why is europe peaceful today - john mearsheimer [eps]

ECPR KEYNOTE LECTURE

why is europe peaceful today?john j. mearsheimerPolitical Science Department, University of Chicago 5828, S. University AvenueChicago, IL 60637E-mail: [email protected]

doi:10.1057/eps.2010.24

AbstractThis talk attempts to explain Europe’s peacefulness since the Berlin Wallfell. The core argument is that this tranquility is mainly because of Europe’srelationship with the United States, which has changed little since the ColdWar ended. America continues to act as Europe’s pacifier by keepingsubstantial military forces in the region. Moreover, many Europeancountries have been helping the United States police the globe, whichfocuses their attention outward, not on each other.

Keywords American pacifier; NATO; peace in Europe; Francis Fukuyama

I would like to thank Mick Cox for hiskind introduction and for inviting meto give the keynote address to the

ECPR. I would also like to thank all of youfor coming out tonight to hear me speak.As you know, we are about to celebratethe twentieth anniversary of the fall of theBerlin Wall, one of the most momentousevents in modern history.Much has happened since then, includ-

ing the dire economic crisis that we arenow experiencing. It promises to have far-reaching effects on European life. Never-theless, I think that the most importantdevelopment of the past two decades isthe fact that Europe remains at peace.Of course, there were a handful of small

wars in the Balkans during the 1990s, butthe major European powers did not startthem, did not exploit them for nationalgain, and with the help of the UnitedStates ultimately managed to shut themdown. Very importantly there has been no

war between any of the major powers.Indeed, there has been little securitycompetition among them.

Given Europe’s tumultuous history, thisis quite remarkable. Remember that from1900 to 1990 Europe was the site of twoof the deadliest wars in recorded historyfollowed by the Cold War. The broadsweep of European history certainly looksvery different from the past two decades.

What explains this recent shift fromconflict to peace? Why has Europe beenso peaceful since 1989? That is the ques-tion that I would like to try to answertonight. Some might think that this is notan interesting issue, because it is obviousthat war has been burned out of Europeand that situation is simply not going tochange. I would not bet on that proposi-tion. Nothing is forever in internationalpolitics and it behooves all of us to under-stand how we got where we are so we canknow what the future might hold for us.

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Let me now turn to the question athand. One might say that the answer issimple: the Soviet Union collapsed andabsent that threatening superpower,the remaining states in Europe no longerhave to worry about their security. Theproblem with that argument is thatdangerous European states have beendefanged before – think about NapoleonicFrance, Imperial Germany, and NaziGermany – but afterwards the majorpowers still found ways to compete andsometimes fight with each other. So Idon’t think the fall of the Soviet Union canaccount for Europe’s peacefulness.I believe that the explanation lies in

Europe’s relationship with the UnitedStates, which has changed surprisinglylittle since the Cold War ended. Indeed,one might argue that the trans-Atlanticrelationship has grown stronger sincethe fall of the Berlin Wall.This relationship has two dimensions

that foster peace. First, America hascontinued to serve as Europe’s pacifierby maintaining a significant military pre-sence on the continent and keepingNATO intact. Second, most Europeanshave not only welcomed America’s con-tinued presence in their midst, but theyhave largely accepted the idea that theUnited States has a moral and strategicresponsibility to run the world. In fact,the Europeans – especially the British –have even been willing to help the UnitedStates police certain areas of the globe,which effectively means that Europe’smajor powers have been too busy worry-ing about threats in Central Asia and theMiddle East to have much time to worryabout each other.Let me expand on each of these points

starting with America’s role as Europe’spacifier.When the Cold War ended and the

Soviet Union moved its troops out ofEastern Europe, I predicted that theUnited States would follow suit and exitWestern Europe, which would lead to

security competition among Europe’smajor powers (Mearsheimer, 1990a, b).But the United States did not leaveEurope and it did not allow NATO toexpire. Instead, it kept its military forcesin Europe, albeit at lower levels thanduring the Cold War, and it moved NATOeastward, so that it now includes all ofthe countries in Eastern Europe thatwere once important members of theWarsaw Pact: the Czech Republic, EastGermany, Poland, and Slovakia. In fact,some states that are now in NATO –Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – wereonce part of the Soviet Union itself.

America’s decision to stay in Europeand continue to run NATOmuch the way itdid during the Cold War has done a greatdeal to facilitate stability in Europe. Thereason is simple: the United States is byfar the most powerful country in the worldand it effectively acts as a night watch-man. Its presence on this continentmeans that there is little chance thatany two states in NATO will fight againsteach other, simply because the UnitedStates would not tolerate it. This meansthat France and Germany can live peace-fully together and not have to worry aboutthe balance of power between them, asthey had to do for much of their history.Given that NATO has expanded far to theeast, this means that a huge swath ofEurope has been pacified by Uncle Sam’spresence.

The United States enhances Europeanstability in another important way. Itextends its security umbrella over all ofthe states in NATO, which means thatcountries like Germany and Poland do nothave to worry much about a possiblethreat from non-NATO countries likeRussia. Very importantly, Germany, which

‘Why has Europebeen so peaceful

since 1989?’

european political science: 9 2010 why is europe peaceful today?388

has no nuclear arsenal of its own, doesnot have to worry about Russia’s nuclearweapons, because America’s nuclearumbrella covers Germany. In short, theUnited States not only protects NATOcountries from each other, it protectsthem from serious threats that mightcome from outside of NATO.I am sure that some of you do not find

my argument convincing and insteadthink that there is no serious chance ofwar in Europe and thus there is no needfor the United States to maintain itscontinental commitment. The truth isthat we cannot know whether you areright or I am right until US troops arepulled completely out of Europe and NATOis disbanded. If Europe remains at peaceafter an American withdrawal, you willbe proved right. But if serious securitycompetition breaks out, I will be provedright.I would note, however, that most of

your leaders think that it makes emi-nently good sense to maintain a signifi-cant American military presence inEurope. No European leader over the pasttwo decades has uttered the words:‘Yankee, go home!’ And there is noindication that is likely to happen anytimesoon. Even the Russians want the UnitedStates to stay in Europe and to maintainNATO, in good part because they do notwant to see Germany provide for its ownsecurity. What the Russians don’t like isNATO expanding up to their borders,which is certainly understandable fromtheir perspective.Why is there so much interest in keep-

ing the United States militarily engaged inEurope? Because most Europeans – andAmericans for that matter – think thatthe world’s remaining superpower playsthe key role in keeping the peace inEurope. Take away that Leviathan andthere is likely to be big trouble. Other-wise, why keep American troops here?There is a second reason why Europe is

peaceful and it has to do with how Europe

and the United States think and acttoward other areas of the world. MostAmericans believe that their country hasboth a moral and strategic responsibilityto intervene in the daily life of countriesall around the globe. And they are some-times willing to use military force toachieve their ends.

This kind of thinking is not just foundamong neoconservatives and Republi-cans; it is widespread among Democratsas well. Remember, it was Secretary ofState Madeleine Albright, a Democrat,who said: ‘If we have to use force, it isbecause we are America. We are theindispensable nation. We stand tall.We see further into the future’. And itwas Madeleine Albright who remarkedto Colin Powell, when he was Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘What’s thepoint of having this superb military thatyou’re always talking about if we can’tuse it?’ And don’t forget that many liberalDemocrats supported the Iraq war;indeed, none of Barack Obama’s principalforeign policy advisors opposed thedecision to invade Iraq in March 2003.

Given Europe’s bitter experiences withcolonialism in the latter half of thetwentieth century, one would think thatmost Europeans would be opposed toAmerica’s imperial mission. While I wouldthink that many of you share that senti-ment, most of your leaders do not. Theyseem willing to act as America’s juniorpartner in trying to run the world. Britain,of course, is the best example of this kindof behavior. Consider that the United

‘In short, the UnitedStates not only protects

NATO countries fromeach other, it protects

them from seriousthreats that might comefrom outside of NATO.’

john j. mearsheimer european political science: 9 2010 389

States has started or intervened in fivewars since the Cold War ended – Iraq(1991), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999),Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003).Britain has fought side-by-side with theUnited States in each of those conflicts.But it is not just Britain that supports

America’s ambitious foreign policy. NATO,after all, is concerned with fashioningitself so that it can fight ‘out of area’,which it is doing in Afghanistan. In fact,there are troops from twenty-eight NATOcountries in Afghanistan. And when theUnited States invaded Iraq in March2003, it took along a ‘coalition of thewilling’ that included Britain, Denmark,Poland, and Spain. Within a year afterthe invasion began, small contingents oftroops were sent to Iraq by the CzechRepublic, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, andRomania – all NATO members. Then inDecember 2004, NATO set up a trainingmission in Iraq.One might challenge this line of argu-

ment by noting that two of Europe’sheavyweights, France and Germany,opposed the Iraq war and have not senttroops there. While that is true, it is notbecause Berlin and Paris were opposedto meddling in Iraq’s affairs. Instead,French and German leaders felt thatwar made no sense in the late winterof 2003 because Saddam Hussein hadallowed UN weapons inspectors into Iraqand there were good reasons to thinkthat the inspectors were capable ofdetermining whether or not Iraq hadWMD – which was supposed to be thecritical issue at the time. The French – asmany of you remember – were willing togo to war with Iraq if the inspectorsdiscovered WMD and Saddam refused tosurrender them. Germany probably wouldnot have joined the war in that case, but itsurely would not have tried to stop it.Germany, however, has sent troops to

Afghanistan, although they have stayedaway from the heavy fighting there.

Nevertheless, the German military hasrecently become embroiled in a contro-versy in Afghanistan that indicates theextent to which even the Germans havebeen willing to support America’s liberalimperial agenda. One week ago, theGerman army called in air strikes on twofuel trucks that were hijacked by theTaliban. The bombing attacks, which werecarried out by American planes, killedsomewhere between 70 and 130 people,including many civilians. This attack,which was hardly the first of its kind,has caused serious problems for NATOwith the Afghani people and their leaders.

It has also caused trouble inside thealliance. The Wall Street Journal reportedthis past Monday (8 September) that:‘A US-German rift over a deadly airstrikein Afghanistan y escalated, as US com-manders accused the German militaryof undermining guidelines that seek toavoid civilian casualties. US militaryofficials questioned why the Germanarmy had called in an airstrike whenGerman troops weren’t under fire frominsurgents, as well as German forces’intelligence that led them to thinkcivilians wouldn’t be hurt’ (Walker et al,2009).

What is remarkable about this situationis that it is the German military – notthe American military –that is under firefor using air power carelessly and killinglarge numbers of civilians. The UnitedStates, after all, is usually the culpritwhen incidents of this sort occur. AndAmerican aircraft did carry out thebombing attack for the Germans. Allof this goes to show the extent to whichGermany and the United States areworking together to shape daily life inAfghanistan.

There are other cases – especially inthe Middle East – where Europe and theUnited States have been working jointlyto deal with potential trouble. For exam-ple, Britain, France, and Germany have allbeen staunchly supporting Washington’s


campaign to prevent Iran from acquiringthe capability to enrich uranium, eventhough Tehran has the right to do so asa signatory of the NPT – provided, ofcourse, that it does not produce weaponsgrade uranium.Moreover, where there were once sig-

nificant differences between Europeand the United States over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there is no longermuch difference between how Americanand European leaders deal with thatconflict. Leaders on both sides of theAtlantic praise the two-state solution,urge Israel to stop building settlements,condemn Palestinian terrorism, and sidewith Israel when it gets in a shooting warwith the Arabs. This is not to deny that theEuropeans occasionally level criticisms atIsrael, but so does the United States.European leaders, however, are unwillingto get tough with Israel; instead theyfollow America’s lead when dealing withthe Israelis and the Palestinians, just asthey do when dealing with other trouble-spots around the globe.What is going on here? Why are Eur-

opean leaders willing to act as America’sjunior partner in running the world?Why has Europe bought into America’sliberal imperial mission?Obviously, the long experience of the

Cold War helped Europe and the UnitedStates learn to work closely together,and it helped the Europeans learn howto follow America’s lead on securitymatters broadly defined. Nevertheless,there is something more profound goingon here. Europe, I would argue, has beenAmericanized over the past 65 years. Letme explain.There is a rich scholarly literature in the

United States on what is called ‘Americanexceptionalism’. Probably the mostfamous book of that genre is The LiberalTradition in America by Louis Hartz, whichwas originally published in 1955 (Hartz,1955). He argues that what makesAmerica special is that it has been

a thoroughly liberal country since itsfounding. It was born liberal because itdid not have a feudal tradition like Europe– which meant that America had no realleft and no real right. Communism andfascism never stood a chance in theUnited States, not just because it was soliberal, but also because that liberalismwas profoundly intolerant of other politi-cal ideologies. Europe, Hartz argued, wasfundamentally different; because it had afeudal past, it had a real left and right.

While that description of Europe’s poli-tical spectrum was true for most of itshistory, it is not true anymore. The right –in its fascist form – suffered an egregiousset of defeats during WWII, and thenduring the Cold War, Portugal and Spainwent from being right-wing dictatorshipsto democracies. The left, on the otherhand, suffered a devastating defeat whencommunism collapsed in 1989, althoughthat particular ideology had lost much ofits appeal before the Berlin Wall fell. Inpractice, this meant that the communistparties in Western Europe had no future,at least as real communist parties. And, ofcourse, the former communist countriesin Eastern Europe desperately wanted tobecome liberal democracies like theirneighbors to the west.

In effect, there was no viable alterna-tive to liberal democracy in Europeafter the Cold War. Hartz’s description ofAmerica now applied to Europe.

These new circumstances are reflectedin Francis Fukuyama’s famous 1989article on ‘The End of History’, in whichhe argued that liberal democracy hadtriumphed over fascism in the first halfof the twentieth century and communismin the second half of the twentieth centuryand that liberal democracy no longerfaced a serious ideological challenger(Fukuyama, 1989). To quote Fukuyama,‘What we may be witnessing is not justthe end of the Cold War, or the passing ofa particular period of postwar history, butthe end of history as such: that is, the end


point of mankind’s ideological evolutionand the universalization of Western liberaldemocracy as the final form of humangovernment.’Fukuyama was careful to argue that

liberal democracy had not yet triumphedin every area of the world. He wrote, forexample, ‘Clearly, the vast bulk of theThird World remains very much mired inhistory, and will be a terrain of conflict formany years to come’. But he was clearthat liberal democracy had triumphed inWestern Europe, and, of course, it hadalways been the reigning ideology inthe United States. Fukuyama’s articlecertainly came in for a lot of criticism,but I do not know of anybody whoseriously argued that he was wrong aboutthe triumph of liberal democracy inWestern Europe.This triumph had two important con-

sequences for Europe. First, it facilitatedtrans-Atlantic cooperation in Europe itselfas well as in other regions of the world.The United States and Europe now spokethe same political language and tendedto see the wider world in similar terms,all of which made it easier for them tocooperate with each other in joint endea-vors. Birds of a feather stick together.Second, many Europeans came to sharethe triumphalism of Fukuyama, althoughthey were certainly more modest withtheir rhetoric than the Americans, whoseem to never miss an opportunity tobrag about their superior virtues. Still,there is little doubt that the Europeanslooked at what they had built in the45 years since World War II and con-cluded – with considerable confidence –that they had found the magic formula.Of course, the obvious next step was to

make Eastern Europe look like WesternEurope, which is why both the EU andNATO have expanded eastward over thepast 20 years. The aim was to create acommon European home. It did nottake long, however, before this line ofthinking led many Europeans to push for

promoting liberal democracy in regionsoutside of Europe. After all, if you havethe magic formula, why not share itwidely and make other areas of the worldprosperous and peaceful like Europe.However, once you start thinking in thoseterms, you are out on that slippery slopethat leads to liberal imperialism.

For sure, Europeans were more reluc-tant than Americans to embrace theimperial mission, and they were muchmore wary than their friends from theNew World about using military force tospread liberal democracy. The Europeanshave a rich history of telling non-Europeans how to run their lives – and itwas not for the most part a happy story.Moreover, the Europeans do not havemuch power projection capability, so theywere in no position to spread liberaldemocracy at the end of a rifle barrel. Inthe end, however, those considerationsdid not matter much because Europecould follow America’s lead and Washingtonwould not ask them to do much fightingand dying. Europe would be America’sjunior partner as they worked together tospread liberal democracy into conflict-ridden regions like Central Asia and theMiddle East.

The most important consequence ofthis implicit bargain to do large-scalesocial engineering with the Americansis that the Europeans got themselvesinvolved in brutal and unwinnable warsin Afghanistan and Iraq. Fortunately foryou, your leaders have had the good

‘After all, if you havethe magic formula, whynot share it widely and

make other areas ofthe world prosperous

and peaceful likeEurope.’


sense to get out of Iraq almost comple-tely. But unfortunately for you, Europeantroops are still stuck in Afghanistan, ina war that shows no signs of endinganytime soon.One benefit of Europe’s decision to

fight in Afghanistan and Iraq – and thereare hardly any – is that the countriesof Europe have been so pre-occupiedwith fighting insurgents abroad thatthey have had hardly any time to worryabout each other. In other words, whenit comes to thinking about security,Europeans look outward not inward.In a perverse way, that situation facil-itates peace in Europe. At the sametime, America’s campaign to make theworld safe for liberal democracy has notled to a weakening of its commitmentto Europe, which means that the Amer-ican pacifier – which is the main causeof peace in Europe – remains firmly inplace. Not surprisingly, Europe hasenjoyed unprecedented peace over thepast 20 years.There are naturally alternative explana-

tions for why post-Cold War Europe hasbeen so peaceful. Let me briefly considerwhat I think are the three main competi-tors to my story.First, there is the claim that the absence

of serious conflict is because of the factthat the EU has helped to transform howEuropeans think about their identity. MostEuropeans, so the argument goes, haveleft behind their national identities andadopted instead a European identity. Inother words, they think of themselves asEuropeans, not as Italians or Germans.This new identity naturally has an effecton how the countries in the EU thinkabout their interests. Europeans tendnot to think in terms of that old-fashionedconcept we call the national interest.Instead, they emphasize what is goodfor Europe as a whole, and downplay whatmight be best for their individual coun-tries. In effect, Europe has been turnedinto one big family where there are spats

for sure, but family members do notcountenance killing each other.

Survey data show that this explanationcannot be true, because a clear majorityof Europeans have not abandoned theirnational identities in favor of a Europeanone. This is clear from examining Euro-barometer data for the past 20 years.The surveys ask the question: In thefuture, do you see yourself as Europeanonly, European plus your nationality,your nationality only, or your nationalityplus European. Let’s consider theresponses for Britain, France, Germany,and Italy. I will use the data for 2004,which is similar to the data for every otheryear since the Cold War ended.

For Britain, 8 per cent think of them-selves as either European only or asEuropean plus British. On the otherhand, 62 per cent think of themselves asBritish only and 27 per cent think ofthemselves as British plus European.

For France, 14 per cent think ofthemselves as either European only oras European plus French. On the otherhand, 29 per cent think of themselvesas French only and 54 per cent think ofthemselves as French plus European.

For Germany, 14 per cent think ofthemselves as either European only oras European plus German. On the otherhand, 38 per cent think of themselvesas German only and 46 per cent think ofthemselves as German plus European.

For Italy, 11 per cent think of them-selves as either European only or asEuropean plus Italian. On the otherhand, 28 per cent think of themselves asItalian only and 56 per cent think ofthemselves as Italian plus European.

In short, roughly one out of every tenpeople in the biggest four countries in theEU can be said to privilege Europeanidentity over national identity.

A second explanation also ascribesEurope’s peacefulness to the EU,although it focuses on rules not identity.Europeans, according to this line of


argument, have produced a tightly kniteconomic and political entity – ‘Europe’ –in which the rules discourage thinkingand acting along national lines. There isno room for security competition and waramong the countries in this highly inter-dependent and well-integrated system,simply because they do not have eitherthe inclination or the maneuver room tocause each other trouble. After all, whywould anyone break the rules and starttrouble when the EU is making everyonericher by the year?There are three problems with this

explanation. First, there is no questionthat the EU has done much to fostereconomic growth and to get Europeanstates to surrender some elements oftheir sovereignty and engage instead injoint decision-making. But that processhas begun to break down in recent yearsas economic growth has slowed and EUmembers have shown an increased will-ingness to break the rules. Watchingthe various EU countries respond to thepresent economic crisis, one does nothave the sense that it is a closely knitinstitution. Indeed, most of the countriesoften appear to be acting unilaterally tofurther their own national interest, some-times at the expense of other members.Second, the EU has failed to produce

its own foreign and security policy. Norhas it developed an integrated militaryforce of its own. Instead, the principalinstrument for providing security inEurope is NATO, which is an American-led institution. European integration hasbeen impressive for sure, but not soimpressive that it has stopped its mem-bers from acting like sovereign states.And as we move further and further awayfrom 1989, the ties that bind in thatinstitution look more and more fragile.Finally, Russia is not a member of the

EU, which means that this line of argu-ment about the virtues of rules cannotaccount for the absence of security com-petition between Germany and Russia,

which are not only the two most powerfulstates in Europe, but also have a richhistory of competing with each other inEastern Europe.

The third alternative explanation is thatpeace has broken out because Europe hasdemocratized and – as democratic peacetheory teaches us – democracies do notfight other democracies. I have mydoubts about the explanatory power ofthis particular theory, but even if it is truethat democracies hardly ever fight witheach other, it cannot account for Europe’sremarkable stability over the past 20years. Why? Because Russia is not ademocracy in any meaningful sense ofthat term, which means that democraticpeace theory cannot account for theabsence of conflict between Germanyand Russia over Eastern Europe.

In short, I do not think any of thesealternative explanations are compelling.Peace in Europe in my opinion is duemainly to the fact the United Statescontinues to dominate the security envir-onment on the continent and to a lesserextent by the fact that Europe – which hasbeen Americanized over time – is anxiousto help the United States run the world.

I would like to close with some remarksabout the prospects for maintainingpeace in Europe in the years ahead. It isnot clear where we are headed, but thebest way to think about the future is tofocus on three critical issues. Let me startwith what I think is the least important –the future of the imperial mission, which,for Europeans, means the future of ‘out ofarea’ operations.

I believe that the United States is goingto lose the war in Afghanistan as well asthe war in Iraq. The liberal imperialmission was doomed from the start, andI find it remarkable that so few Americansunderstand this obvious fact.

Furthermore, I believe that mostEuropean countries will pull their troopsout of Afghanistan in the next year or two.And, as I said, the Europeans are already


out of Iraq. The Americans, on the otherhand, will probably remain in Afghanistanand Iraq for many years to come. TheUnited States will do everything it can toforestall defeat in those conflicts, and thatmeans staying there for the long term.Europe’s unhappy experience with

imperial policy will probably be the deathknell for employing NATO ‘out of area’. Itis hard to imagine NATO getting involvedin another Afghanistan anytime soon.More generally, it seems likely thatEurope will have little enthusiasm in theyears ahead for helping the United Statestry to run the world. This reluctance tohelp the world’s self-appointed sheriffwill anger at least some Americans whowill feel that the Europeans have leftthem in the lurch in both Afghanistanand Iraq. And it will not be good for NATO,because failure is rarely good for anyinstitution. It will also cause the Eur-opeans to look inward rather thanoutward, which will not be helpful fortranquility in Europe.The second critical issue before us

concerns the US commitment to Europe.Specifically, what does the future holdfor the American pacifier? This is a hardquestion to answer because the availableevidence does not point clearly in onedirection or another.For the past 70 years, the United States

has cared greatly about three areas ofthe world: Europe, Northeast Asia, andthe Middle East, especially the oil-richPersian Gulf. For sound geo-politicalreasons, Europe has long been the mostimportant of those three regions. Butthat situation is rapidly changing withthe rise of China in Asia and America’sdeep-seated commitment to maintaininga significant military presence in theMiddle East. Europe is probably theleast important of those three regionsfor the United States today, and it is likelyto become less important over time,which is not to say that it will becomeunimportant.

There is another important dimensionto America’s geo-political situation: thestate of the world economy. We are nowundergoing the worst economic crisissince the Great Depression of the 1930s.It appears that we have avoided anotherdepression, but still, the damage to oureconomies has been enormous and it isunlikely that a full recovery will happenanytime soon. Indeed, it looks like therecovery will be slow and painful, and,of course, one can never be sure thatwe won’t go back in the other direction.In this economic environment, the UnitedStates is sure to look for ways to reduce,or at least slow down spending ondefense.

All of this is to say that in the face of anincreasingly powerful China, continuedtrouble in the Middle East, and a slowand painful end to the great recession, itis possible that the United States willleave Europe to concentrate its limitedresources in Asia and the Middle East.

It is also important to note that theUnited States has traditionally acted as anoff-shore balancer in Europe. In otherwords, it has stayed out of Europe unlessthere was a potential hegemon that couldnot be contained by the other Europeangreat powers. The only exception to thatpattern is what has happened since 1989when the United States opted to stay inEurope even though no country threa-tened to dominate the continent. Inshort, America’s present relationship withEurope is highly unusual and, one mightargue, not in the US national interest.

However, there are also good reasonsfor thinking that the United States will

‘I believe that theUnited States is going

to lose the war inAfghanistan as well as

the war in Iraq.’


stay in Europe. Most of the Americanforeign policy establishment remainsdetermined to continue trying to run theworld – despite all our troubles in CentralAsia and the Middle East – and keepingpeace in Europe is high up on the estab-lishment’s agenda. Furthermore, one canmake a strong case that it is in America’snational interest to keep the peace inEurope, although that logic has notalways been compelling in the past.And one can also argue that althoughNortheast Asia and the Middle East arenow strategically more important thanEurope for the United States, the fact isthat Uncle Sam is rich enough that he canmaintain substantial military forces in allthree regions.It is difficult to say how this will turn out

in the long run, although it seems clearthat the United States will remain inEurope over the next decade.This brings me to the third critical

issue – the Russian-Ukrainian relationship– which I think is the greatest potentialsource of trouble in Europe today. Russiadoes not have good relations with Ukraineand there is no reason to expect themto improve in the foreseeable future,especially since Ukraine wants theRussian military to leave the CrimeanPeninsula when its lease expires in 2017,while Russia will surely want to remainthere. NATO has made a bad situationworse by foolishly threatening to bringUkraine into the alliance, a move that theRussians consider threatening to themand therefore unacceptable. I am notarguing that war between Russia andUkraine is likely, but it is not out of thequestion, as Russia’s war with Georgia inAugust 2008 shows. Great powers caredeeply about the security arrangementson their borders, and Russia is no excep-tion in that regard.If there were signs of serious trouble

between Russia and Ukraine, not to men-tion actual fighting, this would have aprofound effect on how the countries in

Eastern Europe and Germany think abouttheir security. It would surely heightentensions between Germany and Russiaand cause Germany to worry aboutfurther Russian moves to increaseits influence in Eastern Europe. Increa-sed security competition would surelybecome the order of the day in EasternEurope.

The nature of that security competition,however, will depend heavily on whetherthe United States remains in Europe andNATO remains intact. If that happens, aclash between Russia and Ukraine shouldnot lead to wider conflict, mainly becausethe American security umbrella wouldextend over the rest of Europe, makingit impossible for the Russians to movefurther westward. And, of course, NATOmembers, to include Germany, couldrely heavily on the United States toprotect them.

But if the American pacifier is not therein the event of trouble between Russiaand Ukraine, not only will the Russianshave less to fear if they expand westward,but the Germans would have to providefor their own security. This would surelyset off an intense security competitionbetween Germany and Russia for controland influence in Eastern Europe. Again,one does not want to underestimate theextent to which great powers care abouttheir border areas.

It would also give Germany cause tothink about acquiring its own nucleardeterrent. Remember, they would nolonger be under the American nuclearumbrella and nuclear weapons are theultimate deterrent. This would create adangerous situation, as the Russianswould have powerful incentives to pre-vent Germany from going nuclear.

This brings me to my bottom line, whichis straightforward. The two most impor-tant factors in determining the futureprospects for peace in Europe are one –whether serious trouble erupts betweenRussia and Ukraine – and two –whether


the United States remains firmly com-mitted to staying in Europe and runningNATO. Obviously, you should hopethat Moscow and Kiev can settle their

differences peacefully, but if they don’t,you should hope that the American paci-fier remains in place so as to prevent evenmore trouble. Thank you.

ReferencesFukuyama, F. (1989) ‘The end of history?’ The National Interest 16(Summer): 3–18.Hartz, L. (1955) The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since

the Revolution, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.Mearsheimer, J.J. (1990a) ‘Back to the future: instability in Europe after the cold war’, International

Security 15(4): 5–56.Mearsheimer, J.J. (1990b) ‘Why we will soon miss the cold war’, The Atlantic 266(2): 35–50.Walker, M., Rosenberg, M. and Dreazen, Y.J. (2009) ‘Germany faces scrutiny over Afghan Airstrike’, Wall

Street Journal, 8 September.

About the Author

John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of PoliticalScience at the University of Chicago. He has written five books, which include: The Tragedyof Great Power Politics (2001), The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy (with Stephen Walt,2007), and Why Leaders Lie (2011).


why is europe peaceful today - john mearsheimer [eps]

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