why iran should get a bomb waltz

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j u l y / a u g u s t 2 o 1 2

Volume 91 Number 4

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Why Iran Should Get the Bomb

Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability

Kenneth N. Waltz


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Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability

Kenneth N. Waltz

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Kenneth N . Waltz is Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Instituteof War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at

Columbia University.

The past several months have witnesseda heated debate over the best way for the

United States and Israel to respond toIrans nuclear activities. As the argumenthas raged, the United States has tight-ened its already robust sanctions regimeagainst the Islamic Republic, and theEuropean Union announced in Januarythat it will begin an embargo on Iranianoil on July 1. Although the United States,the eu, and Iran have recently returnedto the negotiating table, a palpable senseof crisis still looms.

It should not. Most U.S., European, andIsraeli commentators and policymakerswarn that a nuclear-armed Iran would bethe worst possible outcome of the currentstando. In fact, it would probably be thebest possible result: the one most likelyto restore stability to the Middle East.

POWER BEGS TO BE BALANCED

The crisis over Irans nuclear programcould end in three dierent ways. First,diplomacy coupled with serious sanctionscould convince Iran to abandon its pursuit

of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome isunlikely: the historical record indicates

that a country bent on acquiring nuclearweapons can rarely be dissuaded fromdoing so. Punishing a state througheconomic sanctions does not inexorablyderail its nuclear program. Take NorthKorea, which succeeded in buildingits weapons despite countless roundsof sanctions and un Security Councilresolutions. If Tehran determines that itssecurity depends on possessing nuclearweapons, sanctions are unlikely to changeits mind. In fact, adding still moresanctions now could make Iran feeleven more vulnerable, giving it stillmore reason to seek the protection ofthe ultimate deterrent.

The second possible outcome is thatIran stops short of testing a nuclear weaponbut develops a breakout capability, the

capacity to build and test one quite quickly.Iran would not be the rst country toacquire a sophisticated nuclear programwithout building an actual bomb. Japan,for instance, maintains a vast civilian


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begun to develop a nuclear weapon ofits own. Yet so far, every time anothercountry has managed to shoulder its wayinto the nuclear club, the other membershave always changed tack and decided to

live with it. In fact, by reducing imbalancesin military power, new nuclear statesgenerally produce more regional andinternational stability, not less.

Israels regional nuclear monopoly,which has proved remarkably durablefor the past four decades, has long fueledinstability in the Middle East. In noother region of the world does a lone,

unchecked nuclear state exist. It is Israelsnuclear arsenal, not Irans desire for one,that has contributed most to the currentcrisis. Power, after all, begs to be balanced.What is surprising about the Israeli caseis that it has taken so long for a potentialbalancer to emerge.

Of course, it is easy to understand whyIsrael wants to remain the sole nuclearpower in the region and why it is willingto use force to secure that status. In 1981,Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challengeto its nuclear monopoly. It did the sameto Syria in 2007 and is now consideringsimilar action against Iran. But the veryacts that have allowed Israel to maintainits nuclear edge in the short term haveprolonged an imbalance that is unsustain-able in the long term. Israels proven ability

to strike potential nuclear rivals withimpunity has inevitably made its enemiesanxious to develop the means to preventIsrael from doing so again. In this way,the current tensions are best viewed notas the early stages of a relatively recentIranian nuclear crisis but rather as the nalstages of a decades-long Middle Eastnuclear crisis that will end only when a

balance of military power is restored.

nuclear infrastructure. Experts believethat it could produce a nuclear weaponon short notice.

Such a breakout capability might satisfythe domestic political needs of Irans

rulers by assuring hard-liners that theycan enjoy all the benets of having abomb (such as greater security) withoutthe downsides (such as internationalisolation and condemnation). The prob-lem is that a breakout capability mightnot work as intended.

The United States and its Europeanallies are primarily concerned with

weaponization, so they might accept ascenario in which Iran stops short ofa nuclear weapon. Israel, however, hasmade it clear that it views a signicantIranian enrichment capacity alone as anunacceptable threat. It is possible, then,that a veriable commitment from Iranto stop short of a weapon could appeasemajor Western powers but leave the Israelisunsatised. Israel would be less intimi-dated by a virtual nuclear weapon thanit would be by an actual one and thereforewould likely continue its risky eorts atsubverting Irans nuclear program throughsabotage and assassinationwhich couldlead Iran to conclude that a breakoutcapability is an insucient deterrent, afterall, and that only weaponization canprovide it with the security it seeks.

The third possible outcome of thestando is that Iran continues its currentcourse and publicly goes nuclear by testinga weapon. U.S. and Israeli ocials havedeclared that outcome unacceptable,arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquelyterrifying prospect, even an existentialthreat. Such language is typical of majorpowers, which have historically gotten

riled up whenever another country has


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Kenneth N. Waltz

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do so after the eu announced its plannedoil embargo in January. The Iranian regimeclearly concluded that it did not want toprovoke what would surely have been aswift and devastating American response

to such a move.Nevertheless, even some observers and

policymakers who accept that the Iranianregime is rational still worry that a nuclearweapon would embolden it, providingTehran with a shield that would allowit to act more aggressively and increaseits support for terrorism. Some analystseven fear that Iran would directly provide

terrorists with nuclear arms. The problemwith these concerns is that they contradictthe record of every other nuclear weaponsstate going back to 1945. History showsthat when countries acquire the bomb, theyfeel increasingly vulnerable and becomeacutely aware that their nuclear weaponsmake them a potential target in the eyes ofmajor powers. This awareness discouragesnuclear states from bold and aggressiveaction. Maoist China, for example, becamemuch less bellicose after acquiring nuclearweapons in 1964, and India and Pakistanhave both become more cautious sincegoing nuclear. There is little reason tobelieve Iran would break this mold.

As for the risk of a hando to terrorists,no country could transfer nuclear weaponswithout running a high risk of being found

out. U.S. surveillance capabilities wouldpose a serious obstacle, as would the UnitedStates impressive and growing abilityto identify the source of ssile material.Moreover, countries can never entirelycontrol or even predict the behavior ofthe terrorist groups they sponsor. Oncea country such as Iran acquires a nuclearcapability, it will have every reason to

maintain full control over its arsenal.

UNFOUNDE D FEARS

One reason the danger of a nuclear Iranhas been grossly exaggerated is that thedebate surrounding it has been distorted

by misplaced worries and fundamentalmisunderstandings of how states generallybehave in the international system. Therst prominent concern, which undergirdsmany others, is that the Iranian regime isinnately irrational. Despite a widespreadbelief to the contrary, Iranian policy ismade not by mad mullahs but by perfectlysane ayatollahs who want to survive just

like any other leaders. Although Iransleaders indulge in inammatory andhateful rhetoric, they show no propensityfor self-destruction. It would be a graveerror for policymakers in the UnitedStates and Israel to assume otherwise.

Yet that is precisely what many U.S.and Israeli ocials and analysts havedone. Portraying Iran as irrational hasallowed them to argue that the logic ofnuclear deterrence does not apply tothe Islamic Republic. If Iran acquired anuclear weapon, they warn, it would nothesitate to use it in a rst strike againstIsrael, even though doing so would invitemassive retaliation and risk destroyingeverything the Iranian regime holds dear.

Although it is impossible to be certainof Iranian intentions, it is far more likely

that if Iran desires nuclear weapons, itis for the purpose of providing for itsown security, not to improve its oensivecapabilities (or destroy itself ). Iran maybe intransigent at the negotiating tableand deant in the face of sanctions, butit still acts to secure its own preservation.Irans leaders did not, for example, attemptto close the Strait of Hormuz despite

issuing blustery warnings that they might


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states. Once Iran crosses the nuclearthreshold, deterrence will apply, even ifthe Iranian arsenal is relatively small.No other country in the region will havean incentive to acquire its own nuclear

capability, and the current crisis willnally dissipate, leading to a MiddleEast that is more stable than it is today.

For that reason, the United Statesand its allies need not take such painsto prevent the Iranians from developinga nuclear weapon. Diplomacy betweenIran and the major powers should continue,because open lines of communication

will make the Western countries feelbetter able to live with a nuclear Iran.But the current sanctions on Iran canbe dropped: they primarily harm ordi-nary Iranians, with little purpose.

Most important, policymakers andcitizens in the Arab world, Europe,Israel, and the United States shouldtake comfort from the fact that historyhas shown that where nuclear capabilitiesemerge, so, too, does stability. When itcomes to nuclear weapons, now as ever,more may be better.

After all, building a bomb is costly anddangerous. It would make little sense totransfer the product of that investment toparties that cannot be trusted or managed.

Another oft-touted worry is that if

Iran obtains the bomb, other states in theregion will follow suit, leading to a nucleararms race in the Middle East. But thenuclear age is now almost 70 years old, andso far, fears of proliferation have provedto be unfounded. Properly dened, theterm proliferation means a rapid anduncontrolled spread. Nothing like thathas occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has

been a marked slowdown in the emergenceof nuclear states. There is no reason toexpect that this pattern will change now.Should Iran become the second MiddleEastern nuclear power since 1945, it wouldhardly signal the start of a landslide. WhenIsrael acquired the bomb in the 1960s, itwas at war with many of its neighbors.Its nuclear arms were a much bigger threatto the Arab world than Irans program istoday. If an atomic Israel did not triggeran arms race then, there is no reason anuclear Iran should now.

REST ASSURED

In 1991, the historical rivals India andPakistan signed a treaty agreeing notto target each others nuclear facilities.They realized that far more worrisome

than their adversarys nuclear deterrentwas the instability produced by challengesto it. Since then, even in the face of hightensions and risky provocations, the twocountries have kept the peace. Israel andIran would do well to consider thisprecedent. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel andIran will deter each other, as nuclear powersalways have. There has never been a

full-scale war between two nuclear-armed

why iran should get a bomb waltz

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