hit
Sister." (Messrs. MacMillan & Co.)
B 2
4 WHY GORDON 1'EKISHEI).
so many anxieties en his account, and who loved the deat
brother as he deserved to be.
You are all so good and trustjul, and have such strongfaith,
that you will be sustained even now, when real evidence of
your dear brother's death does not exist; but Ifear there can
not be much doubt of it. Some day I hope to seeyou again, to
tellyou all I cannot express. My daughter Beatrice, who has
felt quite as I do, wishes me to express her deepest sympathy
with you.
I have so many expressions of sorrow and sympathy from
abroad, from my eldest daughter the Crown Princess o/
Germany, andfrom my cousin the King of the Belgians—the
very warmest.
Would you express to your other sisters and your elder
brother my true sympathy; and what I do so keenly feel is the
stain left upon England for your dear brother's cruel though
heroicfate.
In subsequently acknowledging the gift from Miss
Gordon of the Bible which had been the constant
companion of her brother, the Queen, after asking
how many years her " dear heroic brother " had had
it with him, thus expressed her appreciation of it :—
/ shall have a case made for it, with an inscription, and
place it in the library here with your letter and Hie touching
extractfrom his last note to you. I have ordered, as you know,
a marble bust of your dear brother to be placed in the corridor
here, where so many busts of our greatest generals and states
men are.
The extract from Gordon's last letter* to his
* This letter, dated Khartum, December 14th, 1884, was brought
down by one of Gordon's steamers that left there on that day, and
received by Sir C. W. Wilson on January 21st, when with three others
the met the Expedition at Gubat near Mutemma.
A "HERO" AMONGST HEROES. 5
sister here referred to' by Her Majesty was as
follows :—
This may be the last letter you will receive from me, for we
are on our last legs owing to the delay of the Expedition.
However, God rules to His glory and our welfare. His will
be done I
The letter from which this was taken had this
postscript :—
P.S.—I am quite happy, thank God, and, like Lawrence, I
have tried to do my duty.
Such were the high encomiums paid to General
Gordon by our Beloved Sovereign, and such her
pathetic references to his loss and the causes which
led to it. The burden of her " inexpressible grief"
was that " the promises of support made to him
" were not fulfilled by those who had asked him to
go " to a post of danger and Gordon's " cruel
though heroic death ! " And, then, that Gordon
should never be forgotten, and as if by way of a
Royal protest against those who had allowed him
to perish and thus stain the honour of England—
reminiscences of him were placed by the Queen
amongst the memorials of our greatest generals and
statesmen.
It is not often that British Sovereigns have
ventured to criticise the conduct of affairs by their
Constitutional advisers. Her Majesty was fully
justified in calling attention, as was done in the
above letter to Miss Gordon, to the policy of those
who administered Her Government because it
6 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
culminated in consequences which she regarded
as a stain upon England.
With this policy, defined by Mr Gladstone as
one of " Rescue and Retire," and especially with the
disastrous consequences by which it was. followed,
we now propose to deal in these pages.
No fault will or can be found with the advice
given to the late Khedive and his Government to
abandon the Sudan provinces of Egypt, for they
were grossly misgoverned and were a drain upon
its resources. We are at issue, however, with Her
Majesty's Government with the manner by which
they eventually enforced their advice, because it so
endangered the Egyptian garrison and officials and
others who remained loyal to the Khedive as to
oblige our intervention for their rescue. Had we
exercised sooner the authority we had unquestion
ably acquired in the direction of the affairs of
Egypt by our victory at Tel-el-Kebir and by our
armed occupation of it, that part of the policy which
obliged our intervention on behalf of those Egyptian
garrisons and officials would have been avoided. As
a consequence, we became virtually responsible for
their sad fate as well as for the death of the great
soldier whose services were accepted for their rescue.
And the responsibility thus incurred has not been
recognised as fully or as deeply yet as it ought to be.
The massacres of these garrisons and officials and
others implicated with them by the Mahdi, and the
savage cruelties by which they were accompanied,
are comparatively more appalling than were the
atrocities in Upper Armenia, which so recently
APrEALING TO THE CONSTITUTION. 7
roused the indignation of civilised humanity, and led
Her Majesty's Government, in concert with France
and Russia, to demand from the semi-civilised
Power responsible for them such guarantees in the
management of its affairs as would prevent their
recurrence.
When the causes which led to the massacres in
the Sudan and the death of General Gordon are
elearly apprehended and duly weighed, unless the
machinery of our Constitution is an absolute failure,
and unless the people of this country abandon all
their political control over the policy pursued on the
nominal responsibility of their rulers, some adequate
measures should be adopted in order to prevent the
squabbles of any Cabinet and the necessities of
Parliamentary tactics from ever again—as was the
case in this instance—inflicting similar bloodstains
on the national honour !
In reopening the question of responsibility for the
fall of Khartum, General Gordon's death, and those
other, disasters in the Sudan which preceded and
accompanied these catastrophes, we are not un
mindful that at the time of their occurrence the
policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government was
on several occasions discussed in Parliament, and
unfavourably criticised. Resolutions which were
moved by the. Leader of Her Majesty's Opposition
on several of these occasions were negatived by small
majorities strictly on Party votes.
The last of these Parliamentary discussions took
place when Parliament met in February, 1885, soon
after the fall of Khartum, when Her Majesty's Oppo
8 WHY GORTON PERISHED.
sition in both Houses moved Resolutions censuring
the Government. And if these Resolutions had
been affirmed there would have been less reason than
we now have for recalling attention to these disasters
in the Sudan. Had the full facts of the case against
the Government been fairly and fully brought before
this High Court of the nation, the Plaintiffs to it
would, in our opinion, have obtained a verdict.
The Plaintiffs, Her Majesty's Opposition, did on
this occasion make out a strong case, for they were
able to point out that the warnings they had
given had been fully and sadly justified by events.
They could, however, have greatly strengthened
their case had they been informed of the actual
state of affairs at Khartum when it fell, and as to
the true causes which contributed to the failure of
the Expedition sent for its relief. Her Majesty's
Government withheld the information they must
have possessed on both these points until the storm
of indignation which the great catastrophe had
raised against it, both in and out of Parliament, had
been weathered.*
* Her Majesty's Government were at the time in possession of
information which was caleulated to put an entirely different face on
the disaster at Khartum, and the failure of the Expedition to relieve
it. For instance, when Lord Wolscley telegraped them that the
Commander of Gordon's steamers, which put in an appearance at
Mutemma on January 2lst, had brought a letter from him with this
message:—"Khartum all-right, could hold out for years," he must
also have included in his message that Gordon's journal bad been sent
down by one of them which had left Khartum on December 14th,
and that in its last entry on that day stated that if the Expeditionary
Force, or more than 300 men of it, did not come in ten days the town
A PREPOSTEROUS CONSIDERATION. 9
Then, again, when the Ministerial responsibility for
what had happened in the Sudan was discussed in
Parliament, nobody who took part in the discussion
supposed that the Commander of the Nile Expedi
tion had erred in the advice he had given as to the
route which should be adopted first, or had made
any mistakes in conducting it which might have
contributed to that failure. In fact, the resolutions
in both Houses made no reference at all to such a
contingency. The general impression, both in and
out of Parliament, at the time—and, to a certain
extent, still existing—was that Lord Wolseley could
not have made any mistakes at all !' His military
prestige made any consideration of that kind appear
too preposterous for serious consideration in connec
tion with the fall of Khartum.
We can easily understand why the leaders of Her
Majesty's Opposition, as well as the Government,
could not have entered into any discussion of the
manner in which the expedition had been conducted.
In the first place, they had not been sufficiently
might fill. At any rate, 1 1 is Lordship when he sent this message must
have known about this entry, and from a perusal of others in the
journal that no mention whatever was made or suggested in them that
Gordon feared this catastrophe on account of treachery.
We can readily understand, on the ground of necessary precaution,
that much of the information the Government had received from
Gordon was rightly withheld when the Expedition was advancing for the
relief of Khartum ; such, for example, as the letter Lord Wolseley
received from him at Wady-Halfa on November 17th, given further
on. But now that the place had fallen, and Gordon was killed, no
such reasons could be advanced for withholding any of it, and
especially that just noticed.
10 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
informed on the subject, and, in the next place
—constitutionally and according to Parliamentary
procedure—the Ministers of the Crown could only
be held responsible for any military operations
ordered by them. The only manner in which Lord
Wolseley'^hction was mentioned was in connection
with the Nile route. This, Parliament was told, had
been adopted by the Government, as the Earl of
Morley (Under Secretary for War) told the House of
Lords in reply to a question about it,—that the various
opinions as to the best route had been weighed, and
that—
After a most careful consideration, and with the full concur
rence of Lord Wolseley, it was decided that the route by the
Nile was the only route possible at the time the Expedition
was finally decided upon by the Government.
In their defence they might, indeed, have gone
further than this, and stated that the noble and
gallant lord had himself such confidence in being
able to reach Khartum by the Nile route that he
had accepted the command of the Expedition up the
Nile when Sir Frederick Stephenson, who had given
an adverse opinion to that route, could not properly
be called upon to conduct it. Hut of this more
further on.
The Government made many statements in the
debate referred to in defending their Sudan policy
and to account for its disastrous failure—based upon
vague rumours or on imperfect and therefore untrust
worthy information, and, in some instances, upon the
misconstruction of what was substantially correct.
BOLT OUT OF THE BLUE. II
Ministers and their supporters outside of Parliament
followed the same line of defence.
We only mention here the following examples of
their statements, reserving our comments upon them
for a future occasion.
The late Earl Granville, in his statement in the
House of Lords on February 9th, with respect to the
failure of the Nile Expedition to relieve Khartum,
said :—
We had cheerful messages from General Gordon, with
whom we had at last got into somewhat closer communica
tion, and our troops were triumphing over many material
difficulties. It was on the 4th of the month—at a moment
when we were expecting to hear of the meeting between Sir
Charles Wilson and General Gordon—that the dreadful news
arrived that, what military attacks and attempts to starve the
garrison had failed to do, was accomplished by an attack of
treachery against one of our greatest countrymen. This
danger had hung over General Gordon's head for weeks and
months. It could not have been averted by any precipitate
action on our part—indeed, it appears to have been accelerated
by the approach of our troops.
The Earl of Morley (Under Secretary for War)
in the debate on the Resolution of Censure subse
quently moved in the House of Lords by the
Marquis of Salisbury, denied the statement made by
another Earl that Gordon had been abandoned, and,
in support of this denial, gave expression to the
following view of the fall of Khartum :—
The whole question, he stated, was one of time and means.
In a matter of this kind those who do not succeed are always
in an unfavourable position, but when great military operations
are undertaken, one h:is to consider whether there is a reason
12 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
able prospect of success. The result shows that we had a
reasonable prospect of success. Supposing that Khartum
could have been reached by General Wolseley in time to
relieve it, then the Expedition would not have been a case of mis
calculation ; but in point of fact Lord Wolseley nearly
succeeded in reaching Khartum in time, and but for treachery
he would have been in time. Therefore the military operations
were not miscalculated.
In the debate on the Vote of Censure on the Govern
ment, moved by the late Sir Stafford Northeote
(afterwards Earl of Iddesleigh), iMr. Gladstone took up
the parable of treachery in defence of the Govern
ment. In support of this theory, he made the
following statements :—
Lord Wolseley, in his despatch of January nth, informed
the Government that a messenger who left Korti on the iSth of
December had just returned. He was in Khartum one day
and left it on the 28th of December. And what was his
report ? That Gordon was in perfect health, and the troops
on the steamers he saw were well and happy. The steamers
seized cattle and grain and take them up the river to
Khartum.
Mr. Gladstone also quoted another despatch trom
Lord Wolseley stating that two Colonels of Gordon's
black troops had told him that Khartum had fallen
through treachery.
Gordon, Mr. Gladstone stated, had informed them in a
despatch dated August 14th, that he had provisions for five
months and hoped to get more. On December 14th he sent a
messenger to Korti, who told Lord Wolseley that the troops
in Khartum were suffering from lack of provisions. Food
they still had was little—some grain and biscuit—and that
Gordon wanted them to come quickly. The messenger goes
A MISLEADING TICLEGRAM. 13
on to say that there were neither butter nor dates and little
meat in the town, and that all food was very dear. And then
Mr. Gladstone quoted the long letter brought by the messenger
" Khartum all right."
In order to reconcile these conflicting accounts,
Mr. Gladstone attempted to do so by the-wish -
being - father - to - the - thought mode of dealing
with such information. In this instance it was as
follows :—
The scarcity which was stated to exist on the date on which
the messenger left Khartum, December 14th, was relieved
subsequently, for, according to the report of the messenger who
had left there on December 28th, it had been relieved by the
successful trips of Gordon's steamers.
As we refer more fully to these and other state
ments by Her Majesty's Government relative to the
fall of Khartum further on, we only remark now
that Gordon's steamers were actually absent from
there since December 14th. This and other facts
lead us to doubt whether this last messenger ever
had been in Khartum at all !
The two Colonels whose opinion Lord Wolseley
regarded as valuable enough to telegraph to the
Government had all along been on board of these
steamers, and therefore could not have been in
a position to state what they did. They did know,
of course, that although treachery had existed in
Khartum, Gordon had been able successfully to
deal with it. Mr. Gladstone, as we must willingly
admit, honestly believed all he stated. He was
evidently at the moment influenced by Lord
Wolseley's telegrams, in which, we confess, in this
14 WHY GORDON rERISHED.
and other instances, any reason deducible from them
was advanced, and honestly, we must admit, to
account for the failure of the Expedition.
Sir Charles Dilke gave expression to his views on
the subject in the following very confused state
ment :—
There is every evidence to show that there was plenty of
food to enable the garrison to hold out until Lord Wolseley's
forces reached the city in the ordinary course of events.
General Gordon informed us over and over again that he had
food to last up till the end of December—at least, till the end-
of September.
The Duke of Devonshire who, as Minister of War,
might be supposed to have been better informed on
the subject than any other member of che Cabinet,
expressed the same views as to the cause of the
catastrophe as did Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville.
During the debate, and near its elose, the real truth
nearly leaked out, through General Gordon's farewell
letter to Colonel Watson finding its way into the
newspapers. This letter was dated, Khartum,
December 14, and stated that the garrison was on
" its last legs," and that the town might fall any day
after that date. It, however, carried no weight, for it
was not official.
This letter, with others and Gordon's journals, was
brought down to us at Gubat by the Bordeen, which,
with the other three steamers, met our column on
January 21. They were accompanied by two letters
from Gordon addressed to the Chief of the Staff. The
one dated December 14th, 1884, contained this state
ment :—
HEWILDERMENT AND CONFUSION. 15
The state of affairs is such that one cannot foresee further
than five or seven days, after which the town may fall. I
have done all in my power to hold out ; but I own I consider
the position is extremely critical—almost desperate.
That dated December 13th, 1884, stated that
he had left open his enelosed letters to the different
people to whom he had written in order that the
Chief of the Staff, if he thought fit, could peruse
them.
If Lord Wolseley, who knew the contents of these
letters, telegraphed them to the Minister of War, why
were they not communicated to Parliament and the
public by Her Majesty's Government ?
This absence of information, or sufficient of it to
enable Parliament to come to a satisfactory con
elusion as to the failure of the Nile Expedition,
also confused the public mind outside of it. This
was indicated in the comments made by the Press
when the news of the fall of Khartum reached
London on February 5th. Its views of the causes
which had led to it were various and conflicting.
The blow had fallen so unexpectedly, and when the
progress of the Expedition, and especially the success
of the Desert Column at Abu-Klea and near Mutemma
—with the departure from Gubat of Sir Charles
Wilson for Khartum "to join hands with Gordon "—
had excited the universal expectation of its success
it was difficult, in the absence of more definite infor
mation, to account for what had so unexpectedly
happened.
As an illustration of this bewilderment, we quote
the following observations from the Times, in its issue
i6 WHY CORDON PERISHED.
of February 6th, the day after the news had reached
London :—
The announcement of the fall of Khartum occasioned a
shock which few will ever forget. We had been accustomed
to the danger so long averted by the genius of one great
soldier, and the country had learned to believe that the resist
ance could be indefinitely protracted. When the last words
from Khartum—"All right; could hold out for years "—was
telegraphed home by Lord Wolseley, all thoughts naturally
turned to the military operations, the re-inforcemcnt of Gubat
and the advance of General Earle's flotilla. It was rumoured
too hastily that the message must be authentic ; General
Gordon's estimate of his own position was hardly likely to be
wrong. A few facts certainly appeared somewhat difficult to
understand. We do not know yet why all, or nearly all, the
Europeans in Khartum abandoned General Gordon in
September. It seemed strange that, with the command of the
river from Khartum to the Fifth Cataract below Berber,
it was found impossible to send only so few messages to
Korti. A-
That General Gordon should have given his journal to
the Pasha commanding his steamer which appeared before
Mutemma on the 21st of January seemed slightly unnatural,
for General Gordon would know that Lord Wolseley, on
striking the upper reaches of the Nile, would at once send an
officer to confer with him. Why, then, did he send his journal,
and what has become of it ?
These and other circumstances caused a certain undefined
feeling of uneasiness, which was not allayed by the report that
highly-important news from the front had been received by
the Government For months past it has only been necessary
to hint that the military policy adopted was founded on a
wrong basis, and a storm of indignation was at once brought
down ; while the comparatively rare communications from
Lord Wolseley which had been given to the public breathed a
spirit of confidence which it was heresy to gainsay. Thus,
notwithstanding warnings, the blow has fallen. It is a "bolt
AFTER WEATHERING THE STORM. 17
out of the blue," and the fall of Khartum is as yet insuffi
ciently realised.*
After weathering the storm which the fall of
Khartum, and especially the death of General
Gordon, had raised against them, both in and out of
Parliament, and when the national outburst of sorrow
and indignation these events had called forth had in
great measure spent itself, Her Majesty's Government
gradually yielded to the public demand for further
information relative to these disasters. Then followed
the letters of the War Correspondents who had
accompanied the Desert Column under Sir Herbert
Stewart, which threw valuable light on the subject.
In 1886 Sir Charles W. Wilson's book, from
" Korti to Khartum," which had evidently been
written to defend himself against the hasty and
ungenerous suggestion made by Lord Wolseley in
the despatch to the Minister of War—enelosing
his report of the attempt made by him to reach
Khartum—that if he had started earlier from Gubat
he would have been in time to prevent its fall.
In 1887 it was followed by the author's fuller
history of the Expedition up the Nile down to.
February 1st, when the news reached it at Gubat
that Khartum had fallen, and that Gordon was
killed, or supposed then to be.
In 1889 the War Office published an official
* As the remainder of this article is a criticism on the Expedition
up the Nile, in which its writer points out certain defects in its plan of
operations, which, from a military standpoint, may be regarded as
having contributed to its failure, we reserve it until we come to deal
with that part of our subject. :
C
l8 WHY GORDON rERISHED.
account of the campaigns on the Nile and in the
Eastern Sudan, ably edited by Colonel Colvile,
from materials chiefly collected, as its introduction
informs us, by Major-General Brackenbury, who
assumed the command of the Nile Column when
General Earle fell at Kirbekan. It contains
valuable information on several important points,
and from the influences under which it was written
is remarkably impartial. Our chief objection, how
ever, to it is that it attributes the failure of the Nile
Expedition to " the fortunes of war " rather than to
the mistake made in selecting the river route at too
late a date for its success to be assured, and to the
mistakes made in conducting its advance.
In spite of the light thus thrown upon almost one
of the most disastrous campaigns in our military
history, so far as its objects and operations are con
cerned, public opinion still appears to be divided as
to the causes of its failure. His political opponents
still continue to charge Mr. Gladstone personally as
the chief cause of Gordon's death and all that
followed on it. Not a few have come to the con
elusion that both himself and his Cabinet showed,
by their conduct of affairs connected with the
Sudan, that they were more anxious to prevent the
insurrection led by the Mahdi from disturbing the
peace of Egypt than they were desirous of rescuing
the endangered garrison and officials in it ; or even
of rescuing General Gordon from the dangerous
position in which they had placed him.
In military cireles, and in those in touch with
them, Lord Wolseley's selection of the Nile route for
MORE LIGHT WANTED. 19
a Relief Expedition in preference to that by Suakim
and Berber, and his conduct of it, continue to be
severely criticised.
This confusion of public opinion was manifested
during the General Election in 1892 under the follow
ing circumstances :—
The political opponents of the Liberal Party
charged it during the contest with the responsibility
of General Gordon's death from not having taken
measures earlier for the relief of Khartum. The
latter, in reply, stated that Lord Hartington (now
Duke of Devonshire), the Leader of the Unionist
Liberal party, was more responsible for the catas
trophe than was Mr. Gladstone, for he was Minister
of War at the timcj
In order to settle this vexed question, a Liberal
Unionist Member of Parliament courageously ap
pealed to the Duke of Devonshire and H.R.H. the
Commander-in-Chief for such information as would
set it at rest. Both these distinguished personages
replied that the time had not yet arrived when such
information could properly be given to the public.
C 2
20
CHAPTER II.
IK view of the facts, stated in the previous
chapter, how stands the case against Her Majesty's
Government who were in power when Khartum
fell and Gordon met his cruel but heroic death ?
They were arraigned in the High Courts of
Parliament by Resolutions censuring them for these
disasters in the Sudan.
In the House of Lords the Resolution upon which
they were thus arraigned was as follows :—
vThe deplorable failure of the Sudan Expedition to attain
its objects has been due to the undecided counsels of the
Government and to the culpable delay in commencing
operations. .
In the House of Commons the charge against the
Government for the failure to relieve Khartum was
thus stated :—
That the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government in
respect to the affairs of Egypt and the Sudan has involved
a great sacrifice of valuable lives and a heavy expenditure
without an beneficialy result.
In the House of Lords the Vote of Censure
proposed by Lord Salisbury was affirmed by an
overwhelming majority, while that moved by Sir
NOT PROVEN, AND THEREFORE 21
Stafford Northeotc was negatived by a compara
tively small one, on a strictly Party vote.
Taking into account the information in the
possession of the Government at the time, and
which was withheld by them, and the Tarty
vote in the Commons in its favour, we cannot
but regard their trial in the High Court of Parlia
ment as resulting in a verdict only of " not proven."
In other words, and plainly speaking, evidence which
would have had an important influence on the case
was withheld, and the verdict it gave was given by
what we may rightly regard as a packed jury !
Such a decision cannot, nor ought not to be
regarded as being under all the circumstances of the
case, final or satisfactory, for it leaves unanswered
the question as to where the responsibility rightly
rests for the great sacrifice of valuable lives and
heavy expenditure in the Sudan, and for the stain
on England by the circumstances under which
General Gordon met " a cruel, though heroic
death." We now, therefore, propose to answer
it, or, rather, to re-try the case with additional
evidence, and by a jury independent of Party
prejudice and jealousy, and zealous, not only for
the sake of British honour, but also in order to
secure such an administration of our affairs as will
ensure them being carried on in future in such a
manner as will prevent the recurrence of such
disasters.
The first of these causes is attributable to that
part of the Egyptian policy of Her Majesty's
Government with reference to the Egyptian
22 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
provinces in the Sudan. This was manifested when
the question of these affairs forced itself on their
attention after the victory of Tel-el-Kebir, under
the following circumstances.
It was then learned that the serious insurrection
which had broken out in these provinces was spread
ing. The military power of Egypt had been
thoroughly disorganised by the success of arms in
suppressing the rebellion led by Arabi Pasha, and
there was, therefore, a danger that it would affect
Egypt proper if not promptly dealt with. We
had got rid of one difficulty, only, however, to be
brought face to face with another seriously threaten
ing the future of Egypt. We refused to meet it.
This policy of non-interference, so decisively stated
and for some time so rigidly adhered to, led to the
disastrous consequences, as will be shown, which we
now deplore. In order to deal satisfactorily with this
initial blunder in our Egyptian policy, it is necessary
to recall the attention of our readers, though
concisely, to the leading events in the Sudan
immediately preceding the battle of Tel-el-Kebir.
It will be remembered by those acquainted with
the course of events in the Sudan, that when
General Gordon was appointed Governor-General
of it for the second time, that he went to his
post resolved to put an end to the slave trade
carried on in that region. Soon after his arrival at
Khartum he was called upon, in carrying out this
intention, to suppress two formidable rebellions—
one of the slave traders in Kordofan, and another by
them in Darfur.
TRACED TO ITS ORIGIN. *3
His success in both these expeditions resulted in
seriously checking the slave trade. Unfortunately,
he did not remain long enough at Khartum to
complete the work he had so auspiciously begun,
and consequently what he did was soon undone by
his successor, Raouf Pasha.
No One acquainted with the. condition of the
country during Gordon's administration of its affairs
—and especially in 1878-9, can come to any other
conelusion than that it was even then ripe for revolt,
and his personal energy and strict impartiality alone
prevented such a crisis. In fact a leader and an
incapable Governor-General were alone required to
bring it about. That leader now appeared in the
person of Mohammed Achmed in 1881, and the
Governor-General in that of Raouf Pasha.
All previous rebellions had been local, for the
Ethiopic tribes between the Red Sea and the Nile,
the riparian population of the Nile Valley, the
negroes of the Southern districts, and the nomad
Arab tribes of the Western Desert had nothing in
common to unite them. This want was, however,
supplied in the religious fanaticism aroused by the
teaching of Mohammed Achmed, or, as he was
called, the Mahdi.
The insurrection led by him dates from August II,
1880, and its programme seems to have been to drive
the Egyptians from the Sudan ; to restore the old
system of administering justice according to the
precepts of the Koran, to abolish all taxes excepting
the time-honoured tithe, and to pay this tax and
all the spoil he collected from " infidels " into a
24 WHY CORDON PERISHEP.
common treasury, whence it was to be distributed
for the good of the community. He appointed
four Khalifs as his successors, as well as Emirs
to govern the country and conduct all military
operations.
His religious programme was to reform Islam and
to bring, if necessary by conquest, all Moslem
countries to a better observance of the true faith, and
to subdue the Giaour, or infidels.
Raouf Pasha should at once have arrested this
pretender and intending rebel. Instead of doing so
he sent a commission of learned Moslems to Abbas
Island on the Nile above Khartum to discuss his
religious views with him. Their report was so
disturbing that the Pasha sent a force of 200 men to
bring him to Khartum.
On landing at daylight on the following morning,
Ali Effendi—one of the Adjutant-Majors—shot
down a harmless villager, believing him to be the
Mahdi. This blunder was followed by a rush of
Mohammed Achmed's followers from all quarters,
and a massacre of all but sixty of the force who had
escaped to the boats.
The Governor-General seemed to have lost his
head on receiving news of this disaster, for he
ordered a strong force to assemble at Kawa, kept
it there for a month, and then dispersed it. He
thus failed to seize the opportunity he had of crushing
an incipient insurrection.
The failure of the attempt to arrest the Mahdi
added greatly to his prestige, which was further
increased by the destruction of the force under the
VICTORIES AND ITS DEFEATS. 25
command of the Mudir of Fashoda in the following
December. This victory placed a large quantity of
arms and ammunition and stores in the hands of
the enemy.
This second victory so added to the prestige of
the Mahdi that Raouf Pasha enrolled irregular
troops from Dongola, and the Shaikeyeh and Berber
districts, which were supposed to be less disaffected
than were the others.
The insurrection was in the meantime spreading
rapidly. Darfur had arisen, the Kababish in the
north, and the Abu Reif in Sennar, and the Bisharin
on the Berber-Suakim road were wavering, while the
emissaries of the Mahdi were everywhere busily
engaged in preaching the " Holy War."
In May, 1892, Raouf Pasha who was superseded as
Governor-General by Abd-el-Kadir, on his departure
for Egypt, left Gcigler Pasha, a German and late
superintendent of Sudan telegraph lines, to administer
the Government until the arrival of his successor.
A large body of Baggaras were defeated in an
attack on an Egyptian force which had been
concentrated at Kawa ; a few weeks later they were
followed by the latter, and a strong contingent of
Shukuriyehs to Kurko. The latter were in their
turn defeated with great slaughter at Mesalamia.
Geigler Pasha on hearing of this defeat, took the
field with a large force and gained the first victory
over the Mahdi's forces at Abu-Harras.
In the meanwhile the Mahdi had concentrated
a large army at El-Obeid, and on June 7, defeated
an Egyptian force at Jebel Gadic with great loss.
36 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
This was the most important victory he had achieved,
for it rendered the position of the Government most
critical.
Abd-eI-Kadir, who had now arrived at Khartum,
therefore immediately collected troops from all parts,
and by the end of July had mobilised about 1,200
men.
A number of minor skirmishes took place while
this force was being collected, nearly all of which
resulted in favour of the enemy.
During the next two months the Government
troops met with more success—by raising the siege
temporarily of El-Obeid, and defeating a rebel force
near Duem, on the White Nile, with a loss of 3,500
killed.
These successes, which had the effect of delaying
the advance of the Mahdi on Khartum for a time,
led him, however, to take the field in person.
Towards the end of September some of the
Mahdi's troops gained a decisive victory near Bara
over 3,000 Egyptian troops who were marching to
its relief, and who lost 1,100 men and the same
number of rifles, besides a quantity of ammunition and
stores. The remnant of the force managed to reach
Bara, and in co-operation with its garrison in October
made a sortie—inflicting such losses on the besiegers
as led to many desertions from their ranks. To
such an extent had this disaffection now spread
that it was generally believed that the insurrection
in Kordofan had ceased.
Abd-el-Kadir, however, telegraphed to Cairo for a
supply of Remington rifles and ammunition in order
THEN AFTER THE VICTORY. 27
that he might still further successfully deal with the
insurrection.
This telegram somewhat qualified our satisfaction
at having suppressed one Egyptian insurrection by
the victory at Tel-el-Kebir by its bringing us face to
face, as already stated, with another, and one at such
a distance off as to immensely increase the difficulty
of similarly dealing with it.
An attempt was made to settle the question thus
raised with respect to these Egyptian Provinces by a
retrocession of Bagos and Galabat to Abyssinia, by
evacuating Kordofan and Darfur, and by opening
up to commerce the Suakim and Berber road.
Before this proposal had time to be carried out
the condition of affairs in the Sudan had become
more critical, for in a telegram Abd-el-Kadir in
formed the Egyptian Government that two batta
lions of regular troops had been destroyed in a
conflict with the rebels when on their way to Bara,
and that, unless reinforced by 10,000 men, there was
great danger of the insurrection spreading so as to
endanger the peace of Egypt proper.
But where now could such a force be obtained ?
The Egyptian army had been disbanded, and the
Government were therefore not in a position to send
the reinforcements asked for by Abd-el-Kadir. It
was therefore suggested that British officers should
at once be despatched to Khartum to organise its
defence, and that the Indian contingent, then on its
way home, should be employed in the pacification of
the Sudan. It was also suggested that General
Gordon, who was then disengaged, should be asked
WHY GORDON PERISHED.
to resume his old post as its Governor-General.
"But the Egyptian Government would have nothing
to do with him, and Her Majesty's Government
declared that they were
not prepared to undertake any Expedition into the Sudan or
" any responsibilityfor the proposed expedition or for military
operations in that district!' They, however, assented " to
certain officers proceeding to there to make inquiries, but only
on the distinct understanding that they should under no
circumstances assume to act in any military capacity?
Under these circumstances the Egyptian Govern
ment determined to raise the 10,000 men asked for
by Abd-el-Kadir from the old soldiers of Arabi's
army, as they were the only trained men in the
country.
And now what happened ? Her Majesty's Go
vernment, which was then in authority in Egypt,
offered no advice and gave no opinion. It stood
with elosed lips and folded hands, and allowed these
poor unfortunate fellaheen to be again dragged from
their homes and sent in chains, many of them to
perish miserably in the Sudan. And all this as the
result of the policy they had decided upon at the
commencement of their interference in the affairs
of Egypt, and to which they had resolved to adhere
at any cost. As the result of this non-interference,
the bones of ten thousand of these poor fellows laid
bleaching on the plains of Kordofan soon afterwards !
Her Majesty's Government having deelined to
send British officers to render military assistance to
the Egyptian troops in the Sudan, only one officer,
the lamented Colonel Stewart, was sent on a mission
crows'" feet and shields. 29
of inquiry to Khartum, where he remained for
about three months ; and his reports fully justified
his selection for such a service.* In his private
correspondence he shows how hopeless any satis
factory solution of the Sudan question would be if
it were left in the hands of Turkish Pashas and
Egyptian troops. On January 30th he wrote as
follows :—
The troops are so utterly cowardly that it is impossible to
have any sympathy with them. ... I hear an order has
been given to arm the front rank of the Egyptians with shields.
I would give anything to see an Egyptian regiment preparing
for the field—the officers weeping and trembling with fear, and
the soldiers preparing to fix shields. . . . What with
crows'-feet and shields they are a nice army, and worthy of
being commanded by their present officers.
He also wrote thus on the political situation :—
I am quite at a loss to know what to think of the Egyptian '
position here. That they are morally and physically unfit to
govern this country is evident. . . . We may lay it down
as an axiom that the Egyptians cannot govern it, and if they
mean to retain their hold on it they must employ a few
strangers in high positions. This will no doubt entail
jealousies, but 1 can see no other solution. . . . If there is
anything more certain to my mind than another it is that the
Egyptians are absolutely unfit to hold this country with a view
of doing it any good.
Colonel Stewart, however, makes an honourable
exception in his denunciation against Egyptian
Pashas in the case of Abd-el-Kadir, for he describes
him as the best, most active, and energetic Pasha
* See " l'arliamentaiy Papas, 1, 5, 6, 11, 13: Egypt, 1883.
30 WHY GORDON PERISHED
he had met in the Sudan. He had worked hard
while getting his troops into something like military
order, had sharply defeated the Arabs in Sennar,
and had succeeded in gaining the confidence and
respect of the people. But he was too honest for
the corrupt official eliques at Cairo, who managed
by Harem intrigues to have him recalled, and one
after their own hearts—Al-ed-din—sent to replace
him.
The troops raised for service in the Soudan in the
manner we have described were placed under the
command of Suleiman Pasha Niazi, a veteran of
seventy years, and nearly deaf and blind. Hussein
Pasha Suri was his second in command, and who
proved his incompetence when events left him senior
officer.
Under these circumstances, or rather from the
known unfitness of these Pashas for the services now
required of them, the Egyptian Government asked
for the services of a British officer of ability to act
as Chief of the Staff. This request was, as might
have been expected, refused, but Her Majesty's
Government relaxed so far as to allow the Khedive
to employ Colonel Hicks, a retired officer of the
Indian Army. When he reached Khartum on the
4th March, 1883, Kordofan was in the hands of the
Mahdi, Darfur and the Bar Ghazelle were holding
out, and Abd-el-Kadir had given a severe check to
the rebels in Sennar.
Colonel Hicks found such confusion and distrust
existing, and so much intriguing going on, that at
first he could get nothing satisfactorily accomplished.
IN DEFIANCE OF DUFFERIN. 3»
In fact, the troops were in rags, and from four to
six months' pay in arrear, and actually selling grain
to the rebels ! The steamers were also out of repair.
However, in spite of these difficulties, he defeated
the Mahdi's forces at Marabiah in April, and freed
Sennar. He then proceeded to withdraw his troops
to Khartum. He had thus carried out his intention
of pacifying the Eastern Soudan, and happy would
it have been for Egypt if he had been allowed " to
keep the two rivers and Sennar, and let Kordofan
settle itself."
Elated by his success, the Egyptian Government
ordered him to reconquer Kordofan, and this in
defiance of the policy laid down by Lord DufTerin
and approved by Her Majesty's Government that
they should abandon it and Darfur, and only main
tain their authority over the provinces of Khartum
and Sennar.
Sir E. Malet drew the attention of the Downing
Street authorities to this new departure on June 5th,
reporting that Colonel Hicks had asked for 6,000
additional men, but that Egypt could not supply the
necessary funds to send them, and stated that the
question consequently was, " Whether Colonel Hicks
should be instructed to only maintain the supremacy
of the Khedive in the regions between the Blue and
White Niles?"
The answer from Downing Street five days later
was :—
Report decision of Egyptian Government as soon as you
cm, taking care to ojjer no advice, but pointing out that the
Egyptian Government should clearly make up their minds
3*WHV GORDON .l'KRISHLI).
what their policy is to be, and carefully consider the question
to its financial aspect.
Had Her Majesty's Government instructed Sir E.
Malet to have forbidden the Egyptian Government to
undertake the Expedition proposed for reconquering
Kordofan, and which in their position of authority and
responsibility they were justified in doing, it will be
readily understood that Hicks and his army, which
perished in the attempt, would have been saved.
But no such action was taken. As in the case of the
poor fellaheen who formed part of this force, Her
Majesty's Government made no objection to this
Expedition, nor to the depletion of the Egyptian
Treasury by the withdrawal from it of the necessary
funds for its despatch. They thus tacitly approved
of the attempt to reconquer Kordofan, and, there
fore, made themselves largely responsible for the
terrible disaster which followed it.
There is, however, even a more serious aspect
of the matter, as the following facts, not so
generally known to the public as they ought to be,
show.
Her Majesty's Government in Parliament had
repeatedly and emphatically deelared that they were
in "no way responsible for the operations in the
Sudan or for the operations of General Hicks."
The following facts indicate, however, that they
watched those operations with an interest difficult to
harmonise with this deelaration.
They first consented to his employment in the
Sudan by the Egyptian Government, and when his
position on the staff of Sulieman Pasha, which had
PRESSED FOR AN EXPLANATION. 33
from the very first been a false one, became intoler
able they intervened to better it, as the following
correspondence between him and Sir E. Malet elearly
indicates.
In a telegram dated May 13th, Hicks asked SirE.
Malet to use his influence with the Egyptian Govern
ment in order to induce them to give him an
" indisputable command." In reply, he was informed
that he could not be made Commander-in-Chief,
because the nomination of a Christian would fan
fanaticism. A month after this communication had
been received, and he had asked to be recalled, Sir
E. Malet led him to hope that Suleiman would either
" be recalled or forced into obedience." Evidently
annoyed at the delay in removing the obstaeles which
prevented him from satisfactorily discharging the
difficult task he had undertaken, Hicks Pasha sent
in his resignation. This settled the matter, for
Suleiman Pasha was recalled, and he was appointed
Commander-in-Chief in his place.
This correspondence between Hicks Pasha and
Sir E. Malet not having been laid before Parliament,
when its purport became known through other
channels Her Majesty's Government were pressed
for an explanation, because it directly contradicted
certain statements made by it relative to the position
this English Pasha now occupied in the Sudan. It
would appear that Earl Granville, evidently ignorant
of what had taken place, at once telegraphed to
Cairo for information on the subject. An examina
tion of the archives of our British Representative
there showed that the correspondence to which we
D
34WHY GORDON PERISHED.
have referred between Hicks Pasha and Sir E-
Malet, and on his behalf with Cherif Pasha, actually
did take place.
The Blue Books also showed that several
despatches and telegrams about Hicks Pasha's
proceedings and demands were received by Sir E.
Malet and Lord Dufferin in May and June, 1883,
and that their contents were telegraphed to Downing
Street.
In one of these despatches Sir E. Malet informed
Earl Granville that, according to a telegram received
from General Hicks, dated September 5th, that he
expected to start on his Expedition to Kordofan on
the 8th, and that he had forwarded this telegram to
Cherif Pasha, possibly, we presume, as he had sent
a despatch he had received from Hicks Pasha on
April 14th for Baker Pasha, who was then in com
mand at Suakim. Instead of sending it direct to the
latter, as he had been requested, he enelosed it
"confidentially" to Cherif Pasha, "to be dealt with
by such action as his Excellency might deem
advisable." This was followed in the communication
enclosing the telegram by the old story about the
irresponsibility of Her Majesty's Government for the
operations in the Sudan " or for the appointment of
General Hicks," and that in passing on a copy
of this telegram to him, " His Excellency is not
to understand that it indicates any expression
of opinion with regard to the recommendation it
contained."
If Sir E. Malet might thus try to guard himself
from giving weight to the recommendations con
ACCESSORIES TO A CATASTROPilE. 35
tained in this telegram, by having acted as an
intermediary between a British officer and the
Egyptian Government, Cherif Pasha would how
ever, and naturally, infer from this proceeding that
the Government of that officer was interested as
much as they were in his success, and this impression
would be deepened by the last elause of the com
munication referred to :—
These remarks must not, however, Sir E. Malet informs
Cherif Pasha, be taken to the prejudice of General Hicks, who
appears to have shown himself to be a very capable officer.
I merely intended them to prevent any misunderstanding as
to the position of Her Majesty's Government in regard to
operations in the Sudan.
It appears evident, therefore, from the communica
tions which thus passed between Hicks Pasha, Sir
E. Malet, and Cherif Pasha, the Prime Minister of
the Khedive's Government, that Her Majesty's
Government tacitly consented to the despatch of an
Egyptian Expedition to reconquer Kordofan, and did
so although they had accepted and approved Lord
Dufferin's recommendation to the contrary.
The course pursued by Her Majesty's Govern- ,
ment with respect to the despatch of Hicks's-
Expedition was utterly inexcusable. England was
then in armed occupation of Egypt, and with that
occupation had made herself responsible for the
conduct of its affairs* The power with which she
* The Duke of Argyle on one occasion thus expressed himself in
the House of Lords :—" As a matter of fact—contrary to their own
will, and owing to circumstances over which they had not had control,
the Government had been placed in a position of paramount responsi
bility with regard to Egypt."
D 2
3«WHY GORDON PERISHED.
had thus become invested, ought to have been so
exercised later on in the affairs of the country to
prevent this attempt to reconquer Kordofan. In
face of Lord Dufferin's opinion on the subject, they
thus had virtually connived at its despatch, and
consequently made themselves responsible, not only
for it, but for its ulterior consequences, in the
Sudan.
The annihilation of General Hicks's army by
the Mahdi virtually placed the whole country south
of Khartum at his mercy. It left only a force
of about 2,000 Egytian troops to defend about four
miles of earthworks in Khartum. Mohammed
Achmed, who in July, 1 88 1, was only an insignificant
fanatic, surrounded by as insignificant a rabble,
was now at the head of a numerous army, and
with an arsenal of 20,000 Remington rifles and
19 guns, ineluding several Krupps and Nordenfeldts.
It was, therefore, now evident that the disaffected
provinces in which he was supreme could not be
reconquered without military operations on a scale
far beyond the present exhausted resources of Egypt.
When the news of this appalling disaster reached
London on November 21st, 1883, Earl Granville
telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Baring, who had then
replaced Sir Edward Malet, to consult Generals
Stephenson and Wood, and inform him "if the
destruction of Hicks's army and the present state
of the Sudan must be considered as a cause of
danger to Egypt proper." The reply his Lordship
received was, that it was premature to say what the
effect referred to would be, but that, in view of the
WARNED OF COMING DANGERS. 37
destruction of Hicks's army, it was not advisable
to hasten the withdrawal of the troops from Cairo.
The order which had been given for their with
drawal was consequently countermanded.
Telegraphing immediately after the above mes
sage, Sir E. Baring informed Lord Granville that
the Egyptian Government were determined to hold
Khartum, and to re-open the route between Suakim
and Berber. He, however, " felt bound to add that
according to telegrams* from Khartum, the general
opinion there was, that it was necessary to fall back
on Berber." On the very next day he telegraphed
to Downing - street, that Generals Wood and
Stephenson with himself felt that " the success of
the Mahdi seemed a danger to Egypt proper, and
would be increased by the fall of Khartum."
Lord Granville replied to this alarming message
that :—
. Her Majesty's Government could do nothing which would
throw on them responsibility for matters in the Sudanj
Subsequent events, however, showed that this
do-nothing policy at a critical juncture obliged
them soon after to abandon it, and to do that which
co-st us so many valuable lives and some millions of
money.
The first of these events was the endangered
position in which the Egyptian garrisons and officials
* One of the telegrams referred to was the following from Colonel
Coetlogen :—" Khartum and Sennar cannot hold out after two
months—the retreat on Berber should be made at once—to cany force
by river to Berber would be very difficult in a month's time, even if not
attacked. The troops left are the refuse of the Egyptian army."
38 WHY GORDON rERISHED.
were placed by the destruction of Hicks's army.
When Her Majesty's Government would not interfere
to save them from the wrath of the victorious
Dervish hordes, that of Egypt, though left to its own
exhausted resources, resolved to do so. Abd-el-Kadir
Pasha, at its request, agreed to undertake the
mission on condition that its objects should not
be made known until he had made such arrange
ments as would enable him to carry it out success
fully. Her Majesty's Government having insisted
on proelaiming the intention of an Egyptian with
drawal from the Sudan, he deelined it.
This policy of 14 Rescue and Retire," as it was
publiely defined by Mr. Gladstone, was right in itself,
but this determined premature announcement of it
was mischievous, and a potent cause of the disasters
which followed the attempts made to carry it out. As
Abd-el-Kadir foresaw, the loyally and peaceably
disposed tribes of the Sudan either remained
neutral or joined the Mahdi. The latter course
was not adopted by them from any love they had for
him, but simply from the very natural conelusion that
if they compromised themselves with us, he would
regard them as enemies, and after our withdrawal
treat them as such.
39
CHAPTER HI.
The following incidents connected with Gordon's
mission painfully illustrates the results of this pre
mature announcement by Mr. Gladstone of his
" Rescue and Retire" policy. ;
When he arrived at Khartum in the middle of
February (1884), the Mahdi, who was then at El-
Obeid, learned, through messengers sent by Zebehr
Pasha, that the English and Egyptian Governments
had decided to abandon the Sudan, and to make
Assouan the southern frontier of Egypt, and received
a message from Osman Digma that he had defeated
the English troops which had been sent against him.
The news caused great joy in the Dervish camp
there, and led the Mahdi to the resolution ofadvancing
at once on Khartum, and he soon afterwards put his
troops in motion for that purpose.
If Father Oberwalder is to be depended upon, he,
confirms the objection raised by Abd-el-Kadir by his
statement that when Gordon arrived at Berber, on
his way to Khartum, he told Hussein-Khalifa Pasha
the object of his mission, and that the consequent
prospect of eventual abandonment by the Egyptian
Government contributed in some measure to that
town falling into the hands of the Mahdi.
From the same source we learn that when he
40 WHY CORDON PKRISHKD.
reached Mutemma, the headquarters of the Jaalin
tribe, Gordon again openly announced the intended
abandonment of the Sudan, and with similar results.
In illustration of this, Father Oberwalder mentions
the case of Haj Ali, an influential and widely-
respected trader who had gone over to the Mahdi,
and who, in explanation of his having done so, said
to him : " How could have remained loyal to a
Government which I knew intended to leave me in
the lurch afterwards ? I would only have been paving
the way for the vengeance of the Mahdi on me ! "
These statements, although very circumstantial, do
not exactly agree with those contained in the
following extract from a dateless telegram from
Gordon, sent from Cairo to London on September
18th, 1885 :—
With regard to the Finnan issued by the Khedive to all the
notables and people of the Sudan, announcing its evacuation
by Egyptian troops, and informing them that the Sudan would
be left to them, and that its rulers would be appointed from
among them, it has been impossible for me to publish it, or to
allow any of the Sudan to read it on account of their joining
the Mahdi.
I have thought if this Firman is read to them that they
would imagine that the Turkish Government had ceased to
exist, and that there is now no Government here except that of
the Mahdi. This would be in accordance with their own
imaginations, and the representations of the Mahdi to them
for the rebellion of the people of El Ghezireh, and the fighting
of the troops against the Government is due to their having
heard of the intention to evacuate the Sudan. On my arrival
here I found that these reports had gained ground in the
Sudan. I took no notice of them and issued Proclamations
for the establishment of safety and tranquillity."
STRENGTHENS THE MAHDI. 4»
In the proelamation he issued at Berber, Gordon
stated that the Sudan was now independent
and left to govern itself without the interven
tion of the Egyptian Government. It will also
be remembered that his idea was to restore the
country to the different petty sultans who reigned
there at the time of Mohammed Ali's conquest, and
whose families still existed ; and that the Mahdi
should be left altogether out of the caleulation as
regards the handing over of the country to these,
and that it should be optional with the sultans to
accept his supremacy or not.
Then, again, in a message from Abu- Hamed,
somewhat in the form of a report, he calls attention
to the fact that, as the people were accustomed to the
Government they were under, however corrupt and
oppressive it may have been, deprecated being left
without any at all.
When Gordon issued his proelamation of abandon
ment of the Sudan by the Egyptian Government,
it was not, therefore to be wondered at that the
Members of the Council he had formed at Berber
should have entered into communication with the
Mahdi, who was then a power in the land, and
become some of his strongest adherents. Amongst
these men were Suleiman Wad-Gamr, the murderer
of Colonel Stewart and his companions.
In like manner this proelamation of abandonment
issued at Suakim on January 17 arrested the move
ment which had set in in favour of the submis
sion of the wavering tribes, and was actually the
proximate cause of the fall of Sinkat ; for on the very
42 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
evening of the day of its promulgation the Rodi
and others of these tribes left Suakim to join
Osman Digma, and spread abroad the news that the
English were going to hand over the Sudan to the
Mahdi !
Sir Gerald Graham, in his last report, stated that
from the date of his arrival at Suakim he had endea
voured to establish confidence on the part of the
Amarar tribes, hoping thus to induce them to form
a league which would inelude all tribes hostile to
Osman Digma. He did not succeed, however,
because, as he explains, of the impossibility of giving
them any formal guarantee of protection.
Abd-el-Kadir's refusal to proceed to the Sudan ♦
unless his conditions were complied with, left the
question still open for discussion with Her Majesty's
Government. We therefore find that, on Novem
ber 26th, Sir E. Baring telegraphed to Downing
Street that Generals Stephenson, Wood, and Baker
had come to the conelusion that the Egyptian
Government would find it impossible to hold the
Sudan, and that it would eventually be obliged to
fall back from Khartum on Egypt proper, after
withdrawing the military garrisons, that of Khartum
holding out long enough to allow the more advanced
posts to join them.
In a subsequent message to Lord Granville, he
stated that Cherif Pasha still strongly objected to
the policy of withdrawal from the Sudan, and that
he proposed to send Zebehr Pasha to Suakim.
The reply of Lord Granville is contained in the
following despatch, which, from its important bearing
DRIVEN TO INTERVENTION. 43
on the future events with which we will have to deali
we quote in full :—
Excepting for securing the safe retreat of the garrisons still
holding positions in the Sudan, Her Majesty's Government
cannot agree to increasing the burden on the Egyptian revenue
by operations which, if even successful, which is not probable,
would be of doubtful advantage to Egypt.
Her Majesty's Government recommends the Ministers of
the Khedive to come to an early decision to abandon all
territory south of Assouan, or at least Wady-Halfa.
They will insist in maintaining order in Egypt proper, and
in defending it, as well as the ports on the Red Sea.
The employment of Zebehr Pasha appears to Her Majesty's
Government inexpedient, both politically and as regards the
slave trade.
Sir E. Baring, evidently after an interview with
Cherif Pasha, informed Lord Granville that the
objections of the Egyptian Government to the
abandonment of the Sudan was so pronounced that
he advised Her Majesty's Government to insist upon
a change of Ministers. It would, however, he
further stated, be necessary to send an English officer
of high authority to Khartum, with full powers to
withdraw all the garrisons in the Soudan, and to
make the best arrangements possible for its future
government.
The advice to insist on a change of the Egyptian
Ministry was accepted, and resulted in Cherif Pasha
being replaced by Nubar Pasha, who was pledged to
the policy of the abandonment.
When pressed on the subject in Parliament, Mr.
Gladstone defended Her Majesty's Government for
not having earlier exercised the authority they had
44WHY CORDON PERISHED.
attained in Egypt by its armed occupation, by
declaring it would have been an impertinence to do
so. Now, however, when the support of a policy
deemed beneficial to the country is in question, that
authority is exercised in the most arbitrary manner.
We fail to see, as our readers will also, where the
impertinence would have come in when the case
of reconquering Kordofan and Hicks Pasha were
considered. We are rather inelined to think, under
the circumstances, it would have been humane to
do so.
In the elosing paragraph we have the suggestion
which originated Gordon's mission to the Sudan,
for Sir E. Baring informed Earl Granville that if the
Khedive and Her Majesty's Government yielded to
the pressure put on them to withdraw from it,
that :—
It would be necessary to send an English officer of high
authority to Khartum, with full power to withdraw all the
garrisons in the Sudan, and to make the best arrangements
for the future government of the country.
On December 1st, 1883, Earl Granville asked Sir
E. Baring, if Gordon was willing to go, would he be
of any use to you or to the Egyptian Government?
No, replied the latter, for as the movement in the
Sudan was a religious one, the Egyptian Govern
ment were averse towards the appointment of a
Christian, as it would probably excite the tribes who
arc now friendly against them.
Eight days later the Khedive received a telegram
from Colonel Coetlogen, strongly urging that if it is
decided to retire from Khartum it should be at
WOULD 1JE GREATLY .OBLIGED. 45
once ordered, that the retreat might be safely
effected. This message was at once transmitted to
Downing Street. Earl Granville asked Sir E.
Baring on the 16th if Gordon or Wilson (Sir Charles
W. Wilson) would be of any use to him under the
altered circumstances of Egypt ? The reply was,
" Not at present."
As naturally consequent upon this answer, Lord
Granville asked Sir E. Baring on the 15th if he can
give him any " further information as to the pro
spects of retreat for the army and residents at
Khartum, and the measures taken relative thereto,"
and that he had heard indirectly that Gordon was
ready to go straight to Suakim and not to Cairo—
evidently implying in this mention of the route his
intention of disregarding the objections made by the
Egyptian Government to the British officer thus
selected, because of his unfitness for the duties he
would be called upon to discharge. However this
may be, the policy of " insistence " had secured the
acceptance by the Khedive and his Ministers of
the policy it forced upon them with respect to the
Sudan, for thereafter Sir E. Baring informed Lord
Granville, in reply to his message, that the Egyptian
Government would be greatly obliged if Her
Majesty's Government would select a well-qualified
officer " to evacuate the Sudan, and that he would
be given full power—civil and military—to effect
the retreat," and that in his opinion " General
Gordon would be the best man."
What a change had come over the presiding spirits
in Downing Street ! In 1882, after the victory at
WHV GORDON PERISHED.
Te\-c\-K.ebir, they refused the Egyptian Government
1\r\t\sY\ officers to aid Abd-el-Kadir to " smash the
'Nladhi," but now, when he was likely to " smash "
the garrisons and officials in the Sudan, they
listened to this request for an officer to rescue
them I
Their choice of General Gordon for this mission
was generally regarded in England with great satis
faction, excepting to a certain extent, as would seem,
by Her Majesty's Government. This appears
evident from the fact that they regretted having to
adopt his services, from the subsequent reserve in
their relations with him.
It also appears evident that when General Gordon
left England for Khartum, on January 16th, 1884,
he did not sufficiently take into account the
great change which the prestige acquired by the
Madhi and the destruction of Hicks's army had
brought about in the Sudan. One indication of
this was that, until after his arrival at Khartum,
he felt convinced it was impossible for him to carry
out his instructions unaided, and yet, as perhaps few
men would have refrained from doing, he never made
any direct appeal for assistance
Her Majesty's Government, on the other hand,
must have then likewise learned from his telegrams
that the evacuation of the Sudan and the restora
tion of its petty sultans to their former positions
was a much more difficult undertaking than they had
been led to suppose—and one which could not be
effected without their direct assistance. And yet, in
view of this unforeseen difficulty, they did not recall
A SKRIOUS AND SAD QUESTION. 47
General Gordon, the instructions they gave him for
his guidance were very indefinite, and the aid which
at last they felt obliged to send him arrived too late
to be of any value to him.
His feelings, in view of all this, were recorded in
his journal on October 5th, and in a telegram to
the Khedive on September 1 8th, when he asks His
Highness if it was right that he should have been
sent to Khartum with only seven followers after
the destruction of Hicks's army, and no attention
paid to him until his communications were cut ; and
also in three dateless telegrams received from him
on September 16th, 1884, quoted further on.
In the first of these telegrams he stated that
on his arrival at Khartum he found it was
impossible to withdraw the soldiers and Egyptian
employes, in consequence of the insurrection of the
Arabs and the interruption of communications,
and therefore he telegraphed, " I asked for
reinforcements."
On March 2nd, or a fortnight after his arrival
at Khartum, he sent this despatch to Sir E.
Baring :—
I maintain the policy of eventually evacuating the Soudan,
including Khartum ; next anarchy will ensue, about which I
would not trouble myself ; next chaos. I see impossibility of
immediate withdrawal of all Egyptian employes, and the
remedy I propose is sending up Zebehr as my successor, who
would receive for a time a subsidy from the Egyptian Govern
ment, in order to enable him to maintain an armed force
there.
These are my ideas. ... I have no option about staying
at Khartum—it has passed out of my hands—and as to sending
WHV GORDON PKRISHED.
a\arger force than 200 men to VVady-Halfa, I do not think it
necessary. // is not the number but the prestige which I need.
\ am sure the revolt will collapse if / can say that I have
British troops at my back.
In reply to Sir E. Baring's request that he should
more distinctly state his views, Gordon telegraphed
back as foilows :—
Two-thirds of the people are terrorised over by one-third,
excited by the emissaries of the Mahdi. Instead of supporting
the two-thirds, our undisguised intention is to get Egyptian
employes out of the Sudan. To this the two-thirds strongly
object, for it leaves them impotent. To-day—daily go down—
all sick, widows, and orphans, and there remain 1,400 fellaheen
soldiers. Supposing I send down these fellaheen soldiers, in
a few days the town would send its submission to the Mahdi,
and all the machinery of the Government would be caught. It
would not be from love of the Madhi, but because they are
hopeless. They would be perfectly right to do so.
You see, therefore, the fix. What is true here is true else
where, and is, in a few words, this : that the evacuation of
the Sudan is impossible until the Government asserts its
authority ; and I mean by evacuation the removal of all
Egyptian employe's who form the machinery of the Govern
ment, and not the departure of the sick, &c, who may be
considered to have gone from here.
We can hold out and force back the revolt, but the condition
will not ameliorate by time, and our money must come to an
end.
You have to say whether this partial evacuation of the
Sudan fulfils your desires. If it does not, then you must act
by Indian Moslem troops from Wady-Haifa; and do so at
once by sending detachments of troops there.
Another telegram on the same day stated that :—
If Zebehr comes up it will be absolutely necessary for me
to stay here four months.
ZEHEHR AND MYSELF. 49
Then on the next day (March 3rd) he telegraphed
again as follows :—
The combination of Zebehr and myself is absolutely
necessary for success, and I beg you and Lord Granville
to believe my certain conviction that there is not the slightest
danger of our quarrelling, for Zebehr would know that the
subsidy depended on my safety. To do any good we must be
together, and that without delay.
He telegraphed on the 4th to Sir E. Baring again
that a caravan had come in direct the day before from
Dongola—the first which had passed this road for
years—and that this was a good sign, adding, however,
that :—
All things are not serious, although they may become so if
delay occurs in sending up Zebehr. My weakness is that of
being a foreigner and Christian, and peaceful, and it is only
by sending up Zebehr that prejudice can be removed. I wish
you would question Stewart on the subject. ,
Colonel Stewart at the same time reported to Sir
E. Baring by telegraph that :—
The principal desire of General Gordon is to have Zebehr
as soon as possible. His reasons are that he is the only man
who can hold the country together, at any rate for a time, after
the evacuation. Being a Pasha among the Shagie irregulars,
he will be able to get at sources of information and action now
closed to us. He will be opposed to the Mahdi. I agree with
Gordon. - :
Sir E. Baring very strongly supports this demand
from Gordon for Zebehr on the same principle of
policy as that adopted by the Government of India
towards Afghanistan and the tribes on the North
western frontier:—
E
WHY GORDON PERISHEO.
1 have always, he informed Earl Granville, contemplated
making some such arrangement for the future government of
the Sudan, as will be seen from my despatch of December
22nd, 1883, in which I said it would be necessary. As regards
slavery, it certainly receives a stimulus from the abandonment
of the Sudan by Egypt, but the dispatch of Zebehr Pasha to
Khartum will not affect the question one way or the other.
We must either virtually annex the whole country—which is
out of the question—or else we must accept the inevitable
consequences of the policy of abandonment.
You see what Gordon says about the security of Egypt. I
believe that Zebehr Pasha may be made a bulwark against the
approach of the Mahdi. Of course there is a risk that he will
constitute a danger to Egypt, but the risk is a small one, and it
is in any case preferable to incur it rather than face the certain
disadvantages of withdrawing without making any provision
for the future government of the country, which would, without
such provision, fall under the power of the Mahdi.
Colonel Stewart, in the despatch from which we
have just quoted, agrees with Sir E. Baring on the
importance of not consigning the Sudan to the
Madhi or anarchy.
It seems evident to me, he stated in his telegram, that it is
impossible for us to leave the country without leaving some
sort of established government which would last at any rate
for a time ; and Zebehr is the only man who can insure that.
Also that we must withdraw the Sennar and other besieged
garrisons, and here Zebehr can greatly assist us.
The principal objections, Colonel Stewart continues, are, that
Zebehr has an evil reputation as a slave dealer and his enmity
to Gordon. As to the first of these objections, it will have to
be defended on the plea that no other course is open except
British annexation or anarchy. As regards the second objec
tion, if precautionary measures are taken, such as making a
subsidy through General Gordon, I think Zebehr will see
through that his interests are in working with Gordon.
1
NOT BEYOND ITS LINE.
Colonel Stewart then refers to the secondary
measures proposed by General Gordon, which were
that :—
When the Berbcr-Suakim road is clear, to send a small force
of Indian or British cavalry to Berber, and a small force of
British cavalry to Wady-Halfa. These measures, showing that
we have forces at our disposal, would assist our negotiations
with the rebels and hasten evacuation.
Both General Gordon and Colonel Stewart, from
their anxiety to disabuse the minds of Her Majesty's
Government that they intend to do something or
other which may militate against the carrying out of
the decision to abandon the Sudan, repeat their
adherence to that policy, as will be noticed in
Gordon's despatches, and in this one of Colonel
Stewart's. It will also be noticed that, almost every
time Lord Granville excuses his rejection of
Gordon's demands, he calls attention to that policy.
Beyond its line they are not to go, and he will not, by
relaxing it, tempt them to do so.
For example, in reply to some telegram not
published, but evidently emanating from high
quarters, Gordon telegraphed Sir E. Baring on
March^rd as follows :—
Pray do not consider me in any way to advocate the reten
tion of the Sudan. I am quite averse to it ; but you must
see that you could not recall me, for I have named men to
different places, thus involving them with the Madhi. How
could I look the world in the face if I abandoned them and
fled ? Could you, as a gentleman, advise this course?
Sir E. Baring evidently could not advise such a
dishonourable course, being a gentleman, and there
E 2
5*WHV CORDON PERISHED.
fore instinctively replied to this appeal to his honour
that there was not the slightest intention of recalling
him.
And if the same question had been as categorically
put to Mr. Gladstone, he could not have answered in
any other way than by an indignant negative. Yet,
when making a formal statement in Parliament as a
politician, soon after news of Gordon's death had been
received, he said that Gordon was free to leave
Khartum if he found himself in danger, and might
have escaped to the Equator. It is true he recalled this
utterance when it was met by a volley of "Ohs ! " from
gentlemen in the House of Commons. Many of his
Radical supporters of the rightly so-called " Little
England Party " even now, however, repeat this libel
on Gordon for party purposes. They do so, either
because they were ignorant of the nature of the
mission which Gordon had undertaken, and the
dishonour to which a British officer who had been
sent to hold a fortress would be exposed who left his
post without orders, however dangerous it might
have become to himself personally.
It is true, as will be seen further on, that when
Her Majesty's Government, later, saw how fatal
might be their refusal of Gordon's requests for aid
in order to rescue the garrison of Khartum, they
did send him orders to retreat with it on Berber.
But this was when that retreat had been cut off
through the place having fallen, by their neglect,
into the hands of the rebels.
In order finally to dispose of this attempt to elear
Her Majesty's Government from all responsibility,
HOLD ON AT KHARTUM. 53
made not only by Mr. Gladstone, but by other
members of the Cabinet both in the " Lords " and
" Commons," we quote Gordon's entry in his journal on
November 7th in which, being dead, he yet speaketh
to those who still repeat this slander :—
Her Majesty's Government, or rather my friend Baring, told
me I was not to leave Khartum for the Equator until I had
permission ; 1 have his telegram * (so that if it was possible
and I could do it) if I did leave Khartum I would be acting
against orders.
In the despatch of March 2nd, in which Sir E.
Baring asked Gordon to inform him more particu
larly what his views and wishes were, he told him
that Her Majesty's Government were considering
the question of a successor in the Governorship of
the Sudan, and that Lord Granville had expressed
a wish that he would not leave Khartum. With
respect to his request for troops to be sent to Wady-
Halfa, he further stated that he could not advise such
a small force as he had suggested—200 men—to be
sent there, but that two battalions of Egyptian
troops were at Assouan, but it was not yet decided
whether or not any force would be sent further
south.
This refusal of Her Majesty's Government for the
* Sir E. Baring, in a message to Earl Granville of March 13th,
refers as follows to this telegram :—" Id repeating your Lordship's
telegram of the I ith hut. (to General Gordon) I have instructed him
to hold on at Khartum until I can communicate further with Her
Majesty's Government, and have told him that 1 he should on no
account proceed to the Bahr-Gazelle or Equatorial Provinces." (" Blue
Book," Egypt 12, 1884, "Despatch " 242.)
54 WIV GORDON PERISHED.
modest amount of help he had asked as an absolute
necessity for the successful carrying out of his
mission, provoked from Gordon the following reply
to i t :—
Through the weakness of the Government many have joined
the rebels. All news confirms what I already have told you—
that we shall before long be blockaded. The utility of Zebchr
is greatly diminished, owing to our weakness, which has led the
loyal people to join our enemy.
In the event of sending an Expedition to Berber, the greatest
importance is speed. A small advance-guard there would
keep the riparian tribes between this and it quiet, and would
be an assurance to the population of the towns. The rebels
are five hours distant from the Blue Nile.
If wire is cut I shall consider your silence as a consent to
my propositions, and shall hold out and await Zebehr and
diversion at Berber. Through delay in sending up Zebehr,
the sending him up is now inseparable from British occupation
of Berber. Zebchr's value naturally diminishes as the tribes
take up sides with the Mahdi.
It is evident, even from that portion of his
correspondence with Sir E. Baring we have given,
that Gordon now found it impossible to secure the
evacuation of the Sudan garrisons without the
adoption of other measures than those which he
had originally contemplated for the purpose. Her
Majesty's Government, however, seemed unwilling
to admit that any such an alteration had taken place
in the condition of affairs there as to require their
acquiescence to his demands for the occupation of
Berber by a British force or for Zebehr Pasha. They
defended their rejection of the latter on the unfavour
able character given to the man by Gordon himself
in a communication from him when he arrived at
MISDIRECTED PUnLIC OPINION. 55
Abu-Hamed, when on his way to Khartum. Public
opinion in England, they also pleaded, was averse
to making this notorious slave-trader his successor
in the Sudan. In one despatch from Downing-
street to Cairo, their refusal was based on grounds of
policy—that is, probably, from a fear of Zebehr
becoming so powerful in the Sudan as to be a
source of danger to Egypt proper.
56
CHAPTER IV.
The fear of public opinion was the reason given
by Earl Granville in his despatch of February 22nd
to Sir E. Baring for refusing Gordon's request for
Zebehr. Why this public opinion was feared Mr.
Gladstone substantially told Parliament in May,
1884, when the Motion of Censure upon Her
Majesty's Government, made by Sir Michael Hick-
Beach, was under discussion.
Mr. Gladstone then said :—
1 am going to make a confession. I may give offence,
perhaps, to some Hon. (Gentlemen behind me ; but for my part
I felt a disposition to go every length not inconsistent with
principle in the support of General Gordon's recommendation.
General Gordon told us and gave as his reasons for thinking
so, that Zebehr, if inclined to the slave trade, would not be
able to pursue it, and would have the strongest possible motive
for not attempting to pursue it in case we allowed him to stay
at Khartum. For my part I thought the arguments and the
weight due to General Gordon so great, and that in my mind
it would have been a great question whether we ought not to
have given way to his wish ? Yes, but for one consideration ;
and what was that consideration ? Why, that we should not
have announced that intention forty-eight hours when a vote
would have been passed in this House, not merely to condemn
the Government, which is a trumpery affair, but to recall Zebehr,
and I think that not improbably the Right Hon. Gentleman
would have been the man to make that motion.
HAVK WE COME TO THIS? 57
Parliamentary tactics and Party interests on both
sides of the House of Commons were painfully
displayed in this debate, on a question which
may be safely regarded as involving the safety of
Gordon and the Khartum garrison and Egyptian
cniployt's there.
If General Gordon was right in asking for Zebehr
—as Mr. Gladstone seemed strongly inelined to
think—he should have yielded to his urgent appeals
for him to be sent to Khartum. They dared not do
so, according to his admission, from a fear of being
left in a minority ! Have we come to this in the
management of our affairs by Party Government ?
Are Her Majesty's Ministers no longer to be animated
by a sense of what is right, and by a conviction of
duty to their Queen and country ? or are they to be
left by the British people, as in this case, to pursue a
line of conduct which would secure for them a Party
majority in order that they might retain office ?
In review of the appeals from Gordon for aid from
Her Majesty's Government to enable him to carry out
his mission, and their constant refusal of any one of
them, we quote the following censure pronounced
upon them by one of their own supporters, Mr. Joseph
Cowen, during the debate :—
The Ministry desire to dissociate General Gordon from the
garrisons. This is impossible. They sneakingly suggest that
he should sacrifice his comrades in captivity and decamp.
Hut they mistake their man. It was the helpless to help and
the hopeless to save that sent him on his forlorn and chivalrous
mission, and he spurns such cowardly counsels. . . . His
ability or inability to hold out does not acquit us of our
accountability for hiin, and for them with him.
$8 WHY GORDON PERISHKD.
Referring to the objection raised by some of the
supporters of the Government to an Expedition for
Gordon's relief, that although as an economist he
did not approve of it, he further said :—
When a nation halts to count the expense of doing its duty
it parts with the essence of its virility. Other members, he
continued, object to an Expedition because scores of lives may
be lost to save one. Very likely. But England's amenability
for the safety of her citizens and the redress of their wrongs is
no perfunctory engagement prescribed by Charter. It is
comprehensive and far reaching. Occasions, in fact, may and
have arisen when the whole strength of the Empire must be
put forth to get reparation for a solitary act of injustice by a
foreign power, on even the humblest British subject. But the
number will be greater from the decrepitude and nervelessness
of ministers. Had they acted with decision at first, and if
they had moved to the relief of Sinkat and Fokar sooner, we
should have been saved the slaughter of El Teb and Tamanieb.
If they had sent 500 sabres to Berber after General Graham's
victory the road to Khartum would now be open and the
refugees on their way to Cairo I
Had this last operation been authorised by Her
Majesty's Government, and not been hindered by Sir
E. Baring's peace policy, as Gordon calls it, there
would have been no necessity for him to ask for
Zebehr as his only alternative. The refusal to keep the
Suakim and Berber road open was, perhaps, the most
serious of all the causes which contributed to the
failure of Gordon's mission and the disasters in the
Sudan, and as such it now elaims our attention. In
order more elearly to understand its bearing on these
points, we must go back to the period when the
services of Gordon were invoked by Her Majesty's
Government in January, and to his original plan of
CAPTURED AND CHECKMATED. 59
operations for the evacuation of the Sudan. This
was to proceed direct to Khartum vi:\ Suakim and
work through Sidi Osnian of Kassala and Sheik
Musa of the Hadendowas and the Beni-Ameer tribe.
After thus pacifying the Eastern Sudan, he pro
posed to proceed to Khartum and establish some
form of government through the petty sultans who
governed the country before it was conquered by
Mehemet Ali.
Beiore Gordon left London—namely, on January
1 6th—Earl Granville informed Sir E. Baring that
he had heard indirectly- Gcrdon was ready to go
straight to Suakim without passing through Cairo,
and asked him for his opinion.
Sir Evelyn, being of the opinion that Gordon had
better come to Cairo before doing anything with
respect to the Sudan, brought him there from
Ismailia and thus managed to get him under his
control, as the following instructions, given to him
before he left London on January 1 8th, fully
shows :—
You will be under the instructions of Her Majesty's Agent
or Consular General at Cairo through whom your reports
should be sent under flying seal. You will consider yourself
authorised and instructed to perform such other duties as the
Egyptian Government may desire to intrust you with, and as
may be communicated to you by Sir E. Baring. On your
arrival in Egypt you will at once communicate with Sir E.
Baring, who will arrange to meet you and will settle with you
whether you should proceed direct to Suakim, or go direct to
Khartum, or despatch Colonel Stewart there vi& the Nile.
To Sir E. Baring Earl Granville telegraphed on
the same day as follows:—
6o WHY GORDON PERISHED.
General Gordon will be under your instructions and will
perform such other duties beyond those specified in my
despatch as may be intrusted to him by the Egyptian
Government through you.
On the 19th, Sir E. Baring sent this message to
Earl Granville:—
I am of the opinion that it would be useless for these officers
to proceed to Suakim, as General Baker is doing all that can
be done in that quarter with the means at his disposal. They
should at first come to Cairo, and, after discussing matters
with myself and others, proceed to Khartum. ,
It was thus that Gordon was prevented from
carrying out the pacific means he intended to
employ for the evacuation of the Sudan, which
we have already described. In fact, we may
say more strongly that it was chiefly owing to this
interference with him, especially by Sir E. Baring—
or, perhaps, owing to the arrangements made by him
for Gordon with the Egyptian Government—which
entirely changed the character of his mission. The
defeat of Baker Pasha, followed by the compara
tive or actual fruitless Expedition of General Sir
Gerald Graham, capped this unfortunate elimax.
General Gordon had also objected to any military
operations in the Eastern Sudan, and had strongly
urged on that ground the recall of General Baker's
Expedition. The results justified his advice, for it
ended, as we know, in disaster.
General Baker, as will be remembered, was sent
with a purely Egyptian force to relieve Sinkat, which
Avas then threatened by Osman Digma. The news
of his defeat reached London on February 6th, 1 884,
REFUSED HIS ADVICE. 61
in a telegram from Admiral Sir W. Hewett,to which
he added these remarks :—
Arabs fanatically mad, and after this success will probably
attack Suakim. Some trustworthy . . . troops should be
sent to protect the placed camps—only manning the two forts,
Sir E. Baring on the same day telegraphed Lord
Granville as follows :—
Have consulted Nubar Pasha and Sir E. Wood as to the
course of action to be pursued in consequence of Baker's defeat
at Tokar. We propose to await General Gordon's views before
coming to a decision. When here he was strongly in favour
of recalling General Baker from Suakim as soon as possible,
leaving only 150 men, which he considered sufficient to hold
the place.
On February 10th Lord Granville instructed Sir
E. Daring by telegraph to ask Gordon whether he
could suggest anything about Sinkat and Tokar. In
reply to the message sent to him from Cairo, Gordon
replied as follows :—
About Tokar and Sinkat you can do nothing, except by
proclaiming that the chiefs of the tribes should come to
Khartum to an assembly of notables (Medgliss) when the
independence of the Soudan will be decided.
Her Majesty's Government, however, refused to
accept Gordon's advice, and instructed Sir E. Baring
to forward the following message to him :—
It has been suggested by a military authority that to assist
the policy of withdrawal a British force should be sent to
Suakim—sufficient to operate in its vicinity. Would such a
step injure or assist you ?
In a telegram to Sir E. Baring on nth, Gordon
stated that he understood his desire " to be the
62 WHY GORDON l'ERISHED.
pacification of the Sudan without bloodshed," and
therefore in this spirit he replied as follows to the
above message :—
Would care more for a rumour of such an intention than
for such a force. What would have the greatest effect would
be the rumour of English intervention.
Again, regardless of Gordon's views, and turning
a deaf ear to his advice, not only as Governor-
General of the Sudan, but as specially commis
sioned to report to them the best means of
evacuating the country, Her Majesty's Government,
on the day after they had received this message,
ordered General Sir Gerald Graham to collect a
force at Suakim for the relief of Tokar, and for the
defence of the former. Admiral Sir W. Hcwett was
warned of the arrival there on the 19th or 20th.
In submitting the Estimates for this first Expedi
tion to the Eastern Sudan on March 6th, Lord
Hartington, as Minister of War, explained its objects
and origin as follows :—
Her Majesty's Government, in advising the Egyptian
Government and in assisting it to evacuate the Sudan, have
undertaken the protection of the Red Sea ports, and especially
that at Suakim. That port had, for some time, and was now,
threatened by the insurgent tribes, and after the defeat of
Baker Pasha and the fall of Sinkat and the surrender of
Tokar, it was menaced by very considerable bodies of warlike
and victorious tribes who had resolved that, after having
disposed of the Egyptian garrisons, to capture Suakim, and
drive the British into the sea.
From this explanation it is apparent the origin
and objects of the Expedition did not in any way
1IARTINGT0N versus GORDON. 63
connect it with the evacuation of the interior of the
Sudan, but by Her Majesty's Government simply
with the defence of Suakim. It is difficult to compre
hend how it could have aided Gordon or his mission.
As we have seen, both he, Sir E. Baring, and therefore
Nubar Pasha, were of the opinion that it would
seriously interfere with it. Unfortunately, Her
Majesty's Government seem in this, and in other
instances, to have given more consideration to the
advice they had received from the military authorities
in London than they did to that which had come to
them from Khartum and Cairo.
Lord Hartington, in fact, flatly calls in question
the opinions of both General Gordon and the other
authorities named by stating to the Committee
that—
He thought the position of the Mahdi and that of Osman
Digma was not threatening any position which the British
Government had undertaken to defend, nor was the latter, as
far as they were aware, actually engaged in obstructing the
measures which General Gordon had been directed to take for
the evacuation of the Sudan.
General Gordon, however, said it did and would,
but Lord Hartington said it did not and would not.
In fact, Osman Digma was in fact at the time
actually threatening Berber, upon the safety of which
his line of communication depended, and, therefore,
the success of his mission.
Fvidently alarmed by the hint given by Gordon at
any intervention on his behalf, Lord Granville
telegraphed to Sir E. Baring on February 12th as
follows :—
64 WHY GORDON I'KKISHED.
With reference to my previous despatch and that sent to Sir
W. Hewett, I have to state that the attempt which is to be
made by a British force to relieve the Garrison of Tokar is in
no way intended to interfere with the main principles of the
policy which Her Majesty's Government have announced with
regard to the Sudan.
It did, however, very seriously interfere with the
pacific policy upon which Gordon had undertaken to
carry out his mission, and which he had reason to
believe was approved of by the Government, as the
following facts indicate.
With respect to the proelamation Gordon had
requested should be issued to the Chiefs, Sir E.
Baring suggested to Earl Granville that it should be
at once carried into effect by Admiral Hewett, and
that he should be authorised to add to it these
words :—
Uy accepting the terms now offered by General Gordon, the
Chiefs will secure their independence, and will be relieved from
all the oppression and mis-government under which they had
hitherto laboured.
Admiral Hewett, however, deelined to issue the
proelamation after he had been instructed on the
1 6th February to do so, because he thought that the
rebels ought to be defeated before this was done.
Then, when he was again asked to issue it, he
declined doing so, because, as he telegraphed Sir E.
Baring :—
I cannot ask Chiefs to leave people to meet Gordon at
Khartum, when I know that English troops are about to be
sent against the people in question.
NOT AS HE HAD REQUESTED. 65
On February iSth Gordon sent the following
telegram to Sir E. Baring :—
Received information of intention to relieve Tokar—would
advise Proclamation to Rebels :—Gordon at Khartum ready
to redress wrongs—Chiefs to proceed there and sec him, who
was invested with full power, &c.
On February 27th Lord Harrington telegraphed
General Graham as follows :—
You should, before attacking, summon Chiefs to disband
forces and a'tend Gordon at Khartum for settlement of
Sudan. Say we are not at war with Arabs—but must disperse
force threatening Suakim.
Following his instructions, General Graham, before
advancing, sent out, on February 28th, under a (lag
of truce, a letter in Arabic addressed " From the
General Commanding English Army to the Sheiks of
the tribes between Trinkitat and Tokar."
It first summoned them, in the name of the
English Government, to disperse their fighting men
before daybreak next morning, or the consequences
would be on their " own heads," and advised them
as follows :—
Instead of fighting with English troops, you should send
delegates to Khartum to consult with Gordon Pasha as to the
future settlement of the Sudan Provinces.
The EnglUh Government is not at war with the Arabs, but
is determined to disperse the force now in arms in this
neighbourhood (Trinkitat), and near Suakim.
The answer to this letter was directed to be left at
a certain place before daybreak next morning
February 29th.
V
66 WHY GORDON PEKISHEP.
No answer having been found at the place
indicated, General Graham, without any further
delay, advanced and drove the Arabs from their
entrenchments at El Teb with a loss to them of
2.IOO men, and to his force of 34 killed and 155
wounded.
A summons was then sent through prisoners to
the rebel Chief at Tokar to surrender by March 2nd
on the previously offered terms. General Graham
and his force then returned to Trinkitat, bringing
with him the inhabitants of Tokar on March 4th.
The force then marched back to Suakim, where
the Government had resolved to concentrate it, in
order to give effect to a proelamation from General
Graham and Admiral Hewett, denouncing Osman
Digma, and summoning the rebel chiefs to submit.
No answer having been received to this proelama
tion, another was issued on March 8th, warning the
Arabs that if they did not submit General Graham
would march on Tamai, where it was known about
] 2,000 Arabs had entrenched themselves and awaited
his attack.
To this message a defiant reply, signed by a large
number of Sheiks, was received. The threatened
advance was then made by General Graham and the
Arabs driven from their entrenchments with a loss
to them of 2,000 men and to the attacking British
force of 102 rank and file killed and 112 wounded.
And so ended the attempt made by Her Majesty's
Government not to interfere with Gordon's pacific
intention with regard to the settlement of the Sudan
question. It failed because, first, the proelamation
A CHIVALROUS ADMIRAL. 67
he asked for was couched in too belligerent a tone
to secure its object.
The mistake thus made by Her .Majesty's
Government was bluntly hinted at by Admiral
Hewett in his refusal to issue any pacific proelama
tion under the circumstances. When asked to do so
his answer was :—
I cannot ask Chiefs to leave people and meet Gordon at
Khartum when I know th.it English troops are about to . be
sent against the said people !
Had the gallant and chivalrous Admiral been
informed that troops were being sent only for the
defence of Suakim against Osman Digma, he
probably would have felt it his duty to issue such a
proelamation to the Arab Sheiks.
In view of Gordon's evident desire that no military
operations should be undertaken against the Arabs
—not even to save Tokar—the Expedition should
have been primarily confined to the defence of
Suakim. There can be little ,doubt that the
imperious tone in which the Sheiks were addressed
by General Graham, emphasised as it was by the
force he had with him, deprived the proelamation
he issued of the pacific character which Gordon
obviously wanted it to bear.
Giving Her Majesty's Government credit for their
intention with respect to this proelamation, and for
an apparent honest desire to avoid doing anything
that might interfere injuriously with Gordon's
mission, they actually did so in the manner we have
pointed out. On the other hand, in order to save
f a
68 WHY GORDON I'EKISHKR
their policy of non-interfcrence in the affairs of the
Sudan, they would not allow General Graham to
utilise the success of his operations against Osman
Digma in order materially to assist Gordon by
occupying Berber.
In confirmation of this opinion, we first quote the
following telegram from General Graham to Lord
Hartington on March 17, in which he summarises
the results of his operations :—
Present position of affairs is that two heavy blows have been
dealt at rebels and followers of Mahdi, who are profoundly
discouraged.
They say, however, that the English troops can do no more
—must re-ernbark and leave the country to them. To follow
up these victories and bring wavcrers to our side, we should
not proclaim our intention of leaving the country, but rather
make a demonstration of our force. I propose, therefore,
making as great a show as possible without harassing troops.
Acting upon this determination, General Graham
sent a strong battalion, with a regiment of cavalry,
to Hamdab, from whence it made a reconnaissance,
along the Berber road as far as Tambuk. Colonel
Stewart — afterwards Sir Herbert Stewart — who
commanded the flying column, reported that no
Arabs had been seen during its march, excepting
a few women around the wells with their flocks,
and that the country presented quite a peaceful
aspect.
A caravan of pilgrims from Central Africa, which
had left Berber fourteen days previously, and had
arrived at Hamdab when the column reached there,
reported the road safe between these points, and that
WE MAY HE CUT OFF ! 69
they had only encountered on their way a few armed
men tending their (locks.
Anticipating that his victories over Osman Digma
would have such a result as these reports from
Colonel Stewart indicated, General Graham had on
March 5th telegraphed General Stephenson suggest
ing that Gordon should be asked if he would
recommend an advance on the Berber road, and,
if so, how far he would be prepared to co-operate
with it. In reply, Gordon telegraphed as follows :—
The Mahdi hai attempted to raise the people of Shendy by
means of an emissary. Should he succeed we may be cut off.
J think it most important to follow up the success near
Suakim by sending a smallforce to Berber. . . . Should
the telegraph be cut I have told Hussein Khalifa, Mudir of
Ilerber, to send out scouts, and himself to meet the forces at
O-Bak that might be advancing from Suakim.
General Stephenson, in transmitting this message
to Lord Hartington, reported that he was not
prepared to recommend Graham's force marching
from Suakim to Berber " owing to the necessity of
water," and this although he had already recom
mended that route as an alternative to Lord
Wolseley's proposal for an expedition to Khartum
up the Nile ! He also knew at the time he made
this objection that Colonel Coctlogen had taken a
battalion over the Suakim-Berber road without diffi
culty. Both the Foreign and War Offices were also
cognisant of the fact that towards the end of 1882
ten thousand Egyptian troops had been sent over it
in response to the demand made by Abd-el-Kadir
from Khartum for reinforcements !
70 WHY GORDON PKRISHED.
Gordon once referred to Iigyptian soldiers as
"hens" on account of their lack of staying powers,
and, therefore, if they could traverse a region so
short of water as this route was alleged to be,
certainly British soldiers could be relied upon now
to do likewise.
Neither General Graham's proposal nor Gordon's
urgent appeal for the occupation of Berber were
listened to by Her Majesty's Government, for on
March 6th they informed Sir K. Baring with respect
to the operation that " The attempt to rescue the
garrison of Tokar is in no way intended to interfere
with the principles of the policy which Her Majesty's
Government have announced with regard to the
Sudan," and that " operations at a considerable
distance from Suakim were not to be undertaken."
On March 1st Gordon telegraphed Sir E. Baring
as follows :—
I maintain a firm policy of eventual evacuation, but I tell
you plainly it is impossible for me to get Cairo employe's out of
Khartum unless the Government help me in the way / have
told. They refuse Zebehr, and are quite right (may be) to do
so, but it was the only chance. It is scarcely worth while
saying more on the subject. I will do my best to carry out my
instructions, but I feel convinced that I shall be caught in
Khartum.
On March 14th Sir E. Baring informed Lord
Granville that the European Consular Agent at
Berber had telegraphed him that the Sheik-el-
Obeid* had without doubt deelared in favour of the
* The camp of this powerful Sheik is marked in the sketch map
tent by Cordon with his letter of November 4th, and which we have
given on p. 191.
A PAINFUL SURPRISE. 71
Mahdi, and that the tribes between Khartum and
Shendy were in revolt ; and on the 15th that the
telegraph line, which was working as far as Shendy,
had now been cut between there and Berber ; and
on the 1 6th that—
It had become of importance to open road between Derbe r
and Khartum.
The reply to these urgent messages will be a
painful surprise to those of our readers who have
not as yet been made acquainted with it, for it was
as follows :—
Unable to authorise advance of British troops in the direc
tion of Berber until I have received further information with
regard to such an Expedition, and am satisfied that it is
necessary in order to ensure the safety of General Gordon,
and that it will be confined to that object. According to
present information it is not safe to send a small body of
cavalry to Berber as proposed, and the despatch of a large
force would be impossible.
General Graham not having, however, yet aban
doned all hope of being allowed to occupy Berber,
instructed Colonel Stewart, who was in command of
his cavalry, to prepare a scheme for the advance of
mounted troops for that purpose.
CHAPTER V.
In the middle of March, when news came from
Khartum of very serious import, such an operation
with respect to Berber as General Graham had
proposed was again discussed.
Although Generals Stephenson and Wood now
had come to the conelusion that it was possible,
though involving great risk, Her Majesty's Govern
ment telegraphed General Graham, through Sir E.
Daring, as follows :—
The Government have no intention of sending British troops
to Berber. The operations in which you are engaged must
be limited to the pacification of the district round Suakim, and
restoring communication with Berber, if possible, by other
means and influence of tribes.
In evident explanation of this telegram, another
of the same date by Sir E. Baring from Lord
Granville :—
Although, Lord Granville telegraphed, the demand for a
military demonstration by a British force at Berber was
contrary to the original policy agreed upon, it has been care
fully considered, and Her Majesty's Government would not
willingly refuse it, coming from General Gordon, with the
additional weight of your concurrence, if the military objec
tions to it had not appeared conclusive. The distance, the
nature of the country to be traversed, and, above all, the
climate, render the march of a force to Berber at the present
AM) WHY NOT? 73
season .in undertaking so difficult as almost to be imprac
ticable. For a large body of all arms the military authorities
regard the Expedition as impossible. While for a small force
of cavalry to undertake the expedition without support, in the
face of possible opposition by largely superior numbers, would
be an extremely hazardous venture, and might in the end
prove useless.
And why useless? Because, Lord Granville ex
plains
It was understood that Khartum was provisioned for six
months, and that its present garrison was sufficient for its
security during that period from any attack from Arab tribes,
who are without artillery.
livery other consideration but that of the com
munications with the beleaguered town, and the
importance of keeping its communications open
with Berber, are taken into account by Her Majesty's
Government !
The military authorities, upon whose advice their
refusal to allow General Graham to occupy Berber
was evidently based, gave no weight to the im
portance of keeping the line of communication with
Khartum open, although this necessity was pressed
on their attention by the increased embarrassing
circumstances in which it was placed by the advance
of the Dervishes from below it. Gordon had warned
them of this danger, and told Her Majesty's Govern
ment that, if Berber fell, he would be cut off. The
military authorities advised them that it would be
dangerous to send a small column of troops to save
it without support. General Graham said it could
be done, Generals Wood and Stephenson both said
74WHY GORDON PERISHED.
it might be, though rather risky, but Lord Wolscley,
then Chief Military Adviser, said, or suggested, as
may be supposed, that on strictly tactical principles
it ought not to be attempted. Therefore Her
Majesty's Government, rather than run the slight
risk General Graham's proposition involved, chose
the greater one of having Gordon's communica
tions cut because he had six months' provisions and
the Arabs round the town had no artillery t
Certainly such reasoning, and such a decision, defies
the wit of man to comprehend !
Taking for example the question of distance,
it will be seen that the route from Suakim to
Berber was only 240 miles, while that from the
sea up the Nile to Khartoum was about 1,600
miles !
It could also be easily shown that, so far as
elimate was concerned, Her Majesty's Government
had been greatly misinformed, but even admitting
that they were not, what then ? Had a British force
• never before been called upon, in carrying out
military operations, to face such a difficulty as the
elimate of the country presented, which they would
have to traverse before reaching Berber from
Suakim ? What about our occupation of Cyprus
during the intensely hot months of July and August,
1878, and its malarial fever, not to mention the
Ashanti War, which in these respects presented even
greater obstaeles to a military European force than
did the Eastern Sudan. The Egyptian Campaign
of '82—what about the heat endured then by our
Army? Whoever dreamed of abandoning the siege
AN INADMISSIBLE EXCUSE. 75
of Sebastopol, when our troops before it were struck
down by cholera, or exposed to the severities of the
season which then overtook them ?
When Imperial interests demanded the prompt
despatch of an army, either to defend or to advance
them, no such obstaeles as those now raised by Earl
Granville in the present instance, were considered.
It might be, it is true, impossible to carry on a
campaign in Russia during its Arctic winter, but a
march of only 240 miles from Suakim to Berber, in.
a elimate only suspected of being unhealthy,
although known to be hot during the summer
months, presented no obstaele in itself which should
have prevented its having been undertaken.
Then the objections to adopting General Graham's
proposal to occupy Berber in March, 1884, were the
same in 1885, when Her Majesty's Government sent
12,000 men to open the road to it, and to attack
Osman Digma in all his positions.
Nor can we admit the excuse then made that
our military authorities were at the time ignorant
of the elimate of the Sudan. There was no
reason why they should not have been informed
about it, and they would have been if they had
consulted those who were able to enlighten them
on the subject.
Amongst these were General Gordon himself,
Colonel Coetlogen, Colonel Watson, and some others.
Instead of obtaining information on the subject from
such sources of information, they listened to those
who, while later on advocating the Nile route for an
Expedition to relieve Khartum, had confessed they
76 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
knew nothing about the river and its obstaeles
above Cairo !
They would not even listen to Sir E. Baring when
he telegraphed Lord Granville—probably in reply
to a question for information on the subject—that the
prejudice against the Sudan on account of its
climate originated in general statements made by
the late Sir Samuel Baker and others, to the effect
that Europeans could not live in it.
Amongst them was Mr. II. M. Stanley, who, in a
letter to The Times in July, 1884, when the Nile and
Suakim-Bcrber routes were being considered, thus
derided altogether the proposed Expedition to
Khartum :—
Think of the consequences of an Expedition to Khartum to
release Cordon, the immense expense and (he terrible loss of
life which must necessarily ensue frem travelling in the
country ! What do we think English soldiers could do in
these deserts ? They would drop off faster than you could
count them almost ! You would have to provide an abundance
of provisions and an abundance of doctors, I should say one
doctor for every twenty-live men.
Such weight had tln's extravagantly expressed
opinion by the great explorer of other parts of
Africa on Her Majesty's Government that Lord
Granville actually quoted him as an authority against
the Suakim-Berber route when defending the choice
of that by the Nile for the Expedition to Khartum
in the House ol Lords.
Colonel Kitchener, in a despatch dated from
Debbeh, on September 1st, 1884, thus criticised Mr.
Stanley's letter :—
IN POINT HERK. 77
I have just read Stanley's statement in the Weekly Times of
August ist, in which the climatic influences on the road to
Khartum arc grossly exaggerated. There are no extensive
deserts to be traversed—the heat in the day is much less than
it was at Cairo during the same season last year, and the nights,
are quite cool, required blankets, and I have never been better
than since I have been at Debbeh, which is only 200 niilcs
from Khartum.
The late Lord Napier of Magdala is in point here,
for—when he asked the Government in the House of
Lords on April 3rd, 18S4, whether, under the possible
contingency of finding it necessary to make an effort
to relieve General Gordon, the military departments
had been requested to consider by what means such
relief could possibly be effected either from Cairo or
Suakim—he made the following observations on the
practicability of the latter route :—
No doubt the climate of Suakim was very severe indeed,
but it was not unhealthy ; and he believed thab the country
could be crossed by British troops, properly equipped, at any
season of the year. Mis Noble and Gallant Friend (Lord
Strathnairn) and many other generals before him had
marched and fought in the hottest weather in India, and
there was no doubt the same could be done again by our troops
The crossing of the 100 miles of desert certainly would be
difficult, but water might be transported, and with the resources
the Government had at their command, even a light railway
might be laid down to carry up supplies of water. Cavalry
might cross fifty miles on a march—that distance being done
over and over again by the Scinde Horse and other regiments
in India.
In the debate on the Vote of Censure the Noble
Lord said that
Great misapprehensions prevailed as to the heat in the Sudan.
The temperature recorded on the higher lands was from
78 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
110 deg. to 112 deg. in the shade {i.e. in summer). I have
records in my possession from officer* in Moultan in India
showing a temperature of 1 20 dcg. in the shade. The heat of
the Sudan is not so trying as that of India, although it is very
great, and although no one would wish to send troops to the
Sudan in the hot weather if it could be avoided, yet I believe it
would be possible to conduct operations even, if necessary, in
the hot season—provided they are supplied with Indian tents
and proper means of assistance.
Here was a source of information on the feasibility
of a dash on Berber in March which Her Majesty's
Government, as well as the usually well-informed
Army Intelligence Department, might have con
sulted, so far as elimatic difficulties were concerned,
with great advantage on this critical point in
Gordon's position.
We return again to the rejection of General
Graham's proposal about Berber when dealing with
his second Expedition. The real reason of its
rejection was apparently that given by Lord
Granville in the following telegram to Sir E. Baring
on March 28th, in reply to one in which the latter
had pressed his Lordship to consider the dangerous
position in which Gordon would be placed if his
communications with Berber were cut :—
The circumstances with which it (Gordon's mission) had
necessarily to deal were no doubt difficult, and might change
from day to day, but it certainly was not contemplated that
the duties assigned to General Gordon should be of a nature
which would require the despatch of a British Expedition to
support or extricate him I
As the special and temporary policy of Her
Majesty's Government had been made the subject
LXCITES UNPARLIAMENTARY LANGUAGE. 79
of deelarations to Parliament, and communicated
diplomatically to Foreign Powers, Earl Granville
further informs Sir E. Baring in this despatch that—
Her Majesty's Government desired to keep within its limits as
thus laid down and not to extend the scope of Dritish
intervention than is necessary for the realisation of the objects
in view.
Then follows this deelaration, which we will not
venture to criticise, as it deserves to be, for its cool
deliberation under the whole circumstances of the
case, lest we should be tempted to use un
parliamentary language :—
General Gordon's mission, even though not successful, will
have added to his very high reputation. Her Majesty's Govern
ment are aware of the complicated difficulties of the under
taking, but they believe that there is a reasonable hope that at
least a portion of what they desire may be accomplished.
• Earl Granville in the previous despatch had
recalled Sir E. Baring's attention to the fact that
Gordon's mission had been extended by his having
been authorised by the Egyptian Government, and
with the approval of Her Majesty's Government,
and instructed to undertake such other duties as the
English Government desired to entrust him with,
and as might be communicated to him.
If we refer to these instructions we will find that
the evacuation of the Sudan stands first. As
regards the most opportune time and methods of
carrying it out, Gordon, from the full confidence
reposed in him, was really given full discretionary
powers to retain the troops at Khartum for such a
So WHY GORDON PERISHED.
reasonable period as he thought necessary, in order
to accomplish the abandonment of the country with
the least possible risk to life and property. Gordon
did hope, when he undertook his mission, to be able
to evacuate the Egyptian garrison and employes, as
Her Majesty's Go%'crninent also did at the time,
by pacific means, or, as Lord Granville expressed
it, " without involving any movement of British
troops."
British troops had, however, been moved to the
Eastern Sudan to relieve Tokar, but this move
ment was explained by Her Majesty's Government
referring their despatch to the pledges given to the
Egyptian Government about the protection of the
Red Sea ports, especially that of Suakim.
Her Majesty's Government knew at this time
(March 28th) that Gordon had already begun the
work of evacuating Khartum down the Nile, viA
Abu-Hamed and Korosko, and they also knew, or
ought to have known, that if they allowed Berber to
fall that it would be impossible for him to continue
that operation.
Although the British force they had sent to
Suakim had an object of admitted importance, they
yet refused to sanction any portion of it to be
employed for an object of equal, if not of a more
pressing, character. Even if such a movement of
troops had been attended by a greater risk than
they had been advised by the military authorities,
it would be, that risk, under the circumstances, ought
to have been faced. Through their failure to do so
they not only checked Gordon's work of evacuation, •
SEND KOR WOLSELEY. 8l
but, as events show, they put the first seal on his
tragic fate and that of the garrisons and officials at
Khartum and elsewhere in the Sudan.
Gordon thus commented on the despatch of this
Expedition under General Graham in the following
entry in his journal of October 8, 1884 :—
Truly the indecision of our Government has been, from a
military point of view, a very great bore, for \vc never could
act independently ; there was always the chance of their taking
action which hampered us. Take the Tokar business. Had
Baker been supported, say by 500 men, he would not have
been defeated ; yet, after he was defeated, you go and send a
force to relieve the town. Had Baker been supported by these
500 men he would in all probability have been victorious and
would have pushed on to Berber ; and once there Berber would
not have fallen. What was right to do in March was right to
do in February. . . . The worst of it was that, Baker
having been defeated, when you did send your Expedition to
Tokar, Baker's force no longer existed and his guns resist me
at Berber. Take your present Expedition, I do not know the
details, but it seems to me that till August 20th, or thereabouts,
we were supposed to be quietly disposed of, but about that
date our resurrection occurred, and then " Let us have an
Expedition and send for Wolseley.'' Personally, I do not care,
but I think what a perfect mess we would be in in a European
war.
General Graham's force was recalled soon after the
events we have noticed, and he himself left for
London early in April. This withdrawal rendered
it impossible to utilise the influence of the friendly
tribes to open the road to Berber—for, had they
consented to help us to do so, it would have brought
down upon them (as they well knew) the wrath
of Osman Digma and his sympathisers. It was a
O
82 WHY GORDON PEKISHKI).
vain hope in this instance as in every other when
such a suggestion was made without any guarantee
of protection from a British force. It was equally
absurd to suggest—as Earl Granville actually did—
that this road should be opened by Hussein Khalifa
Fasha, the Mudir of Dongola with the forces at his
command, because if there was danger to a British
force sent on such a mission from hostile Arab tribes,
how much more dangerous would it have been to
one of Egyptian troops under the circumstances ? A
co-operation, as Gordon had proposed, between the
garrison of Berber and General Graham's force was,
however, another and a more feasible operation,
and could have been carried out if Earl Granville's
mode of sustaining the policy adopted by Her
Majesty's Government had been based on broader
and more intelligent lines.
Soon after the withdrawal of General Graham's
force, the position of Gordon at Khartum became
still more critical, for the rising he feared at Shendy
took place, and cut his communications with Berber.
Had proper measures been taken to occupy the latter
place, they might have been reopened. Acting under
the advice finally of Sir E. Baring, it was, as the
following correspondence shows, allowed to fall into
the hands of the enemy, who then had completely
isolated Khartum.
On April 20th Hussein Khalifa Pasha, as Mudir of
Dongola, telegraphed to the Egyptian Government
that the Bishareen tribes were ready to join the
rebels, and that he feared Berber would be sur
rounded, adding that as the
" NUBAR AND THE GENERALS."»3
Government had abandoned them they could only trust in
God.
Sir E. Baring immediately telegraphed Earl
Granville that Nubar Pasha had sent him this
telegram, with a semi-official note stating that—
As the conduct of the retreat from the Sudan had been under
taken by Her Majesty's Government, the Council of Ministers
requested him to ask what answer should be sent to it, adding
this warning :—
The matter is serious. Please send reply early, unless some
prospect of help can be held out ; there is some risk he will be
thrown into the hands oi the rebels, and this would seriously
affect Gordon's position.
The reply from Downing Street acknowledged
that the danger to Berber appeared imminent, and
directed Sir E. Baring to report, after consulting
Nubar and generals whether there is any step by negotiation
or otherwise, which can be taken at once to relieve it.
To this Sir Evelyn replied that, in the opinion of
" Nubar and generals," there was no possibility of
negotiating without a force to back the Governor of
Berber ; Nubar's personal opinion was that, consider
ing the pressing demands of the Governor, two
Egyptian battalions and 500 Ababdies—when
collected—should be sent on at once to Berber.
Generals Stephenson and Wood, he stated, objected
to sending the Egyptian troops alone, but considered
It possible to send an Anglo-Egyptian force, either over the
Korosko desert, or by Wady-Haifa and Dongola.
Sir E. Baring then stated that the immediate
G 2
84 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
safety of Berber might be secured by assuring
Hassein Khalifa Pasha
That material English aid would be rendered as soon as prac
ticable, but that Nubar's opinion was that this assurance could
only be made effective by an immediate advance ofan Egyptian
force to Berber.
After all these consultations with Nubar Pasha
and " the generals," and in face of the warning he
had given Her Majesty's Government of the risk of
Hussein Khalifa being thrown into the hands of the
rebels, and that thrs would seriously affect Gordon's
position, he seals the fate of Berber by advising Her
Majesty's Government, in a subsequent despatch,
that "it would be madness to send either English or
Egyptian troops by either of the routes named," and
acting upon what we do not hesitate to designate
as his " mad advice," they instructed him to inform
Hussein Khalifa that no immediate aid would be
sent to him !
And thus Berber was allowed to fall on May 28th,
under the circumstances we have narrated. Her
Majesty's Government would not move themselves
to save it, nor would they allow the Egyptian Govern
ment to do so.
Unless, said Nubar Pasha, Egyptian troops are at once sent
no assurance of English material aid will suffice to save the
place. Probably it was in consequence of this declaration that
they declined to do what they might have done to prevent this
catastrophe to Gordon. To allow Egyptian troops easily and
safely to be employed in such a service would, however, or
might perhaps be or taken to be, a departure from their
" Rescue and Retire'' policy. Had they not refused to allow a
EVACUATION PURE AND SIMPLE. 85
battalion of Egyptian troops to take part in General Graham's
Expedition in February, 1884?
In a despatch to Sir E. Baring, Earl Granville
reminds him that the force under the command of
Sir E. Wood was organised for service in Egypt
proper. And probably on the principle here referred
to, Her Majesty's Government did risk everything
with respect to Gordon and the objects of his mission,
rather than incur the censure of Mr. John Morley and
others of their supporters if they did anything that,
even in appearance, looked like a departure from
the policy to which they had committed themselves
with respect to the Sudan,
General Gordon and Colonel Stewart evidently
understood the feeling which thus prevailed in
Downing Street, and hence subsequently, when pres
sing for aid to their mission—on several occasions
they deelared their strict intention of adhering to the
policy of evacuation "pure and simple." On one
pressing occasion, the latter emphatically assured
Sir E. Baring that both General Gordon and
himself were very anxious to get out of the
country at the very earliest moment they could do
so honourably.
With the foregoing facts before us, it is difficult to
avoid coming to the conelusion that Gordon was
being virtually abandoned by Her Majesty's Govern
ment. He had served their purpose by meeting the
public demand for the rescue of the Sudan garrisons.
Instinctively, he appears to have recognised this, and
in the entry in his journal on October 5th, he thus
stated his views :—
86 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
Let us consider dispassionately the state of affairs. Does
Her Majesty's Goverment consider that they are responsible
for the Sudan garrisons and Cairo inhabitants ? We can
only judge that Her Majesty's Government docs recognise
this responsibility, for otherwise why did they send me up, and
why did they relieve Tokar? Once this responsibility is
assumed, I sec no outlet for it but to relieve the garrisons
conle que eoiile. It may be said that the object of the present
Expedition is ior my relief personally. Hut how is it possible
for me to go away and leave men whom I have egged on to
fight for the last six months? How could I leave after
encouraging Scnnar to hold out ? No Government could take
the responsibility of so ordering me. Had Baring said in
March " Shift for yourself as best you can ! * which he could
have done, the affair could have been arranged ; but if you
look over my telegrams you will see I ask him what he will do,
and he never answered. The people had not then endured
any privations and I was, as it were, not much engaged to
them ; but now it is different, especially as we have com
municated to them that English help is coming.
No one can judge the waste of money and expense of life
in the present Expedition— it is an utter waste of both—but it is
simply due to the indecisions of our Government. Had they said
from the first, We do not care — we will do nothing for the
garrisons of the Sudan — they may perish ; had they not
relieved Tokar ; had they not telegraphed to me as to the force
to relieve me {vide telegrams May 5th from Suakim, April 29th
from Massouah) ; had they telegraphed (when Daring tele
graphed to Cuzzi 29th March saying No British troops are
coming to Berber, negotiations going on about opening road-
Graham was about to attack Osman Digma) Shift for
yourself! why nothing could have been said. But Her
Majesty's Government would not say they were going to
abandon the garrisons, and therefore shift for yourself ! It is
that which has hampered us so much. On the one hand, if I
bolted I deserted them (Her Majesty's Government), on the
other hand I have brought about these Expeditions.
/ do say that Her Majesty's Government ought to have
WILL ACT DETRIMENTALLY. 87
taken the bold step, andspeaking out, to say in March " Shiftfor
yourself! " when I could have done it, and not now when Iam
bound to the people after six months' bothering warfare.
From the following entry in his journal on
November 6th, it is evident that Gordon had con
eluded, from the manner in which his appeals for
help had been refused by Her Majesty's Govern
ment, that he would be made a sacrifice to their
political emergencies :—
I am quite sure that the policy followed up till lately is one
which will act detrimentally on our army—for what officer, if
he was in a fortress, could have any confidence that it might
not be advisable to abandon him ?
These criticisms, and that last sad reflection upon
the conduct of Her Majesty's Government towards
Gordon, were justified by its fatal results. He
certainly was, as a military man at any rate,
warranted in coneluding that he was about to be
•abandoned—or rather to be sacrificed to the political
exigencies of the Party in power, from their having
allowed his communications to be cut with Berber.
In fact, the whole correspondence relative to
keeping them open in order that Berber might not fall
into the hands of the rebels is a painful and heart-
sickening illustration of the tortuous and hesitating
policy pursued by both the War and Foreign
Departments of our Government, and not creditable
to either of them. It was one also likely to throw
discredit upon the Liberal Party, for it was unworthy
of its best traditions. The only comfort we have in
calling attention to this last aspect of the policy
referred to is that it was not that of a Cabinet reprc
88 WHY CORDON 1'KRISHF.D.
senting the party per se, but of a Cabinet calling
themselves Liberal, but which comprised elements
not politically homogeneous with its principles.
Had the policy of the Government towards Gordon
been a frank one, it would not have darkened its
counsels by cunningly-devised words and phrases.
They had to do with an honourable, straightforward
agent. Why, therefore, did they not treat him in
their communications as such ? Had they done so,
as he complains in the extract quoted from his
journal, how different might have been the results to
him and to -the garrisons and civil employe's at
Khartum !
Her Majesty's Government were plentiful in their
expressions of respect for General Gordon, and even
spoke of him as a I Iero ! They were equally profuse
in their expressions of anxiety for his safety. All
the military movements in the Sudan, when pro
posed in Parliament, were represented as intended
either to help him in his mission, or to rescue him if
exposed to danger in carrying it out. But they dared
not, under the pressure of public opinion, openly
deelare an intention to abandon Gordon to his fate ;
and yet the measures they adopted, either for his aid
or for his rescue, were always so delayed in execu
tion as to fail of their object.
We do not say that the Government absolutely
determined by a Cabinet vote to abandon Gordon ;
but we do affirm, on the facts before us, that they
practically did so by rejecting his counsel, and turning
a deaf ear to his warnings, as they did in the case of
Berber.
MAY HE CUT OFF. 89
We now come to the consideration of the im
mediate consequences which followed the inter
ruption of Gordon's communications with Berber
through the occupation of the country between it
and Khartum by the rebels.
On April 18th, Sir E. Baring informed Lord
Granville that since this interruption between
Khartum and Berber—telegrams to Gordon were a
week and some ten days in reaching him. Some
which had been sent had not.he believed, reached him,
and that several messengers who had been despatched
with messages had been captured. " If therefore,"
he very naturally, and in an apparent tone of
irony, said
Her Majesty's Government desired to send anything to him,
it is quite worth while to make the attempt, although it was not
certain that the messages will reach him. No time, however,
he further stated, should be lost in doing so, as it was possible
thai before long communication with Berber would be cut of.
Then followed, on next day, a message informing
Lord Granville that Gordon had telegraphed to Sir
Samuel Baker asking him about the feasibility of
applying to American and English millionaires for
£200,000 to subsidise Turkish Regular troops to
aid him in evacuating the garrisons, and for smashing
up the Mahdi, an operation which, he hinted, would
fetch " the Sultan and secure his help."
A few hours later Sir E. Baring wired Downing
Street as follows :—
Cuzzi (telegraphs from Berber) that the garrison and civilians
of Shendy attempted to come down the river on the 16th.
When they reached a spot two hours from Darner the boat
90 WHY CORDON PERISHED.
stuck in the sand-banks. Soldiers have no ammunition and are
said to be surrounded by rebels. $00 men have gone from
here to help them. They are said to have been massacred.*
On April 18th another message came from Gordon,
in which his demand for Turkish troops was repeated.
In transmitting it to London, Sir E. Baring
remarked that it was most unfortunate that, of all
the telegrams he had sent Gordon, only one very
short one had reached him, and that he had
evidently thought he was to be abandoned, and
was very indignant. Enelosed was the following
message from him in which this indignation was
expressed :—
As far as I can understand the situation is this : You refuse
me Zcbehr. I consider myself free to act according to
circumstances. I shall hold on here as long as 1 can, and if
1 can suppress the rebellion I shall do so, if I cannot I shall
. Tetire to the Equator and leave you the indelible disgrace of
abandoning the garrisons of Scnnar, Kassala, lierbcr, and
Dongola.
The evident reason why Gordon considered him
self free to act now that Zebehr was refused, appears
clearly to have been that, having been commissioned
by Her Majesty's Government to report upon the
best means of evacuating the garrisons, &c., of the
Sudan, when he had done so no notice was taken of
his recommendations.
The following telegraphic message from Colonel
Stewart, which Sir E. Baring enelosed with the
* Mr. Cuui telegraphed four days later that the 500 men had failed
to relieve them and that they had been massacred.
WE ARE QUITE BLOCKED. 91
above, ought certainly have had some effect in
calling the earnest attention of Her Majesty's
Government to the critical position of affairs at
Khartum at the time :—
General Gordon has acquainted me with your intention of not
relieving Berber and trusting to your negotiations for opening
road from Suakim to Berber. General Gordon has given you
his decision as to what he himself intends doing. And weighing
•ill the circumstances, and doubting the success of your opening
Jhe road to Berber, unless by advancing troops, I am inclined
to think my retreat will be safer by the Equator. I shall,
therefore, follow the fortunes of General Gordon.
Enelosed also to Lord Granville, and of the same
date, was the following message from Mr. Power,
Her Majesty's Consul at Khartum :—
General Gordon, in view of the present critical situation here,
lias made the following intimation to me : " As soon as possible
I propose that you should go to Berber. If you do not elect to
do so, then justify me to British Minister." At present I do not
see how it is possible for any but an Arab to get. to Berber ; I
would elect to take the less risky route and go viil the Equator.
We are quite blocked on the North, East, and West.
93
CHAPTER VI.
As it has an important bearing upon the incidents
to which \ve now proceed to call attention, reference
must be made to the following important message
from Gordon, dated Khartum, March 9th, and to
the reply he received from Earl Granville on the
1 3th of that month.
On March 9th Gordon telegraphed to Sir E.
liaring as follows :—
There is no probability of the people rallying round mc or
paying any attention to my proclamation. If you mean to
make the proposed diversion to Berber (of British troops) and
to accept my proposal to instal Zebchr and so evacuate, then it
is worth while to hold on to Khartum.
If on the other hand you determine upon neither steps, then
I can see no use holding on to Khartum, for it is impossible
for me to help the other garrisons, and I should be sacrificing
the whole of the troops and cmployts here.
In the latter case (/'.*. neither sending Zebehr nor occupying
Berber) your instructions to me had better be that I should
evacuate Khartum and with all the cmployts and troops
remove the seat of Government to Berber.
You must give a prompt reply to this, as even the retreat to
Berber may not be in my power in a few days, and even if
carried out out at once the retreat will be of extreme
difficulty.
If the immediate evacuation of Khartum is determined
upon, irrespective of outlying towns, I would propose to send
VIRTUALLY ABANDONED.93
down all Cairo cmployts and white troops with Colonel Stewart
to Berber, where he would await your orders. I would ask
Her Majesty's Government to accept the resignation of my
Commission and I would take all the steamers and stores up
to the Equator and Bahr-Gazelle Provinces, and consider these
Provinces under the King of the Belgians. It is the only
solution I see if Khartum is evacuated irrespective of
outlying towns.
Earl Granville, in reply to this communication,
informed Sir E. Baring that Her Majesty's Govern-
• ment could not accept General Gordon's proposals
for a diversion by British troops to Berber, or for the
appointment of Zcbehr as Governor of the Sudan.
If General Gordon, his Lordship further stated, is of opinion
that the prospect of his early departure diminishes the chance
of accomplishing his task, that by staying at Khartum himself
for any length of time which he may judge necessary he- would
be able to establish a settled Government at that place, he is
at liberty to stay there. In the event of his being unable to
carry out this suggestion, he should evacuate Khartum and
save that garrison by conducting it himself to Berber without
delay.
On March 25th Lord Granville telegraphed to Sir
E. Baring that—
Having regard to the danger of climate, as well as the
extraordinary risk from a military point of view, Her. Majesty's
Government do not think it justifiable to send a British
Expedition to Berber, and they wish you to communicate this
decision to General Gordon, that he may adopt measures in
accordance therewith. Her Majesty's Government desire to
leave full discretion to General Gordon to remain at Khartum,
if he thinks it necessary, or to retire by southern or any other
route which may be found available.
It is impossible to regard the reply sent to
94 WHY CORDON PERIS1IED.
Gordon's message of March 9th as an honest,
straightforward one. Gordon himself has expressed
the feelings which it is likely to rouse in any candid
mind in the extract from his journal which we have
quoted.
I do say, he wrote, that Her Majesty's Government ought to*
have taken the bold step, and speaking out said, shift for
yourself ! when I could have done it. But Her Majesty's
Government would not say they were going to abandon the
garrisons, and, therefore, shift for yourself.
Gordon's message, in which the two alternative
courses are submitted to Her Majesty's Government,
demanded, in justice to him, that a categorical reply
should have been sent to it. The Government dared
not at the time proelaim their abandonment of the
garrisons, or they evidently would have been glad to
do so. The responsibility of such a course they
apparently desired to shift from themselves to
Gordon. They were also anxious that his safety
should not depend on them in any way, hence Mr.
Gladstone's statement in Parliament on April 3rd
that Gordon was, if in danger, free to escape to the
Equator.
Possibly Gordon might have acted upon the
message giving him permission to retire to Berber in
order to save the people ; but it does not appear to
have reached him, for Gordon telegraphed him on
April 16th that the only message he had received
from Sir E. Baring, since March 10th had come
into his hands on April 9th, and which informed
him that he should not expect British troops to
A GLARING INCONSISTENCY. 95
advance from Suakim to Berber, and that if other
messages had been sent he had not received them.
And yet, in view of the difficulty of communi
cating with Khartum pointed out by Sir E. Baring
in his message to Downing Street on April 18th,
and the imminent danger of his not being able to
do so at all by that route, during his temporary
absence, our Charge" d%Affaires there, Mr. Egerton,
received instructions on April 23rd to the following
effect :—
Cordon should be at once informed, in cypher, by several
messengers, at sonic interval between each—or in such other
ways as may, on the spot, be deemed most prompt and certain
—that he should keep us informed, to the best of his ability,
not only as to an immediate danger at Khartum, but to be
prepared for any such danger he advise as to the force neces
sary in order to secure his removal, its amount, character,
route for access to Khartum, and time of operations.
And, apparently most inconsistently with the
latter part of his instructions, he was to inform
Gordon that—
Her Majesty's Government did not propose to supply him
with Turkish troops, or other force, for the purpose of military
operations, as such were beyond the scope of the Commission
he held, and at " variance with the purpose of his mission to
the Sudan,'' and further, that "if, with this knowledge, he
continues at Khartum, he should state to us the cause and
intentions with which he so continues."
He was also instructed to add to these messages
an expression on behalf of Her Majesty's Govern
ment both of
their respect and gratitude for his gallant and self-sacrificing;
conduct, and for the good he had achieved.
96 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
A more heartless message could not have been
sent by a British statesman to a British officer, or
a more insulting one than this. It presumes that
Gordon had not been frank with them, and that
he wanted Turkish or some other forces to use for
other purposes than for the successful carrying-out
his mission of evacuation. From the despatches
we have quoted, out of the many in which he had
again and again explained his object in asking for
British intervention. As he was then shut up in
Khartum through their failure to keep his road
of escape and communication open, how galling
it must have been to him to have received such
a message as this !
Had he not sent them, no later than February 29th,
when he first became fully aware of the problem
he had undertaken to solve for them, through Sir
E. Baring, the following message :—
Should you wish to interfere, send 200 troops to Wady-
Halfa, and then open the Suakim-Derber road by Indian
troops. This will cause an immediate collapse of the revolt.
Whether you think it worth while to do this or not you are, of
course, the best judges. I can only tell you the modus
optrnndi of intervening.
On the 8th of March he sent separately the
following telegrams to Sir E. Baring :—
The Mahdi has raised the tribes, who will try and cut oft
provisions from Khartum, and cut telegraph.
We have provisions tor six months.
If we get shut in you should send an expedition of
Indian troops—Mussulmen—to Suakim, and open road to
Berber.
WHY SMASH THE MAHDI ?97
In face of storm likely to bnak on us, why not utilize Wood
and his forces to move on Dongola and thence to Berber ?
The route is safe and camels plenty.
It must be remembered, however, that Gordon had
from the first called the attention of Her Majesty's
Government to the manifest impolicy, as well as to
the injustice to the people of the Sudan, of with
drawing peremptorily a Government which had been
of some advantage to them, and the danger to which
Egypt proper would be exposed if the Sudan was
abandoned to a condition of anarchy. He, there
fore, proposed that it should be returned to its
ancient sultans. The increase of the power of the
Mahdi not only rendered this difficult, if not
impossible of accomplishment, but also seriously
interfered with the objects of his mission. Hence all
his references to smashing up the Mahdi ; in fact, in
his telegram to Sir Samuel Baker he remarked that
the presence of Turkish regulars, coming by Berber,
would enable him to settle, as he puts it, "our
affairs "—that is, the evacuation of the country.
We can quite understand the objection to the
employment of Turkish troops in the Sudan.
Gordon had asked for other help and had been
refused. Rather than the lives he had volunteered
to save should be lost, he asked for this help to save
them, and only in despair of obtaining the other
help he would have preferred. To this view of the
case Her Majesty's Government was blind and
deaf.
For example, in a despatch to Mr. Egerton on
May ist, Lord Granville, in summarising the instruc-
H
98 WHY GORDON l'ERISHED.
tions he had sent to him on the 23rd, gives the
following explanation of their refusal of Turkish or
other troops for expeditions in the Sudan :—
Such a course would involve a reversal of the original policy
of Her Majesty's Government, which was to detach the
Sudan from Egypt and restore its inhabitants to their former
independence.
The request for Turkish troops was not founded on any
necessities of defence in Khartum, as, according to Sir E.
Baring's telegram of April 9th, General Gordon considered
himself safe for a certain time—the town was provisioned for
some months, and the market was well supplied. It is clear
from his message to Sir E. Baring and also to Sir S. Baker,
that in asking for these troops his object was to effect the
withdrawal of the Sudan garrisons by military expeditions,
and to bring about the collapse of the Mahdi.
Operations in the vicinity of Khartum must be taken as
required for the defence of the place, and it can well be
understood that such action may be necessary even for
defensive purposes.
Turkish troops will not be sent for offensive operations
General Gordon cannot too clearly understand—cannot receive
the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, and they are
beyond the scope of his Mission.
The telegrams referred to from Sir E. Baring on
' April the 9th from Gordon, stated that he might
rest assured that for the present and for two months
thence they were as safe at Khartum as at Cairo.
It is painful to notice how Her Majesty's Govern
ment seemed to pounce on any statement of this
kind from Gordon, while they turned a deaf ear to
the warnings he had again and again given them, as
we have seen, of the dangers which threatened him,
'nd, by implication, he asked them to take the
INCO.MI'ATIULU WITH HEROISM. 99
necessary steps to avert. A general sent on a
dangerous mission does not like to go whining for
help when in peril. All the qualities which make
men heroes are incompatible with such a course.
These qualities rather lead them to underrate
danger, and to shrink from any appeal for effort for
their relief. Gordon would rather have cut off his
right hand than have written a telegram to Sir E.
Baring stating that he was in imminent peril—send
help to save me ! And it would appear it was
something like this style of appeal that was needed
to move the Government that had sent him on his
perilous mission. They knew he had provisions for
six months from March, and that when the Nile rose
his position strategically would be strengthened ; but
they had allowed his communications to be cut ;
they must have been uncertain as to the "circum
stances which might, in spite of all this, seriously
affect him ; and they would not make any effort to
ensure his safety. He might be in peril, but even
200 soldiers could not be sent either to Wady- Haifa
or Berber, because from a military and elimaterical
standpoint it would have been too unsafe to send
them, and in one case, that of Wady-Halfa, and
under the advice of His Royal Highness the
Commander, because of the danger to small bodies
of troops so isolated and so far from support
as they would be there. Gordon might, however,
be endangered, his communications cut, but the
non possumus policy these British statesmen had
adopted and held fast, left him to his own
resources. He has two months' provisions, and
II 2
lOO WHY CORDON 1'ERISHEI).
as the Arabs who are besieging him have no
guns, why need you trouble us about him ! And
so, at last, when driven to it by the force
of circumstances and Party necessities, they ask
him first, What is the object of his remaining at
Khartum ? as if he had not so often told them ; to
let them know if he was in danger—although they
had every evidence that he was ; and then leave to
him the responsibility of remaining at his post and
let the garrisons and employes they had sent him to
rescue, perish !
In the despatch referred to, Mr. Egerton is thus
instructed to express himself on their behalf to
Gordon :—
Her Majesty's Government fully acknowledge their debt of
gratitude to General Gordon for the heroic courage with which
he has proceeded upon his mission, which presented difficulties
unsurmountable by ordinary means, together with the possi--
bility of serious danger.
They recognised the benefits which have resulted from it ;
the confidence which at all events for a time he restored hi
Khartum, and the despatch of the women and children in
safety from that place, and hi* success, perhaps, in averting
any military movements upon Egypt, certainly in dispelling
the alarms connected with the expectation of such an event ! !
We quote the paragraph in extenso, leaving our
readers to draw their own conelusions from it, only
calling their attention to the omission from it of
all mention of the endangered garrisons and employes
in the Sudan.
Writing again to Gordon relative to the instruc
tions given to him by Her Majesty's Government,
Mr. Egerton said :—
EVACUATION, IJUT NOT DESERTION. IOI
You will bear in mind the main end to be pursued is the
evacuation of the Sudan ;
Now by implication this ineludes not only the
garrison and others at Khartum who were to be
withdrawn from the country, but those at Kassala,
Sennar, and elsewhere.
The observations made by Gordon in his journal
on November 22nd are so much in point here that
we feel constrained therefore to quote them :—
It may be agreed, he then writes, I was made Governor-
General in order to carry out the evacuation of the Sudan,
and that I am bound to carry that out, which is quite correct ;
but I was named for evacuation of Sudan (against which
I have nothing to say), not to run away from Khartum, and
leave the garrisons elsewhere to their fate. If it is positively
determined on not to look after the garrisons and not to
establish some sort of provisional government in the Sudan,
then the course to pursue is to name a governor in my place,
and carry out with that governor this policy. Personally,
looking at the matter from a very selfish point of view (and
seeing I have done my best to prevent this policy being
followed, and am impatient to oppose it), I should be much
relieved at the dt'nouemcul, for I would be in Brussels on
20th January.
If the Expedition comes here before the place falls (which is
doubtful), and if the instructions are to evacuate the place ac
once and leave Kassala and Sennar, &c., I will resign, and
have nothing more to do with the Government of the place or
of the Sudan.
Early in May Her Majesty's Government were
pressed in Parliament, as they had often previously
been, relative to the position of affairs at Khartum.
Amongst the questions asked was one by the late
Lord Randolph Churchill, on May 1st, 1884, when,
102 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
referring to a previous application for information
about Berber, he asked whether the attention of the
Prime Minister had been drawn to the despatch of
Sir E. Baring of April 20th, stating that, unless
some promise of help was sent to the Governor of
Berber, there was some risk of his joining the rebels,
and that this would seriously affect the position of
* Gordon ?
Mr. Gladstone, on the occasion referred to, denied
that the fate of Berber would have any serious
effect on Gordon's position, saying that :—
Whatever might take place in Uerber would make no
essential change in the position at Khartum, although the fall
would affect one of the routes to Khartum unfavourably
rather than otherwise. The opinionof Her Majesty's Govern
ment was that it would make nothing like an essential change
in the position or security of General Gordon.
Lord Randolph Churchill, in reply to these observa
tions, said :—
So the House is to understand that the deliberately expressed
opinion of Her Majesty's Envoy (Sir E. Daring) is absolutely
and utterly worthless.
During the same sitting, Mr. Staveley Hill having
asked if the time had not come when the Govern
ment might properly take steps towards ending the
mission of General Gordon, Mr. Gladstone replied
by stating that—
The honourable and learned Gentleman was aware that
General Gordon was sent out to the Sudan upon a mission
which involved the use of pacific means, and that the first
accounts from him were encouraging. Those, however, subse
INTERCEPTED MESSAGES. I03
nuently received, he admitted, threw some doubt upon his
being able to carry it out by such means ; !Hit that upon that
subject they had asked him for information, which would
naturally enlarge it with respect to his views of there being
any prospect of accomplishing that pacific mission, and until
they received his replies to these inquiries, he would not be in
a position to answer the question.
Having laid before our readers the explanations
which Gordon had from time to time sent Her
Majesty's Government about his position and pros
pects, and about his anxiety that Berber should be
occupied in order that he might be able to con
tinue his mission at all, it is hardly necessary for
us to comment upon these evasive and unsatisfac
tory answers from Mr. Gladstone. To a far more
serious extent than he stated did the fall of Berber
affect the route thence to Khartum, as we shall
presently see. In fact, when his communications
with Berber were interrupted by the revolt of the
tribes between it and Khartum, and more especially
when it fell, his mission of evacuating the Sudan
by pacific means was rendered impossible. One
result of it was that no reply was received from
Gordon to the message sent him on April 23rd
until September 28th, when one came from him
dated Khartum, July 30th.
Mr. Egerton informed Lord Granville on May 1st
that the message of April 23rd had been sent as
directed, and by Berber, Dongola, Suakim, and
Massowah. The agent (Mr. Cuzzi) at Berber had
telegraphed him that it was " impossible to send
letters or telegrams thence to Khartum for General
104 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
Gordon," and that "the situation was becoming
more desperate than ever." Duplicates were sent
by different messengers from Dongola, and likewise
from Suakim and Massowah.
Gordon, in his letter of November 4th, received
by Lord Wolseley at Wady-Halfa, stated that since
March ioth, exelusive of Kitchener's of October 14th,
only two despatches had reached him—one from
Dongola of no date, one from Suakim, May 5th,
and one of same import of April 27th from
Massowah. He had sent out a crowd of messengers
during the eight months, and one of them had
brought the message dated Khartum, July 30th,
and from which we quote the following paragraphs,
with this explanation : that " Yours of the 5th May,"
with which it commences, must refer to the fact of
its bearing the message of April 27th from Massowah,
for it was of the same import. The acknowledgment
by Gordon of the expression of thanks for good
wishes seems to refer to the congratulations appended
to both messages.
Your telegram of the 5th May received. . . . My retreat
is impossible, unless I abandon the civil employes and their
families. The feeling of the soldiers is against this. I will not
leave Khartum till suitably replaced. Before abandoning the
Sudan I must remove the Egyptian population. Even if the
road was open, the people would not let me leave without
them—unless a government was established.
P.S.—Reading over your telegram of May 5, 1884, you ask
ine to state cause and intention of staying at Khartum,
knowing that Government means to abandon Sudan, and in
answer I say I stay at Khartum because the Arabs have shut
as up and will not let us out. I repeat, I have no wish to
ANOTHER MESSAGE TO CORDON. 105
retain this country. The sole desire is to restore the prestige
of the Government, aad put some ephemeral Government in
^ position in order to get away.
Having been partially roused from their over
weening confidence in Gordon's ability to hold out
at Khartum or to escape from it, and evidently
under the pressure in Parliament, which as we have
seen was brought to bear upon them, Hef Majesty's
Government did not wait until they had received
replies to the communication to which Mr. Gladstone
then referred, for on May 17th they instructed Mr.
Egcrton to send him the following message :—
Having regard to the time which has elapsed, Her Majesty's
Government desire to add to their communication of April
23rd, as follows :— '
As the original plan for the evacuation of the Soudan has .
been dropped, and as aggressive operations cannot be under
taken with the countenance of Her Majesty's Government,
General Gordon is enjoined to consider and either report
upon, or, if possible, adopt at the first proper moment, measures
for his own removal and for that of the Egyptians at Khartum
who have suffered for him, and who have served him faithfully,
including their wives and children, by whatever toute he may
consider best.
With regard to the Egyptians, General Gordon is to be
informed also that he is authorised to make free use of money
rewards, or promises, at his discretion. For example, he is
at liberty to assign to Egyptian soldiers at Khartum sums
for themselves and for persons brought with them per
head, contingent on their safe arrival at Korosko or other
places of safety, or he may employ and pay the tribes to escort
them.
Then follow the compliments which we have
WHY GORDON PERISHED.
already quoted, and which on their connection would
seem to indicate that Her Majesty's Government
meant to say to Gordon :—
And we think you have done a great deal—quite as much
really as we had designed when we sent you to the Sudan ;
do oblige us, therefore, by coming out of it as soon as you
can, for you know, from circumstances you will readily under
stand, we could not send you any British force to help you
out of the scrape we have got you into I
The absurdity of sending such a message as that
just quoted to Gordon under the circumstances under
which he was then placed is expressed by him in
the following entry to his journal on September
17th :—
Egerton's telegram (May 17th), carefully written in cypher
(and equally carefully without date, but which we ascribe to
June) respecting the contracts to be entered into with the
Bedouin tribes to escort down (and be sure to look after
yourself) might as well have been written in Arabic, for it
would have produced hilarity in the Mahdi.
The pomp of Egerton's telegram, informing me " that Her
Majesty's Government would (really) pay on delivery so much
a head for all refugees delivered on the Egyptian frontier, and
would positively (it is incredible) reward tribes with whom I
might contract to escort them clown ! '
It was too generous for me to believe ! Egerton's chivalrous
nature must have got the better of his diplomatic training
when he wrote it The clerks in my divan, to whom I
disclosed it are full of expectations ofwonder at this generosity.
Egerton must consider that I was a complete idiot to have
needed such permission. I hope he will get promoted, and
will not be blamed for overstraining his instructions.
It is evident, we think, that Mr. Egerton did not
A JOCULAR DIPLOMATIST. I07
really overstrain these instructions on the points
criticised, but Gordon's were, as we have seen, ineluded
in them. The criticism, therefore, must be regarded
as falling upon Her Majesty's Government.
Gordon, in view of all the warnings he had sent
through Sir E. Baring about his increasingly
dangerous position, and the demand he had made
in his message of April 23rd—asking him to state
exactly how he was placed, and, if in danger, how,
and by what route, and how strong a force would be
required to rescue him—wrote as follows in his
journal on September 23rd, on a message he
had received through Colonel Kitchener from
Debbeh, dated August 31st. The message was as
follows :—
Tell Gordon steamers are being passed over the Second
Cataract, and that we wish to be informed through Dongola
exactly when he expects to be in difficulties as to provisions
and ammunition.
I am sure I should like that fellow Egerton. There is .1
light-hearted jocularity about his communications, and I
should think the care of life sat easily on him. He wishes
to know exactly — "day, hour, and minute" — that he
(Gordon) expects to be in " difficulties as to provisions and
ammunition."
Now I really think if Egeiton was to turn over the
"archives" of his office he could see we had been in difficulty
for provisions for some months. It is a man on the bank,
having seen his friend in river already bobbed down two or
three times, bawls, " I say, old fellow, let us know when we are
to throw you the life-buoy. I know you have bobbed down two
or three times—but it is a pity to throw you the life-buoy until
you are in extremis, and I want to know exactly, for I am a
man brought up in a school of exactitude, though I did forget
to date my June telegram about that Bedouin contract."
io8 WHY GORDON PEKISHEU
In order to let Gordon defend his decision to
remain in Khartum, and to explain his meaning
when he states that the people would not let him
leave the place, even if he could or would do so, we
quote the following from an entry in his journal on
November 9th :—
The people up here would reason thus if I attempted to
leave : You came up here, and, had you not come, we should
have some of us got away to Cairo, but we trusted in you to
extricate us ; we suffered, and are suffering, great privations in
order to hold the town. Had you not come we should have
given in at once, and obtained pardon. Now we can, after our
obstinate defence, expect no mercy from the Mahdi, who will
avenge on us all the blood which has been spilt around
Khartum. You have taken our money, and promised to
repay us ; all this goes for nought if you quit us ; it is your
bounden duty to stay by us, and to share our fate, fif the
British Government deserts us, that is -no reason for y.ou_to (to
so] after our having stood by you. I declare positively, and
once for all, that I will not leave the Sudan until every one
who wants to go down is given the chance to do so, unless a
Government is established which relieves me of the charge.
There'ore, if any emissary or letter comes up here ordering me
to come down, / will not obey it; but will stay here andfall
with the town, and run all risks.
In Sir C. W. Wilson's instructions from Lord
Wolseley relative to his mission to Khartum when
Mutemma was occupied by the Desert Column
under Stewart in January, 1885, his attention is
called to an accompanying letter to General Gordon
which is left open in order that he may read it. The
contents of this letter has never been made public.
It is possible, however, that its contents may have
IMPORTANT TELEGRAMS WITHHELD. IO9
been in accord with what Gordon instinctively
supposed would follow the course which Her Majesty's
Government had evidently been following with
respect to his mission. In fact, it was rumoured at
Korti, before the writer left there, that Lord Wolseley
had prohibited any of us correspondents going up
to Khartum with Sir Charles Wilson lest they
should become acquainted with some message that
he was bearing from Her Majesty's Government to
Gordon, because it was feared it would rouse his
indignation.
In the entry just quoted (November 9th) Gordon
further said that he had got all the "telegrams"
"European" sent from and received in Sudan "for
1SS3-84," and which he says were a "splendid collec
tion " full of interest. " What," he asks, " would the
Stividtird give for them ? However, I think I can
afford to be generous, and so I shall send them
down with this vol. vi." The Government, however,
withheld them when sending the original of the
journal to Sir Henry Gordon. Possibly, and very
probably, some of these telegrams, if published,
would throw considerable light on the contents of
this letter.
Before passing on to the inception and develop
ment of the plan adopted in August for the despatch
of the Expedition under Lord Wolseley, ostensibly
for the relief of Gordon and Khartum, we call the
attention of our readers, by way of introduction,
to the following extracts from the entry in Gordon's
journal of November 8th :—
1 10 WHY GORDON l'ERISH KI>.
There is one thing that is quite incomprehensible. If it is
rirfht to send up an Expedition now, why was it not right
before? It is all very well to say one ought to consider the
difficulties of the Government, but it is not easy to get over
a feeling that " a hope existed of no Expedition being necessary,
owing to our having fallen." As for myself, personally I feei
no rancour on the subject ; but I own I do not care to show
that I like men, whoever they may be, who act in such a
caleulating way ; and I do not think one is bound to act the
hypocrite's part and pretend to be friendly towards them. . . .
I know of no sort of parallel to all this in history except it be
David and Uriah the Hittite, and thtn there was an Eve in
the case, »ho, I am not aware of, exists in this case.
Remember, also, that I do not judge the question of
abandoning the garrisons or not ; what I judge is the in
decision of the Government. They did not dare say "abandon
the garrisons,"' as they prevented me leaving for the Equator,
with the determination not to relieve me and the hope (well,
I will not say what their hope was . . . March, April ....
August, why ? he ought to have surrendered, he said six
months), there is my point of complaint.
In the message sent to Gordon on April 25th
Lord Granville acknowledges that the original plan
upon which he hoped Gordon would be able to
evacuate the Sudan had failed. The Government,
as we have seen, considered him to be in a com
paratively safe position, and that he would be so
for some months to come, for he had told them
on March 8th that he had then six months' pro
visions and plenty of ammunition, and they sup
posed that, as the forces by which he was besieged
were without artillery, he would be able to resist
any direct attacks they might attempt to make
KHARTUM CONTINGENTLY SECURE. Ill
on the place. When the Nile rose Gordon also had
informed them his position would be strengthened.*
This would begin to occur about the end of May.
* This was consequent upon the ditch or canal dug from the Blue
to the White Nile being then flllcd with water. This canal, with its
parapet, formed the defensive works of Khartum on the south, and
converted it into an island. It was 5,900 yards in length at high Nile,
and at low Nile 6,700 yards. Its depth was eight feet, and width at
top seventeen feet, and at the bottom eight feet. Its principal defect*
as a defensive work were its great length, which required a large force
to man, and the absence of flanking defences.
t
112
CHAPTER VII.
Her Majesty's Government, however, had early
in April begun to contemplate the probability of
despatching an Expedition for the relief of Khartum,
and the rescue, not only of its garrison and the
Egyptian employes, but especially of Gordon, and
Colonel Stewart, and Mr. Power. On April 8th, we,
therefore, find that Lord Hartington received from
Lord Wolseley, as Adjutant-General, a communica
tion stating that he thought such aplan of operations
should be framed with a view of placing in the field
in the neighbourhood of Shendy, on the right bank
of the Nile, and nearly opposite to Mutcmma, a
British force of at least 6,506 men.
He named Shendy because, as he stated, it might
be assumed that, as long as Berber and Dongola
were held by the Khedive's troops, a force advancing
to the relief of Gordon at Khartum need not
anticipate any serious fighting until it or its district
was reached.
His reasons for an exelusively British Force were
that it was doubtful whether even the best of our
Indian regiments could stand a charge of Arabs
such as those which had recently been encountered
by General Graham's force, and because they were
WOLSELEV AND THE QUESTION OK ROUTES. 113
encumbered with numerous followers, who would
have to be fed, &c. If, however, for political reasons
it was thought best to employ Indian battalions, he
suggested they should be Punjaub troops. "
Lord YVolseley then refers to the three lines of
advance which had as their respective bases
Massowah and Suakim on the Red Sea, and Wady-
Ilalfa on the Nile.
Wady-Halfa he mentions as a base, because, for
a Relieving Force following the Valley of the Nile, it
could be easily reached with men and stores during
low water on that river.
The two last-named routes, his Lordship pointed
out, pass directly through Berber, and the first very
near it as it strikes the Nile at its junction with the
Atbara. Taking Berber as a central converging
point of these routes, he gives their relative distances
from their bases as follows :—
Miles.
No. i. Massowah to junction of Atbara
with the Nile 603
No. 2. Suakim to Berber 240
No. 3. Wady-Halfa to Berber... ... 666
As the selection of the route for a Relieving Expe
dition chosen by Her Majesty's Government was, in
its consequences, one of the causes which so largely
contributed to its lateness in accomplishing its object,
we have given Lord Wolseley's description of its
relative difficulties and advantages, in which he
stated to Lord Hartington that, owing to its vast
saving in expense by the water-facility for transport,
I
114 WHY GORDON PKRISHED.
as compared with that over land, he had no hesitation
whatever in saying that the river route from Wady-
Halfa to Khartum was infinitely preferable to any
other.
Lord Hartington, after examining this Memo
randum, asked Lord Wolseley if there was "No point
on the Nile, between the southern end of the Wady-
Halfa railway and Berber, where further progress in
boats became impossible?" and received the follow
ing reply :—
To those who do not know what was done by the men of the
Red River Expedition, the possibility of reaching Berber by
boats may well be doubted. Sir Redvcrs Duller took part as a
Captain commanding a company in that Expedition ; tell him
to study this question and state his opinion.
The cataracts of the Nile he acknowledged were, without
doubt, very serious, and of these difficulties Lord Wolseley
further stated there was no positive information, but what was
possessed led him to believe that all the boats of the Expedi
tion could be taken up every cataract (rapids) of the 140
beyond the point to which the Wady-Halfa railway he proposed
should be extended* when the river was full. If they could
not be so taken up, he adds, they should be portaged, as we
portaged our boats dozens of times in 1S70.
We should, Lord Wolsclcy continues, have camels with the
Expeditionary Force, who would march with the cavalry along
the banks. These would portage (carry) the stores round any
rapid required, the boats and small steamers being hauled over
if necessary on rollers, to be carried for that purpose in the
boats. The work should, if possible, be done by moonlight !
* Fifty-five miles of the roadway of this line had been built, but only
thirty-six miles from Wady-Halfa had been completed, thus leaving
forty-five miles roadway ready for the rail', which Lord Wolseley
proposed should now be laid.
STEPHENSON AND WOOD'S NEWS. 115
Lord Wolscley further stated in his Second
Memorandum, dated April 14th, that he considered
the 15th November to be the latest date up to which
General Gordon could hold out at Khartum, and
that preparations should bo made in view of that
fact. The force, he therefore advised, should be at
Berber not later than October 20th, and that if the
Government decided on the Suakim route, the force
should rendezvous there on the 1st of September.
General Sir Frederick Stephenson, then in com
mand of the British Force in Egypt, was strongly in
favour of the Suakim-Berber route ; and Sir Evelyn
Wood, in command of the Egyptian Army, was in
favour of that by Korosko to Abu-Hamed. The
former telegraphed his opinion to the Minister of
War on May 4th, as follows :—
l'roposc Suakim route—Wood Korosko Desert—Nile
throughout impracticable—Kassala undesirable. Force re
quisite 10,000 men, English or Indian—Wood can furnish 2,000
men for line of communications and two batteries. Best time
for Expedition to start October—Wood says for Korosko,
August—For Suakim early September.
General Stephenson reported that Wady-Halfa,
which Lord Wolseley proposed as a base for an
Expedition up the Nile by smaller boats to
Khartum, was 750 miles south of Cairo, and 860
from Khartum, with a known stretch of 180 miles of
broken water (Second and Third Cataracts) between '
it and Dongola. At the usual rate of progress,
steamers, &c., could only be expected to reach
Assouan, 210 miles below Wady-Halfa, in fourteen
days. Their stores would have to be carried past
I 2
Il6 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
the First Cataract which occurs, there to Philrc and
shipped again.
From Wady-Halfa to Khartum, this mareli route
along the river, as he supposed the advance of the
proposed Expedition would be made, would take 100
. days, with a camel for each man. There would, as
he supposes, also be an insufficiency of provender
for both camels and horses, and great difficulty in
taking care of the sick. In view of all these
difficulties—some of which Lord Wolseley proposed
to meet by the adoption of small row-boats for
transport—General Stephenson stated that he re
garded the Nile route as quite unsuited for such an
advance.
He then proposes the Suakim-Berber route as an
alternative one, and which could be traversed in
nine weeks from Suakim to Khartum. Our readers
will notice how completely this able officer proposes
to meet the obstaeles alleged by Lord Wolseley and
the military authorities who had advised. The
advantages of this route for an advance were, as
Sir Frederic states—
A shorter land march than by any other which had been
proposed—having a firm base at Suakim—with facilities for
the supply of meat and the care of the sick, and one protected
by the Fleet.
Reports on the subject were also received from
Lieutenant-Colonel Maurice, R.A., Quarter-Master
General, extracts from which we also give else
where, and from Admiral Sir John Hay, and
several other authorities.
Early in May Her Majesty's Government decided
ANOTHER VIEW OF Tilt: QUESTION. 1 17
upon having a careful survey made of the Second
and Third Cataracts, and Commander Hammill,
R.N., who was detailed for the duty by the
Admiralty, reached Wady-Halfa on the 15th of that
month. His report was an exhaustive and very able
one.
In his opinion, the proposed Relieving Expedition
should be so timed in its dispatch as to reach
Dongola not later than the 1 5th or 20th of September.
As the Nile was usually high on September 4th at
Wady-Halfa, he had no doubt but that steamers,
deahbeahs, &c., could ascend to Dongola (/.*,over
the 180 miles of the broken water of these cataracts)
after this date, but that, in order to avoid any risk
and the least delay and to reduce the amount of
assistance required at different points from the shore,
he advised that the river should be taken at its-
highest, because
It should be remembered that, with a falling Nile, the diffi
culties on that account would be experienced earlier, the
farther an Expedition ascended. As a rough mean, he also
stated September 25th might be looked upon as the usual date
of high Nile.
If advantage was taken of this period, that an Ex
pedition could be pushed forward from Wady-Halfa
within twenty days.
It recommended that preparations should be made
for getting eight steamers over the Second Cataract
to Semneh by September 1st for the transport of
men and stores to Dongola.
Commander Hammil gives also in his report an
estimate for supplies and rations of 3,500 men and
118 " W1IV (JORUON PERISHED.
800 horses for forty-five days, weighing a total of
S69 tons.
• He recommended cargo boats of about twenty-
eight tons—the usual size of the ordinary craft
(nuggars) used in the river above the Third Cataract.
Forty of them leaving space for thirty men, would
provide for 1,120 tons, and the steamers for ten tons
each. The horses and cavalry would, of course,
proceed by land. A large number of native craft
could, he stated, be obtained for such a transport
service in the long open reach of the Nile between
Hannek Mcrawi.
We have on a previous page mentioned that Lord
Hartington had asked Lord Wolseley if he knew of
any difficulty between the southern end of the Wady-
Halfa railway and Berber which might arrest the
progress of the boats, to which he replied that the
matter should be referred to Sir Redvers Buller to
study, as he hail commanded a company in the
Red River Expedition.
A report from a Committee composed of Generals
Sir Redvers Buller and Sir C. NcNeill and Colonel,
afterwards General, Sir W. Butler, dated July 29th,
1884, made the following statements on the proposal
of Lord Wolscley :—
Remembering the Red River, we believe that a brigade can
easily be conveyed in small boats from Cairo to Dongola on
the lines stated by Lord Wolscley ; and further that, should it
be necessary to send a still larger force by water to Khartum,
that operation will present no insufferable difficulties.
From all that we can learn about the N ile, and the difficulties
of desert journeys—when water for men and animals employed
AN HYPOTHETICAL IMSIS. 119
liavc to be conveyed on camels, \ve are convinced that, if it be
necessary to take a fighting force to Khartum before the end
of January, the Nile will be found the easiest, the safest, and
immensely the cheapest line of advance to adopt.
The report however stated that, in order lo ensure
the success of such an Expedition, the small row-
boats to be used for transport should be at Sarras—
the southern end of the Wady-Halfa railway—not
later than October 5th. This recommendation was
in accord with Lord Wolseley's warning to the
Government that Gordon could only be expected to
hold out up till November 15th. Sir Redvers Buller,
however, it appears from his mentioning that date,
thought with his colleagues that getting up to
Khartum by the end of January, would nevertheless
"do for Gordon" —which it did, fatally and
completely, as' we all, alas, know.
In order to bring out in full relief the hypothetical
basis upon which this proposal of Lord Wolseley and
his Red River colleagues rested, we mention that
Sir W. Butler in a separate report and with his
characteristic frankness, admitted that he knew
nothing whatever about the Nile above Cairo!
Neither did Lord Wolseley nor the others, but all of
them soon became better acquainted with the
difficulties it presented to navigation, and the ob
structions not only of the Second and Third Cataracts
but of the fourth above Merawi.
For example, in the middle of October, 1884, Lord
Wolseley telegraphed to Lord Hartington that he
had witnessed six Nile boats successfully hauled up
the Bab-el-Kebir (Big Gate, or main channel) of the
120 WHY GORDON l'EKISHEP.
Second Cataract, which was, he telegraphed to Lord
Hartington, " the greatest obstaele to the navigation
of the river."
About a fortnight after this incident, made historic
in the Nile Expedition by this telegram from Lord
Wolseley, we straddled all the water left in this
channel by the falling Nile and which was now
nowhere deep enough to float a biscuit box.
From the same cause other and similarly
important channels above this one—at the time
these small boats, or " whalers," as we usually called
them, were so triumphantly hauled up through the
" Big Gate," easy of passage—began to be either
entirely elosed to navigation, or had the depth of
water in them so lessened, or their currents so
increased, as to render their ascent either very
difficult or altogether impracticable.
Her Majesty's Government, however, had the
Suakim-Berber route still under their serious
consideration on June 14th, for on that date, and as
the result of enquiries that had been instituted about
the advantages or otherwise of a railway between the
points named, Lord Hartington informed General
Stephenson that it had been decided to take some
steps to facilitate its construction, if it was
eventually coneluded to do so.
As up till July 27th no reply had been received
to the messages sent to Gordon on April 23rd and
May 17th, and as a consequence fears were
entertained that he had not even received them,
Mr. Egerton was authorised to offer through
Colonel Kitchener, then at Debbeh, a reward
ROUSED FROM THEIR LETHARGY. 121
of £20,000 to Saleh, chief of the Kabbabish tribe, if
he would bring Gordon safely away from Khartum.
The message to Mr. Egerton further stated that—
Her Majesty's Government would not only not grudge that
amount provided the expenditure were effectual for that pur
pose, nor would they desire that Colonel Kitchener should be
absolutely restricted to that sum.
Colonel Kitchener, when he received this message,
said he would try and carry out his instructions,
but that he was not so sanguine about his being
able to do so successfully. Beyond this attempt,
and the consideration of the best route for an
Expedition for the relief of Khartum, nothing of a
practical nature was attempted for its relief until
early in August, under the following circumstances.
The rebellion in the Sudan had up till then been
gathering so much strength that, at the beginning
of July, it had actually begun to involve the upper
portion of Dongola. General Stephenson therefore
considered the situation so threatening that he
regarded the movement of British troops above
Wady-Halfa as absolutely essential. This primarily
roused Her Majesty's Government to action, for the
peace of Egypt proper was becoming endangered,
and on August 7th they obtained a Vote of
Credit from Parliament for £300,000 to enable
them, as Lord Hartington explained in a
despatch on August 8th to General Stephenson,
" to undertake operations for the relief of General
Gordon, should they become necessary, and to
make certain preparations in respect thereof," and
I 22 WHY CORDON* I'EKISHED.
then, in spite of all the warnings the Minister
of War had received and the knowledge of the fact
that Gordon's communications had been cut not
only by the fall of Berber but by the spread of the
rebellion, he qualifies this intention by adding to it
that they were not
At present convinced that it will be impossible for General
Gordon, acting on the instructions which he has received, to
secure the withdrawal from Khartum, either by the employ
ment of force or by pacific means, of the Egyptian garrisons,
and ofsuch of the inhabitants as may desire to leave !
Let our readers compare this deelaration with the
preamble to the message sent to Mr. Egerton for
transmission to Gordon on April 23rd, and say how
they can be reconciled, for in that preamble it is
plainly deelared that Gordon's mission on the lines
originally laid down for it, or believed to be, or as
represented by Earl Granville again and again in the
despatches from him we have quoted—had entirely
failed, and he was therefore virtually recalled by
that message in consequence of that failure !
And this extraordinary statement made by a
Minister of the Crown is followed by this one
equally so :—
The time, however, which has elapsed since the receipt of
authentic information of General Gordon's exact position, plans
and] intentions, is so long, and the state of the country as
evidenced by the difficulty of communicating with him is so
disturbed, that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that
the time has arrived when some further means for obtaining
accurate information should be adopted.
General Stephenson was then informed that
l'ROHAHLY UV SUAKIM AND 11ERBER. 123
although Her Majesty's Government had not then
actually made up their minds as to the best route
for an Expedition, that—
Certain preparations had been made at Suakim to receive the
stores for a light railway thence to Herber, and for the landing
of troops and the necessary supplies for an Expedition across
the desert by that route, he is told that the most recent infor
mation as to the existing condition of affairs, imperfect as it is,
appears to point in a different direction.
Amongst these " affairs " the despatch mentioned
was the danger of any advance by that route not
being unattended with " severe fighting," which the
Government wished to avoid, with the hostile tribes,
and the withdrawal of General Graham's force,
" rendered necessary by the approaching heat of the
summer."
Another of these " affairs " was that, Berber being
in the hands of the followers of the Mahdi, it was
probable that the operation of sending a force to the
place—necessarily on account of the scarcity of
water—" in small detachments would be one of
considerable difficulty and risk."
And here, again, we must express our astonish
ment at Lord Hartington pleading, in extenuation,
the consequences for which Her Majesty's Govern
ment were responsible through refusing to allow
General Graham, when he knew he could have so
easily occupied Berber, and when Gordon had
earnestly suggested that this should be done !
On May 28th, a telegram from Consul Baker stated
that Osman Digma, whose fighting force barely
numbered 300 men at the end of March, had since
124 WHY GORDON rERISHED.
been increased to 3,000 men, because of the sudden
revival of his popularity with the Hadendowa tribes,
owing to the spread of rumours amongst them of the
fall of Berber. On June 1st this was confirmed by
Major Chermside, who reported that he had then
enrolled 3,200 men.
The danger on account of severe fighting
mentioned by Lord Hartington as one which Her
Majesty's Government wished . to avoid was a
danger brought about by their refusal to occupy
Berber, as we have shown could have been done
by General Graham.
What further information could Her Majesty's
Government have required to warrant them
adopting immediate measures for Gordon's relief
than they had already in their possession ? They
knew he was besieged and his communications
had been cut ! They had been informed in a
despatch from him on March 8th that he had
provisions only for six months from that date, and
which would be exhausted now in a few weeks.
They admitted that the country was disturbed, and
the insurrection had spread down to Berber and to
the upper part of Dongola ; and yet they still waited
for further information before they were willing to
strike a blow on his behalf and on that of the
beleaguered city he had been sent by them to
rescue ! They had sent him a message on April
23rd, to which they had no reply as yet. What
reply could have been given to that message other
than was contained in those he had already sent
them ?
SOME STUMBLING-BLOCKS. , 125
They had admitted Gordon's right to the title of
" Hero," and had praised his marked abnegation.
Did they expect a man with such marked charac
teristics to telegraph to the Minister of War :—" I
am in the greatest danger! Do send troops to save
me ! " Such would not be the conduct of a hero.
Gordon, or any other British officer similarly placed
as he was, would have cut off their right hands
before they would have sent such a telegram as
thatl
However his action in the matter may be viewed,
the general impression has been that Lord Harting-
ton was personally in favour of immediate and
energetic efforts being made for the relief of General
Gordon, but that he failed to induce his colleagues
to adopt them. It is further believed that the chief
stumbling-blocks in his way, as "Minister of War,"
were the Foreign Secretary, our Diplomatic Agent at
Cairo, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The
first-named of these distinguished members of the
Cabinet seems to have had a free hand in his depart
ment, and used his power to prevent any departure
from the rigid policy he had laid down with respect
to the Sudan, and consequently and continuously
turned a deaf ear to any of General Gordon's
requests or suggestions which might, in any measure
or degree, compromise that policy.
There have been distinguished strategists in
diplomacy as well as in war, but the late Earl
Granville was not one of the former, at least there
was always a want of boldness about his procedure
which was illustrated by his preference for a series of
126 WHY CORDON rERISHED.
flank movements in place of a bold and direct attack-
in order to gain his object.
We have many illustrations of this characteristic
in the diplomacy of the late Earl, amongst which
was his dealing with France with respect to the Joint
Control—a question which uncomfortably cropped
up after our occupation of Egypt in 1882. Instead of
treating it as having been abrogated by the refusal
of France to join us in suppressing the rebellion led
by Arabi— as we know M. Freycinet actually did—
he regarded it as still existent, and only removable
as a stumbling-block in our way by negotiation
with France.
Communications, therefore, continued to pass
between London and Paris, but in none of them did
Lord Granville indicate that he had the courage of
his opinions. Lord Granville " beat about the bush,"
and never came to the point with M. Duclerc. At
last the latter, then Minister for Foreign Affairs,
seemed, on one occasion, to have lost patience, and
said to our Charge* d'Affaires," Mr. Plunkett, we wish
your Government would tell us plainly what they do
want, and if possible we will try and meet their
wishes."
127
CHAPTER VIII.
Lord Granville had no reason, as we have already
stated, to fear that Gordon would do anything to
compromise his policy of evacuating the Sudan,
and yet he acted towards him as if he really thought
that such would be the case if he sent him the
material aid he needed to carry out this one acknow
ledged object of his mission. To some extent the
course he followed was, no doubt, shaped to meet
the Parliamentary exigencies of the Cabinet. Hut
it was not a bold course—nor was it creditable to
the Foreign Minister of the Liberal party. Better
for him and the Cabinet to have resigned office than
to have contributed, as his Lordship unquestionably
thus did, to the delay in intervening on Gordon's
behalf.
It is an open secret that Mr. Childers, who held
the "sinews of war" in his keeping, also used his
power by urging delay, in order either to save
expense or to avoid it altogether.
These, then, were probably the chief hindrances
in the way of the Minister of War yielding to his
convictions relative to the danger in which Gordon
was evidently placed long before he obtained the
grant from Parliament for the purposes mentioned
128 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
in his despatch of August 8th. Although, therefore,
we are warranted in criticising the paragraphs in it
to which we have thus far called attention, in the
interests of fair play we feel bound to make this
admission. Lord Hartington spoke in Parliament,
and quoted this despatch diplomatically ; but it
would have been better for him to have put his foot
down earlier, and if he had, probably the disaster at
Khartum would not have occurred.
Following the paragraphs of this despatch already
quoted, we find the following:—
On the other hand, the intelligence which had been received
of the spread of the insurrection in the direction of Berber and
Dongala and the uncertainty which still existed as to the
position of affairs at the latter place, had created a feeling of
alarm and insecurity on the frontiers of Upper Egypt, which
has made it, in our opinion, necessary to direct a portion of
the Egyptian army to positions at Koroskoand Wady-Halfa to
support the advanced portion of British troops at Assiout and
Assouan, and I understand you to contemplate occupying the
the advanced posts by British troops.
We have quoted this paragraph chiefly on account
of this one which follows it :—
Under these circumstances it seems probable that if any
active measures for the relief of General Gordon and the
garrison of Khartum should become necessary, the object in
riew could be accomplished with the least risk of serious
opposition and loss of life combined with the greatest amount
of protection to the Egyptian territory by an operation in the
Valley of the Nile if it should appear practicable.
The question of the practicability is then thus
referred to :—
AS ON THE RED RIVER. 129
Although the obstacles caused by the series of cataracts
which intercept the navigation of the Nile between Assouan
•and Dongola and Khartum are such as to render almost
mpossible the transport by means of the river, of a
considerable force and its necessary supplies in the steam
boats and other craft which have hitherto been employed, I
am advised by competent authorities that the transport of a
force of moderate dimensions in small boats—such as were
employed in the Red River Expedition in 1870—beyond the
points where the ordinary means of Nile navigation would not
prevent any insuperable difficulties. Her Majesty's Govern
ment have therefore come to a conclusion that the best mode
in which they can place themselves in a position to undertake
the relief of General Gordon, should the necessity arise, would
be by the provision of the means by which such an expedition
could be despatched to Dongola, and as circumstances at the
time may render expedient and necessary, to Berber aiid
Khartum.
The principal preparatory measures which General
Stephenson is informed had been decided upon were
(1) The passing up the First and Second Cataracts
as many steamers as might be possible or expedient.
(2) To obtain from the Admiralty and other sources
a supply of small boats suitable for the transport
of troops and supplies beyond the point at which
ordinary transport would be available. (3) The
despatch to Egypt of one battalion of infantry
and ordering two others—the first in the list for
relief from India—to be stopped in Egypt when en
route. (4) The despatch of British troops to VVady-
Halfa as he might consider requisite.
General Stephenson was also directed to collect
supplies at Wady-Halfa for a force up to the limit
of 3,000 men. He was also directed to put the
K
130 WHY GORDON l'ERISHED.
railway thence to Sarras in good working order, and
to purchase 1,200 camels for a transport corps.
So far so well, and equally satisfactory was
the following message from Lord Hartington to
General Stephenson :—
If, during the progress of these preparations for the
operations above described, it should appear that an actual
advance on Khartum is imperatively required, it will be
necessary to further increase the number of troops at your
disposal, and the scale of preparations now sanctioned. But,
in any event, these measures and the advance of the force
indicated, should it be decided on, cannot fail in the opinion of
Her Majesty's Government materially to facilitate the
adoption of such further measures, if they should unfortunately
be found to be ultimately required.
On the day before this despatch was sent by post
to General Stephenson, Lord Hartington telegraphed
that he was about to send him instructions, the
general scope of which would facilitate the move
ment of a battalion at short notice from Wady-Halfa
to Dongola, and asked him what he could do with
the force and resources at his command, and to
which he received the following reply :—
Can send four battalions, 2,200 bayonets, 200 cavalry, one
battery field artillery, two batteries mountain guns, and,
mounted infantry. Small boats not suitable, and could procure
native craft.
General Stephenson telegraphed on the 14th that,
the Nile began to fall at Wady-Halfa about the
middle of September, and at Dongola a week
earlier, and then its navigation would become more
difficult.
AN IMPORTANT DESPATCH. 133
Two days later he telegraphed Lord Hartington,
urging that steamers and other craft should pass up
the Second Cataract (above Wady-Halfa) by the
middle of September, adding :—
Advise they then embark men and stores, and proceed to
Dongola while the Nile is favourable. Sufficient and suitable
craft can be obtained here (i.e., Cairo), and further supply from
Dongola if necessary. Early occupation of Dongola desirable
from political as well,as military grounds. If approved prompt,
reply necessary.
In order to place the fullest information possible
before our readers on this important question of a
route for a Relieving Expedition, we have given the
accompanying Map showing the obstruction to
navigation by the Nile Cataracts, and will now lay
before them the following despatch from Lord
Hartington to General Stephenson, for which we
have in our foregoing quotations and remarks
prepared the way. It was dated August 15th, and
was as follows :—
With reference to my recent correspondence and telegrams
upon matters connected with defence of the southern frontiers of
Egypt, and upqn the military operations beyond this frontier,
for the purpose of relieving General Cordon, in Khartum.
Should such an operation become, necessary, 1 think it advisable
to place you further in possession of my views on these subjects,
and of the measures which, I think, should now be adopted
with a view to carry out that undertaking.
After a careful revision of the military and political position in
Egypt, and the comparison, which recently obtained informa
tion enables me to make between the respective difficulties
which an advance on Khartum by the Suakim-Berbcr line,
and which a movement by water up to the Nile Valley would
134 WHY CORDON I'ERISHKI).
present, I am led to prefer the latter line of operations, for any
troops that may have to be employed in the event of its being
found necessary to send help to General Gordon. It is
essential that the plan adopted should provide for the return
of all the troops employed before the end of the approaching
winter season.
The Nile Valley having been selected as the line of advance,
and water transport having been considered the safest and
most economical, if not, indeed, the only practical transport
"when all the circumstances attendant upon any such possible
operation .ire fully weighed and considered, it is evident that
the first step would be the conveyance by water to Dongola of
a brigade of all arms.
Having this preliminary object in view, I informed you in my
telegram of the 7th inst. that the proposal was to use small
boats above the cataracts, as the Red River Expedition, and
I asked you what you could do with the force and resources at
your disposal to enable such a brigade to be dispatched at
short notice from Wady - Haifa to Dongola, and that the
additional battalion you ask for had been placed under orders
for Egypt.
On the 9th I informed you we could build here in one month
500 boats 30 ft. by 6 ft. 6 in., and drawing 22 inches when
loaded, with a crew of 12 men and too days' rations for
them and other stores, and asking you if you wished them to
be proceeded with and sent to Egypt for the purpose described
in my telegram of August 7.
On the nth I received your despatch of that date. You
tell me you can move 2,200 bayonets, &c., and that the
small boats are not suitable, and you could procure a large
amount of water transport locally.
Captain Molyncux and Commander Hammill, R.N., who
have examined the cataracts of the Nile, have similarly
reported as to the unsuitability of small rowing-boats for
transport purposes on that river. The latter officer has lately
submitted a most detailed scheme for the conveyance to
Dongola of a brigade of all arms by means of deahbeahs,
nuggars, and steamers.
an admiral's oP.j ACTIONS. '35
In forwarding that scheme to the Admiralty on
August 4lh, Admiral Sir John Hay remarks:—
It will be gathered from reading this report that no neces
sary preparations having been made, time does not admit of such
an Expedition being armed at this season. Still, undoubtedly,
one in which a less amount of water transports would suffice
might be undertaken. Whatever could not be carried by
water would, in that case, require to be carried by land.
He had previously telegraphed that small boats
would not be useful, and in his telegram of July
2 1st he repeats this as follows :—
Afier a full consideration I am of opinion it is too' late for an
Expedition (to Dongola) this season, if transport by the Nile
beyond Second Cataract is to be a main feature. Preparation
cannot now with any certainty be made in time.
Nevertheless, I have such confidence in your ability, and in
the zeal and energy of the Staff and Departmental Offices
under your command, that I am sure you can surmount all
difficulties. It is essential, however, to remember that, as the
operation has for its sole object the relief of General Gordon,
and that, therefore, in framing any plans for the movement of
troops south of Wady-Halfa, the possibility of an advance
as far as Khartum itself should be included in and form a
necessary part of such plans. To move troops, therefore, lo
Dongola, I consider would be to ignore the one great object in
view, unless the scheme embraced and provided for the
advance of a still much larger force to Khartum.
I am convinced, after a careful study of Commander
Hammill's report, the opinion of Sir John Hay, and the pro
posals contained in your telegrams of the nth instant that it
would not be possible for a suitable force to reach Khartum
by water* and return to Egypt before the end of the
approaching winter, if the steamers and native boats now at
your disposal were alone to be used as a means of conveyance.
Under these circumstances I feel it necessary to make
preparations for giving effect to the small-boat plan, to enable
136 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
.-j
you to send up a force towards Khartum in the |event of itsy^
being necessary to do so. (
A similar plan of operations was most successful in the Red -
River Expedition of 1870, where greater river difficulties had ^
to be overcome than any which the Nile presents. ,
I am informed by experinced officers who took part in *
the Expedition that those accustomed to working in small
boats in any rapid and difficult rivers are apt to attach too •
much importance to the obstacles which cataracts or even v^
falls present to navigation. After carefully considering the\)
difference in levels between the Nile below Wady-Halfa and^
at Khartum, and the able Reports of Commissioner Hammill
upon the cataracts he examined, they pronounce that an
advance up the Nile in small row boats is a practical operation,
altogether independent of the height of the river.
General Stephenson is then informed that General
Karle and General Sir Redvers Buller, as his Chiet
of Staff, were to be placed in command of the troops
at Wady-Halfa—receiving their orders from him—
the former because " he was acquainted with the
organisation of the force which was sent to the
" Red River," and the latter as having been selected
because " besides his considerable experience in
war, took part in the Red River Expedition," and
was, therefore, well versed in all the arrangements
necessary for the successful organisation of one on
the same plan, &c., up the Nile. 1
General Stephenson was also informed that
Colonel Butler, C.B., had been selected to
superintend the purchase and fitting up of the 400
boats which had been ordered, and that it was hoped
they might " be on the water ready for use at Sarras
by the 1st November."
137
CHAPTER IX.
BEFORE replying to his telegram of the 1 6th August,
Lord Harrington, on the 19th, informed General
Stephenson—in order to avoid any misunderstanding
—that Her Majesty's Government wished to be in a
position to send a force that season (1884) to
Dongola, and, if necessary, to Khartum this winter,
and then as follows :—
From Hammill's Report we believe it impossible to effect
that object if we employ only steamers and Nile boats; also
that to effect it at all there must be at least twelve good
steamers and Nile boats below Assouan, and eight between that
place and Wady-Halfa. Consequently, until twenty steamers
are thus distributed, it appears wrong to pass any steamer above
Wady-Halfa. In these circumstances we are organising an
Expedition in small boats, propelled by their crews beyond
Wady-Halfa.
You disagree, but what do you propose ? What force do
you propose to send to Dongola, and how could you get it
there ? How would you send it to Khartum, and how bring
it back ? State approximate number of camels you would
require to assist in each operation. How many steamers
would you keep on the Nile south of Wady-Halfa before you
sent any south ?
To this General Stephenson replied (August 21st}
that it was possible to send a force to Dongola that
season, but impossible, owing to distance, for it to
proceed by that route to Khartum and return it*
133 WHY GORDON PEKISHEI).
the winter, and that it should consist of S.ooo men.
The number of camels required would depend upon
the success of water transport and difficulties of
the Fourth and Fifth Cataracts, but that a good
supply was reported at Debbeh and Merawi. An
Expedition, he further states, by the Nile route
must return by Nile unless the Suakim Berber route
be open, because it would be most difficult to furnish
supplies to forces returning by Nile.
And we now have the cruxot the dispute between
the Red River men and Sir F. Stephenson and
Commander Hammill in his further observation on
this report :—
Believe Expedition to Dongola by means of small boats
impracticable. Difficulties on river too gieat. Naval
opinion here is the same. Can be best done by steamers and
local craft, but prompt decision urgent to secure craft for
force you propose in yours of 8th. Already arranged that
eight steamers be placed above Assouan and twelve below ;
more available if required. Former fit to pass Second Cataract,
arrangements made to pass over six, at least, directly river
is fit.
General Stephenson then plainly and frankly
stated that his own opinion still was in favour of the
Suakim-Berber route if the friendly tribes are armed
and subsidised and would procure sufficient camels,
which he believed they easily could.*
* The possibility of thus using the friendly tribes was substantially
confirmed by a telegram from Commander Molyneux from Suakim on
August 8th, stating that five chiefs, representing a large force, had
sworn on the Koran loyally to support the Government, to retake
Handout and Disabil (probably Tambouk was meant), and to keep
their section of the Berber road open. They gave as hostages five
ONLY HY SMALL-ltOATS. 139
Three days later General Stephenson was further
informed by Lord Hartington that he gathered from
the telegraphic correspondence with him, since he
had received his despatch of the 15th, that he had
based the plan of his operations substantially on that
sketched out by Commander Hammill dated August
4U1. After referring to his offer to send the brigade
to Dongola, on August nth, but that it would
not be practicable to send it to Khartum and back
by the same route during winter, his Lordship
stated he was not prepared to authorize a move
ment of troops by native craft and steamers to
Dongola, for reasons stated in his despatch of
August Sth, being still of the opinion that an
Expedition by small-boat transport for troops and
their supplies was not only practicable, but that the
risk would be lessened by their use, and that they
would afford the best means for bringing back the
troops before the commencement of the hot weather.
He had, therefore, ordered 400 more boats for the
larger force which it might eventually be found
necessary to send beyond Dongola. He therefore
instructed General Stephenson that the measures
ordered to be taken by him must be conformed to
this decision. This, however, must not be taken as
inconsistent with the instructions he had already
received, and the preparations in which he" was
actively engaged for collecting a force and supplies at
■ datives of Ihe Chiefi and received supplies of aims, ammunition,
grain, and biscuits. Colonel Chermsirfe also then telegraphed
Colonel Watson, K.E., then at Suakim, that Osman Digma's forces
had been reduced by 3,000 deserters.
140 WHY GORDON rEKISHKD.
Wady-Halfa and Sarras, although his Lordship,
as he further informed General Stephenson, did not
think it desirable,
Actually to move a larger number of men than was necessary
much before the time it would be possible for them to proceed
further.
He then, after authorising him to pass two steamers
up the Second Cataract stated that—
However desirable as it was to increase the transport above
that Cataract, it is, having regard to the plan of making use of
small boats capable of being propelled by their own crews
above the Cataracts, of the first importance that the river
transports should be maintained in a condition of complete
efficiency, and I desire that nothing should be done which
would tend to impair it.
Then, as if moved by some unreported influence,
Lord Hartington somewhat modifies the fore
going stringent instructions on August 23rd in the
following message to General Stephenson :—
You are authorised to send British mounted infantry to
Dongola, and with them Bedouins if you think desirable. Use
your discretion as to the concentration of British troops at
Haifa—but they must not proceed south of Sarras until the
arrival of boats from England. When the mounted infantry
arrive at Dongola, form a large depot of supplies there. I
give you authority to hire or purchase native boits for this
purpose, either below or above Second Cataract. Only
move two steamers up Second Cataract. When safely placed
above Semneh, the propriety of sending up more will be
considered.
Then, on August 26th, Her Majesty's Government,
after anxious consideration, came to the conelusion
A PRACTICAULE SUGCESTION. 141
that it would be unjust to Sir Frederic Stephenson
to ask him to be responsible for directing an
operation which, after full knowledge of the plan
he considered to be impracticable, and it had, there
fore, been decided to send Lord Wolseley to take,
temporarily, the Chief Command in Egypt.
VVe have thus laid before our readers in full detail
the official correspondence between the Minister of
War and General Stephenson, which ended in the
rejection of his proposal to send a brigade of troops
to Dongola, when it could have been taken there
early in September. The circumstances in which
Gordon, as we have seen, was placed, were such as
to call for immediate action, but that was now
postponed until the small boats from England had
arrived on November 15th at Wady-Halfa !
Colonel Kitchener, who was at Debbeh in August,
appears to have also been consulted about sending a
force to Dongola, from the following telegram
received from him on the 31st of the month.
I do not think a large Expedition would be necessary from
here to Khartum. A flying column composed of a strong fore;
of cavalry and artillery and some infantry on camels and on
foot—altogether about 4,000 men—could, I believe, relieve
Khartum. My opinion is, decidedly send up your troops.
There is no difficulty, and one good right close to Khartum
will see the matter through.
When submitting the Supplementary Estimates to
Parliament, on November 13th, Lord Hartington,
having stated that the' Government had acted upon
the recommendations and advice of certain officers,
when asked who they were, gave the names of the
142 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
officers engaged on the Red River Expedition.
They were not only, he said, Lord Wolscley himself
but there were General Buller, General McNeill.
Colonel Alleyne, and Colonel Butler ! These were
the officers consulted on the subject.
His Lordship seems to have forgotten to mention
the names of others who had likewise been consulted
—but who had not reported so favourably as the
officers he had mentioned.
Amongst these was Colonel Maurice, R.A.,
Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General at head
quarters. In his report of May 17th, he referred
thus to the Nile route :—
The Nile route, if the railway be completed round the
Wady-Haifa Cataract, so as to pass below the more serious
cataracts, and reach the Nile below Semnch Cataract, seems
to me by far the safest for the mass of the Expedition.
I think, from what I have been able to learn from the
engineers who were employed on the railway, that this could
be completed in two months—say by middle of July, if the
orders were now given for it.
In the same time, or less, steamers adapted to Nile trans
port could be built in this country and arrive at Semnch in
time to complete the number of boats required. ... As the
movement of the Flotilla cannot begin below the Second
Cataract prior to August 20th, the lighter draft boats built
in England would certainly be in time to supplement those
probably able to pass the cataract.
There can be but little doubt that had the Nile
Valley route, small boats and all, been adopted a
month earlier, and practically entered upon, it
would have been successful, although at the same
time the burden of proof, in the opinion of those who
NOT ON A FALLING NILE. '43
have carefully studied the information about the
Suakim and Berber route, and that by Massowah,
were relatively in their favour.
The adoption of the Nile route, even early in
August, if prompt measures had been taken to
despatch the Expedition, might still have been
successful. whole month, however, was lost in
constructing special boats for the Expedition.} This
delay was fatal to it.
It is interesting to mark here Gordon's opinion on
this point, as recorded in his journal on October 29th.
I am still of opinion, if the season was not so far advanced
and the Nile not on the fall, that the route up the Nile for a
covering force was a correct one—but it ought to havs been
undertaken in July with a rising Nile.
The three men caught to-day say the Expeditionary Force is
still at Debbeh, and I expect that is the truth, for the eight
steamers coming up the Nile is scarcely possible now, since the
Nile is falling.
The distance direct from Khartum to Debbeh is nearly
250 miles, and the Kabbabish are friendly, the road is not a bad
one. However I think Ambukol to Mutemma (could the
force know I had five steamers there) would be better, for it is
only 1 50 miles, and from Debbeh there is water transport.
Mcrawi to Berber is 150 miles with water transport to
Merawi. You have the map of the railway. When debouched
at Mutemma, split off one detachment to capture Berber and
another towards Khartum.
144
CHAPTER X.
THE correspondence from which \ve have quoted
so largely, between Lord Hartington and General
Stephenson, requires more than a passing notice, as
it supplies us with a key to the policy acted upon by
Her Majesty's Government, from the beginning to the
bitter end, with respect to General Gordon personally
and with respect to his mission towards the garrisons
of the Sudan, which they endangered as we have
already pointed out.
Although the grant 'of £300,000 was readily
obtained from Parliament for the objects named,
its application for their attainment was marked
by inexcusable delay. Lord Hartington told the
Committee, for example, that Her Majesty's Govern
ment were not yet convinced that General Gordon,
acting upon his instructions, might not be able to
withdraw the garrison and civil employes at
Khartum—and by implication—without any Expe
dition of British troops being despatched to aid him
in that withdrawal. They were, therefore, not ready
to sanction any movement of troops beyond the
southern frontiers of Egypt proper, for that purpose,
and only did so shortly afterwards to protect it from
the threatened advance of the Dervish rebels. Now
what further evidence did they require than they
PROPOSED HASTY RETREAT. MS
had to convince them that such an Expedition was
needed ?
, In March, when, as \ve have seen, the forces of the
Mahdi had seriously threatened Gordon's communi
cation with Berber, he had telegraphed the Govern
ment, that as the road from Suakim to it was elosed,
and from the growing strength of the besieging force,
leave had been given to Colonel Stewart and Mr.
Power to escape from the threatened fortress. The
despatches which we have quoted showed how despe
rate that condition had become. It is evident that
they shrank from leaving the gallant soldier alone,
and hoped that British aid would be sent to them in
their critical position. Gordon at last persuaded
them to go down the Nile and to explain verbally
the necessities of the case, hoping that they might
be listened to, although his statements and appeals
had been disregarded. We know the fate which
befell them. Before they left him he telegraphed
Sir E. Baring that, with the permission of Her
Majesty's Government understood, he proposed
to send the garrison of Khartum and the civil
employts by Colonel Stewart to Berber, and that
then he would seek personal safety by a flight to the
Equator, requesting an immediate answer because
the operation would even thert be a difficult, and
might soon be an impossible, one. The message
sent in reply to him—to conduct this retreat himself
—they had substantial grounds for believing had
never reached him, for Sir E. Baring informed them
on April 8th, that it was most unfortunate that of
all the telegrams he had sent to General Gordon
L
146 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
since March ioth, that is, three days earlier than the
one ordering the retreat to Berber, only one very
short one, of March 28th, had reached him.
This seems to have alarmed Her Majesty's
Government, and instead of taking immediate
measures then to open up communications and to
make some practical military demonstration on his
behalf, as British statesmen ought to have done, they
decided to send the beleaguered hero the message
of April 23rd. Why did he stay there? they asked.
Because, as Gordon had previously replied, " I cannot
get away or carry out my obligations to the people
of Khartum without your aid ! " Then followed the
additional message of May 17th. Nine days later
Berber fell, and Gordon was entirely isolated, help
less, and in deadly danger of perishing.
On March 8th, it is true, he had told them he had
eight months' provisions, and that when the Nile
rose, his position, from a military point of view,
would be strengthened, as we have already explained
it would. These provisions would be exhausted, or
nearly so, and they had no right to come to any
conelusion—and yet they did not yet feel convinced
but that Gordon might be able to fight his way
down to Berber. The flooded river which would
have enabled Gordon single-handed to have held
Khartum, would also have facilitated the pushing up
of a force ready to help him, but this was not done,
for Her Majesty's Government was not yet con
vinced by all they had learned, as we have seen, of
his being in such danger as to require it. They
must forgive us if we err in charging them with the
NOT YET DECIDED. 147
facts before us—that they were not willing to be
convinced—on the principle of the old adage :—
" Convince a man against his will,
He's of the same opinion still."
Even on September 17th we find them still in this
frame of mind, for on that date in a telegram to Lord
Wolseley, who had then assumed the command of
our Army in Egypt, they said that while complying
with his requisition for additional troops, they must
at the same time remind him that no decision had
as yet been arrived at to send any portion of the
force under his command beyond Dongola, but that
they recognised the fact that to put him in a position
to undertake such a military operation would pro
bably do more than anything else to render such
an operation unnecessary.
And then we have the last sentence of this
despatch to guide us in criticising, as we shall soon
do, Lord Wolseley's conduct of the Expedition sent
for the relief of Khartum and the rescue of Gordon,
which was as follows :—
You are fully aware of the views of Her Majesty's Govern-
tnent on this subject, and know how adverse they are to under
take any warlike expedition not called for by absolute necessity I
Not called for, indeed, by absolute necessity ?
Was not Khartum so elosely hemmed in as to be
cut off from all communication with the outside?
Had not Her Majesty's Government informed its
heroic defender that he was not to abandon the
place without orders ? Was there not enough in all
this to call for an immediate effort by force of arms,
L 2
148 WHY CORDON PERISHED.
to hurry to his relief? Patriotism, humanity, and
British honour called for such a movement—and yet
it was delayed until, as \ve know, it was too late to
be effective.
• That Lord Wolseley should have undertaken the
command of the Expedition under such restrictions
seems unaccountable. We will not attempt to
explain it, but let our readers form their own con
elusions on this delicate subject.
Lord Wolseley seems certainly to have allowed
himself to be handicapped not only by his under
standing with the Government, but also by his
instructions, which were drawn up by himself, at
Cairo, with Lord Northbrook and Sir E. Baring.
We ask our readers if they know of any page in
British history which records such treatment of a
brave and gallant officer as that meted out to General
Gordon by the Government which had sent him on a
dangerous and hazardous mission, and who, by their
delay in affording him the protection he elaimed at
their hands, virtually abandoned him to his fate?
Gordon himself cites the case of Uriah, the Hittite,
in Jewish history, as a parallel one ; adding that,
however, there was an Eve in it. In that of the
Gladstone Cabinet the Eve was either place and
power and parliamentary necessities, or incom
petency ! Our limits prevent us illustrating this by
a reference to the defence made by the Cabinet in
Parliament of their conduct in this matter when it
was called in question. No patriot can read the
excuses and evasions—if not something more dis
creditable—in that defence without feelings of shame
INCORRECTLY ACCOUNTED FOR. 149
and fear for the future of Constitutional Govern
ment conducted as now on Party lines.
Returning from this digression again to the
correspondence of Lord Hartington—which ended
on August 26th, when General Stephenson was
superseded in his command by Lord Wolseley—
we find the former referring to it in Parliament on
November 13th, when submitting the Supplementary
Estimates for the Sudan Expedition, as follows:—
It appeared to Her Majesty's Government that while the
officers in Egypt were prepared to place a considerable force
at Dongola, and one larger than they thought necessary—
relying on steamboats, &c., for the means of transport, they
had not formed in their own mind and did not appear to be
able to so, any definite plan of operations by which, in the
event of necessity occurring, that force could be successfully
transported beyond Dongola as far as Khartum, should that
be requisite . . . and that, therefore, that it would both in
justice to the officers who had recommended the operation
(i.e., by small boats), and to those on the spot who felt a doubt
as to the practicability of carrying out the operation, and also
in the success that the responsibility for its execution might
be placed in the hands of the officer who had been principally
concerned in recommending it, and felt perfectly confident of
its success on carrying it out.
Lord Hartington is not quite correct in stating
that the officers on the spot had been unable to form
a plan for taking a force to Khartum, because they
had reported chiefly against the small-boat plan of
transport up the Nile. General Stephenson had,
however, formed and submitted a plan to get the
larger force to Khartum by the Suakim-Berber
route, and had forcibly urged it on the attention of
150 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
the Goverment as swifter, safer and more certain
than that which was then being pressed for their
acceptance by officers who were not on the spot.
Again, with respect to the inability or the failure
of these " officers on the spot " to form any definite
plan for moving a force beyond Dongola to Khar
tum, it is important to call attention to the fact
that neither in August had the officers in London—
in their plan—gone beyond that of transporting it
by water all the way to Shendy. In fact, Lord
Hartington himself, on the occasion, referring to the
fact of Lord Wolseley's intention of concentrating
a force of 2,ooo men at Debbch, stated that if the
position of Gordon became so critical as to demand
such an operation, part of that force might be sent
direct to Khartum !
Now we find that Lord Wolseley first proposed
this to Her Majesty's Government in his despatch
from Cairo, on September nth, in which he made
the requisition for reinforcements already alluded to.
It was on that occasion he suggested the formation
of a Camel Corps, for the very purpose of making
such a dash across the desert.
General Stephenson had, as will be seen in his
report, given a very strong opinion against reliance
being placed on small boats as a means for trans
porting a force to Khartum, and, in fact, against
the route of the Nile Valley ; and every one of his
objections, excepting as to the practicability of taking
them up the Second and Third Cataracts, was fully
justified by Lord Wolscley's subsequent and sad
experience.
A DOUHTFUI. TRIUMPH. >5I
General Stephenson had also stated—and his
statement was confirmed by Colonel Kitchener from
Debbch—that camels were plentiful both there and
at Merawi. Some such movement as that proposed
by Lord Wolscley direct to Khartum must have
occurred to the Colonel when he telegraphed :—
"Send up your troops, etc., and one fight near
Khartum will settle the whole business ! " It is
not at all unlikely that the suggestion of the " flying
column," proposed in the despatch referred to, came
from the same officer, for he was connected with
the Army Intelligence Department. Atany rate.it
is evident that the dispute between the War Office
and the officers in Egypt turned upon the proposed
water-transport all the way to Shendy or Khartum,
and the former, being at hand, triumphed. In fact,
Lord Ilartington admits it was too difficult to
negotiate plans with officers to be satisfactory—as
this had to be done by telegraph !
Lord Wolscley's plan had, however, been in pro
cess of elaboration since April 8th, and was now,
with the exception mentioned about the Camel
Corps, ready for adoption, even when Lord Harting-
ton asked General Stephenson, on August nth,
what he could do, with the means at his command,
to push a force up to Dongola. Colonel Colvile's
book gives us all the details of this plan, and they
certainly showed the skill of an able Adjutant-
General. It, however, entirely failed in its object.
Time was a question of great importance, and when
it was adopted by the Government, it was too late
for it to be carried out successfully. Had it been,
152 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
however, prepared for two months earlier, or even a
month sooner, as already admitted, there was every
chance of its success. It, however, should never have
been adopted by Her Majesty's Government in
preference to the Suakim route, or even to that by
Massowah, as we shall presently try to prove. The
main argument in its favour, used by its originators,'
was the success of the Red River Expedition. That
Expedition comprised a force of 1,141 men, two-
thirds of which were Canadian Militia. In order to
move them up the Red River, no less than 400 native
boatmen—the very best in the world—were nearly
all utilized, and, as an officer with the Expedition
stated, without them the Expedition would never have
reached its destination.* The obstructions in the
way of navigation which the Red River Expedition
had to overcome cannot fairly be compared with
those which had to be encountered in the proposed
one up the Nile, because the latter were, in various
respects, much more serious. This will appear when
the number of the constituents of both Expeditions
are considered, and the length of the line of advance.
In fine, the success of this Canadian Expedition
was not a safe argument in favour of the proposed
one in Egypt, for in the latter case there were a
* Captain Huyshe, of the Rifle Brigade, which formed part of the
Red Rivet force, in a lecture before the Royal United Service
Institution on this Expedition, remarked on Ibis point as follows :—
" A proportion of these voyagcurs were 1 Iroquois Indians,' who were
found splendid fellows, and without whom, it is not too much to say,
the Expedition would never have reached its destination." (Journal
R.U.S. Institution, vol. xv., p. 73.)
SUCH A CONFUSING MEDLEY.
greater number of possible contingencies, and of such
a nature that all of them could not be provided
against beforehand.
The scheme, however, as proposed by Lord
Wolscley, was a novel and attractive one, to which
his prestige evidently gave weight. It would have,
however, been well, not only for that prestige, but also
for Gordon and Khartum—as its failure demon
strated—that no Expedition up the Red River had
taken place.
Then the equipment of the force to be employed in
it was to differ from that of any previous British
Army that had been sent into the field. For example,
two regiments of cavalry, a detachment of marines,
a part of the infantry and its bearer company and
transport corps, were to ride to battle mounted on
camels ! The bulk of the infantry were to make
their way to the final rendezvous by paddling them
selves and their rations against the current of a river,
the navigation of which was seriously interrupted by
rocks !
This medley of forces and variety of transport made
sad confusion in the supply of the stores required
in the service, because the usual routine regulations
affecting their provision and distribution could not
now be easily applied in such a campaign in which
transport was difficult, scarce, and tedious. Even
the main base—Wady-Halfa—was, in point of
time, farther from Alexandria than India was from
England.
In fact, the plan, as a whole, was too large under the
circumstances to be easily carried out—too complex
IS4 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
to be compact. What a contrast in all these respects
would have been General Stephenson's brigade of
small arms !
A commanding officer, when \ve marched out from
Jakdul, on Mutemma, on January 14th, 1885—when
discussing the mixture up in the column of cavalry
on horse and on camel-back, and of sailors, marines,
and infantry, remarked to me—" A little ofeverything,
they say, makes a good salad—but a little of each
corps of the Army will not make a good fighting
column ! " Our experiences, both at Abu-Klea and
Mutemma, proved he was right. In one case we
came near a disaster, and in the next failed, as a
consequence, lo capture a village.
Let us now compare Lord YVolseley's accepted
plan for an Expedition to relieve Khartum in
August, so far as routes are concerned, with those
by Massowah and Suakim.
Lord Wolseley, in his report on the various routes
when dealing with that by Massowah, compares it
as a base of operations with Wady-Halfa. In doing
so he gives, as we have noticed, their respective
distances from Berber. The former as a sea- port
was, however, nearer to the object of the proposed
Expedition than Wady-Halfa—inasmuch as the
latter was about nine hundred miles from the sea
at Alexandria—or, as stated, in point of time, farther
from England than was India, so far as transport
was concerned.
There are also substantial grounds for questioning
the accuracy of Lord Wolseley's statements re
specting the time it would take for a column to
I _
AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE. 1 55
march from Massowah to Gos-Regeb. He caleulated
that it would require seven weeks to cover this
distance of four hundred miles. This would limit
the marching of the force—leaving out Sundays—
to nine and a half miles per day, when at least
fifteen miles could easily have been done, thus making
the time of traversing the distance between these
points within four weeks.
He places the objective of the proposed Ex
pedition at Berber—200 miles below Khartum—
when Shendy, where he proposed to concentrate
his force, was less than half that distance. Now,
Shendy is about 145 miles from Gos-Rcgeb, and
Halfiyeh—immediately below Khartum—is less than
100 miles from that position on the " Atbara."
And then, again, the junction of the Rahat with
the Blue Nile, only a short distance below Sennar
on the latter, is only 195 miles from Kassala, and
could be reached by a road plentifully supplied
with water.
The fact must also be taken into account—which
was not done by Lord Wolscley in his report, probably
because of the interest he felt in his proposal about
the Nile Valley—that at Kassala and Scnnar there
were garrisons to be relieved as well as at Khartum,
and that the forces of the Mahdi were along the
left bank of the Nile. Referring to the fallacious
hope, as it turned out to be—entertained by Her
Majesty's Government and shared with them by Lord
Wolseley, and probably at first mooted to them by
himself—that when the Mahdi learned that a large
British Army had reached Dongola, he would raise
156 WHY CORDON PERISHED.
the siege of Khartum and withdraw to El-Obeid, or
elsewhere up the White Nile.
Then, again, owing to these garrisons at Kassala
and Sennar holding out, there was the additional
reason that no opposing formidable force would have
been encountered in its approach to Khartum by
this route.
When the force at Kassala learned that Tokar had
been relieved, they sent a touching message to
Gordon on March 28th, expressing the hope that
the same service would be rendered to them. In a
message dated a day later they sent him this addi
tional message :—
The road from Massowah to Sanheit, and from thence to
Beni-Amcr, being safe, and communications are free through
it, and the telegraph lines are in good working order through
them ; if, therefore, reinforcements come by this route there is
no danger.
Lord Wolscley also takes exception to this route,
because
Ranges of hills have to be crossed before Kassala is reached,
and the spurs of the Abyssinian Mountains, which present
serious difficulties. Now, neither these hills nor these
mountain spurs prevented an Italian force from marching
on this town, and why, then, should it have prevented a British
force from attempting to do likewise ?
Mr. William James, brothcrof the late W. L. James *
who visited the Eastern Soudan in 1883, has kindly
sent the author the following description of a part of
this route based upon his own observation :—
* ^Author of «' The Wild Tribes of the Soudan."
KOROSKO AND I5ER!IER ROUTES. 157
With regard to the various routes adopted, I can, of course,
only speak with any authority on those which I have myself
traversed—from Cairo to Herber by the river, and also across
the Korosko desert and from Massowah to Berber vid Kassala.
As I said to you in my former letter, the Italians have
proved the practicability of marching from Massowah to
Kassala. This route is, for the Soudan, well watered, healthy,
and teeming with flocks and herds.
From Kassala to Gos-Regeb, and down the Atbara to
Berber, the road is level ; water, of course, in abundance, but
not so large a number of cattle and sheep.
From Kassala to Khartum I can say nothing from personal
experience ; but from what I was able to ascertain I believe it
would be practicable for a small force, and their march probably
could have been made in somewhat the same way as the
march across from Korti to Mutemma was made.
Although not relevant to the point under con
sideration, \ve quote from Mr. James' letter the
following expression of opinion about the Korosko
route and Herber, because it has some bearing on
Sir Evelyn Wood's suggestion when the relief of that
town was under consideration :—
Had an earlier start been made, Berber could have been
held, vid the Suakim road, and a camel corps could have
traversed the Korosko desert to co-operate. The camel corps
now stationed at Wady-Halfa has, on several occasions,
already traversed this desert till almost in sight of Abu-
Hamed.
Her Majesty's Government does not appear to
have taken this route into consideration, although
Mr. James and others, ineluding the late Sir Samuel
Baker, had called their earnest attention to it. Had
they been seriously bent upon the relief of the two
important garrisons mentioned, an effort might have
WHY GORDON PEIUSHED.
been made by it to relieve them. That it was
important to have done so, so far as Khartum was
concerned, will appear from the fact that Sennar,
upon which Gordon chiefly depended for his supplies
of grain and cattle, was cut off when Berber fell
at the end of May. He did, however, manage by
his steamers to capture large quantities of grain on
its way thence to the army of the Mahdi.
No doubt, acting upon the advice of the military
authorities in London, and being restrained by the
policy communicated to the Powers in diplomatic
correspondence, as Earl Granville, as we have seen,
so often referred to it when Gordon asked for help—
and more especially as it was defined in Parliament,
all the garrisons of the Sudan but Khartum were
deliberately abandoned to the cruel mercy of the
Dervishes. Hence this Massowah route was not
at all taken into account by them.
•59
CHAITER XI.
THE Suakim-Berber route was, however, seriously
taken into consideration, and Her Majesty's Govern
ment were primarily advised with respect to it by
Lord Wolseley, although General Stephenson had
subsequently reported favourably upon the facility
or otherwise which it presented as a route for the
intended Expedition. The error they made in not
adopting it may be traced to the same cause as
led to the adoption of the Nile Valley by small
row-boats route, to the greater influence of the
officers who knew nothing personally about that
route—but urged it upon hypothetical grounds—and
against the opinion of the officers on the spot.
It is, therefore, important for us to point out the
utter fallacy of the objections raised to the Suakim-
Berber route by Lord Wolseley in the extract we
have given from his report of April 8th, and to
which he evidently adhered, as may be inferred
from references made to them in the official history
of the " Sudan Expedition," when it was written.
The objections to this route were that, from the
scarcity of water along it, and the hostility of the
adjacent Muluke tribes, it would be impossible to
send across it the force which he deemed necessary
lOO WHY CORDON rERISHED.
for the proposed Expedition for the relief of
Khartum.
We have also the objections made to this route by
General Sir William Butler, which were summarily
as follows :— i, That the route has many mountains ;
2, That these passes are from 3,000 to 4,000 feet
above the sea level ; and 3, That for distances of
eighty miles there is not a drop of water.*
To these " a priori " objections we must add those
which are made to an advance of a relieving column
in the official War Office book on the Sudan
Campaign.f after Berber had fallen. They are
stated in a footnote to the following paragraph:—
On May 261I1 the town surrendered, after a feeble resistance,
thus cutting off Khartum completely from the world, and
taking away the main reason for an advance along the
Suakim-Berber road,
The footnote comment on this is as follows :—
It may be assumed that, after the fall of Berber, the
r conditions of a march from Suakiin to that place would have
been similar to those of the march from Korti to Mutemma,
with |these differences, that the whole distance between
Suakim and Berber would have been longer ; that the distance
from O-Bak, the last well on the road, to the river at Berber,
was fifty-eight miles, against twenty-four miles from Abu-Klea
Wells to Mutemma ; while the O-Bak Wells are small and
bad, those at Abu-Klea are relatively large and good ; that
Jierber is ninety-five miles further from Khartum than
Mutemma ; that a difficult range of hills about 4,000 feet
in height has to be traversed, the known passes through
* Gordon'! " Men of Action," p. 222.
t " History of the Sudan Campaign," Part I., pages 25 and 26.
FROM SUAKIM TO BERBER. l6l
which are 2,700 feet above sea level, and finally that, owing to
the time the march would have taken, and to the fact that the
concentration of a force at Suakim could only have one
objective—tl)c operation could not have partaken of the nature
of a surprise, and that, not being menaced from any other
points, the Mahdi could have concentrated.
The following statements from persons actually
acquainted with this route either fully contravert
the objections thus advanced against the Suakim-
Bcrber road, or so favourably modify them as to
reduce to a minimum the difficulties in the way of an
advance of British troops on Berber by this route.
We quote first from a paper read before the
Geographical Society at Manchester, by Colonel,
then Major, C. W. Watson, R.E., in which he gives
information about this route—based upon a survey
made of it by himself, in 1874—the report of which
is ineluded with the paper in the bound volume of
the Society's Journals for 1SS7.
The route from Suakim to Berber, he then stated, was 270
miles long, and along it were Nine Wells, at no very unequal
distances apart. 1'he highest point of the road is at Odios,
eighty-three miles from Suakim, where the track passes over
the hill at an altitude of rather more than 3,000 feet. In this
section of the route the steepest average gradient seems to be
not more than one in sixty. From Odios to Berber—distance
of 187 miles—there, is a fairly gradual fall of 1,800 feet to the
Nile.
The Suakim-Berber route is not a desert road like that be
tween Abu-Hamed and Korosko. There is water every day on
the march, and if proper wells were dug, there would be a
large supply. The climate is good ; there are quantities of
cattle, sheep, and goats, and everywhere there is plenty for the
camels to eat.
M
1 62 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
To insist, as some do, that this is an impracticable road, as
omc do, I would ask, " How, then, do they explain that 9,500
Egyptian soldiers* were sent over it without difficulty in the
months of December, 1882, and January, 1883 ?"
Another paper, by Mr. A. 13. Wylde, merchant, of
Suakim and Jeddah, was read at the same time, in
his absence, by Mr. Yates, barrister-at-law, from
which \ve make the follow ing quotations :—
The water question on routes is also one of great interest to
commercial people, and, as far as my experience since 1874-5
extends, there is absolutely no water difficulty, nor ever has
been, in the Suakiin-Bcrber route. There is ample supply from
Suakim to Ariab, and even in the warmest of summer weather,
with the heaviest loads, in the sections between Ariab and
O-Ilak, and O-Bak and Mohebe, say in round figures about fifty
miles each, a quick half section was done. The same was done
on the other side Mohebe.t From Mohebe to Berber is about
eight miles. In winter this need not be done, as camels can
go through without watering. These sections might be
improved, as it is only a question of sinking wells.
There is one bad piece of road—namely, the moving dunes
of O-Bak, hillocks of soft sand, the surface of which is
constantly changing with the northerly and southerly winds.
The wells at O-liak are bad and over 80 feet deep—the water
bitter, and not in large quantities during the summer. The
sand dunes, however, can be got round by proceeding north
and turning them. Thus a longer and better road, and that
water nvght be found on it, and wells sunk is a certainty. . .
At Mohebe and Ariab water is plentiful. Taking the difference
of heights at 650 feet between the two roads of this section,
* " These hens," as Gordon called them, probably because of their
lack both of courage and of endurance.
t In his report of 1874 Colonel Watson states that at Mohebe there
ti a good supply of water.
THE SHORTEST CUT TO KHARTUM. 163
and that tlie slope is a gradual one, water ought to be found,
and at no great depths.
The question of wheel traffic I settled during General Hicks'
Expedition, when Krupp guns with six mules were wheeled
over the desert to Berber in fourteen days.
Mr. Wylde, in this paper, as well as Colonel
Watson in his, compared the Nile route to Berber
and that by Suakim as follows :—
Products leaving Manchester, vid Suez Canal, arrived at
Suakim as soon"as products from it could be put at Assiout, and
at a considerably lower cost.
Then from Assiout it had to be transhipped from the rail
road to Nile craft, then the time expended on the voyage to
Korosko against stream, and then the very difficult and
waterless track from thence across the desert, with the exception
of the Murad Wells, to Abu-Hamed and thence to Berber—a
longer and more expensive route than the perfectly easy route
from Suakim to Berber. . . . Part of the Government
ivory sold at Khartum to private firms and shipped vid
Berber and Suakim, arrived in London in less than six weeks
from Khartum, and were sold six months before the
Government ivory, vid the Nile, arrived there.
These statements made upon unquestionable
authority, are a sufficient reply to both Lord
Wolseley's and General Butler's objections against
the Suakim-Bcrber route. The former, however,
recognises the fact that by sinking wells the water
difficulty might be overcome—but that this would
require time and would be difficult to arrange for—
but not so much time as the preparation for the
small-boat expedition required to get it fairly under
way, as will be shown.
We come now to the footnote quoted from the
M 2
164 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
official account of the Sudan Expedition, compiled
in the Intelligence Division of the War Office, and
in the preface of w hich it is stated that the original
manuscript had been "subjected to much revision,
consequent upon suggestions of the various Officers
and Departments to whom the proofs were referred."
There can be but little doubt, we presume, there
fore, as to the personality of the suggestion of this
footnote, although the Editor of the book can only
be held responsible for it.
The note deals with Wady-Halfa and Suakim as
bases of equal value for an advance on Khartum,
just as Lord Wolseley, as we have seen, dealt with
the latter and Wady-Halfa. In this case as in that,
such a comparison is not a fair one. The accom
panying diagram will aid us in apprehending the
difference between them in this respect.
As will be noticed—the distance from Alexandria
—the sea base of the Nile route is 1,876 miles
from Khartum and 860 miles from its main base
at Wady-Halfa.
In favourable contrast we have Suakim, the sea
base of the route via Berber to Khartum ; distant
from it but 457 miles. Then, again, as regards the
important question of concentrating a force at the
main base of operations, the superiority of Suakim
over Wady-Halfa is obvious, for it was only four-
and-a-half days distant from Cairo and within three
weeks ordinary steaming from England, while the
former, 903 miles up the Nile, required nearly a
month to reach.
Let us now follow Colonel Colvile's comparison
DIAGRAM
Of Comparative Distances of Four of tkt Koults from the
SEA TO KHARTUM,
Submitted to Her Majesty's Government for consideration in 1SS4.
Miles.
;ooo
1900
1800
I1-00
1600
1500
1400
1300
1200
II '00
I1000
I900
800
I700
Coo
Scale.—150 miles to 1 inch.
500 jKhartum
J00
Khartum
Berber
Abu-Hamed
Korosko
300
200
ijoo
Berber
Assiout
Khartum
Mutemma
Assiout
Khartum
LJerber
Mi'cs.
2000
I90O
1800
17 loo
16
Abu-Hamed
1500
1A0
Klorti
\
12
II
00
00
00
10 00
|VVady-Halfa 900
8
Assouan
[Assiout .
Cairo
00
00
600
00
400
300
2 00
100
Alexandria
Overland— Railway =
WHY GORDON l'ERISHED.
of the Suakim-Berber route with that across the
Bayuda Desert from Korti to Mutemma — taking
for example the first 100 miles from the former
position on the Nile to Jakdul.
The first source of supply upon which any
dependence could be placed for a column was at
El-Howeiyat, fifty-two miles distant from the Nile
at Korti. The wells here are pits sunk in the soil
and supplied with water by percolation from the
surrounding strata. My own personal experience,
when accompanying Colonel Stanley Clarke's
convoy which left Korti for Jakdul, of the supply
here was as follows.
We reached these wells at sunset after two long
marches, but, although the men worked hard all
through the night, they only succeeded in completing
the watering of the convoy at seven o'elock next
morning. We had then so drained them that when
General Stewart's column, which had left Korti on
the 8th, reached these wells a few hours after we had
left them, the men had, on account of the want of
water in them, to push on nine miles further to
Aboo-Halfa to quench their thirst.
At Jakdul, 100 miles from Korti, there was an
abundant supply of water in rock cisterns, but no
other until Abu-Klea, fifty-two miles distant, was
reached.
We marched out from Jakdul on January 14, but
had to fight our way there and did not reach the'
Nile until the lSth.
The supply of these wells was then so insufficent
that General Stewart was detained until nearly 4 p.m.
THE WATER-SUPPLY DISCUSSE1X 167
before he could march on Mutemma, which we did
that night, coining in sight of the Nile at daylight
next morning. Mere we had another fight with the
Arabs, and did not reach the river until the afternoon
of the 20th, that is excepting the men who fought
their way there on the 19th.
It will be seen from the statements we have quoted
about the Suakim-Berber route, that as far as Ariab,
to ,140 miles distant from its base, there was water to
be had daily, and that the supply was abundant
at tlns point.
The wells at O-Bak were, as was always supposed,
brackish, and contained but little water in summer,
and, like Jacob's well, were very deep. Although the
liquid was hardly suited for bipeds, quadrupeds
enjoyed it. Mr. Wylde] however states that, by a
short detour, better water and more of it could easily
be obtained.
Colonel Colvile then states the distance from
O-Bak to the Nile at Berber as being fifty-eight
miles, but, as wc have seen, an abundant supply of
water was to be had eight miles from Berber, at
Mohebe.
We do not question the emphasis the Colonel
lays upon the importance of the post we occupied at
Abu-Klea, but to his observation about its not being
so valuable as affording a feasible line of march for a.
surprise, and about the length of time to make an
advance on Berber, which would give the Mahdi
time to concentrate a large force to meet the advanc
ing column before it could reach its objective, we
will reply by venturing the opinion that such an
1 68 WHY GORDON PliRlSHED.
operation would very much depend upon the genius
and dash of the general commanding.
We would also call his attention to the misuse made
of the Bahuda Desert road, which he represents as
being more favourably adapted for such an operation,
by Lord Wolseley when he had resolved to occupy
Mutemma. Instead of pushing General Stewart's
column directly across it, as we shall see more par
ticularly further on, he sent it first to Jakdul, to
establish a post there, and then allowed nearly a
fortnight to elapse after this had been done before
he pushed it on beyond Jakdul, 76 miles further to
Mutemma. Now Jakdul and Mutemma were only
100 miles distant from the Mahdi and his army,
and the consequences were the battles of Abu-Klea
and El Gubat, the capture of Omdurman, and the
fall of Khartum.
Now Berber was 200 miles below the Mahdi's
army, the mass of which was concentrated on the
left bank of the Nile, and it was only held by a
comparatively small force of Dervishes, such troops
as we had fought at Abu-Klea, when our square of
some 1400 men defeated 10,000 of them.
Colonel Colvile, when he wrote this lame and
impotent conelusion, had before him Lord Wolscley's
despatch to Lord Hartington after the fall of
Khartum, in which he describes how easily he could
have relieved Khartum by an advance on the right
bank of the Nile, because the Mahdi was on the
other side of an unfordable river !
This attempt of Colonel Colvile to depreciate the
Suakim-Berber route, and defend that up the Nile,
BUAVERY, DASH, AND STEADINESS. 169
by pleading in the abstract a canon in military
tactics, was not the only instance of its kind, for
many others occurred during the debate between the
officers on the spot and the officers of the Horse
Guards on the question of routes for an Expedition
to relieve Khartum if it should become necessary.
During the course of the Expedition, this tendency
to move by " rule " was often manifested, and once,
as we ventured to point out at Mutemma on January
2 1 st., in our detailed history of the Expedition.
The bravery, dash, and steadiness of our soldiers,
and the often inferiority of their commanders, in
tactics, according to his views of the matter, led
Napoleon to describe our Army as one of lions com
manded by a quadruped vastly inferior. And from his .
personal experience of it he was substantially right.
When they are ordered, and however dangerous the
service or the movements which they are directed
to carry out, they go to victory or death as the gallant
Six Hundred did at Balaelava. And no officer in
the latter respect bears personally a brighter record
in all that is worthy of the best traditions of our
soldiers that does Lord Wolseley himself.
Yet, in the discussion that took place about the
occupation of Berber, early in 1884, by General
Graham, and in the refusal to send 200 soldiers
to Wady-Halfa at Gordon's request, based ostensibly
on military as well as elimatic dangers, a strange
and discouraging timidity and nervousness is mani
fested on the part of those at the head of our
Army. Perhaps Her Majesty's Government were
chiefly responsible for all this, for they seemed
170 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
rather pleased than otherwise that it should be as
these high military authorities suggested, because of
its enabling them to keep within the lines of their
policy. They were not willing, in the language of
one of their supporters in Parliament, to risk a
corporal's guard at first to rescue the Egyptian
garrisons in the Sudan. This want of courage to
do the proper thing, at the proper time, led them
further on to an excess of expenditure both of
treasure and of life which might have otherwise
been avoided. It was so specially in the case of
Berber, for if Her Majesty's Government had
listened to General Graham's report and heard
Gordon's appeal for its occupation, there would
have been no necessity for the advice and counten
ance of the military authorities they had consulted.
We come now to consider the route decided upon
for the Expedition for the relief of Gordon, and will
confine ourselves now to only a few general remarks—
intending to deal more particularly with it when re
ferring to its course and final and fatal issue.
The plan of transport by small-boats up the Nile
of a force to relieve Khartum was in itself, under
certain conditions, a feasible one if Debbeh, or even
Merawi, had been its ultimate objective. With one
beyond that it was not so, for no one, not even the
Red River men themselves, knew anything of the
difficulties which the broken water of the Fourth and
Fifth Cataracts might interpose. Those of the Second
and Third had been carefully examined and were
therefore known—and that there was an open reach
of the river up to Merawi.
MIGHT YET HAVE SUCCEEDED. 171
Colonel Colvile, in the official account of the Ex
pedition, loses no opportunity of saying a good word
for his Chiefs plan of operations, and in some cases
seems to have carefully refrained from introducing
into his pages anything per contra. In one instance
he cites Gordon as a witness in its favour, by stating
that, after Berber fell, he advocated the Nile route.
We admit he did, but, as the entries in his journal
show, Gordon never dreamed of Lord Wolseley
advancing a force all the way by water for his relief,
nor did he know anything about the small row-boats.
In all the entries referred to, and in the last messages
received from him by Lord Wolseley, he indicates
the impression that Debbeh or Ambukol would be
the objective of the Expedition up the Nile for his
relief.
In bringing our remarks to a elose on the adoption
of the Nile route for an Expedition, we have
admitted that, if Her Majesty's Government had
accepted Lord Wolseley's plan for it a month or six
weeks earlier than "they did, there was a fair
probability of its success, and that, if the 250
boats which were available at our Dockyards
and from ships in reserve had been utilized, instead
of waiting till others could be specially constructed
for the purpose—there would have even then been a
chance of its success. It was also a cause of serious
delay, curtailing General Stephenson's operations to
the extent mentioned in sending up troops and stores
above the Second and Third Cataracts by steamers
and native craft while the Nile was high. Had this
been done, the small boats, lightened of the greater
172 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
part of their subsequent cargoes, would have made
more rapid progress up the river. They took
subsequently six weeks to reach Korti, while General
Stephenson sent up the Royal Surrey Regiment in
thirteen days from Wady-Halfa to Dongola.
Then, again, the greater part of the stoics might
have been carried past these cataracts on the camels
used by the Camel Corps. To a large extent such a
mode of relief, in principle, was followed by Lord
Wolseley in the Red River Expedition with success,
and some such method of aiding the advance of
the Expeditionary Force at the late season when it
was despatched ought to have been adopted.
It was also a serious mistake to have missed the
high Nile in September ; but these Red River men,
in their enthusiasm, assured Her Majesty's Govern
ment that small boats could do the work demanded,
whatever might be the state of the river.
Colonel Colvile, in defence of the river route,
states that, after the fall of Berber, Gordon was in
favour of it, but not, as the entry we have quoted from
his journal indicates, in the way Lord Wolseley
proposed to advance by it for his relief. He never
supposed that it would be by small boats all the way
up to Berber before it joined hands with him. On
October 6th for example, when he had heard that
three steamers had reached Debbeh, he made these
remarks in an entry in his journal :—
In reality, with a well-equipped force, Debbeh is not more
than eight days from Khartum at the outside. Saying that
150 miles were made in six days and a half, which for camels
is twenty-five miles a day—very easy marching—while from
A WONDERFUL CONFIDENCE. 173
Mutemma to tliis is 100 miles (when I say Debbeh, I mean
Ambukol, to which place from Debbeh you have the open
river). The appearance of one British soldier or officer here
settles the question of relief, v/W-t'/j the townsmen, for then
they know 1 have not told lies.
When General Gordon had learned that Lord
Wolseley had been sent out as Commander of the
Expedition for the relief of Khartum, and probably
learned something about the plan of operations he
had adopted, he made the following entry in his'
journal in November.
If Lord Wolseley did say he hoped to relieve Khartum
before many months, he mu«t have a wonderful confidence in
our power of endurance, considering that when he is said to
have made this utterance we had been blockaded for six and
a half months, and arc now in our ninth month I
General Gordon here suggests the rock upon which
Lord Wolseley, in concert with Her Majesty's Govern
ment, wrecked the Nile Expedition and brought
about the disaster at Khartum, as will be made
evident by his conduct of the Expedition, to which we
will now proceed to call the attention of our readers.
«74
CHAPTER XII.
ON July 24th Lord Wolscley wrote to Her
Majesty's Government that he thought no time
should be lost in pushing up a small brigade of
between three or four thousand troops to Dongola,
for that such a force might probably end the whole
business, adding :—
Hut you must know lime presses. I believe such a force
could be sent from England, and reach Dongola on Octo
ber 15th, if the Government be in earnest and act at once.
Remember we cannot command things, but all the gold in
England will not affect the rise and fall of the Nile, or the
duration of the hot and cold seasons in Egypt. Time is an
important clement in the question, and indeed it will be an
indelible disgrace if wc allow the most generous, patriotic, and
gallant of our public servants to die of want or fall into the
hands of a cruel enemy, because we would not hold our hands
to save him.
Lord Wolseley had thus given utterance to the
prevailing public feeling at the time, and it must
ever be, not only to himself, but to the nation at
large, a matter of profound regret that Her Majesty's
Government yielded so slowly to this urgent appeal
and remonstrance on behalf of General Gordon.
And yet, in face of this urgent appeal, Lord
Wolseley, as we have seen, urged upon the Govern
ment the adoption of a route for an Expedition for
WAITING FOR THE "WHALERS.". 175
Gordon's relief in apparent contradiction to that
part of his remonstrance which called attention to
time being an important element in the question,
and the rise and fall of the Nile.
How Lord Wolseley, in view of his subsequent
correspondence with the Government, in which the
employment of small boats was urged as an absolute
necessity, could have expected that by their use a
brigade of the strength he mentions could be sent
up to Dongola by October does not appear.
Iler Majesty's Government did, however, so far
respond to Lord Wolseley's advice about sending a
force to Dongola in September ; but not, as we have
seen, with the object of any immediate effort on
Gordon's behalf, but only.to prevent the insurrection
affecting Egypt proper. This was accomplished in
September by General Stephenson, by sending up
the Royal Sussex Regiment in native craft, with
three months' supplies, from Sarras to Dongola in
thirteen days. The operations in this direction
were, however, arrested, and everything placed at a
standstill until the small boats were sent out to
Wady-Halfa*
Lord Ilartington, as will be remembered, informed
him on August 8th that amongst the measures which
Her Majesty's Government were then prepared to
sanction, was to obtain from the Admiralty and
from other sources a supply of small boats capable
of being employed in the transport of troops and
* With reference to the despatch of these troops to Dongola, Colonel
Colvile only states they were sent in " nuggars," with no mention of
the short time in which the operation was carried out
176 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
supplies beyond the point at which ordinary means
of transport would be available.
Sir Redvers Buller, with General McNeill and
Colonel Butler, in their report in favour of the
employment of small boats, deelared that in their
opinion the question of the relief of Khartum
resolved itself into this :—
Is it possible to procure and place on the Nile at Sarras
500 boats by the 5th of October ? adding : Surely this
should be possible. The Admiralty would undertake to convey
the boats and stores required as far as the foot of the Second
Cataract. If this is done by the date specified above, we
believe that the further advance of the brigade to Dongola is
a matter of detail well within the power of the military
authorities.
The Admiralty agreed to take charge of the dis
embarkation of the boats and stores at Alexandria,
and suggested that use should be made of the boats
belonging to ships not in commission, as well as
those to be had at the Dockyards. They also
suggested that others could be obtained from various
large steamship companies.
On August 7th a committee, composed of the
officers who had been engaged in the Red River
Expedition, was appointed to report on the most
suitable craft, and make arrangements for their
purchase. The officers comprising it were of
opinion, after inspecting the various boats used
by the Royal Navy and some of the chief steamship
companies, that not more than 200 to 250 of them
were adapted for the navigation of the Nile, and
that this limited number would not fulfil the require
ments of the proposed Expedition.
AN ENTIRE NEW FLEET. 177
After more inquiries and caleulations about the
loads each boat would have to carry, and its conse
quent size, the Committee came to the conclusion
that the best model to adopt was that of a man-of-
war "whaler."
Instead, however, of availing themselves of the 250 boats,
which could have been at once obtained from the sources
named, and then building whatever number of others might be
needed for the Expedition, the Committee reported in favour
of building an entire new fleet of certain dimensions, and after
the model referred to.
An experimental boat, 30 ft. long by 6 ft. broad,
and 2 ft. 3 in. deep, was found to weigh, with
fittings, 1,073 lb., while the weight of the model
Royal Navy boat, 28 ft. long by 7 ft. 6 in. by 2 ft.
6 in. was, with fittings, 1,960 lb. It was evidently
a matter of weight which decided against the latter,
but how was the lighter weight obtained ?
The boats for the Expedition were built of
Canadian white spruce*—the most common and
fragile of soft woods—and with comparatively thin
planking. The boats for the Red River Expedition
were, on the contrary, built of pine, like the whalers
of the Royal Navy, and must have consequently
weighed quite as much as they did.
This lightness of the boats, and their fragility,
on account of the material with which they were
constructed, turned out to be a more serious blunder,
so far as the progress of the Expedition was con-
* This is the wood of which boxes for groceries, &c, are made,
an<7 a blow will shiver.
N
i78 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
cerned, than the weight of the rejected Royal Navy
whalers would have been on the high Nile in
September.
Their progress was delayed by having to haul
them up often for repairs, and their leakage damaged
a great many of the stores carried in them. How
Tommy Atkins and his officers got these frail craft
up the Second and Third Cataracts so safely as they
did, speaks volumes for them.
There was but one place at which the boats had
themselves to be portaged, and this would not have
been necessary if they had been at Wady-Halfa a
month earlier, when the Royal Navy boats could
have been there.*
Colonel Colvile, who never misses an opportunity
of saying a good word for the small-boat plan of
operations, thus records their arrival at Wady-
Halfa :—
At 8.30 a.m., November 1st, two months and three weeks
After they were ordered in England, the first " whaler'' boats,
propelled by English crews, left Ccmai.
. On August 1 2th, orders were given for the first
400 boats, which were ready for shipment on Sep
tember 10th, the first thirty of them arriving at
Alexandria on September 22nd, and eleared four
* Theie was no such uniformity in the dimension! of the boats
'constructed for the Red River Expedition. These boats differed
considerably in size and shape—averaging 25 ft/to 30 ft. long by 6 ft. to
7 ft. broad, with a draught when loaded of from 24 in. to 30 in., and
a carrying capacity of 2J tons to 4 tons, and were to carry ten men, two
voyageurs, and thirty days* rations. The " whalers " were to carry
twelve men and a hundred days' store*.
THIRTY-TWO DAYS AKTER DATE. 1 79
days later, and the last of this batch were landed
there about October ioth. They were delivered,
by contract with Messrs. Cook, at Wady-Halfa on
November 1st, and the first regiment—the South
Staffordshire — left there on November 5th, and
reached Korti on December 17th, or thirty-two
days after the date upon which Lord Wolseley
had informed Her Majesty's Government, that
Gordon could not be expected to hold out, and
three days after the date on which he had been
informed by the latter it would be difficult for him
to do so. It was also one day after the date of
the message he had received from Gordon, on
December 30th, asking him to come quickly ; and
when he elosed his journal in the entry that, if
the Expedition did not come to its relief in ten
days, the town might fall !
We might content ourselves with the above general
observations about the delay caused to the Expe
dition by not utilizing the 250 boats which were
found available, as emphasizing the mistake made
by adopting, at so late a date, the Nile route for
the relief Expedition. There were, however, a
number of other contingencies to be met and other
mistakes made, to which attention must be called.
One of these has reference to the fact that, as
the boats were constructed by some seventeen
builders, their gear could not be expected to be
interchangeable. Every care was, however, taken
to see that it, and the boats to which it belonged,
were landed together.
Unfortunately, the boats arrived in Egypt before
N 2
180 WHY GORDON TERISHEI).
Mr. Thomas Cook did, and his agent contended
that the firm were only bound by their contract to
deliver the boats at Wady-Halfa. The gear—that
is the masts, sails, oars, rowlocks, rudders, etc.—
were, therefore, separated from the boats to which
they belonged, and carried up the country independ
ently, and had, in consequence, to be sorted to their
own boats, and when this could not be done they
had to be refitted !
Colonel Grove, in his report, stated that in
dealing with such large masses of gear—some
of it, like a mast, a burden for one man — the
mere transport of it occasioned much labour. In
addition, each boat had twenty-six artieles, which
did not fit any other boat, save those by the same
maker, and often the gear of one maker would
arrive with the boats made by another, and vice
versd, etc.
One part of Lord Wolseley's scheme had refer
ence to the facility of transport past the worst part
of the Second Cataract by the railway from Wady-
Halfa to Sarras. Unfortunately, this part of his
scheme was rendered comparatively ineffective by
several mistakes. There was delay in getting the
road into anything like running order. When it
was used, the engineers employed in carrying it on
were not sufficiently acquainted practically in such
work to do it efficiently. The rolling-stock was short,
and in order to increase it, trucks and carriages were
sent for to the Cape of Good Hope, because they
could be obtained there of a gauge to suit the Sarras
line ! This delay, it is evident, could have been
A TOO-LATE REPENTANCE. 1 8 1
obviated by altering its gauge to suit carriages
which might have been obtained in EngJand.
Then there was delay caused by the difficulty of
advancing such a force, with a narrow front, so long
a distance.
We have thus far traced the chain of events and
the pressure of public opinion, both in and out of
Parliament, by which Her Majesty's Government
were compelled to abandon their original policy
of absolute non-intervention in the Sudan, under
circumstances of greater embarrassment, and in
volving a greater risk of life and expenditure than
it would have cost had this course been adopted
after the victory at Tel-el-Kebir.
Attention has also been called in the foregoing
pages to the grounds upon which they adopted theNile
route for a Relieving Expedition to Khartum, and
to the manner in which the Expedition in the
Eastern Sudan had seriously interfered with
Gordon's mission, as well as the mistake made in
not allowing its Commander, Sir Gerald Graham,
to seize Berber—as Gordon had urged should be
done.
By way of recapitulation we quote Lord Gran
ville's definition in the House of Lords, in February,
1885, of the objects of the Expedition the Govern
ment had now decided upon, which was as
follows :— . •
The object of this Expedition was primarily to rescue
General Gordon, and those to whom General Gordon con
sidered himself honourably bound, and also to provide for
defence against an attack on Egypt.
1 82 WHY GORDON rERISHED.
The pressure of public opinion which compelled
them to undertake it was thus summarily and forcibly
expressed by His Grace the Duke of Argyle in the
House of Lords, on April 3rd, 1884 :—
The Government had said that the Sudan was not a
necessary appendage of Egypt, and, having given that
opinion, having dictated the Government policy of Egypt, we
were bound in honour to sec that those populations, such as
that of Khartum, should, if possible, be taken out without being
massacred. He believed that to be the feeling of the country.
The interpellations might have been far too frequent, because
no Government could explain to Parliament beforehand the
detailed policy which they might have in view in regard to
military and naval operations. But let the Government not
mistake, and he hoped his noble friends did not mistake—it
was not a mere agitation on the part of Egyptian bondholders
—it was no mere agitation upon the part of the press—but it
was a deep feeling of interest among all parties in the country.
As a matter of fact, contrary to their own will, and owing
to circumstances over which certainly they had not had control,
they bad been placed in a position of paramount responsibility
with regard to Egypt
Lord Denman on the same occasion said that, " if
there was another slaughter like that of Sinkat, the
whole of Christendom would be roused to indig
nation."
For reasons which will be understood further on,
we also quote here the following observations, made
by the Earl of Morley in the House of Lords in
the debate on the Vote of Censure, in February,
1885 :—
It was upon the distinct advice of Lord Wolseley that it was
decided to adopt the Nile route. Its advantages were manifest
for the following reasons :
AN OPTIMIST VIEW OF THINGS. 183
First. A considerable portion of their route was easily
navigable. They had a base, although at a considerable
distance from the sea.
Second. There was also the great advantage, that by-
following the river route, each boat was able to carry supplics-
for its crew for 100 days.
Third. The third reason was that, in addition to the military
advantages, from a political point of view it was of great
importance that the advance should be made along the Nile,
because there was great danger of the spread of fanaticism
among the tribes of Upper Egypt and Nubia, and it was
eminently desirable that a force should appear on the Nile
with a view to securing the allegiance of the wavering and
disaffected tribes. They knew the great importance of Dongola,
and of conciliating the allegiance of its Mudir, and it was
indispensable that a brigade should be prepared in order to
advance as quickly as possible from Assouan and Wady-Halfa
to Dongola.
While fully recognising the ability of Sir Frederic
Stephenson, it was only fair to state that he had none of
the peculiar experience of the mode of passing cataracts which)
had fallen to the lot of Lord Wolseley in the Red River
Expedition. ,
The noble Earl went so far as to say, after stating:
the advantage offered by being able to carry 100
days' rations in boats, that " he thought that Lord
Wolseley's plan, in spite of the difficulties he had
had to undergo, had been perfectly justified by its-
success."
It will be remembered that this statement was
made after the fall of Khartum, and the death of
General Gordon, and the massacre of those to whom
he was honourably bound. The primary object of
the Expedition, so far as they were concerned, had
not been attained, although Lord Wolseley had.
184 WHY GORDON PEKISHED.
after a fashion as \ve shall see, taken up in boats
the quantity of provisions the noble Earl mentioned.
We now, therefore, proceed to call attention to the
disastrous ending of the Expedition Lord Wolseley
had recommended through the collapse of his plans
and his own mistakes in endeavouring to give it
effect.
By way of introduction to this part of our subject,
ive will first refer to the statement made by Lord
Hartington before Parliament, when submitting to
the Committee of the House of Commons, on
November 13th, 1S84, a Supplementary Vote or
Estimate for the Expedition to the Sudan.
His Lordship then told the Committee of the
House of Commons that the order given to Sir
Frederic Stephenson in August had been carried out,
and that the troops he had been directed to send to
Dongola had been despatched there from Wady-
Halfa. Lord Wolseley had determined, he further
stated, upon concentrating a force of 2,000 men at
Debbeh, a place at a considerable distance above
Dongola. If he should then find the attitude of the
tribes such as they had reason to expect it would
be, it would then be in his power to " advance that
force on Khartum, if necessary, in advance of any
considerable movement of infantry, and that, in the
opinion of Lord Wolseley, the Camel Corps,
composed of drafts from a number of different
regiments, would be particularly suitable for that
operation, and would, in his opinion, render the
advance of any considerable force from Dongola
unnecessary."
AN ELASTIC PLAN OV OPERATIONS. 1 85
In fact, his Lordship further told the Committee
that the advantage elaimed by the Government for
this plan of operations adopted by them was, to
a certain extent, an elastic one, as it provided the
means of sending a force of 5,000 or 6,000 men
the whole distance by river, which, in the opinion of
our military advisers, will be a sufficient force to
meet successfully any resistance likely to be offered.
On the other hand, that very considerable operation
might be converted, if circumstances were favourable,
into one of a considerably smaller character, namely,
the sending of a much smaller, but sufficient, force
across the desert, which would accomplish the object
in view with much greater rapidity, and render it
possible that the rest of the troops would not be
necessary.
Lord Partington then stated that information
received both publiely and privately from Lord
Wolscley tended to show his confidence in the
soundness of the plan he had adopted, and that he
still held the opinion that it would not have been
possible by any other means than by that of small
boats sent out from England to have secured the
possibility of an advance on Khartum with a
sufficient force during the ensuing winter.
As to the objects of the Expedition, Lord
Hartington referred the Committee to the instructions
given Lord Wolseley in the Blue Book, Egypt, 35,
1884, and from which we abstract the following :—
The primary object of the Expedition up the Nile is to.bring
away General Gordon and Colonel Stewart from Khartum.
186 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
When that object has been secured, no further offensive opera
tions of any kind whatever are to be undertaken.
Although you are not precluded from advancing on Khartum
if you consider such a step necessary to secure the retreat of
General Gordon and Colonel Stewart, you should bear in mind
that Her Majesty's Government is desirous to limit the sphere
of your military operations.
Lord Wolseley, while further instructed to direct
his attention to rescuing the Egyptian Garrisons and
civil employes at Khartum, was informed that Her
Majesty's Government had no intention of sending
any Expeditions for the relief of the other beleagured
garrisons in the Sudan, namely, those in Darfur,
the Bahr-el-Gazelle and Equatorial Provinces, and
that of Sennar. The former were to be abandoned,
because, as his instructions stated, it would be
impossible that he should take any action which
would facilitate their retreat without extending his
operations " far beyond the sphere which Her
Majesty's Government " were prepared to sanction ;
and as regarded Sennar, no Expedition, on the same
grounds, would be despatched up the Blue Nile for
its relief.
Then Lord Wolscley was told in these instructions
that—
The feasibility of relieving Khartum, and the possibility of
relieving General Gordon, might depend very much indeed
upon the arrangements which may be made beforehand for
announcing to the people (of the Sudan) the establishment of
some form of government in the district after General Gordon
shall have left.
The considerations thus stated in Lord Wolseley's
instruction, the Marquis of Hartington further told
THE BARINGS AND WOLSF.LEV. 187
the Committee, were before his mind, and that
he fully understood that the greatest possible
triumph they could achieve—a triumph very much
greater than that of any victory he could gain, or any
successful march he could accomplish—would be the
making of such political arrangements as would
enable the object of his mission, and of General
Gordon's mission as well, to be successfully
accomplished without the necessity of fighting.
These instructions to Lord Wolseley, were drawn
up by himself in concert with Lord Northbrook and
Sir Evelyn Baring, and approved by Her Majesty's
Government. The bearing they had upon his Lord
ship's subsequent actions in conducting the Nile
Expedition will appear as we discuss it. They are
by no means satisfactory when we consider General
Gordon's position at the time they were drawn up.
The period beyond which, as Lord Wolseley had
informed the Government in April—that is Novem
ber 15th—Khartum could not be expected to
hold out, was less than a month from the date upon
which, for example, Lord Wolseley had informed
Lord Hartington of what he intended to do in
concentrating troops at Debbeh, and adding a Camel
Corps to his boat-plan of advance. *
In considering these instructions, the painful
impression is produced that, although Her Majesty's
Government proposed to do something that ought
to be done, and quickly under the circumstances, that
they had no real heart in doing it—that they hoped,
in fact, that events would not make it obligatory on
them to do it. In fact, their intention, as gathered
WHY CORDON PERISHED.
from all their statements in Parliament and out of
it, and from these instructions to Lord Wolseley,
seems to be as elastic as Lord Hartington had
described the former plan of operations were.
They also seem to impose a restraint on Lord
Wolseley's movements. He is to relieve Khartum
without fighting, for instance, if he can do so ; and
consenting to such conditions he failed to take the
only effectual measures to attain this primary object,
if he had had, as we shall see, a freer hand.
With these preliminary remarks \ve now proceed
to call attention to the manner in which the Nile
Expedition, thus despatched by Her Majesty's
Government on Lord Wolseley's plan of operation,
was carried out.
189
CHAPTER XIII.
The Nile boats which, as already stated, ought,
according to the opinion of Lord Wolselsy, Sir
Redvers Buller, and other officers, to have been on
the water at Wady-Halfa on October 5th, were not
delivered there in part (400 out of the 600) until
the end of that month and the first days of November.
The first detachment of troops started up the
river on November 5th, and others rapidly followed.
On November 17th a letter was received from
General Gordon by Lord Wolscley, dated Khartum,
4th November, which appeared to us at the time to
have exerted no more influence in Downing Street
than it did at the Headquarters Staff on the Nile ; for
it did not lead them in any appreciable or important
way to accelerate the advance of the Expedition, as
our readers will easily comprehend from its purport
it ought to have done.
After acknowledging the receipt of a letter from
Colonel Kitchener, on November 3rd, dated Debbeh,
October 14th, and another dated September 17th,
and one from Lord Wolseley in cypher, on Septem
ber 20th, General Gordon wrote as follows :—
At Mutemma waiting your orders are four steamers with
nine guns. We can hold out for forty days, but after that it
1 90 WHY CORDON PERISHED.
will be difficult. Mahdi is here about eight miles away. All
north side along White Nile free of Arabs ; they are on the
south, west, and cast of the town some way off. They are
quiet.
I should take the road from Ambukol to Mutcmma, where
my steamers meet you.
Do not let any Egyptian soldiers come up here. Take
command of steamers direct, and turn out Egyptians
(fellaheen).
You may know what passed here. The Arabs camped out
side Khartum, March 12th, 1884. We attacked them on
March 16th, and were defeated and lost heavily—also a gun.
We then from that date had continual skirmishes with Arabs.
When river rose we drove off Arabs in three or four engage
ments, and freed town. Sent up to Sennar two expeditions,
had another fight,and again were defeated with heavy loss ; the
square was always broken. This last defeat was 4th September.
Since then we have had comparative quiet. We fired 3,000,000
rounds ; the palace was the great place for firing. Arabs have
Krupps here, and have often hulled our steamers. Arabs
captured two small steamers at Berber, and one on Blue Nile.
Since the 10th March, 1S84, we have had up to date, exclusive
of Kitchener's 14th October, only two despatches, one Dongola,
no date, one from Suakim, 5th May, one of same import
Massowah, 27th April. ... I should take the road from
Ambukol to Mutemma, where my steamers wait you.
On the back of this letter was the adjoining
map.
When Lord Hartington received a telegraphic
summary of this letter he at once telegraphed Lord
Wolseley, asking how the news from General Gordon
would affect his plans, and received the following
reply from him :—
Your 15th, news from Gordon makes no change in my plans,
but it seems to indicate the almost impossibility of his relief
without fighting.
A SKETCH OF GORDON'S. 191
What these plans were \ve know substantially,
namely, that no mounted troops were to be concen
trated at Debbeh in advance of the infantry, so that,
in the event of intelligence from Gordon rendering a
Copy of a Skttck on tit hack of Central Gordon': Ltlttr of
November the 4th.
rapid movement to be made across the desert, " at
all hazards," it could be accomplished. Hence his
proposal, on October 19th, for a Camel Corps.
As Colonel Colvile informs us, when referring to
192 WHY GORDON PERISHl-D.
the proposed concentration of troops at Debbeh,
Lord Wolseley felt " that at any time after reaching
Debbeh he might receive an urgent appeal from
General Gordon for immediate help," and that such
an appeal could only be met by an Expedition on
camels across the desert from the neighbourhood
of Mutemma.
The force he proposed to concentrate at Debbch
for this purpose, ineluding 36b men of the
19th Hussars, the Camel Corps, &c, was 2,250
men and twelve mountain guns. Sir Evelyn
Wood was instructed to collect supplies there by
native craft, or otherwise, for 3,000 men and 4,500
camels and 500 horses for one month, for 4,000
men for fifteen days, and for 600 for forty days.
The Senior Commissariat Officer was warned to be
liberal in his estimates, because the people coming
from Khartum would have to be provided for.
When General Gordon's letter of November 4th,
was received by Lord Wolseley at Wady-Halfa, we
naturally expected that the crisis it threatened to
occur at Khartum within four weeks—that is after
December 14th—would have led to the adoption of
measures to avert it in some possible way. Such
wc found upon enquiry at the Head Quarters Staff
then was not to be the case. The anxiety we
ventured to express was sought to be relieved by
one Staff Officer assuring us that there were no
grounds for it, because—and we quote his words
verbatim—
"If General Gordon stated that he can hold out for six
weeks—never fear—he can do so for six months.
EXAGGERATED AND UNWARRANTED. 193
It did, however, seem to me unfair thus to
construe Gordon's word " difficult," for with him—as
we told the officer—it certainly meant "desperate; "
and events proved the correctness of my conelusion.
That a similar exaggerated and unwarranted
confidence was cherished by Lord Wolseley himself
in Gordon's ability to hold out, even under the most
adverse circumstances, until he could relieve him, may
be inferred from the following address issued by him
to the troops of the Expedition from Dongola on
November 22nd :—
We are all proud of General Gordon, and he cannot
hold out many months longer, and he now calls upon us to
save his garrison !
In a despatch from Cairo on September nth, to
the Minister of War, asking for an augmentation of
the force in Egypt, Lord Wolseley stated that he
should be wanting in his duty if he did not point out
in elearest terms that without this augmentation, that
if the force surrounding General Gordon remained
where it was, it would be impossible to relieve him
this year, and that, in his opinion, it was a certainty
" that want ofammunition would prevent him holding
outfor another twelve months /"
Is it any wonder that Her Majesty's Government
should defend themselves against the charges ofdelay
made against them, for not despatching the
Expedition earlier than they did, when their high
military adviser—who had warned them in April,
1884, that Gordon could not be expected to hold out
beyond November 1 5th, now indefinitely extended
such a crisis in his position ?
O
194 WHY GORDON PERISI1ED.
Her Majesty's Government had evidently such a
contingency in view as that indicated in Gordon's
letter, and we must suppose that the plan of the
campaign, in the success of which they had so strongly
been assured by its designer, would meet it satis
factorily. This we infer from Lord Hartington's
statement to Parliament in November—made on the
very day before that letter had been received at Wady-
Halfa, namely, that Lord Wolseley "could if
necessary" send "direct to Khartum a part of the
2,000 men he intended concentrating at Debbeh as
a mounted force."
Now, the very fact that Gordon could only hold
out with difficulty after December 14th ought to
have led Lord Wolseley to have immediately made
such a movement from Debbeh.
If Gordon's warning—that it would be difficult
to hold out after forty days from the date of his
letter, November 4th—did not cause the movement,
the following message from him, dated Khartum,
September 9th, and received at Dongola by Lord
Wolseley on November 29th, ought certainly to have
done so, for this is what it told him :—
There is money and provisions enough in Khartum for four
months, after which we shall be embarrassed. At Sennar
there is doura enough.
Then, after referring to the despatch of Colonel
Stewart and the Consuls to Dongola, the letter
continues as follows :—
How many times have I written asking for reinforcements,
and calling your serious attention to the Sudan. No answer
SEND TROOPS WITHOUT DELAY. 195
at all has come to us as to what has been decided in the
matter, and the hearts of men have become weary of this
delay. While you are eating, drinking, and resting in good
beds, wc and those with us, both soldiers and servants, are
watching by night and day, endeavouring to quell the move
ment of the false prophet.
Of course you take no interest in suppressing the rebellion,
the serious consequences of which you will have to deal with
later on.
The reason why I have now sent Colonel Stewart is because
you have been silent all this while, and have neglected us and
lost time without doing any good. If troops were sent, as soon
as they reach Derber this rebellion will cease, and the inhabi
tants will return to their former occupations. It is, therefore,
hoped that you will listen to all that is told you by him and
the Consuls and send troops without delay.
Although he had not concentrated the force
named at Debbeh, when Gordon's message of
November 4th had been received, Lord Wolseley
was in a position to do so on December 1st, as the
following facts fully indicate.
In September, Sir Frederic Stephenson, in co
operation with Sir Evelyn Wood and his Egyptian
troops, had collected 52,000 rations at Hannek, at
the head of the Third Cataract, and from whence
there was open water to Korti and beyond it.
These, with additional supplies and grain, were
taken up the Nile by the native craft used in these
transports so far, to Debbeh.
In confirmation of this statement, we quote Lord
Wolseley's following telegram to Lord Hartington,
dated Dongola, November 28th :—
Telegraph to Debbeh not working. Liable to interruption.
Am naturally anxious, owing to large quantity of stores there,
O 2
196 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
and am sending up this afternoon 200 Royal Surrey to
construct redoubt and act as guard.
That Lord Wolseley had men enough at hand
available for such a movement is indicated by the
following abstract from the official report of the
position of his troops on November 18th :—
The Royal Surrey Regiment and the Mounted
Infantry, giving a total of 1,260 men, were at
Dongola. At Dal, sixty miles below it, there were
the 600 men of the South Staffordshire Regiment,
and the Mounted Guards Camel Corps, 320 strong—
in all, 920 men.
Between Dal and Gemai, sixty miles apart, there
were also coming up the river, then, 1,588 men, and
at Wady-IIalfa 1,895 men, ineluding the Black
Watch.
Then, again, between Wady-Halfa and Assouan
there were 3,210 men on their way up, some by
steamers, others in barges towed by them or by
native craft, and a few in the small boats.
Ineluding the 300 men of the 19th Hussars,
mounted on horses, Lord Wolseley had on this date
at Dongola, and rapidly approaching it, no less than
4,1 18 men.
From this force he could readily have organised
and despatched a flying column adequately sup
plied with rations and ammunition direct to
Khartum, as Lord Hartington puts it, " in advance
of any considerable movement of infantry." In
fact, he iiad ready organised at Dongola 440
Mounted Infantry admirably adapted for such a
movement.
WHAT GORDON EXPECTED. 197
It was just such a movement as this that Gordon
expected would be made for his relief; for in his
letter of November 4th, he advised that Lord
Wolseley should take the road from Ambukol to
Mutemma, where his steamers would be met.
When Gordon heard, in September, of the dis
patch of an Expedition for his relief, he made the
following entry in his journal :—
My view is this as to the operation of a British Force : I will
put three steamers, each with two guns in them, and an armed
force of infantry at disposal of British authority. I will send
these steamers to either Mutemma or to the cataract below
Berber, to meet any British force which may come across
country to the Nile . . . . t would not attempt to pass
the bulk of British force across the country, but only thefighting
column, to co-operate with the steamers. No artillery is wanted
with either force—it is not needed in any way in this country.
From this entry it is evident that he also expected
this force coming across the country would, " D.V.,
capture Berber, and then communicate with
Khartum."
Instead of making some direct and immediate
movement of troops towards Khartum, in view of
Gordon's warning in his letter of the 4th November,
Lord Wolseley replied to him as follows on the
17th, the day on which he had received it at Wady-
Halfa :—
Yours of the 4th. 17th, Will be at Dongola in ten days. I
shall have an army between Dcbbeh and Ambukol on a date
which you can fix by counting 283 days from the date of your
appointment as Major-Gcneral, etc.
As Gordon was promoted to his Major-Generalship
I98 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
on March 31st, the date therefore thus indicated was
December 31st. This would be six weeks after the
limit at first fixed by Lord Wolseley to Gordon's
ability to hold out. It was also seventeen days after
that from which Gordon had told him it would be
difficult for him to do so.
199
CHAPTER XIV.
LORD WolSELEY had not only now deviated from
the plan of the Expedition, as sketched by Lord
Hartington before the Committee of the House of
Commons on November 13th, by not sending a
flying column to Khartum, but also, by adhering
rigidly to a fixed plan of operations, he had acted
contrary to an important strategetic maxim thus
referred to by the late General Von Moltke in his
memoirs :—
It is a delusion that a plan of war may be laid down for a
prolonged period and carried out in every particular. The
first collision with the enemy changes the situation entirely.
Something decided upon will be impracticable ; others deemed
originally impossible may become possible.
All that the leader of an army can do is to get a clear view
of the circumstances, and to decide for the best for an unknown
period.
After stating that the plan of the Franco-German
War was based on the determination to attack the
enemy at once, this greatest of modern strategists
further remarked that :—
By whatever means these plans were to be accomplished was
left to the decision of the hour. The advance to the frontier
alone was pre-ordained in every detail.
2O0 WHY GORDON PERISHEO.
Now, where was the frontier on the present occa
sion ? It certainly was Dongola, and the point in
that Province from which Lord Wolseley had selected
for concentrating a force—part of which was to be
employed in relieving Khartum, if hard pressed, or
likely to be—was Debbeh, ninety miles above its
chief town, then Lord Wolscley's head-quarters.
From Gordon's letter of November 4th, and the
sketch-map showing the position of the enemy
round Khartum, he had every reason to conelude
that they had come to stay, and were likely to cut it
off from approach by a relieving force. At the
moment, any General, not wedded to a particular
plan of operations, could—taking Gordon's letters
received by Lord Wolseley on the 17th and 29th of
November—have arrived at no other conelusion than
that General Gordon was in imminent danger of
being " in extremis." Hut, as he informed Lord
Hartington, the position of Gordon, as revealed in
his letter, would make no change in his plans, which
had been, in General Von Moltke's words, pre
ordained, and to the success of which he had pledged
himself to the Government. The main feature of
these plans was the transportation of a force with
its supplies by small boats. Under his Lordship's
advice the Government had adopted it, and, there
fore, we may conelude that he was unwilling to
compromise it by sending any part of his force on
camels, or with them, to check the enemy which was
now so seriously threatening the place he was sent
especially to relieve.
There had been greater delay than Lord VVolseley
WHALERS FIRST, THEN CAMELS. 201
had anticipated in taking up the Nile an Expedition
for Gordon's relief on the plan he proposed. As
the writer in the Times, from which we have quoted
in our introductory remarks, very elearly stated :—
The dangers involved in the adoption ol the Nile route in
light boats were repeatedly stated, and this plan of advance
was from the first opposed by many thinking men. Given
success, unquestioned and unqualified—the violation of all
rules may entail no dangers—but once a check, even a slight
derangement of plans arrives, all the evil results of a mistaken
policy at . . . To provide a large camel force would be to
discount the boats, from which so much was expected, and the
Camel Corps was, therefore, an adjunct, and not a principal
feature in the scheme.
The time came a month ago when the two modes of advance
must be separate. The Camel Corps must justify its presence
—the boats must go on or prove a failure.
All that was known as to the position of Gordon
in June had led Lord Wolseley to the conelusion
that he could not be expected to hold out beyond
November 15th. Why, then,when that date was passed,
did he hope he could hold out, as he told the troops
in his address, " many months longer " ? There can
be only one reply to this question, namely, that
Lord Wolseley had resolved not to compromise that
part of his plan of operations for which, as we have
seen, he had, as Lord I lartington told Parliament on
November 13th, expressed a preference and still
adhered to when, as he had learned a few days
subsequently by Gordon's letter that Khartum was
endangered, and he should, therefore, have now so
far departed from his original plan as to have
despatched a flying column for his relief.
202 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
The disastrous consequences which followed this
rigid adherence to the small-boat transport up the
Nile part of his plan at this juncture—to the exelusion
of his mounted force—is condemned by General Von
Moltke's maxim, which denounces it as " the greatest
delusion under which the leader of an army could
fall?"
It would, perhaps, not have been impossible for
Lord Wolseley to have carried out successfully the
small-boat plan of an expedition up the Nile if Her
Majesty's Government had accepted it even a month
earlier.
Colonel Colvile interjects, when discussing Lord
Wolseley's adoption of it, that Gordon was in its
favour. He certainly was, but only when the Nile
was high. The date upon which the Expedition
was prepared to leave Wady- Halfa the river was
rapidly falling, with the delaying results we have
already pointed out. .
There were in November substantial grounds,
therefore, for fearing that, by Lord Wolseley's own
calculations, it would now take him two-and-a-half
months beyond the date which he had advised
Her Majesty's Government that it would be im
possible or difficult for Gordon to hold out.
It was possible for him, as we have proved, to have
modified his plan of operations so far, at any rate,
as to send a flying column on December 15th,
direct to Khartum, for the risk of doing so then was
much less than it would have been a month later
when he despatched Stewart's Column across the
Bayudu Desert to establish a post at Mutemma.
LOOKING FOR THE ADVANCE GUARD. 203
That column had to fight its way there with a loss
in killed and wounded of a tenth of its number.
When it did reach the river its waters had so
subsided as to make navigation thence to Khartum
much more difficult, as was seen in the case of
Sir C. W. Wilson's flotilla, than it would have been
a month earlier.
It will also be remembered that Stewart's Column
only met Gordon's steamers there to convey to him
the disheartening message, that effectual relief could
not reach him until six weeks later.
These steamers had been on the look out for the
advance guard of the English force coming for the
relief of Khartum since September 30th, or nearly
four months before our column reached Mutemma.
Gordon had during all this time been deprived of
their assistance in foraging for supplies and for
defensive purposes. In fact, owing to their absence
he had lost Omdurman, and with it the command
of the Blue Nile, along which the defences of
Khartum had been weakened by the fall of the
river.
Lord Wolseley, in what reads like an exculpatory
telegram after Khartum fell, informed Lord
Hartington that, in despatching Stewart's Column to
establish a post at Mutemma, he had exceeded the
limits of military precautionary prudence. ~Be that
as it may, the message now received from Gordon
would have justified him in adopting measures of
even a more hazardous character in order to avert
even a more remote possibility of Khartum falling
before he would be in a position to relieve it,
204 WHY GORDON PKKISI 1 1£I>.
according to his plans, than that indicated in the
letter he had now received from Gordon.
When dealing with the Desert Column, under
the command of Sir Herbert Stewart, it will be
shown that it not only did not serve to secure the
object for which the Nile Expedition had been
despatched, but, on the contrary, it hastened the
fall of Khartum.
We now come to a more striking illustration of
the delusion into which Lord Wolseley had fallen,
according to General Von Moltke, when he received
Gordon's last appeal for immediate assistance on
December 31st.
This appeal was dated Khartum, December 14th,
the day after which Gordon had informed him it
would be difficult for him to hold out.
The Sudanese Arab had come provided with
one of the tiny letters Gordon had been in the
habit of sending out, a bit of paper about the
size of a postage stamp, having on one side the
words " Khartum, all right," and bearing on the
reverse his seal.
The verbal message with which the Arab was
charged to deliver to Lord Wolseley showed, how
ever, that it was far from being all right, for it was
as follows :—
Wc are beseiged on three sides, Omdurman, Halfiyeli, and
Haggiali. Fighting goes on day and night. Enemy cannot
take us save by starving us out. Do not scatter your troops.
Enemy is numerous. Bring plenty of troops if you can. We
still hold Omdurman on the left bank and the fort on the right
Mahdi's people have thrown up earthworks within rifle shot of
HIS LAST APPEAL. 205
Omdurmnn. About four weeks ago Mahdi's people attacked
that place and disabled one steamer. We disabled one of
Mahdi's guns ; three days after fighting was renewed on south,
and the rebels were driven back.
This part of the message was evidently intended
for general circulation, and all that was com
municated to us war correspondents at the time.
The rest of it, which was as follows, was withheld,
but is published by Colonel Colvile under the
heading of " Secret and Confidential," and was as
follows :—
Our troops arc suffering from lack of provisions. Thefood
wc have is a Utile grain.
Wc want you to come quickly.
You should come by Afutemma or Berber; do not leave
Berber in your rear.
Do this without letting rumours of your approach spread
abroad.
On the receipt of this message a summary of it
was telegraphed by Lord Wolscley to Sir Evelyn
Baring, who, in reply, immediately consulted him
as to the desirability of operating from Suakim in
order to aid him. In answer he received the
following reply from his Lordship :—
Gordon's message on December 31st compels measures that
will postpone my arrival at Khartum . He warns me not to
leave Berber in my rear, so I must move by icafcr and fake it
before I march on Khartum; meanwhile I shall have
established post at Afutemma by men and stores across the
desert. I shall then be able to communicate with Gordon by
steam—learn exact position, and if he is in extremis before
infantry arrive by river, to push forward Camel Corps to help
him at all hazards. On this point I would like an expression
206 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
ofopinion ofHer Majestys Government, without at all wishing
to shift responsibilityfrom myself to them.
My view of the position is this :—
/ feel confident of success IF KHARTUM CAN HOLD OUT
UNTIL DOATS WITH TROOPS CAN REACH ITS NEIGHBOUR
HOOD.
If I have to make a hazardous push on Khartum with
Camel Troops only, I do not think military operations at
Suakim would affect mine at Khartum.*
The WORST DISASTER which COULD OCCUR WOULD BE
THE FALL OF KHARTUM AND GORDON MADE A PRISONER.
We have not been officially informed what effect
the message from Gordon of December 14th had
upon Her Majesty's Government, or as to how it
regarded Lord Wolseley's plans in view of it. It
certainly led the authorities at Downing-street to
regard the situation at Khartum as very critical,
for a number of telegrams passed to and fro
between them and Cairo and Korti. These were of
either such a serious and delicate character that
those sent from or received at the War Office were
despatched and deciphered by Lord Hartington
himself, and not allowed to pass through the hands
of those upon whom such duties devolve in the
Department. It is most important, both in the
interest of the public as well as in that of Her
Majesty's Government and due to Lord VVolseley
himself, that the purport of this animated and im
portant correspondence should be made known. It,
* These military operations referred to weie those undertaken on
February 7th, 1885, by Sir Gerald Giaham, and had for their chief
object the construction of a railway from Suakim to Berber, to
facilitate withdrawal of Lord Wolseley's force.
DELUDED STILL. 207
however, resulted in Lord Wolseley being allowed to
put into execution his proposed plan of operations.
How perplexing and discouraging must the
situation have been to Her Majesty's Ministers
during that first week in January, 1885 ? They
would naturally recall Lord Wolseley's warning to
them in April, 1884, to the effect that, as Gordon
could not be expected to hold out beyond November
15th, any force sent from England for his relief
should, therefore, be concentrated at Berber not
later than October 20th. In November, as we have
seen, they were informed that he could hold out a
month longer, but that afterwards it would be
difficult for him to do so. 'Then came his message,
dated on the very day when his position would
become seriously embarrassed. In reply to Gordon's
- appeal to come quickly to his relief in view of his
desperate position, Lord Wolseley had now informed
them that his advance on Khartum would be
delayed until he could capture Berber, because he
had been warned by Gordon not to leave open his
rear ? It would not be surprising to us to learn that
at a Cabinet meeting held that week, regret would
be expressed that they had not accepted Sir
Frederic Stephenson's proposal instead of that of
the Red River men. It was too late now to rectify
this serious blunder. —
A high authority informed us that the feeling in
Downing-street at the time was substantially as
follows :—
" Lord Wolseley told Her Majesty's Ministers
that, if they gave him a carte blanche to carry out his
208 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
proposed Expedition up the Nile, he could reach
Khartum at such a period as would prevent its
fall, but that when that time arrived he told them he
could not do so."
It appears probable from his despatch of January
12th, 1885, to Lord Hartington, and to which
reference will presently be made, that the date of
this negative reply may have been about December
29th.
209
CHAPTER XV.
We must now call the attention of our readers to
a question of a most serious character suggested by
some of the statements made by Lord VVolscley in
his telegram to Sir Evelyn Baring, already quoted.
At first sight it would appear from that telegram
that Lord VVolscley had been led to the resolution of
advancing by water and take Berber by the warning
he had received from Gordon in his message not to
leave it in his rear, and which he advances as a
reason for his being delayed longer than he expected
in reaching Khartum. But that such was not
actually the case is evident from the following state
ments to Her Majesty's Government in his Lord
ship's despatch to the Minister of War on January
1 2th, and to which we have just incidentally
referred :—
I had always, he then stated, thought it possible that upon
my arrival here (December 16th) I might find it necessary to
operate beyond this point in two columns—one continuing up
the river in our English-built boats, while the other pushed
rapidly across the desert to Mutemma ; and it was in view of
moving across the desert that in my letter of September 21st
last I proposed the formation of a Camel Brigade of picked
troops under carefully-selected officers, and organised on lines
then recommended.
In any march across the desert with a small column it would
P
210 WHY GORDON* PERISHED.
most probably be able to fight its way into Khartum — and
possibly fight its way out of it again— but it could not bring
away Gordon and his garrison in safety. . .
Upon arrival here 1 had to decide whether I should keep all
my forces together and follow the Nile to Khartum, or to
divide it into two columns, one to follow the river, while the
other was pushed across the desert.
If I were not restricted by time, the first course would be by
far the most satisfactory and the safest, and would insure the
best results ; but I know that General Gordon is pressed by
want offood (the italics are ours), and the hot season is not far
off, when military operations in this country are trying to the
health of European soldiers.
I therefore decided upon the last-mentioned course, and so
reported to your Lordship by telegraph on 29th December that
I had despatched a brigade of Guards under Sir Herbert
Stewart on the 30th to seize the Jakdull wells— 101 miles from
here, and seventy-six miles from Mutcmma. . .
The column to advance in boats under the command of
General Earle, C.B., will rendezvous at Hamdab, about fifty-
four miles above this (i.e., Korti), where a camp has already
been formed.
It is thus elearly proven by the foregoing extracts
from this despatch, and by Lord Wolseley himself,
that he had decided upon an advance on Khartum
by water, and on the establishment of a post at
Mutemma by men and stores across the desert,
soon after he had reached Korti on December 16th.
May it not be asked here why Lord Wolseley,
after having informed Her Majesty's Government on
the 29th of December that he had decided upon
these movements, telegraphed Sir Evelyn Baring two
days later, when he received Gordon's message, that
they were, consequent upon the warning it contained,
not to leave Berber in his rear. The only reply that
QUI s'excuse, s'accuse! 211
can be given is that this statement was a mani
festation of that state of mind in which the wish is
described as being father to the thought.
This despatch and telegram, however, when taken
together, suggest the lesson inculeated by that well-
known French adage, Qui s excuse, s'accuse I
Napoleon, as Allison observes in reviewing the
incidents of the Battle of Waterloo and Grouchy's
alleged failure to put in an appearance there, never
took blame to himself for any of his failings if
he could "justly or unjustly lay it on another."
Generally, and in some instances, as we shall see
also particularly, Lord Wolseley, in accounting for
his failure up the Nile, seems to express himself as
if imbued by a similar spirit, for in the instance
before us he pleads Gordon's warning about Berber
as an excuse for continuing his boat plan of the
campaign inster.d of responding to its appeal to him
to come quickly across the desert to his relief.
Then, in the despatch of January 12th, he ex
presses his heartfelt regret that he was not able to
reach Korti at an earlier date, because " his advance
had been delayed through the difficulty of collecting
supplies at this point ^Korti), 1,400 miles by river
from the sea, in sufficient quantities to warrant an
advance into the neighbourhood of a besieged
garrison that is very short of food, where all the
surrounding districts have been laid waste, and
where even the besieging army finds it difficult to
subsist."
Great as had been the difficulty of getting supplies
up the Nile to Korti, Lord Wolseley deelares in
P 2
212 WHY GORDON J'EKISIIKD.
another paragraph of this despatch that " it would
have been simply impossible for his force to have
reached there, ready and provisioned for a movement
on Khartum, without the aid of 'our English-built
boats.' "
Now, here we are at an absolute issue with both
his Lordship's logic and with his facts.
In the first place, it was not originally intended—
as Lord Hartington, in describing the plan of the
Expedition, told Parliament, that an immediate
advance of the whole force of the Expedition on
Khartum was to be made. A part only of the
2,ooo men which Lord Wolseley expected to
concentrate at Debbeh might, in case of neces
sity, be used for that purpose. We have also
shown, when dealing with Gordon's letter of Novem
ber 4th, that, although he had not yet actually
concentrated this proposed force at Debbeh, he had
then both men and sufficient supplies at his disposal
for such an advance. These supplies had nearly all
of them been accumulated at Dongola by native craft
before one of Lord Wolseley's English-built boats had
left Wady- Halfa or the advance of their flotilla had
eleared the broken water of the Third Cataract.
It has also been pointed out that, if Her Majesty's
Government had not, by the advice of the officers
engaged in the Red River Expedition, arrested the
operations in which General Stephenson was thus
engaged in August, a much larger quantity of
supplies could have been collected by the native craft
he was hiring for the purpose.
The small boats did certainly get up supplies to
LEARNED TO FEATHER THEIR OARS. 213
Korti from the Second Cataract in large quantities,
but it took them on an average forty days to do so,
and to Dongola thirty days, whereas Sir Frederic
Stevenson sent the Royal Sussex to the latter point
by native craft, with three months' supplies for it and
the mounted infantry, in thirteen days !
We bear cheerful and even proud testimony to
the infantry regiments who navigated these boats
up the Nile from Gemai or Sarras to Korti. Many
of them had little or no experience in boating when
they started up the river ; they soon, however,
became such adepts at rowing that they had actually
learned to feather their oars !
In August and September our Consular represen
tative at Cairo and General Stephenson again and
again urged upon the Government the importance
of taking advantage of the approaching high Nile
to get stores and men up to Dongola. The advo
cates of the small row-boat plan of operations, as
already stated, had assured them that an advance up
the river by them was "a practical operation
altogether independent of the height of the river ! "
And this notion was tenaciously adhered t^by the
Headquarters Staff at Wady-Halfa, in the middle of
November. In a conversation with one of them he
pooh-poohed the difficulties to which I called his
attention, which would impede the progress of the
boats by the fall of the river.
So enthusiastic was he in favour of the plan Lord
Wolseley and his chief had adopted, that he even
went so far as to assert that, instead of hindering, it
would facilitate their progress. The contrary was,
WHY GORDON PERISHliD.
however, the case, for as the river fell " reef after
reef"—as Colonel Colvile justly remarks, and as we
noticed in riding up along it subsequently to that
conversation — " was bared ; the difficulties to
navigation were increased until it became im
passable at low water for native craft, and a grave
source of difficulty even to the buoyant English
whalers."
The progress of the boats had been also seriously
delayed by the damages they received from collision
with rocks, owing to the turbid water of the
river concealing them until too near to be avoided.
The material of which they were constructed—
Canadian white spruce—rendered such accidents
often very serious, for the blow received in such
collisions often literally " shivered their timbers."
In two of the many instances which came under
our notice, in which both boats were hopelessly
wrecked, one had a hole made in her bottom as
if a round shot had been driven through, and the
adjacent timbers shivered into splinters, as if struck
by a hammer. In the other instance, we found the
stern and stern-post had been made of semi-decayed
elm, and the planking fastened to it by copper nails
only an inch long. The bow of this boat was com
pletely stove in. These damages were repaired by
patches of white tin, and in the journal of one of
the officers of the Royal Irish, which we published
with our history of the Expedition, instances are
given of the delay caused by the necessity of making
. such repairs. And yet, although the boats had thus
often to be hauled up and patched, and carried two
NOT THE DETAILS, BUT THE OBJECTIVE. 215
tons of stores, they did, with lemarkably few acci
dents, get up to Korti with their heavy loads.
Lord Wolseley had certainly a right to call
attention, in his despatch to Lord Harrington, to the
fact that the boats he had recommended as a means
of transport up the Nile had, in that respect, proved
their feasibility.
We are not dealing, however, now with the
success of these English-built boats, but with
that of the Expedition for the relief of Khartum,
of which they formed an important detail. Had
they been in the water at the Second Cataract a
month earlier than they were, and with a higher
Nile, it is probable that Lord Wolseley would not
have had to express to Lord Harrington his heart
felt regret on December 16th at the delay in
getting his forces together at Korti at an earlier
date.
In the despatch of January 12th his Lordship
admits that he believed that the garrison at
Khartum was very short of food. He must also
have anticipated from its elose investiture by the
enemy that its supplies would be still further
diminished. In fact, so short had they become that
on that very day Lord Wolseley reached Korti
Gordon made this entry in his journal :—
If some effort is not made before ten days, the town will fall.
It is inexplicable, this delay. If the Expeditionary Forces have
reached the river and met my steamers, one hundred men are
all that are required—Just to show themselves.
Why, therefore, did not Lord Wolseley yield to
the impression which Gordon's last message and the
2l6 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
inferences which ordinary common sense should
have led him to draw from it, namely, that Khartum
was in imminent danger of falling from starvation ?
At his own suggestion he had been supplied by Her
Majesty's Government with a Camel Brigade to
enable him, if any such an emergency arose, to push
a force across the desert at any hazard for its relief,
instead of deciding to adhere to his original plan of
operations. These he ought to have now appre
hended would delay him from raising its siege for at
least two months after he had received that urgent
message from Gordon which implored him to " come
quickly " to the rescue.
Lord Wolseley's unwarranted confidence in
Gordon's ability to hold out, even when he received
Gordon's letter of November 4th, had encouraged
him to delay accelerating his movements in the
manner we have indicated he might easily have
done. In the paragraph in his telegram to Sir
Evelyn Baring, on January 1st, he asks the opinion
of Her Majesty's Government on what he proposed
to do after receiving Gordon's message of December
1 6th, namely, that when he communicated with him
" by steam " from Mutemma, and if he found him
in extremis before the infantry sent up the river to
Berber had arrived there, he would—" Push forward
the Camel Corps to help him at all hazards."
From asking this opinion, Lord Wolseley either
betrays a want of confidence in his own judgment,
or seems to have lost that nerve and dash as a general
which so distinguished him in his early soldiering
days as a subaltern. Perhaps, however, we are
DISCORDANT NOTES. 217
warranted in coneluding that he would rather risk a
disaster at Khartum than incur the responsibility of
one to any part of the force which had been sent
under his command to avert it. Rather than run any
such a risk Khartum may fall and Gordon may
perish—or, as he hopes, be only made a prisoner! If
Her Majesty's Government approved of his plan of
operations, they, and not he, would be held re
sponsible for these catastrophes to the British public
Lord Wolseley's despatch of January 12th to
Lord Hartington seems, in some of its statements,
out of harmony with the message he sent to Gordon
by Sir C. W. Wilson four days previously. The
mission of the latter to Khartum was based upon
the hope that Gordon would be able to encourage
his garrison to hold out, when they had some
tangible evidence that English troops, coming to
their rescue, were at hand, but that no active move
ments would be made on their behalf by these
troops until the March following. He was instructed
to tell Gordon that—
No British troops will be sent to Khartum beyond a few
red coats in steamers for the purpose of impressing the
inhabitants that it was to the presence of an army that they
owe their safety. The siege of Khartum thus raised, all our
military arrangements would be made with a view to the
immediate occupation of Berber, and to a march across the
desert to Ariab, on the Berber and Suakim road.
From the words we have italicised, we are not to
infer that the siege was to be raised by the few
British soldiers which Sir Charles was ordered to
take up with him to Khartum. Nol In a previous
218 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
elause in these instructions, Lord Wolseley expresses
the hope that, when the Mahdi learns that the advance
guard of the coming English army had reached
Mutemma, he would flee ! This, his Lordship
informs Lord Hartington in his despatch of January
1 2th, would occur when Stewart occupied that place
on January 16th, for, as he enthusiastically observed,
" this column would be regarded as the head of
what the natives of this country believe to be an
enormous army, as it seems to them, from covering
in its advance up 450 miles of the river."
Then, after stating that a small column, marched
across the desert, would probably be able to fight its
way into and out of Khartum, but could not be
relied upon to bring away Gordon and his garrison
in safety, Lord Wolseley asserts that such an opera
tion, when Mutemma was occupied by a small force,
would present a different aspect, for then " this so-
called Mahdi and his followers would be well aware
that they had not only to deal with it, but also with
the English army, which they know is advancing up
the Nile on Khartum by Abu-Hamed and Berber."
Subsequent events proved how visionary all these
hopes had been, and also to a certain extent incon
sistent with his telegram to Lord Hartington, after
he received Gordon's letter of November, namely,
that it indicated the almost impossibility of his relief
without fighting.
His Lordship's opinion now was that the Mahdi,
whose army round Khartum had been .greatly
strengthened since November, would not stay to
SERIOUSLY MODIFIED INTENTIONS. 219
fight when he became aware of the advance of an
English army against him !
The points just mentioned seem to explain why
Lord Wolseley did not concentrate troops at Debbeh,
as he had originally proposed to do, and also to
modify very seriously his deelared intention to push
a column, at all hazards, across the desert to save
Gordon, if he should ascertain " by steamer that he
was really /'// extremis."
We dare not assert that his Lordship was resolved
at all hazards to avoid such a movement, but we may
safely assume that he did not evince, in his subse
quent operations, any readiness to do so. On the
contrary, he tenaciously adhered to his original plan
of operations, under the evident delusion that, what
ever happened to Khartum, his force would be well
fed, and not, if he could help it, be very much
exposed to danger.
220
CHAPTER XVI.
This deliberate plan of procedure acted upon by
Lord Wolseley is further most painfully manifested
in the despatch of the River Column, under the late
General Earle, in order primarily to capture Berber,
but also to seize Abu-Hamed, where supplies were
to be forwarded from Korosko across the desert to
supplement those carried with it. In fact, the trans
port by this route for supplies, in addition to those
brought up the Nile by the small boats, had been
previously arranged for by Lord Wolseley, in view
of the despatch of the River Column.
For example, we learn from his instructions, dated
December 27th, that General Earle was told it was
desirable to concentrate his force at Hamdab and
start thence as soon as he had 100 days' supplies
per man in hand to take with him, and that Major
Rundle had undertaken to have other supplies at
Abu-Hamed from Korosko four days after his
arrival at Hamdab.
These supplies were to have been conveyed across
the desert by the Ababdeh tribes who were under
Major Rundle's control, and comprised 200,000 rations
of groceries, 100,000 rations of biscuit, and 50,000
rations of preserved meat, then collected by native
craft at Korosko. Having thus filled up at Abu
HALTED AND FELL BACK. 221
Hamed, General Earle was to continue his advance
on Berber.
General Earle could not start from Hamdab until
January 24th, owing to the delay in filling up his
100 days' supplies, and he did not advance very far
until he had to fight a few hundred Monnassir
Arabs, strongly posted at the Jebel Kirbekan. In
dislodging them the column lost its general, two
colonels, and a number of men.
When the news of the fall of Khartum reached
Korti on February 4th it was halted, and its subse
quent history is told concisely in the following
correspondence with the Chief of the Staff and
Colonel Brackenbury, who, as Brigadier - General,
assumed command of the Nile Column after General
Earle was killed.
On February 24th, when the column was
encamped sixteen miles above Hibbeh, General
Brackenbury telegraphed to the Chief of the Staff at
Korti as follows :—
I am by map twenty-six miles from Abu-Hamed. My latest
information is that the enemy intend to fight there—at Abu-
Hamed—and I expect opposition if I advance upon it. There
is a cataract between this and Abu-Hamed ; and, if opposed,
it might take some days before I could occupy this place.
Therefore, although confident of being able to beat any force
opposed to me, I feel it my duty, in view of the first part of
your telegram, to fall back immediately to Abu-Dom.
The telegram here referred to by General Bracken
bury from Sir Redvers Buller, was one sent imme
diately after news had reached Korti of the fall of
Khartum.
222 WHY CORDON PERISHED.
Another despatch, sent from Korti by the Chief of
the Staff on February 26th, informed General
Brackenbury that Sir Redvers Buller, who replaced
Sir Herbert Stewart, who had been severely wounded
in the engagement of January 19th, had evacuated
Gubat, as the position on the Nile near Mutemma
was designated, because he had abandoned all
hope of going to Berber before autumn. He was,
therefore, ordered not to go to Abu-Hamed, but
having burnt and destroyed everything in the neigh
bourhood where Colonel Stewart was murdered, " to
withdraw all his force to Abu-Dom, near Merawi."
And then comes this significant sentence :—
Having punished the Monassir people for Stewart's murder,
it is not intended to undertake any military operations until
after approaching hot season.
In a telegram from Korti, asking him when he
expected to occupy Berber, General Brackenbury
replied that he did not think it possible to reach Berber
before the 28th February, and that any date given
must be pure conjecture, the time being dependent
on unknown rapids and unknown movements of the
enemy, but that he did not think he would reach
Berber before the 1 2th of March !
Unknown rapids ! Unknown, of course at the
time Lord Wolseley submitted his plans to Her
Majesty's Government. When asked, as we have
seen, if there were any difficulties to navigation
beyond those interposed by the Second and Third
Cataracts below Dongola, he replied, if there were,
they were not worth considering, for, as in the Red
AN UNJUSTIFIED RISK. 223
River Expedition, they could be passed by small
boats !
What a risk there was, in view of the state of
affairs at Khartum, for Lord Wolseley to venture
to move by water and take Berber because Gordon
had warned him not to leave it in his rear !
This decision to capture Berber before relieving
Khartum seems difficult to account for under the
uncertainty in which Lord Wolseley was placed from
his not having had accurate information about the
cataracts of the Nile beyond Merawi and the
absolutely accurate information he possessed of the
desert route from Korti to Mutemma.
This latter was supplied for the use of the Expedi
tion by the Army Intelligence Department, based
on the surveys made in 1875 for a railway from
Wady-Halfa to Khartum, and was as perfect almost
as a sea chart—for it gave, not only the topography
of the region, but indicated the distances by
kilometres.*
This department, however, according to a remark
made by Colonel Colville, were so puzzled about
the Shushuk Pass, near Kirbekan, that they could
only infer from reports about it that, if held by the
enemy in any force, it would be a serious obstacle
to the advance of a column up the river to Abu-
Hamed. Lord Wolseley himself had acknowledged
to Lord Hartington that he had no positive informa-
* This map was a facsimile of one borrowed from Messrs. Lease
and Bakewell, engineers, engaged in the survey of this railway, and
drawn by that firm in 1876, in view of its being valuable for the use
of travellers.
224 WHY GORDON PERISlIEl).
tion as to any point beyond the southern end of the
Wady-Halfa railway, where further progress in boats
became impossible—that, in fact, he had no informa
tion as to any such difficulties—but that, so far as
informed, the boats could be taken up all the cataracts.
It is rather strange to say that what the General
of the Expedition was thus in ignorance about, one
of the war correspondents at Sarkamatto, who
accompanied it, had ascertained early in December,
when on his way to Dongola. Mere he met Mr.
John Cook, who was on his way down the river in
a deahbeah, the reis of which, and the oldest on the
river, informed him that the obstaeles to navigation
between Abu-Dom and Berber were equal to those
of the Second and Third Cataracts, and would be
much greater as the river fell. Even when it was
at its flood native craft were over two months
voyaging from Ambukal to Berber.
Lord Wolseley, while acknowledging to Lord
Hartington the imperfection of the existing
information about the obstaeles to navigation of
the Nile beyond Sarras, affirmed that, whatever these
cataracts were, the small boats could either be taken
up or portaged round them. How long a time it
would take to do this in the case of those between
Korti and Berber he could not caleulate from his
want of exact information as to their character.
And yet, with the fate of Gordon and Khartum
trembling in the balance, he decides to " advance
by water " to take Berber, when he could have more
rapidly and surely done so by a march across the
country, as Gordon had suggested.
225
CHAPTER XVII.
The River Column, by which Lord Wolseley
moved by water to take Berber, even if it had gone
on, could not in any way have aided the attainment
of the main objects of the Expedition, for it was
not intended to reach there before the middle of
March.
Even if Lord Wolseley felt himself compelled, on
strategic grounds, to act upon Gordon's warning
about Berber, why, may we not ask, did he not
advance by road across country to do so ? Such
an operation, we contend, would not have been
more hazardous than his advance to occupy a post
at Mutemma by men and stores across the
Desert of Bayuda, which he subsequently attempted,
and as the following facts indicate, was equally
feasible.
The caravan road, evidently thus referred to by
Gordon in his message, leads up along the left bank
of the Nile from Korti for thirty miles to Abu-Dom,
and thence strikes for 143 miles across the country
to Berber, a distance thirty-three miles shorter than
from Korti to Mutemma.
Between Korti and Abu-Dom there is an open
reach of the river. This would have facilitated the
Q
226 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
rapid collection of the supplies necessary for a
flying column at the latter point.
The following table shows the comparative water
supplies along these two roads—the distances noted
being caleulated from their respective termini on
the river :—
Caravan Road to '^Beruer.
Wells. From Abu-Dom.
El-Kun 46 miles.
Saini 52 „
Tebel-El-Soped 74 „
Bir Karbai 124 „
Nile at Berber 143 „
Caravan Road to Mutemma.
Wells. _ From Korti.
El-Howeiyat 50 miles.
Aboo-Halfa 90 „
Jakdul 100 „
Abu-Klea 153 „
Nile at Mutemma 176 „
So far as our information goes, it leads us to
believe that the supply of water at the wells on the
Berber road was quite equal, if not superior, on that
leading to Mutemma. Our own personal knowledge
of the wells along the latter, however, enables us
to spe-'k positively about them.
After leaving the Nile at Korti with a supply of
water carried on camels fifty miles, two good days'
journey had to be traversed before the wells at
-
WATER IN THE DAYUDA DESERT. 227
El Howeiyat were reached. When Colonel Stanley
Clarke's convoy of stores, which we accompanied,
reached these wells at sunset on January 9th it
took the force twelve hours to replenish its water
owing to the paucity of the supply. We designate
them wells, but they were only pits from 12 ft. to
1 $ ft. deep, into which the water percolated from the
adjacent strata ; and the slowness with which it did
so caused this delay. Sir Herbert Stewart, on his
second march to Jakdul, arrived at El-Howeiyat
wells a few hours after our convoy had left them,
and finding the supply had been so thoroughly
lessened by us, had to push on to Aboo-Halfa.
The supply in the rock' cisterns at Jakdul was so
abundant, that from one pool 20,000 camels had been
watered during the course of the Expedition. The
supply at the Abu-Klea wells was from the
same sources as those at El-Howeiyat and
quite as deficient, so much so that it took our
column nearly eight hours to partially replenish its
supply.
Be all this as it may, we may feel confident that
General Gordon, who knew about their water supply,
would not have advised Lord Wolseley to come to
Berber or Mutemma by the roads leading to them
from Ambukol had he not deemed it sufficient
along either of them.
But Gordon did not expect, as we have seen from
the entry in his journal on September 21st, that
Lord Wolseley would march his whole force, or the
greater portion of it, across the desert. His words
are :—
Q 2
228 WHY GORIX>N PERISHED.
My view is ... I would not attempt to pass the bulk of
British Force across the country, but only the fighting column
to co-operate with the steamers.
But Lord Wolseley, as \ve have seen, had decided
upon concentrating his whole force at Shendy
(opposite Mutemma) before he made any direct or
serious attempt to relieve Khartum, and adhered to
this decision after he had received Gordon's urgent
message of December 14th, imploring him to come
quickly to the rescue.
In view of this decision, and the consequences
by which it was followed, how different would have
been the result had General Lord Wolscley been be
leaguered in Khartum and General Gordon been in
command of the army sent for its relief ! The latter,
as we infer from the above entry in his journal,
would have sent at least two of the infantry regi
ments out of the four which formed the River Column
to capture Berber, in co-operation with his steamers,
and then to communicate with him direct !
Lord Wolseley, as we have reasons for stating,
excuses himself from following the course thus sub
stantially recommended by Gordon, on the ground
of his lack of camel transport at the time. From our
point of view, we regard this excuse as inexcusable
as it is untenable, for the following reasons.
In the first place, had not his Lordship in his
despatch of January 12th reminded Lord Hartington
of his recommendation for the organisation of a
camel brigade in his letter to the War Office in
September, because it would secure for him the
power of moving rapidly across the desert to
THE CAMEL CORPS. 229
Mutemma ? This brigade, he then further stated,
was to be formed of picked troops, under carefully-
selected officers on lines recommended. This
brigade, known as the " Camel Corps," was formed
upon the lines laid down by Lord VVolseley.
When on the field it comprised the three following
regiments :—
I.—The Guards Camel Regiment, formed out of
detachments from the Grenadier, Coldstream, and
Scots Guards, and from the Royal Marines.
II.—The Heavy Camel Regiment was, as its
designation implies, comprised of detachments from
the Household Cavalry and from several Dragoon
Regiments and Lancers.
III.—The Light Camel Regiment was made up of
detachments from various Hussar Regiments.
If this Camel Corps was intended for fighting we
can hardly see where the picked cavalry troops come
in. One third of it were certainly all that could be
desired, for it ineluded the " Guards " who, we need
hardly remark, are recognised as the very cream
of our infantry, both as regards officers and men.
The other two thirds of the corps were composed of
cavalry on camels, and yet, as the following extract
from the " Notes issued by Lord Wolseley for the use
of camel regiments " these two regiments, when in
action, were to fight as infantry :—
The cavalry soldier fights on horseback ; infantry, mounted
on horses, fight dismounted—but within easy reach—on which
they retire if hard pressed, or have their horses brought to
them.
The soldiers of the Camel Regiment will fight only on foot.
230 WHY GORDON PEKISHED.
They are mounted on camels only to enable them to make
long marches. . . . The men of the Camel Corps must,
therefore, trust solely to themselves and their weapons
whenever they have dismounted for action.
The men and officers of the two cavalry regiments
in the Camel Corps were, therefore, according to
Lord Wolseley himself, not to fight as cavalry, but
to be used, when brought into conflict with the
enemy, as infantry, for which, from their drill and
training, however, they were as wholly unfitted, as
were the infantry from fighting as cavalry by them.
We know how bravely they fought on foot in the
square at Abu-Klea. It was not wholly their fault,
as we have shown in our history of the Expedition,
that the Dervishes broke into it at the corner round
which they were formed, but was owing in great
part to the pressure of the camels against it and the
fact that the two masses of the enemy which entered
the formation there were screened from the fire by
an intervening hill in their approach. Two-thirds
of the men and the majority of the officers who
were killed on that occasion belonged to those
cavalry detachments. Had they been as well trained
in the use of the Martini-Henry Rifle and of the
bayonet instead of the sword and the carbine, as were
the mounted infantry which formed two-thirds of the
left face of the square, probably the breach in it
referred to would not have happened, for the latter
received and repelled—without their formation being
broken or moved a pace to their rear—the masses of
the enemy which surged up against it.
We have good reasons for stating that the late Sir
CAVALRY NOT INFANTRY. 231
Herbert Stewart, himself a cavalry officer, placed
these detachments of the heavy camel regiment in
a part of the square which he did not think would
have to bear the brunt of the fray. They formed
its rear face and a part of its left face. He fully
expected that the attack of the enemy would be made
in the front and right faces, both of which and the
right of the left face being formed of infantry. It
was their steadiness and withering fire on the masses
of the enemy that saved the Desert Column in this
battle from a crushing defeat.
Why was it that Lord Wolseley " picked " these
men for such a service ? They were not trained to
fight as infantry, and yet were called upon to do so.
An infantry regiment would have been more reliable
in such circumstances.
But Lord Wolseley did not expect any serious
fighting would have to be done when this Desert
Column was despatched from Korti. The " Heavies "
were to be employed after Mutemma was reached,
according to his instructions to Sir Herbert Stewart,
in the convoy of supplies from Jakdul to that post.
And this was based on the fancy that, as cavalry
were often employed, or usually, in such a service,
these " Heavies," mounted on camels, but on which
they were not to fight, could plausibly be used for
that purpose. We mean " plausibly," for that appears
to have been the only reason which can be assigned
for their employment under such conditions on this
occasion. And here the spirit of the courtier was
manifested rather than that of military genius in
planning a campaign, for the latter always has in
232 WHY CORDON PERISHED.
view the "practical," while the other seeks for a
purpose—what we may call the ornamental.
These cavalry regiments absorbed, as mounts,
about 800 of Lord Wolseley's stock of camels.
Then, according to a statement made by Colonel
Colvile, the weight carried by each animal, ineluding
150 lb. for that of the rider, was 400 lb. With the
man marching at his side the camel would only have
to carry 250 lb. It would therefore require, at this
rate, about 500 camels to transport the rations, kit,
and spare ammunition for 800 men.
The chief causes which contributed to shortening
this supply of camel transport is variously accounted
for by Colonel Colvile. He refers it in one instance
to the scarcity of forage, which necessitated its
reduction to the lowest possible limits. Then he
inform his readers that the camels were not forth
coming which the Mudir of Dongola promised them
Saleh, chief of the Kababish tribes, should supply
for the Expedition. In another place he states,
"so meagre was the supply of saddles that, in
spite of the urgent necessity for camels, orders had
to be issued that none were to be bought unless
furnished with saddles."
This lack of camel transport at a critical moment,
however caused, is but an additional evidence of
the failure of Lord Wolscley's elaborate plan of
operations. The contingencies which Colonel
Colvile mentions as chargeable for it had evidently
not been sufficiently taken into consideration when
they were formed. Nevertheless, we venture to
assert that such provision should have been made,
THE PROVENDER QUESTION. 233
in view of some of them occurring, as would have
reduced their influence in the progress of the
Expedition to a minimum. Others, that of shortness
of provender, as stated by Colonel Colvile, is not
in strict accordance with facts. Finally, all these
difficulties which he alleges shortened the supply
of Lord Wolscley's camel transport might have
been met by a possible departure from some of the
previously fixed details of his plan of operations.
While there was undoubtedly an absolute dearth
of forage in the region on both sides of the Second
and Third Cataracts, that from Wady-Halfa to
Hannek, beyond the latter point, and in the district
of Dongola, there was an abundant supply.
There was a large stock of grain in the Govern
ment stores at Dongola and Debbeh in December.
At the former place the quantities were as follows :
—Barley 357,000 lb., dhurra 591,000 lb., wheat
54,000 lb. We have no estimate of the quantity
in store at Debbeh, but from our personal observation
coneluded that it was nearly equal to that at
Dongola.
On our way up the left bank of the Nile to Korti,
we found plenty of dhurra at nearly all the villages.
In many places there were also, as at Khandak, large
standing fields of it available for use as green fodder.
If correctly informed, Lord Wolseley had been
authorised by the Egyptian Government to deal
with the Mudir, not as a suppliant for supplies,
but as master of the situation. Instead, therefore,
of making contracts through him for camels, grain,
or labour, and also paying those who furnished
234 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
them through him, he ought to have dealt directly
with the latter. As a consequence of his failure
to do so, enormous prices had to be paid to these
middlemen by us for everything that was thus
bought, and those who supplied the " goods "
either did not receive their usual market value
for them, or, as in the case of those who were
thus contracted with to labour for us, many were
not paid at all. Several gangs of natives engaged
through the Mudir to help the boats up the
cataracts, and for other work consequently deserted
en bloc!
The Vakeel boasted, in the middle of December,
when we were passing through Dongola, and
most unblushingly, that he had himself made a
profit of £10,000 by these nefarious modes of
dealing. We never learned, of course, what was
the share of the Mudir in the plunder, but it must
have exceeded that of his subordinate. Both of
them not only thus enriched themselves, but also
discredited us with the native population, who
naturally, and so far as they could, evaded the
pressure put on them by the Dongolese authorities,
and held back their camels and produce.* It was
this indirect mode of dealing with the natives, which
largely contributed to shorten Lord Wolseley's camel
transport and supplies of fodder.
* The premature announcement of the " Rescue and Retire policy of
Her Majesty's Government had also its influence in the matter."
235
CHAPTER XVIH.
IT seems, however, from another statement made by
Colonel Colvile in this connection, that more camels
could have been easily procured if there had
been saddles for them. Hereby hangs a tale of
want of forethought on the part of those whose
duty it was to have secured in advance an adequate
supply of this absolute necessity for baggage
animals.
A sufficient number of riding saddles had, however,
been provided for the Camel Corps, which, ineluding
the mounted infantry, required about 1,600 to
mount them. Much skill and taste and ingenuity
had been exercised in the design and construction
of these. They were grand saddles, covered with
crimson coloured sheep-skin, and fitted with easy
riding cushions. They were also supplied with
two haversacks, and saddle eloths of the crimson
leather, and also with stirrups.
The foundation of those manufactured at Cairo
for the Expedition was of wood, but some genius,
not well up in the natural history of the animal
on which they were to be used, had invented an
iron saddle. We saw specimens of these at Wady
236 WHY GORDON rERISHED.
Halfa, and were told they were of English manu
facture.
The latter were, undoubtedly, too heavy to be
used at all, and the former were so badly constructed,
as far as fitting the camel's back was concerned,
that they largely contributed to swell the loss of
many of them during our hard desert march.
Nearly all of them suffered from sore backs, and
the general use of carbolic oil to heal or soothe them
made it necessary, for one like myself not obliged
to ride in the column, to keep to windward of it.
It does seem strange that, while so much attention
was given to provide such swell mounts for the
officers and men of the regiments of this Camel
Brigade, but little, or inadequate attention, had
been paid to provide saddles for the camels which
would have to be employed in transporting their
supplies, kits, and ammunition.
Rope lashings also seem to have been forgotten,
for, in order to supply them, a regular " rope walk "
was established by the Transport Department, in
which the cotton spun by the natives was used
in manufacturing substitutes. These deficiencies
were painfully evident to mc on January 7th at
Korti, under the following circumstances:—
A convoy with stores under Colonel Stanley Clarke
was ordered to leave that day for Jakdul, and
on his invitation I gladly decided to accompany it.
It was originally intended to march at noon. Two
o'elock came and it was not ready. My tent was
struck and camels loaded and ready. This made
the delay so irksome that I rode out to that part
WORKED TO DEATH. 237
of the camp where preparations were being made
for its despatch, and learned that both saddles and
lashings were needed to complete the loading of
the stores. It was nearly sunset before the tail of
the column of 1,066 camels got up on the desert-
plateau from the alluvial plain, and where it had to
halt until the moon rose shortly after midnight
before it could proceed.
The transport which Lord Wolseley even had at
his command was not economically used, for it was
soon reduced by the unnatural use made of the
camels employed in it. As has been remarked, his
Lordship regarded them as animals whose powers
of endurance had never been properly appreciated.
He, however, had coneluded that they could
be worked to any extent without proper food and
necessary rest. Take, for example, the way they
were driven and used in the Desert Column.
Jakdul is ninety-eight miles from Korti, and Sir
Herbert Stewart, in his first march there, covered
this distance in three marches of 32^ miles each with
loaded camels. These were returned empty to Korti,
and were driven at the same rate back to it. In
consequence of this unnatural speed, over 600 of
them were almost completely done up, and the
others rendered less fit for the work before them
than they would have been by those who knew how
to use them.
It was a serious mistake on the part of Lord
Wolseley to have made two marches to Jakdul in
order to occupy Mutemma, instead of one. He had
been warned by Gordon not to let rumours spread
238 WHY GOKDON PERISHED.
abroad of his approach. This double march in
effectively did so, and led to the battles at Abu-
Klea and Mutemina.
Colonel Colvile, in asking us to excuse the mistake
thus made by Lord Wolseley for not making a dash
all the way across the Bayuda Desert on Mutemma,
on account of the shortness of camel transport,
seems not to have been aware of the fact that Sir
Herbert Stewart^ on his first march, carried with
him secret orders to the effect that, if he did not find
a sufficient supply of water at Jakdul to warrant
the establishment of a post there, he was to push
seventy-six miles further onto the Nile at Mutemma.
Unfortunately he found the supply adequate for the
purpose, and, after examining it, and as he stood
before the lower pool, from which no fewer than
20,000 camels had been watered during the course
of the Expedition, he turned to one of his staff and
said :—
As I cannot conscientiously report that there is an insuffi
cient supply ofwater here for a post, I must, as ordered, return
to Korti, with the prospect of having to fight our way to
Mutemma, when wc march on it from here, for evidently we
were not expected to come by this route.
The information Lord Wolseley received on
December 31st, from his Intelligence Department,
was sufficiently favourable to warrant such a dash
across the Bayuda Desert on Mutemma.
That information was to the effect that the bulk
of the Mahdi's army was concentrated round
Omdurman Fort, and round Khartum itself, which
was still safe in Gordon's hands. Small raiding
UNWARNED OF DANGER. 239
parties were believed to be operating on the Khar
tum and Debbeh road, but the Bayuda Desert was
reported to be quiet. The Dervish force at Mutemma
was computed to be only 2, $00 or 3,000 Arabs, armed
with Remington rifles, fowling-pieces, and two brass
field-guns. The Mahdi was, however, reported to
be about to send another brass gun and a Gatling
there, and a reinforcement of a 1,000 men to Shendy.
Lord Wolseley had subsequently received infor
mation about the state of the road between Korti
and Mutemma, in a telegram from the Mudir of
Dongola, on December 30th. It stated that the
enemy were about sending 20,000 men to the
Bayuda Desert, to elose this road against an advance
over it by British troops.
Sir Herbert Stewart had, however, left Korti
before this latter information had been received by
Lord Wolseley, and even then if he had been
disposed to countermand or modify his orders about
returning to Korti from Jakdul under the circum
stances mentioned, he could not have done so
excepting by despatching a messenger by camels
after him, for he had no other method of communi
cating with Sir Herbert, nor had the latter with
him, when he found his way open to Mutemma. '
A field telegraph-cart with Sir Gerald Graham's
column had kept up a communication between him
and Suakim, but no such a provision had been made
either on Sir Herbert's first march to Jakdul nor
subsequently. He was sent off from his base, as
our Gallican neighbours would express it, en i'air.
A large amount of telegraph equipment and
240 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
stores had been sent up the river to Assouan, but
from lack of transport it had been detained there,
excepting about twenty miles of wire. When Lord
VVolseley took leave of us on the night of November
17th at Wady-Halfa, on his return to Dongola,
Colonel (now Major-General) Webber, the energetic
and able chief of the Telegraph Department of the
Expedition, asked leave to bring some of it up the
river, Lord Wolscley refused to grant it, because
" Men can do without news, but not without food."
It appeared to me then, and the impression was
deepened by subsequent events, that generals could
not, while their soldiers could do without the former.
One hundred and twenty camels could have run
a line of field telegraph on six days from Korti to
Jakdul, and there was at the former place a large
heliographic apparatus.
Lord Wolseley, in giving an estimate of the force
he would require in September, had ineluded in it
four battalions to keep open his line of communica
tions between Assouan and Shendy. This was of
unquestionable importance. Viewed from the same
standpoint, he certainly in such a case as that of
the Desert Column should have adopted the means
supplied by the heliographic apparatus at hand , for
keeping himself in touch with it after it left Korti.
In fact, Sir Herbert Stewart, on his second march,
fully expected that this would be done. Had he
been followed by an heliographic communication
with his base, even as far as ELHoweiyat, half way
to Jakdul on his first march, it might have prevented
his second, by affording a way of consulting Lord
WHY, WHAT NONSENSE? 24I
Wolseley about the importance of taking advantage
of the open road he found between Jakdul and
Mutemma.
Then again, before \ve marched out from the
former place on January 14th on Mutemma, when
it was known by the Intelligence Department at
Korti that the Mahdi, becoming aware of the
intention of the English troops crossing the Bayuda
Desert, had sent a large force to prevent our column
from reaching the Nile, unfortunately there were no
means such as those indicated to warn us of this
movement by the enemy.
The omission of this now regularly-adopted means
to enable an advancing army to keep up a con
tinuous communication with its base was, for the
reasons stated, unfortunate. It was humorously, and
perhaps also correctly, accounted for by a well-
known officer of our force thus : Why, what
nonsense ! They did not need any such thing as a
field telegraph, for they were just going to make a
dash across the desert to Khartum and bring back
General Gordon in their arms and then be all made
dukes and viscounts !
Returning to Colonel Colvile's observation in
extenuation of Sir Herbert's double march from
Korti to Jakdul before Lord Wolseley's intention
of occupying Mutemma was effected, on the ground
of the lack of camel transport, we assert that for the
following further reasons we regard it as untenable.
We take it for granted that Lord Wolseley, who
probably made the suggestion to Colonel Colvile
on which this explanation is founded, felt the
R
242 WHY GORDON PliRISHED.
importance of sending a column direct from Korti
to Mutemma. If, therefore, this ought to have been
done, a shortness of camel transport should not
have hindered him from making the movement.
The Camel Corps had been organised for a
hazardous inarch direct on Khartum if it should
at any time during the Expedition be thought
necessary. But, as we have seen, Lord Wolseley,
from his confidence in Gordon's ability to hold out
until his more roundabout and scientific mode of
reaching him two months later could be carried out,
did not require its use on this occasion. The
column was despatched by him to seize Mutemma
and establish posts at the Jakdul and Abu-Klea
wells. Gordon's boats were waiting for it at
Mutemma. Now if Sir Herbert Stewart had been
sent direct to Mutemma when he left Korti on
December 30th and pushed on as rapidly as he had
done to Jakdul, he could have reached there on
January Cth, and communicated with Gordon by his
steamers by the 8th at the latest. It was not,
therefore, as has been represented by Lord Wolseley
and others, and believed by Lord Cromer, that the
fall of Khartum on January 26th would have been
averted if Sir C. W. Wilson had left El Gubat two
days earlier than he had done. The bare possibility
of the relief at this juncture of the critical, nay
desperate, condition of things with Gordon when
our column reached there on January 20th, was lost
by this imperfect attempt of Lord Wolseley to
establish a post at Mutemma for the objects at
which it was aimed.
EXACTLY WHERE IT HALTED. 243
That there was even a bare possibility of that fall
being arrested by a rapid movement on Mutemma
to meet Gordon's steamers ought to have led Lord
Wolseley, therefore, to have ventured making such a
movement—even if it had been more hazardous than
it really appeared to him to be at the time. In fact,
it was not so hazardous as has been generally
supposed ; but was actually made so by being
imperfectly carried out.
In the first place, Lord Wolseley was provided
with a map of the route from Ambukol and Korti to
Jakdul,Abu-Klea, and Mutemma based upon surveys
made by Mr. Fowler for a projected railway from
Wady-IIalfa to Shendy and Khartum. It gave
him, in the most minute detail, a topographical
description of the country, and had even marked on
it the distances from point to point in kilometres.
So accurate was it in the latter respect that the late
Sir Herbert Stewart, in his despatch describing the
battle of Abu-Klea wells, stated that the column
had halted on the morning of the 16th January for
breakfast at 1 1.30 a.m. " at the spot marked on the
map by the 840th kilometre."
Nor can we, as Colonel Colvile suggests, take into
consideration the lack of camel transports as justi
fying the double march to Jakdul, not only for the
reasons already given—namely, that Sir Herbert
Stewart had orders to push on to the Nile at Mutemma
if water enough for a post was not found there—but
because Lord Wolseley adhered rigidly to his fixed
plan of the campaign about the use of a mounted
force. It does not appear, therefore, that being short
R 2
244 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
of camels he might not have deviated from this
feature of the Expedition, by either marching part
of his men in this first march across the desert, or
have economised his transport by sending with Sir
Herbert Stewart a less quantity of supplies, to be
forwarded subsequently under the protection of
infantry marching on foot. It was not necessary
that a sufficiency of these supplies for the establish
ment of a post at Jakdul should have been sent with
the flying column intended to seize and occupy
Mutemma.
The possibility of such an operation as \ve have
thus suggested is proved by the fact that, when Lord
Wolscley received Sir C. W. Wilson's despatch about
the battle near Mutemma, he promptly marched two
regiments across the desert to strengthen the
decimated force at El Gubat.
The Royal Irish (one of these regiments) left Korti
in half battalions on January 28th and 29th respec
tively, and this is how they marched :—
Each man carried on him a filled water-bottle,
70 rounds of ammunition, and his rolled overcoat.
Their blankets and water-proof sheets, 230 rounds
of reserve ammunition, eight days' rations for each
man, and a kit-bag for four, with an allowance
of one gallon of water per man per day, and
considerable quantities of supplies were sent on
camels with these half battalions, one camel trans
porting thirteen days' rations for eight men quite
easily.
The marches were made at night, and the average
daily distance covered between Korti to Jakdul
NOT SAILORS, HUT SOLDIERS. 24$
was 14J miles. The shortest was ten miles, and the
longest seventeen miles.
Having personally withdrawn from Gubat on the
evening of the day when the news was received
there of the fall of Khartum, in order to keep
up our communications with London, we had the
gratification of witnessing three companies of them
marching into the Jakdul gorge on February 5th.
Their step was as elastic and their formation as
well kept after their march of 100 miles across the
desert as one would naturally expect from our well-
trained and disciplined infantry. In fact, they
marched as they would have done past the Colours
on a review at Aldershot !
This was not our first acquaintance with the
Royal Irish, for we had met them on their arrival at
Wady-Halfa, and were not surprised from their
seasoned appearance to learn subsequently that
Colonel Shaw, who commanded them, had thus
expressed himself when he received the order to
proceed up the Nile in the small boats :—
I am the Colonel of a regiment of soldiers, not sailors !
Why do they not let me march my men up the river to the
front ?
Lord Wolseley had now a practical illustration
of his ability to do so by this march across the
Bayuda Desert.
It is certain that the rest of the infantry of the
force under his command could have done likewise,
and that, therefore, shortness of camels, in view
of the crisis at Khartum, was no reason why they
■
/
/
246 WHY GORDON PERIS1IED.
should not have marched across the desert for its
relief. Take, for another example, the Guards'
Camel Regiment, composed of picked men from
regiments which have always been regarded, and
on every occasion have proved themselves to be,
the very first in physique and training of our
infantry regiments. They also gave abundant proof
of the mistake Lord Wolscley made in not sending
them on to Mutemma instead of to Jakdul, in the
first instance, as he had now despatched the Royal
Irish on an emergency.
For example, when the force at Gubat was with
drawn in February, owing to the collapse of the camel
transport of the Desert Column, the Guards, like the
other regiments of the Camel Corps, had to march
back on foot to Korti. We have not all the particulars
of their march, but this we do know, that that able
officer, Colonel Mildmay Wilson, who was in
command of them at the time, marched his
men easily, after leaving Jakdul for Korti, forty-
eight miles in forty-two hours, and subsequently
marched them down to Dongola, about 170 miles,
without any material discomfort to the men, and in
tropical June weather !
We may mention in this connection also that in
his final report (March, 1885) of the operations in
the Eastern Soudan, General Graham bore the
following testimony to the physical endurance of
two battalions of the Scots GuaiJs he had with him.
In a reconnaissance made by them in different
directions in order to protect those engaged on the
construction of the railway from Suakim to Berber,
A SUCCESSFUL CAMEL COUPS. 247
he stated that one day they marched nearly twenty
miles over rougli passes without a man falling out !
Sir Gerald further stated in his report that his
Camel Corps was most successful, and that of the
500 camels sent to him from India as mounts for it,
300 only were used for mounting them. These were
provided with saddles made for the transport of two
men on each animal, and had one native driver for
every three camels.
The remaining 200 camels were used on the " ride-
and-tic " system, that is, familiarly, " You ride and
I'll walk, and then by-and-by we'll change places."
By this economical use of his 500 camels General
Graham informs us that he had thus secured the
means of moving on an emergency about 1,800
infantry, one-half of which would always be mounted ;
and, further, that with his Camel Corps, infantry,
and cavalry, he had at his command a formidable
column.
In view of these facts, Colonel Colvile was not
justified in pleading Lord Wolscley's shortness of
camels as a reason for his not having sent the
Desert Column direct to Mutemma on December
30th, instead of first occupying Jakdul.
248
CHAPTER XIX;
Nor can we admit, under all the circumstances,
that before seizing Mutemma, Jakdul should have
been occupied as a post, for even this was contingent
upon its water supply.
That its occupation as post before moving on
Mutemma formed part of Lord Wolseley's cast-iron
plan of operations is evident from a despatch he
sent to Sir Evelyn Wood, on December 27th,
directing him to come to Korti at once. In it he
explains that the intention was to form a post at
Jakdul wells, to be garrisoned by the Royal Sussex
Regiment, and collect there sixty days' supplies for
the whole force. The mounted troops were then to
occupy Mutemma, and either at once proceed to
Khartum, or else bring some more supplies to
Jakdul, or to form a garrison at Shendy, as circum
stances may direct.
Now, knowing Gordon's perilous situation, as Lord
Wolseley must have, or certainly ought to have
known, from General Gordon's letter of November
4th and the sketch it contained of the position of
the enemy round it, and from the message he had
received from him on December 31st, informing him
of the critical condition of Khartum on the 14th of
SHORT OF ITS KIGHT OBJECTIVE. 249
December, these deliberate and cool caleulations for
moving for its relief not only excite our surprise, but
also, if we may use such a term, our indignation.
We naturally, therefore, ask if the needed supplies,
to which he referred in his despatch to Sir Evelyn
Wood of December 27th, and for the object he
proposed, could not have been collected at Jakdul,
after Mutemma had been seized, and communication
opened with General Gordon by his steamers, which
his Lordship knew were there ? Was it not a
matter of stratcgetic importance that, in view of
the nearness to Mutemma of the large army of
the Mahdi, to have seized it by a forced march ?
Such a march, as we have shown, might even easily
have been effected by Sir Herbert Stewart when he
reached Jakdul on January 2nd.
" We want you to come quickly ! " was Gordon's call
to Lord Wolseley from Khartum on December
14th. " Make by the roads to Berber and Mutemma.
Do not let rumours of your approach. spread abroad.
My steamers await you at Mutemma."
To these urgent appeals Lord Wolseley virtually
turned a deaf ear, although in September he
informed Lord Hartington that, if he found Gordon
to be in extremis, the Camel Corps he was about to
organise would enable him to move for his relief.
And yet now, from want of camels, as Colonel
Colvile tells us, could not do so effectively. He
had spoken, in another and later despatch, of
having gone beyond the limits of ordinary prudence
in sending it across the desert as he did. By the
double march to Jakdul instead of making a dash
250 WHY GORDON rERISHED.
and a surprise march on Mutemma, as events
showed, he had nearly risked its entire failure,
and no doubt led to that other dash on Khartum,
as Father Ohrwalder has told us, on that fatal
January 26th !
We cannot but compare his decision and action
in this case with the conduct and decision of other
generals in Her Majesty's Army when called upon
to make rapid movements to meet emergencies.
Take, for example, the march of General Lord
Roberts from Cabul on Candahar in order to relieve
its beleaguered and endangered garrison.
From a paper read before the Royal United
Service Association by Colonel (now General)
Chapman, we quote here the following reference
to the inception and execution of this celebrated
march, because of its comparative bearing upon the
Nile Expedition in both these respects.
A march conducted without a base of operations or com
munications of any kind through a hostile country, and
towards a point presumably in the hands of an enemy who
had recently been successful, could only be warranted by such
a necessity as had now arisen. In this instance, however,
the wisdom which prompted the measure, and the courage
which executed it, sprang of experience and of the confidence
which claims success as a certainty. The result justified the
conception, and the march from Cabul to Candahar has been
recognised as a great achievement. It will be remembered
that when it was undertaken, and until a crushing defeat had
been inflicted on Ayub-Khan at Candahar itself, the movement
was condemned in no measured terms by military critics, its
originators being judged to have acted in complete disregard
of the principles of military science ! With troops, however,
trained and equipped as were those selected for the under
FROM CABUL ON CANDAHAK. 251
taking, .1 commander may, humanly speaking, anticipate
success in any enterprise.
When the news was received at Cabul, on July
28th, of the defeat of General Barrows' brigade
and the retirement of our troops into the City of
Candahar, it was decided at first by the generals
there that relief to the beleaguered garrison could
only be effected from Scinde with great delay and
difficulty at that season of the year. When Sir
Donald Stewart was called upon for his opinion by
the Indian Government, he counselled the despatch
of a force from Cabul, under the command of
General Roberts (now Lord Roberts) to accomplish
this object.
Orders for the despatch of this column were
received on August 3rd, leaving the constitution of
the force, its equipment, and other details to the
officers at Cabul. It was decided that, as no
dependence could be placed in Afghan assurances
about supplies along the route, that the columns
should march without any dependence upon them
—in fact, independently. It did so march, and
accomplished its object.
^-Napier's march on Emaum-Ghur is also in point
here.
At Dcjee, he wrote, I found such prevarication and such
ignorance as to the route, that I became impressed with the
objections which Moorad and all the other Ameers felt to our
entering the desert, and also judged it unsafe to risk a large
force without any positive information about water. All the
authorities were in the belief that to reach Emaum-Ghur
was necessary to the tranquillity of Scinde, I therefore
252 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
resolved to advance with a small force, leaving the other troops
at Dejee. On the night of the 5th we moved with 350 of the
Queen's 22nd Regiment—all moved on camels, two soldiers
on each. We had two twenty-four pounder Howitzers, with
double teams of camels. 200 Scinde horse, and fifteen days'
provisions, and four days' water. The road was in some
places hilly, and in others very sandy.
The daily marches, he informs us, were from ten
to eleven miles, and the last march, being through
deep sand, the guns had to be hauled by 160
camels and sixty men, and yet he informs us that :—
Nevertheless, having foreseen and prepared for all
mishaps, they could only have delayed, not baftled me. The
desert presented some difficulties, but we overcame them.
Our burden camels were miserable animals, but we only lost
eight or nine out of 600 !
The recent Chitral Expedition may also be
quoted here as an illustration of what a general
may be called upon to accomplish, and do so
successfully by a reliance on the discipline, endurance,
and native pluck of the rank and file of the troops
under his command, and by his skill in directing
their movements.
Frost and snow, high mountain passes held in
strong positions and in superior numbers by a daring
enemy, were the difficulties with which the small
force comprised in the Expedition had to contend.
Yet these were met and overcome by General Sir
Robert Low in order to attain its object.
This object was of a far less pressing nature and
national importance than was that of the Nile
Expedition, and yet the manner by which it was
NOT RECKLESSLY, DUT BRAVELY. 253
successfully attained has added another proof of
the prowess of our soldiers when efficiently led.
In the instances \ve have thus quoted the generals
never hesitated to incur risk in order to attain the
objects of the Expeditions upon which they were
despatched. They faced such risks—not recklessly,
but bravely—and never allowed them to delay or to
baffle them.
The inception of the Nile Expedition, the choice
of its route and the great care manifested by its
Commander to avoid any extraordinary risk to his
men—and the measures so far as supplies were
concerned to save them from, not merely want of
food, but from any discomfort—is all strangely in
contrast with the examples of the generals men
tioned, as well as of others to which reference might
also be made. It does appear, from the manner in
which Lord Wolseley conducted the Nile Expedition,
in these and other respects, as if he would rather
run the risk of Khartum falling, than by any
movements to relieve it he might endanger the
force placed under his command for that object.
On one occasion he gives expression to this
excessive carefulness. It occurs in a despatch,
dated February 8th, 1885, to Sir Redvers Buller,
who was then at Gubat—informing him that he was
waiting for the decision of Her Majesty's Government
about seizing Berber. In order to quiet any anxiety
his Lieutenant might feel as to the danger of such a
movement, Lord Wolseley adds :—
I have no doubt the first thought of the Government will be
the absolute safety of this Army.
254 WHY CORDON PERISHED.
This reminds us of the remarks made about
Admiral Blake by a contemporary writer when
Sir Henry Vane appointed him to succeed such
Admirals of the Commonwealth as Warwick and
Moultaine, because they allowed Prince Rupert to
carry on unscathed his piracy along our coasts.
" This prototype of Nelson, this writer quaintly
observed, was not one of those admirals who
would think that the main object of a naval
expedition was to bring himself and his ships safe
home again."
In the hope Lord Wolscley expressed to Sir
Redvcrs Buller about Her Majesty's Government's
first thought about the absolute safety of the Army
under his command would seem to simply suggest
that his moments were not entirely free in some
respects, but controlled by it. Another indication
of such a control was his telegram to Lord Hartington
when he received Gordon's letter of November 4th,
that "it did not seem from it that Khartum could
be relieved without fighting." We have no
published reply to this intimation, but in justice to
Lord Wolseley we should have one. We have,
however, his instructions to guide us, in which it
has been seen he was placed under obligations not
to fight if possible. General Gordon refers in his
journal, in the extract we give from it, to Sir Evelyn
Baring's "peace policy." The latter, with Lord
Northbrook, drew up Lord Wolseley's instruction,
and must also, therefore, have had a hand in
checking any movement involving risk on financial
grounds.
AN OPEN ROAD.
Sir Herbert Stewart left Korti with the Desert
Column, as stated, on December 30th, at 3 p.m., and
arrived at the Jakdul wells at 6.45 am. on
January 2nd, the total distance being ninety-eight
miles, and the time consumed in covering it was only
32$ hours. Thence to Mutemma was seventy-six
miles further, but it was only fifty-two miles from the
Abu-Klea wells. The march so far was evidently a
surprise, for no Arabs were met along the desert
tracks, though traces of them were seen. On nearing
Jakdul, a party of men wearing the Mahdi's uniform
were captured, who were supposed to be on their
way from Mutemma as emissaries of the Mahdi
to a Sowarab Sheik, who had for some time been
raiding the villages between Korti and Merawi.
It was very evident to Sir Herbert Stewart that
the road was equally open on to Mutemma, and,
if his orders had allowed him to do so, he would
have pushed on there ; and, as the place was known
to be only occupied by about 2,500 Dervishes, he
could easily have captured it.
His general orders were to occupy Jakdul, leaving
the Guards Camel Regiment and a detachment of
the Royal Engineers there — 422 of all ranks,
under the command of Colonel the Hon. E. E. T.
Boscawen — and then return to Korti with the
camels (2,206) he had taken with him for transport
purposes. He was, however, instructed, as we are
credibly informed, that if the supply of water was
not sufficient to warrant the establishment of a
post at Jakdul, to push on to the Nile and seize
Mutemma.
256 WHY GORDON l'ERISHED.
After an examination of the pools* or rock
cavities, and finding in them an abundant supply of
water, he observed to one of his aides-de-camps that
he could not conscientiously report that they were
not sufficient for a post, and that, therefore, he would
be compelled by his orders to return to Korti, and
run the risk of having to fight his way to Mutemma
when he made the projected advance on it.
No doubt, if Sir Herbert had been able promptly
to inform his chief of the position of affairs, either
by a military telegraph or a heliograph, as we have
described, he would have been directed to proceed
to Mutemma. There can be little doubt that, if
he had been authorised to do so, he could have
seized Mutcmma on the 5th of January, and not
only been able to communicate with Gordon by his
steamers, who were on the look-out then for the
Expedition, and so saved Omdurman from falling
and strengthened the defences of Khartum by their
return, but by the sudden and unexpected appearance
of a British Force only ninety miles from him, the
Mahdi would have fled south.
We have some reasons, given by Father Ohrwalder
for supposing that the Mahdi would thus have fled,
because he informs us that when the news of the
defeat of his troops at Abu-Klea reached him, he
wished to raise the siege of Khartum and retire to
Kordofan, and that, " if the English had appeared
* These pools were three in number, and well known as the Upper,
Middle, and Lower Tools. The two former were computed to contain
1 19,050 gallons of water, and the last one no less than 420,000. They
were replenished by the heavy periodical rains of the region.
THE AUU-KLEA VICTORV. 257
any time before he delivered the attack, he would
have thus acted."
The final advance was made from Jakdul by Sir
Herbert Stewart on January 14th, when the author
accompanied his column. The day after it marched
fresh horse tracks bore evidence of the vicinity of
the enemy, and in the afternoon an advance guard
caught sight of a few of his camel men. W hen we
halted for breakfast at 1 1 a.m. on the 16th, a message
was received from Colonel Barrow, who had been
sent on before daylight to reconnoitre the Abu-
K!ea wells, that they were occupied by the enemy.
On the 17th the battle of Abu-Klea was fought,
in which our column of 1,685 bayonets defeated
ten or twelve thousand Arabs. From papers found
on several Emirs who were killed, we learned
that, when it became known that the English
were advancing by this route, the tribes in the
vicinity were summoned to oppose them in the
desert.
It was also ascertained from prisoners then
captured that a large force of Dervishes had
occupied the wells on the 12th, and that on the
morning of the battle this force had been
strengthened by a strong detachment from Omdur-
man, which had, they further informed us, been
captured by the Mahdi on the 6th or 7th,
We marched out from Abu-Klea wells on the
afternoon of the 18th, and went on all night, coming
in sight of Mutemma before sunrise on the 19th.
Unfortunately we halted, and in such an exposed
position that, before it could be left to fight our way
S
253 WHY GORDON l'ERISHED.
to the Nile—about three miles distant—it had to
be fortified. The square only moved out at 2.30 p.m.,
and succeeded, though strongly opposed, on reaching
the river that evening, and the rest of the column
next day—that is on the 20th. It had, therefore,
been six days in fighting its way seventy-six
miles, which, if Sir Herbert Stewart had not
been hindered by the inelasticity of his orders,
could, on his first march to Jakdul, have reached
the Nile from there without firing a shot in half
the time. In fact, he could have occupied Mutemma
on the 5th instead of on the 20th, as had now been
accomplished with heavy losses in killed and wounded,
amounting in all to about a tenth of the force !
The general impression in England at the time it
was despatched from Korti, was that Lord Wolseley
had sent the Desert Column, under Sir Herbert
Stewart, for the immediate relief of Khartum.
We have, however, learned from his Lordship's
message to Sir E. Baring, that its object was
primarily to establish a post at Mutemma, " by
men and stores across the desert," in view of future
movements for the above main object of the
Expedition.
As the above impression still prevails in many
quarters, and in order to correct it, we therefore
call particular attention to the instructions given
to Sir Herbert Stewart, who commanded it, and
to Sir C. W. Wilson, who accompanied it as a
Staff Officer charged with a message to General
Gordon, and for other purposes.
Sir Herbert Stewart was ordered to leave Korti
THE LINES ON WHICH IT MOVED. 259
on January 8th, with a force, the fighting part of
which number 1,607 of nll ranks, out of which he
was to leave fifty men at El-Howeiyat wells, and
1 50 men at Jakdul. After such rest as his camels
required at the latter place, he was to proceed
to Mulemma with the "Guards" and "Heavy"
Gamel Regiments, the Mounted Infantry, 250 of
the Sussex Regiment, the Naval Brigade, and a
detachment of Royal Engineers. He was also to
take with him eight days' rations for the force,
and 25,000 rations for the post at Mutemma, and
3,000 rations for the post to be established at
Abu-Klea. After occupying the latter he was
ordered to advance upon, attack, and occupy
Mutemma, where, leaving the Guards' Gamel
Regiments, the detachment of the Royal Surrey, the
Naval Brigade, and the half-battery of the Royal
Artillery, he was to return with the camels used in
the transport of stores to Jakdul, from whence he
was to forward stores to Mutemma.
Sir Herbert Stewart was further informed that
Colonel Sir C. W. Wilson, D.A.G., and Gaptain
Verner, D.A.A.G., would accompany him for intel
ligence duties, and that the former would be in
command at Mutemma, when he returned to
Jakdul, and that Colonel Burnaby would act as
Commandant there after Sir Charles had left for
Khartum.
Colonel Sir Charles W. Wilson's instructions were
as follows, the italics being ours :—
I am sending Captain Lord C. Ceresford, R.N., with a small
party of seamen, to accompany Sir H. Stewart to Mutemma,
S 2
WHY GORDON PERISHED.
where, if there are any steamers, Lord C. Beresford will take
possession of one or /wo of them, as he may think best, &c.
As soon as Lord C. IJeresford reports that he is ready to
proceed with one or more steamers to Khartum, you will go to
that place with him, and deliver the enclosed letter to General
Gordon. I leave it open so that you may read it.
Orders have been given to Sir H. Stewart to send a small
detachment of infantry with you to Khartum. If you like
you can, upon arrival there, march these soldiers through the
city, to show the people that British troops are near at hand.
If there is any epidemic in the town you will not do this. I do
not wish them to sleep in the city. They must return with you
to Mutemma. You will only stay long enough in Khartum
to confer fully with General Gordon. Having done so, you
will return with Lord C. licresford in steamers to Mutemma.
My letter to General Gordon will explain to you the object
of your mission. You will confer with him, both upon the
military and upon the political position. You know how we
are off in the matter of supplies, the condition and distribution
of the troops under my command, the dates when General
Earle will be able to move on Abu-Hamed, &c.
It is always possible that when Mohammed Achmed (i.e., the
Afahdi) fully realises that an English Army is approaching
Khartum he will retreat, and thus raise the siege. Khartum
would, under such circumstances, continue to be the political
centre ofour operations, but Berber would be our objective. No
British troops would be sent to Khartum beyond a few red
coats in steamers for the purpose of impressing on the inhabi
tants the fact that it was to the presence of our Army they
o~Mcd their safety.
The siege of Khartum being thus raised, all our military
arrangements would be made with a view to the immediate
occupation of Berber, and to a march across the desert to
Ariab, on the Suakim road.*
* Berber could not be occupied, as we have seen by Lord Wolseley's
Memorandum of April 8th, on account of the water supply being
short in this desert, except by pushing small detachments across it,
ONLY THREE OFFICERS.
Sir Charles was also informed in these instruc
tions that three officers would accompany him to
Khartum, to " remain there to assist General
Gordon," until Lord Wolseley was able to relieve
the place.
which would be dangerous. Then the last objection to General
Stephenson's proposal was that only by the small-boat plan could
troops not only be taken to, but brought from, Khartum during the
winter.
262
CHAPTER XX.
It will be seen from the instructions of Lord
Wolseley to Sir H. Stewart and to Sir C. VV. Wilson
that the Desert Column was not primarily sent for
the relief of Khartum, and that so far, as we have
already pointed out, neither his Lordship nor the
Chief of his Staff appeared to recognise any imme
diate or pressing necessity for an armed intervention
for that purpose.
In further proof of the statements already made
on this state of confidence at the Head Quarters
of the Expedition, we refer to Lord Wolseley's
despatch of January 29th, enelosing one from Sir
C. W. Wilson, describing the operations of the
Desert Column after the 18th, when, after Sir H.
Stewart had been wounded, he had taken command
of it :—
The result, Lord Wolscley informed Lord Hartington, of
these successfully-executed operations has been to place us in
possession of the desert route from this place (Korti) to the
Nile, in the vicinity of Mutcmma, near which place wc are
now fairly established, cutting off in great measure the enemy's
forces north of Shendy from those besieging Khartum, thus
rendering still more difficult than before the feeding of the
Mahdi's army, already short of provisions.
MILITARY ROMANCING. 2C3
Further on in this military romancing spirit—for
common sense will not permit any other description
of the views Lord Wolseley expresses in it—he
further congratulates himself by these successes of
being able to capture Berber, " as Gordon's steamers,
manned by the Naval Brigade, will assist him in that
operation." So far, however, as Gordon himself was
concerned, these steamers would enable him to com
municate direct with him, and ascertain the real
condition of Khartum !
When Lord Wolseley wrote this despatch he must
have known when Sir H. Stewart marched out from
Jakdul on January 14th, that the information
Colonel Kitchener had been able to obtain about
Mutemma was in harmony with what was believed
to be the case when the Desert Column was
despatched from Korti on the 8th. This was to the
effect that it was held by only from 2,500 to 3,000
Arabs.
He did not on this occasion take into adequate
account the condition in which our small force was
placed on its arrival on the Nile near Mutemma,
nor the following facts and circumstances which
combined either fatally to delay or might entirely
upset the caleulations upon which he had so
enthusiastically dilated in his despatch.
Sir Herbert Stewart was dangerously wounded in
the engagement of the 19th, and Colonel Burnaby
had been killed. Our force had lost in killed and
wounded nearly a tenth of its number, and had with
it at Gubat 104 of the latter to care for. As we had
only ten days' rations with us, a convoy had to be
264 W"Y GORDON PERISHED.
sent back to Jakdul for supplies, and this had reduced
its numbers to 868 bayonets.
The Naval Brigade was in a hopeless state of
collapse. Lord Charles Beresford, who commanded,
and who was to take possession of one or more of
Gordon's steamers, and take Sir Charles Wilson up to
Khartum, was in hospital unable to walk, and all
the officers under his command had been killed or
severely wounded. A third of his sailors had fallen in
the square at Abu-Klea, and all but one of his petty
officers. Those who survived had become, according
to Lord Charles Beresford himself, in a statement made
to the author and ten officers, thoroughly demoralised,
or, as he put it, had funked it in the square at Abu-
Klea after the Arabs had captured their Gardner
gun and killed their officers. In fact, this was
apparent to many others at Gubat, and it did not
surprise us that the Naval Brigade was not in a
position to discharge the duty assigned to them by
Lord Wolseley.
In fact the disasters to the Desert Column in its
gallant march and successful seizure of a post on the
Nile had considerably affected the objects his Lordship
had in view in its despatch.
To add to its difficulties, Sir Charles Wilson had
learned from prisoners captured at Abu-Klea, that
Omdurman had fallen, and that one of the Mahdi's
generals or emirs—Feki-Mustapha—was marching
down the left bank of the Nile with a strong force
to Mutemma, and that another army was advancing
up from Berber.
Lord Charles Beresford and his artificers are,
HOPING AGAINST HOPii. 265
nevertheless, credited by Sir Charles Wilson with
having overhauled the engines of the two steamers
selected for the trip up the river to Khartum—a
matter, as he observed, of great importance, for,
according to the following information received from
the captain of one of them which had left Khartum
on December 14th, it was evident he would have to
fight his way there.
This captain told him that when he left there on
that date Gordon Pasha had said to him: "If you
don't come back in ten days with English troops you
need not come at all, for all will be over."
Sir Charles Wilson also learned from the comman
dant of the flotilla that at several points on the river
between Mutemma and Khartum the enemy had
constructed batteries and breastworks, from which
they had fired upon the steamers and had sunk one of
them. In a conversation with the captain of the
Bordecn he particularly described to me several
below Halfiyeh, but said he :—" Never fear, when
Gordon Pasha sees the smoke of the steamers he
will make a diversion."
We therefore consoled ourselves when Sir Charles
left us on the 24th by the thought thus suggested,
and picturing how the " hero " of Khartum would
anxiously look out for the steamers he was destined
never to see.
Father Ohrwalder confirmed the view this captain
had taken of what Gordon would do in the following
extract from his " Ten Years' Captivity in the Camp
of the Mahdi " :—
Every day, and many and many a time, did he look north
266 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
from the roof of the Palace for the relief which never arrived.
, . . He was sure they would come—but when ? The
time was pressing. How eagerly he searched the distant
horizon for the English flag he longed to see—but every day
he was doomed to disappointment.
The last entries in his journal, which had been
written up from the day Colonel Stewart had been
sent down the Nile, on September 9th, up till
December 14th, added to the anxiety now felt about
Gordon, for on the 13th he had made the following
ominous entry in it
Certainly this day-after-day delay has a most disheartening
effect on every one. To-day is the 276th day of our anxiety.
. . . We are going to send down the Bordcen the day after
to-morrow, and with her I shall send this journal. If some
effort is not made before ten days, the town may fall. It
is inexplicable, this delay. If the Expeditionary Force have
reached the river and met my steamers, 100 men are all
that we require—just to show themselves. . . . This is not
asking for much, but it must happen at once or it will be
(as usual) too late.
The last entry on the 14th was in the following
similar strain :—
Now mark this, if the Expeditionary Force—and I ask for
no more than 200 men — docs not come in ten days, the
town may fall, and I have done my duty. Good-bye !
Thirty-eight days had elapsed since these entries
had been made, and therefore but little hope
remained to cheer us that we might , still be in time
to save Khartum. Yet, small as it was, Sir Charles
Wilson resolved to act upon it, and did so as promptly
as circumstances would permit.
MIGHT STILL DE RELIEVED. 267
It has been alleged, and is still believed by some
that the fall of Khartum on the 26th would have
been averted if Sir Charles Wilson had left Gubat
on the 22nd instead of the 24th of January. In
fact, Lord Wolseley implied this in his despatch
to Lord Hartington when he enelosed to him Sir
Charles Wilson's report of his journey from Gubat.
We are credibly informed that even Lord Cromer
still holds this view.
Sir Charles Wilson, however, fully explained and
justified his delay in starting on his official mission
in his book, " From Korti to Khartum " (pp.
1 1 3- 1 14), as follows :—
I had every reason to believe that forces of the enemy were
advancing upon us from the north and south, and I could not
leave the small force in its position on the Nile without
ascertaining whether it was likely to be attacked. I knew
that Omdurman had fallen, and that Gordon expected
Khartum to fall on Christmas Day ; but I also knew that it
was still holding out, and I hoped that the pressure upon
the town would be relieved by the large number of men sent
down by the Mahdi to meet us, and that news of our victories
would have got into Khartum and given Gordon and his
garrison fresh heart. At any rate, there was nothing to show—
and I questioned the commanders of the steamers carefully—
that the crisis at Khartum, which had been deferred from
the 25th December to the 19th of January, would be hurried
on, or that a delay of a couple of days would make much
difference.
The fight at Abu-Klea on the 7th was known to
Khasm-el-Mus on the 17th, and probably also in
the Mahdi's camp and in Khartum on the 19th
and 20th. This, he hoped, would further delay the
268 WllV GORDON PEKISHED.
impending crisis, and he therefore resolved to
make a reconnaissance on the 22nd, in two of
Gordon's steamers, to ascertain if the report he
had received was true, stating that a large body of
the enemy had collected at Sayal, a few miles below
Mutemma.
Finding no force there, upon his return late on the
afternoon of that day he handed over the command
of the force at Gubat to Colonel the Hon. H. H.
Boscawen (now Lord Falmouth), and gave orders
for two steamers to be got ready to take him to
Khartum.
From daylight on the 23rd until sunset every
effort was made to get these steamers ready for the
evidently dangerous service on which they were to
be employed. In order to effect this their engines
were overhauled, rations put on board, and their
crews changed, so that, in compliance with Gordon's
urgent request, none of the " fellaheen " soldiers, or
" hens," as he called them, should be brought back
on them to Khartum.
A supply of fuel had to be obtained for stoking
purposes. This was no small item, as the old-
fashioned boilers of the steamers, in which wood
only was used, consumed a large quantity of it.
Some difficulty was encountered in obtaining a
sufficient supply, owing to our virtually besieged
position.
As an eye-witness, the author can bear testimony
to the diligence and earnestness manifested in these
preparations, which were carried on with a view
at first of getting the steamers off that day. It was
RED COATS AND GREY. 269
too late to accomplish this, bvit all was made ready
for an early start next morning.
During the day it was discovered that the " rod
coats " sent up with the column by Lord Wolseley
for the detachment Sir Charles Wilson was ordered
to take with him were not to be found. It was
ascertained subsequently that they had been lost
with other more valuable stores in one night march
from Abu-Klea. Happily a sufficient number of
scarlet tunics were found amongst the men of the
" Heavies " to replace them.*
Much amusement was caused by this incident
amongst both officers and men, who were all elad in
light grey. The fun, as well as the absurdity of
the thing, was well expressed in my hearing by a
Tommy Atkins of this Sussex detachment, thus :—
" Have we not thrashed these niggers in grey, and
what the use is there in dressing us up in
red now? They'll not think us the same fellows
whose acquaintance they made at Abu-Klea."
The very earliest date on which Sir Charles
Wilson could have started for Khartum was the
22nd, as the steamers had only put in an appear
ance at Gubat. late on the morning of the 2 1st.,
and when our force was out making an armed
reconnaisance of Mutemma. If Sir Charles Wilson
had been even able to start up the river that day,
he could only have travelled at the same rate he did
* It was subsequently reported that this bale of " Red Coats " fell
into the hands of the Dervishes, and were exhibited by the Mthdi to
his troops as proofs of his victories over us at Abu- Kita and at
Mutcmma.
270 WHY CORDON PERIS1ILI).
two days later, and therefore could not possibly
have reached the place before midday on the 26th,
and to find it in the hands of the enemy.
It was alleged by the writer of an artiele in the
Nineteenth Century magazine for May, 1892, that
Sir Charles might have travelled faster than he had
done after leaving Gubat on the 24th. This state
ment is absolutely contradicted by the following
abstract from the report of the Commandant of
Gordon's flotilla, and by the " log " of that of Sir
Charles Wilson's trip up to Khartum.
Khasm-el-Mus, in his report, gives the following
particulars bearing on the condition of the river, and
the increased difficulty of navigating it in the middle
of December :—
On December 17th the flotilla proceeding up the
Nile from Mutemma met the Bordeen, then on its
way down from Khartum, at the head of the
Shablooka Cataract. She was in a sad plight, for,
on coming down it (the river) she had struck a rock,
and had only escaped sinking by running the boat
ashore on Wad-Hassoureh Island, where she lay full
of water. All the crews set to work to take out her
cargo and ammunition, pump her dry, and stop
the leak. Before this could be accomplished, a
watertight cistern to cover up the hole had to be
made.
On December 26th her cargo and ammunition
were put on board of the steamer, and on the 28th
it was decided to return to Mutemma.
At a council of the captains of the steamers, con
vened by Nusri Pasha, it was decided, as they
OFF FOR KHARTUM.
were too heavy to pass the cataract of Shablooka, to
bring the troops on board of them down in boats.
Khasm-el-Mus was ordered to start down the
cataract with the Tewfikich, with the boats in tow,
and wait at its foot for the other steamers.
Referring to the success of this operation, Nusri
Pasha thus expressed himself in his journal :—
We thanked God because no damage was done to any of the
steamers, although the cataract is not passable at this time of
year. .
Sir Charles Wilson in his own graphic and often
touching account of his voyage gives us the following
daily " log" of his flotilla :—
Our progress (January 24th) had been slow, owing to the
heavy loads that the (two) steamers were carrying, and to the
low state of the water, which made navigation difficult amongst
the sandbanks.
With respect to the 25th he writes :—
We made a good start, steam up and off at daylight. In the
morning we had to stop for wood Such a business
this wooding is ; first the houses or Saiiehs* have to be pulled
down and carried to the bank, and then the logs have to be
cut up, so as to go into the furnace, with the roughest axes and
a couple of cross-cut saws, which have not been "set" for no
one knows how long.
About an hour before sunset on the 25th, the
Shablooka Cataract with its stretches of open water,
* So called Persian Water Wheels in the construction of which, as
their only material, a large quantity of wood is used.
272 WHY CORDON PERISHED.
and the rapids with their many dangerous rocks,
was entered.
When one of these stretches, three or four miles
long, had been reached about the hour named, the
captains of the two steamers objected to go further,
because no good place could be found before
sunset to tie up for the night. As there was
still a hour and a half of daylight, Sir Charles
pressed them to go on. After "an expenditure of
strong language and gesticulation " the captain of the
Talahawiych said he would go and she started off,
the Bordecn following. Sir Charles then remarks :—
It was exciting work, and I could not help thinking ofGordon's
" praying up " the nuggars on the Upper Nile. All went well
until sunset, when the Bordccit struck heavily on a rock at the
head of the last rapid we had to surmount before getting to a
reach of open water. . . . We worked hard under the
bright moonlight until past ten, but could not move her.
On the 26th [he continues] we were all up at the first streak
of dawn to make a last effort to get the ship off, little thinking
of the awful tragedy then being enacted at Khartoum.
The ammunition and all the stores were shifted aft
and the soldiers landed on a small sand - bank to
haul upon a hawser from the starboard quarter.
It was nearly nine o'clock, Sir Charles continues, before all
these arrangements were completed, when the signal was given
to pull, but she did not respond. Then we tried, "Turn astern
full speed, and pull together." I was watching a mark on the
shore, Sir Charles states, there was a slight move, followed
by a short " Stop her," and then, " Turn ahead full speed "—
.ill orders are in English— and we were again quivering in
the rapid water.
Steaming slowly ahead, the flotilla reached the
UNDER SUCH A FIRE.
most difficult part of the cataract, and, after passing
through some " nasty broken water with many
pointed rocks peeping out of it," and just as open
water was in sight " bump went the old steamer
on a sand-bank with a crash that set every thing
in a dance. . . . It was an unlucky day.
We had worked hard and yet at nightfall we
were only three miles from the place where the
Talahawiych had passed the previous night.
On January 27th, a start was made at daylight
and the steamers kept on till dark. During the
afternoon a camel-man on the left bank shouted
that Khartum was taken and Gorden killed, but
he was not believed.
Next day (28th) a start was made at 6 a.m.
Soon Khartum was in sight above the trees of
Tuti Island, when a shagiyeh on the right bank
shouted out to the Talahawiych to stop and told
them that Khartum had fallen and that Gordon
was killed two days previously.
The fire which had been opened on the little
flotilla became very hot after Halfiyeh was passed,
and from both banks of the river.
It was clear, writes Sir Charles, that the enemy's riflemen
were on Tuti Island—but ^Khartum might still be holding
out So, after a delay of.about a quarter of an hour, we went
on. Old Khasm protesting it was all up, and predicting
terrible disaster to numbers. No sooner did we start upwards
than we got into such 'a fire as I hope never to pass through
again in a " penny steamer." Two more guns opened on us
from Omdurman Fort, and three or four from Khartum, or
the upper end of Tuti ; the roll of musketry from each tide
T
274 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
was continuous, and high above that could be heard the grunt
ing of the Nordenfeldts, &c.
The flotilla kept on to the junction of the two
hills, when Sir Charles states :—
It became plain to every one that Khartum had
fallen into the Mahdi's hands ; for not only were there
hundreds of Dervishes ranged under their banners standing on
the sand pit close to the town to resist our landing, but no flag
was flying in Khartum, and not a shot was fired in our assist
ance ; here, too, if not before, we should have met the two
steamers I knew Gordon still had at Khartum. I at once
gave orders to turn and run full speed down the river. It was
hopeless to attempt a landing, or to communicate with the
shore under such a fire.
And here ended the attempt of this gallant officer
to communicate with Khartum and deliver the
message and letter Lord Wolseley had sent by him
to General Gordon. What that message was Sir
Charles Wilson tells us summarily in the following
extract from his book :—
January 25th.—I lay awake for a long time last night
thinking over the situation, and how Gordon would receive
the news I had to tell him, and what effect it would have in
Khartum. Buller's calculation was that Earlc would be at
Shendy on March 5th, and Lord Wolscley at Mutemma on
the 2nd of March ; more than another month to wait, and
Gordon had given up hope in December.
In November we knew that he could only hold out with
difficulty after the middle of December, and I had to inform
him that we could not relieve him till the middle of March.
Then I had to tell him of the rough handling of the little force
which had reached the Nile, the losses in officers, and the state
cf the transport—all of which must delay the relief—and last,
my orders to take back the few soldiers I had.
TOO CRUEL TO DE TRUE. 275
Then, when turning back from Khartum, this
gallant officer—characterized by the gentleness of
the lamb, and, when the occasion required its exer
cise, by the boldness of a lion, as this effort to reach
Khartum shows—thus expressed his feelings of
sorrow and disappointment :—
To me the blow was crushing. Khartum had fallen, and
Gordon dead !—for I never believed he would allow himself to
Tall into the Mahdi's hands alive. Such was the ending of all
our labours and of his perilous enterprise. I could not realize
it, and yet there was a heavy feeling at the heart—telling of
some awful disaster. For months I had been looking forward
to the time when I should meet Gordon again, and tell him
what everyone thought of his splendid defence of Khartum,
and now all was over—it seemed to me too cruel to be true.
And in this feeling, our little force, which had
suffered so much in fighting its way to Gubat, and
had held it against fearful odds, deeply Empathised.
And that sympathy was also felt for the present
position of the " heroes " who, in " penny boats," had
fought their way up to Khartum and back from it.
276
CHAPTER XXI.
When Lord Wolseley, however, received the report
from Sir Charles Wilson of his attempt and failure
to reach Khartum, he sent it to the Minister of
War with these ungracious remarks :—
My Lord,—I have the honour to forward a letter from
Colonel Sir Charles Wilson, R.E., giving the reasons for the
delay in the departure of the steamers from Gubat.
I do not propose to add any remarks of my own to this letter.
The reasons given by Sir Charles Wilson must speak for -
themselves.
And they did, for Her Majesty's Government had
previously received from Sir Charles Wilson the
orders Lord Wolseley had given him, which he had
done his best, under the circumstances already
explained, to carry out, and the conelusion to
which they had come about " the delay in the
departure of the steamers from Gubat " were stated
in Parliament on the occasion of the vote of thanks
to the Army, by Lord Hartington, as follows :—
I cannot upon this occasion, and I think the House cannot,
withhold its sympathy and admiration of the small body of
men who, under the leadership of Sir Charles Wilson, supple
mented the march across the desert, by the perilous and
romantic Expedition up the river to Khartum. I am aware
that criticism has been levelled at what was alleged to have
GREAT HOPES DISAIM'OINTED. 277
been a slight delay on the part of Sir Charles Wilson in
embarking on that Expedition. I think it only due to that
gallant officer to say that in the paper which has been laid
before Parliament, Sir Charles Wilson has justified himself
from any imputation of that kind.
It was certainly his own bitter disappointment at
the course and fatal issue of his plans, so elaborately
sketched and in view of his non-appreciation of the
imminent danger of Gordon so deliberately and
coolly carried out, that must have led Lord Wolseley
to withold his sympathy from Sir Charles Wilson
and his gallant band, indicated in the despatch we
have quoted.
That Lord Wolseley did naturally feel such
a disappointment may be inferred from the manner
in which it referred to what the Desert Column
accomplished by its occupation of Gubat.
In that despatch Lord Wolseley thus expressed
himself on the matter:—
The result of these successfully executed operations has
been to place us in the possession of the desert route from
this place to the Nile, in the vicinity of Mutcmma—near
which place we are now fairly established—cutting off in a
great measure the enemy's forces at Berber from those
besieging Khartum, and thus rendering still more difficult
than before the feeding of the Mahdi's army, already very-
short of provisions.
I am in great hopes that the position thus gained on the*
Nile will materially facilitate the capture of Berber by General
Earle's column, as the steamers from Khartum, now at my
command, manned by the Naval Brigade and by detachments
of infantry, will be able to assist in that operation.
I am now enabled to communicate by steamer direct with
Khartum, and thus raise the veil which has so long hung
278 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
round that city — preventing us from ascertaining its real
condition, or communicating my plan to the heroic soldier
who has so long and nobly defended it under the most adverse
and trying conditions.
The operations of Lord Wolseley—in view of
and subsequent to the information received from
General Gordon on November 17th and 22nd, and
by a messenger from him on December 31st, at
Korti, who had left Khartum on the 14th of
that month, asking him to come quickly to his
relief—have been regarded by us as indications of
that delusion, according to the great German
strategist, under which a general falls if he attempts
or hopes to carry out successfully in every particular
his predetermined plan of a campaign. The despatch
under consideration is indicative of the tenacity
with which he held on to this notion. Every
sentence is marked by it.
The self-congratulatory manner in which he
expresses himself and the positive confidence of its
tone was not warranted, for the double march to
Jakdul, by which the desert road had been secured
had hastened the fall of Khartum rather than it
had tended to its relief. The post at Gubat
had been secured by two serious engagements
with enemy which might have been avoided had
it in the first instance been sent direct to Mutemma
when the road was actually free of the enemy to
that place from Korti. We have shown that this
could have been accomplished if Sir Herbert
Stewart's orders had been elastic enough to have
warrant him in making such a movement.
STILL RIDES HIS 1I0UBY. 279
It is also difficult to understand upon what
authority Lord Wolseley coneluded that the army
of the Mahdi drew such a quantity of supplies from
Berber, if indeed any at all, and that by his having
cut it off from Khartum by the occupation of
Mutemma it would be more difficult for him to
continue his siege of the place than was actually
the case.
Then, again, as to the material aid which his
command of Gordon's steamers under the circum
stances would give him in the capture of Berber
he had no right to be so hopeful. For example
on January 12th, seventeen days previously, he haa
thus telegraphed Lord Hartington :—
The river has now fallen so low that its navigation by the
native craft of the country has become quite impossible, but
to our boats movement by water is actually more feasible than
it was in November.
He was hardly warranted in making this statement,
for the water up the river had become less every
day, and very rapidly, and so low when the small
boats of the River Column were despatched, that
their loads had to be consequently considerably
reduced from what they had been in coming up
the Nile in November.
At any rate it does not seem to have occurred to
Lord Wolseley, at the time he sent the congratula
tory despatch with which we are now dealing, that
if the Nile in the reach below the Fifth Cataract, that
is from Hannek to Merawi, had so fallen as to
prevent its navigation, how much more so must it
have fallen in the reach between Berber and Gubat,
280 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
where Lord Wolseley had, as he supposed, four
of Gordon's steamers at his command ! He found
out, thirteen days later, that his navigation was
similarly interrupted, for in a despatch dated Gubat,
February nth, Sir Redvers Buller informed him
that, according to Lord Charles Beresford's report,
the two steamers there were unfit for offensive
purposes, and that the larger one could only ascend
the river twenty-two miles, and descend it twenty-five
miles, on account of the low water.
In view of the information indicative of the
serious position of affairs at Khartum which Lord
Wolseley had received from General Gordon on
November 17th or 22nd, which was emphatically
confirmed by the communication he had received
from him at Korti on December 31st by a messenger
he had despatched on December 14th, how could
his Lordship have so hopefully expressed himself in
the last paragraph we have quoted from this
despatch ? As one of the results of these success
ful operations, he stated that of his being now able
to lift the veil which had so long hung over that
city, and prevented its real condition from being
known, and of communicating to Gordon his plan
of operations for its relief.
That plan, we have learned from Sir Charles
Wilson's instructions, could not then, as he had to
inform Gordon, relieve him until early in March. Two
officers were, in the meantime, to be sent to aid him
in holding out until then ; and ten English soldiers,
clad in scarlet, were to be exhibited to the tried and
famine-stricken garrison of Khartum, to convince
THE DISILLUSIONMENT AT HAND. 28l
them that the relief, of which they had been assured,
was now at hand !
The impression all this produces is that, however
desperate might be the circumstances of Gordon,
up till the last moments of its history the Com
mander-in-Chief of the Nile Expedition still remained
under the delusion that he could carry out, in all its
details, his predetermined plan of operations ! This
disillusionment was, however, near at hand. It
came to him on February 4th, on Sir Charles
Wilson's despatch announcing the fall of Khartum
and the probable death of its heroic defender. What
effect this " bolt out of the blue "—that is Lord
Wolseley's " blue," as painted with the colours of
his self-congratulatory despatch—is not difficult to
imagine. , '
His Lordship was not at first inelined to believe
it, for, in his despatch of February 9th to the Minister
of War—enelosing Lieutenant Stuart-Wortley's
report of the attempt made to reach Khartum, in
order to communicate with General Gordon—he
thus expressed his incredulity :—
Up to the moment of my writing this no native here
believes that Khartum has fallen, as no rumour on the
subject had been received in any neighbouring village. The
Mudir of Dongola, who is in my camp, says it is impossible
that Khartum should have been taken on the 26th ultimo
without the fact being long since known far and wide.
There can be no doubt that the enemy have captured
Omdurman and Tuti Island, as an artillery fire was opened
from both these places on the two steamers carrying Colonel
C. Wilson and party. It is not, however, clear that any shots
were fired from Khartum itself on those steamers, thus
B82 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
leaving a gleam of hope that, although the positions above
referred to are certainly in the Mahdi's possession, the city
itself may still be uncaptured.
One rumour is, as will be seen from enclosed papers, that
General Gordon and a party of determined men had taken
refuge in the Roman Catholic Church, which is strongly built
of stone. The accompanying sketch of the city shows its
position.
And yet at the same time in another paragraph
in this despatch, he thus further informed Lord
Hartington that he would not attempt to disguise
the fact from his Lordship how deeply the report of
the fall of Khartum was felt by all ranks in the Army
under my command, and remarked as follows :—
If it be literally true—and it is difficult to believe it—the
mission of this force, which was the relief of Khartum, falls
to the ground.
In a despatch, dated March 6th, to Lord Harting
ton he wrote as follows :—
My despatch of the 9th ult. (February 9th) informed your
Lordship of the reported fall of Khartum on the 26th of
January last, only two days before the detachment of troops
I had ordered, forward in steamers from the neighbourhood
of Mutemma, to open communications with General Gordon,
&c.; I have now the honour to report that, in my opinion, there
can be no longer any doubt that Mohammed Achmed's troops
took possession of Khartum and killed General Gordon on
the date I have named.
From the observation made by Lord Wolseley in
his despatch of April 13th (enelosing the letter from
Sir Charles Wilson explaining the cause of his delay
in starting for Khartum from Gubat after the
NO DIFFERENCE ANY WAV. 283
Desert Column had reached there on January 20th)
it would appear that on the date of this despatch he
still held the opinion—as sonie of his admirers still
do—that if only the detachment of ten soldiers elad
in scarlet had put in an appearance at Khartum on
January 25th it would not have been captured next
day.
With the despatch of January 23rd, about the
operations of the Desert Column, from Sir Charles
Wilson, Lord Wolseley also received the contents of
Gordon's farewell letter to Colonel Watson, and a
copy or the substance of the entry in his journal on
December 14th, in which Gordon expressed the
opinion that, if help did not come to him in ten
days, the town might fall.
Now, if even Sir Charles Wilson had been able to
reach Khartum on the 25th, from the command the
Mahdi had of the White Nile consequent upon his
capture of Omdurman, it is very improbable that
the ten scarlet soldiers would, by their exhibition,
have prevented its fall on the 26th.
The facts which later on convinced Lord Wolseley
that the place had fallen and Gordon was killed on
January 26th were followed by others proving how
desperate had been its condition subsequent to
December 14th—the date after which Gordon had
informed him it would be difficult for him to hold
out. The latter, amongst which are the following,
must have further convinced him that the sight of
ten English soldiers and the presence of two officers
could not have enabled a garrison famine-stricken
to hold out until his plan for the relief of the
284 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
place could be carried out on the date he had
fixed.
We quote first those given to us by Father
Ohrwalder, who was for ten years a captive in the
camp of the Mahdi.*
The troops were famine-stricken and began to lose heart,
whilst the enemy without the walls daily grew bolder in
anticipation of the plunder they hoped so soon would be theirs.
From Bun to Kalkala the Dervishes extended in one unbroken
mass, whilst their hundreds of naggoras {tom-toms) never
ceased beating in Gordon's ears day or night. The town was
close hemmed in on three sides. Wad Gutasa was near cnorgh
to shell his palace, and under the hole whet e the first shot
struck the wall Gordon inscribed the date as a remembrance.
None of us can realize how heavily his terrible responsibilities
weighed upon him. Despair had seized upon the town. The
unreliable nature of the Sudanese was a constant source of
anxiety to him, and enhanced the critical situation.
In his consideration of the chances of the success
of the English Relief Expedition he thus expresses
himself :—
The defeat at Abu-Klea struck terror into the Mahdist's
gathered round Khartum, and the arrival of some wounded
men at Omdunnan added to the general alarm . Had twenty
red coats arrived at Khartum, it would have been saved.
Their presence would have given fresh courage to the inhabi
tants, and, confident of their approaching deliverance, they
would have striven might and main to hold out longer.
Losing faith in Gordon's continued promises that the English
were coming, "They became broken-hearted—the Father
informs us—and in despair."
Had the Khartum people but seen one Englishman with
• *' Ten Years' Captivity in the Mahdi's Camp " : Major Wngate,
R.A.
THE STARVED AND HELPLESS TOWN. 285
their own eyes, they would have taken fresh courage, and
would, in all probability have held out for another month, until
the relief, for which they had waited so long, was a fait
accompli.
When *he Nile was high, towards the end of
August, Gordon made several counter attacks on the
enemy. Mohammad-AH Pasha in one of these
defeated the Arabs on August 31, at Gereifa, a short
distance up the Blue Nile. He also attacked the old
Sheik El-Obeid at Halfya and captured from him a
quantity of grain and cattle. Then, as Father
Ohrwalder remarks :—
Khartum breathed once more, and it seemed as if all would
be well; the town was full ofjoy, which, alas, was soon turned into
sadness. Mohammed-Ali emboldened by his late successes,
advanced again against the Sheik El-Obeid, and defeated him
near El Eilefun. Following him across the desert to renew
the attack on the 4th of September, he fell into an ambush,
when 800 of his troops were slaughtered. This proved a very
severe blow to Gordon, and Khartum being now closely
invested, he decided to send a steamer north and communicate
with the Government, and give them full information of the
state of affairs. This was his object in sending Colonel
Stewart down the Nile in the Abbas on September 10th.
His murder was another terrible blow to Gordon, for he had
counted upon his being able to inform the Government about
the dangerous position in which Khartoum was placed.
Its position had now become dangerously critical, for
upwards of 10,000 Dervishes extended from Kalkala to Buri,
and threatened it. From morning to night they attacked the
starved and helpless town, and many of their bullets fell into
its streets.
Then, again, when Colonel Stewart was killed,
the letters he had from Gordon explaining his
286 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
position, and that part of his journal written down to
the ioth September, fell into the hands of the Madhi
and made him fully acquainted with Gordon's
desperate position.
In consequence of this information, the Mahdi
wrote to Gordon on October 22, stating that the
messenger he had sent asking for speedy relief had
been killed, and summoning him to surrender as a
consequence.
It was the knowledge of the deplorable condition
of things in Khartum previously acquired by the
Mahdi from deserters from its garrison and from
other sources in the place which led him to expect
that it would soon fall into his hands by famine,
unless relieved by the Expedition under Lord
Wolseley, of the movements of which he was kept
well informed by his agents at Cairo and in Upper
Egypt, amongst the chief of whom, it is supposed,
was Zebehr Pasha.
Although we have no positive information on the
point, there are sufficient grounds for coneluding that
up till the first week in January he had been led to
expect that Lord Wolseley's advance on Khartum
would be made all the way by water—at least as far
as Berber. Aware of the delay which would be
caused by the rapid fall of the Nile, the Mahdi con
tented himself with a elose investment of Khartum.
The occupation of Jakdul on January 2nd by Sir
Herbert Stewart must have been an unweleome
surprise to him and to his Emirs. If, as we have
already pointed out, the Desert Column had then
gone on to Mutemma, which it could easily have
WOLSELEY OUT-GEN ERALLED. 287
reached twenty days before Khartum fell, it is
possible that the surprise, as Ohnvalder c&neluded,
would have led the Mahdi to raise the siege and
go to Kordofan.
When, however, he learned of the occupation of
Jakdul, and that any further advance across the
desert was not evidently immediately intended, we
must give the Mahdi and his Emirs the credit of
having out-generalled Lord Wolseley by immediately
occupying the wells at Abu-Klea. His concentra
tion of troops there began on the 12th, and when the
Desert Column reached there on the 1 6th, they found
this important strategical position held by not less
than io.ooo Arabs. He also, with remarkable
military prescience, elosed upon Omdurman, and,
after the defeat of his troops on the 17th, sent
fresh forces to oppose the further advance of the
English on Mutemma.
If the Desert Column had been despatched in the
first instance direct to Mutemma, as it might and
ought to have been, it could have reached its objec
tive on January 5th, but, owing to the serious mistake
of the double march to Jakdul, it did. not accomplish
this until the 20th of January, or a fortnight later.
It was not the delay of two days by Sir Charles
Wilson, as alleged by Lord Wolseley and his friends,
at Gubat before starting for Khartum that sealed
Gordon's fate, but this longer delay in seizing
Mutemma and communicating with him that did so.
When the Mahdi, for instance, heard of the
occupation of Jakdul on January 2nd by Sir
Herbert Stewart, he made another masterly
288 WHY GORDON TERISHED.
movement, as a preliminary to a direct assault on
Khartum, by elosing at once upon Omdurman.
The communications with this fort with Khartum
had been cut off since November 3rd, when it had
been provisioned for six weeks. By the 20th of
December its garrison must, therefore, have been in
great straits.
Gordon had so weakened himself by sending four
of his steamers down the Nile to meet the Expedition
and another with Colonel Stewart and his companions,
that he found it impossible to reopen his com
munications with Omdurman.
Its commander, Faraj Bey-Allah, had signalled
him for ammunition, but it could not, under the
circumstances, be sent to him. When his provisions
were exhausted, early in January, he surrendered,
some time between the 6th and 13th January.
When Omdurman fell into their hands, the Arabs
had obtained a most important key to Gordon's
position, for it enabled them to elose the White Nile
to Gordon's steamers by constructing batteries along
its banks. This enabled them to establish ferries on
the river south of Khartum, by which a constant
and rapid communication between the left and right
banks of the river could be established.
On October 25th Gordon noted in his journal the
following pertinent observations :—
A lot of people are moving from the right bank of Nile
towards Sheik-el-Obeyed (the man, not the city). Are they
leaving on account of the advance of the (English) troops ? or
is it only for offensive purposes ? or is it a raid which is return
ing from pillage ? We sent up the steamers and stopped the
Arab ferry near the lines.
"COULD ONLY LOOK ON." 289
For two days previous to the attack of the 26th
on Khartum, Ohrwalder states that Gordon had
noticed a considerable movement going on in the
Mahdi's camp, and had observed numbers of boats
passing to and fro on the White and Blue Niles.
This must have led him to the conelusion that the
Mahdi was preparing for some serious movement—
perhaps for an assault on the town. Now he could
only look on, for the absence of his steamers
prevented him from taking measures, as he had in
October, of meeting this threatened danger!
The Mahdi, as Ohrwalder informs us, however, only
made up his mind to make an assault on Khartum
when he found that the English at Gubat had delayed
any further advance, for " he did not begin to cross his
troops from the left to the right bank of the river
until the 24th, and it was not until the evening of the
25th (Sunday) that the crossing was completed. He
could not have attacked earlier, therefore, than he
did."
U
293
CHAPTER XXH.
KHARTUM, as will be noticed on the sketch map
(see p. 191), was built oix point of land where the
junction of the Blue and White Niles occur. Two
sides of the triangle it thus formed were protected
from assault by these rivers. The line of its defences
on the land, or third side, comprised a ditch and
parapet extending from one of these rivers to the
other. At various points along this parapet there
were strongly-built forts with guns, and a little in
its rear there was high earthwork, commanding the
ditch.
During high Nile the parapet had been seriously
damaged by the water at its White Nile end—and
had not been repaired. This Ohrwalder remarks, was
not Gordon's fault, for in his desperate condition he
could not be everywhere. When the ditch was full
of water—as was the case during high Nile—the
land defences were substantially impregnable, as
were also those on the other two sides under a low
state of the river.
General Gordon himself, in one of his earlier
despatches to Her Majesty's Government, informed
them that when the Nile began to rise his position
would be much strengthened. This message, like
others of the same nature, were sent as an assurance
HIS LAST MESSAGE. 293
that he could hold out until nn Expedition for his
relief reached him. Unfortunately and strangely? as
we have shown, they were often pleaded as a reason
for delay in its despatch.
Colonel Kitchener informs us that Gordon had
a complete system of telegraphic communication
with all the forts or posts along the line of
communication, and expresses the opinion that
" there must have been great irregularity in the
telegraph stations to account for his having been
left entirely unwarned of the attack and entry of
the rebels," and that for this irregularity he thinks
Farag Pasha was responsible.
We, however, differ from Colonel Kitchener
because of the following facts :—
Father Ohrwalder states that General Gordon, was
so unwell on Sunday, the 25th, that he did not leave
the Palace—worn out, in fact, by the weight of his
terrible responsibility, and the anxiety caused by the
non-arrival of the relief he had so long expected.
In a telegram, dated December 29th, and brought
down by a telegraph elerk to Dongola in &
cartridge, Gordon expresses his deep anxiety and
anguish consequent upon the failure of the
Expedition coming to his relief within the ten days
after the 14th of December. It ended as follows :—
Although, personally, too insignificant to be taken into
account, the powers were bound, nevertheless, to fulfil the
engagements upon which my appointment was based, so as to
shield the honour of their Governments.
" What 1 have gone through I cannot describe. The
Almighty Cod will help me I
294 WHY CORDON PERISHED.
How that anxiety and anguish must have been
increased by the accumulated difficulties with which
he had to contend for nearly a month later! After
an heroic struggle of 317 days to hold the fort,
ineluding the long period during which its com
munications had been cut, and when he had
reason to fear that the crisis he had so long staved
off, might now be hourly expected—what must have
been his feelings on that Sunday ? They must have
been such as to have seriously depressed his energies.
No wonder, then, if there were irregularities at this
point of the defences.
Then what was the condition of the garrison on
the eventful night of the 25th and 26th? From
Colonel Kitchener's own description it was most
deplorable.
On December the 14th he tells us that Gordon
had only eighteen days' provisions on hand for the
garrison alone, and that this supply must have been
almost, if not altogether, exhausted on January 1st.
On the 6th he consequently offered the poorer
people free permission to leave the place, and of
which many of them took advantage.
During the interval between then and the 25th
the state of the garrison became desperate from
want of food, for all the donkeys, dogs, cats, &c., had
been eaten. A small ration of grain had been issued
daily to the troops together with a sort of bread
made from pounded Palm-tree fibre ! Is it,
therefore, to be wondered that, on the night of the
25th as Colonel Kitchener further informs us:—
Many of the famished troops left their posts on the
THEIR WILD l)ATTLE-CkY. 295
fortifications in search of food in the town. Some of the
troops were also too weak from want of nourishment to go to
their posts. This state of things was known in the town and
caused some alarm. Many of the principal inhabitants armed
themselves and their slaves and went to the fortifications in
place of the soldiers.
We therefore believe that Gordon's illness and
exhaustion, together with the famine-stricken con
dition of his troops, afford substantial causes for the
failure of the telegraphists to warn him of the assault
on the fortifications by the Dervish hordes !
Hut, further, the suddenness of this unanticipated
assault may also be taken into account here. Father
Ohrwalder thus describes it :—
The moon had gone down, deep obscurity reigned ; and now
the Dervishes stealthily advanced in perfect silence towards
that portion of the defence which had been destroyed during
h'gh Nile, and, which, as the river recedtd, had left an open
space in which ditch and parapet had almost disappeared.
Here there was little to impede their entry, and the Dervishes,
shouting their wild battle cry, dashed over the open ground.
Colonel Kitchener states, in his report on the fall
of the town, that the assault of it took' place about
3.30 a.m. on the 26th. The principal points cf
attack were the Buri Gate at the extreme east end
cf the line of defence—that is, on the Blue Nile, and
the Mesalamia Gate, at the west end, abutting on
the White Nile.
The defence of the former post held out against
the attack, but at the White Nile end, he further
states :—
The rebels having filled the ditch with bundles of straw,
brushwood, beds, &c, brought up in their arms, penetrated
296 WHY COKDUX PERISHEl).
the fortification;. The (black troops) defenders of the Buri
Gate, seeing the rebels inside the works in the rear, retired
and left the town at the mercy of the rebels."
When the breach had been thus entered, the Der
vishes, according to Father Ohrwalder, broke up
into two parties, one of which dashed along the
parapet, breaking all resistance, and slaughtering
the soldiers in all directions. The inhabitants, roused
from their sleep by the din of rifle shots and the
shouts of the Arabs, hurried out, anticipating what
had occurred. Like a pent-up stream suddenly
released, over 50,000 wild Dervishes, with hideous
yells, rushed upon the inhabitants of Khartum, and
on the 5,000 soldiers left out of the 9,000 at the
commencement of the siege, their only cry being—
" To the church ! To the palace ! "
The sudden assault and what has been described
as subsequently having taken place, not only
accounts in large measure for the irregularity
alleged by Colonel Kitchener, which prevented
Gordon being warned of the entry of the Dervishes
into the town, but also the utter uselessness of any
such warning under the circumstances.
In view of Gordon's inability to check the move
ment of the Dervishes acrcss the Nile,' as he had
done in August, owing to the fall of Omdurman,
and the absence down the Nile of five of his
steamers, and of the famine-stricken condition of
his garrison, and the unrepaired breach in the
line of his land defences, we can come to no other
conelusion than that arrived at by Colonel Kitchener,
namely :—
WOLSELliY, NOT WILSON. 297
Khartum fell from sudden assault when the garrison west
loo exhausted by privations to make a proper resistance.
It was not, therefore, because Sir Charles Wilson
delayed two days at Gubat after Gordon's steamers
had put in an appearance there that Lord Wolseley's*
plan of operations for the relief of Kiiarturji had
failed, but, as we have endeavoured to point out,
because of his tenacious adherence to it when, as a
military man, he ought to have feared, from what
he had learned of Gordon's critical condition on
November, and at the end of December, that
Khartum might fall before that elaborate plan could
be carried out in all its particulars.
Gordon, in an entry in his journal on Novem
ber 8th, seems to have apprehended the manner in
which his appeals for speedy help were being
responded to when he thus expressed himself:—
If Lord Wolseley did say he hoped to relieve Khartum
before many months, he must have a wonderful confidence in
our powers of endurance, considering that when he is said to
have made this utterance we had been blockaded six and a half
months, and are now in our ninth month.*
From an A priori standpoint the above facts dis
prove the allegation made by Mr. Gladstone and by
other members of Her Majesty's Government, and
still held by many not acquainted with them, that
Khartum had fallen by internal treachery.
* In a telegram dated Khartum, March 13th, and received at Cairo
on April 19th, Gordon informed Baring that he was in this position :
—" We have provisions for five months and are hemmed in."
293 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
Colonel Kitchener, in his report on its fall, came to
the conelusion to which the above and other facts
led, that .—
The accusations of treachery have all been vague, and .ire (o
my mind the outcome of mere suspicion.
Referring to the irregularity of not using the
telegraphic communication between the forts on the
land line of defences and the palace to warn Gordon
of the attack, he holds Farag Pasha to some extent
responsible for it. This Pasha was also further
accused of opening the Mesalamia Gate to the
enemy and otherwise of having connived at the
entrance of the enemy. This, however, he remarks
was distinctively denied by a colonel who com
manded a battalions of irregulars in the town and
by thirty refugee soldiers who had escaped to
Dongola, and who had been examined by him in
preparing his report.
Hassan P-ey Bahnawassi, who commanded at the
Bab-Mesalamia Gate, so named, and which is
marked on our Sketch Map showing the defences,
was also accused of not having made a proper
defence there, and of having failed to warn General
Gordon of the danger in which the town was. It
was even said that he had taken a commission from
the Mahdi, and also that he was in receipt of money
from him.
The conelusion, nevertheless, to which Colonel
Kitchener arrived negativing the allegation of
treachery has been fully confirmed by subsequent
and fuller information obtained by the Egyptian
AN IMPORTANT WITNESS. 299
Army Intelligence Department and published by its
able Adjutant-General Major Wingate*
Perhaps the most valuable information thus
obtained was from the Emir Medawi, who took an
important part in the siege, assault, and capture of
Khartum. Having opposed the elaims made by
Abdullah Taash as Khalifa in succession to the
Mahdi, he became the object of his wrath and was
obliged to flee to Abyssinia. King John refused to
give him up and aided his escape to Cairo, where he
was pardoned by the Khedive.
When the Arabs had gained possession of that
part of the defences which had been injured by
the Nile, he stated, as Father Ohrwalder did,
that they " then pushed along the whole length
of the inside of the parapet, and met with
some resistance at various points ; while the
stream of them, still pouring in where the first
attack had been made, entered the town," adding
that—
Farag Pasha, who was at the Mcsalamia Gate, when he saw
that it was useless to fight—for by this time thousands of our
men were inside the lines—gave the order to his men to stop
firing, opened the gate, and surrendered. ... By that time
resistance was useless, for Nejumi's attack over the broken-
down part of the parapet had been quite successful, and
Khartum was in our hands. . . . Farag was made prisoner
and taken to the camp outside. Three days afterwards he
was killed by one of his old servants for something he had done
him a long time ago. He was not killed by the Mahdi, and he
* "Mahdism in the Egyptian Sudan," by Major F. R. Wingate,
D.S.O., R.A.
300 WHY CORDON PERISHED.
did not betray the town, nor open the Mesalamia Gate until
Khartum was actually in our hands.*
The charge against Hassan Bey Bahnawassi was
that, being in command of the regiment which held
that portion of the fortifications of Khartum
through which the enemy first entered, he
treacheously delivered up his post to the enemy.
On this main and two subsidiary charges he was
tried by court-martial at Cairo, which he had reached
after escaping from imprisonment at Khartum.
As Major Wingate observes, this court-martial
was not " an inquiry by generous officers into what
had been the conduct of a brother officer under
circumstances of extreme difficulty. Large sums of
money depended on the finding." "If the officers and
men who arrived daily from the Sudan had done
their duty, they were entitled to pensions and long
arrears of pay. Were treachery or neglect proved
against them they were entitled to nothing. The
officials of the Egyptian Finance Department who
took part in the inquiry were of themselves a safe
guard and an assurance against unfair dealing, and
that the matter should be thoroughly sifted."
Major Owen Quick, in summing up, stated the
prosecution had failed to produce one tittle of
evidence to prove one word of the charge against
* One of the witnesses at the Court Martial held at Cairo with
respect to the charge of treachery, &c, made against Hassan Bey
Bahnawassi, stated that the Arabs opened this gate after they had
entered the defences. This, we think, more likely, for it would
naturally be done in order to gire access to that part of their force
engaged at the Buri Gate.
NOT BY TREACHERY WITHIN. 30I
the prisoner. An ex-elerk of the Khartum treasury,
for instance, having stated in support of his alleged
treachery, that Hassan Bey received an allowance
from the Mahdi, the evidence for the defence con
elusively proved that, on the contrary, after he had
been made prisoner on the capture of Khartum he
had been beaten severely, and that his wives and
daughters had been taken as concubines by the
Mahdi and his officers. The court-martial honour
ably acquitted the prisoner of the treachery alleged
against him.
. Treachery, therefore, cannot, from the circum
stances under which Khartum fell and the sudden
and well-made assault by which it was captured, be
alleged to account for the catastrophe, and those who
were charged with it were found to be innocent of
the crime.
302
CHAPTER XXIII.
As another set off against the failure of the Nile
Expedition to relieve Khartum—that is too late to
effect this—it has, as \ve have seen, been alleged by
a Member of the Cabinet in the House of Lords,
that the place might, or indeed would, have fallen
through treachery on the approach of a British force,
even if it had been despatched for its relief at an
earlier date.
Immediately after Gordon's arrival at Khartum,
he informed Sir Evelyn Baring that he found two-
thirds of its people terrorised over by one-third ;
and evidently reasoning from the existing feeling
between the parties, and the influences under which
the latter were from the Mahdi's camp, he further
stated, that he must, therefore, " be aware that a
conspiracy up here is more to be feared than any
outward revolt." Others of his despatches show how
that any mutiny of his soldiers or treachery of their
officers might, at any moment, bring on a crisis fatal
to himself and his companions.
And yet knowing this—Her Majesty's Govern
ment, in face of such a peril which would likely be
increased by delay in sending the aid he asked for
—they did not move on his behalf until Khartum
was hemmed in by the Mahdi, and his garrison
A STRATEGICAL PLUNDER. 3Q3
reduced to the last extremity, and then turned round
and pleaded, as an excuse for their conduct, the
inevitable nature of a catastrophe which their own
neglect of duty had thus contributed to bring about !
They knew in April, by a telegram dated March
13th, that Gordon was then hemmed in. If the
danger from treachery to Gordon's safety then
existed in a latent form, the conditions of things
consequent upon his being hemmed in would
certainly develop it, and should led to more prompt
measures than were adopted to safeguard him
from it.
Lord Wolscley seemed to have had no fear of
danger from this source, else he would have made a
single march on Mutcmma, instead of a double one ;
for in the latter case the Mahdi and the alleged
traitors in the beleaguered town had, as has been
shown, fourteen days' notice of his advance across
the desert. All the evidence adduced already and
to follow, goes to assure us that if the Desert Column
had reached Mutemma on January 2nd, Khartum
would probably have been saved.
On December 31st, when Lord Wolseley had
received his last message from Gordon—despatched
from Khartum on the very day after which he had
been told it would be difficult to hold out—he might
have occupied Merawi because it threatened the
Berber road, but not another soldier nor a biscuit
should have been sent further up the Nile beyond
his base at Korti, until he had potentially joined
hands with Gordon
If camel transport was lacking, the whole or part
304 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
of the Desert Column, as we have further insisted,
should have been marched on foot in order to secure
this object.
That 31st of December marked an important, nay
final, crisis in the Expedition his Lordship com
manded, and every risk and sacrifice should have
been run and made in order to meet it successfully.
Late as it had been despatched, and delayed as it
had been by unforeseen obstaeles in its advance up
the Nile, it was now within measurable distance—as
regards both time and space—of Khartum, and not
an hour should have been lost by Lord Wolseley in
pushing on for its relief. All other mistakes made in
the conduct of the Expedition sink into insignificance
when compared with this final and fatal blunder.
In order to emphasise as well as confirm this
serious and important conelusion, we quote General
Sir William F. Butler's view of the position of affairs
at Khartum, as revealed to Lord Wolseley by,the
message sent to him by Gordon on December 14th,
and received at Korti by him on December 31st*:—
As for Khartum, closer than ever had been the cordon of
silence surrounding it. One little scrap—a postage stamp— on
which was written " All right," had come through the encircling
Arabs, but the messenger who had brought it had a different
story to tell by word of mouth.
Come quickly—come together—do not leave Derbcr behind
you ! These were the message words he carried, and his
own spoken testimony was still more pressing. Famine was
in Khartum—the Arabs knew it—there was not a moment to
be lost. This message—the last to leave the doomed city—
* "The Campaign on the Cataracts," pp. 2O4, 2S1.
BY THE DESERT TO THE RESCUE.30S
was dated 14th December. It was all that was needed to give
to the column, which was about to start across the desert,
the supreme interest of a forlorn hope.
I have said that but for one consideration there could have
been no hesitation between the routes to be followed from
Korti. That consideration was, however, all important. It was
time. The New Year had begun ; the date to which Khartum
could hold out had already been passed, and if the place
was to be succoured and Gordon saved, the attempt, cost what
it might, must be made across the 180 miles of desert, and not
by 400 miles of liver to Mutemma But that was
now past. Time had thrown his single weight into the scales,
and had over-balanced all other considerations. Across the
Bayuda Desert 1800 men on camels and 200 on horses must
try to get quickest touch with the steamers, even if all the
Arabs in the Sudan stood to bar the road between Korti and
Mutcmma.
We have already stated that the Mahdi was inelined
to raise the siege of Khartum, and return to
Kordofan, when he heard of the defeat of his troops
at Abu-Klea on January 20th, and, in fact, when he
had learned that the English army had reached the
Nile at Mutemma. The Emir Medawi, in his
statement to the Egyptian Army Intelligence
Department, already referred to, confirms this as
follows •—
When he . (the Mahdi) heard that the English were
approaching Mutcmma for the relief of Khartum he sent
a large force of fighting men, under Mussa Wad Helu and
Abu-Safia to attack them. A great battle took place at
Abu-Klea and another at Abu Kru, in which Nur Angara was
defeated, and at last the English reached Gubat, driving the
Arabs before them. The news of the defeat' at Abu-Klea
reached the Mahdi on the 20th January, and made a great
consternation in the camp. He at once ordered a salute of
X
306 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
101 guns to be fired, which is the signal for a victory, and by
which he thought to delude the garrison at Khartum.
The Mahdi was alarmed for his safety, and, after afternoon
prayers, he assembled a meeting of his Khalifas, and
favourite Emirs, and told them secretly that he had had
a vision in which the prophet told him that he should
make an hejira (or flight) to El Obeid. For, he argued, if
one Englishman, Gordon, has been able to command the
Sudanese and Egyptian soldiers, and keep us at bay for
almost a year, how much more w ill these thousands of English,
who have defeated our bravest men at Abu-Klea, be able
' to crush us and drive us away. He then asked his Khalifas
and Emirs for their advice. All agreed to the Mahdi's
wishes except Mohammed Abd-el-Kerim, who agreed that an
attempt should be made to attack Khartum. " For,1' he said,
" if we succeed and enter Khartum, then the English will not
dare to come on ; and if we fail, then we shall have time to
retreat." After this, several meetings were held. The Mahdi
had full information of every movement of the English ; the
delay on their advance gave us a fresh courage, and we knew
too, that the garrison in Khartum were in despair when, day
after day passed and the steamers did not come. If they had
come on at once, when we were all alarmed by the defeat of
Abu-Klea, the Mahdi might have carried out his hejira to the
south, but the delay strengthened Abd-cl-Kerim, and when on
Sunday, the 25th, a messenger arrived from Gubat with the
news that the steamers had started on the 24th, another
council was held, in which it was decided finally to accept
Abd-cl-Kerim's advice, and to attack Khartum the following
morning before the steamers should arrive. ... I had orders
to send some men down the river to harass the steamers as
they came. Fiki Mustapha's force also received orders to
proceed down the river, and everybody was warned to fire on
the steamer* when they appeared. Wc also received orders to
attack Tuti and Kasikh from Kubba at the same time as
Nejumi attacked from the south.
The next morning, about an hour-and-a-half after mid
night the force left Kala Kala under Wad en-N'cjumi. It
DATED KORTI, MARCH 6ni. 307
was divided in two parts : the advanced portion was to attack
the lines between the White Nile and the Mesalamia Gate,
which were known to have been partially destroyed by the
Nile, while the other part was to attack towards Huri ; but it
was decided that if the attack towards the White Nile- suc
ceeded, the second portion of the force, instead of attacking
Buri, was to follow in the track of the first portion of the force ;
and this is what happened. . . . The orders were to march
silently as possible till close up to the fortifications, and not to
attack until the soldiers fired from the lines. . . . The advance
continued quite silently till close up to the lines, for the ground
was soft and the men's feet bare ; at last the ditch was almost
reached, and when it was seen that it was partly filled up with
mud and the parapet broken down, the Arabs did not hesitate,
but shouting their war-cries dashed into the ditch and up the
parapet. Some shots were fired from the lines, but in a few
minutes it was all over ; the soldiers seeing the Arabs were on
them made little resistance ; some were killed, while others
escaped.
Let us now refer again to Lord Wolseley's
despatch to the Minister for War, dated Korti,
March 6th, in which he reported to him that in his
opinion there could be no longer a doubt bu.t that
the Mahdi's troops had taken possession of Khar
tum and killed General Gordon on January 26th.
After quoting that part of his instructions which
defined the scope and object of the military opera
tions to be undertaken by him, he stated that,
although they contained no direct reference to raising
the siege of Khartum, or the defeat of the Mahdi's
troops surrounding it, he always considered such
operations would be necessary before General
Gordon and his Egyptian garrison could safely bs
withdrawn. He then observes that, as the fall of
308 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
Khartum and General Gordon's death had left him
and his army without any defined mission to
accomplish in the Sudan, he had, therefore, in reply
to his request " for further instructions and a elearly-
defined exposition of the policy that Her Majesty's
Government intended to adopt under the altered
condition of affairs," been informed by them that his
immediate duty was " the protection of the Pro
vince of Dongola, and that, as soon as arrangements
could be completed, Her Majesty's Gdttfernmcnt had
determined to destroy the Mahdi s power at
Khartum in order that peace, order, and a settled
government might be established there."
After Khartum had fallen and Gordon had
perished, Her Majesty's Government, as it will
be observed, decided to do the very thing which
Gordon had urged them to do all along ! They
had sent him to report, as Mr. Gladstone told
Parliament, on the best methods of withdrawing the
endangered Egyptian garrisons and officials, but they
did not respond in one instance to the reports he
sent. The only part of those reports sent in messages
and telegrams to which they paid any attention at
all were those in which he spoke of his ability to hold
out. These were evidently the sources of hope that,
somehow or other, he would be able to do something
or other which would enable them to keep within the
bounds of the policy they had adopted, of absolute
non-interference in the Sudan. It was this that led
them to adopt the Nile route. This latter decision,
was not, as we have seen, adopted until they
had obtained a considerable amount of valuable
THE "THUNDERER" SPEAKS OUT. 309
information about the impediments to navigation
presented by its cataracts. The opinions of others
than Lord Wolscley were against this route, but
nevertheless, the latter scheme was adopted, and
with fatal consequences.
In fact, as the writer in the Times of February6th,
from whose artiele we have already quoted, very
correctly observed :—
The news of yesterday (that is of the fall of Khartum) has
a further meaning, and one which it is useless to disguise and
set aside.
The great principles of military science are almost absolute.
To violate them is to accept certain risk, and to leave far too
much to the chances of war.
The dangers involved in the adoption of the Nile route in
light boats were repeatedly stated, and this plan of advance
from the very first was opposed by many soldiers. Given
success, unquestioned and unqualified, the violation of all
rules may entail no dangers ; but once a check, even a slight
derangement of plans arise, all the evil results of a mistaken
policy at once assert themselves. Great commanders have
frequently abandoned their line of communications, but it has
been in order to assume another and a moie advantageous one.
When the first whaler reached Korti Lord Wolseley had
practically no communications—a telegraph line and a post
maintained by steam-launches, but no more. His whole force
was from henceforth en Pair, and, under any circumstances, the
position was, from a military point of view, unsatisfactory.
Yet an advance from Suakim to Berber would, as has been
pointed out, have given the force a line of communications
only 260 miles long, with a sea base of twenty days from
Portsmouth.
Admitting that the Nile route in whale boats was wise and
inevitable—the opening up of the Suakim route was its
necessary compliment weighed strongly with those who
advocated its adoption for the main advance.
3IO WHY GORDON rERISHED.
If you must inevitably operate on a certain line, the
argument for its primary adoption becomes particularly
strong ; more especially when measured by your distance
from your ships. This line, the Suakim-Berber, is nearly
one-fifth of the length of the alternate, or Nile route.
Possibly because of the reluctance to undertake any fighting
near Suakim—by far the best place to fight at—a nondescript
mode of advance was adopted, involving boats and camels.
The boats being trusted overmuch, and their rate of advance
being enormously over-estimated— it was only natural that
camels should be too few, and that the desert equipment should
be incomplete and inadequate.
To provide a large camel force would be to discredit the
boats from which so much was expected, and the Camel Corps
was, therefore, an adjunct and not a principal feature of the
scheme.
The time came a month ago (early in January) when the
two modes of advance must separate. The Camel Corps must
justify its presence, the boats must also, or be pronounced
a failure. Thus a force already en fair, and by no means too
strong, had to be divided, and no reserve practically remained.
These are the circumstances which have conferred upon the
news of the fall of Khartum a grave significance, and the
country should clearly understand the issues.
If Lord Wolseley were now at Berber, with every group
of wells occupied, and forming a strong link in a strong chain
of posts, the military position pure and simple would have
been entirely different. We might have been at Berber two
months ago and have finally crushed Osman Digma, and
at no greater sacrifice of life and expenditure than has already
been incurred.
How strange would the following paragraph in
Lord Wolseley's dispatch of March 6th, if written by-
anyone else appear ! It is, however, in perfect
harmony with what we have, after Von Moltke,
called a delusion. Khartum had fallen, Gordon
DEFEATED, YET CONGRATULATORY. 3 1 1
was killed, and the Nile Expedition had, therefore,
failed to attain its object. And yet, in view of
all this, and as if what happened was only one,
not of the fortunes, but the misfortunes of war, he
could thus express himself to the Minister of War :—
I take this opportunity of congratulating Her Majesty's
Government upon having adopted the Nile route as the line of
advance on Khartum. Had the Army been despatched from
Suakim as a base, and upon arrival at or near Berber learnt
that Khartum had fallen it could not possibly have transferred
its base to the Mediterranean, for it could not have been fed
under these circumstances in this part of the Nile Valley.
The province of Dongola would have been at the enemy's
mercy, and that portion of Egypt would have been open to
his attack.
As if condemning the route itself, and the manner
in which the Expedition had been conducted, he
adds the following pertinent observations :—
Recent events at Khartum have naturally added greatly to
Mohammed Achmed's influence and power, and have gone far
towards persuading many to believe in the truth of his sacred
pretensions. He occupies a very different position in the
Sudan now to that in which he found himself during the
three months when he was making frequent, but apparently
hopeless, efforts to take Khartum. He wields an almost
undisputed sway over the whole ol the Sudan, the Province
of Dongola, which we occupy, alone excepted. All classes
look up to him as a great conqueror, and a very holy man.
We, on the other hand, have no party here in our favour.
Then Lord Wolseley expresses the opinion that
all these circumstances must be considered in
planning a compaign next autumn for smashing
the Mahdi—that, in the meanwhile, Osman Digma's
312 WHY GORDON PERISHED.
power in the Eastern Sudan should be crushed as
a counterpoise to the Mahdi's'capture of Khartum.
Then, referring to the proposed Expedition under
General Graham to crush Osman, and construct a
4 ft. 8J in. railway from Suakim to Berber, as not
likely to be of any use in connection with an advance
on Khartum in the autumn, makes the following
suggestive observation :—
Had Berber beenjoined by a line of rail when the Madhifirst
took up arms against the Egyptian Government his poiuer
would long ago have been disposed of! I
And then, again, this :—
In the campaign before us the construction of this railway
even as far as Ariab, will, in case of necessity, secure us a
second and alternative line of communication by which
supplies may be obtained, and sick andjwounded taken to the
coast for embarkation.
Not to the Mediterranean, but to the Red Sea
coast, be it observed !
It is not necessary for us to criticise in detail the
grounds upon which Lord Wolseley complimented
Her Majesty's Government for having selected the
Nile route for the relief of Khartum and the rescue
of Gordon, because we have already shown them to
be fallacious and to have been proved to be so by
the Expedition sent by it failing to attain its object.
In view of that failure how could they congratulate
themselves in view of what had happened as a con
sequence of that choice } That they did, however,
was the case, for Lord Hartington, the Minister
of War, officially responsible for the choice of that
A COURAGEOUS WAR MINSTER. 3 13
route for the Expedition, when seconding the Vote
of Thanks to the Army in the House of Commons
on August 1 2th, 1885, said :—
The ascent of the Nile fora distance of 1,500 miles from what
was practically the base of the Expedition at Alexandria, by
means which had to be improvised for the occasion, and means
which depended altogether on the troops themselves for their
efficiency is, in my belief, a precedent altogether new in our
military annals. The conception of that operation will form a
new chapter in our military history. In my opinion great
credit is due to Lord Wolseley for the courage and self reliance
with which he formed the plan of that operation, and for the
manner in which he staked his great military reputation on the
success of measures which were hitherto untried, and of which
we had no knowledge.
General Von Molike, his Lordship further stated,
had given his enthusiastic approval of the plan of
the Expedition, by saying to his informant that " our
troops were heroes, not soldiers—that our British
cavalry had become infantry, our infantry turned
into sailors, and our sailors into mounted infantry."
Lord Hartington had, in our opinion, shown as
much courage as Lord Wolseley had shown, in lauding
the Nile Expedition, because of its disastrous failure,
and because the measures upon which it depended
for success were, as he admitted, " hitherto untried
and of which we had no knowledge."
We are not informed of any subsequent opinion
given by the great German strategist about the
Expedition. If he did so it must have been based
on the principle of war which we have already
quoted, and which we have shown Lord Wolselcy
violated in its conduct.
314 WHY GORDON rERISHED.
Our readers—or, as \ve may call them, our
empanelled jury—will, from the facts we have laid
before them in these pages, find the causes >vhich
combined to bring about our disasters in the Sudan.
The questions they are called upon to decide are :—
Who is responsible for not having rescued Gordon
from the sad but heroic end that befell him ?
Who stained the honour of England by the neglect
to do so ? And upon whom should rest the blood
of Hicks's army and of the garrisons which,
endangered by the policy pursued with respect to
the Sudan factor in the Egyptian Question, had
been recklessly left, by an adherence to it, to their
cruel fate ?
INDEX.
A.
AnAiiniF-s, 83
Abbas Island, 24
Alxl-cl-Kadir, 25, 26, 27, 69
Aboo- Haifa, 226
Abu-Dom, 225
Abu- 1 Limed, 41, 115
Aim K lea, 1 5, 226, 227
Abu- Keif, 25
Alexandria, 154
Ali Hi i t nil i, 24
Alleyne, Colonel, 142
Ambukol, 190
Argyle, Duke of, 182
Armenia, Upper, 6
Assouan, 138
Atbara, 155
B.
Bah-ei.-Kkhik, 1 19
Baggaras, 25
Bagos, 27
Baker, Consul, 123
Baker, General, 42, 60
Baker, Sir Samuel, 157
Baling, Sir E., 36, 41, 45, 4S,
49, 58, 60,61,65,89,96,302
Bayuda Desert, 245
Berber, 25, 54, 68, 72, 74, 73,
84, 113, 225
Bern ford, Lcrd Charles, 264,
2So
Bir-Karbai, 226
Bisharecn, 82
Brackcnbury, General, 18, 21
Duller, Sir Kedvcrs, 11S, 119,
I76, 222
Buller, SirW., 118, 160, 176,
C.
Cahul Candahar, 250
Cairo, 30, 40
Camel Corps, 229, 230, 235
Chancellor of the Exchequer,
'25
Chapman, Colonel, 250
Cherif I'asha, 35, 43
Chitral Expedition, 252
Chu-chill, Lord R , 102
Clarke, Colonel Stanley, 226
Coellogen, Colonel, 37, 69, 75
Colvile, Colonel, 18, 164, 167,
171, 172, 178, 202, 205, 235,
241
Cuui, Mr., 103
D.
Dai, 196
Darfur, 25
Debbeh, 138, 184, 195, 212,
*33
Denman, Lord, 182
316 INDEX.
Dacrt Columr, 204, 231, 246,
264, 277, 283
Dongola, 49, 103, 117, 137,
«39. *>3. *33
Duclcrc, 126
DuSerin, Lord, 36
E.
Eari.e, General, 221
Egcrton, Mr., Consul, 97, 100,
103, 107
El-Ghezircb, 40
El-Howciyat, 226
El-Kun, 226
El-Obeid, 25
El-Teb, 66
Emaum-Gbur, 251
Emir-Medawi, 299, 306
F.
Farag Pasha, 299
Faraj-Bey- Allah, 288
Feki-Mustapha, 264
Fowler, Sir John, 243
Freycinet, M., 1 26
G.
GALAnAT, 27
Geigler Pa- ha, 25
Getnai, 209
Gladstone, Mr., 2, 14, 102, 297
Gordon, Miss, 3
Graham General, 60, 62, 65, 68,
72, 81, 181, 246
Granville, Kail, II, 43, 82, 83,
93
Grove, Colonel, 180
H:
Haj-Ai.i, 40
Halfiyeh, 155, 265
Uamdab, 68
Hammill, Commander, 117
Hannek, 68, 195, 279
Hartington, Lord, 19, 62, 63,
112, 114, 133, 206, 312, 313
Hay, Admiral Sir John, 1 16, 135
Hewitt, Admiral Sir \V., 62, 64
Hibbch, 221
Hiclcs Tasha, 32, 33, 35, 36,
44. 46
Hussein- Hey- ISahnawassi, 300
Hussein Khalifa Pasha, 39, 82,
84
I.
Iddesleigh, Eakl of, 12
J-
JAKDUL, I54, l66,?'226, 231,
257
James, Mr. W., 156, 157
Jebel Gadic, 25
K.
Kababisii, 25, 232
Kassala, 155. 156
Kiwa, 2$
Khandak, 233
Khedive, Tne la'.e, 6, 45, 47,
&&
Kitchener, 77, 104, 107, 121,
263, 293, 295
Kordofan, 27, 30, 31, 35, 44
Korosk-> Desert, 1 15
Knrko, 25
INDEX. 317
M.
IfAHDI, 23, 25, 26, 39, 71, ic.
Malet, Sit E , Jl, 33, 34, 35.
36
Massowah, 103, 113, 138, 154,
158
Maurice, Lieut. -Colonel, 1 16
McNeill, General, 11S, 176
Merawi, 118, 119, >5>. 3°3
Mesalamia Gate, 25
Moltke, General Von, 199
Morley, Earl of, 1 82
Mudir of Dongola, 233
Mutemma, 197, 205, 226, 239
N.
Napier, of Macdala, Lord,
77. «5»
Nile, 23, 74, 111, 213
Northbrook, Lord, 254
Nubar Pasha, 43, 83
Nusri Pa> ha, 271
0.
O-Bak, 167
Ohrwalder Father, 39, 40, 265,
284, 285
Omdurman, 264, 2S3, 287
Otman Digma, 39, 63, 66, 67,
75
P.
Power, Mr , 112
Prince of Wales, 1, 2
Q.
Queen, Her Majesty the, 3
Quick, Major, 300
R.
KAllAT, 155
Raouf Pasha, 23
Red River Expedition, 152
Red Sea, 23
Roberts, General Lord, 250,
*5 1
Royal Irish, 244, 246, 255
S.
Saini, 226
Salisbury, Lord, 20
Sanheit, 156
Sarkamatto, 224
Sarras, 1 19, 224
Semneh, 117
Sennar, 25, 37, 155, 156
Shablookah Cataract, 271
Shagie, 49
Shaw, Colonel, 245
Sheik El-Obeid, 285
Shendy, 71, 155
Shukuriyehs, 25
Stanley, H. M., 77
Stewart, Sir Herbert, 218, 339,
&c
Stuart-Won ley, Li :u tenant, 2f 1
Sinkat, 61, 155
Suakim, 41, 59, 61, 62, 63, 74,
"3
Sudan, 41, &c
Suleiman Pasha Niaza, 30
Suleiman-Wad-Gam r, 4 1
3'8 INDEX.
T.
Tamkuk, 68
Tebel-el-Soped, 226
Tel-el-Kebir, 22
Times, The, 15, 309
Tokar, 61, 65, 66, 70
Trinkikat, 65. 66
Tuti Island, 274
Tweedale, Lord, I
W.
Wady-Halfa, 113, 119, 154
Watson, Colonel, C. W., 75,
161, 283
Webber, Colonel, 240
Wilson, Colonel Mildmay, 246
Wilson, General Sir C W., 109,
203, 217, 259, 28 1, 303
Wolseley, Lord, 109, 112, 114,
11S, I47, >8s. 189, 193, 197,
205, 283, 311
Wood, General Sir E., 37, 4*,
72, 192, 195, 249
Wylde, Mr., 162, 163, 167
Z.
Zebehr Pasha, 42, 49, 50,
54. 55. 56, 57. 70, 95
PRINTED BY \VY.MAN AND SONS, LIMITED, GREAT QUEEN ST.,
LONDON, W.C.
I
*
The borrower must return this item on or before M
the last date stamped below. If another user I
places a recall for this item, the borrower will I
be notified of the need for an earlier return.
Non-receipt ofoverdue notices does not exempt
the borrowerfrom overduefines.
Harvard College Widener Library
Cambridge, MA 02138 617-495-2413
> rji^oT3O20OBb
GAMQgH"1""..*'
Please handle with care.
Thank you for helping to preserve
library collections at Harvard.
^3 3