Why Oh Y ?HS2 -- grand projet, great

delusion or national network ?Jonathan Tyler

Passenger Transport Networks, YORK

Cambridge University Railway Club17 February 2012

How have we got here ?• growth in rail traffic

-- distinct change in trends, with multiple causation-- corporate assumptions of trends continuing-- limited interest in alternative scenarios-- ‘green’ message imperfectly understoodhence momentum for increased capacity

• politics-- Conservative commitment lieu Heathrow runway-- enthusiasm of Labour Transport Secretary-- longstanding LibDem support for public transport

how have we got here ? continued

• engineering opportunity seized by -- people frustrated by more modest projects-- the construction industry

• economic opportunity seized by-- believers in infrastructure as economic driver-- northern cities desperate for regeneration

• other factors-- keeping up with other countries-- railway enthusiasts dreaming of an HSR in Britain-- a polarised debate [more later]

My position• long career dedicated to quality passenger

services(first to quantify link between speed and demand)-- therefore a surprising sceptic about HSR

• reasons:-- this University taught me objective appraisal-- doubts grew as I studied documents, specifically

- the ‘network’ concept- the technical optimism- the environmental arguments- the mega-project phenomenon

A flawed process

• Government need for grand projet• HS2 Ltd too close to Department for Transport• HS2 did not emerge from a national strategy• planning presupposed standards + geography• concern for property rights > secrecy• consultation confused strategy, route-planning

and local considerations – largely ignored anyway

• polarisation : ‘true believers’ versus ‘nimbys’• little independent debate:

silence of the industry / treason of the consultants

So, what are the issues ?• need for a national network strategy• demand forecasts• scale, timescale, costs, economic benefits• routes (Chilterns, M corridors, Heathrow, HS1)• technical specification and operating capacity

• location-specific environmental issues not addressed (ecological, socio-cultural, personal loss only legitimate if overwhelming justification for a project : establish that first without compromised assessment procedure)

A national network strategy• what is railway for ?

-- context : continuous growth … ecological limits -- public service or travel supermarket **-- marginal social cost pricing (all modes), or subsidy-- mode of first choice for all appropriate journeys ?

• principles :-- national standards of service, eg. frequency, speed-- comprehensive connectivity (including other modes)

-- fares system matched to objectives (not so now !)• nb. responsibility for delivery is secondary matter

“Whatever your destination this autumn, you can bag a bargain, giving you more money to spend on nights out or your Christmas shopping. But hurry, this offer ends on Sunday and the numbers of tickets are limited, …”

a national network strategy continued• huge improvements but still uneven quality• no systematic plan to address weaknesses

-- eg. London / non-London variation, mixed-purpose services, missing links, ends of suburban lines, historic anomalies, off-rail places-- not helped by poor data

• model demand with various scenarios, mode splits• then envision an ideal network (compare Swiss)• possible outcomes : a case for extensive HSR /

limited HSR / new non-HSR sections / projects directed at specific timetable improvements

modal-splittargets

national standards of service-qualityand connectivity

modellingroute-specific

demand

organisations,budgets

timetabling,operationsplanning

infrastructureplan

toward an excellent system of public transport

data,scenarios

Demand forecasts• questionable presumption of continuing growth• changes in composition of traffic, public

expectations• surprising acceptance of ‘predict and provide’• no analysis of potential gains elsewhere on

network (lower mode-shares > greater social benefit ?)

• reluctance to question value by journey-purpose• myth of business people doing vital deals• doubts about Virgin’s business model• crowding distorted by fares policy• should we be encouraging long-distance

commuting ?

Scale, timescale, costs, benefits• bold vision – or hubris ?• Birmingham … London not until 2026, full ‘Y’ not

until 2032 : a long time to wait in an uncertain world• risk of cost-escalation or changed circumstances

leaving unfinished project, lost opportunities• high cost of British civil engineering compounded by

large projects (Euston), tunnelling• economic benefits subject of fierce debate (weak

evidence on regional regeneration, absence of strong regional government, arcane value-of-time figures)

• may widen, not narrow, North / South division• as planned will favour select cities, not whole

regions

The routeing arguments• HS2 ‘perfect railway’ : straight, 400 km/h, few

stops• the ‘Y’ is London-centric, serves few cities• not a network, places omitted (Stoke, Coventry)• ambiguity on city-centre or ‘parkway’ stations • Chiltern route (note pull of Heathrow) most

environmentally and politically damaging• routes along Motorway corridors : less damaging

–and would the engineering be that difficult ?• muddled thinking about Heathrow• even more muddled thinking about HS1 link

Specification + operating capacity• maximum speed driven by technical ambition

-- undervalues energy and carbon costs-- prejudices route choices-- marginalises all but largest cities

• assumption of European gauge-- required by EU law (challengeable ?), BUT-- adds engineering cost-- predicates 2 train-types (‘captive’, ‘classic compatible’)

-- complicates station design-- may introduce operational inflexibility

specification + operating capacity continued• HS2 Ltd believes 18 trains / hour feasible, based on

advanced control technology (= >20, with margin)• compare with present maximum anywhere of 15• 18 t/h an act of faith too far ?

-- effect of intermediate stops, diverge/merge moves-- inevitable perturbations, esp. from classic lines-- matters because expectations exceed even 18

• poor integration with existing network• system designed for 400 m trains, but ‘classic

compatibles’ limited to 200 m – unless portion-working introduced (could help capacity)

The convergence problem

Train-paths through a converging junction

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700

seconds from station

km fr

om sta

tion

train 1

train 2

train 3

Trains 1 and 3 non-stop, train 2 starts on ‘slow’ line and converges at c. 2.5 km from station.

The timetable plan for a £32billion project

Frequency of HS2 services under various scenarios [trains / hour]

scenarios

routes Figu

re 7

in U

pdat

ed

Econ

omic

App

raisal

of

the

Y N

etw

ork

aspi

ratio

ns a

nd

idea

l fre

quen

cies

no H

eath

row

or H

S1 s

ervi

ces

with

por

tion

wor

king

rest of Britain <> LONDON Edinburgh 1 1

Glasgow 2

1 1 1

Newcastle ... York 2 1 - 2 - -

Leeds 2 1

Sheffield 2 2

Nottingham

3

2 1

2

Manchester 3 3 - 4 3

Liverpool 2 2 2

other North West - 1 - 2 1

3

Birmingham 3 4 4 4

spare - - - 2

rest of Britain <> HEATHROW Manchester 1 1 -

other North West 1 - 1

Leeds … East Midlands 1 1 -

Birmingham 1 - 1

rest of Britain <> HS1 Scotland 0.5 - -

Newcastle … Leeds 0.5 - -

Manchester 1 -

other North West 0.5 - 1

East Midlands 0.5 -

Birmingham 1 - 1

TOTAL 17 27 – 30 16 16

The implications of constrained capacity

Column 1 : HS2 latest plans * HS1 services omitted

* Birmingham reduced to 3

* commitment to North East

Col. 2 : aspirations

Col. 3 : what could be offered without the Heathrow and HS1 links

Col. 4 : the potential benefits of portion-working (actual frequencies = 2 x trains)

NB. ‘open access’ ignored !

What are the alternative strategies ?• a flexible, incremental approach• for example, for the West Coast Main Line :

-- Pendolino lengthening, more Standard seats-- better operating discipline in peaks-- reform of ticket-pricing policy-- selective infrastructure schemes

• but do in context of a national public transport plan

• new alignments may be justified (not necessarily in WCML corridor) but make socio-economic case first and weigh environmental factors honestly

What now ?

• Government has decided to build• despite the spin the project is not certain• complex Hybrid Bill procedure• opponents will fight bloody battle through

Judicial Review and then Parliament• will distract the rail industry’s attention• dangers of mega-projects with own momentum• compare APT and HST• case for a pause, a national debate, a fresh

start ?• I would rather that than a negative ‘stop’

campaign

Jonathan Tyler

Passenger Transport Networks, YORK

01904 611187

ptn@btconnect.com